THE ANDROPOV FILE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 88
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 7, 1983
• Content Type: NSPR

I
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-P 7 FEBRUARY
THE ANDROPOV FILE'
BY EDWARD JAY ErsTEIN
Wh HEN Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov was merely
ea d d of the K.G.B., his image was that of the
stereotypic hard-line "police boss." His major accom-
plishment, according to C. L. Sulzberger, writing in The
New York Times in 1974, was "a fairly successful cam-
paign to throttle the recent wave of liberal dissidence."
Nor was he viewed as much of an admirer of foreign
culture. In 1980 Harrison E. Salisbury wrote in the Times
that Andropov "has been working for three years on
schemes to minimize the mingling of foreigners and
natives.... Now Andropov's hands have been freed to
embark on all kinds of repressive measures designed to
enhance the 'purity' of Soviet society." Completing this
picture of a tough, xenophobic, wave-throttling cop,
Andropov was physically described, in another Times
story, as a "shock-haired, burly man."
Andropov's accession to power last November was
accompanied by a corresponding ennoblement of his
image. Suddenly he became, in The Wall Street journal,
"silver-haired and dapper." His stature, previously re-
ported in The Washington Post as an unimpressive "five
feet, eight inches," was abruptly elevated to "tall and
urbane." The Times noted that Andropov "stood con-
spicuously taller than most" Soviet leaders and that "his
spectacles, intense gaze and donnish demeanor gave
him the air of a scholar." U.S. News & World Report, on
the other hand, reported that "he has notoriously bad
eyesight and wears thick spectacles."
His linguistic abilities also came in for scrutiny. Har-
rison Salisbury wrote, "The first thing to know about
Mr. Andropov is that he speaks and reads English."
Another Times story took note of his "fluent English."
Newsweek reported that even though he had never meta
"senior" American official, "he spoke English and re-
laxed with American novels." Confirmation of his com-
mand of English appeared in Time, The Wall Street
Journal, The Christian Science Monitor, and The Washing-
ton Post. The Economist credited him with "a working
knowledge of German," and U.S. News & World Report
added Hungarian'to the growing list. And this quadra-
lingual prodigy was skilled in the use of language, too:
STAT
Time described him as reportedly "a witty conversa-
tionalist," and "a bibliophile" and "connoisseur of mod-
ern art" to boot. The Washington Post passed along a
rumor that he was partly Jewish. (Andropov was rapidly
becoming That Cosmopolitan Man.)
Soon there were reports that Andropov was a man of
extraordinary accomplishment, with some interests and
proclivities that are unusual in a former head of the
KG.B. According to an article in The Washington Post,
Andropov "is fond of cynical political jokes with an anti-
regime twist.... collects abstract art, likes jazz and
Gypsy music," and "has a record of stepping out of his
high party official's cocoon to contact dissidents." Also,
he swims, "plays tennis," and wears clothes that are
"sharply tailored in a West European style." Besides the
Viennese waltz and the Hungarian czarda, he "dances
the tango gracefully." (At a press conference within
hours of Andropov's accession, President Reagan, asked
about the prospects for agreement with him, used the
unfortunate metaphor, "It takes two to tango.") The Wall
Street journal added that Andropov "likes Glenn Miller
records, good scotch whisky, Oriental rugs, and Ameri-
can books." To the list of his musical favorites, Time
added "Chubby Checker, Frank Sinatra, Peggy Lee, and
Bob Eberly," and, asserting that he had once worked as a
Volga boatman, said that he enjoyed singing "hearty
renditions of Russian songs" at after-theater parties. The
Christian Science Monitor suggested that he has "tried his
hand at writing verse-in Russian, as it happens, and of
a comic variety."
The press was less successful in ferreting out more
mundane details of his life. Where, for example, was he
born? The Washington Post initially reported that he was
"a native of Karelia," a Soviet province on the Finnish
border. The New York Times gave his birthplace as the
"southern Ukraine," which is hundreds of miles to
the south. And Time said he had been born in "the
village of Nagutskoye in the northern Caucasus." His
birthplace was thus narrowed down to an area stretch-
ing from Finland to Iran. There was also some vagueness
with respect to his education. The Wall Street journal
reported that he had "graduated" from an unnamed
Edward Jay Epstein is the author of