MEDIA ITEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-01137R000100120001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 185
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 4, 1986
• Content Type: NSPR

_.. .Approved For Release 2006JL4il~Q?T1C 1- I R~P1 IR~0100
4 April 1986
Prospects for
Reagan-Gorbachev
summit brighten
News items undercut views
of arms control naysayers
By J096
C. Harsch
Three items in the news this week have been of
particular importance to the prospects for another sum-
mit conference and what might happen in superpower
relations at future summits between Ronald Reagan and
Mikhail Gorbachev, if they occur.
Those in the Reagan administration who oppose
arms control agreements with the Soviets, business
with the Soviets, and summits have based their case
mainly on the double contention that the Soviets are
running ahead of the United
States in the arms race and, in
the process, cheating on the
arms control agreements
which exist.
Over the past week the fol-
lowing news items undercut
those major contentions of the
PATTERN
OF
DIPLOMACY
anti-arms control faction in the administration:"
? Recent testimony before congressional committees
shows the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) agreeing substan-
tially that Soviet spending on weapons has been re a-
tivel constant over the last decade and is likely in the
pear future to remain constant and even decline.
? Donald Hicks, undersecretary of defense for re-
search and engineering, submitted an annual report to
Congress on the race in military technology. It showed
the US leading the USSR in the 14 most important areas
of military technology, the US trailing the USSR in none,
and the Soviets trying to catch up, but with little
success. The Soviets have narrowed their disadvantage
in four categories, but are falling further behind in one.
? The CIA has revised its method for calc ating
Soviet nuclear tests. The old method showed the viets
e cheating on the tests. The new met r uces
to b hod
estimates of Soviet yield by 20 rcent and indicates
that the ma not have cheated. News re its sai at
William Casey, the CIA director, approved the down-
ward revision on Jan. 21, over protests from RkTard
Perle, undersecret of defense for international secu-
rity is r. Pere has been the administration's most
active an influential o nent of arms control a ee-
m nts with the Soviets.
These three events strengthen the hands of those in
the administration who favor going ahead with summit
conferences and with efforts to reach new agreements
on arms control with the Soviets. They weaken the
hand of those led by Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger and Mr. Perle, who say that any agreement
with the Soviets would be to the US's disadvantage and
that the Soviets routinely cheat on such agreements.
Mw throe items, togt'tbe tMprove the kchk1tee ;that,
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WASHINGTON POST
_Approved For Relea?ep?-9Q6/91/9? g CIA-RE
New CIA Calculations Cast Doubt
On Test Ban Violations by Soviets
By Don Oberdorfer
W.,-hingtan Post Staff Wntcr
The Central Intelligence Agency
has revised its calculations of Soviet
-indergroun nut ear tests in a wav
that adds new uncertainty_ to
char es that Moscow probably vi-
olated a 1974 arms control agree-
ment, administration ottiCialS Said
vesfei y.
The changes in U.S. measure-
ments of Soviet nuclear tests are a
result of advances in seismology
ind improvements in assessing the
"differences in geology between U.S.
tst sites and those of the Soviet
Umion, an official said. Beyond the
dense technicalities involved, the is-
sue has major political repercus-
sions in view of sharply contested
administration charges of Soviet
cheating on nuclear test limits and
other obligations.
Some officials said yesterday that
even under the new calculations it
Ja likely that severs Soviet tests
nave gone over the limit ot 15Q -ki-
lotons accepted in the 197
ireshold Test Ban Treaty. Other
officials said there was already
doubt among overnment and non-
goVernment scientists that the So-
viets violated the limits and that the
C A adjustment makes it even hard-
er to draw suc a conclusion.
he 074- treaty, concluded by
the Nixon administration, has never
been ratified by the United States.
As with other unratified agree-
nients, both sides have accepted an
obligation not to undercut it.
Officials of several U.S. agencies
said the CIA revision which took
effect in Januarresulted from rec-
ommendations last fad separate
scient is panels on Soviet test mea-
surements under the sponsorship of
two Defense a rtment organi-
zations, the Advanced Research
Pro'ects Agency and the A7r Force
Technics Applications Center.
The change also followed the rec-
ommendations last December
interagency panel, the Joint Atomic
Energy me igence ommittee. to
alter previous formulas for cal-
culating the size of Soviet tests. De-
fense officials said the key vote in
this panel was 5 to 3, with the De-
fense Intelligence A ge e n c ai E o her agencies dissenting.
White House spokesman Larry
Speakes said in Santa Barbara, fol-
lowing the first report of the change
in yesterday's New York Times.
"We haven't changed our method
for estimating yields of Soviet tests.
As a part of the verification pro-
cess, we are constantly refining our
techniques to improve our under-
standing of Soviet testing activi-
ties."
Other officials explained that
while the "method" of estimation
has not changed, the mathematical
multipliers by which that Method is
a lied have been changed at the
order o IA Director William J.
&'We haven't
changed our method
for estimating yields
of Soviet tests."
- Larry Speaker,
White House spokesman
Casey. The result is to lower the
"central value" or main estimate of
v4jjgus Soviet tests as measured
from afar by the United States by
an averay-e-of about 20 percent.
The margin for error in such cal-
culations remains large, however. If
the "central value" of a Soviet test
is 200 kilotons (the equivalent of
200,000 tons of TNT), the accept-
ed margin for error would permit
the test to be judged as low as 100
kilotons or as high as 400 kilotons,
officials said.
Uncertainty about the power of
nuclear explosions and the ways of
measuring them was so great, even
at the time the treaty was signed,
that both sides agreed to allow one
or two unintentional breaches per
year of the 150-kiloton limit.
Assistant Defense Secretary
Richard N. Perle said that 10 or 11
Soviet underground tests previous-
ly estimated to have exceeded the
agreed U.S.-Soviet limit of 150 ki-
lotons would be reduced to six or
seven under the mathematics of the
new directive.
While fewer tests turn out to be
violations under the new calcula-
tions. Perle said, there should be
greater confidence that those re-
maining were actually above the
agreed limits.
Kenneth L. Adelman, director of
the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, said the report to Congress
that "a number of [Soviet] tests
.constitute a likely violation" of the
limit remains valid. Adelman said
'.the level of uncertainty" about the
measurements remains very high,
which is why the administration is
asking the Soviets to accept on-site
inspection and other improvements
in verification.
Rep. Thomas J. Downey (D-
ti.Y.), an advocate of nuclear dis-
armament, said, "There is ample
reason to believe that the Soviet
Union has not violated the 150-ki-
loton limit" based on the newly ap-
proved factors. "My understanding
is that there are three reports by
panels of scientists that suggest the
United States has grossly overes-
timated the yield of Soviet explo-
sions in the past."
The new U.S. calculations will be
employed when the Soviet Union
resumes underground nuclear tests,
after abstaining since last August.
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev
said last Saturday that tests will be-
gin following the next U.S. under-
ground test, which is expected to
take place next week.
The Times report said President
Reagan signed a directive ordering
a report on how the new calcula-
tions would reflect on past U.S.
charges of Soviet violations.
The debate over U.S. estimation of
Soviet nuclear tests has led to antag-
onism between scientists, especially
seismologists, and the Reagan admin-
istration. Seismologists have accused
administration officials of subordinat-
ing technical judgments to political
ideology in attacks on the Soviets for
nuclear testing, while administration
officials have accused seismologists
of being willing and even eager to ac-
cept the most comfortable assump-
tions about Soviet activity in the nu-
clear field.
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3 April 1986
U.S. revises method of
measuring Soviet nuclear tests
-rom Inquirer Wire Services
WASHINGTON - The Reagan ad-
ministration has revised the way it
measures Soviet underground nu-
clear test explosions, and the new,
method indicates that fewer of the:
tests have violated a 1974 treaty with
the United States than had been
charged, according to a high-level
U.S. official.
The change had been urged by the
CIA, the official told the Associated
Press, and involved the interpreta-
tion of the force of the tests through
seismologic data.
The official, who insisted on ano-
nymity, said any measurement
method involving seismology has
consioerable room for error.
The White House, through spokes-
man- Larry Speakes, denied that
there had been a change and said the
administration still believed the So-
viet Union had repeatedly violated
the treaty. .
"We haven't changed our method
for estimating yields of Soviet tests.
As a part of the verification process,
we are constantly refining our tech-
niques in an effort to improve our
understanding of Soviet testing ac-
tivities," Speakes said in Santa Bar-
bara, Calif.
The high-level official who said
there was room for error in seismic
measurements said that was pre-
cisely why President Reagan invited
Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev
to send observers to the test site in
the Nevada desert. The observers
then could make on-site use of new
technology to see that the United
States was complying with the treaty,
he said.
The Reagan administration has in-
sisted on improved methods of veri-
fying the yield of nuclear tests be-
fore it will ask the Senate to ratify
the 1974 pact and another limited
test ban treaty signed in. 1975.
The 1974 agreement, the Threshold
Test Ban Treaty, limits underground
weapons-test explosions by both na-
tions to 150 kilotons, about 11 times
the force of the U.S. atomic bomb
that devastated Hiroshima at the end
of World War II.
The Reagan administration has ac-
cused the Soviets of flouting the 1974
treaty and other accords.
The official said that even apply-
ing the new CIA approach retroac-
tively, a number of tests at Semipala-
tinsk, the Soviet test site, were
greater than 150 kilotons and would
still be considered to be in violation.
The New York Times yesterday
quoted administration officials as
saying the change was made Jan. 21
by CIA Director William J. Casey
even though some Defense Depart-
ment officials objected to it.
The new procedure will lower esti-
mates of the yield of Soviet nuclear
tests by 20 percent, the newspaper
quoted experts as saying.
The Times said administration ex-
perts it had interviewed were divid-
ed about whether the administration
should now drop its allegations
against the Soviet Union that it had
violated the treaty.
Officials interview by United Press
International noted that the CIA was
only one of a half-dozen agencies
responsible for verifying Soviet com-
pliance with treaties and that a
change at the CIA might not amount
to a complete change in policy. .
Officials told the Times that the
new estimating procedure would be
applied to the next Soviet test.- The
Soviet Union has not held a nuclear
test since last summer, when it de-
clared a unilateral moratorium on
tests and asked the United States to
join in a total test ban.
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WASHINGTON TIMES
3 April 1986
Change in U.S. monitoring
lowers Soviet test violations
FROM COMBINED DISPATCHES
A change in the way the United States mea-
sures Soviet underground nuclear test explo-
sions indicates fewer of them have violated a
1974 treaty than had been charged, a high-
level U.S. official said today.
The change was approved by the CIA, the
official said, and involves the interpretation of
the force of the tests through seismologic
data.
Because the main Soviet test site at
Semipalatinsk in Central Asia is older and
more stable geologically than the U.S. test site
in the Nevada desert, scientists say Soviet
explosions produce a larger sound wave
through the earth than U.S. tests of the same
size.
While the United States has long adjusted
its intelligence estimates of Soviet tests to
account for this, experts question whether the
adjustment factor has been large enough. The
matter has been under study for years.
A story in The New York Times yesterday
quoted administration officials as saying the
change was made Jan. 21 by CIA Director
William Casey, despite objections from Pen-
tagon officials. Richard Perle, assistant sec-
retary of defense for international security
policy, argued that the issue needed more
study.
Experts familiar with the change say it will
lower estimates of the yield of Soviet tests by
about 20 percent-
The high-level official, who insisted on ano-
nymity, said any measurement method involv-
ing seismology has considerable room for er-
ror.
He said that is why President Reagan has
invited Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to
send observers to the U.S. test site to make
on-site use of new technology.
The Threshold Test Ban Treaty limits un-
derground weapons-test explosions on both
sides to 150 kilotons, about 11 times the force
of the U.S. atomic bomb that devastated Hiro-
shima toward the end of World War II. Al-
though the Senate has never ratified the
treaty, the U.S. government is complying with
its provisions.
The Reagan administration has accused
the Soviets of flouting the 1974 treaty and
other accords. It has urged the Soviets to
tighten verification procedures.
Before Mr. Casey made his decision, Mr.
Reagan had ordered a report on how the
change would affect administration concerns
about Soviet violations, administration offi-
cials said. The report remains incomplete.
The high-level official said that even with
the new CIA approach, a number of tests con-
ducted by the Soviets were greater than 150
kilotons and still would be considered to be in
violation.
U.S. accusations of Soviet arms-tral to U.S.-
Soviet relations, with no significant progress
occurring in this area since the November
summit meeting between Mr. Reagan and Mr.
Gorbachev.
Officials told the Times the new estimating
procedure would be applied to the next Soviet
test. The Soviet Union has not held a nuclear
test since last summer, when it declared a
unilateral moratorium on tests and asked the
United States to join in a total test ban.
Asked for comment on the new procedure,
CIA spokeswoman Kathy Pherson said, "We
wouldn't have anything to say on that one way
or the other."
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 NEW YORK TIMES
Approved For Release 2006/01 At3i:1CIA $P94
C.I.A. CHANGES WAY
' THAT IT MEASURES
SOVIET ATOM TESTS
U.S. CHARGES QUESTIONED
Readings Will Be Lower and
Officials Debate Issue of
Past Russian Cheating
By MICHAEL R. GORDON
Special to The New York Tlmn
WASHINGTON, April 1 - The Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency has changed
its procedures for estimating the yield
of large Soviet nuclear tests because it
has decided its previous estimates
were too high, Reagan Administration
officials said today.
The officials said the decision to use
the new method was made in January
by William J. Casey, the Director of
Central Intelligence, despite objections
from some Defense Department offi-
cials.
Reagan Requests a Report
The C.I.A. decision has raised quest
tions about past Administration asser-
tions that the Soviet Union had prob-
ably violated the Threshold Test Ban
Treaty of 1974, which limits under-
ground tests to no more than 150 kilo-
tons.
Before the C.I.A. decision was made,.
President Reagan ordered a report on
how the change would affect Adminis-
tration concerns about Soviet Union
violations, the Administration officials
said. That report has not yet been com-
pleted.
Mr. Casey formally approved the
change on Jan. 21, officials said. Ex-
perts familiar with the change say it
will lower estimates of the yield of
Soviet tests by about 20 percent.
No White House Comment
Richard N. Perle, the Assistant Sec.
retary of Defense for International Se-
curity Policy, reportedly opposed
adopting the recommendations and
argued that the issue needed more
study. Mr. Perle declined to discuss the
issue.
Edward P. Djerejian, a White House
spokesman, said the White House had
no comment at this time on the decisonl
and its implications:
Administration experts, who asked,
not to be identified, were divided about
whether the change should lead the Ad-
ministration to drop its allegatkm
against the Soviet Union.
The accusations of Soviet arms con-
trol violations has become a central
issue in United States-Soviet relations.
No significant progress has been made
in this area since the November sum-
mit meeting President Reagan and Mi-
khail S. Gorbachev, the Soviet leader.
Dellberationa Over Treaty
The Reagan Administration is cur-
rently deliberating over what actions to
take in response to reported arms con-
.trol violations and in considering
whether to modify its commitment not
to undercut the 1979 Strategic Arms
Limitations Treaty.
The Administration has said that
many of the Soviet tests had "likely"
violated the threshold treaty, which
stipulates that the size of warheads
being tested should not exceed 150 kilo-
tons, equal to the explosive force of
150,000 tons of TNT. The Soviet Union
has denied violating the treaty.
But Administration and nongovern
mental experts have long questioned
the accuracy of the intelligence esti-
mates on which those charges were
based.
The debate has centered on the seis-
mological procedures for assessing the
yield of nuclear tests. The main Soviet
test site at Semipalatinsk in Central
Asia is older and more geologically
stable than the site in Nevada where
the United States conducts its tests.
Larger Wave Is Produced
Scientists say Soviet explosions
produce a larger sound wave through
the earth than American tests of the
same size.
While Government intelligence esti-
mates of Soviet tests have long been ad-
justed to take this into account, experts
have questioned whether the adjust-
ment factor was large enough.
Officials said the question of chang-
ing the United States estimating proce- I
dure has been under review and study
for years
New Studies Come to Light
The issue came to the fore again last
year after several new studies.
Last Oct. 18, a panel of scientists se-
lected by the Defense Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency prepared a
classified report that concluded that
Government's method for estimating
the yield of Soviet explosions was based
on faulty assumptions.
The eight-member panel recom-
mended a change in procedures that.
would lower the estimates.
The panel's report was submitted in
late October to the Joint Atomic
Energy Intelligence Committee, which
issues reports on the size of foreign nu-
clear explosions. The committee is
made up of members from the military
services and intelligence m
Second Stody Adds Sq*wt
Adding support to the scientists'
recommendation was a separate study,,
also completed in October, that was
overseen by the Air.. Force Technical'
Applications Center, which operates a
system of seismic stations to monitor
Soviet tests. This study agreed with the
finding of the military research agency
report.
On Dec. 17, the Joint Atomic Energy
Intelligence Committee recommended
that the C.I.A. adopt the advice in the
report commissioned by the research
agency. Officials said the Defense In-
telligence Agency disagreed, but was
overruled.
The new C.I.A. procedure will be
used to estimate the size of explosions
in the Shagan River area of Semipala-
tinsk, where the Soviet Union conducts
its largest nuclear tests. Officials said
they expected the new estimating
procedure to be applied to the next
Soviet test in this area. The Soviet
Union has not held a nuclear test since
last summer, when it declared a unilat-
eral moratorium on tests and asked the
United States to join in a total test ban.
What the new procedure means
about past Administration allegations.
about Soviet cheating is unclear.
Reagan Signs Directive
At the time the Administration pre-
pared its report to Congress charging
Soviet arms control violations, Presi-
dent Reagan signed a National Se-
curity Decision Directive, NSDD-202,
that asked for a report on how the new
method would reflect on past United
States charges of violations by the
Soviet Union.
This is the report that has not been
completed, and officials are divided.
about whether the Russians have been
violating the treaty.
Officials said applying the new
method retroactively would still leave
about a dozen Soviet tests that appear
to be above the limit, although one offi-
cial said that three or four of these ex-
ceeded the limit enough to warrant spe-
cial concern.
The new procedure also suggests
j that the largest Soviet blast since the
signing of the threshold treaty In 1974
was no higher than 250 kilotons. The
Administration has previously said
that the Soviet Union has conducted a
test that was greater than 300 kilotons.
Violations Still 'Likely'
One Administration official said the
new data still point "in the direction of
a likely violation" and noted that the
Administration qualified its charges
against the Soviet Union.
But another official said the change
in the estimating procedure would sig- 1
nificantly undercut the charges.
He said that given the uncertainty in-
volved in seismic measurements, it
was usual to expect some Soviet tests to
appear to exceed the 150-kiloton limit.
He added that some American tests
that are under that limit may also ap-
pear to the Soviets to exceed the limit.
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ART r1 r APPEARED
ON PA 511E 2ZA
BALTIMORE SUN
2 April 1986
CIA is said to have overrated
yields of Soviet nuclear tests
WASHINGTON - The Central
Intelligence Agency has changed its
procedures for estimating the yield of
large Soviet nuclear tests because it
has decided its previous estimates
were too high, Reagan administra-
tion officials said yesterday.
The officials said the decision to
use the new method was made In
January by William J. Casey, direc-
tor of the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy, despite objections from some De-
fense Department officials.
The CIA decision has raised ques-
tions about past administration as-
sertions that the Soviet Union had
probably violated the Threshold Test
Ban Treaty of 1974.
Mr. Casey formally approved the
change Jan. 21. officials said.
Administration experts, who
asked not to be identified, were di-
vided about whether the change
should lead the administration to
drop its allegations against the Sovi-
et Union.
The accusations of Soviet arms-
control violations have become a
central issue in U.S.-Soviet relations.
The Reagan administration is de-
liberating what actions to take in re-
sponse to reported arms-control vio-
lations and In considering whether
to modify its commitment not to un-
dercut the 1979 Strategic Arms Lim-
itations Treaty.
The administration has said that
many of the Soviet tests had "likely"
violated the threshold treaty, which
stipulates that the size of warheads
being tested should not exceed 150
kilotons. equal to the explosive force
of 150,000 tons of TNT.
The Soviet Union has denied vio-
lating the treaty.
But administration and non-gov-
ernmental experts have long.ques-
tioned the accuracy of the intelli-
gence estimates on which those
charges were based.
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BOSTON GLOBE
1 April 1986
CIA lowers Soviet nuclear test
estimates
By William Beecher
Globe Staff
WASHINGTON - The Central
Intelligence Agency decided re-
cently to lower by about 20 per-
t cent the seismic formula used to
estimate the yields of Soviet un-
derground nuclear tests, accord-
Ing to administration officials.
The result is that some.Russian
tests once thought to have violat-
ed the 150-kiloton ceiling estab-
lished by the unratified Threshold
Test Ban treaty of 1974 are now
believed to have been proper.
But. officials say, even under
the new CIA-approved formula.
anywhere from six to 20 tests are
still believed to have been likely
violations.
The decision to change the for-
mula, taken by William Casey. the
director of central intelligence,
after a split vote in the intelligence
community. was based on three
separate studies but is being critl-
cized within the bureaucracy by
some senior officials of the De-
fense Department and the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agen-
cy. The sources said President
Reagan recently ordered a new in-
teragency study to "clean up this
mess" by considering nonseismic
as well as seismic methods of im-
proving the estimating process.
The issue has potential politi-
cal implications because the Unit-
ed States continues to insist it
needs an agreement on on-site
monitoring of nuclear tests before
submitting to the Senate for ratift-
ation both the 1974 treaty and
the companion Peaceful Nuclear
Explosions treaty of 1976.
Officials say the Soviet demand
for a total nuclear test ban and a
US counter-suggestion that a steF
be taken first on the two earlier
treaties are expected to be on the
agenda when - Soviet Ambassador
Anatoll Dobrvnin returns tc
Washington for farewell talks
with the president and Secretary
of State George P. Shultz.
Dobrvnin Is expected to return
Friday for about a week before go-
ing back to Moscow to take up his
new foreign policy duties in the
Secretariat of the powerful Cen-
tral Committee. it is understood.
He is also expected to fix a date,
either in July or more likely De-
cember. for a Washington summit
meeting between Reagan and Mik-
hail S. Gorbachev, the Soviet lead-
er. and to confirm whether For-
eign Minister Eduard Shevard-
nadze is prepared for another
round of talks with Shultz here
this month.
The yield of Soviet under-
ground nuclear tests has been a
matter of heated dispute for more
than a decade. American seismo-
logical estimates. which are an ex-
trapolation from US experiences
at the Nevada test site. have been
lowered three or four times since
1974 - by a total of 60 percent -
as seismologists have refined their
calculations.
Because Americans can't mon-
itor the tests on-site, they estimate
the size of the Soviet blast based
on underground shock waves and
surface waves, compare these to
waves produced by US tests in Ne-
vada and reach a conclusion
about how many kilotons the
blast was.
But critics of this approach
have pointed out that extrapola-
tions based on surface and sub-
surface readings from the soft
sediment in Nevada have not
yielded the same results when ap-
plied to tests in the hard rock of
Soviet test sites.
This is a major reason, they
contend, that the administration
has called for calibration mea-
surements at Soviet test centers,
with the Russians having the
same access at US sites. Reagan
recently offered to have Soviet spe-
cialists come to Nevada to try out
a new yield monitoring device dur-
ing a test shot late this month.
Moscow has declined, saying it
is not Interested in monitoring a
continuation of tests but In join-
Ing a total moratorium.
Sources in-several agencies
provided the following account of
the internal policy debate:
When Casey, more than a Year
ago, notified officials he was pre-
pared to lower the formula for esti-
mating test yields once again, in-
ternal protests led to the conven-
ing of three special panels: one b%-
the Air Force Technical Analvsi_
Center, another by the Defense
Advanced Research Projects At~er.-
cy and a third by the Defense In-
telligence Agency.
The first two panels recom
mended a downward revision, as
urged by Casey. The DIA panel.
while concurring in the recom-
mendation because seismic sci-
ence is more advanced than alter-
native approaches, called for more
research into nonseismic analy-
sis. such as aerial photos of earth
cratering caused by underground
explosions.
Casey then convened the Joint
Atomic Energy Intelligence Com-
mittee. consisting of intelligence
specialists from the CIA,. the DiA.
the 11'z- h - r'a' ,- _-_ ity Agency, the
State Department's Bureau of In-
telligence and Research, the De-
partment of Energy and the intel-
ligence arms of the Army. Navy
and Air Force- By a vote of 5 to 3,
the committee voted for the down-
ward revision. It was after that re-
sult that the White House ordered
a new interagency study to come
up with a fresh look.
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137ROO01
f, i 1 CL`s r1.Q7(51R~ 1)
2 April 1986
Measuring Soviet Tests:
U.S. Methods Questioned
WASHINGTON, April 1 - Ad-
ministration experts as well as
those outside the Government
have long questioned Administra-
tion estimates of the yield of
Soviet underground nuclear tests.
At the heart of the debate are
the seismological procedures for
assessing the yield of Soviet nu-
clear tests. Under new procedures
chosen by the Central Intelligence
Agency, the estimates of, yields
from Soviet nuclear blasts would
be about 20 percent less than
under previous procedures. -
Experts note that the geology of
the main Soviet test site at Semi-
palatinsk in Central Asia is unlike
the Nevada test site where the
United States conducts its nuclear
tests.
Geologically Stable Area
The Soviet test site is in an area
that is described by scientists as a
more geologically stable region
that is older and cooler than the
American site. The Nevada test
site is described as a more vol-
canic region, and some of the
rocks below it are partly molten.
Experts say seismic signals
travel better at the Seminpala-
tinsk test site. As a result, an ex-
plosion at the 'Soviet site would
produce a larger discernible seis-
mic wave than an American test
of the same yield at the Nevada
site.
The differences between the
two test sites have long been
known, and Government intelli-
gence assessments have tried to
take the difference into account
by introducing a corrective factor
into the calculations.
But experts have questioned
whether the corrective factor was
large enough. Despite these un-
certainties, a classified study by
the Defense Intelligence Agency
concluded last year that seismic
readings were still the most reli-
able method of assessing the yield
of Soviet underground nuclear
tests.
Several Approaches
Experts have said the recom-
mendations to change the Govern-
ment's estimating procedure, put
forth by a panel of eight scientists
chosen by the Defense Advanced
Research Project Agency, were
based on several different ap-
proaches to the problem of seis-
mic measurement.
For example, scientists studied
measurements taken at a Cana-
dian site that is thought to have a
geology similar to the Central
Asian part of the Soviet Union,
and they examined a 1965 nuclear
explosion by the Soviet Union at a
dam site in the region of the Cen-
tral Asia test site.
They also. studied different
types of surface waves that travel
in the upper layers of the earth.
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 Y
XAPIE
ON PAGE
Release 2 0tI (: >IIEDP90-01137R0001001 0001-5
4+ March 1986
What Defense-Spending Gap?
By Franklyn D. Holzman
MEDFORD, Mass. - President
Reagan is again asking for more mill-
tary spending, and, as before, he
partly bases his case on an overstate-
ment of Soviet military outlays.
When he said Thursday in his tele-
vision address that the Soviet Union
had invested V00 billion more in its
military than the United states had
since 1970, he was playing the same
tune he played in February 1981,
when he said, "Since 1970, the Soviet
Union has invested $300 billion more
in its military forces than we have."
In March 1981, -the Central Intelli-
gence Agency updated this estimate
to $420 billion. But a proper account-
ing and interpretation of both sides'
military outlays indicates that, in
fact, the west outspent the pastern
bloc by $740 billion from 1971 through
1980. Actually, Mr. Reagan was off by
more than $1 trillion. Let me explain.
The C.I.A. makes many economic
comparisons of the two superpowers,
calculating its estimates in dollar and
ruble prices. Its comparisons are al-
most always presented, properly, as an
average, for dollar comparisons exag-
gerate Soviet outlays and ruble com-
parisons exaggerate ours, partly be-
cause of wide differences in prices be-
tween the countries. However, the
C.I.A.'s comparison of military outlays
remains a glaring exception to its
standard practice. While a ruble esti-
mate is calculated and the figure is
made public, no dollar-ruble average is
presented. Press releases, hearings
and media coverage ignore it and con-
centrate on the - dollar comparison.
This exaggerates Soviet military
Franklyn D. Holzman. professor of
economics at Tufts University and a
fellow at the Russian Research
Center, at Harvard University,
is author of "Financial Checks.on
Soviet Defense Expenditures."
spending relative to ours - as the
C.I.A. often has admitted.
An adjustment for this exaggera-
tion reduces the $420 billion-gap" by
$100 billion.
Second, the C.I.A. said in 1984 that
it had overestimated Moscow's 1978?
to-1962 military spending by assum-
ing a 3 pert to 5 percent annual
growth rate in that spending when in
fact it had been only 2 percent.
Deduct $80 billion more from the
?, Third, in comparing outlays, the
Pentagon has subtracted money
spent an our Vietnam War effort from
our total, on the sound basis that the
C.I.A. data on
Soviet costs
are befogged
war was not part of our confrontation
with the Soviet Union Similarly, we
should not calculate the Soviet Union's
outlays for its problem with China, for
they are not part of the Soviet confron-
tation with us. Moscow might ask. How
much more would Mr. Reagan be
spending if a million-man Chinese
Army was poised on America's border
and there were a billion people just be-
hind that army? Various C.I.A. and
Pentagon estimates suggest that 15 per-
cent to 20 percent of Soviet military
spending has been directed at China.
Subtract 3230 billion --15 percent of
Moscow's 10-year total military
spending of $1.530 trillion - from the
C.I.A.'s $420 billion "gap."
These three revisions leave the
United States with an adjusted 10-
year difference of about $60 billion --
a trivial sum over a decade.
Fourth, the purveyors of the "gap"
dogma pretend the world consists of
two superpowers. But America is
joined by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization; the Soviet Union har-
nesses six countries in the Warsaw
Pact. NATO's other 15 members in-
clude most of the industrial democra-
cies, and three of them --- Britain.
West Germany and France - each
spends more on weapons annually
than all six smaller Warsaw Pact
countries do together.
Over the 10-year period ending in
1980 NATO, excluding the United
States, outspent the Warsaw Pact, ex-
cluding the Soviet Union, by $800 bil-
lion. Subtracting from this amount
the $60 billion by which the Soviet
Union outspent America results in an
overall NATO-Warsaw Pact gap of
$740 billion - in our favor.
To summarize, in 1981 the Reagan
Administration wound up claiming
the Soviet Union had outspent the
United States by $420 billion from 1971
through 1980. In fact, all NATO mem-
bers outspent all Warsaw Pact mem-
bers by $740 billion. This difference
(from a negative $420 billion "gap" to
a positive $740 billion gap) adds up to
$1.16 trillion - what might be called
the Reagan misinformation gap.
Moreover, an adjusted American-
Soviet 10-year gap of $60 billion was
trivial when we consider how far be-
hind us in military strength the Rus-
sians were in 1970. Further, President
Reagan's $80 billion addition to the
supposed 1971-1980 gap (when he ele-
vated it last Thursday to $500 billion
from $420 billion) is more than neu-
tralized by Soviet outlays directed
against China since 1980.
In evaluating the President's new
defense budget requests, Congress
should take these disparities into con-
sideration. If, indeed, the Soviet
Union and its Warsaw Pact allies are
catching up, then the Pentagon and
its NATO counterparts cannot be
making very good use of the funds
they have been allocated. ^
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 V
Apkegv;@ F A~se 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP90-01137R0001
WASHINGTON TIMES
19 December 1985
NATO set to act on technology
leakage
By Walter Andrews
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
NATO defense ministers for the
first time have agreed to cooperate
to stem the flow of advanced West-
ern military technology to the com-
munist Warsaw Pact nations,
source's said yesterday.
The sources said agreement
reached last week in Paris was the
culmination of four years of effort by
U.S. negotiators to gain the help of
the European defense ministers
within the framework of the mul-
tilateral coordinating committee on
trade - the co-called COCOM.
The ministers have cooperated
before on an informal basis, the
sources said. But last week's
agreement marked the first time
they agreed to gyrate formally
"in an institutional sense" for overall
control of technology exports
through COCOM.
COCOM, which is made up of the
United States, NATO countries and
Japan, controls exports to the Soviet
Union and its allies. Pentagon offi-
cials have complained for years that
the committee was not strict enough
in limiting exports of advanced tech-
nology with military value.
This technology leakage has been
a major deterrent to joint develop-
ment of weapons by the United
States and its European allies.
CIA estimates show that NATO
s ends more on defense than the
Warsaw Pact but gets fewer we - -
ons for it. Earlier this year House
Armed Services Committee
an Re . Les As in Wiscon-
sin Democrat said the estimates
raised the question of whether the
Soviet block countries are more ef-
ficient or just build lower uality
wea ons.
In a September Pentagon report
on military technology exports, De-
fense Secretary Caspar Weinberger
warned that Soviet efforts to obtain
Western technology "are far greater
than previously believed" and have
helped produce Soviet jet fighters,
space-based chemical laser weapons
and a reusable space shuttle.
The first indication of the new
agreement came in a speech yester-
day by Deputy Defense Secretary
William Howard Taft IV to the
Georgetown Center for Strategic
and International Studies.
"The Allied record in the last sev-
eral months is a good indication of
our commitment to stemming the
tide of technology to the Warsaw
Pact. Technology security does not
preclude [NATO weapons develop-
ment] cooperation, but must pre-
cede it;' Mr. Taft said.
Asked to elaborate after his
speech, Mr. Taft said the Pentagon
had been working with the multilat-
eral coordinating committee on
trade over the past four months on
the military effects of leaked tech-
nology.
"They're [COCOM] having some
meetings. I can't go into it in too
much detail because the negoti-
ations are still going on. But we have
made some very good steps;' he said.
Other sources said the Allied de-
fense ministers agreed last week
during negotiations in Paris to work
within the framework of COCOM.
Mr. Thft said NATO cooperation
on the design and purchase of weap-
ons is urgent because, while the
need for defense spending contin-
ues, pressure for budget cuts is in-
creasing.
"NATO is on the verge of a new
era of cooperation that offers a
chance for more efficient use of
each nation's vital research and de-
velopment resources;' he said.
Mr. Taft said cooperation bet xeen
the United States and its allies is
needed particularly in areas where
NATO is deficient - anti-aircraft
weapons; the ability to strike enemy
forces being moved forward as rein-
forcements; anti-submarine war-
fare; and communications systems
secure from eavesdropping.
Technology security is the
toughest issue facing NATO, he said.
"We cannot afford to allow vital mili-
tary technologies to be compro-
mised, nullifying any advantage the
alliance may gain from cooperative
research and development. I believe,
however, that we can overcome this
concern:'
Mr. Taft said another concern is
political interference in the
awarding of contracts to various
NATO nations for joint development
efforts, an apparent reference to the
pressure Great Britain exerted on
behalf of an English company for the
U.S. Army's $4.5 billion contract for
a new field communications system.
The selection of a French com-
pany instead proves "that cooperat-
ive development decisions can be
made solely on military and effi-
ciency criteria even in a highly
charged political climate;' he said.
The deputy secretary said there
are some concerns that need to be
addressed, such as the worry of U.S.
companies that they will be subsidiz-
ing competition and the possibility
that joint ventures could lead to the
formation of cartels.
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 pproved For Rele S4 9I1W pq RDP90-0113
9 September 1985
Chemical
Anus Curbs
Are Sought
Officials Alarmed
By Increasing Use
Of Banned Weapons
By Don Oberdorfer
watl*glm %a staff writer
The dirty yellow cloud of poison-
ous gas has supplanted the atom's
mushroom cloud as a symbol of the
most pressing proliferation danger
facing the world, in the view of gov-
ernment officials from the United
States and several other countries.
While no nation has joined the A-
bomb club since India conducted a
nuclear test in 1974, the deadly
chemicals known as "the poor man's
atomic bomb" have been repeatedly
used in warfare in the 1980s, and in
ways that experts fear may pro-
mote their further use.
In an effort to stem the tide, of-
ficials and chemical specialists from
the United States and chemically
advanced Western European and
Asian countries held an unpubli-
cized meeting for several days last
week in Brussels, under the lead-
ership of Australia, to discuss ways
to prevent the production and use
of chemical weapons from spread-
ing to additional countries. This was
the second meeting since June of
this group, whose existence is so
sensitive with some governments
that it has not been given a name.
Secretary of State George P.
Shultz said earlier this year that the
United States thinks that at least 13
nations have chemical weapons,
compared with five in 1963, and
that additional nations are trying to
get them.
"The sad fact," Shultz said, "is
that a half century of widely accept.
ed international restraint on the use
or development of chemical weap-
ons is in danger of breaking down."
Other U.S. officials have said that
at least 15 countries belong to the
"chemical weapons club."
"Proliferation is an enormous
problem," said a senior State De-
partment official who has been
deeply involved in low-key U.S. ef-
forts to limit them. "I'm afraid that
the number [of chemical weapons
nations] could double in the next
decade."
Since Iraq used mustard gas and
nerve gas against Iranian troops in
early 1984 and again this year, con-
cern has mounted, generating U.S.
interagency studies, chemical-ex-
port controls and unpublicized in.
ternational meetings with American,
allies to consider joint actions.
The most acute worry is that a
future Iranian offensive will trigger
another Iraqi poison gas attack and
that, in retaliation, major Iranian
gas attacks will be launched on the
battlefield or against civilian tar-
gets. Such an exchange would be
the first time since World War I
that both sides have used chemical
weapons in a war.
Officials are also concerned that
if Iran uses chemical weapons it
might also supply poison gas to ter-
rorist groups.
Recent U.S. and international
discussions have covered such
items as restricting shipments of
"precursor chemicals" that could be
used in chemical weapons and cre-
ating "trigger lists" of chemicals
whose acquisition should set off
alarms in world capitals. The anti-
proliferation program in the chem-
ical-weapons field is in its infancy,
however, compared with the exten-
sive international drive to halt the
spread of nuclear weapons.
"Unless we in the West and oth-
ers get our act together soon to
stop the spread of chemical weap-
ons, we will pass up a good oppor-
tunity," said Kenneth L. Adelman,
director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency. "We can pos-
sibly nip this looming threat early,
before chemical weapons become as
commonplace as hand grenades in
Third World armies."
Prof. Joseph Nye of Harvard Uni-
versity, who served from 1977 to
1979 as the key U.S. negotiator in
creating a "suppliers' group" of ad-
vanced nations working together
against nuclear weapons prolifer-
ation, said that the drive against
chemical weapons is "not even as
far along" and that it faces consid-
erably more difficult problems.
Nye said it is more difficult to
obtain a broad political consensus
against chemical weapons, which
lack the "species threatening" di-
mension of atomic weapons. For
example, the Soviet Union, which
has cooperated in the effort to con-
trol nuclear-weapons proliferation,
is considered a big part of the prob-
lem in the proliferation of chemical
weapons.
Moreover, chemical weapons are
much easier to manufacture-and
thus more difficult to control-than
nuclear weapons.
Particularly worrisome, Nye said,
are growing programs here and in
the Soviet Union to investigate bio-
engineering, especially the creation
of potent new biological substances,
as a weapon of war.
The fields of chemical and biolog-
ical warfare are governed by sep-
arate international agreements, but
are closely related. The distinction
is that biological weapons are living
organisms, while chemical weapons
are not. Falling in a middle ground
are toxins such as "yellow rain,"
described by the United States as a
chemical byproduct of biological
processes.
Mounting concern about the
spread of chemical weapons in
Third World nations comes as a 40-
nation conference in Geneva con-
tinues to work on a new worldwide
chemical weapons ban, without no-
table success, and as the United
States appears about to resume
production of nerve gas for its
chemical-weapons stockpiles.
Production was halted by Pres-
ident Richard M. Nixon in 1969, but
the Reagan administration has
waged a three-year battle to restart
it.
After a major fight, a House-Sen-
ate conference committee author-
ized resumption of poison-gas pro-
duction in July, and an appropriation
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 last round of-putting together the Fis-
cal Year 1986 budget of the US De-
Promoting the Defense Budget:
Some Intelligence Issues
by Maj. Gen. Jasper R elclt~ .r__,. _ .
USAF-Ret.
partment of Defense. Whatever its exact
total may be, we can be sure it will be
sufficient to qualify as a "very tidy sum."
But the DoD budget, even after run ning
the Office of Management- and,?Budget
gauntlet, and even after approval b)k:, the
President, is merely aproposal-1norderfor
that proposed budget to becamcnanifest it
must be accepted by the American body
politic, respected by oursecurity partners,
and feared by our adversaries -
In all of these subsequent actions the
actors are complex political enmics- None
of them are beholden to the US Department
of Defense. Each actor, for various
reasons, will want to come-to.an independ
ent judgment on the adequacy of the:DoD
budget, its detailed procoetent,.
and the rationale used -to prvu
There are important palicgauac.edhucaEt.-
issues .raised by this necsssazy~paan
of the budget.
We start with the promotion used by.
Secretary of Defense . Root . McN
mara, because his special pr iiewatmthix
solutions-still influence cazrcat"app...
proaches. McNamara had received from -
President Kennedy the pubiic cbzrZ5-_--
obtain all the defense:.the co c'g't.
but obtain it at the lowesrsoun&pric-_. -
Given McNamara's geatadmirxtion for=.
analytic decision-making,. this clhaxge.led..
to the publication annually ofaneive.
report, in the Secretary's n e=, ha[.can- -
tained a detailed analytic rationale foe
every important budget decision (and:rrrany
not-so-important ones)- Yo'meetthe Presi-
dent's charge pro forma, the brans of
argumentation was squarely on why it was.
not necessary to budget more forthis,or that
particular matter...
Congress, by and large, gaveMcNamara
what he wanted--at first because they per-
ceived him as a strong Secretary who was.
in charge of a Department that-was &fflcult
for Congress to control, and later because
Congress began to realize that McNamara
was setting up machinery whereby Con-
gress could exercise detailed control long
after McNamara was gone.
2 t is December and the beginning of the
Brown, were writft fr 8fF4yl1
became officially titled, have continued to One Secretary of Defense, when pressed
be the starting point for debating the d-. ier harder for more decisiveness of word-
fense budget. Most Washington insiders mg on an estimate, cried out in exaspera-
know that for 20 years mosrof these Annual non, "You are asking me to decide for the
Reports, from McNamara through Harold Russians things that they have yet to decide
De-camber 1984
rerrraskahle. ma+r either Henry Glass, a
longtime civil servant, now retired, or Wil-
liam Kaufman, presently a professor at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Usually the Annual Report started with a
classified version at the secret level, which
also served to communicate the Secretary's
policy within the Department.
This secret version could and did contain
substantive intelligence on adversary
forces. In many cases it contained sum-
mary intelligence data hitherto available
only with special clearances well above the
secret level. These summary data were dis-
played because it was necessary to provide
the analytic underpinnings to the budget
rationale.
The selection of intelligence to support
the budget implies the non-selection (sup-
pression) of other intelligence. Two forms
-of non-selection are worth distinguishing.
The first, unequivocally reprehensible, is
the non-selection of data whose disclosure
would serve to undercut the budget
rationale. The second, generally more im-
portant but less clearly pernicious, is the
omission of intelligence concerning threats
and missions that are being systematically
downplayed in the budget at hand.
This second form. is important because
suasion, emphasis is the crux of proper
budget allocation. It is not necessarily
pernicious because intelligence clearly is
not the only legitimate basis for mission
emphasis. As a practical matter it is far
better to allude to and discount intelligence
on a dc-emphasized mission than to ignore
the data, especially if there are new or start-
ling data. Some of the most undisciplined
uses of intelligence data have been by pro-
ponents of de-emphasized missions in their
zeal to reverse decisions by out-of-channel
disclosures.
We have used the word "data" to this
point in order to highlight the difference
between "data" and "estimates." "Esti-
mate" is the right word for what we now say
an adversary will have in the future. Form-
ing an estimate by one government about
another government is a very complex and
difficult task. -
Both governments are affected by the
process itself. The estimator is sorely temp-
ted to engage in wishful thinking, distor-
tions of convenience, and outright
demagoguery. And the estimator is gener-
ally free to react to the estimate in time to
ME ON
Nonetheless, since it is a long time be-
tween when a budget is proposed and the
time when its effect is felt in delivered
hardware, the estimate of future adversary
strength is crucial. And history shows that
at least this nation has been systematically
wrong in some of its numerical estimates
over substantial periods of time.
Perhaps the best known example is the
work of Albert Wohlstetter, who compared
official estimates of Soviet strategic weap-
on systems with the much larger actuals for
the late '60s and early '70s. Not long after,
in 1976, the President's Foreign In-
telligence Advisory Board spurred the
Director of Central Intelligence to appoints
so-called "Team B" to develop indepen-
dent estimates in three vital strategic areas.
Team B was asked a fairly narrow ques-
tion: Could. the intelligence data in hand
support, with intellectual rigor, .a more
somber strategic estimate for the Soviet
Union, and, if so, what would be the con-
tent of that somber estimate and on what
differences in 'rationale would it be based?
The intended ?privacy of the exercise was
blown shortly after the election of 1976.
The matterbecame a cause cdlebre of the.
Eastern press"'relating to implied harrass
merit of pwfessional government employ-
ees ("Tea A") for ideological purposes.
The matter thereafter took on a bizarre twist
with the..rrrsterious death-and an even
-.more mysj rious post-mortem investiga-
tion--of Team B's executive secretary- a
retired CIA employee.
Over the last few years the national level
estimating process has been centered
around respected and knowledgeable in,-
dividuals who are-publicly appointed as
National Intelligence Officers for a particu-
lar country, region, or subject matter (such
as strategic forces). -
Only time will tell whether this produces
more perceptive and more accurate esti-
mates than the consensual committee sys-
tem of the past..It is clear, however, that
there is much more widespread profession-
al respect throughout official Washington
for the current arrangement.
After the Team B episode, in another -
attempt to build public confidence in CIA
research, the then Director of Central in-
telligence, Admiral Stansfield Turner. -
pushed a policy of open publication under.
CIA auspices. The policy was initially ap-
plauded and drew .substantial interest from
the press with prompt and widespread
coverage.
.More recently, many CIA publications
have been treated to media hype beyond the
toleration level at C&A's Langley headquar-
ters. As a result, P current Director of
Central Intelligende, William Casey, has
quietly adopted a policy reversion to have
no open CIA -publication.
By contrast, Secretary of Defense'Wein-
d For Release 2(*P /9%KR~-5WPAQ1137R00010012
-berme 'f103 : CIA-RDP90-0113 RUUU J4 ie~a new open:publica
Continued
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000
ARTICLE Arr' _k?
WASHINGTON POST
25 September 1984
The CIA has devised some wonder- '
ful y-Gicif l ways. _The +count beans,
and I don't mean coffee_bean s. They'
; each piece of equipment and
.each military personnel and then figure_
out what it would-cost us in dollars to
ye w _ K~-fFxviafu leads Weu-- i
Berger into Wonderland. A Soviet pri-
yate, for example, is paid in rubles
worth about $100 a month, while an
American private is paid $573 a month.
But'we calculate the Soviet privates at'
American wages-
That's simple compared to what we
.do for equipment. We take 'a photo of a
Soviet missile or plane. We then ask our
own defense contractors to tell.us what
it would cost their companies to build
the same missile or plane. We have no
way of knowing whether these contrac-
tors will budget $670 for each armrest
in the mythical Soviet plane. But when
this whole bizarre process is over, we
take the figures from Hughes Aircraft
or whoever and charge those to the
Soviet side of. the ledger.
As Andrew Cockburn wrote in "The
Threat": "The bottom line is that no
one has the faintest idea what the real
costs of Soviet defense are, and the tre-
mendous efforts that go into finding a
figure are solely for the purpose of help-
ing drive up the U.S. defense budget."
But have a little sympathy for the
military. Faced with this bogus ac-
counting system, and pressure from
the administration, the poor belea-
guered men still have to figure out
some way to outspend the mythical
Soviet military budget. If the Soviets
were listed, for example, as spending
$50 on their hammers, then the least
we could do for the sake of our coun-
try is'to spend $436 on our hammers.
Spending here, spending there;
spending, spending everywhere. It's
pretty tiring stuff. Frankly, after a long,
hard day spending, I think the officers in
charge deserve a nice $7,600 cup of-
coffee without getting roasted for it.
CM, The Boston Globe Newspaper Co.
Ellen Goodman
Force Feeding
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BOSTON-Two men came to the
Senate last week to spill the beans
about Air Force coffee pots.
- The airmen, who worked on spare
parts at Travis Air Force Base, said
that a`10-cup coffee maker fora plane
had cost the Air Force $7,600. This
did:not include the stainless steel pot
or, for that matter, the coffee.
The men brought another goodie
with them to the Senate subcommit-
tee: a flashlight the Air Force had
bought for $180: They didn't bring the
aircraft armrest that cost $670 each,
but'said that it could be manufactured
for between $5 and $25. -
,-The coffee pot, the armrest-and the
flashlight will be added to the infamous
$436 hammer and the $1,118 plastic
stool-leg cap. The names of Robert
Greenstreet and Thomas Jonsson will
be added to the list of whistleblowers.
But I for one refuse to pin a medal
on these two men. It's just too easy to
laugh at the military these days. It's
like picking on someone who is suffer-
ing from a problem he can't control:
force feeding. Today's military budget
is' 'rather like a tube permanently
placed in the throat of the armed serv-
ices, into which they mercilessly pour
money.
Remember what happened in 1981
when budget officers found out. that
the administration was going to ask for
an increase of $32 billion? As Nicholas
Lemann reports in the October Atlan-
tic, the first question facing the offi-
cers -was, "What can we think of to
spend all the money on." A man work-
ing on readiness accounts said, "Car-
tef had given us a lot. The Weinberger
team came in and said, 'Add more.
Find room to add. Find places to put
more money."'
It was an article of faith among the
Reagan people that the Soviets were
outspending the United States. In-
deed, it had to_ be an article of faith,
since there simply is no way to esti-
mate the Soviet budget.
The government says that in 1982
the Soviets spent $257 billion to our
$196 billion. But the Soviets don't spend
any. dollars, they spend rubles. How do
we compare these apples and oranges of
two economic systems?
 ARTICLE APPEARED 'Approved For Release "017ft~~ 4A 137RO001 AN 00004 -5
une
ONPAGE
Per-Capita Picture
Analysts debate what's the best measure of a country's exter-
nal debt. Most commonly used is the ratio of debt-service pay-
ments to export earnings (see opposite chart), because how much
a country can afford to borrow depends on how much of its
output can be sold for hard currency. But absolute debt compared
to absolute output (GNP or GDP) is another guide economists
use. In the chart below, the figures are given on a per-capita
basis. When a country's external debt (black bar) approaches
half its GNP (gray bar). economists watch closely.
Norway 7,290
1$.366
Israel 7,283
f>264
Denmark 6,99
11.098
ice and 6,383
8.936
Ireland 5,599
4,967
we den 5,237
10,931
Switzerland 4,524
15.227
Canada 4,291
12.803
Finland 4,208
9867
Kuwait 3,450
14,058
New Zealand 3,262
7,473
Belgium 3,247
8.392
Venezuela 2,372
4893
Australia 2,115
1 331
__-
Port uga ,
2 083
Germany 1,963
10618
France 1,743
9.576
Hama 1,712
2,202
Costa Rica 1,635
1 506
Nile 1,619
1.819
Argentina 1,554
2 202 11111110
Austria 1,532
8,863
Uruguay 1,527
?W-
1.866
Jamaica 1,527
1 527
Hong Kong 1,510
5.446
United States 1,400
14266
. Netherlands 1,258
9,071
Mexico 1,230
U-3-3
SaudlArabla 227
11,401 MIS
Greece 1,225
3 594 INN mmumm
rlnl a o 1,203
7 863
Unit Kingdom ,154
80"
Italy 1111191111111
6189
Oman 1
*15-,14129 116iiiimiiiiiiiii 9.
ivoryoast 1,062
915
Spain 1,033
4,173
Malaysia 1,032
1.94190
Japan 1,005
9.762
Jordan 863
1 1
Yugoslavia 861
2067
a on 812
2888
Singapore 809
6068
Ecuador 794
1,453
Hungary 757
2 887
South A r ca 756
2,626 ILM
ger a 745
2,396
Poland
4
Brazil 734
1.78890
E. Germany
.5 ,103
Korea 690
1,290
Peru 686 ^
862 1~
Tunisia 654
1160
Bolivia 612
1.02o
Morocco
6031
654
Egypt 564
989 1110
Taiwan 541
2.746
Honduras 531
733
Philippines 520
676
Turkey 516
1.164
Iraq 494
2.394
Colombia 476,
1,378
Dominican Rep. 418
1,515
Libya 403
*7,233
Romania 372
3,427
Syria 352
2,050
Zimbabwe 345
756
Thailand 260
Continued
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100120001-5
Czechoslovakia 254
4
Bulgaria 253
2,857
Guatemala 234
1.143
Sudan 222
303
Iran 209
,3 265
Sri Lanka 204
349
Nigeria 182197 6
Indonesia 188 6
505
Zaire ?
116
ana 147
2,671
Pakistan 133
3209
go-Viet union 107
5,106
India 38250
China 7
3526
Statistics: Morgan Guaranty Trust Co_, Morgan International Data:
Population Data. U.N.: 'U.S. CIA estimates.
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 For Release 20064~f FA-FWP98-01 137R-
Approved
GULF CUTOFF WOULDN'T CAUSE IMMEDIATE CRISIS, ANALYSTS BELIEVE
If the escalating Iran-Iraq war cuts off the shipment of Persian Gulf oil, a
serious shortage would be unlikely in the short run, but a prolonged cutoff
could cause prices to double, analysts say.
The analysts estimate the consuming nations could easily replace two-third;
of the oil that leaves the gulf by ship. Prices still would jump, but not
seriously, they say.
A prolonged shutoff would mean much higher prices, with some analysts
predicting prices could jump from the current level of $29 a barrel to around
$60. But once shipments resumed, prices would fall back, the analysts add.
About 9 million barrels of oil pass daily through the 26-mile Strait of
Hormuz, which links the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea.
That is about 20 percent of the non-communist world's daily supply.
lane varies greatly, with Ja an ettin 5S ercent
of its ail from the area and Western Europe 33 percent, the Central
Intelligence A enc says. But the United States gets only 3 percent of its
oil rom e Persian Gulf.
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Iran use
the strait. Iraq, which used to ship oil from the gulf, has relied on its
650,000-barrel-a-day pipeline to the Mediterranean Sea via Turkey since
September 1980, when its war with Iran began.
Saudi Arabia also has a pipeline that carries about 600,000 barrels a day to
Yanbu on the Red Sea. Analysts say they believe that could be increased in an
emergency to 1 million barrels.
In addition, analysts say, oil-producing nations outside the Persian Gulf
could increase their production to add 3 million to 4 million barrels a day and
natural gas and other fuels could replace a million barrels daily.
Many nations also have stockpiled oil. The U.S. announced this past Thursday,
for instance, that it now has a 400 million-barrel emergency pool that could
stave off a two-year disruption in Middle East supplies.
In addition, the International Energy Agency estimates there are about 600
million barrels of oil in transit an the high seas at any given time and there
are 150 million barrels in waterborne storage. Together, that represents a
two-week suppy at current daily consumption rates in the non-communist
countries.
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/03': CIA-RDP90-0113
AR'tI -A"U."Cf~' ` CHICAGO TRIBUNE
04, PACE- - '~ 22 May 1984
Fascination with the Pacific Basin
PARIS-Zhe new: American fascination with the
Pacific Basin has-a less solid base than many may
think, although important questions are posed for the
future. There is much enthusiasm in the United
States about development of a vast Pacific market
that would leave the Atlantic .t backwater of trade.
There aremany in Western Europe, as well, who
look at Asia's development with frightened [or de-
spairing] concern for what this may mean for the
future of Europeans.
America's interest in the Pacific is justified eco-
nomically by the fact that the United States now has
a larger trans-Pacific than trans-Atlantic trade flow.'
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and
Singapore are rightly recognized as terrifically dy-
namic manufacturing and trading centers. Beyond
them are a score of other nations yet to take off
economically, one of them the biggest nation, and
market, of all-China.
If all of East and Southeast Asia developed as
Japan, and a few others, have developed, then we
would certainly find ourselves with a transformation
of world economic and political re] tions dwarfing
mere trade considerations. We would see the over-
throw of cultural and power relations established in
and after the 16th Century by Europe's Renaissance,
the rise of European science and the European
exploration of the Americas, Asia and Africa [which
resulted, in crucial respects, in their Westernization].
The Pacific would become the center of world
economy and industry, and undoubtedly of world
power..
But will the rest of Asia develop as Japan has
developed? This is the critical question; and the
answer is far from certain.
First of all, it must be noted that the only Asian
societies that have successfully and innovatively
industrialized are those culturally derivative of
China. They are the overseas, culturally dependent
offspring of China. That culturally different societies
in Asia can, or will, develop in the same way does not
logically follow; It might happen. There has yet to be
evidence that it will happpen.
It would seem logteal, though, to think that China
itself will industrialize in the way it9 offspring
William Pfaff
societies have done. Yet precisely because China is a
great, ancient and self-sufficient civilization, it may
not be able to do what the others have done, whic h
has amounted to turning themselves inside out. These
frontier states, simply because they have been vul-
nerable, -less than totally self-sufficient, may have
been able to change themselves in ways the central
civilization cannot.
We are, in any case, talking in terms of decades if
not centuries; the success of the Pacific Basin, i? it
comes, is not for tomorrow.
For now, the Pacific Basin needs to be seen in
realistic scale. The shift in trade of the United States
to Asia is not in itself a decisive indicator. Nor is it
necessarily very healthy for the American economy.
Food and raw materials are exported by the United
States, and sophisticated consumer goods are im-
ported-to compete with U.S.-made goods.
The actual weight of the Far Eastern economies is
distorted by the presence of Japan, the second-.
largest national economy in the world.
China's industrial output-its gross national prod-
uct-is much argued, the figures doubtful, but the
CIA estimate for 1981, in 1980 dollars, is only slightly
above the official figures for Britain's economy
alone. South Korea's economy, in 1982 figures, is
slightly larger than Denmark's, about 70 percent that
of Belgium, a quarter that of Canada. Taiwan's
economy, on the latest figures, is about 80 percent as
large as Denmark's, a little bigger than that of
Greece, smaller than Norway's.
On 1982 figures for gross domestic product, NATO
Europe possesses a total output worth over $3 trillion,
which is three times that of Japan, much more than
twice that of all Asia, slightly larger than that of the
United States itself. Common Market Europe is the
largest trading group in the world. The Pacific Basin
may provoke interesting thoughts about the future,
but these should be taken for no more than that. For
the present, it is Europe that weighs in world
economic scales. a 1994, Willem Fla11
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 ARTICLE APPEAR
ON PAGE _"-
@0
Q A-RDP90-01137
ki-cNamara on Record, Reluc
on Vietnam
By CHARLES MOHR
Spedal to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, May 15 --- In two
days of questioning this spring, Rob-
ert S. McNamara said he ceased to
believe that the Vietnam War could
be won not long after American corn-
bat troops were committed to the con-
flict in 1965.
Mr. McNamara, the Seretary of
Defense in the Kennedy and Johnson
Administrations, who was known for
his appetite for facts and figures, also
said he lost faith in the military
statistics that he he.!ped create be-
cause ?"they made no sense."
Mr. McNamara has resolutely
refused to discuss in public the Viet-
nam War and his role in it since he re-
signed as Secretary of Defense on
Feb. 28, 1968. However, in late March
of this year he was subpoenaed to
give a deposition in the libel suit
brought by Gen. William C. West-
moreland against CBS inc.
The suit arose after CBS News sug-
gested in a documentary broadcast
Jan. 23, 1982, that the American mili-
tary, and specifically General West-
moreland, had altered figures on the
strength of enemy forces in Vietnam _
to make it appear that the United
States was winning the war. The gen-
eral, now retired, commanded Amer-
ican forces in Vietnam from 1964 to
1968.
Reluctant and Unresponsive
The initial McNamara deposition
runs to 444 pages, and lawyers said he
would probably be called for futher
deposition. ,
Despite Mr. McNamara's strong
reluctance to discuss the war at all
and his apparent unresponsiveness to
many questions, his deposition por-
trays a public servant unwilling to
come to terms with his past record
and a one-time policy maker who
grudgingly continued to administer
what he believed was a lost war.
At one point in the two-day ques-
tioning, Mr. McNamara said he,
would resist to the limits of his legal
power having` to discuss the war.
After an "off-the-record" interlude,
in which his own attorney may have
convinced him that he had little re-
course, he went on to give what stu-
dents of the Vietnam conflict may re-
gard as his most complete accounting
of his stewardship.
However, early in the deposition,
taken in Washington, he said: ".I want
it clear on the record that you are ex-
traccing these answers from me
against my wishes. I have never'
sz *ken publicly on Vietnam. I have no
intention of doing so."
Mr. McNamara said the events in
question occurred 20 years ago and
"my memory is imperfect."
"I was a particpant in a decision-
making process," he added. "I do not
believe a participant should be judge
of his own actions or the validity of
those actions."
Unable to Recall His Opinions
On more than 100 occasions, Mr.
McNamara protested that he could
not recall his opinions or those of
others during the war or basic facts
about the conflict. At one point he said
he was unable to recall the opinions of
any other major policy maker. Yet,
at other points in the deposition, his
memory seemed more firm.
Under the persistent questioning of
David Soies, a lawyer in the New
York firm of Cravath, Swaine &
Moore, which represents CBS, Mr.
McNamara made these points:
qpf the war, he testified, "I did not
believe it could be won militarily."
He said he came to this view in 1966
"if not earlier." He later said that it
might have been 1965.
4He was almost contemptuous of
the bombing program in North Viet-
nam, testifying that he doubted it had
any chance of forcing North Vietnam
either to end the war or to neogtiate.
He said he never recommended a
sharply reduced bombing schedule
but,'instead, tried to hold bombing to
moderate levels.
q"For a considerable period of
time," the former Defense Secretary
said, he and President Johnson dis-
agreed about the conduct of the war
and "eventually carne to a parting of
the ways." But he professed to be to-
tally unable to recall his discussions
with the President before leaving of-
fice. Did he resign or was he asked to
do so? "I'm not sure I decided. It
would have been the President who
decides." Mr. McNamara asserted
Continue;
Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP90-01137R000100120001-5
the President never gave him in--ex---
planation of the necessity for his
departure from the Pentagon.
(IThroughout 1967, Mr. McNamara
testified, he successfully resisted a
request by General Westmoreland
that 200,000 troops be added to the
more than 500,000 troops already
fighting in Vietnam: "I believed it
would carry human and political
costs disproportionate to any military
advantages it would bring," the for-
Secretary said. "At a certain
mer
point one would come to the conclu
Sion, as I did in 1967, that we had gone
as far as we could or should to assist
the South Vietnamese to help them-
1 selves, and if they couldn't we should-
n't go further."
At one point Mr- McNamara said
it was fair and correct to say that he
had asked for more and more statis-
tics by which to measure the conduct
of the war. He added, "Statistics are
nothing other than the means of
convenying information and recog
nizing that. information is frequently
imprecise; it is better to have as
much coverage as one can get."
9But he subsequently stressed and
re-stressed his growing disenchant-
ment with the military reporting
from Vietnam. "Because," he. said,
"you couldn't reconcile the number"
of the enemy, "the level of infiltra-
tion, the body count and the resultant
figures. It just didn't add up. I never
did get the answer, because there
weren't any answers." Mr.
McNamara protested he could never
get "a balanced equation."
This was a reference to the mathe-
matical inconsistency, often noted by
 Y
AIR TI cL
ON PAGE
ved For ReleasQM/Q.A~A-RDP90-01137R0001
11 May 1984
porft^,,I. *r_ - /_,_ - --^t% by the Air Force, the soviet Union has i Last year, Congress mandated e ,
Doubts MX's Value
Against Soviet Arms
threefold since the MX missile, which of $2.1 billion, and said that the first 10
the Administration refers to as the Ij should be deployed by December 1986.
"Peacekeeper," entered full develop , Mr. Stark noted that as the production
ment in September 1979. schedule accelerated, it would be
"The ability of the Peacekeeper to harder for Congress to stop the missile,
accomplish its mission
" the report because it would become an economic
,
states, "may have been impaired be- benefit in many Congressional dis- i
By STEVEN V. ROBERTS cause a major change has occurred in tricts.
Specia)toTheNewYork Tim~-, the threat it was initially designed to "You build a constituency as you
overcome, build a weapons system," he said.
WASHINGTON, May 10 - Recent + "Formal reassessments of the abil- The Pentagon spokesman acknowl-
advances in Soviet technology cast ity of the Peacekeeper to meet the ex- edged that some parts of the missile
doubt on the ability of the MX missile pected threat have not been made. would be built before they were fully
to accomplish its objective of destroy- There is some risk that threat changes checked out. But he described them as
ing the Soviet land-based missile force, may require modifications to the mis- "low risk components" that were
a new report from the General Ac- sile to improve its performance." familiar from other weapons and not
counting Office says. Two Modifications Mentioned likely to fail.
But a Pentagon spokesman said The accounting office said two modi- A third issue raised by the account-
today that the report was in error and fications to the missile could be re- ing office is cost. The problem is cam-
that the MX was fully able to hold "the quired to overcome increased Soviet plea' because the number of missiles
hard Soviet targets at risk." defersive capacity. One would be to in- , Produced' and their method of basing,
crease the accuracy the have been altered by Congress. Put the
The G-A.O., an investigative arm of ~' of the missile; report asserts that the rice of each
o ess, completed the report this other would be to increase the power of price
its warhead. . missile had increased 36 per cent since
w
k
d
i
i
l
d
d
an
ee
cop
es c
rcu
ate
to
ay on the program beg
, The Pentagon s kesmanwho s kean.
Ca
itol Hill It seems lik
l
to b
p
e
ecome
y
. an important factor in the debate next
week when the House of Representa-
tives considers a Defense Department
measure calling for 30 MX missiles
tasting a total of $2.7 billion.
Representative Fortney H. Stark, a
California Democrat who opposes the
NIX'. interpreted the report this way:
"We may be building a missile that's
absolutely useless. It may be a bar-
gairing chip, but it's from the wrong
casino."
on condition e not i enti i id
ari~cyueEttateFnent
it describes a threefold increase in the
stren~tfi of :Soviet silo Acc_o_'rding to
the latest intell ence information, the
,~~esman said the hardness-fa~or
has 'creased onl 50 p2K cent over a
ssac
usetts Democrat who is lead-
decade mg the fight against the missile. Ac-
R e foresaw this ,increase in hard- cording to a Mavroules aide, the report
ness, the Pentagon spokesman said. Mates that none of the money apprnprl_
We set our requirements for the MX
E aced for the missile in this fiscal year
t
ll
aeioe?d
ac
ua
y been spent ad l th
Thze fi,the spokesman added, the,nessan
MX. or missile experimental- as now' one-quarter of the total work had been
counting office as part of its continuous designed is capable of destroying cur- contracted out.
monitoring of major weapon systems. rent Soviet silos, and no further modi- L "What it showsus," the aide said, "is
The document was not due to be made fications of the weapon are required. that there are some technical problems
panlic until next ::ionth, but Represent- According to the spokesman, Penta- ' in this program." _?
alive Stack and two dozen other oppo- gon officials who saw a draft of the re-
r :ens of the program asked that it be port several weeks ago told accounting
published before the House debate- office investigators that their assess-
The clash betsna_the General c- ment was wrong. "But they chose not
counting Office and the Pentagon ap- ' to change it,'?' he said.
parenti~~ stems from a disagreement He also noted that thereport quoted .
over which intellizence estimates the Air o cer _ as the source of i data
on silo stren tth.But intellice ages-
shouldbbe us e4Y_'h_e_accounting_offjcP_ cies not the Air Force, are the,~, ?r
kaid it relied on- data supplied by the source of such data the s
_ l esman
po,
Air. Force. The Pentagon said it was said
basing its estimate on information, The report also suggests that the
gt eered -Y the Cen me1i &e-lice, Pentagon is taking a "major risk" by
Agency and the D efetue intelligence- starting production of some compo-
Ag - nents of the missile before they are
The report was produced by the ac-
cerns the-ability of the Soviet Union's: says, deployment is scheduled to begin
silos to protect its missile force. ?61i- in 1986, before the entire system is sub-
tary experts refer to this ability as ject to thorough flight-testing.
"hardness," meaning, how well the Representative. Stark said that this
silos withstand the blast of a nuclear Plan smacked of "reckless abandon"
explosion. The accounting office says by the Pentagon. "We seem to be build
that according to information supplied uig weapons systems that haven't been:
adequately tested," he said. ..They
maybe trying to get this thing into pro-
duhtion so we can't stop it."
It Provides No Alternative
The Pentagon calls the figure too
high, but declined to provide an alter-
native.
A second report by the General Ac-
counting Office was delivered today to
Representative Nicholas Mavroules, a
Ma
h
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 roved For Releas0/6prA-RDP90-01137R00010('
AGE
14- 2.G 27 January 198
Letters
Defense Spending: On the Use of Soviet Yardsticks
To the Editor: are A -Soviet worker in the civilian ample, We Soviets "pay" their con--
Gordon Adams's Jan- 10 Op-Ed ?ar- economy is far less productive than his pts 5 rubles a month -;;$ at the of-
ticle ("Moscow's Military 'Costs, ") U.S. counterpart. It follows that the ficial exchange rate. That compares
is riddled with contradictions and unr opportunity cost of employing him in with several hundred dollars a month
founded assertions which deny. va-, the military is less. Yet it doe's not fol- spent by the Pentagon to hire a volun-
lidity to his principal thesis -that do.- teer away from the private sector. =
fence spending under President tea- Using Mr. Adams's approach, . we
gnu has been unnecessarily high mould conclude the Soviets are spend-
Mr. Adams begins by Saying he :ing tar less on soldiers than we are.
Administration's defense_. Yet a Soviet infantryman
on estlIDate,,xif .Soviet mill Xaliehmmv ~ -wielding a
Lary- rifle is every . bit .as as much
spending Re, maintains these -esti !a fghter as a U.S. private with,an
Soviet arms spending because-crf he? our manpower spending on the S8-fig-
methodologyused.-:-? : _ _ : '? ore or, 'for that matter, on any .other
Then, shifting grvitad,'lae implie& version of Soviet man '
Power costs.
the Admini- ation rejects the spend- Output is what cm arts. The saute
ing estimate we., input) approach, . -: applies to other areas of the military.: -
focusing instead~n -producgca?snd _ -After criticizing the C.IA's esti.-
large stockpiles" of Soviet weapons ; ..', mates for the past seven years, Mr.
(output measures). This -latter ap-:. Adams is only too happy. to embrace
proach fails to justify our buildup; their latest downward. revisions of
cording to Mr. ,daums, because the 'Soviet arms spending. Indeed, the
strategic and .ccrtiventianal military -. - C.1.A.'s track record in forecasting
balance is approximately even. key internal variables for that coon. AMUNpaAk Mr. Adams's statements about the - ? try has been dismal (in 19T7 it-pre-
military balance are not supported by low that the C.I.A.. :has been overstat- dieted a Soviet "Oil crisis" that never.
argument;.and his vague reference to -. ing Soviet arms ;spending or that our materialized).
"data amassed" by various authori- .'defense budget istoohigh. Consider: - -But the evidence, specially, from
ties is no substitute!or analysis of this o The only valid criterion on which former 'Soviet economists and other
critical issue. to base the U.S. defense effort is Soviet experts with firsthand experience in
More interesting is his contention military output-both in quantity and the U.S.S.R., suggests the C.I.A. has
that the C.IA overstates Soviet mili-. in -quality. We must be able to match consistently underestimated Soviet
tary spending by estimating what it Soviet military caps) is to -the ex- . a= spending and coritinues is do so.
would cost the U.S. to match the tent necessary for deterrence. - In 1976, for instance,.the C.I.A. an- i
Soviet level of military output + Soviet military spending is rele- pounced it had been off by 100
Pe1-
"Our wage and material costs," vant as an indicator of the priority as- cent in its assessment of the Soviet
says Mr. Adams,. "are higher than signed to the military sector, and the - defense burden. ,The figure was-.re-
Moscow's." In the strictest sense, they burden this sectarplaces on the ecoi - vised from 6 Percent to 12 percent of
`omy. As such, spending shout be ex- G.N.P. As Lev Navrozov pointed dirt
t pressed as a percentage of society's in a recent article, even these higher
otalproductivecapacity_ figures do not account for the fact
The only conceivable reason for that the -Soviet military employs?13
coming up with a dollar expression of times as many engineers as the U:S.
Soviet arms spending is to give us a military, or that the U.S.S.R: 'pro-
rough idea of absolute levels of re- duces twice as much steel as the U.S.
source ~comnutments to the Soviet but uses less in the civilian economy
militarysector. Since most Americans (where does the rest go?). - ?
are unfamiliar with the Soviet econ- The C.I.A. is a closed, noncompeti-
omyrit is hard to visualize X percent - tive bureaucrac with few reliable
of Soviet G.N.P- But we know that y y
sources within the with f R. It relies
billion dollars represents so many heavily onofficial Soviet?statisticsfor
man-years of trained personnel, _-so : its estimates. There is -little ground
many vehicles, ships, etc., in our own for Mr. Adams's .new-found faith -in .
economy. For this purpose, the C.I.A. them. DAVID A. MORO
methodology, so derided by Mr. New Y
flrk, Jan. 15,39-
Adam s, is entirely appropriate. - - The writer is a . Mr. Adams seems to think that the : financial analyst at
dollar figure for Soviet arms spending o~~ Stanley.
M
should be based not on American re- .
source costs but on Soviet ones. Such a
figure would be meaningless. For ex-
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-0.1137R0001
r'` j sr1F ,17 P-Pt E!~RED WALL STREET JOURNAL
I/, pl ro
6 December 1983
~j :C L1fY4..
Why the CIA Undershoots Soviet Ark
By 1X V NAVrozOV Soviet output in order to make its military the CIA car- reshape at will, the rate of
Every year the Central Intelligence sector look small. Thus, this office claims that spending's growth is an imaginary
that the Soviet national income in dollars flea on that imaginary dog: If the CIA an-
Agency makes public two estimates cru- was, as of 1976, 67% of its American count-' nounced in 1976 that its "Soviet defense
cial for Western policies: "Soviet defense erpart. The CIA's latest Soviet-American spending" had been wrong by 100%, how
spending" and its rate of growth. The GNP ratio in dollars for the same year is can the CIA presume that it increases at
agency's latest numbers are being used to 73,7%-more favorable to the Soviet econ- "about 2%" and not 4% to 5%?
l
d
th
p
ay
awn
e need for a U.S. rearmament omy than the national income ratio. Actu-
oli
S
p
cy.
ome background is in order.
Before 1976, the CIA's estimate of So-
viet defense spending hovered around 6%
of the Soviet gross national product-
roughly matching the American percent-
age. The "Soviet defense burden," the CIA
stated in 19 "is no greater than that of
the United States," and the "Soviet share
of gross: national product spent on defense
'has been falling." This good news nurtured
detente and sapped the stronger defense
policy. In 1976, the CIA announced that ev-
ery year it had been making a 100% error:
Soviet defense spending had been closer to
1215, not 6%, of GNP. and had been grow-
ing since 1966 at 4% to 5%. It was time for
detente to wane and for defense to wax.
According to the CIA's testimony this
year before Congress's Joint Economic
Committee, released to the press last
month as a 66-page report, Soviet defense
spending has been growing not at 4%a to
5%, but at "about 2% a year ... because
ally, the GNP ratio must be far less favor-
able to the Soviet economy than the na-
tional income ratio,-since the latter disre-
gards services and plant depreciation, and
it is precisely in those two areas that the
Soviet economy lags further behind the
U.S. than it does in'goods.
The CIA reports give no sources for
data. An American unfamiliar with the So-
viet press is likely to infer that those are
secret intelligence sources. Actually, they
are "open" Soviet books and pamphlets-
i.e., Soviet propaganda-since the CIA has
never been able ? to obtain "closed" Soviet
statistics.
In its American-Soviet GNP compari.
sons, the CIA uses a methodology appro-
priate for comparing the GNPs of the U.S.
and, say, Western Europe. Thus the CIA
ignores, in terms of both cost and value,
the Soviet lack of Western diversification,
innovation and sophistication of consumer
"The slowdown in go viet military
growth" is the only new fact in the CIA's
testimony this year. Just like its predeces-
sors, it is a digest of the Soviet press. Thus
we learn that in 1982 the Soviet economy
produced 147 million tons of steel, com-..
pared with 66 million tons produced in the
U.S. But what does the regime do with all
that steel, considering how little goes into
cars, housing and highways, and -consider-
ing how much rolled steel ($5.3 billion a
year) the regime imports? The answer is
missing in this year's CIA report, just as it
was missing 10 'years ago.
The CIA report abounds in slogans
lifted unthinkingly from the Soviet press.
"Production of fruits and vegetables
reached record levels.... " "Meat output.
... reached a record level.... " .. Rail-
road performance has also improved
markedly.... " Andropov's regime "has
shown concern for the welfare of the popu-
lafion " The latter is a Soviet cliche
procurement of military hardware-the- self, whereby the right goods and Services in use since lulls.
largest category of defense spending-was In 1977, the CIA made the groundless
almost flat in 1976-8 of And, according to reach the right customers it the right and indeed preposterous prediction that
time. Using the C1, Vs methodology, It can
"preliminary estimates available for be proved that even Soviet labor-camp in? the Soviet economy faced an oil crisis; this
1982," the "trends .. , are continuing." year, the CIA explains that the Soviet
Now it is time for opponents of Mr. Rea- mates consume, in terms of dollars or ru economy "has thus far averted the down-
bles, not so much less than median-income
gan's defense policy to rejoice. turn in oil production ... by virtue of an
That the CIA's estimates of the Soviet Amencans enormous brute-force development effort-
GNP share spent on defense are absurd is Having inflated the Soviet GNP more as though there is a Soviet national .
obvious at a glance. About 300,000 engi- than Soviet propaganda does, the CIA gets, development effort that can't be credited
neers and 400,000 "junior engineers" are if only for that reason, "Soviet defense to brute force.
graduated in the U.S.S.R. annually, and ` spending" as an absurdly low percentage The CIA is a closed, noncompetitive bu-
half -of these 700,000 go into the military of GNP. reaucracy that is practically unopposed,
sector; in the U.S., 60,000 engineers are There are other reasons. As is clear since most of the major news media agree
graduated, and only one-fifth of them go even from the reports, the CIA has no hu- with its intelligence. All attempts to expose
into the defense industry. The expenditure J man agents at the top of the Soviet infra- its scholastics have failed. Thus, in 1978 1
ratio in this area is thus almost 6o to 1 structure. Thus, it can perceive and evalu- submitted to the CIA a 150-page analysis of
considering the fact that the pay of Soviet ate the weapons tested, built or deployed its reports and then distilled my paper into
military engineers is on the average twice. under optically or electronically observ- an article for Commentary that Ronald
as high as that of civilian engineers. How able conditions, but not the weapons devel- Reagan and his associates hailed enthusi-
can the Soviet economy pay for such ratios oped, produced, stored or deployed on opti- astically. But that applied to Jimmy Car.
if Soviet defense spending as a share of cally and electronically closed premises. It ter's CIA. When the CIA became Mr. Rea.
GNP roughly matched its American count- can't know to what extent each "civilian" gan's, the enthusiasm evaporated.
erpart according to the pre-1976 CIA, and institution works as a military one. With Recently, former Soviet economist Igor
is only about twice as high according to.the the greater importance paid nowadays to Birman -made a painstaking study showing
post=1976 CIA? high-technology surveillance, as opposed to that the CIA doesn't know the Soviet econ-
- The key to the CIA calculus is the So- the former belief in the necessity of agents omy as it exists, but as it seems on the
viet GNP. Yet the CIA can't now calculate in place, the discrepancy between what. is basis of purely American experience and
the GNP for the U.S.S.R.,'if only because observed by the CIA and what actually oc- "open" Soviet statistics. The CIA has
most Soviet goods and services are priced curs has only widened. Nor does the ? never budged, and possibly never will.
w
for the fact that civilian pro-
by fiat; and few of them can be sampled agency allo
and evaluated, since they are foisted on duction mainly receives those human and
Soviet consumers far from foreign. eyes. other resources rejected by the military.
Predictably, the Soviet Central Statist- While the CIA's "Soviet defense spend-
ical Office inflates the value of the overall ing" is an imaginary "shaggy dog" that
Mr. Navromv, a Russian emigre. writes
frequently on Soviet affairs and intelii.
gence matters.
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ARTICLE AP
ON PAGE.,
SoN?iets Reported
Slowing Rate of
Military Buying
By Fred Hiatt
WASHINGTON POST
22 November 1983
Washington Post Staff Writer
Since 1976, the Soviet Union has slowed the
rate at which it procures tanks, airplanes and !
other military equipment rather than accelerating
defense spending as the Reagan administration
has suggested, senior intelligence officials said yes-
terday.
The officials, who spoke on condition that they
not, be identified- said the CIA believes that Soviet
defense budgets stayed even or increased only,
slightly from 1976 through -1982, the last year -for which reliable information is available:
Fewer planes and tanks were purchased. as the
Soviets joined the United States in discovering
that increasingly complex military technology
strains budgets. the officials said.
The Reagan administration has sought to jus-
tiff large U.S. defense spending increases by
claiming that the Soviets have engaged in an un-
precedented military buildup.
The CIA estimate differs marginally from the
assessment of Pentagon intelligence officers, who
agree on the trend in equipment produced but say
they brliege that Soviet expenditures have grown.
The senior intelligence officials said their anal -
ysis does not contradict. President Reagan's posi-
tion because. even without growth, the Soviet de-
fense budget remains 25 to 45 percent higher than
U .S. spending.
They also stressed that military spending does
not, measure "combat effectiveness," which de-
pends on many factors.
"This has no implication for the U.S. defense
budget, as far as I'm concerned," one analyst said.
The officials said that not since the early ?1960s
had Soviet defense spending slowed. as noticeably
as since 1976. The officials said they do not be-
lieve that the trend reflected several years of U.S.-
Soviet detente preceding the current. plateau or a
deliberate decision to restrain spending.
Instead, they attributed the slowdown to weap-'
ons-testing problems and delays, a. "policy, deci-
sion" to adhere to weapons limits set in the SALT
I and.II arms-control talks and general economic i
problems involving ,transportation..and basic-ma-
terial production.
While insisting that world events had no impact
on the slowdown, the officials said a Soviet view of
increasing world tension may prompt increased
,military spend' _., ,.. , .
~~
They said -the Soviets are developing more
weapons systems than ever and have "expanded
the bases of production."
A decision to increase defense spending would
force the Soviets to abandon plans for decreasing
their citizens' cost of living, they said.
The Reagan administration increased the de-
fense budget during its first year by about 12 per-
cent in "real," after-inflation growth. That budget
grew by about 7 percent last year and less than 4
percent this year, and the Pentagon has drafted a
preliminary request for '17 percent real growth
next year.
U.S. officials say' real growth in Soviet defense
spending averaged between zero and 3 percent
from 1976-82. The range reflects departmental
disagreements on how to calculate Soviet inflation'
and money exchange rates.
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EAR= 1E7 YORK MW
014 PAGE 19 , November 1983
deputy chairman of the Joint Eco-
nomic Committee, said the "slowdown
of Soviet defense growth rates has pro.
found significance that has not yet
penetrated policy circles."
"In one sense, the C.LA:'s new esti.
mates demonstrate that the Soviet de-
fense program is very large and still
growing, although at a slower rate thaw
before,', Mr. Pracmire said. ?"But Mos-
cow has not been expanding its effort at
the rapid rate that was once believed.
It slowed its defense expansion begin.
ning about sevein years ago,
the Soviets neglected to comm%mmi
and that the West failed to detect."
Dispute Over Estimates
Last spring Pentagon and C.I.A. spo-
cialists were reported to be arguing
over levels of Soviet military spending.
The Pentagon estimate was that Mos-
cow was Proceeding as ambitiously as
before, but C.L.A. officials said those
estimates were overstated.
Today's report indicated the agency
was sticking to the more cautious view
of Soviet spending. "The rate of growth
of overall -defense costs is lower be-
cause procurement of military hard.
ware., the largest category of defense
spending, was almost flat in 1976-to-
81,"- the agency study said. Prelimi.
nary estimates for 1982, it added, show
the same lower trend is continuing.
The study attributed the slowdown in
military procurement since the late
1970's to technological problems, indus-
trial bottlenecks and policy decisions.
It also speculated that some money
previously allocated to buying new
weapons might have been diverted to i
research and development.
Nonetheless, the agency report indi-
cated that such momentum was gener-
ated in the late 1960's and early 1970's
that Moscow continued to accumulate I
large stocks of new weapons. Moscow I
also allocated roughly 13 to 14 percent
of the total Soviet budget to military
spending, roughly double the American
The agency said present Soviet levels
of spending were so high that since
-1975, despite "the procurement pla-
teau," Soviet forces have received
about 2,000 land- and sea-based inter.
continental missiles, more than 5.000
tactical combat and interceptor air..
craft, 15,000 tanks and substantial
,numbers of naval surface vessels and
submari ies;
Lower Growth Rate Predicted
Soviet Arms Spending Sal
By HEDRICK SMITH
Sf* 3mTheNeoYorkTimes
WASHINGTON, Nov. 18 -- The Cen-
I Tr al Intelligence Agency said today
that Soviet military spending, espe.
cially for proatt'ement of new weapons
systems. had gmwa more slowly in the
Elast s s
Est years than previously
"New information indicates that the
Soviets did nag field weapons as rapidly
after 1976 as -before," said the report
released
a of by Joint Economic Com-
gress. ..Practically all
I major ? categories of Soviet weapons
-were affected- missiles, aircraft and
ships..'
President Reagan has repeatedly
said the Soviet Union is engaged in an
unprecedented military buildup, but
the C.I.A. study said that for the last
seven years the annual growth in
Soviet military spending was only half
what it was in the 1966.76 period. From
1966 to 1976, it said, Moscow increased
military outlays by 4 to 5 percent a
'About 2% a Year' on Military
"Our new estimate, however, shows
that like overall economic growth, the
-rise in the cost of defense since 1976 has
been slower - about 2 percent a year,"
the C.I.A. report said.
But the agency also estimated that in
Yuri V. Andropov's first year as the
Soviet leader, the Soviet economy re-
bounded from sluggish performances
in 1951 and 1982, when the growth rate
was 2 percent. This year, the report
forecast growth of 3.5 to 4 percent.
The Soviet economic rebound, the
agency said, leaves open the question
of whether the Kremlin leadership will
now feel it can push Soviet military
spending at faster rates.
In energy production, the C.I.A. said,
Moscow's "prospects for the future are
considerably better than we once
thought." In 1977, the agency predicted
that Soviet energy production would?
significantly taper off and that the
Soviet Union would be an energy im-
porter by 1985.
No More Currency Squeeze
The report issued today said Soviet
natural gas, coal and oil output were all
advancing. It also said Moscow had
significantly recovered from a hard.
currency squeeze in 1981 by holding
dawn imports and strongly pushing po-
tzoleum exports.
In spite of the slowdown in Soviet
military spending, the study said, Mob-
cow's military budget still outstrips the
Pentagon budget by at least 25 percent,
Nonetheless, with Congress having
approvb
1984 Pea on budget, Senator William
Proxmire, . Democrat of Wisconsin,
next few years.
More broadly, the study said the new
slower trend in military procurement
along with continuing domestic eco-
nomic problems and the political suo-
cession of Mr. Andropov .'raise Impor.
tant questions about the future of the
Soviet defense effort."
It suggested that the Currmt leader-
ship "may well be under messrxre m
speed up defense spending" butt that
any major ettort to do so "could make
i.
it even more difficult to solve the fem.
damental economic problems facing
the Soviets" by forcing cutbacks in in-
vestment in the civilian sector and In
c nsumergoods,
In the long rim, it said, such a stoat-eg* could "erode the economic base of
the military industrial complex itself...
Despite these competing economic
pressures and priorities, the study said
economy had shown enough
strength to conclude that it "is not on
the verge of collapse.."
Assessing Mr. Andropov's first year,
the agency study said his economic
policies had not brought much innova-
tion. "Continuity has ' been far more
pronounced than e," it said.
~fltk/Otith~9rrb3 100120001-5
this year, it projected a lower annual - -
growth rate of around 2 percent in the
 Invasion in Grenada: Flawed
NE Y YORK TI"''ES
29 October 1983
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Intelligence Debated
..Now Pats the Strengt
Of Qibans=on Isle at 1,1001
gaa . wed ` eaid.;Z7agy ~tevasic~a .had
kn Grenada today amid growing debate "tinjn~ ad theislaiodr??~ '': r= `r' `'s'`''x`_`
tor"
about why hitelligence agencies -failed C d >881d "th4
-tomeesme'('ban'e,trength mor'e'accu ,{s. .~YtapL and ? ; f f 1ericat1{
ratelybefa uesdaysinvasion-t-?:=. F tEd tb$t`.~ba:~anned ,
Admi tiara officials said the let- ' 341 tioo8l` i3tlcl '000;
est figures showed more than -1;100 -. reservists AD -Grenada saari:?He said
Cubans were in -Grenada, 10 percent y`tlist e~`L - ppeo "~ta~e~lan`
more than reported try the Government -sing to take over aoatrol- of the island
on Thursday and almosttwice as many aDdinstalltheirowrigovernmeat._
as estimated before American and ;The daeumeate cited by Admiral MCI
Caribbean assault farces invaded. donald and Or secret Cuban milit ry
At the same time, some military -- papers'.th.- on officiall
sources said privately -that reports said have been farad in Grenada have
from Grenada today indicated that 610 aotbeenmadepublic.
pC.u/b?a~ns/weereewbeiinng held prisoner and _ r = .Gap Cafie~daHasdap
8W to ``.
1,w~ were still at large.
- ` Adm. Wesley L McDaz ald, Corn- - -Before theinvasian began, however.
=mandertn Chief of American forces in .11igeace -abaft the Cuban
-the Atlantic region, said at a Defense ." preseoce-on-the island indicated little
daagerthatsuchan
Departmedt news CDIIfe[PSiCB that 638 otx atiadWasim-
_- $~~.to Intelligence oi-
GithB , including a colonel, are baking s cad public u me ty Admin-
held prisoner at Point Salines and istmtko naides.
Pearls airports in Grenada. -He said 17 Some military officers have said psi-
Grenadians are also being held cap- vately that the gap in intelligence seri-
He added, "We were not micro-man- ;
aging Grenada Intelligeac ewise until.
about-that time frame.". .
erne Administration has. said that the
United states first received a request
'to intervene early last Saturdays
-. =in .an appearance today.before .the
.Senate Select Committee -on .Intelli-
gence, William r. Casey,:.tbe Director
- of Gent al Intelligenca. said that intelli-
gence -coverage of Grenada;:.including
by Ameridan:spy.planes,
:was ancresised overslast veekend,;.ao-
0rding to -several--senatrs;m the
panel-;Irbe -senators said: that Mr.
Casey -tuldthecomtaitteetbatthe
.C &bad1P_wAge=j= eJsland be
2ometLeiuvasiam. t ; rt' , ?,.,
~1AdiaaiIal ~McDpnald, ..l ke cthe r M
I; iris tion off dale, ~ssid that. estl-
-mates 'before-the invasionyplaced .the
aumber.of Cubans in Grenadaat500 to
600, with at least balf-serving as - am
struaron workers.:It was not-apparent
until after the invasion began, he said,
that-many of those were trained-mm-
bat troops. Nor was the United States
aware- that the actual number of
Cubans in Grenada totaled more1han
1,100, hesaid. -
"Aware of a iguildup
me united States was aware of some
Cuban buildup )n recent weeks, Admi-
ral-McDonald said:.
On-Oct. 6, be' said; '"a Cuban troop
transport ship "offloaded arms in St.
George'sRarb9r" ?. =,.; _:._,. ._ . .
. ?On Oct. 24. the day before the inva-
sion began, be said, a Cuban transport
aircraft arrived in Grenada with a
delegation of military personnel. He
said that 'President Fidel Castro of
Cuba "later announced tbatthe delega-
tion was led by Col. Totola Comas for
the purpose of taking charge" of the
Calms an the island.
? "Colonel Totola was sent to organize
.and supervise defense of--the island."
the admiral continued= IAIICuban per-
tive' curly hanaicapped planning for the to-.'
Admiral- McDonald said the Defense vaaioa and left the troops that landed.
Departrnrmt din not a the where. unprepared for the intense resistance
abouts of the remaining 50D ,or more they faced from heavily armed Cuban
Cubans, but assumes they have fled i
b
t farces
a
.
com
into the bills where invading forces "ODe of the fundamentals of warfare
coutirtue to wester pockets of armed
resi*+~ is knowing the t3tresigth of your enemy
and to this=cane-'We were =badly sur-
cubmi Doc Cited " :_ -?- ;~?a'aeniorm ryaf5aersaid
"I think they're going back into the'_Admir McDonald,, noting :that
hnls," Admiral McDonald - said., "resistance was much greater than ex-
"They're Bring a delaying action or pel=ted due to the extensive Cuban mili-
they're taking us on to defend the mill tary.involvement on the island," said,
tary areas that they have been as-? - "I didn't have enough intelligencebut
signed to. As those places are being: - don't think there was a failure there."
overrun - I would say with a restraint The collection of intelligence infor-
oi force -- they are disappearing into matron in places such as Grenada does
the nuxmtatcs:" - - :not normally involve the kind of de.
Admiral McDonald. end other - Ad-' tailed, tactical reporting needed to plan;
ministration officials said the figure of an invasion, the admiral said, adding:
1,100 Cubans was based partly an docu- "1 don't think the system failed, I just;
meats t I at a Cuban military instal- t we didn't have the timeto concen-;
lati in Grenada overrun earlier this trateonit:"
weeks. The estimate is also drawn from , . : intelliannrea r r
comments by. Cuban P + the offs-_ e...~ Increased
vials said : Admiral McDonald said that -intelli-
Cantusion on the ground in Grenada; gence: coverage of Grenada was nOt
makes It Impossible to provide a pre -stepped up .until -several days before
tine carat of Cubans, the officials said. , the ipv_asip "When, we were invited
`~ res Reagan and his lop aides: ' by the Organization of. Eastern Carib'
have hxxeasingly empbasized the bean States to intervene it became ob-
Cuban presence m Grenada as aimstivious we had to solicit as much intelli-
genceas we could,.. he said.-.--. -
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s el were ordered twimprove-their
disposition."
Although Administration - officials
have expressed surprise at the extent
.of the Cuban military presence in Gre-
m the days since the invasion
n, there was intelligence informa-
tion available months ago that officials
cited at the time as evidence-of a large
Cuban involvement =
_ j March 9, for example; .Nestor D.
Sanc>7ex the Deputy, Assistant Secret'
tary olDefense for Inter American Al. fairs,:-old a. group of educators, "In
Grenada, Cuban influence has reached
such a-high level that it.can be consid-
ered a Cuban protegd-" - -
. Mr. Sanchez said, "Cuba has, for ex-
ample, cc sttucted a military camp in
Grenada" After describing the facili-_
ties at the camp in detail. Mr. Sanhez
said, "The camp is built to house a bat-
talion.-size unit and is being built by the
Cubans." An American battalion nor-
affl of aboutB00txoops.
HMT
0001-5 ?
 Approved For Release 2006/OtW. & A- D
October
61137R00
Cuba was tipped off to U.S. plans to invade orenada at least 24 hours before
tree attack began, possibly explaining why the 1,100-man Cuban force Seemed so
WEll prepared for the assault, U.S. intelligence sources said Friday night.
Sources, who spoke on condition they not be identified, said the warning came
from an "unintentional" leak from one of the Caribbean nations which joined the
United States in the invasion Tuesday.
The sources refused to disclose which of the six countries leaked the
information.
Although learning of the invasion plans, Cuba's President Fidel Castro did
,not send reinforcements to the island, but did dispatch an army colonel to
direct the island defense, the sources said.'
U.S. Marines and Army paratroopers who landed on Grenada in the pre-dawn
hours Tuesday were surprised by the stiffer-than-expected defense mounted by the
Cubans and the Grenadian army. The possibility of a leak could help explain why
the defenders were able to prevent U.S. forces from obtaining their main
objectives on the first day.
Meanwhile, the Navy admiral who commanded the invasion force and a White
House spokesman disputed suggestions that U.S. intelligence had failed by
underestimating the number of Cubans on the island by about half.
"You can't know everything," said de uty press secretar Larr S Bakes ho
adoed that there was no U.S. intelligence operation in Grenada. "You do your
best."
1dm. Wesley McDonald, commander in chief of the Atlantic fleet, said, "I
didn't have enough intelligence, but there wasn't an intelligence failure. I
don't think the system failed. We just didn't have the time to focus on it.''
In tial estimates put the number of Cubans on Grenada at 600, a figure that
Was raised to "upwards of 1,000" once the U.5.-led invasion of the island got
under way early Tuesday. McDonald said the estimate was 1,100 Cubans, with more
than 300 still fighting.
President Reagan said he launched the invasion at the request of SIX Eastern
Caribbean nations concerned about a bloody leftist coup on Grenada and the
possibility that violence would spread to them.
U.S. intelli ence hastily compiled what it could about Cuban and Grenadian
military strength last week as final plans were put together for the invasion,
Reagan administration sources said, but the CIA estimate. proved off the mark
when U.S. forces landed on the island.
U.S. officials, speaking publicly and privately, have expressed surprise at STAY
the number of Cubans on the island and the determined fight mounted by Cuban and
Grenadian defenders.
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP90-01137R0
A T~''F. r'- "~'r i CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
21 September 1983
CIA, Pentagon disagree
on Soviet arms spending
Washington
The CIA and the Defense Depart-
ment disagree over whether Soviet
military spending is increasing, ac-
cording to a report by the Congres-
sional Joint Economic Committee. The
report was released Tuesday by Sen.
William Proxmire (D) of Wisconsin,
who said it raised questions about the
accuracy of US assessments-of Soviet
military Strength.
The CIA- estimated Soviet military
spending grew at a yearly rate of 2 -
percent during 1978-81, compared
with an annual rate of 4 to 5 percent
during the previous'10 years' ' 7. 1
The Defense Department's Defense'
Intelligence Agency said there was no
slowdown in Soviet military spending,
and it estimated annual increases of 6
to 7 percent during the last decade,
according to the report. Senator
Proxmire said the CIA estimates
seemed more accurate because they
were adjusted for inflation and the de-
tense agency's were not
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 Approved For Release 2001' 1176a :$ RDTI i4'2T 100
20 September 1983.
WASHINGTON
SOVIET MILITARY" SPENDING DATA MAY BE INFLATED
By PATRICIA KOZA
CuestianEble methods of analysis by Pentagon intell igen perts may be
producing inflated estimates of Soviet spending on the superpower; arms race,
congressional panel indicated Tuesday.
Sen. William Proxmire, D-Wis., released a study by the Joint Economic
Committee that analyzed the differences between recent estimates made by the
CIA and the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency.
The CIA study found that Soviet defense costs grew at an annual rate of 2
percent during 1978-81, compared to a growth rate of 4 percent to 5 percent
during the previous 10 years.
The DIA study agreed with the Central : Intelligence Agency's dollar cost
estimates, but its own current ruble-price analytical process - which does not
take inflation into account ---- indicated no slowdown in total Soviet defense
spending.
The DI, found that Soviet actual defense spending increased by 6 percent to 7
percent in real terms, after inflation, during the 1970s and defense procurement
Growth slowed somewhat, from 9.11 percent in the first half of the decade to 6-9
percent in the second half.
The Pentagon agency also concluded the share of the Soviet economy devoted to
the.military increased from 13 percent to 14 percent in 1970 to 14 percent to 16
percent in 1981. The CIA. concluded it did not change during the decade.
Proxmire said the Pentagon agency in effect challenges the CIA es tirrates
but in doing 5G, is raising more questions than it answers.
'The fact that the DIA's estimates are not adjusted for inflation reduces
their usefulness to practically zero, Proxmire said. "This questionable
practice could result in inflating the costs of Soviet defense.
" At the very least, the DIA's methodology should be subjected to careful
scrutiny by an outside group of experts so that Congress understands what weight
to dive it. "
The study noted the CIA rates the margin of error on its dollar cost
estimates as plus or minus 10 percent. A DIA spokesman estimated the margin of
error in the indirect method for measuring Soviet military procurement was plus
or minus 33 percent.
The report also noted that the CIA's methodology was subjected to ''an
exhaustive review'' by an outside panel.
The latest CIA estimates are significant because they demonstrate a
change in' the trend of Soviet defense growth over a five-year period,'' the
study said. ''The period is longer than previous cyclical fluctuations and could
represent a medium- or longer-term phenomenom."
C0A'I7IVLTF-D
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100
ART I Cl ~? r'?,,
ON PADS WASHTNGTON POST
30 June 1983
The Oil- Glut Will Continue
Hobart Rowen
The conventional wisdom in financial
circles--more of a hope-is that world,
oil prices Will stabilize around the
OPEC-set price of $`?9- a barrel, and;
maybe even go up a bit if economic
growth in the industrial world picks up.
Not likely, savsa man who has been
right all along on oil. Well before Wall:
Street and the CIA caught on: Prof.
Elivahu Kanovsky, of Queens College
and Bar-Ilan' University, an American
economist who resides in Israel, pre-
dicted the oil glut, and the break in
OPEC power and prices.
-.-Those who scoffed at Kanovsky. be-:
cause they'presumed he had an -Isr_ aeli
bias made a costly mistake. His factu-
ally dispassionate assessments- on the
oil iuuthx)k put the forecasts of highly
paid and highly visible oil consultants
in New York to shame,
Now. in an interview here,. Kanovsky
predicts that as a consequence of the lit-
tle-understo od but devastating Iran-Iraq
war, the oil glut is goring to-be extended
and deepened-and that can only mean
a further sharp drop in o , prices..
Ka.novsky anticipates "a? 'erosion" of 2
to :3 percent a year in real prices.
What's more, fanovsky reports that
American diplomats and other experts
have-failed to grasp the extent of the
current economic crisis in Egypt, so se-
vere that any Egyptian government.
must be prepared lirr social upheavals.
And ironically, they also do not un-'.
derstand that the real reason .Jordan's
King Hussein is ,unwilling to join ne-
gotiations over the West Bank is the
unique and unheralded economic suc-
cess in -Jordan,. which has enjoyed -a
read growth rate of 8 to 10 percent an-
nually over the last decade.
-"Hussein would he crazy to rock the
boat." Kanovsky says simply. . ? -
"Aniericaua policy -in the Middle -Ea-st
has been based over the last. nunal-er of
veins; on out asetunptiom, initiated by
IHenr l Kissinger, that there were three
friendly countries of imisrrtance-- name-
ly. Irut, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Well, nl
course, Iran has fallen by the wayside,':
ICaux-vsky says. "But my anal sis _sug-,
gests that the other two are on their
way."
The American fixation on the "special"
U 5. Saudi relationship, he points out, as.
sumed "that the need firr their oil would
increase and that their financial assets
would- increase." -Hut with the glut-in-
duced crack in oil' prices, the Saudis no
longer are piling up mnney a ,erves.
In fact, Saudi Arabia-will have a $:n)
fiilli-m balance-of prayments deficit this
year, shrinking its reserve assets from
$140 billion to $120 billion. This cushion
will go clown more, he says,- as the Saudis,
fearfiil of Iran, are forced to shovel out
additional billions of dollars to the Iraqis.
Egypt is in worse shape, Despite lav-
ish American economic and military;
aid, Egypt faces desperate problems,
exacerbated by the drop in oil prices.
Egypt's relatively small volume of oil
exports (in relation to the OPEC
world) was bringing the Mubarak gov-
ernment about :i:3 billion in revenue,.ar
more than four times the total export
sales of every. thing else, including cart-:
ton. And at the peak of the OPEC
boom, Egypt was earning $3 billion an-
nually from the wages of 1.5 million
Egyptian nationals who worked in the
oil fields of other exporting countries.
Come now to the Iran-Iraq war. The
world glut developed even though, Iran's
f,-million-harrels.a-dap- - potential and
Iraq's :3.5 million daily output liar the
most part-couldn't be marketed while the
two countries were shooting at each
other.
Initially, the decline in' Iranian pro-
duction'. didn't cost Khomeini much in
revena,'because prices skyrocketed. But
when the effects of war devastation, along
with huge casualties, began to cripple the
Iranian economy. Khomeini once again
stepped up oil proxiuction.
Now, after three years of decline,
Kanovsky reports, Iran's nil production
is back up fmom a low point of 1.-5 mil-
lion barrels a day to close to :3 million.
But the Iraqis. whose main pipeline to
Mediterranean ports-has been blocked
by Syria, are left with only one outlet, a
pipeline through Turkey, with a. ca-
pacity of merely 6.50,000 barrels a day.
Thus, as the war continues, Iran has
st fully begun 4t Ix ost its oil pmduc
tion and exports, while Iraq is unable to .
do su--and is dependent on the Saudis
and Kuwaitis to keep up:a now of finan-
cial aid, estimated at $45 billion so far.
"This ' means that sooner or later
they ISaudi Arabia and Kuwait[ are
going in have "- raise their (own oil)
production. When and if the war ends,
Iraq is going to unleash its-[oil produc-
tion] potential. _. nd --its - potential -- is
-huge-second only in `that' of -Saudi
Arabia in the Middle East.... .
"What this suggests is that the oil
glut is going to be made lengthier and
pwssibly. steeper than ..-it would other-
wise be," Kanovsky concludes. -
American, officials, whose plans for
the Middle East have so often misfired,
might be helped in their policy-making
1f they take the-trmibie in-enalyze the
available economic facts.
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 THE WASHINGTON POST
27 April 1983
In-House Study Cites
11 `Principal Flaws' ProgTa-
O Y Torn .hales
CBS News Yesterday released,
v: it.i: urea; reluctance and on orders
=from a U -district-judge, a. 68-page
in-house report- that takes-the net,,
-work tti task'forthevvav a C_BS-doc- 'J
-umentarv,.'?The"iliaeounted Enemy-
A Vietnam Deception," was prepared-
and presented early last year.
It finds1L"Drinrwal flaws"-in..
-program, charges -it-with several-*n="
olations of CBS Neves "guidelines;"
and probably reveals the inner work-
ing-_z of a broadcast news organiza-
tion in more naked detail than a net-
work nas ever crone before.
Amonc the documentary's flaws
.-e
H, h v CBS News senior execu-
rive producer Burton Benjamin, who
compiled the report: failure to prove
that the under-reporting of enemy
troop strength in Vietnam was in-
deed a "conspiracy" as the documen-
tarv charged; failure to identify one
participant in the ocumentarv (for-
mer CLa analyst Sam Adams) as a
"pare consultant; an imbalance in
presenting the two sides of the is-
sue"; and "the - coddling of sympa-
thetic witnesses" during the filming
of interviews for the program-
In a statement released by, CBS
with the report, CBS Neap president
Van Gordon Sauter calls it "a
-thoughtful and detailed inquiry" but
says "CBS stands by the documen-
tary' and its value-to those seeking a
broader understanding of the Viet-
nam experience.`
.___ The documentary was. controver-
sial when first aired, on Jan. 23,
1982. It -presented evidence, often
from the mouths -of the .military
leaders involved, that during the
'Vietnam -war military .intelligence
consistently and, the report. said,
underestimated enemy
strength so as to support the falla- i
cious notion that. the Viet Cong were
losing the war and that America
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While the Benjamin Report is high-
]v critical of the way the documentary
was made, it also quotes, and appears
to- endorse, a remark -made to Benja-
min by Howard - Stringer, then exec-
utive producer of "CBS Reports;" the
unit responsible for the documentary.
Stringer said, if all the standards of
fairness had been followed, it. -would
not have changed the outcome of the
broadcast."
The Benjamin Report was precip-
itated by TV Guide magazine, which
published an attack on the documen-
tary last May with the blazing cover
headline, "Anatomy of a Smear,' The
article called the documentary `'pow-
erful and Polished" and "ambitious"
but also said it was ;'often arbitrary
and unfair" and charged it with var-
ious journalistic. infractions made in
the pursuit of proving a thesis. Then,
in, September, Gen. William? C. West-
moreland, former commander of U.S.
military forces in Vietnam and one of
those interviewed on the program,
filed suit against CBS Inc, for $120
million on the grounds that the doc-
umentary, had dishonored him.
Soon controversy surrounding a
documentary about the Vietnam war,-.
still an extremeh touchy subject in
itself, had escalated into what. some at
CBS News have characterized as an
"all-out assault" on "media" in general.
In coming forth to defend Westmore-
land, CBS sources have said publicly
and privately, his friends and support-
ers have found a new club with which
to beat the press.
Yesterday, Westmoreland's lawyer.
Dan M. Burt, president of the Capital
Legal ? Foundation here, said he con-
sidered the Benjamin Report, "devas-
tating" and "very harmful" to CBS
News. "Obviously I doet think it's a_;
document CBS is happy to have other
people have," Burt said. "I do not
think this will make our-case an y more
difficult -I think it will::make- it-sub-.
stantiallv easier." Burt - complained
that CBS had delivered the document
to reporters before delivering it to him,
but, said his first impression was that it
clearly did not square" with an eight-
page memorandum issued last July by
Sauter. The memo summarized the
report but declined to make its full
contents public and said, "CBS News
stands by this broadcast.'
Last. week U.S. District Court Judge
Pierre N. Leval, who ruled that the
report had to be made available to the
court. said, "If the Benjamin Report
does not say what the Sauter memo-
randum says it says, it could be signif-
icant proof of malice or recklessness on
CBS's part, in issuing Sauter's state-
ment ..."
"Probably. Mr. Sauter has a very se-
rious problem.` Burt said yesterday,
referring to alleged disparities between
the memo and the report The report
concludes that "a 'conspiracy,' given
,the accepted definition. of _ theme word:
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were not new, but this w s t e - trst
time military- officials involved had
'rone on camera to sunnort then,
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April 1983
Lh
TS &:COMENT'
WASHINGTON
ELOQUENT
STATISTICS
A new study of military and social
spending details where nations are
concentrating their resources
e4
R urE LEGER SrvARD has been pub-
lishing World Military and Social
/ Expenditures since 1974, the year after
she left her job as chief of the economics
division of the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency. Her annual re-
port is a riveting document with an un-
fortunate title; it suggests a weighty
tome of arduous reading, precisely what
it is not. It may, in fact, be the most ef-
fective (and least publicized) portrait we
have of our imperiled planet. In a maga-
zine-size booklet of only forty-four
pages, the 1982 edition quantifies the
arms race and its staggering economic
consequences with a concision and clar-
ity that even the most ardent cold war-
rior would find difficult to dismiss.
The numbers she presents are dismay-
ing. An estimated 100 million people are
engaged directly or indirectly in military
activities: 25 million troops march in the
world's armed forces, backed three-to-
one by reserves, paramilitary forces,
and the civilians needed to produce the
weapons and services essential for their
operation. An estimated one billion peo-
ple live in poverty ; 900 million adults re-
main illiterate; 600 million people are un-
der- or unemployed. Between 1960 and
1980, the population of the developed
world grew from 879 million to slightly
more than one billion. The developing
countries grew from 2.17 billion to 3.42
billion. During that same period, the
armed forces in the developed nations
decreased from 9.9 million to 9.5 million,
while in the Third World the total almost
doubled, to 15 million-nearly two
thirds of the world's total armed forces.
Arms imports of developing countries
have risen even more sharply, in 1980,
they came to $20 billion, three quarters
of world arms trade. The poorest coun-
tries now have access to the most ad-
vanced forms of military technology.
They have access to military guidance,
as well. According to Sivard, an incom-
plete record shows ninety-three coun-
tries and territories in which there is a
foreign military presence, with at least
1,800,000 personnel involved. One quar-
ter of the forces, she says, are on foreign
ground to fight wars; the rest are abroad
for such reasons as supporting govern-
ments in power, providing training, con-
ducting nuclear tests, and establishing
listening posts or bases for ships and
planes. In 1981, the United States pro-
vided military training to forces from
sixty developing countries, the United
Kingdom to trainees from twenty-three
developing countries.
The intrusion of military authority
and influence into the political realm has
been one of the fastest growing enter-
prises of the second half of this century,"
Sivard writes. Of the 113 countries she
lists in the Third World, fifty-two are un-
der military domination by their national
governments. More than thirty are pro-
ducing weapons, some as complex as
fighter aircraft and missiles. According
to Amnesty International, the U.S.
State Department, and other sources
cited by the author, forty-nine of the
fifty-two regimes limit citizens' rights to
safety under the law, "almost two-thirds
of them showing a consistent pattern of
extreme repression, including the use of
torture ...." In the past twenty-two
years, 112 coups have taken place in
these developing nations; Bolivia led the
way, with eight, followed by Ghana (five)
and Argentina. Honduras, Peru, Bangla-
desh, Vietnam, and Benin (four
each).
Sivard calculates that since 1960 more
than 10 million people have died in sixty-
five major wars (defined as causing more
than 1,000 deaths). This, of course, is
only a partial accounting. Forty-nine
countries have been caught up in war
since 1960, almost all' of them .in the
Third World. In 1982 alone, new and old
conflicts spilled blood in El Salvador, the
Falklands, Northern Ireland, Afghani-
stan, Lebanon, Iran-Iraq, Ethiopia-So-
malia, the Western Sahara, and Angola.
'Q4VUED
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J
 THE BALTIMORE SUN
31 Marc: 1983
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Opinion e Commentary
Tunnel Vision .11-
Self-Deception, Self-Destruction
KNOW THYSELF," said the
Greek sages. and a military
adage that may be equally ancient
advises: "Know your enemy."
Looking back on the American
intervention in Vietnam, 10 years
after it ended, it is difficult to avoid
the conclusion that the U.S. mili-
tary leadership in that conflict un-
derstood neither its enemy nor it-
self.
If American strategy was faulty
because it miscalculated the pres-
sures its enemy could withstand,
the error was compounded by
equal}-, faulty evaluations of how
the strategy was working. The sys-
tem of reports from subordinates to
higher commanders almost seemed
designed to frustrate true under-
standinE. The military historian
Cecil B Currey. writing under the
pseudonym "Cincinnatus," chose
tht a--le "Self-Destruction'- for his
highly critical 1981 book on the
Vietnam-era Army. "Self-Decep-
tion" might have been equally ap-
propriate.
Most notoriously distorted,
probably, was the "body count" of
claimed enemy dead. Military corn-
rnanders have exaggerated enemy
casualties. as Cincinnatus pointed
out, ever since Samson reported
sizvinr a thousand foes with the
law: one of an ass. But, in Vietnam,
where the United States fought, a
war of attrition whose aim was to
inflict losses that would force the
Communists to quit, the body
cou:: became the ont, measure of
battlefield achievement. and thus
of the success and future promo-
tion, of field commanders. The re-
suit was enormous pressure at ev-
ery level in the chair. of command
to report huge numbers of enemy
deaths, whether the figures were
reliable or not- -
'When the higher commanders
rode lower ones for better statisti-
cal. results." retired Brigadier Gen-
era] Douglas Kinnard pointed out
sardonically in his postwar study
The - War Managers, "it was evi-
dent they were going to get either
the statistics or the results, and on
fortunate occasions both." Of the
Vietnam-era generals whom Gen-.
era] Kinnard polled for his book, 61
per cent believed the body counts
were inflated. "The immensity of
the false reporting," wrote one of
his respondents, "is a blot on the
honor of the Army." -
Body counts by South Vietnam-
ese units, which may have been
even less trustworthy than Ameri-
can claims, were nonetheless given
a spurious credibility by being re-
produced without any qualifying
disclaimers in official reports, dis-
tributed in the U.S. defense and
foreign affairs bureaucracies and to
Congress. Far from expressing
skepticism, in fact, U.S. analysts
increased the Vietnamese claims by
35 per cent, an arbitrary estimate
of the number of Communist sol-
diers who were permanently disa-
bled or died of wounds after being
evacuated from the battlefields.
In 1972 this method produced
an official estimate that nearly
180,000 enemy troops, or nearly
half the entire Communist combat
force, had been permanently put
out of action. Lt only one man were
wounded for every one killed, that.
would mean the whole Communist
Army had become casualties. Yet
despite its obvious absurdity the
statistic was enshrined in the offi-
cial records and no doubt contrib-
uted to Washington's rosy view of
its ally's prospects at the signing of
the 1973 Vietnam ceasefire agree-
ment.
Exaggerated body counts were
only one aspect of questionable re-
porting. -"Once the high command
decided what it was going to do,
and the orders went down the line,"
(says, Douglas Blaufarb, a former
Central Intelligence Agency offi-
cial, "it was more or less under-
stood what kind of reporting was
going to come back up ... Report-
By Arnold R. s
ing that reflected on whether the
strategy was succeeding was terri-
bly distorted. [It] was all permeat-
ed with the assumption that the
command wanted to hear good
things, the way to get. ahead was to
serve up the good information. it
was a very corrupt system, I'm
afraid."
It seems fairly clear that-assess-
ments of the effectiveness of the air
war, for example, were exaggerated,
as were American evaluations of
the South Vietnamese Army, whose
sudden collapse in the spring of
1975 -- due to economic hardship
and material shortages and an offi-
cer corps that proved uneoua] to
the demands put on it when the
U.S. combat support ended '-
caught Washington policymakers
completely by surprise.
In their own war. American
commanders reported success with-
out ever considering that Commu-
nist strategists might perceive the
war very differently. In 1970 and
1971, when combat diminished in
large areas of the country following
several years of pacification efforts,
the Americans looked around them
and saw only encouraging signs.
More villages were secure, or
seemed so; more roads were open to
civilian and military traffic; more
peasants were seeking the greater
safety of government-held zones in-
stead of risking the bombing. shell-
ing. defoliation and pacification
raids that were regularly Visited on
Communist or contested areas.
To some, the relative calm
looked like victory. "If successful
pacification is the yardstick," de-
clared the military affairs colum-
nist Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr.,
"the war in Vietnam is already set-
tled. We have won." But pacifica-
tion was not the yardstick, and its
apparent success was not victory.
To a large extent it, reflected a stra-
tegic retreat but not the surrender
or disappearance of the Communist
insurgency; the concept of "pro-
tracted war," in which combat was
to be avoided when conditions were
unfavorable, was after all at the
heart of Communist strategy.
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 Vttl= Alt
ON ?AGE
28 MARC1 1983
Interview With Gen. John Vessey, Jr.,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Why the U.S.
Must Stay in the
Arms Race .
America can deter the Soviets from going to
war today, says the nation's top military
officer. But all bets are off for tomorrow if
present trends are not reversed.
Q General Vessey, why does the Pentagon give Americans
the impression that Russia produces near-perfect weapons and
goes from strength to strength while the US. always has trouble
with its weapons and is constantly plagued by problems in its
defense buildup? Is the military situation really that bleak and
lopsided?
A If the picture we have painted appears that grim to
the public, then we have painted it inaccurately. It's fair to
sax- that the Soviets have got all the' same problems in
producing high-technology weaponry that we have--may-
be more- Besides, their troops are inferior to ours. '
And while we in the United States are choking on the
question of whether or not to spend 6.3, 6.4 or 6.5 percent
of our gross national product for defense, the Soviets are
spending 15 percent of their GNP for defense. That alone
has got to give them great social and economic problems-
and clearly it does.
But having said that, we must also recognize that the
Soviets are continuing to build an, enormous military arse-
nal. They are building far more than they would ever need
for legitimate defense-and that concerns me.
ed For Release 2(6,01ft8Ck4E20R%1jWjR0001
Q Some U.S. intelligence analysts now claim that they may
have overestimated the level of Soviet defense spending in
recent years. Does that mean that the Soviet buildup has been
exaggerated and that the U.S. can scale back its buildup
accordingly?
A You have to put that whole issue into some perspec-
tive, it is undisputed that since the early 1970s Soviet
military investment has far exceeded ours. By investment, I
refer to the amount that they have spent on weapons and
weapons research. The cumulative difference is very
large-400 to 500 billion dollars-and that has not changed.
The argument within the intelligence community, such
as there is-one, is simply about whether the gap is continu-
ing to grow at the same rate as before or whether it is
starting to flatten out some. It's a technical argument that
has very little bearing on what we need to do in our own
defense budget. We still have to contend with the power
the Soviets have bought with that extra 400 to 500 billion.-
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137
LOS ANGELES TIMES
OTC PAGE 27 MARCH 1983
Reagan on
. _ b fti . WW,- aFf fareigrCmid d=esdc policy sssue s that LoQch the
President Stirs gas the gremlin grown atrapger Hwea of Pirts~aUy aIlgmric; .. ^.. _ ? : ;
&bat Uwled off `by:Reagan'i i I P
Broad Debate the United Stataa and its allies :buildup has: .. ~.. =
~xbate on In , artillery and other . Znfluemed the tent,=d er f
conventional farces as well? If it
Arms Superiority has, what then? What difference
does "
i
it
"
ak
t
super
or
y
m
e
o the
-atomic age? Given the tmdputed
foreign ?pol icy, tnrludi ng the shaperof US.-=ms cool
proposals, :this country's relations with its
Earivelin
allies and the temperature -cif Washingtmm's dealings
By R OBERTL. TCXI'H, uasCaess of American m ibU ry pow-
T:rnraSa er, -would-,it-.matter.-if -the Soviets
WASHINGTON --President,hstrouger? is. s call far
Reagan. M, calling for the greatest: S
armma buildup is L.S. his-ta has -~, formrne' over~tl?" - __-
p:unged the nation into an urgent = str ~t in -the -name of 'God is
and potentia~ly fateful debate over tegtc supenvrtty ?" former Sec-
the relauve military strength of the;reary of State Henry A i nger
countryand its sttpeipvwa-adver- ?mee demanded =:in
~austed frustrate= ,a"Whitt is moment of the`
s? ry the Soviet r'.-.- ;
YO balance," Re declared j ulL[:ALI%= LA IL ( ~', 113-
may. operdtianally, at the levels
`l$s?~ year
the Sovi
t
h
.
e
s
ave _a
of numbers?. What can you do with
(iefinite clacker of superWrity." And it',"
his current def
c
an
.4 -fk4g ;]IM -peace,
d
pmralul reRgous ]ewers as *be -= ;
Roman Qtholic bishops into tbe-f and sth fated-?: 1i
nationwide campaign for a nuclear free.
-Intensified fears thatincrea ty intricate nuclear'
weapons systems are themselves a greater. threat .to
peace and human survival than The Soviet faces tbey..
werehutltx+od+e9,er. - .
Gone ?are : the days when American nuclear - zibt
geDeially was seen as a positive fiats in the world, =
RUgene V. Rostov, former erector o' the Arms
ContrN --and DisarmameaL Agency,- said President
Dwight D. nbower's 'tamlear hint"-implichty-
same kind of talk that led the ? ?"_ not simple or "`~-R", gnu a the Korean War.-And overw u
have far-reaching consequences. -late as 1 b~elmmg`_ ry
democracies to neglect their de- They involve questions of Dabboal vrSo the Amxn= nuclear. arsetW
fences in tae 1ST and invited the outnumbered the Soviets' by a ratio of 40 to 1,1s credited
tragedy of Warid War IL" ~' and ? and ? y with feccing Mosww to back down during the Cuban
L it tee, however, that the : missile crisis. Soviet Union has gained Today, by :contrast;
military large segments of the Eczra
s'4e_ncrn4y over the United States? and American population take no comfort from plans
lans
Does Moscov command a superior for 'restoring" the nuclear balance by adding to and
a--sepal or strategic weapons, from improving the U.S. arsenal Instead of feeling rewzure: ,
continent-spanning. ICBMs eano to nu- ? as they once did, that greater strength makes war less
clear-a.-med submarines and bomb- likely, many people now say mare weapons make them
err? What about intermediate- feel more vulnerable - 9 ......
range nuclear weapons, such as the ? Fee nap Snit Be Dared
Soviet that can easily European targets the: h
Wei . vastly, -
-x`his Psychological element has
Soviet homeland? the problems of developing national vet ityppolc es,
even though many specialists believe that it clouds the
basic issues.
As Harold Brown. `farmer President. Jimmy Carter's
defense secretary, said in an interview:' Reaasruanee 38 not more important than deterrence and not of equal
ttaportance, either. Reassurance comes from a steady:
hand in diplomacy, and no American .ad tn'
recent. years has provided that: As for detenvca-, y'o ~
still Deed to 1cx atthe military balancein asses g itw'
-ycLpolicy-makeiseanaatigrrae'the way.pecgle fed
as Resgsca as learDed. in. l ? t~h~--~~ ,.ryattle aver bb a
, sl ;
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 V
NEW AR~ICS d For Release 20 YORK TW P90-O1137ROO
OdZ PAGE
Sch1ethiger's ~y tai vie.,
Spedw to-rim Neti-Ybrk Tl ? ...
I AI think it is - if we have eco- r m8 something .like full employment
' March 18 How. ' nomic recovery. We ought not to think and continued economic. growth, an
WASHINGTON
,
advantageous is the oil price-decline? ' of the recession as a cure for, our .: assumption that apparently has been
first Secretary of Energy, believes-.it- prospects are grimmer: than five
over, he says, it may further dampen .- : ' live effects of recession and in-
efforts to develop alternative fuels-
Mr. Schlesinger, a former top budg-
et, defense and intelligence official as
.well as Energy Secretary, is now a.
,Kuhn Loeb Inc- and Georgetown Uni-
ternational Studies. The following are-':
creased energy efficiency?
A. At least half of the decline in oil
demand is` attributable to the decline
in international economic activity. We
the order of 4 million barrels- a day.
That, with an end to destocking, would
increase-: demand': from the OPEC
ganization ? of : Petroleum Exporting
Countries and other energy matters.
Q. What does the OPEC .' price .
cut to Sts a barrel mean?
A. There is a chance the agreement
will hold, but the probabilities arethat
-there will be further downward pres-
sure on prices in the spring. If prices
ing it was more powerful than it vide some degree of protection for do- gas prices would be the same- Old gas
really was? mestic oil production -- we have the prices would come up to something.'
d
and this would put us back into the-
same position we were in the the late
1970's and early i980's.. . ..
'gasoline tax or import fee? _
A. I have always been in favor of. a
substantial increase in gasoline taxes..
41This is an especially-good time. The
?d fee is a less certain item; it
break, they could go down to the $22-.-- ;;
to $'13-a-barrel range. F might lead to a restoration of the enti-
tlements-program. Nonetheless, given
Q Did OPEC bluff us into think . the circumstances, we ought to pro-
lowest reserve-topro
uction . ra o 7 egtu nurn level. if one be.-
A. Some of the power we presumed .: :. amongst major countries - and such lieves the Administration, the new gas
they had was illusion on our part.. It. a fee would be-necessary-';..- - P would-fall. That means that the
-
was a rationalization for what were.... major'trends in the oil market rein....
ail
- what is useful for us in the energy pro y, ex MV. on we
KY . nice in shipping oil to the continental Hill by members of Congress.. But I
I marirat chnv+ 1o.RF1-_ie iarbhr fn ha _1 ____?
ec
ine
eca
bas use major invest- tion and I think that there-was undue
A . The fundamental point is that enu bane been made by the comps- b
---- ^._--- - nize that the acceptability of that idea A. I think there was some eau
a substantial plus. Do you agree? d
g8--
l
d b
incentive to go out and, find new re-
;- ixowever, u prices-aie merely to atp
for a Chart time, then pop back up, the
result willbe a decline in efforts to de-
velop alternative supplies and in drill-
ing activity in the United States and
other high- costareas..
Q. You didn't mention banking.
A. I should have. This brings great.
pressure to bear on those banks that
have extended substantial credits to
oil-producing countries such as Mexi-
A. It certainly has an adverse of
t fect. It will increase the deficits. irhe
Government is now a partner of the oil
industry to a degree it has not been in.
Q. How well have our Intelli-
genee agencies done In energy
analysis? ; : ?:: >t
A. I.think they were functional with
regard to prospective oil supply. They
were less accurate with regard to pro-
jetting demand. The Central InteUi-.
.,--gene Ageopys estimate was
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Q. I gather you think the decline
will be temporary.
. the_strategic off -reserve fast
enough?
?A No:.I believe-in a maximum fill`
are temporarily dipping, we can fill at
synthetic fuel projects?
A-'' The most important are those-
that provide fuel -liquids. We ought to
have the technologies in hand to
produce them synthetically.. At the-
present rate of progress, it appears
. those technologies will ambitiously be-
developed around *the -year? 2000 in-,
stead of the year 1990. That's regretta-:
Q. What do you think of the A&%..
ministration's natural gas bill?
A. The Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978 was: intended to: provide - some
subsidization of those who would go-
out and -find, new reserves. The Ad-
ministration's bill would end that; all
 NEW
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COUKSE,
FOR THE DEPARTMENI_ I F DEFENSE io BRING TOTHE ArTENTION OFKEI NEWS DEVELOPMENTS, USE OF THESE ARTICLFS HERE, OF I JO
DOD PERSONNEL NEWS TEMS Of INTER E~ T TO I HEM IN TH EIR OFFICIAL NOT REFLECr OFFICIAL ENDORSEMFNI. FURTIiERREPRODUC N FOR
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PE KNODICA US AND BROADCASTS AS AM EAN SOF KEEP] N G IN FORMED ABOUT RF.STKIC FIONS.
Stalin's Postwar Army
Reappraised
Pages 110
139
167
Matthew A.
Evangelista
At the end of
War, II, the Soviet army was considered a major threat to the secu
Western Europe, one that could be deterred only by U.S. possession
atomic bomb. In the words of Winston Churchill, "it is indeed a mela
thought that nothing preserves Europe from an overwhelming military attack
except the devastating resources of the United States in this awful weapon-"'
The perception of Soviet conventional armies as overly large, offensively
oriented, and invincibly strong was the driving force behind the formation
of a Western military alliance and a major determinant in the evolution of
U.S. nuclear strategy.2 In the United States, the popular press supported the
notion that a Soviet conventional invasion of Western Europe could be coun-
tered only by U.S. strategic air power and nuclear weapons. As one Newsweek
article from 1948 described the situation:
In the great Washington debate on American defense requirements, the chief
emphasis is put on knocking out Russia in any future war. The temporary
overrunning of Europe by the Red Army is taken for granted.'
The balance of East-West conventional forces presented-175 Soviet divisions
and 75 East European divisions to less than a score of Western divisions-
did indeed make the prospects for a nonnuclear defense of Western Europe
appear bleak.'
I would like to thank Randall Forsberg for encouragement and support during the preliminary
stages of my research on this topic, conducted at her Institute for Defense and Disarmament
Studies in Brookline, Mass_ from 1980-1981. 1 am also grateful to David Holloway of the
University of Edinburgh, Jane -Sharp, Ben Miller, and Walter LaFeber of Cornell University for
their helpful comments and suggestions.
Matthew A. Evangelista is a Graduate Student and an Andrew D. White Fellow in the Department of
Government at Cornell University.
1. Winston Churchill, "The Peril in Europe," a political party broadcast, August 26, 1950, in The
Collected Works of Sir Winston Churchill (London: Cassell, 1975), Vol. 29, p. 29.
2. For a discussion of other factors bearing on early U.S. nuclear weapons decisions, see Gregg
Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War 1945-1950 (New York: Knopf,
1980).
3. Newsweek, May 10, 1948, p_ 32-
4. A typical presentation is an article entitled "Russia's Edge in Men and Arms," U.S. News and
Helen Young, SurfiRt ietNew Branch ?g_01~~71pl~~U~~OTS~istant Chief
For special Yes 8~" 1 it oi , ws na ysls ervice, 695-2884
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Stalin's Postwar Army 1 115
first years of occupation. At this time, however, the JCS no longer described
Soviet troops in terms of their occupation function, but rather as offensively
oriented combat forces: "They are so disposed as to provide a highly mobile
and armored spearhead for an offensive in Western Europe in the event of
a war. "13
Although most observers agreed on a figure of about 30 for Soviet divisions
deployed in Eastern Europe in the late 1940s,14 the final total for postdemo-
bilization forces remained in dispute. Nikita Khrushchev claimed in a speech
before the Supreme Soviet in January 1960 that the size of the Soviet armed
forces (including, presumably, the ground forces, navy, and air forces) had
decreased from 11,365,000 in 1945 to 2,874,000 in 1948.1' This latter figure is
considerably less than most Western estimates of the time, which fell around
4,000,000 for total Soviet armed forces (see Table 1).16
Most contemporary Western observers now agree that Khrushchev's num-
bers were generally accurate and that overall manpower strength of the
Soviet armed forces was considerably exaggerated in the West during the
early postwar years." The more striking point, however, is that the U.S.
Joint Chiefs of Staff at first predicted that the Soviets would need these large
numbers of troops simply for occupation needs. Later, when the JCS was
planning Soviet invasion scenarios, they used their overinflated estimates to
predict invasions that the Soviets were incapable of executing, due to the
decreased manpower levels resulting from earlier demobilization. The gen-
eral conclusions resulting from these early studies-that the Soviets could
easily sweep across Western Europe-were never revised to account for
lower estimates of Soviet divisional and manpower strength.
THE INVASION SCENARIO AND THE CENTRAL BALANCE OF FORCES
In order to consider in more detail the prospects for a successful Soviet
invasion, one must understand the type of attack envisaged and the forces
that would be involved on both sides. Western military officials expected
that the Soviets would launch a surprise attack primarily with standing forces
13. JIC Report, December 2, 1948, p. 22.
14. Wolfe writes that this number remained fairly constant through the early 1950s, Soviet Power
and Europe, p. 39. European military analysts, writing in the mid-1950s, expressed the same
view. See, for example, Allgemeine Schweizerische Militdrzeitschrift, December 1956, p. 928.
15, Khrushchev's speech is printed in Pravda, January 15, 1960.
16. See Wolfe's discussion, Soviet Power and Europe, pp. 10-11, esp. footnotes 3-6, where he
reviews the sources of information on Soviet armed forces strength during the period.
17. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, pp. 38-39.
International Security 1 116
in Europe (fearing that a major mobilization would spoil the surprise) and
that they would employ a blitzkrieg strategy.
In 1947, the joint War Plans Committee (JWPC) of the JCS described the
probable attack as "developing in three thrusts, i.e., (1) across the north
German plain, (2) from Thuringa [sic] southwest through the Lorraine Gap
and thence, down the Rhone Valley, and (3) into the Danish Peninsula."18
Soviet troops deployed in such an attack would presumably be those sta-
tioned in Germany, Austria, Poland, and the western USSR, and perhaps
some transferred from occupation duty in the Balkans. The Soviets had no
troops deployed in Czechoslovakia during these years (until 1968), although
such deployments would have made sense for an invasion through southern
Germany into France.79
The JCS considered the native troops of Poland and Czechoslovakia too
unreliable to participate in a Soviet invasion, and expected that Soviet troops
would most likely have to contend with uprisings in those countries in the
event of war. With respect to Poland, for example: "The estimated 100,000
armed members of the underground would be joined by the majority of the
Polish population in the event of an armed conflict between Russia and the
Western Powers. "20 Another source considered the reliability of the Czech-
oslovak army "highly questionable."" The JCS made similar assessments of
the armies of Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. It should be noted that these
views were in marked contrast to the popular perceptions of the time (and
of the present), which envisaged 75 fully armed satellite divisions fighting
loyally alongside the Russians.22
The JWPC estimated that about 67 Soviet divisions would be employed in
an invasion of Western Europe. This figure was derived from the assumption
that Soviet postdemobilization strength would be 208 divisions, 66 of which
would be deployed on occupation duty in Europe (see Table 2). The report
suggested that 55 of these divisions, plus 12 divisions "in strategic reserve"
18. Joint War Plans Committee, "Strategic Study of Western and Northern Europe," May 15,
1947, p. 36.
19. JWPC, December 18, 1947, p. 71.
20. JWPC, May 15, 1947, p. 62.
21. Brassey's Annual: The Armed Forces Yearbook (London: William Clowes and Sons, 1951), p.
265. The JWPC Report, May 15, 1947, p. 36, expresses the same opinion in much the same
words.
22. JCS 2073/7, "Intelligence Guidance for the US Representatives on the Regional Planning
Groups of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," n.d. [1949?], p. 92. For popular descriptions
of the satellite divisions, see Newsweek, March 29, 1948, p. 28, or May 17, 1948, p. 30.
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Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100120001-5
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100120001-5
SPECIAL EDITION -- 17
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Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100120001-5
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100120001-5
SPECIAL EDITION -- 17 MARCH 1983
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Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100120001-5
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Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100120001-5
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100120001-5
SPECIAL EDITION -- 17 MARCH 1983
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000
ST. LOJIS POST-DISPATCF
L2riLRm1983
For Years, bard-liners have quoted as
gospel the CIA's annual estimates to prove
that Moscow is devoting twice as much of its
GNP to the military as does the U.S. and that
the real growth rate of the Soviet arms
budget is 3 to 4 percent a year.
These ..estimates have always been
controversial and they are bound to get more
so in the wake of reports that the CIA is now
-e-estimating, downward its earlier figures
on Soviet militaryspending. The agency now
says that, given new data on the number of
different Soviet weapons, it appears that
Moscow's, annual rate of growth may be only
half of what was earlier estimated. Other
military analysts argue that Soviet military
spending is as high as ever, but'that Moscow
is getting less for its money.
The CIA's methodology on this issue has
.always been suspect. Because the U.S. and
Soviet economic systems are so radically
different, the CIA has been forced to use an
2 Hoic Much Do The Russians S end? -
P
indirect method. In short, the CIA estimates
what it would cost in U.S. dollars to
reproduce the Soviet military, lock, stock
and barrel.
The weakness of that approach is evident.
High U.S. labor costs alone could inflate the
weapon production cost estimates by billions
of dollars and the Soviets' notoriously
incompetent bureaucracy could squander
billions more.
If the Soviets attempted the reverse --
calculating in rubles what it would cost them
to duplicate the U.S. military - the estimate
would be in the trillions, since Moscow
doesn't have the high-tech industrial base to
produce many of the new U.S. weapons:
There is a strategic planning value in
having regular estimates of what it costs the
Soviet Union to maintain its large military,
but past and present CIA methodologies are
inadequate. A flawed `estimate is as bad as
no estimate.
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 V
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PROVIDENCE JOURNAL (R.I.)
11 March 1983
Soviet , sans. spending lead? Not reaff
centrdl Intelligence "
Fra i i-ry1 0 a1/ ,called rgent valuations ~LKi Statisticians taceo with divergent valuations of
this sort take. averages of the, ruble and dollar
MEDFORD,, Mass: - Like the supper
bomber gap of the-1950's and missile gap of the
1960's, the American-Soviet military-spending
gap turns,out to bemore, fiction than fact:
In his first, State of the. Union Address. In
1981, President Reagan called for. an increase in
defense spending because, -.be said, over the
preceding decade-.the Soviet Union had out-
spent us by hundreds of billions.of dollars. The
Central Intelligence Agency's last official esti
mate of the millts~ry-spending gap Was $420
pillion, for 1971 t6b 1980.
CIA -specialists, It. was dlsclosed last week,
has' ?educed their estimate of the growth of
Soviet military spending' since 1976 from 3.
percent to no more than 2 percent a year, This
(still unofficial) estimate may be Important-if It
reflects a changing Soviet attitude?toward.2lie
arses race. But It will i It in no more than 'a'
$20 billion reduction in. the CIA estimate pt'the
past military-spending gap. There remain three
further reasons'. why, the size of _ that gap is
seriously overestimated and grossly alisrepre
seats the 'true state of the arms -race.
First, much of the gap results from the fact
that in order to compare Soviet and United
States military expenditures, Washington Val-
ues Moscow's expenditures in. dollar prices.
That makes as much.- sense as measuring
American expenditures, In - ruble paces, . Rela-
tively speaking. wages are much . higher in
America 'than in ,the Soviet Union whereas
machinery and equipment; especially high-tech
weapons, are many times more expensive In the
Soviet Union, than in America. Thus, dollar
prices cause, in the CIA's words, "an overstate-
ment of Soviet defense activities relative to
those of the United States."
In CIA estimates. the Soviet Union's 4.3
million-man army Is valued at American p:y-
and-upkeep scales that average about $20,000 a
person.-The exaggeration of this procedure was
highlighted by an unofficial CIA valuation in
dollars of China's military establishment with
Its even niuch' larger army. The bizarre result:
China's ..defense expenditures ..equaled ours!
On the.-otherI hand, a comparison In ruble
prices ,would overvalue American .defense
spending because low Soviet pay scales would..,
downplay the -much larger Soviet . Army,
whereas American high-tech hardware would
be exaggerated . by valuing it in ruble prices
that William E. Colby, former director of
comparisons; the CIA uses this procedure in Its
nonmilitary-spending. comparisons.' Applying
this procedure ,to American and Soviet defense
spending would reduce the 1971.1980 gap by at
least . $100 .billion. . = .
Second;. the' major reason :why America's
military expenditures exceeded-the Soviet Un-
ion's before 1972 'was . that so much of our
spending -was directed not at the Soviet Union
but at Vietnam. The Pentagon subtracts this
spending from our total in its American-Soviet
comparisons. Correspondingly,, a proper evalua-
tion of the Soviet threat should account for the
fact that at least since 1970 about 20 percent of
Soviet defense expenditures have - supported
nearly a million-man army on the China-Soviet
border, according to CIA and Defense Depart-
ment estimates. These troops are not a threat to . ;
this country and the outlays to support them
are not available to build tanks, planes and'
missiles to be used against us. Subtracting most
,of these.expendituM from the C'IA:s estimate
of Soviet defense expenditures reduces them by
$250 billion more.
Third, CIA concentration on the comparison
of American and Soviet defense spending -ne-
glects the fact that our North Atlantic Treaty
Organization allies, who comprise most of the
other major industrial powers in the world,
outspend the Soviet Union's Eastern Europe
allies by more than 5 to 1. This difference has
been so large that the gap of $420 billion in
Moscow's favor becomes converted to a total
East-West gap of ' about $300 billion In our'
favor, according to the Pentagon, despite the
fact that measurement in dollars exaggerates
Eastern defense spending. Correcting for this
dollar exaggeration and factoring out Soviet
expenditures on China increases the West'.s
spending advantage over the past decade :o at
least $600 billion.
The Implication for those who believe that
the Soviet blot is catching up-in military power
is that, if It Is, its gains cannot be attributed to
greater militaryexpenditures. Either-the bloc-.is
not catching up as rapidly as some contend, or,
if It Is, America's and the rest of NATO's huge
expenditures are being squandered 'unwisely
and Ineffectively. The West can 111 afford to
continue such a course. Throwing more money
at defense will only impede needed military-
?spending reforms,nd may even be unnecessary
for our defense.'
Franklyn D. Holzman, professor of econom-
Ics at Tufts University and, a fellow at the
Russian Research Center at Harvard Universi-
ty, is author of "FInancial Checks on Soviet
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A? IC "_: ` .":iw LOS ANGLES TIMES
10 MARCH 1983
.Q4 YAG . -
Weinberger, Seeking Support for
Budget, warns of Soviet Arms Challenge
By DAVID WOOD, Times Staff f Writer
WASHINGTON-In an effort to bolster public sup- 'A Real Ineestive,' Reagan Sa-s - -
port for the Pentagon's proposed 3238.6-billion budget. The pentagon's book-a 107-gage second efrtion of a
Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger declared
Wednesday that the relentless growth of the Soviet study, "Soviet Military ium of first issued in Septem-
declassified'
Union's military power is designed to dominate the ben, intelligence s a data an compendium o military recently hard re and
but that the United States "will meet any intelligence
challenge (the. Soviets). rwgy.
S" t U i t d "to ttndergird the
son n en s
Th
Weinberger, releasing a
new Defense Department
book on the Soviet ..arms
buildup, said that -if the
e ovte
step-by-step extension of Soviet influence and control"
not only by military force but "by instilling fear and
promoting paralysis, by sapping the vitality of collective
security ar: an ements, by subversion, by coercive
political actions of every genre," the book states.
ve-year,
m
n
s
ra
on
s
$1.8-trillion arms modern- Such challenges can only be met, it argues, by
ization effort is allowed to resolve strengthening American "military sinew and national
stagnate, the United States "
will have to settle for per- President .Reagan, in a statement issued just before
manent nuclear inferiority Weinberger's news conference, said that demcrostrating
and thug be subject to nu. such resolve will "not only' deter aggressions, but will
clear blackmail by the So- also offer the Soviets a real incentive" to accept mutual
.vier Union. arms-reduction agreements.
Speaking to hem in In Moscow, the official Soviet news agency Tass
the Pentagon and, by satel- called the book a "mass of doctored data .... full of
lite, toreporters gathered at shamelessly manipulated facts and, groundless conten-
North Atlantic Treaty or- tions about the military lag of the United States."
fi
Ad
i
i
t
ti
'
A o5 red P Brussels, Weinberger also
Caspar W. Weinberger indicated that the Adminis-
tration is not likely to offer
new proposals to break the present deadlock in
- U.S.-Soviet negotiations on deployment of intermedi-
ate-range nuclear weapons inn Europe.
Weinberger said 'the Administration's zero-option
proposal-which calls for canceling the planned deploy-
ment of 572 intermediate-range U.S. nuclear missiles in
Western Europe in exchange for the dismantling of
similar Soviet missiles-is the "best possible one." Any.
interim agreement short of that, such as has been
suggested by the West Germans and the British, would
destroy any incentive for the Soviet Union to agree to
abolish all ground-launched intermediate-range mis-
siles, he asserted.
In the last few weeks alone, the Soviet Union has
deployed more of its triple-warhead.SS-20 intermedi-
ate-range missiles, bringing the total number to 351,
Weinberger said.
The Administration's arms buildup is an effort to
achieve "a margin of safety, not superiority," he said.
"Our preferred objective is arms reduction, not arms
buildup." But he said that the United States is prepared
to meet any Soviet challenge.
White Howse Request?.
Tass said that Reagan, faced with a costly arms race
during a recession, is'. taking actions aimed at "scaring
and confusing the American public. .. - "
Publication of the book was timed to coincide with the
congressional debate over the defense budget The
Senate Budget Committee put off Wednesdagsrntil next
week a crucial vote setting the upper limits of defense
spending for fiscal 1984. Committee sources who requested anonymity said the
delay was taken at the request of the White House;
which feared that Chairman Pete V. Domenico (R-N.M.)
would accede to demands for a limit of 5% growth after
adjustment for inflation in the defense budget, rather
than the roughly 10% figure the Administration has
requested.
Although U.S. intelligence officials have acknowl-
edged that the United States overestimated the growth
rate of Soviet military spending from 1976 to 1981--put-
ting it at 3% instead of 2% in each of the five
years-Weinberger. and other defense -officials have
asserted that overall Soviet military spending, and
.
.deployment of new weapons, has far outstripped 'U.S.
efforts. -
The assessment of Soviet military strength the new
book was a joint product of the Defense Intelligence
Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency, and it has
the backing of the entire U.S. intelligence community,;
according to intelligence offiicials.
Since the book was first-published 18 moms ago, the
pew editionaays, the Soviet Union has,
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cw,rn.~.~+~w.rar~{
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010
ARTI C A. mss'= NEW YORK TIMES
X'gGE
MEDFORD, Mass. - Like the sup-
posed bomber gap of the 1950's and
missile gap of the 1960's, the Ameri-
can-Soviet military-spending gap
turns out to be more fiction than fact.
In his first State of the Union Ad.
dress, in 1931, President Reagan
called for an increase in defense
spending because, he said, over the
preceding decade the Soviet Union
had outspent us by hundreds of bil-
lions of dollars. The Central Intelli-
gence Agency's last official estimate
of the military-spending gap was $420
billion, for 1971 to 1980.
C.I.A. specialists, it was disclosed
last week, have reduced their esti-
mate of the growth of Soviet military
spending since 1976 from 3 percent to
no more than 2 percent a year. This
(still unofficial) estimate may be im-
portant if it reflects a changing Soviet
attitude toward the arms race. But it
will result in no more than a $20 billion
reduction in the C.I.A. estimate of the
past military-spending gap. There re-
main three further reasons why the
size of that gap is seriously overesti-
mated and grossly misrepresents the
true state of the arms race.
First, much of the gap results from
the fact that in order to compare
Soviet and United States military ex-
penditures, Washington values Mos-
cow's expenditures in dollar prices.
That makes as much sense as measur-
ing American expenditures in ruble
prices. - Relatively speaking, wages
are much higher in America than in
the Soviet Union whereas machinery
and equipment, especially high-tech
weapons, are many times more ex-
pensive in the Soviet Union than in
Franklyn D. Holzman, professor of
economics at Tufts University and a
fellow at the Russian Research Cen-
ter, at Harvard University, is author
of "Financial Checks on Soviet -De-
fense Expenditures.,,
9M?RCH 1983
.
AGap?
Another?
By Franklyn D. Holzman
America. Thus, dollar prices cause, in
the C.I.A.'s words, "an overstatement
of Soviet defense activities relative to
those of the United States." In C.I.A.
estimates, the Soviet Union's 4.3 mil-
lion-man army is valued at American
pay-and-upkeep scales that average
about $20,000 a person. The exaggera-
tion of this procedure was highlighted
by an unofficial C.I.A. valuation in
dollars of China's military establish-
ment with its even much larger army.
The bizarre result: China's defense
expenditures equaled ours! On the
other hand, a comparison in ruble
prices would overvalue American de-
fense spending because lbw Soviet pay
scales would downplay the much
larger Soviet Army, whereas Ameri-
can high-tech hardware would be ex-
aggerated by valuing it in ruble prices
that William E; Colby, former Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence, called "un-
countably high." Statisticians faced
with divergent valuations of this sort
take averages of the ruble and dollar
comparisons; the C.IA. uses this
procedure in its nonmilitary-spending
comparisons. Applying this procedure
to American . and Soviet defense
spending would reduce the 1971-1980
gap by at least $100 billion.
Second, the major reason why
America's military expenditures ex-
ceeded the Soviet Union's before 1972
was that so much of our spending was
directed not at the Soviet Union but at
.Vietnam- The Pentagon subtracts this
spending from our total in its Ameri-
can-Soviet comparison;. C:arrespvnd-'
ingly, a proper evaluation of the Soviet
threat should account for the fact that at
least since 1970 about 20 percent of
Soviet defense expenditures have sup.
ported nearly a milliosk-man army on
the China-Soviet border, according to
C.I.A. and Defense Department esti-
mates. These troops are not a threat to
this country and the outlays to support
them are not available to build tanks,
planes and missiles to be used against
us. Subtracting most of these expend.
itures from the C.I.A's estimate of
Soviet defense expenditures reduces
them by $250 billion more.
Third, C.I.A. concentration on the
comparison of American and Soviet
defense spending neglects the fact
that our North Atlantic Treaty organ.
ization allies, who comprise most of .
the other major. industrial powers in
the world, outspend the Soviet Union's
Eastern Europe.allies by more than 5
to 1. This difference has been so large
that the gap of $420 billion in Moscow's
favor becomes converted to ' a total
East-West gap of abo: 5300 billion in
our favor, according to the Pentagon,
despite the fact that Measurement in
dollars exaggerates Eastern defense
spending. Correcting for this dollar
exaggeration and factoring out Soviet
expenditures on China increases the
West's spending advantage over the
past decade to at least X00 billion.
The implication for those who believe
that the Soviet bloc is catching up in
military power is that, if it is, its gains
cannot be attributed to greater military.
expenditures. Either the bloc is not
catching up as rapidly as some contend,
or, if it is, America's and the rest of
NATO's huge expenditures are being
squandered unwisely and ineffectively.
The West can ill afford to continue such
a course. Throwing more money at de-
fense will only impede needed military-
spending reforms and may even be un-
necessary for our defense.
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ARTIM ill' 1 -
CN PAGE
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
.7 MARCH 1983
A fresh look at the Sovei U. 11
alysts figure Soviet defense spending say
Freeze movement, Congress there are problem with the government's
protest Reagan arms buildup metbods that distort :
can dollars, Wg
as Soviet strength disputed ing personnel costs as if ied `may tzru?ps
j were paid as well as US soldiers.
By Brad
Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
. - . Washington
This week sets the scene for a fundamental examina-
tion of the basis for President Reagan's push to rearm
America.
The nuclear freeze movement sweeps back into town
with public demonstrations. Forces on Capitol Hill nor-
mally friendly to the Pentagon continue the legislative
move to slow the rate of the proposed military buildup.
The Pentagon releases a new edition of its dark and trou-
bling report. "Soviet Military Power."
At this key juncture, United States -intelligence offi-
cials now concede that the pace of Soviet military force
growth in recent years has been slower than earlier
thought. This gets to the heart of Mr_ Reagan's rationale
for enduring huge deficits while pouring record sums into
new weapons. He's. argued that defense spending
shouldn't be measured against economic impact or social
goals but against the size and nature of the Soviet threat.
Until recently, US intelligence analysts assumed that
Soviet military spending has grown 3 to 5 percent a year
(not counting inflation), which-would have been faster
than the US. Now, they find that the figure for 1976-81
actually was closer to 2 percent, more in line with the rate
of increase in defense spending in the US.
"For a while, we thought we were looking at a.sbort-
term cyclical phenomenon." says a. senior specialist on
Soviet affairs. "This past fall, we began to realize it was
longer term."
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelli-
gence Agency (DIA.) officials say they are now trying to
reprogram their computers to show a. sh5wer
rate of Soviet military growth. US Belli-
. genre officials warn.-that this counta3' re-
mains well behind the Soviet Union in innpor-
tant areas of military capability.. These
include construction of tanks. aircraft. sub-
marines, and nuclear missiles. -
At the same time, however, the slowerrate
at which these weapons are built may belied
to Soviet economic difficulties, officials say,
as well as problems arising with new
high-
-technology systems. As-in the.135,_movWg to=
ward more complex weapons apparently
means having to build fewer of them. - .
What CIA and DIA officials stress land
what will be emphasized in the Soviet Mili-
tary Power report tads week) is that therebas
been no. slowdown in key aspects of Soviet :
military investment. This includes research,
development, and construction of we ors
production facilities. While the two age mes
are not always in agreement, both say the So-
viet Union is spending about 70 percent zoore
than the US an military R&D.
"That's a frightening gap." says one sue..
figure out why the current flattening in rate of, military . cialist.-'The Soviet defense establishment is
growth occurred and how long it is likely to last. There still very intact, still very much healthy -
were similar occurrences in the late 1950s and late 196Us.. . "Their production facilities have been ex-
Intelligence experts critical of the way government an- panding relay. especially in the pask. few
years. It may indicate that there will be anew
burst of production in the next few years.
That'swhat ge're trying to figure out." - -
The key: is thus: How reliable are these
projections if it is now acknowledged that
rates of overall Soviet military growth.have
had to be adjusted downward?
`Tm not surprised that they feel ti 've
overestimated Soviet spending,", says
Franklyn Holzman of Tufts University. who
has written extensively on the subjectandhas
worked with government- intelligence ana-
lysts, "They , always make the worst-case
While.-. acknowledging that they- mast
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ARTIC_1 ,2 a_=
LOS ANGELES TIMES
If MARCH 1983
U.S. Overestm` ated Soviet Military Outlay
By ROBERT C. TOTH, Times Staff Writer
`WASHINGTON - The United
States overestimated the growth
.rate of Soviet military spending
from 1976 to 1981, putting it at 3%
instead of 2% in each of the five
years, senior U.S. specialists on the
Soviet economy acknowledged
Thursday.
.The embarrassing revision is cer-
tain to have major ~ political'impact-
as Congress prepares to debate the
,Reagan Administration's record re-
quest for $274 billion,-in military
.,spending for next year. .The White
House and the Pentagon have cited
high and increasing Soviet defense
expenditures to justify the request.
Now, however, the Central Intel-
ligence Agency and Defense Intelli
Bence Agency have agreed that
-Soviet defense spending is growing
'-at, a slower rate than previously-
-.believed, even as the U.S:` defense
spending rate increases.
The U.S. defense budget rose an
average of 6% per year since 1976,
:and the new request represents a
9.5% rise over 1983, according to.
Pentagon figures.
The senior U.S. officials, who
-declined to be identified by name or
agencies, maintained, however, that
the Soviets have far outspent the
United States in absolute numbers,
irrespective of growth ? rates, and
.that they continue to do so.
For 1981, the last year for which
- Soviet figures have been calculated,
the Soviets spent $222 billion on
defense, compared to $154 billion by
the United States,. they said. Over
the ? entire decade 'of the 1970s, the
Soviets spent 80% : more than the
United States, according to DIA and
:_CIAfigures? . - _
The officials denied published
reports that the DIA and CIA have
disagreed over the Soviet spending
growth rates. Both agencies accept
2%, not 3%, the officials said.
However, sources noted that the
fact that the two agencies have
been debating the issue for. at least
nine months suggests initial dis-
agreements. The present consensus
reflects a strong desire to present a
united front, one source said. -
The basic reason for-the contro-
versy over Soviet military spending
is that the Kremlin does not release
true figures. For example, it claims
to have spent only $26 billion on
defense -in 1981, one-tenth of the
U.S. -calculations, which are based
on estimating the cost of Soviet
weapons, personnel and the like, as
detected by U.S. intelligence meth
ods.
Agency Disagreement Denied
Soviet defense spending histori-
cally has increased at an annual rate
of 3% through 1975, the officials
said. The reasons for its drop to 2%
after that are not known.
The officials firmly rejected sug
gestions that the slowdown was
solely because of the slower overall
growth rate of the Soviet economy.
or-that the defense cutbacks were
ordered by the Politburo in 1976.
Instead, they released one page of
a forthcoming revision of the Pen-
tagon booklet, "Soviet Military
Power," which claims that the Sovi-
et spending downturn was cyclical,
or . temporary, and that a new
growth spurt in weapons production
could come soon to wipe out the,
slowdowns. - . , .
"The large Soffit research and
development eff&ri, coupled with
observed expansion In military pro-
duction facilities,. saggests that the
dollar costs of Sovilet military pro-
curement may soon resume their
historical growth 'Of 3%)."
In contrast, last year's Pentagon
booklet said that "throughout the
1970s, the Soyiets have consistently
allocated from 12% ao 14 % of gross
national product, to military pro-
grams (compared o0 5% to 6% for -
the United States) in spite of a
marked downward trend in the rate
of economic growth.
"If this trend continues, the per-
centage allocated In the military
will increase," " it predicted last year. -
"There are 'no signs of a de-empha-
Sis of military prog!nsns:"
The officials claimed Thursday
that small declines in Soviet growth -
rates were seen in the early 1950s
and 1960s before the introduction of
new weapons systems: They antici-
pate that new Soviet "aircraft and
missile models wifR be produced in
the future to restore- the past
growth rates. -
The officials also said that they
have identified a 2% growth rate
'earlier in each -of 1979 and 1980 but
considered them temporary de-
creases that would disappear. Over
the last nine moms,- however, in
examining all the evidence for
weapons deploymemt in 1981, they
concluded that the 2% rate contin-
ued .
They then re-examined earlier
.years and concluded that the 2%
growth rate applied for the entire :-
1976 to 1981 period, rather-than the
3 % averages ' -
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PW?LADLLP i1A 1;Qti1RLR
4 :larch 1983
Soviets' military spending reviewed.
Revised CIA studies reportedly show a smaller rate of grotath
""?"?tafense spending must be substantially in-
A review by CIA analysts indicates that, creased to meet a growing Soviet threat.
previous studies by the agency might have The Globe story stressed that the estimates,.
overestimated the growth of Soviet defense of Soviet spending should 'be considered in-,
spending, according to published reports.- exact because of the difficulty in obtaining
The New York Times said yesterday ?thataccurate information 'about the Soviet miii;
CIA specialists had revised an estimate of the tary and 'economy. : "" . ' - -
increase in.Soviet defense spending from as The Times reported that the Defense Intel-
much as 4 percent each year to no more than ligence Agency (DIA)was disputing the new
2 percent annually. The Times said the spe CIA estimates. The newspaper quoted ?Penta-
cialists--believed. that-the, growth-rate had - -gon officials ?as saying -#at? the-Soviets have
been overestimated for six years.'-., ? ? . ? been spending-as much as expected but get-
The Boston Globe-reported, two weeks .ago . - ting.less for-their.money-because of inflation
that CIA analysts estimated that since 1979, and inefficiency in Soviet industry.
the rate of Soviet military growth has been - According to DIA figures, tb Soviets spent..
substantially below the 5 percent figure used 5222 billion on defense. in 1981; 44-. percent
by the Reagan administration. The Globesaidmore than the 5154.-billion.. budget" of the
some analysts bad calculated that the Soviet United-States for the-same year
defense budget might not be growing at all.. - The CIA's, estimates, of Soviet defense ex
The administration has said that U.S. de penditures 'were lower than the DIA's esti-
mates Tor the same year, placing the Soviet
defense budget -closer to the U.S. defense
budget. According :to-tlie Timei, CIA officials
linked the decrease "inSaviet defense spend-
?ing with- industrial inefficiency..
The Times said'that to reach a daflar:lagirre
on Soviet spending; U.S. analysts use satellite'"
.,,photos of Soviet military equipment and esti-
mate how much it would cost to produce the
same tank, ship or plane in' the U.nited'States.
But some'officials said this was ail inaccu-
rate gauge since it did not take into account.
U.S. -labor costs, Which .would increase con=
siderably the - cost-of such ?weapons=:in.:the-
Soviet - Union_ . - - _
DIA officials pointed.ou" t,1hat..not all mili-,,
tary-related spending came under'the calego
ry of defense. For instance, according to -DIA
figures the Soviets spent S45 billion??forre-
search and. developme'nt: the Times'said:=
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NEW YORK 7DES
Q1 ?nC -- 3 MARCH 1983
a, ts,NowS' d-to Fink
w?: i::~; have affected the military sector. In
vershyfed.-- J() a r l l"ms- Risg other words, as long as: the economy
--,--_- ??~ - ??,??y ?4 ???~?~??r... ~r..cr...6.r+~.a.c~aac u. vww unu ruwuuu ncu! de-
lor a os written by Mr- Rallorw . he growth in tnilltary spending:
andw
dined accordingly.
sp?d 1 P Yostrea?s ;y:>"x:u This reasoning aroused protests from
~R-ASHIIVGTGN,'IVLarcb 2 -- A~ the senior officials at the C.IA: and the
The D.IA has reparteto Caspar W.1 D.IA They placed greater weight on
over`.' Soviet military spending `:bast ;'Weinberger, the Secretary of Defense, - Industrial inefficiency as an explana-
peed ammong fatWIlgence analysts,, at the Soviet Union spent the equiva-I tign..They also said modern weapons
spedallsis art rise :Central Intshli~ence
Agmty saying-that the growth rate has
;
_bees>rstated forthe-last six years. i'
f =- : ~e C:S.A. specialists responsible tb;
annual reviews of :.'Soviet mi itary.
ates-otdacre&SiS of 3 to 4 percent
each.: year; : after?-inflation, - may Wao& and that the rate of growth may
been?no more than 2 percent. Their,
:: jud t is based on:evidence that.tfi'
_,Sovie+t-Union bas-been producing less
~sit+amattsriel than expected.
Tine- difference iii',-ratestot;
.viet -militar'ys-outlays would -mesdi
mat the Ruasiaas are spending -the'
_xulveiearofeeveral billions of dollars
less each year than bad been surmised -,
While .the new evidence is generally
accepted within the C.LA. and the State
ent and among some tnilitay-
',s as psis, It is disputed by the Penta-
'gob=.s Defense Intelligence Agency. ?:. "~.
Senior officials of the C.I.A. - and
,Dl-,L are also said to give the evidence
a different Interpretation., To=, them,
-Moscow- has been spending as much as
predicted but has been getting less for
itiapart because of -the higher price of
more. advanced arms' part because LotSovietindustrial ineffici
h.. Crvernmezit ^iTTc1a1s said the :.n,t_?.
were costlier, so that a given amount of -
'money would buy fewer but more cape
.
ble weapons, as In the United States..
Recaovat Reported Under Way '
Also, according to Pentagon officials,
,the D.IA. questioned the C.I.A..ana
lysts' count of Soviet weapons..A new
c stmt is said to be under way. , .
In addition, the Pentagon officials
said the Soviet Union in 1981 spent $45
billion for research and development,
which they said was double the amount
spent 1o years before. The official
Soviet budget figure for "science,"
separate from "defense," has In fact
doubled over the past decade, reaching
some 22 billion. rubles.(;wi1 billion) in
1981. but it is q lower figure than the
-American estimate for military-on -
ented research and development.
The Pentagon officials said they were
less confident about this estate be-
:cause there is less to see and count. For
their ,estimates, analysts examine
'Soviet publications, watch expansion of
design bureaus, and monitor tests.
The officials said the Soviet military
program was stifling in its breadth.
Specifically, the Soviet Union has
tested an intercontinental missile simi
-Iar to the MX, as well as a small, mobile
intercontinental missile, and is working
on another long-range missile and a
new submarine-launched ballistic mis-?
site. they said.
came of the debate could be politically, ""? ' "` "S' "'! "~`?` "` "'?
le of the de the United States than in the Soviet Union,
Reagan A and attaching the United. States -dollar
-military budget-ls already under rriti-
dsm from both--.parties in-'Congress,:
-from business groups and= prominent:
formerofficialss `
Government officials aclmowledged-
that estimating Soviet military spend.
.ing.Is an Inexact art,-based on incom-
-olete Information, subjective assume-
tions, and difficulties in translating
Soviet ruble costs into dollar values.::
Total Soviet military, spending must;
be estimated because the single pub.
?lisbed Soviet budget figure labeled "de-
fense" Is believed to cover only a few'
unspecified categories of outlays. This-
- figure has been fairly s s t a4 bI1
billion, rubles in recent `t o y.
ulm- has' been telling about `> 'o"' cost to Soviet-made weapons may snag-
Soviet expenditures to ,help justify in') Berate their cost to the Soviet economy.
;)em of 1222 billion; 44 percent mare than
the.-United States; in 1981, the most me
-
nt year reviewed.
L= No C.I.A. estimate for 1881 has been
'published, but officials said tt was much
lower and thus closer to the. United
States' military budget of 154 billion, _,.
- Whatever the outcome of the debate,
the gap In spending 1s being closed by
-President Reagan's large military-out.
lays. While the Soviet Union has been
increasing its spending, whether by 2
percent, ,.according to the new a '-
mates, or by the 3 to 4 percent esti-
mated earlier, the United States in 19833
is scheduled to spend 9.5 .percent more
than in 1983..
Satellite Photos Being Used
To estimate Soviet Spending. Ameri-
can analysts try to obtain information
about tuteequipment, noperations,
tion, testing. -largely . from.. satellite photographs.
:Then they undertake a laborious 'count
and factor in other costs such as storage
space for things unseen.
The specialists assig a dollar value
to what it would cost to produce a simi-
lar tank, ship or plane in the United
.States, bring to bear judgments from
Soviet statements and other intelli-
gence, and run. it through computers to
arrive ata spending estimate.
Some `American : specialists -on -the
Soviet economy have questioned the va-
lidity of this approach. In view of higher
American.lahw costs, they say: weap=
Government officials now say that
C.I.A. analysts were surprised late last
year when their count of Soviet arms
turned out to be less than might have
been expected With growth rate of 3 to 4
pent. They looked back over the last
six years and found that arms produc-
tion rates had been more. consistent
with a growth.rate of 2 prrce t.
Two Ahernadve Explarsatlons
The analysts offered two': explana-
tions: dither the Russians were spend
fng less than estimated or- they were
less efficient than . presume '..'The
weight of opinion was said to be leaning
toward the theory - that expenditures
bad in fact l
Release 11 03 CfA=RbFl96-01137R000100120001-5
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SCRIPPS H
WSPAPE RS
WASHINGTON BUREAU
1110 VERMONT AVENUE. N,W., SUITE 610
WASHINGTON, DC 20005
[phone]
10 Feb 83
Dear Dale,
Here's a clip of the piece I did as
it appeased in the Pittsburgh Press, and
-s it went out--a fuller version.
;Many thanks for your help, and I
hope I neither misinformed the readers nor
maligned the agency too badly,
Cordially,
Walt Friedenberg
ply focused on
ite House
Langley, Va
CIA's
ezhr.ev as the to-
et secret police
1.<
Western Europe
gland to crush
-na,jor
.nor any major
-rankirs
Ind Frank; Terpil
br terrorist
dpokesmen say.(
and efficiency
,ions behind
rert operations
Ivert agents that
aampened initiative - ',You had to take along a lawyer," colt ains an
old hand and issued instead a short memo that boils down to '"use
corror_ sense. "<
In fact. Casey has riot begun many new covert action operaticms, but
has pat .,,ore resources, manpower and enthusiasm into such "cloak Sr l
dagger? mro`ects. The list includes
jja 1. 1
and AZserhe pR4NeE~L$~p@Fpaj% 14,11
. ~I ( 10157 c 046l ab aHi5 Costa Ri^w T. a e .,, os o~ rrist sup"
for insurgencies. arms aid to Afghan freedom fighters, clandestine
activities to keen D0St-Khn^laini Tv-an r......
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00
DETROIT FREE PRESS
25 JANUARY 1983
WASHINGTON Pakistan's mill
tary-bred ruler, Mohammad Zia ul-Haq,
told President Reagan last Dec. 7 that
Pakistan had no interest in building nucle-
ar: weapons.::,._.
After Reagan and Zia parted, an admin-
istration official told reporters:. E`We ac
cept that the president of: Pakistan. is
telling us the truth." The official said-Zia, on his first visit to;
the United States,. was offered $3:2-billion
in aid - aimed in large part at persuading.
Pakistan not to go nuclear:
? But across the Potomac,-.the Central..:
Intelligence Agency was skeptical. It has a
fat folder crammed with documents that point .to Pakistan's posing a-substantial,'
.threat to any hope of stopping the spread:
of.atomic bombs. The facts-,:-_,:.
o; Near Islamabad, the Pakistanis have
built a laboratory to reprocess spent.nu-
clear fuel. into plutonium.
At Chasma and Rawalpindi,.construc-
tion is under way on larger reprocessing
plants for separating plutonium from ura- -
-At Kahuta, the Pakistanis . are. building'a.=.
plant that can -pmduse.:highly4enriched,?:
weapons-grade uranium
=A nuclear=test does; not. necessarily"
catapult a country into `a position among
the nuclear powers. On the other hand, a.
nation can gather the technology and. the
industrial capacity to produce a nuclear:
weapon. without ever conducting a test.
The real key to nuclear potential is:
plutonium, a -radioactive, silvery:metai
whose name is derived from an ' ancient;.
Greek god who presided, over hell.: . _'
Until-Worid`War u;~:plutoniui w
ound only in, traces of natural firaniuni`
deposits .Today,'plutoniuin.is produced
when uranium fuel rods are irradiated in
ar
The CIA believes that at least -1.9 more cY - a is successor, immy ,
1ome uu-on .,. - --.,"the world can effectively overcome the
Some plutonium ium has as been-extracted, or
reprocessed, to make nuclear-weapons- in associated risks of proliferation." Ford_
the United; States,: the - Soviet Union, then took the-United States out of the
France, Great Britain and. China. plutonium-making business. It was a polity`
ter fob
th t h' J" C
7T l'Q.nlSbLLn, s arms tntenqun6
:countries will have developed or other- But the Reagan administration has said;
'
;
'wise acquired the ability to make nuclear it would deal with the world as it really is:-
weapons by the 1990s: Argentina, Brazil,. t has eased nuclear export controls to
hose countries that seem to pose little or
Egypt, Greece, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, I
Italy, Japan, Libya, Pakistan; South Afri-- no proliferation risk. Yet restraints also
ca, South Korea. Spain, Taiwan, Turkey, have been eased for sales to South Africa,
West Germany and Yugoslavia. which presents one of the .world's most
There are 286 commercial reactors serious proliferation problems
operating in the non-Communist world, . , '_
Checking for. missing material-.
providing about nine percent of electric
power. Each reactor is a potential source - Hans Blix, director general of the Inter--~
of bomb-grade plutonium. national Atomic - Energy Agency, the
auces, as a waste oyproauct, up to ouv in Vienna, said the agency uses a book=_
pounds. of plutonium-a year. In theory, keeping approach toward safeguards.
-It-
-
-1
that's enough to.produce about 35 atomic measures the amount of fissionable mate
bombs of the type and force that doves- rial-that goes into,a nuclear reactor or-a
toted Nagasaki in 1945 reprocessing nlant_ It then measures th'e'
or plutonium, is enougn.: to. assemble a
nuclear bomb. 1 mine how much --if any -- is missing:;
Paul- Leventhal, a' Washington-based error perhaps one percent. The problem is
nuclear analyst, estimates that by 1990, that: one percent of a very large reactor-
world stockpiles of plutonium -available could be enough to make several bombs,
will amount to 760 tons
r
ro
essin
f
g
or
ep
c
, For larger plutonium, reprocessing
..and by the beginning of the 21st Century
that figure could climb 'to 2,700 tons plants, the hope: is that new computer
t
ues will
ermit
d
untin
te
hni
b
that
g
q
p
,
ase
acco
c
hfor some 337,5070 bombs).
taking inventories on a. far more frequent
-:
France is expanding programs and accurate basis...-.:,
Plants could also be designed to reduce
risk-filled plutonium race. It is expanding and exits and by making sure'they are all
its programs while many nations are cut--heavily guarded and equipped with auto-
generate nearly-all or its electrical power;
needs through nuclear fuels by the end of
the century.
One way of keeping costs down is to
produce plutonium and sell it abroad.
France already has two -reprocessing...
plants.
U.S. - policy on nuclear Fuelshas
-.changed during the -Reagan administra-
tion.
Shortly before leaving office, President.
Gerald Ford called for a halt in the rush to
: w1..4..w...... nn ........leer fnnl nn4i1 ho eaid
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001
RADIO TV REPORTS, IN
470'; V1`LL=kRD A\ ENUE, CHE`.N CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 656-4068
CBS Morning News
STATION W D V M- T V
CBS Network
DATE January 25, 1983 7:00 A.M. CITY Washington, D.C.
Interview with Ralph McGehee
CONNIE CHUNC: The CIA is about to get another beating
from a former agent who has written a book. This time it's
called "Deadly Deceit." But its author, Ralph McGehee, is not
your ordinary disgruntled spook with a grudge. He's not
interested in telling secrets and blowing covers. And in talking
with our John Sheahan, he made it clear that for years he acted
no differently from the colleagues he is now criticizing.
JOHN SHEAHAN: It's clear that your hands were not
exactly clean, either, that you provided the data. And on the
basis of these data, alleged communist political organizers were
ambushed and killed.
SHEAHAN: How does that look to you now? How do you
feel about that today?
MCCEHEE: I feel very badly.
SHEAHAN: For 25 years Ralph McGehee worked for the CIA.
His specialty was ferreting out secret communist organizations in
Southeast Asia. But McGehee, the superspy, is about to make
himself an outcast in the cloak-and-dagger world. Next month he
intends to publish a scathing book about his former employer, the
Central Intelligence Agency.
MCCEHEE: The agency is not an intelligence agency.
It's a covert action agency. And disinformation is a large part
of its covert action charter. And the American people are the
primary target audience of its lies.
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 STAT
VICTORIA ADVOCATE (TX)
11 JANUARY 1983
!EDITORIALS
Oil Imports Shifting
In the running debate over the ing it the third largest seller to th
current state of OPEC, marked United States.
by experts arguing over whether Nor is the U.S. alone in reducin
the Arab-dominated oil cartel can imports of Arab oil, although
survive, much less regain its other countries remain more
stranglehold on oil-importing dependent on Arab oil. West
nations, one very important Germany and France, for exam-
development is largely ignored. ple, each get about one-half their
While it is well-known that the oil imports from the Arab coun-
United States is importing less oil tries- but in 1973, the Arab share
these days and using it more was was 75 percent. Japan, after
efficiently, little is said of a more reaching a high of 65 percent in
subtle shift in the pattern of oil 1980, has cut the Arab share of its
trade - the U.S. is steadily and oil market to 59 percent.
quietly weaning itself from Mid- The United States has accom-
dle East oil, replacing it with plished this shift in sources by
lower-priced and politically safer concentrating on Mexico and
oil from England and Mexico. England. Indeed, Mexico has
replaced Saudi Arabia as the
According to Robert Burns of largest single supplier of foreign
The Associated Press, the most -oil for the U.S. market, rising
recent available figures - assem-. from 7 percent of total U.S.
bled by the Centralir"ligence imports in 1979 to 22 percent
Agency -- put U.S. oil imports today. Mexico is not an OPEC
fiam Arab nations at 722,000 member, and it sells its oil at
barrels a day last August. That is significantly lower prices. Eng-
less than half the daily average land's oil prices also are lower
during 1981, Burns says. than those of the OPEC nations.
Total U.S. oil - imports have By slashing their dependence
dropped to a daily average of on the Middle East oil producers,
about 5 million barrels, one-third the Western nations are reducin
of the oil used by Americans each the risk of embargoes or oth
day. That import share is far forms of political blackmail b
below the peak import year of Arab nations, as well as th
1977, when imports represented massive transfer of dollars to th
nearly one-half of U.S. oil needs. Middle East. In addition, the U.
But that decline is nowhere and other oil importing ratio
are paying far more attention t4
near as dramatic as the .~aharp developing their own energy
shift away from Arab oil. Bv; the resources.
CIA's estimate, 18.9 percent'df?oil That is all to the good. The
imports came from Arab coun- massive economic and political
tries in August, down from almost dislocations that have occurred as
50 percent in both 1978 and 1979. a result of Arab use of the
A major factor in that decline so-called "oil weapon" is intolera
was President Reagan's decision ble to the importing nations. Any r
last year to ban imports of Libyan move away from dependence on
oil. In 1979, Libya provided 10 the OPEC countries can only
percent of U.S. oil imports, mak- benefit the West.
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-ASSOCIATED PRESS
5 JANUARY 1983
'-U.S. Turning Away From Arab Oil Dependence
BY ROBERT BURNS
NEW YORK
It's no secret that the United States is importing less oil these'" days and
using it more efficiently. But little is said of a more subtle shift in the
pattern of oil trade, one that may last longer than the drop in imports.
Steadily and quietly the United States is weaning itself from }Middle East
oil.
In its lace: lower priced and politically safer oil from Great Britain and
Mexico.
That is not to say the United States is no lon
er d
g
ependent on the Arab all
producers. Those nations will be selling a signficant share of the world's oil
for many years to come. But the trend is clearly a boon to U.S. energy security.
Here are some questions and answers to help explain the shift away from Arab
oil:
Q. How much oil do we get from the Arab countries?
A. In the most recent figures available, the Central Intelligence
Agency estimated the United States imported 722,000 barrels a day from Arab
nations last August. That is less than half the daily average of 1981 and
one-third lower than in September 1973, the month before an Arab oil embargo
against the United States and other nations.
Total U.S. oil imports have dropped to a daily average of about 5 million
barrels, equalling about one-third of the 15 million barrels used by Americans
each day. That import share is about equal to the 1973 level but far below the
peak import year of 1977, when imports represented nearly one-half of U.S. oil
needs.
0. Has the United States cut back more on. Arab oil than on other foreign
Sources?.
A. Yes, and that is the shift rarely mentioned in talk about cutting imports.
By the CIA's estimate, 18.9 percent of oil imported into the United States
came from Arab countries last August. That figure was just over 30 percent in
September 1973, and it peaked at near 50 percent in both 1978 and 1979. One of
the biggest reasons for the sharp decline in use of Arab oil was President
Reagan's decision last year to ban imports of Libyan crude. In 1979, Libya was
providing 10 percent of U.S. oil imports, making it the third largest seller to
the United States.
Q. What about the other oil-importing industrialized countries such as West
Germany?
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1 i' tit'
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ASSOCIATED PP ESE
9 December 1982
Cuba Said to Increase Troop Strength in Angola
r?-r. r. r.r r. -.,wn
4?f~C rrr.-.~ w ~r i:r. r
I ER
All `'' =&T 1' CUBA IS BELIEVEO TO HAVE SENT AN ADDITIONAL i0 Uuu -
TRC+Oi=S TO ?iING0LA I N RECENT HONTH5i. RAISING THE TOTAL i e 30f 000
nLC0R01i;a TO :.crr+RAL irxtELL II GEHCE MGENCY EST IMATES
.
L'.''. vFrICIRLE! SPEARING !EDNESOAY NIGHT ON CONDITION THEY NOT SE
I.+Er;T1FIED1 SAID THE REPORTED INCREASE ?,AY HAVE SEEN RELATED TO
ST E FED UP MILITARY -V, +v a HN n x
+ AC +T I V I t t N H N G OLR I N RECENT ?O?iT , ET SOUTH
AFRICA AND EY MNGOLA'S ANTICOMMUNIST REBEL MOVEMENT,
THE OFFICIALS EMPHASIZED THAT IT IS DIFFICULT i0 MEFSURE THE i+iUi^- n^
r.
OF L-UFRN TROOPS BECAUSE OF IMPRECISE REPORTING TECHN I eUES. ONE
OFFICIAL CALLED THE CIA FIGURE R s;GUESSTIMATE,}'
CUBAN FORCES FIRST BEGAN ARRIVING IN NNGOLA IN LfiT" ;v TO S'crri=GRT
J?IE FOST-C0LONIAL ARRXI5T GOVERNiiEN1 THERE AGAINST 30UTHI1FRICA?1
MILITARY THREATS. IN RECENT YEARS! MM?R I CAN ESTIMATES OF ?L#JERN TROOP
+r,c'S rt' ..
rTRENG`; H ? TR""'~ HA BEN iN THE cv3 VU s~ RANGE
i HE "UBR? TROOP F'r ESENCE IN .601 A HAS BEEN A MAJOR Sc + T. J N r + I r+ :,[L r L 0C ~'
,
'N, IS ? UNITED + ?'r r+ - ? -rte .r
I' N THE EFFORT OF THE + T R`, _S RHO O T HER "E ERN, SOU TRIES + O
1*?E5011'IRTE ItNDErEirDENCE AI D FLACK MAJORITY RULE IN AN:BIA, THE SOUTH
AF RI CAN-CON T ROLLED T E R R I T ORY WHICH BORDERS ON 1NGOLA T 0 THE SOU TI H.
'L+UTH MFRICA H A 5 LAL#NCH:ED REPEATED MILITARY RAIDS 'RINST BASES IN
ANGOLA ?IRI vTRINED BY I;AMIEIA'5 BLACK NATIONALIST GGUERRILLASi THE
~~i:+i.?'H- ?ST `IFRICA PEOP'LE'S URGANI%ATION.
+ T
HE WORw MRw,ErTY w,-. i A w ?...,L 'Nt I.
: n GOIVEnr.-ME 5 i'ITH u. S. SUPP'LIFT I ' HAS SAID I T WILL NOT
':r', NT :? DEPENDir?1CE TG t RMIBIA UNTIL LL#:AN FORCES LEAVE NNGOLP,
r-
iINGOLR HAS CONTENDED THAT THE NAMIBIAN AND CL#DRN TR?O? 15UE5 =ri
0_#L0
NOT SE LINKED AND SAID HMER - CAN BACKING FOR THE SOUTH NFRICAN
P'OFITiON HAS DELAYED RESOLUTION OF THE A?~I?ifii?i eI?ESTIOI've
hL+L#TH 1FRICA RETAIN CONTROL OF THE MINERAL-RICH) SPARSELY-POPULATED
TERRITORY IN DEFIANCE OF RESOLUTIONS.
THE ANGOLANS ALSO HAVE SAID THE LU?AN TROOPS WILL REMAIN AS LONG AS
r. r.
E'DL#T H iirrIICRN MILITARY ACTIVITY ON FINGOLRN TERRITORY CONTINUES.
THE DISCLOSURE OF THE REPORTED INCREASE IN CUr^?RN TROOP STRENGTH
FOLLOWED RN UNPRECEDENTED MEETING BETWEEN I"OUTH r FRR I CRN AND ;1NG OLAN
OFFICIALS WEDNESDR Y I N CAFE VERDE,
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gciIGT" NEW YORK TIMES
ON Fx Gam: -/ 24 NOVEMBER 1982
L-~eaganand Mrlrtary.Bala~ce:.ff
Are Right but Nea1y.:J?reIevant.
By LESLIE H. GELB
"rdJO m Th. NPr York Trr~
W l.S INCTON Nrn, 21 - In his
I does not publish accurate budget fig-
gan related his belief that in virtually
every and it is. particular)v difficult to
ry measu e of military p owe, the
5vvi Union enjoys a decided advatr estimate expendittcres in areas such as
urge" over the United Statrs research and development Also, while
Hardly any military ez-, manpower consumes almost half of the
perts in or oar. of the Ad: Amerltsn militry budget, it accounts
1?'yew% ' mtnistratibc dqv that the t less Or one-fourth of `the Soviet
Anat7is enormous Sotet -military
buildup over the last two campar'lsom Sbow Treads
deca6es has confirmed the
5t*viet Union as the dominant power on TO ` at London's International
the Eur?sian land mass and the equal of -Imsvtute for S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s . ji7e_ Per,
the Urured State: in strategic nuclear taRon a en me -pence
F n rug rower. Beyond that, there is !~? the main and ti'-s only
carzsiderabie disagreement among the value of these overa u et con r1-
exnerts abox what that mearz and i` to irt out FS, v ac.
whether Moscow has. pawed military counts these t trends show Mascuw cm->_
s~+eriar)ty. timing to out istance as
William W, Kaufmann of the Massa- numbers of weapons roduced and cios-
ciru.etts Institute of 7erficrolagy, Cabo ~' the ap in the t a wen -
has 'mo iced on es:3matittg the military Mr. Reagan poiixed out that the
balance for all Republican and Demo- ilnfted States has not increased its
tit Secretaries of.? Dete se iz: the number of intercontinental ballistic
:15 7'a and 70'x, said in an interview: missiles since 1905. But each Adm4n
"Mr. Reagan's measuring of the bar-- trabou since then has elected to in-
kom by counting numbers of weapons crease the number of nuclear warheads
on each side is generally rar'ded by, on each missile rather than the number
e parts as pure prmpaganda. Even the ' of missiles themselves, a choice that
;'ter an Administration has no DlSaS to Arner)can xperts say was delfberate)y
duplicate soviet forte levels because made for strategic reasons. There was
"It is need them for our purposes," an even greater addition of missile war.
t is the revalitrtg pie of experts in heads in the American submarine force
and out of the Administration," he con- in this time.
tinued, "that the United States has a
In i the balance of strategic nu-
ear eke Capability right clear warheads and bombs stood at
now and can defend its txaditivnai allies 2,000 for the Unites States and 200 for
Faciorr b_t>rew'I as N=bers
e added; `'CCraape^ing numbers
H
without looking in - purposes, geng;ra-
phy, allies and tbe?likeis.a false com-
parisoa.'.. } -
For example, Mr. -Reagan cited the
generally agreed estimate that Mescow
spends 12 to 14 percent of its estimated
grass national product on ? arms every
.
year.-The Office of Management and
Budget says the American figure has
been 5 to 6 percent fOr law-years. The
American grow national product, how-
ever, is almost double that of the Soviet
Uri) a'
Experts for the most part see such
development Were becoming adverse to analysis of the strategic situation and
the United States. the MX decision in particular, former
These comparisons are difficult at Defense Secretary Schlesinger said. is
the Soviet Union. ?oday, each side has
over8,000. `i?
Mr. Reagan palmed to the fact that
the Soviet Union has added 60 new?
ballistic missile-firing submarines to
its force in the last 15 years as against
one new submarine )am year for the
United States. There is virtually unani-
mous expert judgment that American
submarines, despite their age, remain
decidedly superior in overall perform-
ance. - ? .
Another Example: Bombers
He cited the fact that the Soviet Union
has 200 of the new bombers kr'rown In the
West as Backfires and is building 30
more each year, while much of the
American long-
range bomber torte is
=deba
cnmparls more as Points 1126 years old. But again, the prevailing
than analytical tools. The Central Intel- ' judgment in the United States Air Forte
ligeoee Agency was first asked to make ' is that the o4B-2's are far better long-
these comparisons. in the 1Q60's as a range bombers than the Backfire or
,w-s Of shoving that the United States standard Soviet bombers, such as these
was ahead. In the mid-70's, Defense .known in the W
Secretary James R Srh pMv ogi~leas~e 2006/01/03: Cl I -rRDP
an interview: it does not logically
scan. If we have become increasingly
weak relative to the Soviets, it hardly
follows that Mr.' Reagan should have
decided to but the Carter Administra-
tion ? plan to, deploy MX t$rtrm ' 200 mis-
sues
'No one disputes Mr. Renggn's stets
meat about Moscow adding to and mod-
ernizing its force of medium-range
ballistic missiles targeted on Western
Europe. But opinions varysn and out of
the Administration on the slgnficance of
this. Some, experts argue that unless
this gap is closed, deterrence in Europe
is )eopardlzed. Others maintain that
this ga.p has existed esesrtlai)y for 20
years without noticeable harm.. But
most experts are in favor of closing IL
? AIIIas and Qn&Uty
Nor does anyone Challenge Mr: Rea.
pan's statement t4tat Soviet forces "tar
rxceed us iii the number o',.tanks, artil- i
)ery pieces,, kircraft and slips." But as
experts have been quick- to paint out,
this overlooks the abilities of American
and Soviet allies and ignores the issue of
the quality of Weaonns. '
When allied totals are added, the .
numbers on each side are much closer.
The total number of ships in the Atla -
tic alliance exceeds the Warsaw Net
total. American stilps alone, a)thnu#
less numerous than the Soviet ships, are
larger and be't'ter.
The sera], quality of American cart.
veudont3.l forcers remains superior to the
Soviet Uthoo's, although Moscew con-
tinues to close the M. Recent era m-
tens between Syrian forces using front--
line Soviet aircraft and surface-to-air
=
miles and Israeli forces using Ameri-s?
cart equipment were a case in point to
experts. The lsraelis h i-uyed same 30
missile batteries and 80 aircraft without
a loss. The Israelis also'destxoyed some
new Soviet T-72 tank, previously con-
sidered virtually impenetrable.
W. Schlesinger, who like most est.
Peres in the field as rising Soviet mill- -
Lary abilities and favors inn gad
American , military spending, main-
tained that there were real penalties as-
sodeted with Mr. Reagan's approach.
"It Is t vwise for the President to de-
dare that-the 1:)nlted States is in am in-
ferior posit9oa," he said. "Indeed, in re-
them to show that trends in military ~ With regard to Mr. Reagan's general I I rate."
QW-M
lcvlarly,
at any
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ARTICLE AIF ARED
OIL FAGS .,5' THE 10h' REPUBLIC
22 NOVEMBER 1982
THE INTELLIGENCE GAP
The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis
and Russian Military Strength
by John Prados
(Dial Press, 367 pp., $17.95)
In The Soviet Estimate, John Prados looks the Soviet buildup," we hear from "the
at how the U.S. government has as- brilliant analyst Albert Wohistetter" (as
sessed, over the last three decades, the Kissinger calls him) a rather different
ability of the Soviet Union to make nu- conclusion: "Our officials sometimes
clear war on the United States. The title, overestimate, and sometimes underesti-
with its odd echo of Robert Ludlum's mate, and sometimes they get it right."
thrillers, refers to the U.S. intelligence Representative Les Aspin, in an excel-
community's annual joint analysis and lent article in Strategic .Review not long
prediction, or "estimate," of the Soviet ago, produced a scorecard on the esti-
Union's current power and future ca- mates. Looking at seven major develop-
pabilities. This is not the dry and quiet ments in Soviet strategic strength--the
matter of counting megatons and missile A-bomb, the H-bomb, the long-range
silos that it would seem to be, for the bomber, the long-range missile, the ABM,
evidence is usually sketchy, and the in- the MIRV, and the widespread deploy-
centives to interpret it in certain fashions ment of ICBMs and SLBMs-Arpin found
are great: the U.S. defense budget is al- that the intelligence analysts, on the
ways drawn up with an eye on the esti- whole, had done rather well. But the
mate's measure of the Soviet threat and effect of Aspin's exercise was to demon-
its indications of whether we should ze- strate how difficult the process of es-
spond with submarines, land-based mis- timating is, and how ambiguous both the
siles, or bombers. And, as Prados shows, evidence the analysts use and the condu-
the estimate has often lurked behind, and sions they produce really are.
even shaped, the debate in Presidential This is how Aspin's scorecard looks:
campaigns, as with John F. Kennedy's the analysts said the Soviets would pro-
complaints about the "missile gap" in duce an A-bomb by 1952, and the Sovi-
1960 and Ronald Reagan's warnings ets did it by 1949. The analysts predicted
about the Soviet defense buildup in a Soviet H-bomb by 1954, and the Sovi-
1980. ets had it by 1953. They said the Soviets
Small wonder, then, that the estimates would have 500 long-range bombers by
have received such mixed reviews. Eu- 1960, and they had only 190 by 1961.
gene Rostow, for example, claims to have They predicted the Soviets would have
found in the American intelligence com- 500 long-range missiles in 1961, but by
munity a "bias of systematic optimism then the Soviets actually had deployed
about Soviet intentions and capabilites," only 10. The analysts at the Pentagon
while George Kistiakowsky argues that argued that the Soviets would attempt to
"usually, the government's experts deploy the ABM (antiballistic missile) na-
[have] overestimated the danger" of "the tionwide, but the Soviets never did. The
Soviet threat." So also has Daniel 0. final two categories are somewhat more
Graham held that "CIA analysts genet- confusing: on the question of the Soviet
ally share the antimilitary bias of liberal MIRV (the "multiple, independently
academia," while George Kennan, cer- targetable re-entry vehicle," essentially
tainly no.less imposing a figure, charges many little missiles on top of one inter-
that the U.S. government has been guilty continental vehicle), Aspin writes that
of a "routine exaggeration of Moscow's intelligence analysts first "overestimated
military capabilities." (in 1965 the prediction was 1970), then
Now, with the declassification of many underestimated (in 1968 the prediction
of the estimates, the accuracy of the an;_ was 1978), then overestimated again (in
less has become a matter open to public 1969 the projection was 1971)." And be-
review. Thus, while Henry Kissinger, in cause analysts had concluded that the
th a
t
f h'
mated the rate of deployment of Soviet
ICBMs (intercontinenta) ballistic missiles)
and SLBMs (sea-launched ballistic mis-
siles).
Prados covers much the same ground,
though in more detail, as Aspin did in his
article. Where Aspin only touches on
how- politics and the bureaucracy of intel-
ligence distort the estimates, Prados
makes that a central theme of his study.
As Sherman Kent, a former head of the
CIA's Office of National Estimates, once
observed, "estimating is what you do
when you do not know." Prados shows
how, when the intelligence community
did not know {which was surprisingly
often), institutional interests rushed in to
fill the vacuum. In the airless world por-
trayed by Prados, there are few locations
the White House, Langley, Fort
George G., Meade, the Pentagon, Mos-
cow, and a few missile bases-and no
personalities, save those of institutions-
the mendacious National Security Coun-
cil, the long-suffering CIA, and the
clownish Air Force intelligence agency.
Prados's view of Air Force intelligence
is not exceptional (it has been written
of one former head of that agency that
he "helped make paranoia a technically
sophisticated art form"), but he stands
out for his sheer doggedness in follow-
ing the actions and acronyms through
the decades.
The "bomber gap," for example, took
off in 1955, when the Soviets fooled the
Air Force's attache in Moscow by flying
all their long-range bombers over a pa-
rade reviewing stand twice. In short or-
der the Air Force was telling Congress
that the Soviet Long-Range Air Force
would be double the size of the U.S.
Strategic Air Command by 1959. That
never happened, for the Soviets built
fewer than one-third the number of
bombers the Air Force predicted. Yet
when the "bomber gap" dwindled and
disappeared, there were no Congres-
sional inquiries or internal investigations. ~Zff
C..rw4=11 71'_
i
2 . rs
volume o is p rokv~ rrl el~a "kM/ 41W dA'1EJP9P. i1s37R000100120001-5
to Albers Wohlstetter or in stating -which it actually dad not do until 1975
that "American planners in the Fifties -instead of simply building r are,
-7.. CY-.es cc-.6c ent!", ., .. __
 Approved For Release
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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE
NEW YORK TIMES
17 OCTOBER 1982
U.S. Plans Big Spending Increaser
For 1 idiary. Operations in Space
Program Includes Better Satellites, Gathering of
Intelligence and a Cargo Role for the Shuttle
fJ
Ag
and transition costs to accommodate 2U
defense shuttle launches" through 1987.
The first shuttle with a purely mili-
tary cargo, the nature of which officials
would not discuss, is scheduled for next
fall. After that, 113 of the 311 flights
~?h....a.i sLr-....-L gym. ~.? __. __ ...
stroying Soviet satellites are being de.
The Oct. 16 - After a = The immediate ob]'ectiveisto rovid-e` vel
quarter-century of mostly peaceful ex- P ' ape $. bTbe illion plans a-
com u
mnications and intelligence that spend $20 billion on more on communac-
proration of space, the United States are faster, more reliable, and more se-. tions, mostly in space, to strengthen
has begun a vast expansion of its mill- cure than current systems to enable-` control of nuclear forces.
tary operations there. outnumbered or outgunned United To underscore the new In the next five years the Reagan Ad- : phasis on space. Mr. Reagan has military em-
In forces to move faster and strike.
harder at vulnerable points. Mill lined a policy for space operations_
commanders call this generating Minutes after the shuttle Columbia
Buildup u1 Space g
__von "force mu]tinIiers_" I touched down on July 4, Mr. Reagan
First of three articles i. _ Force. Edward C. Aldridge, seta: + states." While reaffirming a commit.
th
ministration plans to increase spending
on military operations in space even
faster than the rest of the military
budget.
Better satellites are planned for
highly sophisticated communications,
intelligence gathering, navigation,
weather forecasting and mapping. The
space shuttle, having carried its first
military payload. Will replace rockets
as the primary vehicle for lofting mili-
tary cargoes into orbit.
The Administration has undertaken
elaborate new measures to defend
satellites and has Ordered a ground-
based antisatellite system to be ready
by 1987. It has also stimulated research
to develop a new generation of ad-
vanced weapons such as lasers, though
officials say they do not plan to station
weapons in orbit.
New Space Command organized
To put this into a framework, Presi-
dent Reagan has enunciated a new
space policy with emphasis on military
operations, and the Air Force has or-
ganized a new Space Command.
The purpose of the surge into military
s
ace
i
i
p
operat
ons
s to enable American
forces to fight more effectively in a pro-
longed conventional or nuclear war
around the world against the Soviet
Union, according to a variety of Admin-
istration officials. Those officials also
argue that the United States cannot sun
re is
e need to find now we can ment to peaceful uses of space, the di-
better utilize our existing forces. One rective said, "The United States will
thing is information, navigation, weath- pursue activities in space in support of
er, communications, all those things ' its right to self-defense."
that contribute to a better allocation of Five-Year Strategic Plan
farces." The five-year strategic plan known as
W. Aldridge, a key official in the Defense Guidance elaborates, saying
..
y space program, asserted,
"There is clearly a need to provide bet-
ter support to military commanders in
time of crisis and in wartime."
"That translates to a need to main-
tain spacecraft that operate in a hostile
environment," he said, referring to
places where the craft might come
under attack.
Today, Defense Department officials
say. American military forces rely on
more than 40 satellites for long-range
communication, a variety of intern.
gence gathering, navigation, weather
forecasts and mapping.
Those operations, according to -Mr.
Aldridge, will be enlarged as the Ad-
ministration plans to increase spending
for military uses of space more than 10
percent a year after making up for the
effects of inflation. Growth in that area
would be faster than the 7 percent an-
nual increases in the overall military
budget.
A vital element will be the space shut-
tie.
"The space shuttle will change the
way we do business," said Gen. Robert
T. Marsh, commander of the Air Force
p
u
get in
Systems Command. "We will depend 1952, which was $6.4 billion, for the first
upon it for launching virtually all of our time surpassed that of the National
national security payloads." _ Aeronautics and Space Adnsinictratinn
contribute to the deterrence of an at-
tack on the United States or, if deter-
rence fails, to the prosecution of war by
developing, deploying, operating and
Supporting space systems..'
The Air Force, which has the greatest
share of responsibilities in space, has
organized a Space Command that will
gradually centralize control of space
operations. The deputy commander, `
Lieut. Gen. Richard C. Henry, said.
"Space is not a mission, it is a place. It
is a theater of operations. It is now time
that we treat it as a theater of opera-
tions."
Even so, Administration officials in-
sist that they have no plans for putting
weapons into orbit. -
"We are conducting research and
planning related to space weaponry,"
said Richard D. DeLauer, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering- "But I emphasize that no'
commitment has been made to acquire
space-based weapons. And we will pro-
ceed only if our national security is so
"threatened."
Defense Department budgets, how-
ever, reflect the Administration's pri-
orities. The military s
ace b
d
render the high group of s 1 0 -1
1 which gg~~~bb11J001c Soviet Union, most e 1'jRelease 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP90-01137 0 ~-5
fort, they say, isformilitary purposes. C `YI rii...D
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i' RADIO TV REPORTS, nc
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 656-4068
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
Morning Edition
STATION WAMU-FM
NPR Network
DATE September 24, 1982 6:30 P.M. . CITY Washington, D.C.
Intelligence Reporting in Central America
CARL KASELL: The House Intelligence Committee released
a 47-page report yesterday criticizing certain aspects of
American intelligence reporting on Central America. NPR's Bill
Buzenberg says that the House study found serious lapses in the
objectivity of some intelligence reports.
BILL BUZENBERG: -The issue raised by the House report is
this: Has the Reagan Administration's tough policy on Central
America skewed intelligence reporting on that region? American
intelligence agencies would answer no. But the report by the
House Oversight and Evaluation Subcommittee says yes, in some
instances.
Subcommittee Chairman Charles Rose of North Carolina
says their findings were released yesterday over the objections
of intelligence agencies in order to prod them in public.
REP. CHARLES ROSE: We generally give them nothing but
praise. But on occasion we find some things that we think need
to be corrected.
BUZENBERG: What needs to be corrected, Rose says, are
instances where intelligence reporting on Central America appear
to bend to Administration policy.
REP. ROSE: There were some overstatements, some
oversimplifications, some almost misinformation in some cases,
that if continued could fall into a pattern of having the
policymakers driving the intelligence, rather than the
intelligence being independent.
AR vVN PbPFReleaserMb6/b)fP.'1As-RDP9eO-%l 13P7F~OOPb10~1g1 0 ~- p a r t
OFFICES IN: WASHINGTON D.C. ? NEW YORK ? LOS ANGELES 9 CHICAGO ? DETROIT ? AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES
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ART7^i, fix" rw~`r
OR
THE :.? St?DiG O:l POST
23 SEP1 E;=9E3 1982
Need Seen for Intelligence
By George Lardner Jr.
wadungwn Paesetall Writ"
The chairman of a House Intel-
ligence-subcommittee warned yester-
day that the CIA and the rest of the
nation's intelligence agencies may be
in danger of being "co-opted by the
policy-makers at the White House.."
- Rep.-. Charlie-Rose (D-N.C.) said_a
special staff study of intelligence re-
ports and assessments of El Salvador
and Nicaragua in recent years sug-:
gests the need for a stiffer resolve-'
-and posture of independence on the
part of the U.S. intelligence commu-
pity.
The 47-page study sets out what
Rose called examples of "sloppiness,
overstatement or inaccuracies" that
should be warning enough of the
need for more care and objectivity.
The full House Intelligence Com-
riaittee decided at a closed session
Monday to make the report public
despite objections-from the CIA, the
National Security.-Agency and the
Defense Intelligence Agency.- - ~,
A draft copy' obtained by The
Washington Post and cited in yes-
terday's editions 'was a toned-down
.version prepared by minority staff.
-The committee ordered release of
a. more strongly worded and detailed
majority study on a voice vote that
Rose said was "pretty much along
party lines."
- The report praised U.S. intelli-
gence reports and estimates in Cen-
tral America in a number of areas,'
such as the CLA's mid-1978 predic-
tion of the downfall of the Somoza
regime in Nicaragua.
But the study .by_ the Oversight
and - Evaluation subcommittee - staff
said it had also found certain weak-
nesses, including intelligence,reports
and presentations that suggested
greater certainty than the evidence
independence
warranted, that relied on "some un-
questioned and 'sometimes contra-
-dictory assumptions," and that ac-.
cepted Salvadoran government de-
scriptions when there was ground for
skepticism.
The subcommittee staff said it
.also noticed a tendency to view in-
formation from - non=intelligence
sources "supply as material to be
countered" rather than examined..
objectively..
The report was published with a
disclaimer' stating that "it does not
represent the views of all members
of the committee," but Rose told
,reporters that "it certainly represents
my views and, I would say, the views
of the majority." ' - -
The report took issue with the
administration's - complaints earlier.
\this year about news stories of a
massacre in the El Salvador's MO
ratan province. Congress was told
two U.S. Embassy officers were sent
out to investigate the stories and "no
evidence could'be found to confirm
that . government forces systerriatiG
ally massacred civilians" or that the
numbers killed remotely approached
those cited in press reports.' _ -
The embassy investigators, the
House staff study emphasized, "nev-
er reached the towns where the al-'
leged events occurred."
. The subcommittee's ranking mi-
nority member, Rep. C. W. (Bill)
Young (R-Fla.), protested the release,
of the report and said. he considered,
it "extremely biased."
Rose aid+he_ stood solidly behind
"What I hope this says to the in=
telligence -community," Rose told
reporters, "is 'fellas, you do a great
'job but be careful you don't get co-
opted by the policy=makers at the
White House.-It is far more impor-
tant that you retain -a degree of in-
dependence and aloofness from the-
political process. If that doesn't hap.
pen, there is going-to be a loud call-
from the Congress that we construct
real independence between the ad
ministration and the intelligence
community.'"
Spokesmen 'at' the - White House
and the CIA said they had no com-
ment.
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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE
BALTIMORE SUN
23 SEPTEMBER 1982
U.S. .intelligence estimates" assa'-fled
Washington `(AP)--U.S. intelli-
gence agencies resorted to simplistic,
overstated intelligence estimates in
an effort to bolster support for Rea-
gan administration policy in Central
America, a House committee staff
said in a sharply critical report re-
leased yesterday.
The Intelligence Committee staff
report focused on several intelligence
estimates and briefings dealing with
Nicaragua's military buildup, outside
support for guerrillas in El Salvador
Indians by Nicaragua's Marxist re-
gime.
"Taken as a whole, intelligence on
Central America is strong, and its
task is both. difficult and particularly
important," the report said.
But it also spelled out "the costs of
intelligence misuse," pointing to esti-
and a crackdown against the Miskito ? mates to promote policy goals. it said.
mates produced by the Central Intel-
ligence Agency and other intelligence
agencies "whose primary purpose ap-
pears less to inform policy choices
than to help mobilize support for poli-
cy-"This is not to say that these
products are intended to convey false-
hoods, or that they lack serious analy-
sis. But-the purpose of a product fun-
damentally affects its nature," the re-
port said;
Such misuse of intelligence esti-
results in a loss of "precisely quali-
fied judgments and rigorous evalua-
tion of contradictory evidence."
A CIA spokesman had no comment
on the report. . .
The staff report said problems
with recent intelligence on Central
America were exemplified by- a
March 4 briefing on external support
for the Salvadoran guerrillas.
"'Although the briefing consisted
essentially of a rigorous'and success-
ful analysis of intelligence data-a
very important and informative ac-
complishment-the presentation it-
self was marred by various overstate-
ments and misstatements," it said.
The report also said that an intelli-
gence assessment regarding Nicara-
gua's removal of the ?Iiiskitos from
their home territory along the Atlan-
tic Coast "was so selective that it
could not help policymakers to under-
stand the detailed and often contra-
dictory information available in
charges and countercharges by In-
dians :and Sandinistas, and the state-
ments of Moravians and Catholics,
among-others. "
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THE ASSOCIATED PRESS-
22 SEER 1982
By BARTON REPPERT
WASHINGTON
U.S. intelligence agencies resorted to simplisti F
estimates in an effort to bolster support for Reagan ado
Central America, a House committee staff said in a sharf
released Wednesday.
The Intelligence Committee staff report focused on several intelligence
estimate:; and briefings dealing with Nicaragua's military buildup, outside
support for guerrillas in El Salvador and a crackdown against the Miskito
Indians by Nicaragua's Marxist regime.
"Taken as a whale, intelligence on Central America is strong, and its task is
both difficult and particularly important," the report said.
But it also spelled out "the costs of Intelligence misuse," painting to
estimates produced by the CIA and other intelligence agencies "whose primary
purpose appears less to inform policy choices than to help mobilize support for
policy."
"This is not to say that these products are intended to convey falsehoods, or
that they lack serious analysis. But the purpose of a product fundamentally
affects its nature," the report said.
Such misuse of. intelligence estimates to promote policy goals,-it said,
results in a loss of "precisely qualified Judgments and rigorous evaluation of
contradictory evidence."
Asked about the study, CIA spokesman Dale Peterson said, "We have no
comment."
In Issuing the study, Rep. Charles Rose, D=I.C., chairman of the panel's
subcommittee on oversight and evaluation, said, "It is no secret that our
committee labored mightily over the decision to release this staff report."
".Some members believed that we should circulate it only within the
Intelligence community, as a kind of in-house critique," he said. "Sore felt the
staff report was unfair in its criticisms. Some members shared the intelligence
agencies' fear that public release would damage public confidence in
intelligence."
Rose said his subcommittee staff has worked with the intelligence agencies
to ensure the accuracy and fairness of the report."
Also, he said, "I believe that public release of an unclassified report like
this, that both praises and criticizes intelligence performance, will actually
strengthen public confidence in intelligence and in the congressional oversight
process."
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 Approved For Release 200 1Q~~,Q0-RDP90-01137R000
ARTICLE APEEA=',
ON pAGE >T 5= = 1982
LETTE
WALLACE ON VIETNAM NUMBERS
New York City
In his letter to The Nation (Aug, 7-14], Lieut.
Gen. Daniel O. Graham makes a number of
specious assertions concerning the CBS News
documentary "The Uncounted Enemy: A
Vietnam Deception."
First, the general says he agreed to be in-
terviewed only after receiving a guarantee
from me that CBS would air his on-camera
remarks setting forth his contention that
MACV estimates of enemy strength in 1967
and 196$ were not 100 low but too high.
Graham, of course, is one of the officers at
the heart of the controversy over intelligence
reporting during the Vietnam War that was
chronicled in "The Uncounted Enemy." I
am not addressing the question of Graham's
role in these matters. I simply want to make
it clear that what he wrote to The Nation
about my supposed guarantee is untrue.
Graham refers to an agreement made dur-
ing a telephone conversation he had with
CBS producer George Crile and myself. The
general told us he would be pleased to do an
interview with us and asked only that we, in
the course of the interview, allow him to ex-
press his position on enemy strength esti-
mates. Crile and I assured him that we would
be happy to film whatever he had to say on
this subject. That was the extent of the
agreement. Neither Crile nor I made a
guarantee to Graham to include any specific
comments from the interview in the broad-
cast. -
T also also find it i
another-of Graham's assertions: that therc
Z L/\J ? _ is "ample documentary evidence that the
C.I.A. agreed with military intelligence on
strength figures throughout the war." The
general knows this to be untrue, as does -
everyone else involved in the bitter in-
telligence dispute between the C.I.A. and
MACV during the summer. and fall of 1967. 1
and then again in the months after the Tet
offensive.
The fact is, the C.I.A. first challenged the
military's enemy strength estimate of
255,000 in May 1967 by publishing its own
estimate of 500,000 in a report to Secretary
of Defense Robert McNamara.,The C.I.A.
then formally challenged MACV's numbers
throughout the summer and fall in numerous
and often bitter sessions of the National In-
telligence Estimate board in Langley,
Virginia, This battle is documented in the
Pike Committee hearings; in Tom Powers's
book on Richard Helms, The Man Who
Kept the Secrets; and in the testimony of
the many military and intelligence officers
interviewed for "The Uncounted Enemy."
To suggest that this was anything but a
full-scale confrontation between the C.I.A.
and MACV is an attempt to rewrite history.
Bcyond that; Graham knows that the C.1 *A:
only temporarily gave in to MACV's inucac-
table position. He knows that after the
enemy surfaced at Tct, the C.I.A. reopened
the Order of Battle dispute and once again
supported its estimate of an enemy army in
the 500,000 range.
So that there can be no question about
these matters, I am sending the editors of
The Nation several C.I.A, memorandums
and cables directly pertaining to this con-
troversy. These documents demonstrate how
fundamental the differences -were between t,.
the C.I.A. and MACV over the critical ques-
tion of the size of the enemy the United
States was fighting. Mike Wallace
CBS News
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000
THE SAN DIEGO UNION
19 JULY 1982
ARTICLE AFPEA:lXD
ON PAGE,
Critics
, Ackno
and feels he's on top of it.
Such was not the case when he was
haled before the Senate committee to
explain why he appointed the contro-
versial and inexperienced Max C.
Hugel as his deputy for clandestine
operations and failed to provide all
the information required of. him on
committee questionnaires. --
Casey eventually conceded it was
"a mistake" for which `I take full
responsibility" to have appointed
Hugel, who had by then resigned.
And the director wound up telling the_
senators more about his own past
business and government activities
than they probably wanted to know.
Casey seems to be able to admit a
mistake and learn from it He agrees
that he failed to devote sufficient at-
tention to congressional relations
after his confirmation sailed through
the Senate 95 to Q in January 1981.
He came across as a rather reluc-
tant sharer of intelligence informa-
tion with the oversight committees.
Members of the Senate panel were
particularly_ irked. Eventually,'after
Hugel business erupted,
several committee mem-
ber~, Including then Chair-
Barry Goldwater, R-.
Ariz., suggested .Casey;
.Casey;
should resign. ,
cent months, bowev
er, Casey has made an ef-
fort-to. keep in closer touch.'
He- now invites small
.groups of Senate and House
committee members to dis-
cuss matters of mutual in-
terest over breakfast
-Adm. Bobby R. Inman,
'who ret -as CIA deputy
-
director last month, called
CCasey a "good director,"
:
adding,
Strengfhen CaseyHas od CIA
By L. ED GAR PRINA
cop'" ate, Smite
WASHINGTON - A year has
passed since the Senate Intelligence_
Committee reported it could find no
basis for concluding that William Jo-
seph Casey Jr. was unfit to serve as
director of-Central Intelligence:
If that wasn't damning with faint
praise it indicated that the'commit-
tee had, as the Capitol Hill expres-
sion goes, only "a minimum of high
regard" for him.
But if the committee were to make
a judgment on Casey's job perform-'
ance today, it almost certainly would
be phrased in positive, favorable
terms. -
Everi some' of his severest critics,
who personally don't like the' gruff,
sometimes abrasive New Yorker, ac-
knowledge be has strengthened the
CIA in his first 18 months as Lord of
Langley.
"Despite the distrust of Casey, be
.is generally credited with doing a
good job in beefing up the agency,"
an -aide-to one of the most critical
senators said.
A strapping six-footer, the 69-year-
old veteran of the office of Strategic
'Services (OSS) in World War IT, is on
a roll. He is ezbhibi ng the calm as-
surance of a man who loves his iob
,-`T`he only critical =note
`that I-would make, .and I've
made it to Bill, is that he
,needs to work harder on his
congressional relations.
..That.process also could be
'helped if some members of
Congress went a little easi-
er in their public rhetoric
toward him!'.,
Casey gave himself a
handicap - .with the- news
media when be decided that
the CIA once again would
be "not a low-profile, but a
noprofile agency."
No longer can a reporter
simply call the agency's
public affairs office and ar,
range a briefing by one of.
the hundreds, of specialists'
at the CIA complex in near.
by Langley, Va., as was the
case during the Carter ad-
ministration. , .
Such briefings are now
relatively rare and are of-
fered -on -a quid pro quo
basis: "If the reporter is
going to.travel abroad and
agrees to share his insights
.and information upon his.
return;.he will probably find
that a specialist is avail-
able.
Unclassified CIA'. re=
search reports on such.
things as Soviet oil produc-
tion or U.S.S.R_ arms trans-
fers to Third World coun-
tries no longer are brought
to the attention of interest-
ed reporters, nor mailed to
them upon request.,
In an address to agency
employees, Casey said be
believes the CIA will be
more effective and more re-;
spected "if we cut down on
hawking our wares" and
concentrate of excellence in
UVU
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William Casey Jr.
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THE WASHINGTON POST
18 July 1982
Numbers Game Clouds Toll in Lebanon
`Battle Over the Truth' Rages be no way to verify independently American supporters of the Israeli
e UIA's I!ZEes, nor determine on - military operation say that no -mat-
what the are based. Katherine ter how high the civilian losses, the
By Glenn Frankel a CI_A spo eswoman, said yesterday
W invasion is justifiable because the
. tIII gton P Foreign service the yen had no comment on e
Israeli Army has taken massive and
Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Charles Percy (R- matter. unusual precautions--such as drop-
Ill.) said in a hearing last Tuesday that U.S. intelligence Sen.-Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), a ping leaflets on cities warning of at
officials had confirmed to him that 10,000 civilians had member of the Senate Select Intel- tacks and allowing time for evacu.
been killed in the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. ' ligence Committee, said yesterday ations-to protect civilian lives and
Two days later, State Department spokesman Dean that much of what he had been told because the continuing presence of
Fischer told reporters that "there are no reliable figures in intelligence briefings had been the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
available at'this time." On Friday, congressional sources "nothing more than a rehash of what tion in Lebanon had led to civil
said privately that Central Intelligence Agency officials was in the newspapers .... I've strife causing the deaths of between
had told them in briefings that the figure was between heard numbers all over the place 70,000 and 100,000 civilians during
5,000 and 10,000. depending on who's doing the brief- the past decade. They also blame the
Meanwhile, the Israeli government issued a new report ing." PLO for civilian deaths, asserting
putting civilian dead at 600, while Lebanese officials in Many firsthand observers of the. that PLO fighters used schools, 'hos-
Beirut said their count showed 18,000 killed. ' scene in southern Lebanon agree pitals and other civilian institutions
And so the thicket of claims and counterclaims over with Fischer that an accurate esti- for shelter from Israeli assaults.
the number of civilian dead grew more dense last week mate is not possible. The mass "Even if the 10,000 figure is cor-
with the participants in the conflict and the United movement of civilian populations rect, as horrible and
States compounding the confusion and uncertainty in fleeing the war, the possibility that would be, it has to be seen in the
what has emerged as the key issue in the debate over large numbers of civilians who
'
whether Israel
s invasion was justified.
ht
h
l
i
b
soug
s
e
ter
n
asements of build- past,' said Hyman Widely disparate figures have been presented for ci. ings were buried alive in bombing Washington Bookbinder,
vilian deaths, as well as for civilian wounded -and. refu- and shelling attacks, the Moslem American Jewish Committee.o"Only
gees, and Israel and its opponents have accused each custom of burying the dead withi., , . .
other of grossly distorting Lhe body count for political 24 hour
f d
th
ll
h
b
s o
ea
- a
ave
een purposes. puts a final end to the
cited as reasons why no accurate ~g L.eb-
The numbers game thus has become the main ammu- total can be determined Israel's then it may prove worthwhile."
nition in the other war that Israel and its opponents are "you have to picture the scene ofsraest supporters high cost
waging-the propaganda war that Israeli Prime Minister early estimates of h losses cost
Menachem Begin has called "a battle over the truth." the entire population of South Leb- . Israel some popular support fleeing back and forth across ross p and
The United States has added to the fog by issuing caused some longtime American
the landscape trying to get out of the Jewish supporters of Israel to oppose
conflicting accounts of the casualties. Percy said intelli- battle zone," said Dr. Christopher
the officials labeled as accurate an estimate of 10.000 Giannou, a Canadian surgeon and the invasion. Even more important,
iv ilian deaths that he first received from the Lebanese Palestinian supporter who worked in high civilian losses challenge the
ambassador to the United Nations. Sidon before his arrest by the Is. widely held held belief in this country
_Percv added that the "unconfirmed" raelis last month. But Giannou, who that Israel is a special nation with a
estimate may be as high as 14,000. later was released without charge, moral mission, deserving of its ape.
Peru's executive assistant Cott said at a pass conference here last cial relationship with the United
Cohen, said Friday that Walter J. Friday that he was convinced from States and the massive military and
Stoessel Jr., while acting secretary of his own observation that the death economic aid it receives.
state, had told Percy that the gov- his the Israelis what's at stake is
toll in Sidon alone far exceeded Is-
ernment "accepted" that figure, their self-image both at home and
which has been used Publicly by claim for the entire operation. abroad as. a decent "
Y Israel has buried large numbers of people, said Sey-
other senators, including Paul Tson- the dead in mass graves and spread moor Martin Lipset, a noted Jewish
gas (D-Mass.) and Claiborne Pell lime over decomposing corpses. Is- sociologist who has opposed the in-
(D-R.I.). raeli officials say those actions were vasion.
Sources in the Houae of taken for health reasons, ' said many congressmen,
sentatives say the CIA gave them , but oppo- including himself, would weigh the
gents say the burials also have been
e ran, .000 RnF
?f F ' used to conceal the death toll. numbers of civilian deaths in toward Is-
nfuaaa-MLy ing their future attitude toward Is-
_T~py Said have arisenbecause the 10 000 fi a rapt "It ve a direct bearing on
included a Clt?yipg t ease 2006/01/03 CIA-RDP90-01137R00010p11g0(@F gn policy issues," he-
many as 3,000 of those killed were said.
combatnts. But there appeared to
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ARTICLE AP'L' ti,;i1 COMMENTARY
ON PAGE JULY 1982
Disinformation: Or, VGThy the
Verify an Arms-Control A
Edward Jay Epstein
W '~(~ 7 HEN Secretary of Defense Caspar
i V Weinberger revealed last April that
the Soviet Union had achieved superiority over
the United States in intercontinental missiles, he
provoked a furor in Congress over the status of
the nuclear balance. Weinberger's revelation also
pointed to an intelligence failure of unprecedented
proportions that extended back over two decades,
and that cast a great shadow of doubt over the
capacity of the United States to keep accurate track
of the Soviet military arsenal and therefore to verify
any arms-control agreement with the Soviet Union
in the future.
In 1961, the Soviet Union, despite all its bluff
and bluster, had deployed only four cumbersome
and unreliable intercontinental missiles. U.S. intelli-
gence had confidently asserted that there was no
way the Soviet Union could ever deploy the num-
ber of missiles necessary to threaten the rapidly ex-
panding American missile force without providing
years of advance. warning.
Such confidence then seemed fully warranted, as
U.S. intelligence had through its technical wizardry
found means of intercepting virtually all the Soviet
missile-testing data, or telemetry, and of determin-
ing the accuracy of the missiles. It was on the basis
of this powerful array of intelligence about Soviet
activity that American leaders made crucial deci-
sions throughout the 1960's concerning the number,
location, and defense of America's missiles.
Yet in the event, these intelligence assumptions
proved to be seriously flawed. Even though its mis-
sile testing was being relentlessly monitored by
America's electronic sentinels in space and on land,
the Soviet Union, without alerting U.S. intelli-
gence, managed to develop-and deploy-missiles
with multiple warheads accurate enough to attack
the most hardened missile silos in the United States.
ED\+?sttn J Ay LPSTEIN writes often on issues of intelligence.
Among his books in this field are Legend: The Senn
fl otld of Lee Harvey Oswald and /0 quest: The li'rn'ren
Co nr,ris,io,; nfr~4~prb"YFi ds +o4'ttRelelase.2OO6 Q1 IQ3
eontrih:rwer! articles to the ,\'cu 3n;kcr, the New York
T; or . ; :~cc;:re, and COMMENTARY iincluding '?7 he War
Within the C1_-~,- 9uZust 19751.r. l:nct,?{n?c Int-t I,,,I.-
How could such
been detected?
At first, explan__ sor this incredible intelli.
gence failure tended to focus on the errors of the
American analysts. The. inability to see improved
Soviet missile accuracy was attributed either to the
prevailing disposition grossly to underestimate
Soviet technical competence, or to incorrect assump.
tions about the method by which Soviet scientists
tested missile accuracy. The fault, in other words,
lay in self-deception.
However, when the data taken from the Soviet
missiles were studied in retrospect, with the help of
new and better methods of analysis, it appeared that
considerably more was involved in the intelligence
failure than American mistakes and self-deception.
This reanalysis suggested that the Soviet Union had
deliberately and systematically misled American in-
telligence by manipulating and "biasing," as it is
called, the missile transmissions that were being in-
tercepted. In other words, by channeling doctored
data into our most sophisticated scientific spying de-
vices, Soviet intelligence had duped the satellites
and antennas on which American intelligence had
come to depend. The Soviets had thereby effected a
decisive change in the delicate balance of strategic
missiles.
After nearly a decade of bitter debate within the
secret world of intelligence, the deception issue still
remains unresolved. Recently a plan was drawn up
by the National Security Council staff to place tech-
nical as well as human spies under the scrutiny of a
centralized counterintelligence authority. The pro-
ponents of this reorganization argue that without
such an "all-source" unit, able to piece together in-
formation from secret agents, surveillance cameras,
and the interception of coded messages and tele-
metry, the various intelligence-gathering services
could again be easily deceived. The opponents of
this plan in the American intelligence agencies
doubt that the Soviets ever in fact orchestrated a
: s ~~ f~e~~t~37~20OD 1l2O0Dl1 icated moni-
toring devices, and reject the proposed centraliza-
tion as unnecessarv and destructive of morale. The
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WALL STREE'T' JOURNAL
ARTI= AFP' AE D 16 JULY 1982
QN PgCE
Casey's Shadows:
A Greater Emphasis
On CIA-Analysis
' Casey said, when he arrived. Part of the
problem was simply money: In the seven
or eight years prior to the last year' of the
Carter administration, the agency had
"lost 501, of Its people and 40% of its fund.
The problem wasn't just money, though.,...
The program "wasn't timely," said Mr.
In the huge marble entrance hall of the Casey, "and it wasn't -relevant. -For In_:
Central Intelligence Agency outside Wash- stance, I asked.for an-estimate on the:Cu~
ington, one wall bears the words, "And Ye bans and their activities..1 got It after-two
Shall Know the Truth and the Truth Shall
Make You Free." The wall opposite is in- ;
scribed with stars, "In Honor of Those.
Members of the CIA Who Gave Their Lives
in the Service of Their Country." Below the
stars. a glass display case holds a book in
which each star is followed by the name of
the slain CIA member it stands for. Some
of the stars have only blank spaces beside
them, to -mark the -names-that wiil-never:
months-and it neglected to mention,
-Cuba's:relatianshlp with the Soviet.Union:,i.'
sent ,it back, and It 'took another while I
asked how long It had been In the works. It
turned out that it was. begun in June- of.
1980. It had gone through -seven drafts
and the first one was the best."
Moreover, the estimates were too nar- .
row in scope: "They were doing these estl-' I
be revealed, would do one on Nicaragua, Honduras..El
This dnal commitment; `to secrecy and ~T ~v~r:But.no.orie-was looking at there
_'ito knowledge, is the hallmark -of- a govern-:;
ment, intelligence -agency. Most of our at-
tention to the CIA in the past decade has
been concentrated on the secrecy part. But
CIA Director William Casey, In a recent in-
terview, wanted mainly to talk about what
be was doing about the less glamorous and
more important matter of bow the agency
analyzes and reports information. - I--
He did say that the CIA was now active
_again_.in,..landestine._ activities..-albeit.iu
post-Watergate style. "There's a lot of talk
about my being trigger-happy," Mr: Casey.
'defended himself; 'but lots ?'of the. little
countries.of the world are under Pressure"'
FCapitaal, Chronicle
by ' Suzanne Garment
from Soviet-backed -forces. "We've gotten
out of the business of security assistance,
but we're doing lots for them in fields like
communications.
"For instance, we helped in the El Sal-
vador election. In Honduras, we put people
through school and gave them instruments
that can detect how much metal a truck is
carrying. Some countries we help just with
photographic information, or sensors, or
training for. anti-terrorist forces. It's all
done with local people and just a handful of
officers." .
But just as important was ? what was
happening to intelligence analysis. The es-
timates program-the process by which
the intelligence community, within the CIA
and elsewhere, produces its major pieces
of analysis-had been "way down," Mr.
g onal _Interplay"among :these coyntrie .
And, no one was concentrating on the eco-
nomic component of these situations. In X.
years.-we had put-aNy fre estimates oi-
the Soviet economy..
"We've got the estimating process
streak lined." Mr .'Casey said. Instead' 411
;the compromising and papering-over.of dif;
i - ferences - that used to goon at 'the lower
levels: of the' bureaucracy when ails est"
mate-was prepared, ''we, - now:- Have the1.
chiefs of -all The agencies coniprising the in-
=, telllgence king the .decF,;
.sions.*-'. The issues;=-as~=one aide'?to .Mr:"
Casey put it, are drawn more clearly under
.the -new' system. `Tbcy `are ' made clearer:
still by Mr. Casey's eertainty,that." I'n'the
one responsible -for -the estimate and for :.
giving - a: -fair _.,reflection"of? alternative
Mr. Casey has also made some major,
. changes In The way the agency: does' its.,
short-term analysis. -He's`taken the people,
in the analytic sections-who used to be di-
vided up into categories like scientific af-
fairs, societal affairs and strategic .of-_,
fairs-and put them into new sections -or-
ganized along geographic lines. That way.
-he said, they have .a better chance of pro-..
ducing. information that is immediately:"
useful to policymakers. He has also estab-
lished new analysis centers on two topics
of current interest, technology transfer and
"insurgency and instability." .
has been changed. Now high -officials don't ,
merely get a package of written materials
sent over by the agency. Instead they bear
a presentation from a briefing officer. He
then reports back to-headquarters on what
types of questions the officials asked and If
there might be a need for more of certain i.
kinds of information.
These changes in the way the CIA han-
dles intelligence are all of a plece. They...
are designed to make disputes In-the Intel-
ligence community more visible, produce,.
'information on the politicians' timetable,
reorganize the analysts to make their prod-
uct conform more closely to decision mak-
ers' needs and tighten the day-to-day corr..,
nection between high government officials '
and the agency. If they work, they- will
make the CIA more relevant. They will
also make the, agency-,more -political...by,
forcing analysts to attune themselves more
closely to the-schedules and agendas of the
,politicians who are ?their`customers ""' :: ;
? Mr'...Casey's ? strategy- is guaranteed '.to-
provoke 'resistance. but its "political na ,
ture is precisely what makes it promising. -
i After. all; It- is hard 4o give-.a-
maker a good answer unless yon- ~ AT
ing to find out .what his question is.
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 I
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NEW YORK NEWS-WORLD
7 July 1982
paying price
I.S. the forspY folly
President Reagan has insisted twice
that the administration was caught com-
pletely off guard by Israel's massive inva-
sion of Lebanon on June 6: If so, there
ought to be more than a few red faces at
the Central Intelligence Agency.
If not detect the telltale
signs of an imminent invasion involving
tens of thousands of massed Israeli troops,
a partial call-up of reservists, and the
movement of several thousand tanks,
armored vehicles, artillery pieces and
hundreds of aircraft, something is seri-
ously wrong with America's intelligence
community.
all the more inexcusable by the fact that reconnaissance from satellites and air-
Israel is an open society and a de facto ally and the monitoring of radio trans-.
t5' any missions. _
of the United States - is but the latest im.
a dismal series. Six months ago, the ' One example in particular suggests the
administration was caught similarly terrible cost of the Carter-Turner purge. It
unaware by a declaration of martial law in has been reliably reported that a full year
And, in fact, something is wrong. This anticipated, by such electronic
most recent failure of intelligence - made intelligence-gathering means as photo
Poland that had obviously been planned
months in advance.
In December 1979, the Carter admin-
istration was totally surprised by the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan -- an act of
,premeditated aggression carried out by
five Soviet army divisions and requiring a
lengthy mobilization along the Soviet-
Afghan frontier. And a year before that,
the CIA had remained blissfully ignorant
of the revolutionary storm that would
shortly depose America's closest ally in
the strategically vital Persian Gulf region.
It is .hardly a, coincidence that these
glaring intelligence lapses followed
closely on'the heels of the Carter adminis-
tration's decision to de-emphasize the col-
lection of so-called "human-source"-
intelligence,
HUMINT.
known in the trade as
Carter's CIA director, Adm. Stansfield
Turner, dutifully purged the agency's
HUMINT branch by summarily dismiss.
ing more than 800 senior intelligence offi-
cers responsible for managing the
clandestine collection of intelligence in
foreign countries.
The staggering damage inflicted by,
these wholesale firings has never been
repaired, and probably cannot be made
good for, years to come. Nor have the
resulting intelligence gaps been filled, as
after 'the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
not one CIA officer in that country could
-speak Russian! The thought of an agency
case officer attempting to recruit Soviet
agents through a translator would be
laughable were it not so pathetic.
Last month, President Reagan .went to
CIA headquarters in Langley, Va.,,to sign
legislation making it a crime to knowingly
reveal the identity of a clandestine Ameri-
can agent. Reagan assured the assembled
CIA employees that they were on the "Win-
ning side" in the East-West struggle.
The president and his CIA director,
William Casey, could lend added credence
to that prediction by redoubling efforts to
rebuild the still-shattered clandestine ser-
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 NEW YORK TIMES
21 JUNE 1982
'Effort to Halt Spread ofA-Arms
aaw a er
By JUDITH 11SIL LEIt U.N. Aide Backs U.S. Stand The Central Intelligence Agency has i
SpecialwrbeNe.York2tmes This approach has been criticized by j there ws r m e erate e i e that in ururo
..Several Congressional nuclear ? policy.
WASHINGTON, June 20 United specialists. But it has been warmly en- ere sou be an attempt to damathat
ge a
States officials and nuclear policy spe--I dorsed by, among others, Hans Blix, di- clear wee s store a f to ra raid to at-
cialists fear that they may be losing a Atomic mic Energy of the International tae a wee n in transit to a nu-
35-year-0ld battle to curb the spread of ~, Agency, the United Na clear wer ant or to carry out black-
nttclear weapons - mail b threatening to use a nuclear
Critics of the Reagan Administration organization in Vienna.that pre _ wee nor reten in to have one.
motes atomic energy and monitors nu. gLack of progress on arms control
say the White House has placed insuffi- clear facilities to verity that they are agreements between the United States
dent emphasis on stopping nuclear pro- not being used for military purposes, and the Soviet Union has led to a surge
liferation. A policy put forth in a paper Mr. Blix has repeatedly voiced con_. in. nuclear weapons arsenals. and de-
approved last month by President Rea- corn that India, Israel, Pakistan and structive ability: This, in turn, encau-
gan, they argue, will-lead to increased South Africa refused to sign the 1970 ages nonnuclear nations to develop a
eisniyution of plutanium, a _ material treaty that became the cornerstone of nuclear ability, Mr. Blix and other ape-;
used in nuclear weapons, which will ua- efforts to' bait the spread of nuclear cialists contend.
derminetomicarms s efforts to slow the spread of 'T-ar>n:bells are U.S. Concerned by Argentina
dear with ringing laud and ;The conflict over the Falkland Is-
Administration officials deny that to these tour. Mr.' lands focused Administration concernthis will be the effect of the But { Bll c said early this year.. on Argentina. While there have been no
policy. Under the treaty. 116 nations have
officials and private analysts agree that ; forsworn nuclear wee startlingly new program. no developments inns 31st
pons; 45 have not. sine's nuclear
efforts to discourage the spread of nu- pmgrst now in its
clear arms have been severely compli- Causes for Nuclear Wom year, some Administration officials
als
sated by growing international an? re_ 1, Nuclear policy specialists say these #e.ar that the conflict with Britain may
cared tensions grthat put international - ! oar alarms are sounding, if somewhat prompt Argentina to build a nuclear
gional
suenIsrael and pArgentina to ressure on n rte- softly: . bomb, especially since the Falkland
tons and test atomic devices. . - " qNo country capable of developing surrender caused a loss of face for
atomic weapons has acceded to the Buenos Aires.
Robert H. Kupperman, a nuclear ape- I treaty in the last five years. Switzer- a Central Intelligence Agency has
cialist at Georgetown University's Cen- land was the most recent- estimated that r entina col 3Tw1nan
ter for Strategic and International Stud. The International Atomic Energy ' ate c m to ee to five years tt--go s ies.said with reference to the Israeli in-- Agency has become increasingly polar- o new report pre
vasioa of Lebanon and the BritislAr tied and politicized, as have many other by the Congressional Research Service]'
gentine fighting in the Falklands: , United Nations organizations. Some concludes thai At entina would be able
Government
"We had better start thinking not just, mid-
confr
anal nuclea ontat ons abetweenn West- 1980'ss, $if it is will ngl olrun the risks of
about how to sop nations from getting ern industrialized countries. and devel- getting caught at diverting safeguarded
nuclear weapons, but how to stop them oping nations could eventually under- materials or of abrogating its safe-
from using the weapons they will inevi- mine the agency's system of interns- guards agreements." But the report
tablyget." tiona] safeguards, such as. inspections. also states that Argentina could not
"The emergence of some new nuclear 9Israel's attack on an.Iragi research produce an arsenal of weapons until the
powers is unavoidable," concluded reactor a year ago weakened the Inter. 1990's at the earliest.
Lewis A. Dunn in a book published soon national Atomic Energy Agency's abil- Argentina poses a special problem
after he joined the Administration as tty to safeguard nuclear facilities osten- not only because it has declined to sign
ecial assistant to Under Secrets of sibly designed for peaceful purposes, the nonproliferation treaty or to submit
rY i The air strike touched off a debate on all of. its nuclear facilities to ins
State Richard T. Kennedy, ..a central fie- i genaian,
rue in nuclear policy matters. whether the agency was capable of but also because it is building what is
c
Many nuclear specialists- have jet-. material from detecting facility. The dispute .' the known ability as an t o produce everything
Teasingly begun to focus on "manag- has further shaken international aonfi- quired for nuclear power. This would
log a world in which many nations dence in the agency. give Argentina the ability to make nu-
have nuclear weapons, rather than on 9A sagging demand for energy has clear weapons quickly, without violat-
preventing the spread of the weapons. triggered a slump in sales of nuclear ing any safeguards agreements.
But the Reagan Administration re- reactors and a decline in the growth of Bomb Helps Weak Feel Strong
mains officially committed to prevent- nuclear power. This, in turn, has fin-
ing the spread. In Senate testimony last creased strains on the international Sys- "Nuclear tests are political state-
month, Mr. Kennedy called this a "fun- tern of export controls aimed at slowing meats, a country's way of showing that ,
damental commitment." the spread of sensitive technology to it has hair an its chest," said Warren H.
Toward that goal, the Administration countries that might be trying to de- Donnelly, a senior specialist at the Li-;
has emphasized measures to allay velop nuclear weapons, brary of Congress and author of the re-
polit- 9Growing sophistication of terrorist port on Argentina. "So naturally there
ical and military security concerns of groups and a spread of "mininukes" is concern about the growth of pres-
countries and to enhance regional has increased the threat ofi surer that could lead a c try like Ar-
stabthty. Approved For $ie; i,(Dt4Lratdn fsi t a ~ 0"fit? QQl 1o gh."
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ARTICLE APPEARED
THE NEW YORK TIMES
ON P .GE. ,2 0 10 June 1982
C 9
Presses .fed can Civil Deiensc N
ByxU:)i.T ll).. LLEfl
WASHINGTON, June 9 - Despite
co:asidecab.e pu`olxc antipathy and pro
i s?_ sic^:~l . = :t cisrn the Reagen Ad-
tnii::s traL-M:i , P-. - = g a:ad with an
ambitious civil defense proroirra_a that it
..::ves will ;:a'`c?e a r_.:Clear v'm- less
1i.:. ?_y and vi iii
Cf~:5w31tiesshoukls~t~-i1:I~'rar occ~ r.
jn March, x': ~sident Reagan ap-
proved a s . en-ya3r, $4.3 biilie::Y pro-
grain deliririightfind
have seemed to be working at cross p
rposes arid
the Presi
:
u
-
-
it - useful to examine the NSC
dent does not always.appear fully informed about the issues. system under`-Eis nho6we
The truth is that ski There-the NSC. assistant-chafed an NSC Planning Board,,
tration on the bas ic arp approaches conflicts to persist most of the within majtheor a issues. It sues It ?'.:.composed of assistant secretaries from-relevant -agencies
,i
which was responsible. for preparing draft ohc
does not yet have a guiding strategy on how to deal with the p - the papers oix
Soviets; on relations with the-allies; on the-Middle East and majorissues for consideration by the N5C and the President.'
handling Begin and Israel; and on the sort of military. cape- drawing on the full resources of their respective agencies,-
_. assistant made sure that the ae
s
-bi'ity required for deterrence and defense. ---, The national -? - p..p
adtguately anal ed the issue and comnetin recommends
Mr. Reagan cannot have the coherent policy essential for '. ;. tions s-about handling it,and arran&eti r-a intelligence
j
dealing with allies or adversaries until he makes the critical -.~.
estimate in parallel with the olic pa Mr.
choices about the strategy to be followed in these areas: what , ? .-,Second, these papers were circulated to the NSC members-1
does the US avant to'acbieve, by what means, and with what . in. time for them to be briefed by experts-within their agen- -4
priorities? (In,the-Middle East, for example.. does he intend -ciesbefore theNSCmeeting.,Finally, thePresidentpresided
to press forcefully- for a Palestinian solution or to acquiesce- -.at all NSC meetings and. beard the debate on the issue anon
with toothless _ in Israeli absorption of the West g
'protests: the members before making his decision.: =~-''- - . _ = ='~ - ~: ?.~
Bank and Gaza?) Without a strategy, his specific decisions This process had several benefits::_(1)-The"staff work
of-1
will continue tobeerratic, as when Carter vacillated between the Planning Board assured a joint probing of the problems)
the advice-of Brzezinsk i -and Vance regarding the-Soviet and alternatives
(2) The experts in the various agencies bad I
Union. a till) chance to submit their data and views as an input to the f
The primary task of Judge Clark should be to seek to re-(-'' decision:-. (3) The President. not only had the papers but also-
andenethe beard the issue discussed by all those with diverging views:
tifv President situf tti the need to devote will new tL) time to conv'wcp
the rgy In short it provided an effective mechanism forassisting the.
to making wise choices of strategy, and. (2) to ensure that the president to make the critical choices which determined the
Cabinet officers.: and-their agencies provide him with'the coherence and consistent direction of policy.
:analyses and advice for informeddecisions,,= These would seem to me the criteria for?'assessing .what-
Judge_Clark's star e -
ding witWthe-President should qualify ever Procedures Judge Clark may devise:
hirh to do both aspects effectively,It does not mean emulat- :r = i , _
ins Kissinger ar Brzezlrisli -His model should be the very. Robert fl Bowie has been concerned with foreign affairs,j
-different role of the-national .security assistant under Eisen- , for 35 years while serving on the Harvard faculty, in various
bower and Kennedy The assistant was responsible for mak- governmentpczsts, and asa consultant - - - ~: -: -r
ZL:
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 Approved For. Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001
r
OBI x~G~
THE WASHINGTON POST
29 January 1982
Stephen S:-Rosenfeld
e. . _ua'wk,_'..s:.,.-Di1eMr
-` The lesson of the CBS show on the 'doctoring he is : undersecretary of defense ? for policy.
of enemy strength-estimates in,Vietnam is sim- "Every War .Must End" (Columbia) is a-suc-
ple: don't doctor estimates. It's much liarder to '. cinct, beautifully argued . essay on the littl
'cope with the condition. that led to.,the.:doctor- ;,-studied-question of how wars end. Thoughlkle
wing. The-United States wa9.losing the=war,or=itt writes' of hot-wars, his aiialysis.can be extended
was-not winning in the way President Johnson to the Cold War:.
..-wanted. That condition-lingers in respect to our .-In a...government's inevitable internal argu-
general international position. We are not-not-, -merit,.. he says, each faction.: espouses-"peace
.yet, _ anyway-winning in, the,_:way-President ~._ with honor."-A long struggle so deepens disa-
Reagan?seemstowant..--- =y- _7 greement over:.nationalobjectives; however,
Mu m re is entailed here-ththe bias that the.,. phrase loses .its-common meaning:
that frustration can impart to intelligence esti- Those'who wish to end or?ease the war risk ex-
mating What does a country do when its not posing. themselves to charges of betrayal or` even
winning? -Fight on? Widen, the war?.- Cut its treason..,"Fear :of this:taint .-deters senior
losses? It is not a'congenial question. forAmer-. - officers, and government officials: from' taking
_icans;. but circumstances have compelled . us...to....steps:_to end a war,'even if,theyknow full-well-
address it: hat further. fighting":yv' 1~&Tmore harm than.
The initial- Carter' answer--before=Af hani good:
t A.
eagan_ has begun'O ` moral.'arid-legal sanctions. Defenses-are irrucl'
`"'F'i,, W4 2t F-~invrovor sn~inat i,,F rnol 4tfrA,,1o 4.s4t.a
s0 en tz_ l i!ttle :' but hls tflT)Z:' survival _of'a r ation-that stem from obstinacy iii
c = - - state- against: two types of harmful _actssby
;$tan- was to seek-&A as broad-ai aecorittrioda 'dovish';:factions; ?in thinking of their" cotintr3e
Lion as possible withMoscow..,J' nMy Carter's and--,,their--'p eople; ,:might actually- not.' be fah
V. the United States did nothave to win iz acoif be saved' Yet In the eyes.of th'e'hawkish fa c.
ventional' sense but just to'reach a balance: He tion,. the acceptance of a partial defeat would
The_ initial. Reagan amwer- Sefore'Europe "vrithout>butstart an internal process of political=
.:; seemingly stained going neutral under the shock -'iiemoratizati'ait. than would .undermines them e
=was to prepare for a broad confrontation with from=within: -And the `dovish': faction believes".
--President Reagan seemed committed.',to..the destroy.:thise.values'either through-som a fnal1'
idea-of winners-and losers. in the game. of na- cataclysm'or through increasing strife at home.'.
bons. His evident expectation was that at a eer=: Yes;_`)(_ attt running. a=good bit. aheacl.of the'
Cartenhad to harden a lot Reagan has ' begun':. tweerra finite.. shooting. war ,and'. an ongoing
to soften a little, how much we can't yet; know: .Cold. War, however these considerations. seem
But we do know that. his turn, tentative as it is, to me.to illuminate: brilliantly the terrain-of our
distresses many of his longtime supporter's. It politics today. ; * ='
makes me wonder if those of us who, are not so -Ronald Reagan `can. be sure' of -moral;,a id,
much troubled as comforted by the spectacle of political; fortification, although. not. necessariry
a president's loosening grip on ideology may c: success in his foreign policy, if he takes. a hard
r have underestimated-:the-difficulties-of .Rea- line. But whatever tendencies. he may have to
gan's going further down that road. {- -;" let up will stir an intense reaction from the do..
I , ? I say this under the influence or.a catch-up mastic quarter where be' has.the.deepest roots:.
i MM MI C
`7[k~e_ INA " P~ a an there>s no ess w ou o tt?'
V
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f'~T ICLP
pIN ?AGE 3 '
Cu3TSTIAN SCI ~11CE -10 T i TO"t
26 Januai-y 1982
Lessons-for--_ -spy agencies
At a time when the Reagan administration about half. Yet, according to-the- program,
is planning a major buildup imUS intelligence -their. counterviews did. not reach President
capabilities over the, next fiii years, it is vital,'---... Lyndon Johnson 'or Congress- until after the-
that there be healthy competition-and diver-.- Tet- offensive -in- early 1968 and after the
sity in the intelligence-gathering process. The -American public bad been repeatedlyassured
end result must be not justthemere colleetion a that victory waswithin reach. - - - '.
of information ' important as that -is-- but `'-?_ - US Vietnam'commanders,-including "Gen-.r:
ensuring that conflicting viewpoints and anal-Y R-William Westmoreland, - have denied -the .
yses:reachthenanon'sliighestleaderssothat''"charges- The final-historical record has still
-the best national policy jiidgnents_`can'be'ot been'=written. But the critical lessons of
An. that period pinpoint the importance of provid-
rhade.
Events of the past several-years have un-:-=ing the nation's highest political leaders with
'ders'cored-the?need for such-diversity. Many'z=-the widest-possible sources o- information. =
questiops'reinain to be- answered,=for-exam The lesson-, of Vietnam ? would also. seem to,
ple:,about the adequacy of Americas intelli =touch on a related issue; namely, that presi--:
genceregarding Iran, particularly the extent -`r dents and Congresses have a responsibility to
of popular opposition to theShah:'Had there raise the rightquestions-withthe-intelligence?-
:beenadeqiiatecontactswith-Itaniandissident-'''eagencies. Finally,-intelligence` experts ' stress-
rforces US polieytowards-Iran-rhight:have that it_is -the'quality-and integrity ofintelli-
been quite.different tnIt was, during-the?=gence work that-Is ultimately important, not.-
r~
late 1970x. justthe amount of money spent on a particu--.
An. even starker eisaiiiple'of the need for' ='`lar spy operation. ,That means ensuring that
greater diversity' in ' intelligence--operations-' -intelligence reports. not- be "sanitized' or
was spelled=outin-the-CBSreport on Vietnanl-i,=':"scrubbed up" to convey a particularpoint of
last week- According t&CBS;. the top-level US=="'view before they-are givers to top officials: r
milita y=command ? in' Vietnam suppressed-`-`' ` ,' In their, 1980 political platform. R2publi=
:and-altered hey intelligence~information re- cans `promised-`that they would- "propose :
garding enemy troop-strength in the-mid-l'. methods of providing_alternative intelligence-. 1
1960s;. even going so far aSto reprogram com- , `-estimates" =and `.constructive corripetition"-- -
puters.Both the CIA and militaryiritelligence = vithiut the US- spy--coinmunity:: The-White-
officers knew the information=was wrong . - in ?=~ House would be. well-served by- ew_suring ful- i
'`effect underestimating-enemy-strength: by ?--filhnentofthatcommitment_:
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ON PAGE
PHILADELPHIA I?1 'FIRER
25 January 19l2
and Iiie?~ationa1 .News iiiBi*
Tha Cwsaya Pakistan will saon 141
a15ie to detonate a nuclear device.
?According to yesterday's New York,
Times, a CIA reportsays Pakistan will
be able to detonate t e'device withiir
.
the-next. three years The CIA report
-said, however. that Pakistan was not.
:`likely to conduct atomic tests, partly`
because of President Mohammed Zia.
u1-Haq's unwillingness to jeopardize
the Reagan administration's six-year..."
M.2 billion military and. economic
-:aid program, the Times said. Conte:.
grass- suspended"ald_ to. Pakistan-yin
1979 because the country was pursu-
ing a, nuclear weapons program:"But
.the Reagan administration- arguedi
.forahe-recently..approved aid pro-I
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ARTICLE r PPEA.~ED
ON Pr GE !j
'By Roberk G_ Kaiser-
The American inilitar -commandsystem-
atically understated the_ true strength, . of
Vietcong forces, duririg~-the- year before -the
Tetoffensive on=orders:from Gen. Williain.C._
Westmoreland, thW=American commander"In
Vietnam, accordiiig`:tVa 7CBS -News-.docu-
mentary.-.
false reports were-- ingsent from Saigatr:to
Waahington,:-they- acknowledge in the-.doc -
The program;--TheJnoounted Enemy: A
Vietnam Deception," will be broadcast Sat=
urday from 9:30 to-11 p.m. (WDVM -9).
According to the former intelligence ofti
cers, their reports} -were. altered ,to- conform"
with Westmoreland s'- contention that,,;-, the
Vietcong army in South Vietnam consisted
.ohewer than 300,000 men..:: '
THE WASHINGTON POST
21 January 1982
This was
sion that "we had almost no enemy Lett alter
Teton, according to one of the officers, be-
cause. MACV. was; claiming such-high Vie-1
tcong losses. during-the offensive-without,ac--i
knowledging the true level of enemy forces
before the attack began.
In the documentary,' Graliani,= nowr retired
from the Army, but still an active spokesman
for hard-line defense positions, denies he wa
responsible for, altering information--in- the
Computers::
The fact that U.S.. intelligence analysts1
differed sharply "over. estimates of Vietcong]
;Sam Adams, a former CIA analyst whol
In. facts= they say;;-on-.the eve' of the Tet
offensive in January and February, 1968, the.
Vietcong and ? North-' Vietnamese may -have
had-twice that many troops in South Viet-.
nam_
After Tet,whicir Westmoreland termed a-
--.great: Americanvictory.- but- which the Joint
Chiefs of Staff used; as"justification' for re-
uesting._ an additional- 206,000-, `American
troops, the-American command irirVietnam'
(MACV). again altered. intelligence:.estimates,.-
according'ta.CBS
.named Richard.MacArthur says he=returned
-from a brief vacation after `Tet to-discover'<
that his. estimate . fof::. Vietcong:; guerrilla
strength had beerrcuC~in half.-.;A'::
When he protested to `a~ colonel in :the
MACV intelligencecenter,. the offceir'told
-him, "Mac, lie :-a Tittle;: Mac. Lie'alittle;"
MacArthur said. i
Two former intelligence officers. say. then-
colonel Daniel Graham, an Army.. intelligence:
officer who;later.;became director.of-the._De-{
fense Intelligence- Agency; .ordered . that in-
formation in MACV's com uters.`orr,Viet
.cong strength-be l $ F19'. '
could continue the. war "for an indefinite ?p_e=
l "that enemy strength was increasing." L j-
McChristian concluded that "the - eriefny
:officers, including a:-general who was the sen-a
for intelligence officer'-in Vietnam -have said.]
that numbers were deliberately -faked. Thei
general, Joseph McChristian, says in the doc-i
b
umentary that in 1967 his estimates showed,
argued for-higher estimates at the time., has
since written and, spoken about the argu-
ment, which previously appeared to be' a dis-
pute between civilians, at CIA and the mil-
-,itary.
Adams was a consultant'to CBS. producer-,
George Crile for-the documentary.-,-.-'
But this-is the first time Army intelligence i
the- documentaiy,. under, intensivequestion
ing-from correspondent Mike Wallace, West-
_moreland _ explained-that his efusal':was
-based partly'on political cor iderations: ..~:_-
What was the
political reason?:-Walra
asked. "' :7.,.
WestinorelandFrep]
replied: "
Because, thi p' eo-
pie - in :: Washington-;were . notsophistic ated.
But :..Westmoreland rejected -thii:firid
and: refused to report it to - `Vashirigtor . In
.enough-,to'-,=understaiid:I and =_ evaluat&;,this-.?
thing, and neither was the-media."- ~ m- ''fir
006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100120001-5
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100120001-5
rti tCL F? D
THE BOSTON GLOBE
21 January 1982
i"Y
Associated Press ` --
NEW YORK.- Military and .. CIA-analysts fal-
sified enemy
.
troop information before and dur-
... ;..: ^.:?.
ing the 1968-Tet, offensive in Vietn
am; at least,
~,_~ , ?"Y,'.`
partly to appease: politicians and the: press at.'
home, CBS News says in a= report to be broad- ? .:~; . ~?~ '~~ :: ~i 1% 4M
cast Saturday night. _
"The fact +is we Americans. were misin
formed about- the nature and size-of the y
- ~r
we were facing:' Mike Wallace says in-an Intro--" duction to-'The Uncounted- Enemy- A Vietnam-,:.,'
.'
Deception-,"
CBS presents testimony er a,? ` ?~ .
fromseveral, form
high-ranking US_ military and civilian officials
that the program describes as. "a conscious ef:
fort, indeed a conspiracy; at the highest levels of
American military Intelligence.-to-
suppress and 'alter'critical? intelligence on the enemy' in ",.
tw~0 a,
year leading.up to the Tet offensive."
Despite.. mounting optimism in the fail- of
1966 for an-.American victory In Vietnam, CIA
analysts - notably one named, Sam Adams
had begun to doubt estimates on enemy. troop strength coming from military headquarters. in Gen. William Westmoreland briefs President
Saigon: CBS says.= Lyndon Johnson on the Vietnain war situ
- :. -. -' ?-` - r:.
a-
In April 1967, Gen. William Westmoreland, tion in 1967. AP PHOrd'
commander of US forces in Vietnam, was-sum-' "Westmoreland says he doesn't recall these-
moned to ..Washington. Westmoreland CBS ordersWallace ;reports; . but Col. -"George
says, told President Lyndon H_ Johnson that the, - Hamscher. ,who represented the commander at
Viet Cong army had leveled off at 285.000 men:. ?a meeting in. Washington in 1967, remembers,
Westmoreland apparently- was not aware _.= "We can't live with a figure higher than so-and-,-
that his own Intelligence chiefs in Vietnam had- so is the message.... ...,we, got, Enemy troop-
discovered evidence confirming CIA estimates of strength was set, during that- meeting, at
.afar larger enemy. CBS. says. When he did find 294.000. according to.CBS:
out. Gen. Joseph McChristlan,:Westmoreland's : : In the summer of 1967. CBS.says Westmore-
'iii elligence chief ai: the timer recalls: and pu iedr ;'new tactic. Be proposed hat-
I had the' definite'~Impression that he felt' .= an entire cafego of the ?Viet Cong arm_v'the
that If he sent.those.figures back to-Washin ton ?? --? of defense militia; a force of 701000 - simply be
at that time.,. it. would create a political. bomb' - dropped from the orderof battle."
shell." - _ - Through' 1967: according to CBS. mi'tary re-
I was-'not -about' ;to send to Washington`-f . ports never Indicated ` an infiltration- rate of
something that was- specious." Westmoreland, ? ?. - North Vietnamese. regulars Into the south- high-
tells Wallace. '.'And in my opinion; it was spe- : er than 8000 men- a month- During the five
cious:' --':months that preceded Tet; analysts counted as
Wallace asks the general, now retired. "Why: - many as,' 25,000 infiltrating soldiers' each.
,would it-have been. a *Political bombshell'?":: month.
"Because: Westmoreland -says. "the people. "But ? those ? reports of 'a = dramatically -in-
in Washington were not sophisticated enough creased infiltration were- systematically
to understand and evaluate this thing: and nei- blocked," CBS says.
ther was the media.' 1. Col: Russell Cooley: the man In charge of the,'
Atone point, CBS says. military intelligence infiltration analysts, adds:
~."
officers. were apparently under orders from . "These never got past the- higher headquaat'
Westmoreland to keep the reported enemy troop : ters.? Every time these figures went up. they:
level under 000, ev th tht t2~1~~(ii~~c~p,,~~?? 3~~fQ1 Pure'
havebeen>Se `7drTn-til"g r9es... -. -. __?..:.,
anah sille
 ARTICLE
ON PAGE
roved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R
Cr1R.ISTIAN SCTs~?CE Mo:'?JITOR
11 January 1932
B Daniel Southerland
nce
i
ti
C
a a Ste....
s
hr
. l lle
Washington
The White-House has approved a five-year'.
plan which would substantially=strengthen
.American intelligence --agencies across the
board, according to admirdStration,officials. :
- ' The officials say that the-plan grew pri
marily out of a conviction that budgetary and.
manpower- limitations: had.-for more: than -a
decade prevented- the :spy -agencies -from
keeping up adequately-witty- ar rapidly chang-
ing, more dangerous world. The-plan,- which
would lead, tothe'hiring of more analysts, sci-
entists, and secret operatives by the _intelli--
.: gerce agencies, is reported-to-,have the sup-.
..;port of the nation's top intelligence.ofticers.-
The officials= told. this, reporter:tlie plan
would give the intelligence agencies a greater:
increase in funds over the next, several years,
in percentage- terms, than' ,increases now
scheduled for the defense budget as a whole.
The defense budget isto increase by7percent
in real terms-.each--year for. the, next 'five
Increases for the intelligence agencies will
apparently mean not only more'manpower,_
but also more technical capabilities.- such as.
spy satellites, for example, and an increased.
ability to conduct secret operations overseas-
In the case of the-US Central-Intelligence
Agency. the . Reagan- administration's-main,,
concern at this point appears-to-bean effort to
improve the quality of.-intelligenee analysis.,
reaching policymakers_
Administration officials-feel confident that I
key senators and. congressmen, will goy along
with their_telligence_`?`rebuildingY plan, which
has been inthe mating for some months-
now-The full details of the intelligence agencies'
budget are only known to-top administration
officials and-- to- congressional. oversight
Published-speculation on.the-subject hasi
placed the intelligence agencies' budget_.at;
around $10 billion-for 1980-8I"_-A-good part, of J
that budget is said to go to the` technological
side of intelligence gathering. ?? - =-r?? . -. -
- Nearly a. dozen government agencies are {
-involved in intelligence, kathering_:'_ with the
? CIA taking only arelatively small percentage
of the total budget, officials say---America'biggest intelligence agency is the-supersecret
electronic- snooping - organization.. ,-the Na-
tional Security Agency(NSA)._.~:=
public details of the intelligence agencies' t
tal annual bW#I* T r ,. - . 6/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001001
within the Defense Department budget:- hasi
been debated within the US Congress. But th
executive. branch has thus far argued suc-
cessfully that it might be of use to adversaries
of the US, and the Soviet Union, in particular,
to know the full details. Officials contend that
with such details, the Soviets might be able to
plot trends and-'develop new methods of
countering theUS spy agencies- .:.- .:.:r
A number of key senators and .congress-
men were highly critical of those spy agencies
in the early and mid-1970x. Never before had.
any major nation argued out in public, to such
a degree, the virtues. and vices of-its intelli-
gence agencies._,:..
But over the past several years, 'the pendtr-
lum seems to have' swung: on: Capitol- Ilil l in
favor of strengthening the intelligence agen-:
cies. The causes for this-are many. They in-i
elude disillusionment with the results of.US-H
Soviet detente and a feeling that the world has
become-a more dangerous place because of a.
number of-,developments -- the fall of the
Shah of Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghani--i
stan, and the loss of US nuclear superiority.,
among them;=_%
_ ' -While administration officials continue ta-i
decline to give full details of intelligence:
agency-'spending,-meanwhile, they, do give
just enough to argue their case for rebuilding.
They say that such spy agency spending!
reached a peak during the Vietnam war
years, when large number of intelligence offi-
cers were deployed in Southeast Asia.
From the late 1960s onward.. according to
official accounts, there was a steady man-1
power "drawdown" inmost sectors of intelli-' ,
Bence g4he5ng. WAccording to- one account;{
the manpower decrease at the. CIA among
both' analysts and so-called' case officers. ~-
the people who run foreign agents -- has come
to about 25 percent over the past 10 - to _?15
years--;; .ti - . _.-;.?:.:_ ~?~
' Some'-fornrier 1ntelligence?6fficers-claim-
that the CIA's ability to engage in successful
"covert action;" or secret action aimed at in- ,
fluencing political conditions in other nations,
had eroded to the point in recent yearswberee
-it wasvirttiallynonexistent_ : c
There was reported to have been a limited
revival of covert action during the last year or 1
two of the Carter administration, most of it i
apparently=in. the propaganda field., Frustra??
Lion over the fall of the Shah of Iran,'ttie tak-'
ing of American hostages in'Iran,-and the Sod
vet invasion of ? Afghanistan rbelped . to
gen4ate pressures fora return to same of the
The question of .possibly revealing to the cloak-and-dagger operations of the Beast::
 'Approved For Release" 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP50-0113780001
"'= r === MT1 TTARY SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
VOLUME 2, NO. 1
1982
During his tenure as CIA director,
Admiral Stansfield Turner once com-
missioned a former navy colleague for
what Turner believed would be about
a on.-week job: taking an inde-
pendent look at the American
intelligence cornmurity's entire secur-
ity classilication (and ce=..c-word)
system in an attempt to arrive at a
new system.
Actually, the job turned out to he
so complicated, it took nearly half a
year, And in the end, what emerged
was a massive syste-n of code-words
and sources pegged to those with
''need to know" crriairl information.
The system was not only hopelessly
ccniplicated, it was useless as well; as
things turned out, neither Turner nor
the consultant were cleared to know
sorre of the code words, and a huge
chart graphically derionstratiri the
system could not be reproduced in the
CiA since no one at the agency was
cleared to know alt of its components.
Ultimately. it led to the formation of
the, so-called "Royal" special security
system ---- first revealed via newspaper
leaks, much to the bemused reactions
of V+'ashington policyrnakers.
The incident is symptomatic of
much that is wrong with the modern
American intelligence community: an
obsession with strecture over form.
bureaucratic nose-picking. ar)d an
unhealthy concern with technology,
to the exclusion of function- It. is
chiefly symptomatic. of course, of
that central bane, bureaucracy. best
exemplified by the code-word night-
mare. Indeed, there is cause for some
wonder at how Turner's consultant
.managed to pick his way through the
labyrinth. How did he manage, for
example, to understand why there are
things marked ORCON, whic.h means
that permanent federal employees can
look, but not contractors? Or how
certain code words will denote matcr-
ial to be seen only by, say. the navy.
but not by any other military service?
This is not an article about the
intelligence community's code-word
d kit Classification system
s
re
can be done to reform the American
intelligence community. As we have
seen in this series of rticles, that
community for quite some time has
been operating in something of an
information/ intelligence explosion,
an explosion of data for which the
intelligence community i:~ largely re-
sponsible. But the name of the game
has been how the intelligence has been
used..
Summarily, the record is spotty, at
best, on this point. Thcie have been
I N T E L 1. 1 C E. N C lE
A. PrsMI
.for Rgwa
(and still are) too many pulicymakers
who use intelligence as a ?lrunk uses a
lamppost --- not for illun-tination, but
as a crutch. This expi..ius why a
certain kind of intelligence is contin-
ually most attractive to l.ulicymakirs:
the intelligence, carefully worded and
by Ernest Volkinan
subtly tailored, either tells somebody
what he wants to hear or cu,.firnis an already well-established policy posi-
tion. The most unfu:tus~ste develop-
ment in modern intelligi-nee has been
the subordination of int.-Iligence to
institutional and opera ti 'n,.' interests
--- and even more unfortunately the
fact is that the intelligence community
has all too often acgtsio ;ccd in this
sort of self-delusion, which we might
summarize as the ancient pursuit of
the agreeable, rather tarn the dis-
agreeable.
To a certain extent, the American
intelligence community has abrogated
its fundamental responsibility of pro-
viding light in a world clouded by
complexity and the noise of the
information explosion. The sea. of
paper, generated these days in terms
of sheer quantity, is beyond the
capacity of its audience to absorb it.
This sea concerns a dangerously
volatile world, and no better mandate
for the intelligence community exists
than the task- of understanding just
how volatile it is, what dangers exist,
and what can be reasonably antici-
pated in a time of disorderly change.
violence, terror, totalitarian revolu-
tion and. war. There is a pronounced
deficiency by the intelligence com-
munity in this task at the present time,
e
J
an
that subject would fill a dense Volume, and however much we can applaud
provided it could von be u rst od such events as the rapprochement
-- but the concer#RKaYSO 4r lease t~.RQ I Q3it CI,psrfl:QP>s8 k9tb3r7R000100120001-5
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100120
MILITARY SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
Vol. 1, No. 2
1981
.-=.kt (3B?R'~l~~I~ISE1-"T'E~~-haseallzd?~[lie:,Ow9Oi2U4a1c-
,tive,_aslt pluckedjrorn the atrnos-`~
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R900100120001-5
U.S.Already Ahead
SACRAMENTO BEE (CA)
13 December 1981
411
"N-Buidu Reall
15ve, ens.e
(Mr. Hughes is professor of
government and co-ordinator
of the .Soviet Studies Pro-
gram at California State
University, Sacramento. He
also holds a degree in engi~-
neering).
BY RICHARD D. HUGHES
AMERICANS.DESERVE some
view of the realities of the arms
race other than?that fed them by
the military, industrial complex-
or the Republican Party' they'.
are being deceived about the
level of Soviet defense spending,
about the quality of our strategic
forces and about who is really..
preparing for limited nuclear
War.
President Ford raised the.-
issue of measuring the arms race
during his election campaign
when he arranged ? for an inde-
pendent analysis of classified
information prepared by the
CIA. The reviewers included,,
such hard-liners as Richard
Pipes, a Harvard professor cur-
rently on loan to the National
Security Council as White House
resident Soviet specialist.
An example of Pipes' extreme
hard-line perspective is that he
had to be squelched by the White,,
House last spring for talking-
;about the "inevitability of war"
'(presumably with the Soviet_
Union). Ironically, the phrase -
not originally intended to mean,
war between capitalist and
Communist states -- is a quota-
tion from Lenin, disowned by-
Khrushchev and subsequent
Soviet leaders because, of the::
dangers inherent in any nuclear
confrontation. The doctrine of
peaceful co-existence, along with
abundant debate in Soviet mili
tary circles on the inability of
the Soviet Union to survive nu-
clear war, was completely ig-
nored by Pipes in his influential
AN 'ALTERNATIVE VIEW of
our position in the arms race
emerges upon examination of
overall spending figures and
analysis of our strategic weapons
capabilities vis-a-vis the_ Soviet
Union-
sophisticated as to be beyond)
Soviet ability to manufacture, in
some cases for the next-20 years,,
as reported by the Joint Chiefs of.
Staff in congressional testimony.
If Soviet analysts used our meth-
ware which they cannot pro
Estimates of. Soviet- defense
expenditures can Abe calculated
in several ways, each yielding a.
different set of figures. The CIA
method is to measure Soviet
weapons production and
manpower through various Intel-..
ligence.,_channels_(h_a5 satel-
lites) and then attach ~aha~ lllarr
f igure representing.,
would have, to spend. to match
the Soviet effort-
This method has been chal-
lenged in many scholarly jour-
nals. In the first place, it is ridic-
dif-
ulous to evalute structurally
ferent economies and defense
establishments in. a single cur-
rency when the countries are
monetarily isolated. What is
relatively cheap
designer jeans) may be very
expensive there - as.any travel-
er accosted by a Soviet teen-ager
in Red Square can confirm. -
secondly, although the Soviet-'
armed forces are made up of
larger numbers.of soldiers, they,
:receive miniscule salaries, often
serve as border guards, work on
vast construction projects and
must help farmers to bring in the
harvest. Nonetheless, the CIA
measures Soviet pay_ Y
standards - a clear distortion which ignores any difference in
morale and efficiency between
our military, and theirs.
Also, our total strategic forces
require 75,000 personnel, yet an],
equivalent Soviet arsenal re-
quires five times as many.
In addition, 30 percent- of
our weapons are so technically,..'
article publishe?pipr694111 l5pi Release 2006/01/03
"Commentary
pk ;~? r _r
duce, the,ruble cost:-would, be
infinite...`
:According to CIA statistics,
the Soviet Union was spending-
,-up to 40 percent more. than. we
were .before the recent Carter-'
Reagan buildup. A parallel-
our comparative efforts would j .
indicate, some experts say, that
we, are spending three times
what the. Soviet Union spends.
Franklyn Holzmann ' of Tufts
University, an economist special-
izing in Soviet defense spending,)
'has placed expenditures by both
powers about equal in 1979.
An. example of statistical.
manipulation illustrates the need.
for caution in interpreting fig-
ures supplied by the. CIA: Even-
-though. there was no 'change ,in
the rate of Soviet spending, in
1976'the agency concluded that
the Soviet arms industry was as
inefficient as the-:rest, of the
economy; and so its defense of
fort rose, statistically, from 6-8
percent. of Soviet gross national
r
product to 11-12 percent ove-
night, with no increase in force
levels. Hard-liners are tempted
.to cite this change as proof that.
the Soviets were suddenly spend=
ing more. In fact, this should be
interpreted to mean their de-
fense was costing them relative-
ly twice as much,- or that, on at
least one issue, the CIA has been
wrong by a factor of almost 100
percent....::.
CIA-RDP90-01137800010012000 5
 Approved For Fee'1qNT90-
R= 4 E,YLV.? Tfi Y L fi fl 22 November 1981
.TIM-CASEY INVESTMENTS, BJT - 2 TRKE57 f 00-1200
~CiR CHIEF KEEPS CONTROL OVER BIG INVESTMENT F
LASERPHOTO NV9
By MICHAEL J. SNIFFED{ -
T R ? C ER I
~RT PA R RY
+HSSOC I RTEO PRESS WRITERS
GIA DIRECTOR, WILLIAM J. CfiS-: , vr-a trr i nt rE i MEN;
WITH BROAD ACCESS TO THE GOVERNMENT'S SECRET DATA ON INTERNRTIONRL
ECONOMIC OEV'ELOFNENTS3 HAS REVERSED THE PRACTICE OF HIS TWO
PREDECESSORS AND KEPT CONTROL OF HIS PERSONAL STOCK HOLDINGS.-
CASEY AND HIS WIFE 0141i STOCK WORTH AT LEAST 1,, 8 MILLI,ONf AND
PERHAPS MORE THAN $3.4 MILLIONY IN 23 CORPORATIONS WITH NRTOR FOREIGN
OPERATIONS,
MRHY OF THE FIRMS ARE INVOLVED WITH OILS NATURAL GAS AND STRATEGIC
MINERALS AND OPERATE IN NATIONS OF BEEP INTEREST TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE.
UNLIKE CASEY, OTHERS WITH ACCESS TO CLOSELY HELD ECONOMIC SECRETS
INCLUDING PRESIDENT EAGAN, VICE PRESIDENT GEORGE SU.?S
STATE F LEXA~?DER H. HAIG ~ DONALD #Nt ~ECRETf~r~Y OF
As RHO TREASURY SECRET i T. PEGAN
PLACED THEIR HOLDING`S IN BLIND. TRUSTS, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CASPAR
WEINBERGER DIVESTED HIS. STOCK IN COMPANIES WHICH DO BUSINESS WITH THE
PENTAGONS BUT HE DID NOT CREATE R BLIND TRUST.
CASEY, WHOSE PAST BUSINESS DEALIN S ARE UNDER INVESTIGATION BY THE
SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE, MAINTAINS ULTIMATE CONTROL OVER HIS
STOCKS ALTHOUGH AN INVESTMENT ADVISER HANDLES DAY-TO-DAY MANAGEMENT OF
THE PORTFOLIO, ACCORDING TO CIA GENERAL COUNSEL STANLEY SPORKIN.
SPEAKING FOR CASEY, SPORKI.N SAID THE ADVISER HAS BOUGHT RHO SOLD
STOCK OH CASEY'S BEHALF SINCE THE FORMER WALL STREET ATTORNEY TOOK
OVER AT THE CIA LAST-JRNURRY. SPORKIN SAID CASEY HAS NOT AWARE OF WHAT
HAD? BEEN PURCHASED, BUT THE CIA COUNSEL SAID HE COULD NOT SAY CASEY
HAS UNAWARE OF WHAT HAD BEEN SOLD.
HE DECLINED TO IDENTIFY ANY CASEY STOCKS BOUGHT OR SOLDI BUT NOTED
THAT THE LAW RE$UIRES INCUMBENT OFFICIALS BY MAY 15 OF EACH YEAR TO'
DISCLOSE THE VALUE, WITHIN BROAD RAHGES3 OF EACH STOCK TRANSACTION
DURING THE PREVIOUS YEAR.
MANY CASEY INVESTMENTS ARE WITH FIRMS WHOSE TRADING PRICES COULD
RISE AND FALL ON-INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS. FOR INSTANCES CASEY OWNS
MORE THAN $250,000 IN SUPERIOR OIL CO., WHICH DEALS WITH THE ABU
DHA$I GOVERNMENT ON HOW MUCH OIL SUPERIOR CAN PUMP IN TH; _PERSIAN
GULF. SUPERIOR ALSO HAS BEEN NEGOTIATING WITH THAILAND ON THE SALE OF
NATURAL GAS RND THE FIRM MRS AN INTEREST IN A SOUTH AFRICA PLATINUM
SUBSIDIARY, Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP9O-01137R000100120001-5
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137Pnnnlnn19nnn1--f;
l
r. r _ .- ..a 11 21 A E D
JEW YORK TIMES
22 NO.`JEKflE*:i 1981
;~..I.A.'s Casey'Departs Fr
In Keeping Control of his
WASHINGTON, Nov. 22 (AP) - Wil-
liam I. Casey, the Director of Central
Intelligence, one of a handful of men
with broad access to secret Government
data on international economic develop-
ments, has reversed the practice of two
predecessors by keeping control of his
stockholdings. -
Mr. Casey and his wife own stock
worth at least $1.8 million, and perhaps
more than $3.4 million, in 27 corpora-
tions with major foreign operations.
Many of the concerns have oil, natural
gas and strategic minerals operations
and are involved in nations of interest to
American intelligence.
rir_ Casey's immediate predecessors
at the C.I.A., Vice President Bush and
Adm. Stanfield Turner, set up blind
trusts, saying that they wished to avoid
the appearance of conflicts of interests:
Unlike Mr. Casey, others with access
to strategic economic secret, -- includ-
ing President Reagan, Mr. Bush, Secre-
tary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. and
Treasury Secretary Donald T. Regan,
put their holdings in blind trusts. De-
fense Secretary Caspar T. Weinberger
sold his stock in companies doing busi-
ness with the Pentagon, but did not-
create a blind trust.
NoViolation of Rules
Fred F. Fielding, t`re White House
counsel, said that Mr. Casey had not vio-
lated Reagan Administration guidelines
on stock holdings.
trust. A deputy general counsel for the!
C.I.A? Ernest Mayfield, told him Feb. 3:
that he-did not have to.
Mr. Mayerfeld could not be reached,
but Mr. Sporkin said: "There's no re-
quirement that I know of to put his hold-
higs in a blind trust." Referring to Mr.
Casey, he went on: "You're dealing with
a very honorable person. He wouldn't
misuse information. He lust wouldn't do
that." -
Mr. Sporkin said Mr. Mayerfeld had
consulted a classified list of intelligence
contractors before advising Mr. Casey
that he did not have to sell stocks or
create a trust, but should disqualify
himself from dealing with specifics at-;
fectin a his holdings.
Though not required' to do so, Mr.'
Casey put his holdings in a blind trust,
when he headed the Securities and Ex-'
"change Commission, and when he
served as Under Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs and head of the Ex-
port-Import Bank in the Nixon and Ford
administrations.
All think hegot burned on his last blind
trust, Mr. SporYdn.said. "It is a very
k
ind of thing to do.
companies whose trading price could C.LA like Quaker Oats." But.- 1;j cop-II onerous
rise and fall wj ~t 0qR@ pe 2006/01103' : CIA-RDP90-01137 bt0 l~ig0~p~rldgiot: make public'
meets. For ins ce, Mr.. CCasey 9wns r. Cases agreement.with his invest-
? Continued
The director, whose business dealings
are under Senate Intelligence Commit-
tee investigation, has ultimate control
over his stocks, although an investment
adviser handles their day-to-day man-
agement, according to the intelligence
agency's general counsel, Stanley Snor-
kin.
Speaking for Mr. Casey, Mr. Sporltin
said that the adviser had bought and
sold stock on Mr. Casey's behalf since
the former Wall St-e.t attorney took
over the agency directorship in Janu-
ary. Mr. Sporkin said that Mr. Casey
was not aware of what had been pur-
chased, but he said he could not say that
Mr. Casey was unaware of what had
been sold.
He declined to identify any stocks
bought or sold for Mr. Casey. He noted
that a law requires senior-officials, each
May 15, to disclose the value, within
broad ranges, of each stock transaction
in the previous year.
Many Casey investments are with
rested himself to say: "Well, not'
Quaker oats, because C.I.A. estimates 1
the Russian oat crop-"
As Director of Central Intelligence,
I Mr. Casey receives information from
{- :::::...:.:.:::.: ?::;::...:;:.::,. ,,:: -
agents and analysts, and from United States Air Force satellites and the Na-
T:r_ New York'Ume$
William J. Casey
tional Security Agency's electronic in-I'
tercepting equipment.
Three former officials at the security
agency, who asked not to be identified!
because the functions of the agency
were classified, said that, backed by
legal authority and sophisticated tech-
nology,.me agency monitors a large vol-
ume of international communications
by multinational firms, foreign corpora-
` tions and othergovernments.
One official said: "The C.I.A. Direc-
tor will know almost before anyone else
when an oil fire shuts down a major field
in the Persian Gulf; whether the Chi-
nese have to buy wheat or have a major'
oil find and need drilling equipment or
lannin
when a forei
n government is
g
p
g
to expropriatea U.S. firm.
"Few people have access to all of this,
more than $250,000 in Superior Oil Com- but Casey's one of half a'dozen people
pany stock. The company deals with whohavegotitall."
Abu Dhabi on how much oil it can pump Trtrst Inquiry Referred to Counsel
i in the Persian Gulf. Superior has also -
been negotiating with Thailand on natu- Mr. Sporkin said that Mr. Casey had
ral gas sales and has an interest in South asked whether he should create a blind
African platinum.
A 11.165 Presidential order and existing
regulations prohibit Federal employees
from using information not in the public
domain and obtained through their Gov-
ernment work "for the purpose of fur-
j thering a private interest-" A Govern-
I ment-wide regulation on ethical conduct
I says "an employee shall avoid any ac-
tion, whether or not specifically prohib-
ited ... which might result in or create
the appearance of using public office for
pr ivate gain."
Such rules led Mr. Bush to sell nine
stocks and create a blind trust for his in-
vestments in 1976, after becoming C.I.A.
director.
Admiral' Turner, who had invest-
ments worth less than $350,000, said, "I
knew I wasn't going to misuse any infor-
mation, but the safest move forme to be
sure that I didn't have an appearance of
conflict was to put those holdings in a
blind trust."
Even Quaker Oats Questionable
He said that he could have made a
trust unnecessary by shifting invest-
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RETICLE APP ABED THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
ON PACE 20 November 1981
Airforce is a- Step.
closer to getting B-1
BySrepben Nebbe
Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
Washington
The B-1 bomber now looks certain to be emblazoned
with the US Air Force insignia.
The House of Representatives approved funds for
the sleek. new aircraft when it passed a $197.4 billion
defense appropriations bill Nov. 18. The Senate is ex-.-,
petted to act in similar fashion this week.. _ j
By a 263-to-142 vote, the House scotched an attempt
by Rep. Joseph P. Addabbo (D) of New York to cut out
most of the $2.4 billion earmarked for the bomber-., l
Built by Rockwell International, the plane can carry
conventional and nuclear bombs as .well as 30 cruise
missiles.
Representative- Addabbo, chairman of the House t
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, argues that
there is insufficient money-to build the B-1 and, the
"Stealth'-' or advanced technology bomber (ATB) that
eventually -will replace it. Cost estimates for the B-1,
program range from $20 billion by the Pentagon to $40
-billion by the Congressional Budget Office-
Air Air Force chiefs long have wanted to replace the
aging B-52 bombers with the B-1. But President Carter
halted plans for the B-1's full-scale production in 1977.
Instead, he chose to rely on "standoff bombers",.- B-
52Gs armed with long-range cruise missiles
The crucial task facing any bomber pitted against
the Soviet Union is the penetration of increasingly for:
midable air defenses - radars, missiles, and intercep-
tor - aircraft.. US Defense . Secretary .- Caspar W.
Weinberger claims the B-52 will be unable to penetrate
that shield beyond the end of 1985..
But CIA analyst Robert M_ Huffstutler told-the de-
fense subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Com-
mittee Oct. 28 that "there would be practically no dif-
ference" in the ability of B-552s and B-is to pierce Soviet
air defenses.:
The Pentagon promptly counterattacked, fearing...
its rationale for seeking 100 B-1 bombers would be de-
stroyed- "The CIA was-talking about the wrong
says Mr. Weinberger- The new aircraft, the B-1B, car-r";
ries more advanced defenses than the original, the
Pentagon insists -- thus enabling it to reach Soviet
targetsmore easily' Rockwell says the radar cross sec-
lion of--the B4B will be one-tenth that of the B-1'and `
one hundredth that of the B-552. Weinberger says the B-
It will be able to penetrate Soviet-air defenses "well
into the 1990s.'"
dumping from the B-52 to the ATE would be risky in
the Air Force's view because theATB is in its research
and development stages. Weinberger has said that the
first ATB could be completed in 1989. Rockwell says it
could have 100 B-is in USAF lirvery byl988.
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s. TICLE APPEAED
C ; PAGE
THE WASHINGTON POST
18 November 1981
By George C. Wilson
wane wn eoea smrc water
The Senate Appropriations Committee.
handed President Reagan his second .major
victory on defense in two days yesterday. by
voting 21 to 7 to build the B1 bomber.
On Monday, the House Appropriations.
Committee approved the land-based MX mis-
sile.
Reagan proposed .both weapons systems- it
October as part of his plan to beef up strategic
firepower.: -Both proposals have been contro-
versial,- with approval by Congress much in
doubt.
Both Sen. Ernest F. Hollings (D-S.C.), who
tried to kill the B1, and Rep. Joseph. P. Ad
dabbo (D-N.Y.), who sought to delete funding
for the MX, vowed to renew their fits when
the defense appropriations bills are debated in
the two chambers later this week-
The House committee has approved $196.5
billion in -spending authority for the Pentagon
for fiscal 1982, about $4 billion less than Rea- ll
Fan sought, while the Senate unit, by voice
vote yesterday, approved. $203.8'billion. Con-,
gressional leaders hope to have a compromise
version through both houses and ready to send '
to the president by Friday.
=' The MX was not voted- on in the Senate
committee yesterday. Chairman Mark 0. Hat
field (R-Ore.) said he would wait- until the bill
-reaches the- floor before seeking to delete
money for the MX and for chemical warfare.
This left the Hollings B1 amendment as yes-
terday's key test of bow well Reagan has man
aged to sell his .defense strategy to the Senate.
Hollings said the BL would not buy- enough
bang for the buck, and urged that the $2.4 bil-
lion earmarked for the bomber he spent in-,
stead on. upgrading military readiness. He.
.quoted testimony by Defense Secretary Caspar
W. Weinberger that the B1, due to be ready in
1986, would not be able to penetrate Soviet air
defenses after 1990:::.
Weinberger told the Senate Armed Services
Committee Nov. 5 that, after the period of
"probably 1988 to 1989," with the BI "you lose
,the ability to penetrate unless someone wants
to direct suicide missions, and that is not any=
thing I am going to do". . .
At another point in the same hearing, Wein-
herger said: "The simple fact is that the infor-
mation I have,-the department has,. on which
the decision was based was that it would be no
longer safe to utilize the B1 as a penetrating
bomber-after approximately that year"-1989-
to 1990="if the Soviet. rate -of development
does continue at the rate we think it will.
"I think there is. no question whatever,"
Weinberger continued, "that we-will not be
able to use the Bi as a penetrator after 1990,
If it goes to 1992, that will be a. little extra div-
idend."
In the last two weeks, Pentagon civilians,
Air Force generals and Central Intelligence.
Agency Director William J. Casey have had to
o
go to great lengths to undo the damage thi
testimony did to the 131 proposal in Congress.
On Nov. 10, Weinberger and Casey-jointly
signed a letter to the. Senate defense appropri
ations subcommittee "intended to clarify ca=:1
pabilities" of the BL.and other U.S.-.bombers.
In contrast to Weinherger's testimony, the let-
ter said the new BI ."would have, the capability.:
to penetrate anticipated' Soviet air defenses
well into the 1990s in a multitude-of employ-:
.ment modes and to perform effectively as -a
cruise missile carrier and 'as'` a conventional
bomber into the next century:'
Shortly before voting. on the Hollings
amendment yesterday, committee, -members
.. received a secret briefing on the radar-evading
Stealth bomber under development. The, test
versions of that plane were small, about the
size of the. Navy's A4 Skyhawk, and experi-
enced crashes partly. attributable to the unique
-.shapes and other radar-foiling, techniques em- +
ployed. , : The Pentagon.'s, argument ~ that]
(
Stealth cannot yet.be relied'on as the &iombee
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the advanced. plane is grovel: out.-,~:
 ~'ICL #ppj:cM Release N2006 EW /01/0 : C A RDP90-01137R00
oI -FT GE
16 November 1981
The National Interest/ Michael Kramer
The lSragsst Boondtgglo
ew,
MOON~
SLOWLY, EVEN.RONALD REAGAN IS COM-
ing to realize that he can't do it all at
once. The president's advisers are telling
him that he must either accept deficits.
that will make balancing the:- budget by
1934 improbable or raise approximately
$60 billion in revenues through new tax-
es, in violation of the administration's
commitment to supply-side economics.
So far, the president has resisted this
choice. Instead, he has asked Congress
for a new round of domestic budget cuts
-about $13-billion worth. And even
though his own party's congressional
leaders have told him he won't get the
reductions he wants, he appears de-
termined to try. Reagan can't be faulted
for this approach. He's already beaten
the opposition to his first round of rec-
ord budget cuts, and he has just won the
AWACS victory against difficult odds.
Nevertheless, another round of bud-
get rollbacks really does look impossible
-so much so that Howard Baker, the
Senate majority leader. has called for a
trust fund to finance increased military
spending. "We're searching for a way to
get them out of?competition with each
other," says Baker, referring to the fight
for funds between defense and non-de-
fense programs. Like the highway trust
fund that built the nation's interstates,
Baker's defense f>1: FQfri
certain tax revenues for the military be-
fore they -became subject' to con-
There is another way, however Cut
defense spending, or at least cut the in-
crease the administration is seeking. The
problem here is the promise the presi-
dent made during the campaign, a
pledge to "re-arm America" in order to
achieve a "margin of safety" over the
Soviets. So even if a cutback in.some of
his defense plans might make sense,
Reagan just doesn't want to do it.
In many ways, the president is a pris-
oner of his own hysteria. He has spent
his whole political life warning of Rus-
sia's "lead" in this or that area. He is
reluctant to concede that he might have
overstated the case. And yet, in cutting
back the MX missile system, be is really
admitting exactly this.
The Reagan plan calls for 100 MX
missiles to be housed in existing Titan
and Minuteman silos after these shelters
have been "superhardened." The $34-
billion price tag for this program isn't
exactly chicken feed, but it's a far cry
from the ambitious 200-missile MX
racetrack system proposed by Jimmy
Carter. In order to keep faith with its
hard-line constituency, the adminis-
tration has portrayed the 100-missile
plan as merely a "temporary" measure-
A final decision on the scope of the NIX
program will not be made until 1984. -
-A smaller MX system may not be as
commendable as no NIX at all. but the
s? 9 gCaiR^Ge~fr~Y I
since it represents a clearer line of think-
ing than Carter offered. And if, in the
chip in future arms-reduction talks.with.
the Russians, that's fine.
The other new weapon system pro-;
posed by the president. the B-1 bomber,`
is something else again. The B-i is w'
boondoggle whose time never was. It is
only "alive" today because the air force
has ensured that just about every state in,
the union has a stake in its development. `:
The administration wants to build 100;
B-i s- Their cost depends on whom youi
talk to. Originally--which means at the'
beginning of this year-the planes man-1
ufacturer, Rockwell International, put'
the cost at $11.9 billion. In May. the air
force figured the price at between $15
billion and $18 billion. This was then
raised to $19.7 billion, and now con-
gressional estimates put the bill as high-
as $30 billion. And this number probabIy~ -
isn't even close to what the eventual cost
will be. A Senate committee has 'con-
cluded that, on average, major weapon
systems cost almost three times-what
was dstimated when their funds were,
first authorized. In dollars, this bal-
looning is staggering. The total cost of
47 weapon systems escalated by $48-,
billion in just the final three months of
last year-more than enough to swallow
up the domestic budget cuts -Con-i
gress approved a few months back
Even assuming a reasonable cost for
the B-l. the plane makes little if any
sense. By most estimates, the B=1 would
be unable to penetrate Soviet air de-
fenses beyond the year 1990-and pene- j
tration is the name of the game. At al-',
most every turn, the penetration prob- i .
lam is proving an embarrassment forthe
administration. Last February, Aviation;
Week & Space Techneloy, a respected;
journal that rarely deviates from the
Pentagon line, reported that "bomber,
studies show conclusively" that the B-1
couldn't escape Soviet radar beyond the
end of the decade. The air force has die-'i
puted this view, bu.t itwas confirmed last
moni RobertHuffstutler. director of
ince the B-1 isn't scheduled for de=
livery until late 1986, it would have a
useful life against Russian air defenses
of only four years. And by then the B-1
could be replaced by the Stealth bomb-,
er, a nearly "invisible" aircraft whose
cost hasn't even begun to be calculated.
Another potential mission for the B-1
is to serve as a launchingplatform for the'r
}Qla4QQ1s3RO,Ofhsafest and surestway f
would supposedly stand outside Soviet` :.
 ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE .
T' E EC0N0=-11ST
14 November 1901
Keep on guessing
Confused about whether the administra- put in hardened silos now used to house
lion believes nuclear war can or cannot Titan missiles. The defence secretary,
be limited to Europe, whether it thinks Mr Caspar Weinberger, believes this
the budget will or will not be balanced in means of deployment would do for a few
1954, or whether it does or does not years. The chairman of the joint chiefs
intend to raise taxes? Well, at least you ? . of staff, General David Jones, is scepti-
know it. is going to rearm America with -cal. So is the (Republican) chairman of
the help of the.MX missile anti the B-1 ., the- senate armed -services committee,
bomber. Isn't it? Senator John Tower, a vigorous propo-
Yes, it is, unless both houses of con- - nent of'rearmament.
gress? vote against these- weapons by In March the administration asked
November 18th; They are unlikely to do congress for $2.95 billion for developing
so, but congressional opposition, has the MX in fiscal .1982' , -last month-it
been growing apace-rpartly because-ev- reduced that to $1.99 ,billion. The de-
ery-one .is so confused about the costs fence -appropriations subcommittee of
and capabilities of the two weapons. The the house of representatives has -since
main questions-concern: voted it down.,
The MX's vulnerability. Congress has The B-I's cost. The Pentagon has
been repeatedly told by military experts estimated the cost. of-the 100 B-ls the
that the. MX missile would have -to be administration wants to build at $20.5
based in a mobile system, since-a fixed billion, in 1981 dollars; by the time they
system would render it vulnerable to. have all been delivered the total cost,
increasingly accurate Russian warheads. taking account of inflation, will rise, it
The Reagan administration, however, believes, to about $28 billion. The (inde-
bclicves that the first 20-40 of the 100 pendent) congressional. budget office
MX missiles it wants to build should be thinks the figures will be $26.2 billion, in
1981 dollars, and $39.8 billion taking
account of inflation.
The B-1's capability. Mr. Weinberger
told congress in early October that the
B-1 might not be able to penetrate
Russian defences beyo.^.d 1990. The
Central Intelligence Agdncy also pro-
duced a report indicating that there
would be little difference between the 13-
1 and the aircraft it is to replace, the--B-
52, in terms of. its ability to penetrate
Russian, defences. This week Mr Wcin-
Berger and the- head of the CIA, Mr
William Casey, reversed themselves in a
joint letter to influential congressmen,
saying that the B-1 would be able e. to,do -
its job well into the 1990s.
Stealth's development. Last month Mr
Weinberger told congress that the new
stealth bomber, designed to escape ra-
dar detection by the enemy and being -
developed faster than expected, might -
be ready by 1989, just three years after
the B-1 would go into service. This week
the Pentagon's top scientist said this was-
not in fact so. -
Forecasting costs and capabilities is
difficult. So, it seems, is sticking to your
forecast. -
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ARTICLE APPEARED AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY
ON PAGE 2 November 1981
Senate Hearing criticizes B-1
Based on CIA; GAO Reports
Washington-The Rockwell B-1 bomber was
criticized in the Senate last week as Secre-
tary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger clari-
fied cost estimates and B-1 opponents dis-
closed two new reports critical of the proj-
ect.
In the House, the B-1 narrowly survived an
attack in the House Appropriations defense
subcommittee as funding was approved sev-
en to five. The attack had been led by
Subcommittee Chairman Rep. Joseph P.
Addabbo (D.-N. Y.).
Sen. Ted Stevens (R.-Alaska), chairman of
the a ense -s-u5-committee of the Senate
Appropr a ions ommittee, summarized in
an open hieanng a7secrat report given the
Ffouse and Senate by the Central Intelli- 1
gencegency stating that penetration .of
SovieT'defenses, through 1990 Is na greater
.- .
with- the B- th'en with the pres
resent Boeing
Weinberger Immediately countered that
he has not seen the CIA report and believes
the B-52 will be unable to penetrate Soviet
defenses by mid-decade.
Stevens, an opponent of the B-1, also
.announced a new report by the General.i
Accounting office questioning reductions In
8-1 program estimates made by Pentagon
planners and warning that cost estimates do
not Include cruise missile modifications.
Afford Programs
Stevens further questioned, during hear-
ings by his subcommittee last week, whether
the ii. S. can, afford to maintain the B-52,
build the ? B-1 and develop an advanced--.
technology bomber.
1.'1 have been chairman of the subcommit-
tee 10 months, and I can't find a weapons
system that has come In under cost. Not
one," Stevens told Weinberger and Gen.
David C. Jones, chairman of the Joint Chiefs
Weinberger stuck with earlier estimates
for the B-1 program of $19.7 billion, plus an
additional $800 million for cruise missile
modifications, when figured in 1981 dollars.
"It's been in excess of 10% for the Dept.
of Defense for the last four or five years,"
Stevens said. X
Milton A. Margolis of the Pentagon's cost
analysis Improvement group, began last.''
week the group's first full-scale review of the
B-1 bomber cost. Previously the group has
had only interim reports.
Margolis' remarks came. a day : earlier
before the Senate Government Affairs Com-
mittee, where Frank C. Carlucci, depfity sec-
retary of Defense, told the committee the
B1 bomber program cost will be between
$20.2 billion and $20.7 billion when cruise
missile modifications are included.
The governmental affairs ? hearing was
called to explore the acquisition process In
the Defense ? Dept. Carlucci explained the
Pentagon has "technical problems" with an
amendment to the Fiscal 1982 defense
authorization bill by Sen. Sam Nunn (D.-Ga.)
requiring automatic reporting when cost
overruns occur:
When a 10-15% cost overrun.occurs, the
appropriate service secretary with responsi-
bility for the program will report.. When a
25% cost overrun occurs, the secretary of
Defense will report.
Carlucci said such a process would
bypass the secretary. There also are ques-
tions.. of what occurrences will trigger; a
report-and how a program will be affected
once a report Is, made..
Sen. William V. Roth (R.-Del.), the commit-
tee chairman, said .the "military argument
does not wash. What we are trying to do Is
mainfairi civilian control of the military," he
said. ',The Nunn amendment is the best step
in 10 years In controlling overruns."
Parcel on Procurement
In the . House last week a special House
Armed Services :panel on procurenient
chaired by Rep. Dave McCurdy (D.ROkla.)
continued its investigation, due to end in
December, Into coat overruns. . -
Norman. R, Augustine. chairman of the
Defense Science Board and a vice president
of Martin. Marietta Aerospace, said cost
overruns of one-third or more of the original
price estimate occur half the time. He sug-
gested several new initiatives to control
Defense Dept. weapon systems costa,
including: .
a Place the projects under the direction of
competent, qualified, dedicated people and
keep them on the same project rather than
swjtch them from job to job.
^ Avoid the impression of excessive
requirements and eliminate nice-to-have
features. The last few percent of capability In
a system typically generate the greater share
.of the cost and problems encountered In
development. -
^ Encourage realistic contractor and gov-
ernment cost estimating. Overly optimistic
cost estimates stem from sales efforts by the.
government and the contractor.
a Use realistic Inflation estimates.
Discussion of inflation estimates used by
the Pentagon led to a sharp exchange in the I
Senate hearing when Weinberger told Steve,
ens that the Defense Dept. has "high hopes"
that President Ronald Reagan's anti-infla-,
tion program will be successful and reflects
that optimism In using estimates that are
lower than past experience.
- "I also have high bopes. " Stevens said.
"But we can't continue to base projections
for items costing $200 million [the B-1
t2omber] on hopes. That's the real prob-
lem." 0 . . -
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ARTICLE APPEARED 1 NOVEMBER 1981
Oat PAGE"'
Early Warning on :
Nuclear Spendin v;
Congress last week, gave its. first':
.formal . response to - the' Administra-
tion's plan for putting elevator shoes
under the nation's. nuclear triad. It
was underwhelming:.:
The House appropriations subcom-
mittee on defense agreed .8 to 5 that
100 13.1.bombers??should. be .built to
blanket the late;1980's when the B-52
bomber,, it is feai'ed, will be not.obso.
lescent but obsolete and the Stealth, it..
is expected, will not be on line. It re-
fused, however - 7 to 6 any funds
for the MX in 1982, because. Mr_ Rea-
gan wants to put up to 100 of the new.,,
missiles his strategic revitalization
plan. calls for in existing. silos and de=
cidein 1984 how to deploy the rest. .
"We're not going to give him money
to wait and play with," Joseph P. Ad-'
dabbo, chairman of the subcommit-
tee, said in explaining the secret vote.
"If [the silos are] Vulnerable now,
they would be vulnerable after the
MX went into them." . ~'
The MX vote was more than a cau-
tion, Representative Addabba indi-'
cated. On the Senate side; Defense
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger,
who early last month tried to assure
skeptical Congressmen that the $180.3
billion 10-year plan would create a -
"stable and secure" deterrent, got. a
warning of stifferkind. : ' '
Astern Ted Stevens; chairman of
the defense appropriations subpanel,
confronted the Secretary - to his sur-.
prise - with a Central Intelligence
Agency report presented'in secret sea.
sion an hour before. It said that the
B-52 could penetrate Soviet air de-
fensesuntil 1990. "There is a real sub-
stantial conflict in Congress over the
B-1," the Senator said.
He is right. There is growing doubt
on Capitol Hill that the B-i, rejected
as an unneccesary bang for the buck
by the Carter Administration, is
worth the 320.Sbillion (m' 1981 dollars)
Mr. Weinberger said last week
would cost, Some Reagan officials --::`
particularly in the tight-fisted budget
office- are said to have their- doubts
too:. No MX or &1, the equation goes;
could mean balancing the budget.,
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ARTICLE AP PEAP.
ON PACE' NE,il YO' ,E 7'.ILY N IS
1 'Novem'ber 1981
Penta on 9fficials also said Huff
CIA analyst Hobert'' Huffstutler A-: DEFENSE vrrsi,ir,. caii
"invalid,"
looked,-briefly like ground-zero at Huffstutler'sconclusions
Hiroshima last week after he had told a but Lt. Gen; Kelly Burke, - the' Air
Senate committee'that America's aging Force's top bomber expert,. really lo-
B-52 bomber would- be--able -to pene- wered the boom: "Our calculations are
trate Soviet air defenses:-well. into the - based on fact;- not theory, as I suspect
1990s. y - was-the case with the CIA witness.
The trouble with Huffstutler'S testi-
mony, in the Pentagon's-view, was-that
it. undermined- the rationale for
building and deploying 100' B.I bom-
bers. If the 8.52 can get through Soviet
interceptors and ground-to-air,.- mis-
siles, why build the. B-1?--
-The Pentagon, in an unprecedented
public squabble, charged that the CIA
did not know what it was-talking about.
Spokesman Henry Catto, two top civil-
ian officials and an Air Force lieuten-
`ant general called In reporters.
THKY==-A'ITACKED -.Huffstutler's
claim-that the- 8-52- bomber would be
into- the I990&-just like the B-1 born.'
herthat-the Air Force is-about to-pump
The- CIA, andwihe .Pentagarr`=have
differed' on.--foreign intelligence esti-
-mates; private, .this is one--of. the-
ment;pilloried a CM=official. publicly:
Ironically,.:aILhnugl> =:'the.: Reagan
fur campaign to protect the identity
of
-
CIA- agents, reporters had no idea who
the CIA =expert was-Lentil the- Defense-
official namedhima&Huffstutler, dir
fa t-.UA: w
Washington (News BurEatr)Shoot g
holes in a $28 billion Pentagon defense stutlees analysis of. the. B- i's ability to
program and the -Pentagon.will 'shoot dodge Soviet radar was based on the
kr-even'Penta .plans drafted four years ago and not on
right bpc g aim' at, the - a new., Improved -- model, - officially
Central: Intelligence Agency.- n 111 -r,- . .
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001
NEW YORK POST
31 October 1981
A STRANGE thing hap-
pened-this week at a hear-
ing of the Senate's Defense
Appropriations subonmrnlt? r
Secretary of Defense Ca-
spar- W..' Weinberger, had
By.-JAMES?A.
WECBSLER
-Jo penetrate Soviet air de- = after this disagreernent be-. precedented -elrcumstance
tense in the last five years A larger question-1w how tween the Defense Dept created by the nuclear age:
of this decade unless we any legislator presumes to and. the CIA was unveiled;
were equipped with a large cast. a'. vote .ona weapons the parallel House subcom "My opponents;. he wrl-,
force of B-1 bombers: - pro gram: such as. the B-1 mittee was voting ?7-5 ta : tes, believe that -differ-
- confronted by such.-ratify the B-1.. appropri$:. epees. of superiority or. to--
Thereupon' - :r cbalrxx~ars? conllleting testimony from., tion._ Had word of the feriority, in. the statistical
Son Ted.. Stevens.. an - blglL
places. ' And . when Weinberger-CIA collision sense, have meaning the
Alaska Republican, dis- such confusion Is aired oar- not yet traveled across the ..if-you have more of .these-
closed that,--in? . a. previous Capitol Hill, how can lesser - gill? Or did the vote simply' weapons than your adver-
closed- session, the subeorn- - - citizens even begin . - to reflect the still dominant- eery - has.: you are In. - a
mittee had received exactly..- evaluate the argument? impulsse._ to wive the Pen-.,.. stronger position to stand
contrary testimony _ from It happens that both Sens tagonmost of what it says " up against-Intimidation or
-the .- Central: Intelligence-.'.Stevens and Rep. Joseph' it.needsry an actuiii attack..I chal?
Agency.. The CI repro- .- Addabbo, his counterpart = lenge that view: I submit
, sentative had a9,serted that . in the- House-Defense .Ap-:..-.. Beyond the matter of the- that if - you are` talking.'
existing - B-52 - bombers propriations - ` Committee, :-B-1 Investment are many -about what-are- in reality-
could perform that nxission favor scrapping -the-.B-X other new- proposals for "quantities of overkill --ar-
.until at least 1990. - project ($28 billion- for 100--_costl
Y sveaponry..,?? And sepals so excessive ? tlxat
Secretary Weinberger. - planes at- .current prices) beyond such baffling die- they.- would suffice to de-
was described.in an Assocl- and proceeding.: instead cords as the. Weinberger- Stroy .- _ the. - adversary's
-ated Press-report as"takers with-an advanced teehnol. ? CIA :episode' Is the more -homeland many times over
aback by Senator Stevens ? ogy venture. known . as . fundamental question: how - statistical disparities be-
account of the CIA's- esti- "Stealth" that would alleg-s. 'much is enough" tween -the arsenals on the
mate: "I .haven't seen any edly enable warplanes: to :.. two sides are- quite mesa -
indication,- that : the- B-52':- elude detection: In part the"- answer de- ingless. But precisely that
will -. be able to - penetrate-: -_ I can hardly! profess to be- _ pends, as George Aennan- the.- absurd ' excessilve-
bey and mid-decade," be de-. -an- informed partisan, in - earnestly argues _.-in; - the ness of the existing nuclei
-.clared. He% added that- he . this dispute and my bewild- current. New . Yorker, on -arsenals - Is the situation:
would have-to examine the erment increases when the rival premises` Those who we have before us:'
Information; on ? which the Defense Dept. and the CIA see the present as simply a That= is what far more
CIA based It conclusion..' - are- so palpably 'unable td'- re-run' of--the 1930s Insist extensive national dtalogr
All of which raises they get their: act together. One . that ? military - supremacy-: should be- about. It Could
initial question of whether- is also obliged to- ask how- .? a '- can'- save the- West:: matter-more tharr;whether
the Defense- Dept..?and the-- many.-deefslonsr involved fit and, the. peace. But. those..: lbir;_ Weinbe
rger and- the
'CIS are an non peaking shaping- e` Administr like--.?Kennan.- who find
are finally able to re?
terms or-need to. be- Sea- a- fl ws in.thedeadly-parallel ,. C7A
tally reintroduced to, each,- n ` expanded military solve thelrars intent aboniV
budget : are .similarly-_ theory oft :Soviet: strategy : the role of the.B-1 In I98?.
s, other.
~. -- .~: __.~ -~. -r:i~+.--.:M'3i'::. s: ,k i`'.'r^.?,.~. r~.r=r....':r~..->;=:alx'+r`w.v`,.::-va-:.`";--S.IT-":ur'~x~.c.....r, '_~......-R
7 ? ana strength are unwilling
to buy arms as the sin-.
plistic overriding answer. _
clouded :by clashing exer- _hJs case'rests on more than
cases In expertise. - . - ?. a different reading of-"the
worst-case image." It, rests
i'et not many moments ? on the wholly. special, un-
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ST. LOUIS GLOBE-DEfIOCRAT
30 October 1981
f Why Let Q.'Judde S- I Bomber?
Agency become. the authority on military advice on CIA operations, would he ask the
aircraft? Defense Department?
After, Defense- . Secretary Caspar w. Simply because the CIA gathers,
Weinberger testified before a closed session information on- Soviet defense capabilities
of the- Senate -Defense Appropriations does not make its agents authorities on
Committee that 100'B-l bombersare needed military aircraft. ? The foes - of a strong
because existing.:'B-51- bombers %von't be ' .:defense are reaching agaia to try to find
able to. penetrate Soviet air defenses after reasons to support their B-1 opposition.:
1994 : or 1985, opponents brought forth an r They have had their way for about 20 years;
. "expert" from the CIA to. try to make a with the ? result that. the once-powerful-
case against the. B-1--.,. 7.1i manned bomber arm of the Triad which
Sea--Ted Stevens R-Alaska, chairman of started with about 600 B-52s in the early -
thecommittee and opponent of the B-1, said 1960s now- is down. to 315 aging, outdated
the CIA expert has testified that Russian - ? planes.. - ?
air. defenses-won't won't be?'able to stop B-52 It is this same attitude which has caused
bombers equipped with cruise missiles until the United States to lose its nuclear
abouti-1990,. : Thert fore,. Stevens concluded superiority over the Soviets and permitted
the interim B-1, which is-planned to fill the conventional forces to deteriorate to the
gap until the Stealth-equipped B-Is can be point that they, too, are inferior to those of -
built in'ttie1990s, won't be needed. theU.S.5.R:. = .
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WICHITA EAGLE BEACON (KS)
30 October 1981
JB Plan Crucial to Halt
Soviet 'hreai, AF Chief Says~
By JOE GANDILM.AN
Staff `Writer
The Soviet threat is real -- and the
Reagan administration's plan to build
a fleet of 100 B-lB bombers is cru-
cial.
Those were the messages Secretary
of the Air Force Verne Orr brought to
Wichita Thursday when he spoke at a
Paul Revere Foundation luncheon at
the Wichita Royale. Orr was in Wich-
ita to visit McConnell Air Force Base
as part of a tour of Air Force bases
throughout the country.
He assailed critics who want more
but cheaper - military hardware.
"What they basically are saying is
that we can afford the loss of the pilots
more than their planes.
Our administration did not come
to Washington to sacrifice our most
important asset - the lives of our
personnel - on the altar of incompe-
tent airplanes," Orr said.
He said the B-lB bomber, given its-
name to distinguish it from the B-1
model scrapped by President Jimmy
Barter. will be vastly improved. It
will' have advanced Stealth and
avionic technologies, take off faster
than the B-52. be able to land on
shorter runways and carry heavier
loads. he said.
- -"And when it can't penetrate the
USSR. it-can be used as a Cruise mis-
sile carrier like the B-52 is now."
In a n earlierYnews conference Q11
was asked about reports that the CIA
had told the House a ro 'atiors
kubcommit on defense that the
B-52 would do about as well as the
B AB in netraci. the Soviet Union
with Cruise missiles. "I ink there's ;
a little misconception:' he said-
A Cruise missile, he said, is fired
from hundreds of miles away from the
USSR. The old B-1, he said, had a
radar cross-section "only a fraction of
the B-52." and the new B-lB will have
a radar cross-section only a fraction
of the old B-1. "So it has a much lower
Stealth .... It's an excellent pene-
trator long after the B-52 would be a
penetrator."
Orr warned of the growing "Soviet
threat." He noted that the USSR built
1,300 fighters and bombers in a year,
while the US and NATO countries
ApproumdnFmprt>*Iate ^ /QAd l3
5Ci0.??
"You've heard the saying: When we
build they build. and when we stop
they don't." .
He also said:
? The MX missile is a vital part of
America's defense needs. Putting
land-placed ICBMs in Titan or Min-
uteman sites is only temporary..T'he
administration is considering three
permanent measures - continuous
airborne alert. deep underground
basing. and work on ballistic missile
defense,.
? The volunteer army is succeeding
because of pay hikes. It's attracting
more educated recruits. This year &3
percent of the Air Force's recruits
had high school diplomas. Next year's
goal is 92 percent. This year 70 per-'
cent of the Army's recruits had high
school diplomas, compared to 50 per-
cent last year.
CIA-RDP90=01 137R000100120001-5
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ARTICLE APPEARED CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
ON PAGE 30 October 1981
Initial cost of silo work
for MXs put at $7 billion
Washington
It would'cost up to $7 billion to
harden existing silos for deployment
-of the new-MX nuclear missiles, the
Air Force says. That would only be a.
=temporary measure until deciding a
'perma'nent rnethod of basing the mis-
silos.
~,? -Presldent Reagan's (modernization
plan also Includes 100 interim B-1
bombers, at'an'estimated cost of $20 ?
? billion. That part of the proposal ran
into trouble In a Senate panel .
Wednesday when one senator said.
he'd been told by CIA officials that the
current &52 bombers would be able ?-I
to'penetrate Soviet airspace until 1990.
The Pentagon claims the B-52 will
be obsolete by the mkt-1980s and Is
urging that the 8-52 fleet be replaced
with the 100 &1s.
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP90-01137
APT r CLE f.? E a ED
CIPAGa
THE BALTIMORE SUN
30 October 1981
f efl. lagon faults the, -f
for- false data on bon
By Charles W. Corddry?
Washington Bureau of The Sun
Washington-The Defense Department
publicly attacked the Central Intelligence
Agency yesterday on grounds that the
agency got into strategic -arms matters
that were not its concern and got them
wrong. -
At the forefront was the Pentagon's hy-
persensitivity over the B-1 bomber's un-
certain future in Congress and its annoy-
ance over some adverse testimony of CIA
officials Wednesday.-
By second-hand accounts of the secret
testimony, the CIA's Ray M. Huffstutler
told the defense subcommittee on the Sen-
ati .-appropriations ComSiIittee that the old
B=52 bomber would do about as well as the
expensive new B-1 in penetrating Soviet
air defenses with cruise missiles.
Any such conclusion- could severely
damage- the Reagan administration's--
hopes of getting Congress to endorse: a
plan to build 100 B-Is--much modified
and now called B-lBs-at a projected cdst-
of $20.5 billion. -
Just before- a swiftly arranged press
conference yesterday morning, T. K.
Jones, a top research and engineering offi-
cial at the Pentagon, got Mr. Huffstutler
on the telephone and asked what assume-,
tions he had used to reach his worrying as-
sessment. - -
As Mr. Jones then told it at the press-
conference, the CIA man "indicated "hi
waslpot aware'.' that the B-1 had:'been sig-
nificantly changed,'to avoid Soviet air de-
fenses, -since the bomber program was
canceled by President.Jimmy Carter in
1977.
The CIA was not only ignorant of a
major change in a U.S. strategic weapon.
the Pentagon panoply of officials implied,
but was out of its jurisdiction in evaiuat~
ing American arms capabilities-
. Where had Mr. Huffstutler been, not toi
know about the modified B-1? a reporter
asked.
"That's what we asked," said James P.1
Wade; Jr., deputy under secretary of 'de--l
fense for research and engineering. 1
"His- [MMlr. Huffstutler'sl job is'to ana-
lyze what the Soviets are doing," added
Mr. Jones, who holds the same rank as Mr.
Wade and is overseer of bomber develop
ment in the office of Defense Secretary
.Caspar W. Weinberger.
What Mr.- Jones- was saying, and Mr.
Wade elaborated, was that a nation's intel-
ligence agencies.: analyze the . military
capabilities of other nations. Reaching net
assessments of relative capabilities ismor
other,-more senior officials. ? ... -
Mr. Huffstutler had all the worst of it
yesterday-, CIA rules prevented him from
saying anything to the press and. what he
said to. Congress.was known only in' the
most fragmentary form-a few sentences
from Senator Ted. Stevens (R, Alaska),
chairman of the appropriations subcom-
mittee, a skeptic on the B-1 and Senate
majority whip. - - -- -
Mr. Huffstutler is director, of the CIA's
office of Soviet analysis and before that he
was director of its office of strategic re- ,
search, which deals in military problems]
His friends-said yesterday that he-knows
his stuff, but the CIA had to be content
with saying: "We are confident this issue
is going to be resolved very quickly."
. Even if it is resolved quickly, it was an
unusual spectacle while it lasted. Inter-
agency combat is not unheard of in the
Reagan administration. The State Depart-
ment publicly jumped on the Navy Secre-'
tary, John Lehman,when he said early on
that there was no need to abide by strate-
gic arms limitation agreements that had
expired..:
But the Pentagon is usually more sub-
tle in broadcasting its differences with the
CIA., and at other times the CIA and de-
fense chiefs, might have settled the matter
quietly.
Not so yesterday. Henry E. Catto, -Jr.,
the Pentagon. spokesman, showed up at'
the press conference' with Mr. Wade, Mr.
and two general officers, other experts E
were there;. too, to answer -questions. that
didn't even get asked- ; - .
The Defense Department plainly?was
stung by the suggestion that B-1s might be ~
-unequal to their job, especially by sugges-
' tions based on.a model of the-B-1 that the
Pentagon -is not planning-2o build, and by
the implication thereof. That implication
is that. the country should-skip- the B-1.t
project and go straight to-developmeat of
the so-called "advanced technology bomb-
er," also known as "Stealth."
Senator Stevens advanced such a. vie .
after hearing the ClA testimony.' . -
Theburden of the-officials' story at the
Pentagon yesterday was.
.
? The B-1 has been so changed by de-,
sign refinements and new electronics'foi
spoofing Soviet defenses that it can pene-
trate the Soviet Union for many years
(there is no real agreement on how many)
after it enters service in 1986. -
? One factor considered compelli ng is
that the new B-1 makes one-tenth the im-
age-on a radar screen that the former
model did, and one-hundredth the image
that a B-52 makes.- : ? -
? The Stealth bomber: is yet to be de-
signed, developed and tested, and there is
no real certainty about how. well' or how
fast that will proceed. -. . ':
Lt. Gen. Kelly H. Burke, the Air Force
deputy chief of staff for research, devel
opment and purchase of weapons, ruefully
remarked yesterday that some people
think the Air. Force has, a "strong anti-
technology bias" because it wants the B-1
instead of awaiting arrival of the Stealth.
The irony there was that the Air Force-
is the service often considered to be at the
leading edge of technology.
The B-1, General Burke said, could
penetrate Soviet air defenses into the next I
century. The B-52 "looks like a flying barn
door on a radar screen and there is noth-
ing we know to do about that;' he said. _, _
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 ARTICLE-RFor Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137 000100120001-5
ON PAGE, C - 1 0. NE`~I YORK DAILY NEWS
29 October 1981
Controversy- over 3-52
Washiagtoii ? (News Bureau)-The
Central? .Intelligence: _ Agency 'and De-
f ense Secretary Caspar Weinberger dis-
agreed . _ sharplyi-_yesterday" over - how
many moreyears America's 5-52 bomb'
er will' be- able to a penetrate steadily _
improving:.Soviet-air defenses. M-
Sen.Ted=Stavens~(R.Alaska}=told'
reporters=aftera closed-door session.of=.
his. Defenses?Appropriations -subcom-:
mittee that a CIA expert bad estimated'
that ths,aging.B-5Z:would be .able, to.
survive omflighb-over the Soviet Una
ion- well:into?,:the.199Os..cWeinberger,-
testifying'"before=- the-.same? panel; _in-
silted :-.then.: B 52:'"wouldn't:.be--able to
penetrata.beyonct.1984-or 198&'.
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010
AS5OC1P1TLD. Q.Es11,
r- v c I /9L /
R H BYLR Y RZYV A06,36.
D O +HO'J.SE `_UBCOMMITTEE ; E_;EC s S FUNDS FOR MISSILE
y PUN
+ SSOCIATED PRESS WRITER
HoH Nu uN OP) - H HOUSE SUECOHMITTEE3 IN THE FIRST VOTE 09
W
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MAJOR NEW WEAPONS PROPOSALS} WEDNESDAY APPROVED
L1 1
MONEY TO BUILD +UUU B-r BOMBERS BUT REFUSED ANY FUNDS FOR THE ii
MISSILE.
ttt'TH [-;:I O iES CAME AS THE DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE OF
.
SPEND
THE MOUSE R I A T I t3t~= ;'OHMIT TEE Kc>?.O ON _ EAG=?titr'3S RE@UE T TO SPEND
HI PPr: CPr..w Ir~O.R. -_..
~>_ c ? ~ ^ BILLION FOR DEFENSE I N THE CURRENT FISCAL YEAR.
i1L T HOUGH THE TALLY HAS ONLY IN THE SUBCOMHI !TEE! IT i3-AS THE "FIR`_-'T
TIME ,oONGRES5 HAD VOTED ON ! EAGSN3 S PROPOSALS.
IE AHWWHILE! A KEY SENATE CRITIC OF 'ERGAN35 DECISION TO REVIVE THE
PEWrRGO# LEA THAT
.B-4L CONFRONTED PENTAGON LEADERS rRS WITH A 0111 i ASSESSMENT
MISSILE-Ec UIPPED iB-5LS WODULD BE JUST AS EFFECTIVE ALAINS', SOVIET AIR
DEFENSES AS. SIMILARLY EPLIPPED NEW PLANES FOR THE REST OF THE 1' ?:i5.
"THE JUDGMENT WAS .. THAT BETWEEN NOW RHO THE END OF THE DECADE'
r r r AND THE r.-- WITH CRUISE: ~frIr ~55 rLEr
THE s~-5>? WITH ~ CRIJIr ~E ,l~IaSiLcS AHD TH= 6_3 AS WE
KNOW IT 50 FAR333 ARE NO DIFFERENT `IN THE ABILITY TO PENETRATE
SOVIET DEFENSES!" SAID SEN. TIED STEVENS! R-RLASKA.
STEVENS, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE!
TOLD DEFENSE SECRETARY CASPAR Ni. WEINBERGER AND GEN. DAVID JONES!
l' ASSESSMENT CAME AT
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STRFF! THAT THE rir.
A CLASSIFIED BRIEFING HELD FOR THE PANEL JUST BEFORE THE TWO
TESTIFIED:
DO NOT UNDERSTAND HOW THIS COUNTRY CAN AFFORD TO KEEP THE B-5525
FLYING! TO BUILD THE B-I AND GO INTO (ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY STEALTH
BOMBER! DEVELOPMENT AT THE SAME TIRE!!_ STEVENS SAID IN SUMMARIZING
HIS OPPOSITION TO THE MANNED BOMBER PART OF REAGAN'S RECENTLY
ANNOUNCED STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.
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IJr. ? ? 1 n
 STAT
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R
NEW YORK TIMES
vr3 i:r
..~ -:?i~._ ._ --- ~ -.
..-. i'". 1.. P.r-..-~
~R!r"'VE .!_ ~,E -- - ?HE ?-: Eri F .!!r -!a4?~ RRT~_, . E L.'r'.{- FOR --..- iINL NEH _S ~_
r.
_. {~~ w? i?` _r.~ BY TELLIWL F t/EN wT7 E?== EE "". r -ET~ stir L
t- -
BL!--?El ETr?_ .^. t_{'_LL FEN:`ETRPTE an '4=ET csIs DEFENSES LINT 3L 1's =i e
{~T~i. ~ ~-4i L TER Wi t. {ter !~-'r7'.F'.?~30+i.] Ti" T THE 76' %1 S V~?~r.
i
-'TiLit;'?< TO 74:_S
:.~_ -~:-r-rr r.??-
_..-.. _r'zYi-f'FTC{ri~ =-ITT,,.
~. r? --. _. -~ R~ rp?: :rte i{..~- ~'~~~-~.c- T a -rr: ^? -
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_r?X D, is= "6 n
4-
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E_ ?4
FL r
!$TO SEJ PNO HE 5HOUL1 GGo R{;E?^% WITH THE
EC{MEE-s r, 1.r-ONGR rEr?SSION L s OFFICIALS r
FICIAL_ SRI~t HIS SUBCOMMITTEE Hr_? FiL5{{
AECELVEO THE SAME !NFORnRT!cN ON SOVIET AIR DEFENSES FROM T_ E
M, 16 x r '? ..,
LECRETr!Ff ~ =EKE R_rRH w: bci~f=+~~i;rf~ WHO iE_TIFIEE -.LONG 7P
r^SG?t!?:,. n?.iU Vs ijr i~?LL :c2I r ~!?:L~~~ iir ~.Tri~~ r.=r^`:~T
?r= S t.~ ~-`OMMI ry Er _ -r -:? r.nrr ra: ~r ss-
.ZT:-aLw~ ~ r~ o ~~`r Tr. s r nLr -i ~^w
Ft t.' f-
`^r r.r - - trr-r--~+r T -T .r? i TEr. TQT;r: a .r.12? - HAVE !y`,
.. --r.
2 T ? ~ ~i Li :} ! i ie ~ Li T L i r ! ? -, _ UL k
i A?LTTti" OF F E? k ETR_.r?,-.T?&VIET F DEFENSES FOR T1=?? 3 AST r` 'fER-nr
r
~i{F i ~ i =EC OE ?'+~^OUT TE O-1 W'ICi WOULD S E PN F- Yf? N E= VE SIO OF
THE EOM=*E% G NC=LED Sy PRESIDENT I?P 1 ER 114 n- r
sy py(~ } ,'
Y7 T'E4r1 ~j ~ir'~rE^\E:{L\ y O C10E'E,-? T WE ESTF*1!{'Eq MEi E Z~~.
P SSEPTED TH T ~,; ~;VENt T SEEN ANY INDIC TTION HR T THE WILL BE
r r E s.,r.- T A-
AE-LE TO aENc?PATfi uE?r0: ~; _^-GCC~?~{E, RE SAID u_ ~,NT.r== r = SEE -; HE
r; ' `" $Jrov I'bas'~ieL b0 ~b1N3 . MA - 99 O f3-7R000100120001-5 -
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010
ARTICLE APPEARED TIME
pN PAGE 26 October 1981
Out of control and no limits in sight
he scene was shocking, but it was
an aptly ironic image of the times.
A winner of the Nobel Peace Prize
shot by soldiers-his own-wield-
ing Soviet AK-47s (market price: 5750),
who had jumped from a Soviet Zil truck
(price: $18,000) that was towing a North
Korean antitank gun (535,000). In the
background American-made M60 battle
tanks ($2 million each) rumbled on in the
parade of Egyptian military might, while
six French Mirage jet fighters (S2.5 mil-
lion) flew overhead, in tight formation.
Across the Islamic world, from Tripoli to,
Tehran, the assassination of Egyptian
President Anwar Sadat was celebrated by
bursts of bullets from every revolutiori
ary's favorite automatic weapon. Moil
border villages, and promised to try
to deliver quickly $100 million worth
of military equipment to a jittery
President Gaafar Nimeiri. Mean-
while, British Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher was in Pak-
istan, where she urged more
Western weapons sales to pro-
tect that country from a pos-
sible attack. by Soviet. forces
occupying' Afghanistan.
Then she flew in one of Pak-
istan's Soviet Mi-8 helicop-
ters to the Khyber Pass,
where she talked to an Af
ing, of course, an AK 4
U U.S.
1980: $5,~sa(f n ~
U:S.S R 1980, $3,940 (-1-251 %}
and Pakistan all have legiti-
mate security concerns. Yet
last week's pronouncements
provided further proof of what
has long since become an alarm-
ing and accelerating common-
place: for large and small nations
alike, weapons sales have become the
chief tool of diplomacy- "They are now
major strands in the warp and woof of
world politics," writes Foreign Policy An-
alyst Andrew Pierre in a forthcoming
book, The Global Politics of Arms Sales
"They are foreign policy writ large." No
longer content with surplus materiel from
the arsenals of the superpowers, smaller
nations, are demanding state-of-the-art;
equipment in everything from fighters to
frigates, Even as they- deplore the build-
quences, the major arms
.=sellers echo the old dirge
-of, 19th century slave.
traders. "If we don't sell,
someone else svill" The
only effective restraint on
;r the seller, it seems, is the
difficulty- in beating com-
'petitorr.
',,:-;rive contracts.
6P, self-proclaimed freedom
ics- and, alas, the children
5 whose .legacy it is to be born
-- into a world of arms. One of
images may be that of a sad-eyed
adolescent cuddling an automat-
ic rifle as if it were a toy-
The. world arms bazaar is a
Rttbik's Cube of complex and
shifting relationships and one of
the world's largest businesses; last
year weapons transfers amounted
to perhaps $120 billion.* Weapons
- are indisputably a growth industry
of the '70s and '80s. During the past
decade, sales have leaped forward as
never before, spurred by a superpow-
er struggle to gain Third World al-
lies and a leap in oil prices that
brought eager buyers into the market.
"Gklbal figures are elusive because of govern-
mental secrecy and the difficuky in determining
dollar equivalents forvarious armaments and their
related support systems. Most authoritative sourc-
(tlQst4g(1[>t2(ll?e5iment reports and the Stock-
holm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) yearbook. include only officially sanctioned
and publicly reported sales of major conventional
weapons.
 l t laved` YIRelease 2006/01/03: GWROP9 41137R0001
18 October 1981
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-0113
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE
IIATIONAL SECURITY RECORD
TILE H.c:RITAGE r OU 1DATION
AUGUST 1931
rlacking~ the issues :throe
Attenr tion from rote
The outcry which led to the resignation of Max Hugel,
third ranking official at the Central Intelligence Agency,
and which has badly weakened the prestige and effec-
tiveness of William Casey, Director of Central In-
telligence, is rooted in public and congressional concern
over the effectiveness of the intelligence community. The
fact that both of these officials lacked contemporary in-
telligence experience and were appointed because of their
Work in the 1980 presidential campaign has been publicly
deplored by-prominent public officials, and there has been
pressure for "intelligence professionals" to fill both posi-
tions. Mr. Hugel's successor, John Stein, is such a profes-
sional, a veteran. of the operations directorate of the CIA.
There is a strong consensus both in Congress and among
the general public to improve the quality of American in-
telligence, and a feeling that this can best be achieved by
removing restrictions from the professionals in the com-
munity. This interest is demonstrated by the careful man-
ner in which the Senate is approaching the issue of exempt-
ing the-intelligence community from the provisions of the
Freedom of Information Act. Currently two bills, S.1273
introduced by Senator John Chafee, and 5.1235 sponsored
by Senator Alphonse D'Amato, are being considered- by
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Both of these
bills are designed to help the intelligence community
preserve necessary secrecy while doing as little-violence as
possible to the principle of freedom of information.
In other actions, Congress is moving closer to adopting
the Intelligence Identities Protection Act (S.391 and H.R.
4). This act is attempt to frustrate a number of groups com-
mittedto destroying U.S. intelligence, which among other
efforts publish names of individuals which they claim are
CIA. agents. Opposition to this act has come primarily
from the American Civil Liberties Union, which contends
that careful study of State Department records will reveal
the identity of CIA agents and that hence this information
is in the public domain. The recent Supreme Court deci-
sion, Haig vs. Agee, which ruled that the lifting of Philip
Agee's passport in 1974 was 'constitutional, concluded:
"Agee's disclosures, among other things, have - the
declared purpose of obstructing intelligence operations
and the recruiting of intelligence personnel. They are clear-
ly not protected by the Constitution." This Supreme-Court
decision is evidence that any effort to challenge the In-
telligence Identities Protection Act on constitutional
grounds will not be successful.
It is unfortunate that upgrading the performance of
American intelligence has become so firmly identified with
insulating the intelligence bureaucracy from outside com-
petition. This identification has been reinforced by the
Hugel affair. Before the election there had-been recogni-
tion that within theAplpititeateFoorf+leUea$e t 16/tilrt 3
severe problems with the analytical bureaucracy, and that
any effort to reform this would require at the very least
community. As the
We will ree
telligence Adviso
ministration, as a permanent non-partisan body of
distinguished Americans to perform a constant audit of
national intelligence research and performance. We will
propose methods of providing alternative intelligence
estimates in order to improve the quality of the
estimates by constructive competition. .
Yet Mr. Casey's commitment to the competitive.
estimates process has been lukewarm at best. In his first
address to the CIA staff, he stated:
I.found in SALT I, for example, that some of the
judgements were soft. They leaned toward a kind of
benign interpretation rather than a harder interpretation
of assessing or viewing a situation as 1.eing more
dangerous.... At the PFIAB I supported a competitive
assessment process, but I am open as to how that can
best be done. Like anyone else I am in favor +;f improv-
ing our analytical capabilities-that is something easy to
be for. -
Mr. Casey's actions since this address was r{wade have
confirmed its tone. None of the important critic:, of the in- -
telligence analytical process has been appointed to the CIA
staff. A special National Intelligence Council at the CIA,
formed to "upgrade the system under which national
intelligence estimates are produced," is dismissed by many
as decorative. They note that the chairman of the new
panel, Henry Rowen, was associated with many c=F the in-
telligence failures of the 1960s and early 1970s while presi-
dent of the RAND Corporation, even though in the late
1970s he criticized the "CIA's optimistic assessments of
Soviet military strength." They also point- out that the
panel is empowered only to make minor changes 'in the
existing system, rather than radical improvements.
Of even more concern are the persistent reports that the
plans for reconstituting PFIAB will no longer give it direct
access to the President. Instead, it will report to the Direr-
for of Central Intelligence. The "A-Team/B-Team" ex-
periment in competitive analysis would not have been car- -
ried out if PFIAB had not had this access to the President,
and there are real concerns that if PFIAB is so constituted
it will become a prisoner to the intelligence bureaucracy.
It would appear as though the, result of the Huge)
resignation and the criticism it brought upon Mr. Casey
has been to increase his dependence on the intelligence
bureaucracy. His ability to challenge established institu-
tions and mental patterns within the CIA has been under-
cut, and any confrontation with department heads or na-
tional intelligence officers would have a detrimental effect
on his image.if leaked. Firm action is needed by the White
C-McROR9llMAMO 0i0'>a1 044i be immediately re-
established,`ind with its backing Mr: Casey should be
given the authority to make some badly needed institu-
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE
NATIONAL SECURITY RECORD
TIIE HERITAGE F OUYDATTON
AUGUST 1981
of arming I n t e nt An, alysis
Cuxre-_tly Congress has approved or is considering a
um b of measures to correct the damage done to the
U.S. intelligence community in the past decade. Under the .
leadership of Senator Frank Church and other prominent
legislators, Congress enacted a number of hastily con-
cei~ ed restrictions which effectively dismantled America's
capacity for covert intelligence operations- Measures now.
being considered to rectify the problems include repeal of
the Hughes-Ryan amendment, which established extensive
congressional oversight of covert intelligence activities,
repeal or extensive modification of the Freedom of Infor-
ma_ion Act and adoption of an Intelligence Identities Pro-
tection Act. The Reagan Administration also is studying
means to restore the intelligence community to its former
importance, such as re-establishing the President's- Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Committee (PFIAB), which was
abolished by President Carter in 1977.
- Such steps are badly needed if the United States is ever
to r'e,gain its, ability to conduct covert operations, or indeed
to collect data from sources other than technical means of
surveillance- Yet, taken on their own they do nothing to
- -help, and may even impede correction of the most signifi-
cant problem facing the U.S. intelligence community-
correctly analyzing and assessing the data it possesses. This
is a long-standing problem that has intensified in recent
years; especially under the Carter Administration.
A RECORD OF FAILURE . -
Discussion of faulty intelligence assessments must focus
on the Central Intelligence Agency, the designated pro-
ducer of National Intelligence Estimates for the President
and other top policymakers. Although the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency, the National Security Agency, the military
intelligence services, and the State Department Bureau of
Intelligence and Research contribute to the NIE, their own
reports are more specialized to fit the in-house needs of.the
Departments of Defense and State, respectively. By con-
trast, CIA reports are. considered "national"; the
analytical branch of the agency is the National Foreign
Assessment Center, and the section heads for regional and
topical analysis are termed National Intelligence Officers.
When an NIE. is produced, the CIA selects the precise topic
and assigns the principal drafter, whose task is to produce
a paper reflecting a consensus of the views of the intelli-
gence community. Although agencies may register a for-
mal, dissent on particular points, a high value: is placed on
consensus. Even under the best of circumstances this
emphasis results in an enshrinement of the lowest common
denominator of intelligence opinion, and all too often
leads to "party-lining" or anticipating the views of policy
-
makers.
However, this process of forced consensus is not suffi-
cient to explain these staggering failures of the intelligence
community: -
? Until 1979 the NIEs contended that the Soviet Union
would. not place offensive, weapons in Cuba_ To con' tend
otherwise was to assert that the Soviet Union was violating
the. 1962 agreement ending the Cuban missile crisis
(amended in 1970). Therefore the stationing of MiG-23
and MiG-27 fighter-bombers, the construction of sub-
marine pens, and the frequent visits of major Soviet naval
units were noted but not assessed as being of any
significance. Only the revelation of the presence of a Soviet
combat brigade in Cuba just.prior to. the 1980 election
campaign forced modification of this assessment.
? Until December 1979 it was contended that the Soviet -
Union would not-invade Third World-countries, such as
Afghanistan, with its own troops Attention was focused.
instead on "proxy wars," which enormously improved the
strategic situation of the U.S.S.R. in the Third World.
+ The intelligence community predicted well into 1978
that the Shah of Iran would remain in power for the dura-
tion of the. 1980s and that Iran. was not . in a pre-
revolutionary state. Challenging this assumption meant
questioning American. reliance on Iran as the "policeman
of the Gulf." -
? In 1981, after the Reagan Administration called atten-
tion to Soviet use of terrorism as a weapon against Western
nations and pro-Western. Third World governments, the
CIA retroactively identified over. a thousand terrorist acts
in the previous .year that it had not counted earlier.
? The CIA produced a study on Soviet oil production in
1977 predicting a major oil crisis within a decade. This
study was not substantiated by other analyses-either by
the oil industry, European research centers, or the DIA-
and yet was perfectly suited for President Carter's conten-
tion that. increased Soviet need of Western drilling techno-
logy would strengthen detente. The 1977 predictions
proved- embarrassingly inaccurate,'and were drastically
revised in January 1981. .
Yet it is in the area of assessing the extent of the Soviet
strategic buildup during the 1960s and 1970s, and in
estimating Soviet defense expenditures, that the intelli-
gence community has accumulated its most dismal record.
Albert Wohlstetter's documentation of continual annual
CIA strategic underestimates during the 1960s goes far
toward explaining the, deplorable U.S. experience with
arms control, including CIA's failure to recognize- Soviet
SALT deception, and the current radical change in the
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100120001-5
-OzvzMUSEP
 Approved For Rele, 2 Q.1. 0 , DP90-01137R 00100120001-5
ARTICLE AppEA 17,D I, l:~
ON PAGE 301, 15 July 1981
Sets Call for Better. Ties With U .S.,
But- Pon.-.7t. Seem ` Willing to Soften Stance
Speciatto 'I1?[EWALL STREETJOURNAL Soviets' controlled economy can't be di-
IMfOSCOW- Leonid ;_.Brezhnev . sent his rec y compar wt a more competitiv
best wishes to the American people on the races in the ree market economies o the
Fourth of duly and addressed the letter to West. However, t e spen ing figures o
Ronald Reagan, but there weren't, any per- give some in ica on that e ets have
. sonal regards for:-the President:.:.:.,.,.:,.... ou etense spen ng.
The note, published on the front page-of ey are con i en they can eep it up,
Pravda,. the Communist Party daily paper, but it will be .painful," a- high-ranking
gives a good indication of Soviet-U.S. rela= ` Western diplomat says.. The justification is
Lions six months after the Reaganadminis- security, the top priority for Russian rulers
tration took. office. "If relations were near since the overthrow.of the Mongols in the
zero on a scale of 0-to-10 (1n January), then 1300s. "They see Afghanistan and Poland
they're-not much; better '.now" a Westeri -vital, for the-defense-of the'honieland?;..
diplomat says:: and. this justifies-the most -outrageous acts,:::
The.. querulous mood of. the Soviet press like putting in a 'Puppet. government,a
is as sharp, as ever: The daily. cartoon in Western diplomat- says.
Pravda frequently shows' fat, :-cigar-chew- Assessing. actions farther away is `diffi-
ing American generals or-"politicians taus- cult. Some observers blame. the Kremlin:.
ing trouble in places such_as EI Salvador. for every-.flare-up, while the. Soviets- say '
But theSoviets. still. want to talk. They they. .are--favored by a historical process-
say so. the- "s still, w. n tl newspapers. they call the shifting- correlation. of forces.
"Their motives look more insidious.; than-,
on. foreign radio broadcasts and in state- we thinkr ours.. are for-- seeking..influence-.
menu from.Tass, the official news agency. around the. world," a? Western analyst says.
"The U.S.S.R'wants normal relations With The-invasion of Afghanistan was viewed
the U-S.A.,", Mr. Brezhnev said in his re
port -to the last Communist Party Con- by some. as the last drastic--.p oveof an ag-
gress..'There is. simply no other sensible tog Politburo. But,now.the.Po ish,crisis,is
way testing Moscow's tolerance:,,. And,, Poland
But Westerrn analysts :don't see any remain 'a cause of concern because of.
Y fear that the "Polish Disease will infect
signs that the Kremlin 1s 'ready to make the, minds. of workers ; in Hungary, and
the concessions that will be required -to im- Czechoslovakia-There is also the military
prove relations.' : = -?" ? concern of maintaining access to-East Ger-
Soviet View of U.S:. many.-If Solidarity, the trade-union move-
The following .quotations from -.'Mr. ment; runs the railroads, Moscow reasons,
Brezhnev's- February 23 speech illustrate who can -guarantee that the troop trains
what rankles the Sayler leadership about will run smoothly?
U.S. policy: The prospect of concession after cones-
--"Visibly more `active of late are the sion to the Poles' is reflected in the Soviet:
opponents of detente -(and)' oflimiting? ar- press:: In. addition, the Soviet military daily.
maments. - Red Star recently accused NATOInteill-?
-"Advent urism- and areadiness`:to Bence services of. whiPP? up ~ anti-Soviet.
mg'
gamble with the vital interests of humanity feelings in order to tear Poland away from--
for',narrow and selfish wneta 'th:e ;, ,,,-. , rho enr;tiitt+ +.i;.
-"Military expenditures are. ristn un The China Problem
of these tremendous sums is bein r -_ mated 48 Soviet divisions strun
g out alon
crash development' of new types g of spent strate- on the. Chinese border; U.S. arms sales to Pe-
gic nuclear arms. ;,- king would be-_ t an, escalation ot reckless.,
There is little doubt that the `Soviets feel ness, in the' words of a recent Pravda..
bound There
match U.S. arms'P ro headline; = ' The Soviet Union cannot remain=
grarns., As indifferent in the face of a new, dangerous..
Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov has said, turnin Sino-American relations, especially
"We will match any challenge, and match of plans-to provide China with modern U.S.
it effectively." But this would- further weapons, military gear and, technology,"
strainthe Soviet economy, which is strug- Pravda said. "These actions .:'?:' can only
gling to halt a decline in one of the-lowest be described as hostile. :: w 'T living standards in Europe. The Soviet The statement was signed by the:pseu-
Union puts more money and people into de- danymous I:-Alexandrov, ' whose commen
fense than does the United States, and-it taries-.In weekend editions of the 'party
has been doing so for years: daily supposedly-reflect the proceedings of
According to a CIA estimate Soviet de- ? the previous Thursday's- Politburo session..
fence costs, calculated.: in ollars ex- "Sti11;' Moscow ccontinues: to-show're-'
ce comparable. spending ' y-40% straint. "There's been a lot-of- screaming..
tween 1 1 an This is somewhat but they're waiting-4o see, the- worst; 'i: a
mis a ing, owever, ecause p c_es m e Western diplomat says.- -
Approve or a ease - - 1-5
 STAT
.4R1ICLE For Releaser 9( I R~R Q,(~1~1 alp 00100
ON PAGE 8 JULY 1981
EX-Rand Corp. Chief
To Head-CIA Panel.'...:'
The Reagan administration has se-
lected Henry S. Rowen to head a new-i
ly created National Intelligence.'
Council at the Central Intelligence
Agency,' administration officials.
said yesterday...
Rowen, a former president of the
Rand Corp. who resigned in 197I,
partly because: of. Pentagon dissatis..
faction with- Rand's security: 'ar=
rangements%for the Pentagon .pa=
pers, has until. ' recently : been -a
-professor: at.-Stanford University's.
GraduateSchool of Business. He has .
alreadybegun ? working. at'the CIA,
but his appointment hasnot been an-
pounced. -
According to administration offi-
cials, William J.-Casey;;the.director
of central intelligence, those Rowen
for the post and decide Bate the
council to u sya ntunder
which inte2lience esti-
- mates ~ re produced-
.. New.Yor's T rvirrl_ _
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 STAT
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137F 000100120001-5
Ciucc -D
5 July 1981
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001001
A;,iiCLE APPEARED
ON - PAGE
THE WASHINGTON POST
1 July 1981
tics To
By-Michael Getler-: ' attack came after W
P
W
Weshln ar3&t forces
&wnPoeericwdcer ac
had ever- a short time to mobilize,
Challenges to American interests in Here, too, the problems, for the. West
the oil-rich Persian - Gulf . are. more are mostly politicaL Would the -15 .
likely to arise from political factors, NATO nations be able.to act quickly
such as the internal stability of Saudi enough-. to mobilize themselves and
Arabia and Pakistan and the course of would -France,.. which - is outside
Arab-Israeli relations,, than from a di- NATO's military command, join with
rest military- challenge. by the Soviet the. allies?:..:
Union, according, to a report released
today by the Carnegie Endowment for At sea, the western navies "have .
International Peace!.-... more and better" capabilities than
Moscow and its allies- 'have; although'.
Nonetheless, judgments by leaders the West also has a, far tougher job in
in the Persian Gulf about the relative terms of keeping ocean supply lines
Soviet-American military balance and open; But the big question is what
who is and is not willing to use force should be the role, size and compo-
will have an important- bearing on sition of the U.S. fleet? -
their behavior,' . the report, says: "In.
other words, the problem [for U.S. In the Persian Gulf, the report says,
foreign policy) goes beyond. deterring there is an American consensus on the
an actual Soviet attack ... to the far need to deter the Soviets and build
more complicated task of neutralizing up U.S. forces, but this does riot.con-,
a -
stituta one strategy, To produce a stmt
the political effects of Soviet military
power in the area. egy, one question that needs to be ad
dres..ed is whether to continue em-
The 194-page report was produced prasizing the Soviet threat or to give--
by a panel of retired military, leaders, more priority to coping with the po-
former government national security litical and economic instabilites in the
specialists, businessmen, -scientists, ac- region.
ademics and journalists.
In another finding that contradicts
Although the panel's most timely some -other commonly held assess
points deal with the Persian Gulf, the . -..ments,._.the panel said there are so
report also says: many uncertainties, about the outcome
"There are serious roblerns in es of a Soviet-Ameri can armed clash in
timat Soviet defense costs." gDend- the - area ' that Moscow "could not
mg-, comp arisons w i the United... count on a successful,
attack let alone.,
states "are o -ted value" and can a swift or easy victory." The exception
m~sleadding: While such U.S is in .northern Iran;. which would be
intelligence estimates. arHe-
-am hard, for U.S- forces to reach and-
for showino ener trn which is. near major Soviet troop con-
,I itations of these comparisons are over- Centrations across the border.
looked in litical debate, = an a more On the' other hand, the report says
realistic assessment must ocus on Moscow "likely would other factors.~_ lY prevail" if the
conflict were prolonged and the So-.
? Contrary -to a view frequently ex-: viets were willing
to, pressed, the- NATO forces in Bur' o commit forces
pe from other: theaters. A key factor in
"probably would fare- acceptably. well the outcome for the West, however, _
in defending.-against a standing-start would be which. countries would join -1
:attack' from . the [Soviet-led] Warsaw the battle and on whose side -a
'Pact." But the allies would face "a question not easy to answer, the panel
considerably more difficult task" if an _ says.
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 Approved For Release Mwoli : CIA-RDP90-011377
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP90-01137R00
L A~PE~
?
?~
PTI
:
THE PHILADELPHIA I[t; UIRE
2LF June 1981
ted in an interview.in:a British
magazine that.-USe~officials-Iiad=
exaggerated-_the::.tlxreat.. to -the
Persian Gulf posed by- the Soviet-%
invasion of Afghanistan.:
Former Undersecretary_ of---
State- David-' Newsom: recently
revealed in. Foreign Policy maga-
-_zine that President Jimmy Car-
ter's commitment to restrain=the=:.
Soviets in-the Persian Gulf "grew
out of last-ntinute:pressures for a
presidential :speech" and -was
based on a misunderstanding of
Soviet intentions:-;.-_:: ' - ;
*The CIA has just disclosed
...that- its ? rediction ??- that, the
would`-face a. s
oil b the raid-19805 was "mistak-
en." The a leeed-Soviet :need- for
--foreign oil had been??one-of.the'
:principal foLlbeS the viets had
a Gulf.
tgj-
den)ly has adopted`a,'strategy ofz
deception; similar-to the one,that-
'culminated-iir:'the-Tonkin- Gulf-
resolution and the .Vietnam. War'
Amongthe distortions and deceg _
tions- practiced iti the last two
years have been.these events, ` uI
0 Zbigniew-Brzezinsid admit-'-
I-would, like to'point. out that ?.
o lrPsideutAeagan?has'made
..numerous-speeches'rn: which he
claims-that -the Soviet Union- be-
lieves a-nuclear-war is winnable- .
This inflammatory claim contra-,-I
dicts- almost al1;:Sovier military I
writing oa -thee?sublect?::and is
based on one ambiguous: state
meat in one article.._,:::;_ _:. 'a . .
i President Reagan and his-'
advisers continue to_'-maintain
that.the Soviets have decisively,
surpassed _us_iit military, power..;
eventhough the= world's most':-
prestigious-analysis; at the Insti-,:
lute forStrategic=Studfes;=rank?
thee5two superpowers-as ro Tghly
r?equivalenF
The=?atuch- ublicized Soviet'
ms build u derives ins lar a =:
t rota a very dubious:reinter;=.t-
r ures b the s
P.which' radicall in-
--teased ? Soviet-- expenditures' -
sim l b t urine in, oars in-
e. ;mot:
All these stratagems- seek to
l alarm. the American- people with,,
the image of the Soviet Union as a --.
Hitlerian aggressor .;bat,;has a ..
military edge aver,: us and-. cal
destroy us.
The_ new unrestrained;militar,.,
risen pushes -us'- inexorab:y to-
ward a cataclysm that-could wipe
out l0D million Americans- and :
leave the-survivors -praying :for - }
-an early death.- --.- ' :.. i'
MARKSACHAROFF
Melrose Park: ';'
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0&
Lavish as the adminlstration'ddefense bud- 'credibl
anal
d
e
li
tic
d
ll
y
yze
r
a
s
an
a
y revised by
, gets are projected to be-prudent choices will--- Franklin D: Holzman a Tufts ee
i
t
d
onom
s
an
a;
,: have to be made. on how our precious dollars fellow at Harvard's Russian Research Centers
t
N
ll
b
are spen
.
o. rea
suc,
udget,could :.ever His-, understated- conclusion'::'"The? corrected
accommndata_rhe wish licte.nf
e:;erale
d
g
an
admirals and:theircivilian-
:;: a4' ?
mana
ers
~
?
alsuaca 111uJLULr- L114L~
.
g
.
But prudent.choicesdependon:wise ass
-l
,
....
ell.,
the1Soviet" CTnion'has.
not been - outspending
went of whit theaviets.are.up tn, ander
_?
r-theUnitedtates.w
the U_ S. Intelligence-,community historically
:
:tea5Pe tago,?;_ si
--Wis.)..one. of--the-wiser heads. of. the~Hou:sea-;_ _
` -.
Soviet c.-Tparisons
:.,.L~:_.: i ,_ - - -? -?
in s Personal. vie* on the opposite page..; ^ ; f _ ~_ Warsaw Pact allies.-
Other- warped-assessments pervert percept.;,' When ou.add them i
a
v
s of'S
l
n
v
o
i
P
t
s
tre
Y n'
ng
h
an
t
.
d
,
thus they p
e
rvert
even using
~I-~~ :.. .. the CTA s ,;
the Washington reactions based-on them=
:: ! =? r cockeyed Soviet vudgef-
Rrostnotorious..are the CIA "studi
i
es
f S
o
d
,
ec
n
o
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f
aer
es
figures, the perspective
Soviet: defenses pii'ding,,s
e.
.
ilerop3:rg~`that;l~fos;:: seP thear'c
?,
i
g
n an
p y
i
t
l
ng
ab
e) tends Me ase the
'
:
cow
s military budgets-are,far_ large
r tlzar~t
?
a1ar1T}
~YeP
;;
o
ur
'W
ea
li
nCS3:~
r -?
_
V
ours Truth 13. bent: (probably by design..-tn' : Take Into. acco
unt also the charade.: o f
ant e-
o
nl
-Jy
m
ayor pewcl surrounded V5[
Soviet army, the CIA assigns?the pay scale &?f enemies almos all of them ?ro,,,,,,~,nist
o
G
on,
o
- ... -..
it
you will. AdcI the China factor,;-
Soviet soldiers. Then it 'adds the American incluoi
ng
=4:4 milli
on troops The Chinese ae
.r-
-
overhead-of more than $10,OOa-per volunteer:. not,- to be sure, our allies, but they certainly
When Uncle ..am gives our.. Gin a raise, .the are not:tithe Soviet Union's friends.
CIA gives an ..equivalent .`'raise" , to Soviet'',
..
soldiers and 4itoc ;I.. - _-WArit1'-noge~gF;?:thls7.takesy}nto account.tlia=i
p..~r.T_.
e
a
w
o
t
U
o,zmalx-
The CIA's r-- r- ._.
statfst cal. humbug 'hasp been ~ x It is :?paradoxical:= :ta?=read in:.the Joint
rr
than weAave, and -has. almost. twide. as much.'
_ ? ` :_- ~Ing and- deploying `moreF-=ilitary equinme
W-41" epwndb,q (1979) szts b~vre,r stns e> .: _ `' ="The: resolution of this:paradox is not hard;
W-41"
v rru?r. wcarlS.L+la ua-,41s fur Lms view- 13 Lne
tary p~ne~wiel `?~. _ =- ~- ',> 5.7 miYloir~ ~ -',4.5 migtproti= - - - -. _ _~
?' :_F~superioi 'quality and technology of U_ S e gw
C'IC=,GQ S- LT.
22 June 1981
p-F
._ .'1ment'.tTnfQrtunatel} -this`cruciall : im rtian
s,;~.-rim.; cn.rr ~.,,1o.v~,L-- .factorl -notca lured in CLk- estirnate9
UHn4 - ,a" ' t}cipantsis thatcthe United States 1is stillp he
t
STAT
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I R T I C ! J E :iS.CSF?4} 1'r 11~~L~1!JY'i li S U 7 - , F D IY It i,O_:) " I l i
21 June 1901
. By'DA1V 1BL F- GILMOHE
WASHINGTON (UPI)- The inch-thick-..
Pentagon?document on. space-based -laser
weapons was-stamped "secret draft:'- and
-
blurted out its conclusions in-the-very-first
paragrap}r
? "The fundamental issue addressed in this.
paper," it said, "is-whether the-.potential-
utility of, space-based ~ laser. weapons pro-
vides a compelling: reason to accelerate the
current technology base program: to pro-
vide an-option, for- early dePloyment?of-
lasei weapons in space.: Our conclusion-is
that an accelerated. program should be ini-
tiated to provide early on-orbit demonstra-
tion of-technology readiness-".
Then the document;.a copy of which was-
seen by United Press International, detailed
the reasons for speeding up preparations.
for possible space combat.,
Lasers are only. one part of:the .chilling
prospect-of real Star Wars of-the future
because-space weaponry will probably also
include particle beams; which are com- .
pared to directed lightning bolts.
- . - =
- The- Soviets are-.working on them, too,
.and. eveirts are moving even faster than'
that recent. Pentagon paper suggest
The space shuttle, which,. could carry.
these new.. weapons .into .orbit, has already
passed its first orbital-.flight test and is.
being prepared for its. second flight Sept.-
30. And--there-,is Ytalk about. recoverable
manned -"mini-shuttles"- that would be-
launched from the mother. shuttle. to;service
existing detection devices and. future laser-
-- The Republican-controlled;` defense--_
.oriented Senate on April 14 overwhelmingly_
voted an- extra $50. million- tom- givei,the-.
-Defense Department a,total of. $147.5 mil-:
lion in the fiscal 1982 authorization bill- for
laser weapons development ..-
vote was 91-3. -The House- has yet to -
act, but -the Pentagon. had-not. even asked-.
for the extra money in its record-breaking
peacetime budgetr
And the-latest issue of: Aviation Week &
Space Technology,. regarded as exception-
ally well-informed-on--laser and particle -
-beam developments both in' the United,
States and the- Soviet Union, says the Pen
tagon is already talking about the forma-:?
Lion of-a new branch of the- armed services.
-U.S. Space Command..
Aviation Week, which over the: past few
years has been, carrying continuing updates
on laser
21-pages
tnesubject, atong with dramatic .photo-=
graphs and artists conceptions of- existing.
_?
and proposed concepts, installations. and
experiments. -.- ::.::.._. ..
Senior. Military Editor, Clarence.'. A..
Robinson -Jr.. said, "The United States is
moving toward taking full; advantagewofiits?_
'technological: capability _opeirating iii the ?
medium of space tolF CTdee a defense: for,
the. nation .against ballistic missile attack Y
by the Soviet Union " .
All this concentration, his- summation
.said, is defensive and designed to forestall a::..
growing Soviet ability.to knock out Ameri=
!:can land-based intercontinental ballistic
'-missiles on,a first strike with Russian mis
siles of -superior power and increasing.accur~
.racy- - ?: _ :: _ _ ..` .. _ . :
-The best ay;according to.experts, is to
destroy the Soviet missiles far-out in space.::
The Pentagon draft referred to a constel-
lation `of-space laser systems as "an awe- ?
some force capable of checkmating a mas-
sive TCBI+I'-attack ... One hundred such
weapons-properly.deployed could cope with :
,a simultaneous launch of 1,000 ICBMs."--
What are these new super weapons?
-.Laser is an acronymn for light amplifica-
tion by stimulated emission of. ,eradiation.
The most basic laser, first developed in the-.
1960s, involves generating by combustion.
combinations- of gases. that release photons
or bundles of-light energy through a super-
`?: ? `.
-sonic nozzle..
An. optical unit, working. under an elee-
tronic,fire control. system. that detects tar-
gets, focuses-the narrow beam on the, object--
in the form of heat..The beam burns.
through-. the skin of a missile to, destroy
vital components::.:::
Lasers are: distort ed.in the atmosphere
but are. unaffected by the vacuum of space.-
`and could be', focused- on missiles or space.
targets thousands.. of miles distant and-
destroy them. in instants,-' .since the beams
travel at about the-speed of light - 156,000 -
miles per second..: ?,.. - - ., .,: ,._~ _:'.
American.: ground-based lasers in -U.S.,
tests, have already"shot down" unmanned
target drones in the.atmosphere.and des
troyed target tanks on ground ranges.
A- particle beam-is a stream Of highly'
energetic atomic or subatomic particles,
such as electrons, protons, hydrogen atoms,
or ions.- A Defense Department fact sheet-.
says particle beams ".would resemble-a
lightning bolt."
/03 : CI 1 a Don would consist of
AnAR A20A0v an
aiming system and a fire control system to,
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T T,
THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE
8 June 1981
` PRESIDENT REAGAN-and Mexican President, Jose Lopez
Portillo will meet- for- they second time::.in=Washington on,-
Monday:There. will:be:lots, of smiles- for.Ahe carneras.'A
statement will be issued- stressing: traditional ties- of-friend
ing toward confrontation-The most. serious=pr'oblems:?come
from diametrically, opposed-:policies inrCentral"America.:
The United. States supports the SaIvadorean.junta-.,and: is-=
escalating military?aid. MexNlco-' supports. the ;oppositton
forces against whom the U.S. arms are?directed;-encourages
sympathetic press ;accounts of their-:_struggle;=. and- permits
The United States. has: cut off aid 'to-the Sandinista: regime.
in Nicaragua..Mexico, has ?just--staged-- a` gala: reception for
Nicaraguan- leaders,.: pledged' to give.-amore:-aid.`than'- the:
to- pressure Honduras to stop border raids-,and to-dismantle,%
THE UNITED STATES is moving .toward resumption of,,
prospect of -U.S. escalation of conflict on. its-border,. especial-
ly-in the form of:aid to? the explosively.. unpopular. dictator-: -
leasi publiclydefended'by:aresur
U-S_ policies are:at.
_
. resurrected domino- ' theory' Nicaragua has, been:. described by
Reagan offieials=as--a-barely disguised'So'viet-beachhead: It'
is asserted' -that:the'Salvadorean guerrillas: are agents-of
Moscow and Havana. So' are the : guerrillas in;GuatemalarIf: :
theme-are not stopped,- Mexico; too; wily-fall.-victim to.:com.,-
munist subversion'-:The'United-States is saving Mexico'-from'?~.
this future catastrophe:-If'Mexican-authorities are toostupid,,
or short-sighted to see-it-coming,. the United- States. will save
them anyway: -Traditional American noblesse oblige. We'?ve.
saved: a lot of:-people'who; couldn.t see things coming. ':..:.:~.
United States is ? militarizing Central America ;' turning. client;:
states: into virtual colonies .The regimes supported-, by_the
--more U.S.,arms they=get;. the .:more-atrocities.-they: commit
promise, moderation and eventual stability is disappearing.",
-If ?U -S' aid-succeeds,' it-will do -so only.. by, turning-much ofd
T.S.-backed dictatorships: fall,: the --region=: could. faces an-
American invasion.;. `_;.
Either way, Mexico Ioses U.3. policyis'already polanzmg
political forces in Mexico, as it is throughout Latin America.
Polarization will create-opportunities for the US-to meddle
in Mexico itself.. Pressures. from the United Statesjwill-begin
to produce domestic' allies , .within :Mexico:: aided.- byU.S:
economic leverage-, Constraints . on domestic:and
increase- _'. :: `"
licy will
-
s
Mexico is a domino,: ripe for polarization 'and- meddling, a it struggles- with its-:new?oil riches. to avoid the Iran syn-
drome-. But in-the-Mex_i_can.yi t an er
Wash ington.,. not.:f t`~Nt~'Mb~oW:~
more. accurate. The: U.S. version comes- closer- to a self
_The .. Mexican:-version. is accurate because-the Reagan
ico to_ preserve"its traditional political. and.. economic domi
nonce in: Central America. Indeed, a little. turmoil in Mexico
might make the Mexicans more-amenable to U.S. pressures
:issues.hatMexico- views: as a cost.U.S_
"views,
Contrary to theUS.,version, however, the.issue in Central -I
'America`'is not communism. On .the evidence,, .-the . U.S::]
dominotheoryis not just wrong,_it's,positiv-ely-.manic. There
aren't'enou h real-live-communists in alt of Central America
.to i ica o s Auditorium theater. according to the CIA's -
own-estimates. e. ocuments re eased by, the State Depart
en .,w1 muc fanfare in February,-purporting to show-
Soviet;L bloc' aid to the Salvadorean guerrillas,-=actually ?-_
proved: the- opposite..;::
documents showed that ='
t fak
d,
the
i
th
e
u
.no
e
-
ey wer
ng
Ass
m
. .-the guerrillas, waited. until-long after, the ,U.S. escalation :o?
-.aid to -the junta- to approach Havana and Moscow for aid and '
that; they were -promised a. mere. 800: tons, ofwhich no more
'
d
than :200- may have been receive in the country. For a
guerrilla-army of 6,000, this was no more than'a drop in the
bucket: ~,n?~
The, real issue is not'communism;-but pluralism To reach
,a negotiated political solution in El Salvador; for example
I ~would require the United States to accept a government less:
subservient to. Washington, but not necessarily less depen=
-dent;- or - U.$. trade -and capitah It- would- also requirea
willingness to share power- in the region-, not with the Soviet
'Union ;but with Western Europe and-Japan And Mexico -and I
`Venezuela. Itwould - require a decision to abandon, if only
-gradu'ally',-=the exclusive- U.S: dominance created after the
Spanish-American- War in 18981and-maintained since then-by
force of arms= as. well as economic controls: -Y' =
MEXICO,`?VEIVEZUELA. West Germany-and others have
signalled their willingness to broker. a negotiated peace in El
-Salvador.: The?United States has rejected their?proposals out
of-hand-,-'This rejection is -as.traditional. as the policy itself It
would,imply?_a-i loosening,- of the .-U.S_. -political--monopoly -
vague.:?Schmidt.is not about!?to -tradehis country's image as;
.a supporter of social change and valuable counterweight to:
U.S..Power unless- the United States-offers' something in:
- return.:.
Mexico's leaders, have no- more wish to-promote commun-
ism than Sen:Jesse,. Helms. But since. they are not commit.
led to unilateral, U.S: 'dominance in Central 'America, they,
have no. need to avoid the real issue in the conflicts there..
Pptiticalforces, ,need- not in their view?:be-excluded .from, pnu~er'- merely,because they 'Plan -to regulate or nationalize
`U.S.' economic-.interests or consult less -often `withthe U.S.
Nor Flp? communists, a minority in- the region, need to oe
__excludea. from.. political participation just' because-they are
communists- An Mexico, the Communist Party-is legal and
free and above all useful as'a barometer1and safety valve) -
CIA-IaU 8n4*d31 A~ 1afgt]e, political stability,
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ARTICLE AP EARED
ON x AGE
WASHINGTON - The Reagan Ad-
ministration appears to have declared.
as nonproblems the so-called global
corcerns.over which the Carter Ad-
ministration briefly agonized: what to
do about the catastrophic world food
situation,. the instability of the world
monetary system, the sharing of re-
sources under the sea, the mounting
debts of poor countries, the growing
rivalries within the developed world
over access to scarce resources, and
the environmental consequences' of
such rivalries.. -
Mounting economic and social insta-
bility in the third world-is the No. 1 se-
curity problem, but the Administra-
tion's preferred approach to this
threat'to peace is to shake a finger, at
Moscow or to repaint an old battleship.
It is a dangerously . unrealistic. policy;
lnrte lenCe Agency says it has a. Dangerous Decade, ".is a senior
fel-
Most important, it.-would have to en, e to confirm the basic facts low at the Institute for Policy Studie
s,
demonstrate that the nation's econ- anwhich the Administration's aranoi an independent research oganization.
omy was vital enough to sustain our wor dview rests- ministration i .- This is the first of two art. icles.
global commitments. spokesmen claim that America would..
So far, the Administration has-Siio^ lose prestige if' El Salvador's' moder-
ceeded in confusing friend and'. foe ately repressive torturers and murder-
alike. The President calls Soviet.lead- ? -ers, whom we are generously supplying
ers liars, and cheaters but invites them - with helicopters and rifles, should fall-
back into Middle East discussions. Ac- Thus, the Administration is setting
cording to Secretary of State Alexan- that country up to be the new Vietnam.
der M. Haig Jr., the- Russians are Whether a single additional adviser or ,
for there is no way that the United they are about to fall into the very?ash. West German Government to move?i
States can be restored to economic can of history that they have been ? slightly to the right and the German
health without taking on these global ~., preparing for us. The President's clos- people to move to the left (66 percent of
problems in a serious way. est. adviser, Edwin Meese 3d, an- them, .according to United States Gov-
But is it not unfair to judge presi- . flounces that military action, against ernment polls, are against modernizing
dent Reagan harshly for hot doing -'Cubaisbein?considered,butthegrain ? the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
what he never had any intention of embargo against the Soviet Union is with theater nuclear forces). The Ad-
doing? Should not his pe,-orrnance be precipitously lifted Without even ad- -ministration's obvious reluctance to ne-
judged by his own goals? Unfortunate- vance notification to our allies. gotiate arms-control arrangements in
ly, by that test, too, he is headed for. El Salvador is selected as the critical , . Europe, which a majorityof Europeans
failure. site to make a stand apainst'the newly see as the only way to reduce the Soviet
The Administration came to office discovered worldwide Communist-ter- nuclear threat against the Continent.
I
promising. The aA amen. oo what roust conspiracy. But neither the Con- offers the Soviet Union an unparalleled
gress, the Roman Catholic hierarchy, opportunity to put pressure on Euro- f
Dean Acheson once called "situations nor our of strength-" Obviously,--more than a. , bloody European
civil war in that belie.ve
was in- ? mate popular fears. Reagano realism
military buildup was required. The vented in Moscow. International terror- may work so well that the Kremlin will
Government would have to learn-once ism is a fashiorab a construes o make be able to claim a veto power over
again to speak with one voice an for- noire an ages a ev n a _ NATO weapons decisions.
elan policy issues. It would have to aizzyrng van pfd c?;~i[ rean3r Situations of strength these are not.
demonstrate strong public support for rfia a stra egy for a essing em
its program to restore American - much e the '"arc of crisis rhetoric in Richard J. Barnet, author of "Real Se~
power. It would have to strengthen curity: Restnrina Amorirnn Amlia. h'
NEW YURK TIMES
1 JUT-:F, 1931
By Richard J. Barnet
- - s
even one infantry platoon is ever sent
there, the Administration has already.
invested so much in that operation that
this nation cannot help emerging from
the involvement weaker, not stronger.
Having announced that a political
solution that includes the left is a
major defeat, we have once again ad-
vertised our impotence. Having made
supportof our El Salvador policy a loy-
alty test for our allies in Europe and
watched them flunk, the Administra-
tion has strengthened neutralist senti-
ment on the Continent and given a-
boost to the antiwar. movement in both
America and Europe,
The national security adviser. Rich-
ard V. Alen, scolds the Europeans for
their "contemptible" better-Red-than-
powerful enough to orchestrate much _ dead attitudes; The predictable result
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ARTICLE
ON PAGE '"
Of Detente and Duplicity
FACING REALITY
By Cord Meyer
New York: Harper and Row
1980_ 433 pages. $15.95
. Reviewed by David S. Sullivan
STRATEGIC REVIEW
Summer 1981
Cord Meyer-is a romantic legend in his own
time--a Yale-educated former U.S. Marine
Corps officer, a wounded World War II hero who
Birted with the idealism of World Federalism
only to confront eventually the reality of the
Soviet threat to the very institutions on which
this ideal could be based. He has crafted a fine
autobiographical portrait which reflects some
of the noblest philosophical values of the Amer-
ican liberal tradition,'but also depicts one maxi s
attempt to understand, and then to enter, the
"Cold War."
Cord Meyer also exemplifies what is best in
another American tradition-the tradition of
service in intelligence. The only official of the
Central Intelligence Agency to receive three
.times the CIA's highest award, its Distinguished
Intelligence Medal, he was one of the Agency's
wisest operators and executives of covert action.
At the same time, his writings betray a breadth
cf perception and keenness of insight that put
to shame most of those who labor on the "ana-
lytical side of the CIA establishment.
The focus of Meyer's personal odyssey and
-professional analysis is on the relentlessly grow-
ing Soviet threat toAznerica. The book provides
a detailed expose of successful Soviet opera-
tions--for example, in outmaneuvering the
United States in Angola In the mid-1970s. An-
other highlight is a sophisticated and penetrat-
ing analysis of the inner workings of the most
shrouded governing body, in the world, the
Soviet Polinburo. Meyers analysis also. details
authoritatively the KGB's organization and sin-
ister modus operandi, including the organiza-
tion of the-t pica) KGB station abroad. He helps
us to understand bow disinfoririation, propa-
ganda and myth are fabricated and purveyed
by the KGB to the disadvantage of the West.
If there is a central theme in the book; this
concerns the Soviet grand strategy that is
clothed in "detente" on the one hand, and the
sad record of U.S. analysts in grasping Soviet
intentions on the other. Meyer posits. that the
men in the Kremlin make a "deliberate and
continuous effort" to "mislead and deceive the
outside world":
Soviet leaders look upon detente, the SALT
negotiating process, and the expansion of
international trade as temporarily expedient
tactics, designed to win time and opportunity
for the successful achievement of ... the de-
fense and the strengthening of the "socialist
system" ... and the strengthening of the ties
with new governments and with revolution-
ary progressive movements. -
The evidence that detente was brilliantly
conceived and deftly executed as a screen for
the Soviet thrust to military superiority is by
now overwhelming: even Soviet spokesmen are
openly admitting that the USSR exploited the
1969-1980 decade of "peaceful coexistence"
and SALT to mislead the West into compla-
cency, while battening upon Western financial
credits, trade and technology to sustain its stra-
- tegic build-up. -
According to Meyer: "The Soviets in the
SALT I negotiations succeeded in winning cru-
cial advantages by hard bargaining and by the
deliberate concealment of the fact that new
types of ICBMs were ready for testing." He thus
lends his own authority to the evidence that
SALT I represented. an exercise in deceptive
Soviet negotiation tactics. He also supports the
ti
th
t i
SALT I
h
i
U
d
no
on
a
n
t
e
n
te
States traded
Mr. Sullivan _was a senior strategic and Soviet for-
away its technically superior anti-ballistic mis-
eign policy analyst with the CIA for seven years, Y Y su p
and serves cAetp p& fM@TSs'2 q/V#hCIA= ?fO4jejV )$ 0 ig8b belief that it was
the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. achieving the trade-off of constraints on Soviet
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IS May 1981
Co .sera ac on Defense
With little debate and almost no dissent, the world "much less amenable to being
American prices. The gap appeared only
when the CIA change its formula or ca -
Congress is going along with President Rea- managed by American military power." _-The -miss a gap is equa y meaning ess
gans huge increases in defense spending- Buying more military hardware could ac- to Barnet. The weapons aboard a single
15 per cent in real dollars for fiscal 1982, tually undercut national security, he ar- nuclear submarine could destroy all of Rus-
tapering off to a still hefty 7 per cent at gues, since it diverts money that might be sia's largest cities, making a Soviet first
the end offiveyears. Democrats in Congress, used to solve problems such as America's strike suicidal. Why then does the nation
exhausted by their losing battle against the dependence on foreign oil. "The hardware require the redundant destructive capacity
social program cuts and gearing up to fight cannot produce energy," Barnet says, "nor of an MX missile?* Billions are being spent
,
the Kerrip-Roth income-tax reductions, are can it assure access to energy." Rearma- says Barnet, to avoid the perception of a
raising few objections, But critics outside ment, he concludes, is nostalgia for a time gap between U.S. and Soviet nuclear ca-
governrnent--many writing in liberal pub- that can never come again. pabilities-in the belief that if the Russians
lications-have raised some troubling ques- Barnet contends that the Administration think they are stronger, they. gain a. subtle
tions about the direction of the Adrninis- is acting on a questionable belief that the edge in political maneuvering. But Barnet
tration's defense policy. NEWSWEEK Soviets spend far more on defense than the finds no evidence for.that. theory in recent
Pentagon correspondent David C Martin United States-a calculation that fails to history. And once statesmen start buying
examines three of these critiques: - take into account the vastly different stra- weapons for their symbolic value, he says,
tegic and economic situations of the two . they can never have enough-they have
t may not be obvious yet.-but the critics - countries. The United States does not have i lost touch with reality and have begun pre-
of increased defense spending-have-his- -a hostile China at its borders, and it does paring for war games, not war. -
tory on their side: over the last- three dec- not need troops to occupy Poland. America -
ades, including the periods of-.the Korean .: and its NATO allies, he correctly points.
and Vietnamese wars, military spending in,- -.out,. spend more on defense than Russia
the United States has never risertin constant -and its Warsaw Pact allies. The govern- - .KCE"T r t
dollars for more than three consecutive ment's estimate of a $300 billion defense
years. Reagan's position, of course, is that "gap" over the last decade is a paper figure,
no sacrifice is too great in. the cause of based on reconstructing what it would cost
national defense. But his proposals raise _ to buy the Soviet defense establishment at
strategic, tactical and econom-
ic issues that ought to trouble
conservatives as well as liber-
als: if throwing money at social,
problems has been a failure,
how can we be sure that-'it's
the right answer to the. equally, complicated problems of na-
tional security?
The strategic argument-:
that national security depends
on more than just = .military
strength-is made by Richard
J_ Barnet,-of Washington's lib-
eral Institute for Policy-Stiud
ies_. Writing in The New
Yorker, Barnet argues that-the.
spread of nuclear weaponsand
the increasing independence-of
Third World nations has made-
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A T? TCL Ax'$r T7n
O 1PAGE. 13_ May 1981
i thaA-those of of er NATO. members-
ns,o
- Strength.: in EurO"Pe' einbergerinsisted
t
by Henry:h.-ttradsher?.; mil any.:slacxening now. ~ .;._
"T ?`: romewliat.-.vaguely-.warded ?,reaffir~=
BRUSSELS,- Bergitim -'Elie United -; ..
.
.
States told: a:grirn story, ._ormourit= motion of the 3 percent annual. goal:
;;ing Soviet power: in Europe-.. -S officials .took. this;as?progress
military happy-;witlr-7
to tts NATO allies : ;a-? -memberswill reach it!A Britistr.eiC:?
Since' atwgoal was first adopted 4?pert noted shat there. had to be flex-
by the Nort) Atlantic Treaty}Organ: iirtheformulation- of_thegoal"~
nizatiQtt'fb-t pearsago?the ;U:tited:_,Z- to allow for special problems while
S
anc
ime
ot
ie
tates
i st
:
T
r-membershad bn erii 't
-can. offcial ointed ou.
fallen Short of itsannual:,increases, =that tIte%wording ;allowed fort-even
:
in'real~inflationadjusted `terms ~y LL ?~more-than-a 3:percent-effort
4eending_ by; 4 ,_ percent. or S-percent attempt:; to- give guidance to NATO
ayear.=accordin ?to l].& intelligence members on improving. logistical
esttmates?- presented- to A .=de-'-- and military facility-support for?de-?
Tense ministers yesterday- The esti= v fense:-operations.. The backup infra
mates were- offered at? the.-opening. structure- for . Western fighting for.,
,esession--of~-,the-_:ministers'r,two-day;-` ces has been.failingi'to- keep .pace
th coriven-?; with`aiodernizatibn needs .A:main `
spring m e e ng,. t & '
Yionai-: uelear art.of Western--{ reason'; has -been; that inflation. has;
efenses _; ; eaten ,up funds for defense: support
The special intelligence~briefin faster'than,expected:
was -intended-, to -im ress defenses New plans for improvements cov--_
ministers-witlrthe-extent.to which ersuch things-as airfields, naval bas=
.. iNATO-has fallen behind the Soviet-,_? es, fuel stares,` comthiinications. ae
led-Warsaw-Pactimboth convention riai :: navigation aids;- training,
a and nuclear -arm amen ea an _ ?' installations and'headquarters facil-
'administratiorr??-'- rcials-- teelmthat`~' sties.
most Europeans:-have failed to rea - `':.= ? `- with market-oriented economies
-to above 20. on the basis of'the pat ; Lee contends that during the 1970s
tern of allocations in the 1981.85 So-- the Soviet-Union increased its sales
viet economif: plan: ;. to market economies of 'natural gas
Former Defense Secretary James and other raw materials in order to :
R. Schlesinger;. who Was. critical"of- import' more--advanced?-industrial
:the CIA- estimates. when he-- headed. equipment than it could produce it-'
the agency in 1973, said theother?day self: Not only did it get better equip-
that he believed-"the Soviets are, de~- =
iiient-this way but it also freed"some.
voting :17-or18 percent of their na of its own industrial capacity to con-
tional' effort. ta:military':efforts. The'' r--centrate on weapons.
CIA numbers may- be- misleading,"^ 7bus, according to Lee's calcula-
with the agency trapped in method' Lions. from. Soviet- data, the era of,
ology that. underestimates the rriag=' -detente made.- it- possible 'for the
-nitude of the militaryeffort, he said.:-: Kremlin . to: order. more and better',
The'-- Reagan administration's _weapons--rather than diverting the
proposals would increase-US: de-.-. -economy, from armaments to more -
.fense,spending' for-the`1982-fiscal' peaceful--purposes --:-as., has; been
year-to slightly over 6 percent-of .,widely.b:'-ieved. in .the-West-espe
GNP.-Announced plans-would raise- :..'cially by Europeahs who have been
. that_to a little over 7 percent byFY-
eagger for Soviet trade>.;t
Lee draws his conclusions pnm .r-,
Both the CIA' and its critics conk: ily from Soviet data, adjusting them: I
tend that an understanding= of the, .::to include in.. military- spending
,share' of Soviet GNP' going into"`its '=many things hidden elsewhere. in
,military effort is important. Western --the Soviet budget than: under pub.-
intelligence ' :agencies.' have :what: 4'6-lished.defense accounts He says the
,they-'believe-.to. be a pretty good Soviet Union is now making a mili-:
count' of Soviet missiles; tanks -and tary effort of between 108 and 126 bil-
submarines; regardless of their cost.:. ?. lion rubles a year. rather than the
But knowing the economic~burdene, -62 to 71-billion estimated by the CIA.:: {
Kremlin thinking: gressional hearing whose . tran-
In the nevi Soviet economic plan-:,
, . ,scripts were published late last year_
both 'investment- in future growth ;4-;the CIA conceded . that 'its rubles.
and consumer goods output will in?' ? were artificial, values rather-. than-
crease at a slower rate than in the- :.; the real rubles that would show'up
past: Bum Will-con- `:` in the- secret Soviet.accounts-.The
tinue to speed up"at the expense' o US. government therefore lacks any
_other sect arsofanincreasinglysl'ug: r''official-estimate ?of:''actual-Soviet.
-"--
devotion to armed power as more im-: '`. `scathing denunciations of_ -the ex
portant ;than'.: future: prosperity.' or pensive CIA effort to find.Soviet mili-
present-living standards.--`
.This fits the pcture of Kremlin: Lary figures:
In a confrontation last Wednesday
thinking described in articlesby Na-- : `between a CIA official, James Ste'
-:
tional Security Council' spf ctalfsts _a` ner. and Lee. Steiner disclosed that
on the Soviet Union.'-- r.
the agency knew actual ruble prices
= Army Brig. "Gen:' William Odoiri;' "of only 135 things that the Soviet-
'who, worked on the Carter admins- a; military buys. Other prices are con ??
puted., by various means, including
-estimating, dollar, costs. and' then
7.: using. ratios-to convert to_ruubles_..
calculates.that the figure was 18 ver-
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y. t ~t i u.:i: 1.= ; l~ 4.~?.:i.,
0S
'nv:L d
NATIONAL JOURNAL
11 April 1981
trwbles for D_Aa,.fense-Are the
Really Putspending the _1D7 entagon?
Administration officials speak of a spending gap of as much as $450 billion in the
.Soviet Union's favor in the past decade, but others call that grossly inflated.
s Congress gets down to examining
A the Reagan Administration's plan
to add $184 billion to the defense budget
over the next five years, one of the
biggest numbers games in town is es-
timating Soviet military expenditures.
Just about anybody can play: there
are more than enough numbers to satisfy
.all political persuasions.
But it is more tlia n an idle math-
ematical debate. Ultimately, it has to
do with how the Un:.,:d States reads
Soviet military intentions, and it is the
perception of those intentions that can
fuel a U-S -Soviet arms race-
Those who believe the Pentagon needs
the additional funds can start with Presi-
dent Reagan's Feb- 18 address to Con-
gress. Based on -Central. Intelligence-
Agency (CIA) estimates,.:Reagan stated
that "since l970,-.the`-Soviet Union-has
'
invested $300 billion more-on-itsmilitary
fozces than we have."
Or you can do what Defense Secretary
Caspar W. Weinberger-did in his March;
4 testimony to the Senate Armed Ser-
vices Committee. By leaving out 1970
spending and including budget projec-
tions for 1980, the military investment
gap widens by $53' billion.
But huge as a $355 billion' spending
gap may appear, Pentagon supporters
can come up with an even greater sum
by turning to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
off the spending gap. Here's one way,
according to a January Pentagon report:
use the 12-year period from 1968 to
1979 as a basis of comparison, and you
bring the investment gap down to $270
billion. Or you can lop at least another
$100 billion off the difference by adopt-
ing a procedure used in recent reports
by the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency that applies a "geometric means
purchasing parity" scale for rubles and
dollars to the CIA estimates.
Finally, a- full-scale assault' on the
CIA's method of estimating Soviet de-
fense costs, as mounted by Tufts Uni-
versity economics professor Franklyn D.
Holzman, produces an evaluation of U.S.
and Soviet military spending that is more
or less in balance.
This is not to suggest that any of
these estimates are contrived. For the
most part, the different assessments re-
flect long-standing and often arcane dis-
putes about how to compute the amount
of resources devoted to defense in a
foreign economy in which military spend-
ing statistics are shrouded in secrecy.
But there's little doubt that some of
these estimates are abused when they
are pressed into political service. And
the lessons some experts draw.from ex-
amination of Soviet defense spending
are more subtle and tentative than the
rhetoric over a military spending gap
suggests. -
posture statement for fiscal. 1982. By SOVIET STRIDES
factoring in estimates of personnel costs Whatever its defense. costs may be,
and operating expenses, that report pegs there's no doubt that the Soviet Union
the difference between U.S. and Soviet has significantly built up its forces over
.expenditures at an astronomical $450 the past decade. According to estimates
billion over a 10-year period. Some' pri- by the Congressional Research Service
vate estimates are even higher. of the Library of Congress, the Soviets
On the other hand, those who are have added 733 land-based missiles'. sub-
somewhat skeptical of the Defense De- marine-based missiles and bombers to
partment's budget requests can easily their inventory of nuclear "delivery ve-
also increased their stock of nuclear
warheads by 4,019.
In contrast, the United States has
93 fewer delivery vehicles than it had
10 years ago, though thanks to tech-
nology, it has increased -the number of
warheads mounted on them by 5,200.
As far as conventional arms are con-
cerned, the Soviet buildup is similarly,
impressive. In the past decade, to take
but a few examples, the Soviet Union
has increased its fleet of heavy and
medium tanks by 9,000 and added 8,000
pieces of artillery and 765 tactical com-
bat aircraft. (See box, p. 602.)
But if you can count their weapons
so precisely, why bother to try to assess
the levels of Soviet defense spending?
Some experts say there are good reasons
for trying,
For one thing, some strategic decisions
depend at least in part on the cost
of Soviet military hardware. Supporters
of the land-based mobile MX missile,
for example, argue that it would cost
the Soviet Union more to develop the
means of targeting all 4,600 MX shelters
than it would cost the United States
to expand its MX system or protect
it with some sort of antiballistic missile
defense. Not surprisingly, some MX crit-
ics, including former CIA director Stan-
field Turner, have argued precisely the
reverse. (See NJ. 2/14/81. p. 260.)
For another, present Soviet military
investment is taken by the Defense De-
partment as a guide to future Soviet
military capabilities. "The effects of to-
day's investment balance," former De-
fense Secretary Harold Brown states in
the Defense Department report for fiscal
1982, "will be seen in the military ba)-
ance in future years."
In larger terms, projections of Soviet
defense costs also provide U.S. planners
with some idea of how efficient Soviet
shave hundreds of billions of dollars hicles." During this period, they have defense industry is and how great a
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1Y'T.Ci A?Pi-
-THE WASHINGTON POST
9 April 191
Ever- since the Soviet invasion Of caused-a~ 4-percentdrop in production tions, and the rank-a- d-file: m ay! f: :
Afghanistan caught them. by surprise, in some basic East Ge:-manindustries. list-.Though their officers Tara
our intelligence services.have taken a Furthermore, according to CIA es- -pretty thoroughly. Soviet ved : _?>>1
pessimistic view of the Kremlin's itimates,a Soviet occupation of Poland purges and indcctraiation, Polish?gen.-
tentions? in. any situation. Few analysts -would cost the Kremlin 310 billion a erals have warred Soviet colleagues}:
want to be on record as having un-- year a sum the Soviet economy - that the lower ranks will not'submit
acefully to a Russian invasion::`-
derestimated Soviet_aggcessivenIe&%.:__ cfluld:not. absorb without serious dis- to o F~~_ ~;~ ?nt lot f}.o 1.r r~~oea .~1 ..
_.. - - ness or Meer 5I=U0n su~pj
ple,: has been t'~e: subject of. feverish'..! Politically, the- warded optimists in 1939, when they were attackeclei j)-.
study and interpretation by experts at our intelligence agencies point-.coot, tz~ne by .Germany and ked sr. i
the Defense Intelligence:Agency;,Cen- Soviet boss Leonid Brezhnev.:.is re- With some relief, Stan Departmei.e
trap Intelligence-Agency and State De- garded "as a - "consensus guy.'.'. He intelligence experts have nctterl :_pris*'
partment.- A -series of. special "alert would -be reluctant to pursue a mil- vatel that Brezhnev's. hIghly''=Jp
ublt, :
memorandums" has been sent to the itary solution to the polish problem y
eized meeting - in Prague-:ancledes_.
president 'over the _ ;past several -. without support from the other East-
ern;:; European ,satellites.:."Brezhnev --.mostly.,lowlevel Politburo fia:ctiori
;
? ?
:- -'
months
i
Q
l
th
Cie
f
l
l
Gent=to
t
,
,
.
oca
n
y
e
c
i
s
p-,
es
cr
. ,.. The aseessmert of Soviet. intentions downt"want to be alone, an analyst .aries.als,:leadi g.some hos
s ts;td-:'lie=='
is generally grim ,-. The -mnitary ana said. `.h eve that nothin suLstantive ;v~1k rem
4
lysts . have warned ' that the Russians East Germany and Czechoslovakia,. suit from the meeting.
might move to occupy Poland as early. ^--which, with Russia, constitute Pa- ' Balanced against'all these.,.
as. . this week.. A. top-secret . CIA-. es ti lands.' immediate neighbors, are be however, is the.: concern thaf td1s, _A
mate said.D=Day, could be this.com.ng lievedto be supporting: the Kremlin- prove decisive to= the Kremlin:, allow
Friday, not-befo e : .,,But Romania is reported to be a re- irg . the Poles,the: kind :of-.:p ersonar
But- largely ignored in : t e, spate of ' - luctant' Ally. freedoms and independence Rom
gloomy predictions of. a Russian mil Added to this is the certain hostility : viet authority: that they seem` deter= . .
itary move are the economic- and po --.'of the `Vest and the almost-certain mined to achieve would be simply t&-
litical factors the old -men in the disapproval of 'Third World nations threatening to the entire Soviet-sy~
awaywith, t, . .
Kremlin .must -consider before they At a recent clued-door meeting with tem. If the Poles can get
make an izretrie+ble decision .. to.. Use .. top Reagan administration officials, 10 why not the. Romanians, Hungarians, ?'
,y~hy--.n
force against the recalcitrant Poles. Republican . senators got a promise Czechs and East. Germans?
from the administration. that "the even the Russians?,
716 economic consequences panic-...-: strongest economic sanctions" against Self-preservation may over 66 -elk:
Manly have bean~ven;snort shrift; yet the -Soviet Union would follow any other considerations as the Kremlin's
.they: are -imps 1to:..theSorset.`bloc.' ...military .takeover of Poland. .hawks.: and doves argue. From.;:tleeir
'East Germany, for-example, 4 heavily -There is also, of course, a :purely point of. view, Poland may be a cancel.
dependent on coal supplies from Po ,1;-- military consideration that- majr_ give .that requires drastic surgery if- it- is}.
land. Irregular , ehveries in -the recent-:. ' the Russians pause..The Poles have ,not to spread throughout the cgmpsu
months of. stikes and disruption have .:. the best army among the satellite na-, , gist empire.;,,. _j:,;_'~ _?., ~.x.::.; - s +` :~
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k .TXOL n:xLf3.
THE WASHINGTON POST
21 March 1981
South Korean riuilitary agencies `~aave contended
.: =that. Japanese radios - have been ? found among the
equipment carried by Communist agents who inn"1
trate the South. _-.-
A new complaint. by the Soutli -Koreans wasY
lodged recently when Japanese --Foreign Minister
Masaycsbi Ito visited. Seoul. The Japanese' response
has been that it will not restrict. trade in materials
other ".-items that have a clear:mtlitary purpose
under' its anus export law.
.TOKYO, March-::20 North Korea is 'Slowly
ments- of such items ?as -truck and short-wave radio
sets to`North Koreaq-contending they can be fused'
:for ? military purposes.-1-Z' z
friends, which looks upon any trade with the,-com. -
-~--The-increased trade has' aroused the `animosity of -"
officials = in `-South - Korea, -one of :Japan's Asian-
erasing-its image as: . a .risky;debt-ridden trading
partner and is steadily rehabilitating its trade' with
Japan and other Asian nations= ._..' t.., _
Both its exports and":;imports rose considerably
last year''and =snow signs _of increasing. again: this
year, according to Japanese:-,financial sources - with
access to trade statistics irt"ieveral Asian -countries
doing business with North Korea.
Moreover the Communist` country is sa far -pay-
ing oil,, its old - d_ ebts, which were rescheduled two
years ago-. after. an -economic:slump that `almost
wrecked its dealings with the noncommunist world.
The upswing began after changes ordered in 1979
.by President Kim Il Sung put'some new life into
exports, according to the Japanese sources.
Since - then, they have been .-pushing export pro-
motions very hard," said one. banks..
Despite the improvement ';-North. Korea's past -
trading record is so poor that Japanese exporters.
.still insist on being paid in. cash on delivery. Busi-
ness companies get paid promptly these days, either
in- British pounds or- West German marks that the
North Koreans. are - believed to have -obtained by
selling gold. ..= ...
Japan's . financiers are. still : advising their client=
trading houses to go slow and exercise caution.
The CIA 'calculated in 1978 that North Korean
debts amo ihted- to at.-least ' $1.4 billion- with .the
noncommunist wor an ut $1 bUTo-n wi -the-
aovret Union, wMch supplies a rtion o e -
coun s cruse o - 1 debts to Japan alone-
amounted to about o on. - .
--- ' e Japanese debt-was renegotiated in` 1978 and:-
. spread ?out_ over- a-: 10-year: period.- So -far, Japanese
sources say, those debts 'are` being paid.:: As a result, ;
both exports to and imports from -Japan are increas
-ing. The: total, trade amounted to $475-million last;
year 'and- is' expecte& to--rise-to- $600 million: this!-
: There is. nothing we can do ?a Japanese official
said ofthe-latest South k'oreata ;complaint. `Whose
items; .which are not cited specifically -under the
arms-export. law will not be restricted, because this is
a free-enterprise system This is a longstanding is--
sue. It is a question of principles -- -
Nevertheless, major Japanese films- to. some. ex-
tent obscure their trade with North Korea by deal-
_:ing through- dummy firms instead of. in. their own
name for fear of alienating South Korea. A Hitachi
television set deal did not become public knowledge
for several months after it was completed.
Japan's major exports to North Korea are trucks,-
coke, fertilizers and television sets; according to the
North Korea Research Council, the vaguely named
association of Japanese businessmen who trade with
`... r _ -
that country.'
North Korea's- major exports are=-cement, iron ore
and a number of nonferrous metals such as zinc and
magnesium. Rising world prices for. nonferrous met-
als have been one of the major reasons for North
Korea's. improving trade record, according. to busi..
ness sources here
other Asian countries also increased : substantially.,]
last year. Exports to-Asian countries,- including Ja- A
pan, grew more than .30 percent- in 1979 over :1978
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 ?i.
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THE WASHINGTON STAR
11 March 1981
`-This year,.an. astouisliing, ev'ent-
takes place thatis both_linle-noticed,
and a crucial indicator of the world
that the Reagan administration will.
have to handle. Littl&Japan's GNP
Will-outstrip the Soviet Union ,in ! e viets refer.not toe
such secrets of state slit into the
light of day, the fi Lire`s are the CLA's_
But 1u gmg by the cia'sesumares,
aaan s gross nations product wt
soar to s . trt ion, while the vie
Union's remains about S1.2 trillion.:
(The. importance of this tes not a,
all-in the: sheer:economic.numb-
it lies rather: in - the'iact.thSi, of..a
the. --industrialized countries,".busy
Japan is intrinsicall}r "the=':podiesr
-and the - USSR is :-intrinsically the
most richly endowed. .4 - -. i f?~~. -
So we can see:in clear'reliefi the
basic truth of the decade -that the
secret for development is-the system,
an ideology _ of ?= pragmatism _ rather
than one of fanatic faith. ?.
Still another leitmorifof our-times
-is the response to a-22 nation global
Gallup : survey,of problems:, Twa.
problems "were- everywhere -rated-:
highest among- the "populace-- Both'
were economic:.-high inflation and
t:nemployment~71" :~-V
The Same Concerns _ .3{ ?
Again, it is not the figures that are
important What is important is the
fact that, whether in an underdevel-
oped Third World country like India-
or a highly developed country.-like
Norwa}, people by massive margins
had exactly the same concerns-
- 'Ihe soul and spirit of the 1980sare-
economic; not ideological: Indeed,
everywhere in the world one hears
much the same thing. Two examples::
e In Iraq recently, a leading-Arab
thinker said that "the Arab leader of
the future will be the-man who can-
do most for his people, period':: -:
? Far away from the.the North--
South dialogue and po'erty line, in
icy Finlhnd, the "in" new. geopoliti-
cal thinking is called "neo-realism."
By that is meant a distinct: trend
? away from the left's idealistic think- _
ing of the last 20 years, which argued
that the developed world can.help -
the underdeveloped world most` by
unrestricted. haA0p Re
Ong of `neoaiealists -eading
thinkers in the diplomatic corps ex-
plained.that this initially "progres-
sive'. trend, started by Sweden, today
is in for heavy rethinking. Actually,.'
he -said, by giving unlimited aid,
which`stopped people from helping
themselves, such countries as Fin-
land and Sweden were harming peo-
ple in the Third World. ` '.
What do all these 'different
elements have to do with what is go-
ing on these days in Washington? A
great deal..,,
Dismayed and disillusioned with
Jimmy Carter and his appearance of
weakness, masses of Americans vot-
edSor Ronald Reagan, thinking - or
convincing themselves - that he
would be a moderate Republican, an
"Eisenhower type," essentially a
Radical and Ideological. -
Instead, the administration has _
shown itself to be. more and more
radical and ideological. Indeed, two
distinct and highly ideological
groups within the administration, in -
contrast-to the pragmatic needs be-
ing,shown by the' world,` appear to
be going in the other direction.
One of these is the far right, whose
position the president himself seems
to. be- adopting more and. more. The
other group is composed of-the old
Democrats within the- administra-T
lion. This group, which is in some
:respects even more impassioned
than the-far right, is still fighting
the battle of what they perceive as
the--destruction of the Democratic
Party. under McGovernism. This
group includes the likes of U.N: Am-
bassac1 r Jeane!Kirkpatrick and'hu-4f
man fights director Ernest Lefever.
The questions are-'these: Is the
white-heat passion of these sectors
of:-the administration -and their
strong ideological bias-really apps-.
priate to the pragmatic, non
ideological world out th-ere?_Are we
out of sync once.-again?
ire we offering faith when the
rest of the world cries -for manage-
ment? Are we acting more and more
like. a Third'-'World. country: swing
ing back and forth between political
extremes, while the Third World is `
`becoming more rational in our old-
stile?
Are we, finally, ignoring why a ra-
tional-Japan can quietly make such--
strides - and are we failing to apply
.its.lessons .- because we are trans-
fixed by SovietVpower and outdated *-
ideology?.
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When the `fir tst disar~arnent: moverrient':
blossomed during=. the ?1950s, Herbert
Scoville Jr. was nowhere in sight. He- was'_
busy serving. in various capacities- at. the=
Central Intelligence -Agency, -'as--assistant",
director. for scientific- intelligence??and- a? ;.
deputy research director. But.' as he:- ni w =
points out, "the C}A.isn't-all bad;" ',because
that's where he- de elo ped
his. convictions :
about the Iunacy of-the
He cannot under stand' for.exaiziple why
the Reagan :administration.; insists' on'
spreading- the message; that America- is I
somehow-vulnerable--to `a. ,Russian.-nuclear -,
attack;. and that only' a-= massive:; hike. in.
military - expenditures "can:.=solve` matters.
"There's no question '.that we. have. better..
strategic- forces than ?-the-soviet :'Uision,"S.,
.Scoville told a--handful, of Hartford
reporters. late last-.-month.`-"We-: have--a
third of our money into bombers, one-third-
into land-based missiles and one-third into
sea-based missiles; and 'the' Soviets put-75-
percent oftheir. deterrent -into- land=based-
missiles--and they're in trouble:"'-.
The Russian? submarinesr -he -explained,
noisy-you, cane-: spot- them a ;long-- ways
can't track us: They have poorer technology
on their ICBMs (missiles): But you never
hear about that It's a clear-cut case of a
complete misrepresentation of the facts."?
Arid minutes later; addressing- a- Cori-
ference : on Military Spending :. at the
University of Connecticut Health Center, he
added: "Far too often, -most of the people
in this country fall for. cliches and don't; -
hear what the real facts area It's important:`
to dispel some of the.-myths that are in- the:
public's' mind. ?here's =too --much concern",
over whether the Russians are?10-feet.tall or':
20-feet tall. ...-..We-end-up-bad-mouthing
our capabilities: while-the: Russians= boast::
HARTFORD ADVODATE (CT)
11 March 1981
~71Ut erSorry Chapter ,
Easier said than done; not even Scovjl!e..
Arms` Control' and Disarmament Agency,.'"-.
can: make much of- a dent in.-the. public.-
-consciousness. -The opinion polls--confirm -
that, most Americans support bigger-defense :
expenditures--and Reagan.- -has responded-'_
with,-a'.$30-billion hike. over the next two:
-And so, begins .anothw sorry chapter in -
the history of the arms race; repeated efforts
to restrain arms'. spending-to to prove S with
solid statistics why the arms race is
disastrous to both'the world economy and
to our own-have met with decisive defeat.
Treaties have been negotiated and signed
(remember the Test . Ban Treaty?), yet
proliferation ..has- continued . unabated.
Jimmy Carter vows inh.is Inaugural address ?
to worl(~Ltoward banning nuclear weapons-
the om face' of the; earth..:yet-, his last,
budget -hiked . defense-'spending . by-_ $2Q
billion; the military juggernaut,. however; is;
. probably-beyond,-any president's ' control- at'
this .:.point. = The -U.S.:: Arms Control and .
Disarmament Agency, when. Scoville worked-
for.., it;;'used- to. -routinely compare- imilitary-.
this practice,, and now.the'ACDA,:as, one-
U. S. "and: Soviet Union now have - 50,000
power.: that "tbeUnited :States; :when-com-
ranked first in military expenditures as. a
percentage, of the Gross National Product
between:.1960 and I 975---and ? last ? in its
annual productivity growth rate. It was-no
' pie-eyed peacenik in' 1953 who said that the
farms -race was "spending the sweat of its
.laborers, and the genius of its scientists." It
about theirs.:Wve got ta.dispel this myth- t)oration builds the F-14- E-2- A-6"d FA-
or - mencart weariness. ~asfiiO R(O et QFAp 9 1 f
- '- ?'--- A,. .,'+ ' min matter that eveity
the Central--Tiitelligence' Agency has ad.
mitred grossly.-overestimating. the presumes
Soviet military build-up. Back in early-1977.
there -were selective-- military leaks, to'-th,
news media warning that the CIA had detected.,
-doubling of ' Soviet military- -spending be
iween-1970 and,, 1975_ The percentage of the
,Russian GNP. absorbed by defense has
.apparently-jumped from the six-to-eigh
.percent range to the 11-to-I3 percept range
Congress flipped out, and so did Richar,
Nixon:. in his latest book; citing this CIJ
discovery, Nixon declared, "We will fin:
ourselves looking down the nuclear barrel is
the mid-1980s." ,
Turns out, the CIA finding was misir
terpreted. - Defense spending in Russia wa
holding steady--but it was absorbing twic
:as, much of the Soviet GNP -because th
-.economy itself 'was . so inefficient. "Sovic
defense industries-are far less.efficient tha
forrrierly--believed," the CIA explainer
,-although the: American military-industri
complex --preferred::, to,, sound the.,,; alai
anyway:
Down in Washington, regardless of logi
power continues. to flow.. to the . insider
,Each year the-Defense Department sends
'little-noticed -list to ; the ' Senate -..Arm,
Services Committee. This list tabulates,;
.the military. retirees and high ranki;
former Pentagon civilians who-have gone
- work for defense contractors-=or vice ver:
The most xerent list says. that_1,623 Defer
?employees.have moved to, industry, with
moving from = the: -private-e to- the -pub
sector. ? As - United Technologies. lobby
Clark . MacGregor -: told a' reporter, --`
you've known -somebody for a period
.time, whether you're. selling vacur
Ecleaners or whatever; people are more lik+
to listen to you than to someone they do
know,..;.=Y~~:
 ~- A tprd. ed For Release 20001/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137
T a'tE
Obi_--M
9 1-larch
paign, Ronald J1gO13*fe
-in the Amencan propaganda
speakers, exhibits and other aspects
of U.S. "public diplomacy"-has. a
budget of only $448 million. Even
if the S87 million the U.S. spends
separately. for Radio Free Europe
and Radio Liberty are included, the
total is still a small fraction of the
Soviet propaganda budget.
In radio broadcasting, this dis-
parity means that American sta-
tions broadcast for 1,818 hours a
week in 45 languages, mostly to
Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union, while the Soviet Union
broadcasts for a total of 2,022 hours
a week in 82 languages to virtual-
ly every one of the world's 165
countries.
During his presidential cam-
West struggle where words are the, chief
weapons. With their troops occupying
Afghanistan and massed to pounce on
Poland,. the Soviets have a lot to explain
these .days. Through a propaganda effort
perhaps seven times as large as that of
the U.S.. and with more sophistication
than ever before, they are doing just that.
The Central Intelligence Agency es-
timates t at the Soviet 10 nion s ends3.3
billion annually on propaganda activities
of one kind or another. That includes such
overt efforts as Radio Moscow's foreign
service ($700 million) and the Communist
Party's international activities ($150 mil-
lion). It also includes such indirect pro-
paganda efforts as TABS, the Soviet news
agency, which spends S550 million a year
spreading Moscow's view of world events
to foreign countries. By contrast, the U.S.
International Communication Agency
(ICA) --which coordinates the Voice of
America, cultural exchanges, films,
folks, both of whom work long days, arc
unable to make the trip.
Every day, around the globe, the
hearts and minds of people like Deepak
Kumar-as well as his parents and friends
-are reached on a battlefield in the East-
boasts: "It's all right. I'm best in my class
in Russian. And look, I have a library
card." The card he proudly displays ad-
mits him to the library at the Soviet em-
bassy. There he can find children's books,
as well as tracts on Soviet life. He has no
comparable access to American litera-
ture. Children who want to borrow books
from New Delhi's American center must
have their parents get a card. Deepak's
uring the day, Deepak Kumar, 10,
goes to school in New Delhi. In the
evenings he earns a few rupees brushing
ticks off the dogs owned by .a local Amer-
ican artist. In-response to a question from
his boss about his classwork, Deepak '
an3a
The ?ropa
t=p
Sweepstakes
Moscow tries harder
1981
Broadcasting the news from the Munich headquarters of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty
seen. This week the President is expect-
ed to name a new head of the 1CA. The
leading candidate: California Business-
man Charles Wick, a close friend who
was co-chairman of the Reagan Inaugu-
ration Committee.
The Soviet counterpart is Leonid Za-
myatin, chief of the Central Committee's
International Information Department.
He is a former director of TASS who op-
erates under the guidance of the party's
longtime chief ideologist, Mikhail Suslov.
TASS serves as the backbone of Soviet pro-
paganda. The bluntness of TASS's bias
often works against it. For example, the
Soviets in 1963 provided, free of charge,
equipment for receiving TABS bulletins to
the fledgling Kenyan news agency: The
Kenyans, however, soon started using the
equipment to receive. Britain's Reuters
wire service as well. A former Kenyan
journalist says he was supposed.to. give
equal play to both news services, but that
effort, but in this winter of budget Deepak Kumar studying Russian in New Delhi.
money is fore- "And look, I have a library card."
the TASS material arrived days later than
Reuters, and was too late to be usable.
The CIA claims that the Soviets often iry
to plant loyalists in local broadcasting sta-
tions so that TAS5 reports will gat better
play.
TASS provides most of the material for
Radio Moscow, the Soviet version of the
Voice of America. In the past two years
the broadcasts have been enlivened by
sprinkling Soviet-made jazz and rock mu-
sic recordings among the turgid recita-
tions of editorials. Radio Moscow propa-
ganda is much less vitriolic than the
printed press; a Soviet delegation
returning from a visit to the U-&
might be quoted by Radio Moscow as say-
ing that the Americans they met share.
with them. an aim of world peace. The
broadcasts in English are now particu-
larly subtle, using announcers who try to
sound indistinguishable from those on
the VOA or England's BBC World
service. This new sophistication,
however, does not exclude an un-
founded allegation here and there.
Soviet media actively spread the
word, for example,. that the U.S.
was responsible for the. 1978 kid-
naping and murder of former Ital-
ian Premier Aldo Moro. In addi-
tion, events often have to be filtered
through an ideological bureaucracy
before they are reported. For ex-
ample, news of the death of former
Prime Minister Alexei?Kosygin was
withheld for 36 hours by TASS and
Radio Moscow. Even Soviet citi-
ern broadcasts. -
The Soviets also make use of
"clandestine" radio broadcasts,
etc ~sons that purport to orig-
InateTrom within a particular re-
cipient country, but actually come
from the Soviet Union or an East
 A- {roved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010012
AD-- CHRISTIAN 31CIENCE MONITOR
9 i?'farch 1981
--Defense is a difficult;?complex subject. But
when the President of the United. States asks
-Congress to- autborize.an astronomical 32v1`
_ 691ion for the fiscal 1982 military budget= at-
a time of financial squeeze on all other areas -
~of government spending. the American pe-o-
pie ought to take more than a casual interest.
In =five editorials,'- which.. -wilt. appear this-
week;._we shall examine some ,of _the.-;issues
involved and, we hope; stir discussion:
Has this precision homework been done?
There is not much evidence yet that it has.:
argue that the US armed forces are weigbeo;
down by a cumbersome, expensive strategy.'
based on overwhelming an enemy by superior
numbers of soldiers and weapons..They favor
instead-:-"maneuver. warfare,": a strategy
sians I based on defeating an enemy by agile attacks
Wet arms "superiority"% and, about- the Rus-
. p? ants with smaller; more coh
e-
"outspending" the US in defense- Such at its weak
unqualified statements are misleading: It is save divisions`and:with-smaller, cheaper; and
hard to conceive that the United States, With less-sophisticated- planes, tanks, : and, ships.
more than 9,000 strategic H-bombs is in a po- ~0 ally._this is the strategy. of .t7ae Soviet
sition, of overall- inferiority?to the :Russians; Union,--.which maintains-la ge-numbers of
with- their.. 6,000 some -H-bombs:-There. are lean: divisions for'swiftly. overpowering= th
areas in which the Russians have an in or- adversary in intense but short campaigns
defense is not an area in which to take risks:. tant advantage. (most notably in conventional This is not to accept the Boyd group's calli
The armed forces clearly must be adwea for institutional reform at face value, It may
equate to-:r pons)and'areas in which: the US has ,the not be valid and we are in no position to judge
meet -security. needs;:- and -we, ? doubt., any:= clear, edge, (accuracy of warheads). Overall;- it
b
ri lid it d
e
i
s
e
o
s ra
se intelligent ques-
sacrifice -? required to maintain defense at `a, =, pules over detail.' appear to agree that the two{ tt0 'and.-~t therefore hoped that 'IVIr_
demonstratively safe level. That tba.unceas--?shPerPo?vers present are in rough equilib-' Weinberger-,and b his aides are looking-at: this'?
at
.ing:Soviet military buildup-poses new.chal-;-; riumwwith- each other. This' is not to- deny.
lenges to- the-West is a':matter of.-general areas. of.US-vulnerability--- a dated bomber
agreement- The -question, is -exactly. WhatL z force,. a- stretched-thin Navy,' poor :combat
should be done about that challenge,, readiness; `for instance which must be? ad-
Our major concern. is that the subject re=z: esp.-But?calm- .determination of"actual
ceive.honest analysis and debate within the; will-serve, the national .interest better
government. It would be unfortunate if an ex-. tbi~i broad overstatement
aggerated "Russian menace" became the ex-. ;, ,--In this connection, comparing _US outlays]
cuse for bloating the US-Wdgetwith- unneces . '=wwith those of the USSR is an unreliable busi
nary arms programs=,The military services?;w aess:.iVIost CIA estimates of Soviet ending;
always want more weapons and the tempta -' are based on what-it would cost the US to du-i
ron to push for them. under. an' assertively- llcate the Soviet military effort. Yet such a
prodefense administration-must,; be, strong; : : comparison is often fallacious.. a Russians,
The? defense industry-!- that military-Indus-=_- for instance; pay their military far less than
trial complex which-President--Eisenhower:- does-the US and 'have a: more manpower-in-
warned about -Js avidly awaiting huge con- -- tensive.-army. So, as the Center for Defense'
tracts. DefenseSecretary-Caspar'Weinber--.,;Information in Washington points out, when-
ger; even before be has had timeto-study the ever-the US boosts military pay by-$Ithe So-
complicated problems' involved;: bas called't Viet dollar cost increases by almost $2
-- mak
fora- $33 billion jump inr military appropri- mg the ;Soviet Union- -appear _ far'
ations over the Carter .budgets for-1.981' and, threatening than .-;^ ?. _ _, r 1982.. Are: these requests based : on meticu--' Forth ore, even if. CIA estimates are
erm
lously, thought put! plans:'-_or-are they de=' taken as a guide, the picture is not complete)
negotiation table-
it
is bar
dministration. will-not:.be_eaaer.-
toT
toughness vis-a-vis_the`Soviet-UnionrAnd_, spending:?and here NATO is the undispukedf 'Reagan a-
perhaps for domestic political:purpose's? F leader m?s put out by e: o n on-based: pursue arms control:,- and to scale down. its
International Institute for=. Strate budget projections- 'when it realizes the im
Authorizing money beforeit.isdetemunedgicStudies pact'onthe:US-economy=of rising,-defense-
-what the money is to be for is puttingthe cart showy _: the - ,Atlantic-:.- alliance;:--considerably-
before the horse: The United States needs a outspending the Eastern bloc. NATO also has costs,: Few believe the President will be able
also curbing arms outlays.:, 4=
former chairman of the Joint Chiefs Maxwell=- - -= However; the basic point is not how much
- ---
-
-
- - -' _-- ins the massive: defense-budget waste which
- --_~--- ~- "-".. " . -'w'
policy is to ]mow what US foreign-policyand spent.---whether-the arms and personnel a the outgoing-_ US:comptroller 'general, says
security goals are and to determine.these,-; hand are sufficient-to-their mission: Here at;
what dangers can be tention must. be given not only runs into billions of dollars. annually. Subse-
g expected in the decade _ to.the stateoPl uent editorials will dearwith theNIX- bomb-
ortwo ahead. Then, says General Taylor, the,. current weapons systems and manpower.bu q
Pentagon can work out. the missions-which ::, to Western defense strategy itself --. to orga- ers, naval strategy, and :the draft.-But the
must be performed and the weapons nization and doctrine as well-as main point we would make today is that= US
systems :.-- . equipment. = security cannot be bought by throwing doll
best suited to pog thein::!!By-fig; s One, innovative, concept heard these days
task :adequacy the standard -for =farce! comes from a group: of defense analysts who at the veryreal problem 'of Soviet. military.
writes want. to be, assayed: that'
strength it.
t /
l v
and other_analyses asthey consult with NATO
allies, and :.work - out - a, long-term . military
policy-Cballenging.-=.conventional thinking
could open up fresh ideas and approaches.- - ;;_
One other major-item concernsus:moving
forward as .quickly as possible on SALT- We
appreciate that Wlr: Reagan needs time.to-re-:-
view the whole platter of arms control issues
before'.- starting talks . with ;,Moscow, Buts
e:
-meanwhile, it'is disquieting to hear .voice
calling for scrapping of the 19'72. ABM,I treaty
and other changes. The years ahead are likely;`
to be marked by-a higher level of U&-Soviet
military- competition_, and?-tensions :which;
would make nuclear aims control even. more.
crucial if.'the superpowers are.to preserveLa
balance and contain the risks of nuclearwary
Both, sides are developing new systems;such
ascountersilo capabilities.:Both-'a.relscurry
ingto keep-up with-new: vulnerabilities.-This
spiral, driven by--military-institutions,. on :both.'
sides ; needs.to bebroken'- ~..-;
Economics alone should bring both sides to
..
-
-
d to-imagine-the
.- - l +
I
0 a - -'
meet the legitimate requirements-of national, ave a much stronger defense;---and without and Congress-are.applying
Securitywithout need to:resort to a-mindless:,big increases in spending:. These specialists} standards'of cost-effectiveness.:: efficiency,.
armsrace with thevets".~r? = :. yeirled-bY.retiredAir_Forc_colonel3eh~_Sov~:1 andlegitimate purpose astheyseek toputthe-
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-011371
NORWICH aJJLLETIIN(C I )
8 March 1981
-'dy gg
T2`is t2_ree pay. t Bul 2fiLr = ..^_es 3P. 0 e rs of CIA -
e:tirriat cL r;*rir t _ i ;~ >~ilitla reriewa t ro
decades of c^+rt s 117at r~: ~. esar!y 1& .e t ~1
has a?`y tr r. .^$,?1 ' Cz::fJ~l'2.:i 1 t: Soil t raiitarV
w iirig, tecsinic ca i:i wcs a~,d ~.eap~rs c;eploy
tnent.
Ta'~y's s'si LI-am ln:ect " 'he ~ecurit;r Blanket
` et :~ eile*[?," e :ploy ' ? r'! rye a'r the hlur_clera as
e n by a ni 5--x oz :'~r??'r{9 . who :leave arsalyyed to
rept~ duri a z xth Ra-c-iblicen and Democratic
Ad.-ninistrdt_oiLs
i A 7
The recur i Iy hi.:nke.. tha..1 Hed 1
-
By5 t.+i F.P RR '1
-Euiletiaz Staii Writer
ARASK ETON - The U.S. government has wasted
biliicr?s of dollars over Cie. past two decades on
inaccurate estimates and -" :-recasts of Soviet military
spending and caoavilitt es, ,acco.rding to present and
former t3.S. intell ;ence anti delerise officials.
Ever since the Soviets ei ouraged the U.S. in the late
19585 to overeSth: ate Soviet deployment and accuracy
of intercontinental hailistiu missiles-.(IC Ms) which led
to the famous "rraissile gap", U.S. Presidents and
Congresses have reached arms limits agreements with
the Soviets and have determined U.S. defe se invest-
ments on the basis of Inaccurate intelligence about what
the Soviets were.spending on defense and -that weapons
they were : planning. to deploy, strat*gicaily as well ?3
tactically, The,Bul tin has learned. '
The inaccurate irtelligence has been tie subject of
often heated debate wirhiri the iaYte3iige ce coruirn nity
since the mid-19&Os, with some. critics claiming trey .
were forced out of the CIA far ciues4cxiing the agency's
figures. Recently, more ominous questions have been
raised about pcssixie e:l:anations for the errors.
Was it simply the res,_dt of bureaucratic bungli:,g or
stubbornees on t't,e_ part of ihrse involved, some of tae
critics, ask.- Gr was it the result of Soviet deception
possibly - including "moles" or .Soviet agents in high
poaitions in the U_S. gover uitant?
Stever the cause, it ?is beginning to? davm cn
Capitol Kill and throughotit the new Administi tion that
the money- w fisted c -r tl:e paor estimates ma_ y be cruy
the tip of a v?ry unpleasarit iceberg.
An even rmrore signlica c cc.'it: of `wife U.S. intel igence
launched ballistic thissilas (S}
I ), S3 N s, o i - ire
community's peisi9terztiy loss e7timates ircdy be rral ed of Yankee-class subs in ire m_id 1 's;
decide
tl;e U
S
t a
ll
f d
i
`a
y
.
.
o
ars
ns o
ll
in the huzidz eds ,~i t
to spend during the 19 )s on esii e~r_eIy ear five crash --=- The deployment of multiple i4de ently },:rgeta-
to spe ms,. sivch .as .the missile, to prevent the ble reentry vehicle (MIBV) far zra";.._L-1,
Soviets fre Y-- The develoom mt of a third ~ -M ;,~.
mi~~tl'~~'f''~~~~~'CIAiIi'~aS~311~7~~~~,s?, '.'-,,~',1d,
experts say' , ?o 'u3 tall Gverie next _
I the crash catn- ip p.'
decade, says ore analyst on Capitol Hell, the iiltimate I CG~jxl i iJ~ ,y
cost or Ene rna
could be "beyon
West and the vi
default, all at a
of the Soviet s
apparent."
Complicating.
the Central Into
analysts and
consistently low
producing them,
way they_used to,
President Re
William J. Casey
deputy director,
CIA's analytical
mmation-hearings.
But ?a CIA sp
m.aior ordartizati
yet been.urder`
analyzes Soviet
grams.
T"ne Bulletin
- Current
spending (61 to
the actual Sovi
mates to be 108
rate for rubles
exafctly :chat is
single accurate c
- CIA estim
percentage of na
percent to 13
probably 18 perc
- CIA estirria
purchasing as a
machinery are t
over 50 percent t
'60s and 35 perce
The -CIA
better, and nn1
estimating Sovie
to be even further ors ui uve years than it no:~.
- The CIA was apparently caught unawares by ts~
introduction, refinement ordeployrr:ent quantity or rh
ing of at least 18 major new Sovet weapons system and
technologies. -
Also, analysis of the annual Posture State Boyce. Kampiles; Barnett, ' - .lyh,. Halperin thinks that ~s ~ ecial em-
- ;, `to name only a few?'~:~ ~ ~ r, ~ :~-rF~ :.:-._?..:... _,_ y':~ . p
-::; Mr. Hal the cam lete se ~ Phasis should be .given to scholarship.
Win. ~~ p ~~: -'and analytical ' capabilities....Indeed ? the
_. tion-of the clandestine intelligence collet- .intelligence community has long. belle-
:-. tion function from. the rest of CIA, which
'-would become solelyan-analysis agency. In.. ~ ~~~ But even the best scholars can~-
_ fact, during tbs. early days of the CIA, there 'suck facts out of their thumbs, and with-
_ -'.was, for all.. practical purples; just such' ~ :.
-_
?
put the red meat. of fresh and. reliable
'
scholars and good spies. But spies' axe- a '
' lat harrier to come by than the scholars;
especially in these days when we can't.
give them adequate security. protection.
- And if Mr. Halperin wants to strengthen
- our intelligence effort, let him step forth
and support those legislative measures;:
.which he has heretofore been sa active in
.opposing; designed to .protect intelli-:
gents sources, methods and identities. ` ?=_.
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 ,~~zcz~
~ r,w>r
Approved For Release~~/ ~t'~~~1~~~01137R000'I~'~'g0001-5
21 FEBRUARY 1981
at~or~al
An ernnomisC:: disputes. CIA" riser-
bona on Soviet military spendi:pg..-,~~,
President Reagan'; ha~;;sad's.~~t
Soviet 'military'spendizig:; )ias'. oui?
paced':U:S. defense sp~nding:.~bY~ 5300
billion:`since'-1970= "T1Zis is`ta_La-large.,
extent`s my~!>l~"said Tufts.Utiiversity
economist Franklyn. D; Holzman.: He
said they figures used.:by Reagan'are
based- on-:Centrel,.Intelligence.Agen-~,
cy figures;which`Holztnan;said.are.
exaggerated:'.It. is? ~yirtuallyf impossi-
bid=.foF_~the,CltY~to co'rrectlytcompare
,Soviet;!-rand, ..U:S.`, spending ;;figures
`because., of:.the.-difficulty, oF? compar-
ing.:FUbles and dollars; he said: Fur-
titermore, , he ~ aaid the CIA readily
admits this -~fficul-ty, although__ it_
never alludes tn._it in: its repprts~.He
said:.that tliere~is a margid of.error of-
l5_=percent `in=~;the CtA's:Yestimate's:
each year _and ~at.it could. be lzigher_
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 :CIA-RDP90-01137800010012
pES .MOIPJErS REGISTER
21 February 1981
~~~s~~~ v~~~ ~.s
;~;' 'When ~ it comae=-ta~ spending -,-~ little more than guesswork. lt?~ ~
money for planes;;' tanks and:.: ~ certainlynot reliable enough to
ships, the Reagan admiinistration-~ : be used. as ~a i~asis on which to
is determined, to keep up with the .= .formulate the expenditure of ~.
Srezhnevs;a~ a:.~ wastefu}: and -~`' ~~ billions of U.S, tax dollars.. .:
there#ote harmful business. ~ -- - Even if the ~tInited_~. dew .
Presideat?.~.a-Reagap. . on.:..~-.-to the._p~ea~-y`(or kopek) how
Wednesday night' told- -the':}'much the'.Savieis spend.an their
Congress; and the nation that the _: ~: mill '. the information .would
Defense-: Department budget.- is - ~'
the only- .budget :-in government pat be~:very helpful. The Soviets
.--.base their zrcilitary;spending; in
that will ~ro~;Reagan proposed 'large measure, ~on their;, needs,
a X7.2 billion increase in military,_t `-and: the military --needs. ~. of ..the .
spending.~iarfiscal,-;1982~':'in. ~ _'~viet--Union are: diff~nt:'frotn'--
addition to .the already Iarga; ~ ~ and far greater than -those
'increases s`recommended-.;by - of the United Staten;; Far one
former President Carter~_ ~ ;~a;q,. thing, the Soviet Union rs~aintains
-~~ Reagan: jiistifIed this-with,.the a million-man army# along the
-- '~-- ~ .::. Obviausl the Soviet Union is
billion more~iirits~militarq farces `.. Y?
than we have.',';:" ~ :~;:: ` `-,.1i, ~'~-..' :.. ~ .' one factor that any U.S:: president
~: "' -~' must be concerned about, and
`:-:.Whoeveri
Soviet strena hs, but o:r many more
occasions,- he said, the U.S:' estimates:.
have .proved 'to _be:-too conservative.
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 v
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- A;t~PIr-,~; ;:y'~-x~;5~~ THE 4JASHIP?IGTON POST
_ q;; ~~G::~~ 5 February 1981
17~Iorton ~lY ==~Yalperin =
~. _
_-:::~ Ar~l;i~~~fao;~ i~:rwivra~:cas~y;~:;thiJ
~' nevi: direc~Gvr of central- intelligence;; `stated .that hie
-.- primary, objective as heacl'bf the _CI?i'would; be to im-. i
`. provsthe c}uality of file intelligencepioduct:: , :,=:
-;. ~AThere are..two?' possible apprgaclies~-to;; that. task...l
Which-::one;' Casey; and. the;Resgan.administration~
- choose=:w~ determifie=whether the ;intelligence com-:.:
munity continuestobe mired im~eontroiiersy.: ~r =.~:'=:
' One approacliis to loak.hackwairtl and seek to undo'
the. modest.reforms relating to surveillance of rimer-
-leans and l~eedom of Information?undertbe slogan of
"unleashing the CIA".The alternative is'ta move the
debate to a different level bj-=focusing on'prtiposals di-
rectlyaimed atimprovingthe intelligence product.'`" ?'
The-former -approach will do little to:. affect the
_ qualit}r:of the intelligence'.that':thepresident needs
-and much;Ga continue the`debate that-has contributed
to the declining morale of tlie'iiitelligerice agencies.
'.. Despite,all.tha rhetoric~about'shackling the intelli-.
gence-agencies, they are'in:-`fact under very few re-
strainta: most of the limitations ielate only to the sur-
veillance bf'American citiaens~;The-most restrictive?
limitations are not .in executive orders or Iegislation.
'but in agency implementing; directives drafted by the
agencie9 and.,approved by; the, attorney. general, In
urging the new administration to ?leave these duec-
fives irz place,' Hausa InteUigeace'Comtnittee Chair- -
. man Edward Boland. (D-Hasa) 'noted`that=tha...cur-'
rent system h~.the support gf the head of everyintel- '
?ligence agency_ . : - - . ~~~;_:~ ~.. - _ ,. z . ,.~:-~ ;~..,
' -Moreover,.- air ~of.~tha=post=Watergatef?restrictions..
_takert together have: only _a vest' small'unpact; if. any, "
- -- - _ - ~~._ ~-~---_---T
on ~ the~gatheriag ~ of-~inteIIigezice'`aliout3~~
sionq of the new analysis agency:The_?most compelling~j
analysis should triumph; not..t_he:;least'common. de-+
nominatorof agreed ~timates.~=::;~~~~:=~~:~T~ ;", ~ ~+~1 1~~
>;-None of this will'ensure good-iii~lligence; Iet.aloa~"
good policy: But: it .would start they intelligence eo~~
munity- back on the road toward doing the job it.-Naa
setup to do. It would. also avoid the. acrimonious puhCl
lie debate that can only prolong the period of decline ,
J~ U?,
m equality of.the-intelligence product:: ~; ~__- _ ?'~ , ;_
T?' '' :5.;~. -.-"tip-.~ '-Y
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 :CIA-RDP?9~1~'-~O~~n1~6Q~t27k6E1i~6e';ard vVhiteFHause:'
'aide;'ia~director'-o~tfie Ceie`tey=~faT ~Ta~ionai Securi ~`
.: 1 ~ -
.s~ ..-.'..~==~A.$.':'i.{b+~,`..-~~:i+~u:~..:~:~7~~raii..:x~,r h?'.~:k~l
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 :CIA-RDP90-0113
~ ~~e~.,_ ~. F BRUI~RY ~q8x
~~ ~~xsxisysY ~. ~3~i,s~73xx~-
- `,~
s Ronald Reagan-ands
-~ his advisers sit down `~.
in the Oval office tar
map. American stra[---
egy for the 1980's, the-a famed tri guess, These guesses uivolYC
a wide range of "soft" areas like manning
levels, pay, training. maintenance infra-
structere; logistics, etc. which cannot be
aor[ftrmed frvtst imelligence sourtxs or be
oalidated isy sorb national intelligence
means as satellite phacagraphy. As a resuh;
it ~ trot pessibk to refute experts, like
Rrilliam T. Lez, who argue that rho CIA
estimates of Soviet expenditures are far
too law, verbose csitic~like Congressman
Les A~spnn---who feel that the CIA is ez-
aggerat%trg the threat and cannot back up
its calculatiatts.
The CIA has. however, published other
cnraparisons of US and Soviet defense ef-
forts which provide a much more dramatic
cffon, or the rate at which it is mod-
crnizingits forces. The expenditures shown
in Table One include procurement costs
for:
? National security programs that in the
United States would be funded by the
Department of Defense.
? The defense-related activities of the US
Coast Guard and the Soviet Border
Guards.
They exclude: such "soft" or uncertain ac-
tivities as:
? Military retirement pay, which reflects
the cast of past, rather than current ac-
tivities.
? Spate activities that in the United States
would be funded by NASA.
? Civil defense and military assistance pro-
grams.
? Soviet internal security troops (who per=
form essentially internal police functions).
The CIA Method of Estimating.
Procurement Casts
The CIA analysis of the procurement
costs for these forces is carried out as
follows. It begins with estimates of the
annual production of every weapon system
in the Soviet Union. The C1A then de-
velops estimates of Lhe cost to produce:
these items in the United States. Its dollar
concept is the cost of producing the Soviet
design in the US using base year US pro-
auction technology and practices, input
prices, and profit margins. Its ability to
reflect the Soviet design depends to a large
degree upon the intelligence communities'
knowledge of the physical and perfor-
mance characteristics of the individual
nvlitary readiness and capability. Like
inferiority, the: collapse of US military
manpower has slowly become something
A_ mericans fake for granted.
Unfortunately, there is another area
of inferiority which mast-Amerczns are
not aware of. The US has not only gradu-
ally lapsed into a current state of in-
feriority, but has also allowed the Soviet
Union to build up an overwhelming lead
in military procurement. For all intents
and purposes, the US has Lost its ability
to act as the arsenal of demoerary. d ire!
plete, it falls back on US analog results
by extrapolating from its genera] under-
standing of Soviet design practices. Some
weapons---usually lower cost items-are
costed on the basis of the nearest equity
alent US weapons.
This methodology scarcely eliminates all
uncertainty, but it is far more accurate
than attempts to estimate the dollar cast
of other areas of Soviet defense expen-
diture, and its results can be validated
over time by sources ranging from satellite
photographs of Soviet facilities and pro-
duction lines, to examination of actual So-
vier equipmem.
Total US and Soviet Proeuremettt Costs
versus Total Defense Expenditures
The overall trends for total procurement
expenditures in Table. One closely parallel
those far total defense activitits. The es-
timated dollar costs of Soviet procure-
ments show a steady upward trend in the
1970x, averaging 3 to 456 real growth per
year. However, a comparison of US and
Soviet procurement activities shows an
even larger disparity than that between
total defense activities. The CIA's . esti-
mated do}lar costs of Soviet procurements
of weapons and equipment in the 1970s
exceed US procurement outlays by about
$l2Q-billion, ar 50%. - -
To put these trends in perspective, US
procurement outlays fell by more than 405n
between 1970 and 197b, but have been
growing for the past three years. The es-
timated dollar costs of Soviet procure-
ments exceed U5 procurement outlays by
75% or mare in each of the last five years.
During this period, both the US and USSR
used most of their procurements. to replace
and modernize existing farces. The US~
has not increased its numbers of forces
picture of a U5 drift towards inferiority, weapons. When the C1A has good data, in any major areas since the Vietnam War.
artdvfhich are beAej,~at~~i~~s~tY~l~t~f~6~~T'9P'~?499P~0(~( g0`~?r"P~OT1~ed their numbers of
axing US nationa tntelligenee means. plexity" of the Soviet weapon. Most o strategic missiles and tactical aircraft sub-
Thesa comparisons are shown in the ro- the more costly Soviet weapon systems stantially through the mid~evcnties, but
.n9:.rins e~e:.ve?, nP T~hle P1n~_ and thev fall in this cateeorV. their efforts have since been primarily in
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 :CIA-RDP90-01137800010012,
,>~[7IC~ hr'~~L"="'3 LQS ANGELES TIySES ''~
9lt .i'1t0~~ ?" _ 2g ~~vUARY 2981
nyeare"'~rid`~tlie''_resulting' :shortage
;will afeeai'Califonia;~.`-acco din ~ta"
~energy:~ experf:s.,`;who'~m~l~~"i
-Sacramer-to;T0.~ape..kxith,th~; pos-.
~..?sible" fuel-shortage;.,th~'experts I'er-_;;
;oinmeuded,Wat'ylie state; s3~puld ei~
crease refirierY..haiidlfng'o~; heavy:
~?:liigh~sulfurn ~ru~e``pll:~an~"d~~elap.
;~corise~!atian" ari~~`cnntingeriry flans
'ao besC;allocate.tlie;fue.~;,ac~b~dfng,
~';to-tk4g; Cali~orria~; Energj%::Coriiiriis=
~.~u~l~cr n~he~verg?ForseastCby%`Qexa',
::pens from Harvard; 5.tanford,~MIT~~
~' the CIA aril Rand Corp.,`lilus repre- j
?~eri~es, frorli~tl.e`ai1~ ~campanies~
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100120001-5
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100120
~lS I r**,s, _`' ~''a
f3~ ? P~C~~~
BaL~r~loR>~ stir
20 JAPNARY 1g3~
.......... _ _
_ _.
.:..s_. _ .~.__. -
'.~~f,y~~_~-y ,YGLG7w71 Yr 1VL` 114141 C4L 0.1"?' VVY4L Vi 61fY 1Vl--_~~~LU{yy YUY UCacauc uuL 4cY..~?'-~. r ~ ` ~ ~~tia ~--~`-
F3lr.Charleyae incoming Reagan administration
plans _for the future;, there should be .a hard
look at khe current situation of.America's for
eign ? intelligence analysis._ _ Thinking about
needed changes in this sector is far too vital a
matter to be left solely to the deliberations of
the intelligence community as.it now works..
Enduring problems and recent events reflect
wea'~esses which need to be addressed. Ear
lier intelligence failures, ~when~ revealing
analysis was available, occurred in. Vietnam
in 1968, tbeMiddle East in;19'73, and Cyprus,
Greece; and Portugal . is 1974.. These have
been paralleled- in .rxiore. recent failures in
Iran,>~-Afghanistan;=.; Poland, .and Central ~
America..;*=- , `..:~_..... ; .:-: _
Foreign intelligence analysis sectors hati~e`I
suffered f~rvnn inherited weaknesses and more,
recent policies which have allowed frequent
turnover of personnel .who had? become ex-
perts or authorities in some areas only to be.:
transferred into new ar..as whew their exper.:
tise~means less._There have been failures to
communicate `between-.analysts and -
:.. ..
policymakers who tend to be.isolated by too
-many tiers. at bureaucracp_ And .the knowl-
edge available in communities of area study
scholars vial simply not.picked up by foreign
intelligence-,analysts and tran.~mitted to the
decisioninakers.. - = - - - - -
? ' ' In soixae eases, expertise found-in business
and scholazly groups both here and abroad
was ignored as analysts fashioned naive and
unsophisticated:' reports which would please
_-Washington bureaucrats.: To cite one illustra-
tion of hovrthe-International Communications
_.Agency can pursue fruitless projects based in
part onrpoor foreign intelligence analysis, this
`writer was approached to write an: article at
tacking ? a ='host country's tendency to move
foreign intelligence. analysis; ;.but -.there .is~
.room Lor_real~improvement. At_.least_four:
. ways couldpmvide a foundation to begin: , . ?=..
= - ~ 7n order: to. encourage. continuity. of. ex
peruse, among foreign intelligence?analysts
policy should .allow. tezrns of service longed
-than two or flares years:, An ''expert? on Iran,
let us say, as only. beginning to learn the terri-
tory;aftet`;two ,years= Someane_ ovith? five
years' experience could be more valuable and
have a sense?of what I term "historical indi:~
cators" in current affairs. Policy concerning,
foreign intelligence expertise should nourish }
such e.~rpertise as national assets by means of;
improving area studies. training before goinP
to posts, zetraining; and renewal of expertise-:
by means of reassignments to areas where ;
experience ' has -already been, carefully
marshaled- - _-- -...._ . --- ~- - -?
- ..... . 3< ~... -.
~ Foreign intelligence analysts - could-~
benefit from greater contact and liaison in
scholarly- networks ? and associations with
residents, businessmen, and others who have.
essential background- in the -areas under
study. 7zastitutions which train or retrain ana=
lysts could design courses of study which re~~.
Elect a greater. awareness of such expertise a
which too often is ignored or under-used_ - _ ?~
- v Centralize - but creatively -~- the much ~
dispersed and disparate' Foreign intelligence {
_ analysis found in dozens of agencies. To do?
this there should be established a new coordi~':
nal3ng area study institute or structure which
could address the cited problems of continu-;
ity, renewal, and coordination of foreign area;
expertise. -~_~_ . - -- -. w --= _. .
~ In order to encourage more young peo-
ple in secondary and higkzer education to con-
sider foreign intelligence analysis as an irn ..
portant ;and even noble profession, -there
needs tv be reinforcement of lagging foreign,
language; forei~ exchange, and forei~ area';
study programs_ There is a mighty need now;
to put.more rESOurces into the. magnincent
k~nlbright exchange programs. The extent to
which scores of ether, countries nqw realize
the benefits of the Fulbright programs.can be:
seen by the funds these countries now contzib-
ute - an unprecedented situation_ Incentives
furnished by both private' and government
.agencies could encourage greater student in-.
tercet in foreign area and language study,, a: l
vital need for the 1980s: ? ' - - . '?
_ Here would.be a start~for improving for=
eign intelligence analysis as a~crucial next as=.
signment in our increasingly. interdependent
_E~.
? _ :beagles ~L. `>~heeler,~ professor ~-o~ ".
modern history at the University of IveKr~;
~- 'Hampshire, was. a ,Fl~lbrigfit_exchange~=
_ studeotlnPoxtugal,'15i61~2. .' ~:_-- ~._ ,-~-
~.. -moo _ -. - .+:::.,,'-~~~ ='~
1/03 ::?C1A.r~~!9Q'G~~13~:8
-~~--w - -
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 :CIA-RDP90-01137
Aar r c r.,L..iu}I'L ~,La
o~ Pt.c._,__.~? ~__,~
CIA Director Stans#ield Turner. under him, She a~ entry's morale plummeted
f ~ is a disaster out there" "The plant
has depreciated enormously." "There
are shortages just about every place you
can think of." Comments like these from
.members of the intelligence community
suggest that no other Government agen-
cy is in such urgent need of rehabilitation
as the CI a. The agency has even fallen be-
hind in its technology: top officials say
that it-does not have enough spy sate]-
lites.Its analysis has often proved faulty,
mast notably in L-an. Once grandiose co-
vert operations are now run an a shoe-
string. Counterintelligence has been re-
duced to the point where many U_S_
experts fear it is not adequate to cape with
the CIA's principal adversary, the KGB,
which is more active than aver.
Both the Anierica.n public and Con-
gress seem increasingly in the mood to
back a substantial overhaul of the agen-
cy_ There is a widespread perception that
despite its lamentable excesses in the past,
the CIA cannot be permitted to languish,
that its mission is vital to U.S. security.
Says Barry Goldwater, the new chairman
of the Senate Intelligence Committee: "I
thiztlc the CIA is going to find a very cor-
dial reception here. It's difiYCUlt to dis-
cover any opposition to intelligence.
We've learned slot" - -- ?-
- This attitude coincides with the new
President's apparent determination to re-
swre the muscle of the cIa and make it
an important element of his Administra-
tion's global strategy. Reagan indicated
his concern with the appointment of Wil-
liam Casey, his campaign manager and
close adviser, as ClA director. Casey, a far-
mer chairman of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, once served as a top-
ranking oflacer 8,ppttrave~~sorf
vredecessor, the oss of World War IT_
TINI~
19 January 1981
~aa~s~r-s
sociated with intelligence activities, but
veterans at the agency look forward to
working far him because of his reputa-
tion as a forceful manager who is open, to
ideas and surrounds himself with top-
flight aides.
Casey's first task will be to strength-
en intelligence analysis, the agency's basic
responsibility. At present there is no lack
of qualified recruits. Applications for CIa
jabs have reached record levels; in fiscal
1980, 9,2Q0 men and .women asked far
posts, for which 1,45$ were hired. In ad-
dition to new hands, Casey is expected to
bring back some of the talented oldtim-
ers who were ousted in successive house-
cleanings during the past few years. The
current director, Admiral Stansfield Tur-
ner, downgraded the importance of
human beings in intelligence gathering on
the scene. Says a veteran infelligente af-
ficer: "His big mistake was becoming in-
toxicated with our technical proficiency.
It is a great instrument, but only an in-
strument " The agency has been partic-
ularly short of analysts in the world's cri-
sis areas: the Persian Gulf, Central
America, Africa.
Another top priority for the new di-
rector is improving caunte.rintelligence.
Reagan's CIA transition team solicitzd' ad-
vice onthe subject from the agency's long-
time counterintelligence master, James
Angleton, who was fired in 1974 by Di-
rector William Colby. It is generally
agreed that U.S, counterintellrgence ef-
forts have fallen off sharply in the six
years that followed, enabling Soviet
agents to operate more freely in the U~.
Along with personnel and equipment,
the CIA needs a boost in morale. In an
~aa0~6110a~i se?~Ji~vR~R9iQ~d}1r'~t~l
ed ctA o~cials much like swabbies on a
uatnagcu icaa~i~iu ...~ ..,._.~
genre services. "Haw the hell can you l
make an attractive offer to a guy if you I
can't guarantee you can protect him?" ;
asks John Maury, the CIA's former chief
of Soviet operations. `'The real problem '
is to get high-lei?el penetrations of for-
eign. power centers. Oleg Penkovsky (a
top-ranking Moscow defector who sup- ,
plied the U.S. tivith information on Soviet
~~~eaponry in the early 196ds) is worth a .
hundred Ph.D.s." But Penkovskys are not
going to approach a porous ctn.
Without returning is the freebaating
days of old, the C1A needs to recover its
self-confidence and sense of purpose. 'J'he ~
prospects for that look better than they
haveinsomeyears. -eyEdwinlNarner.
Reported ~,y pnn Sider/Washington 4
- -~- ~_.--:~ v_ et...,,,.....-.~ 4~n n t~ ;? 1 Time ro recede into the shadows?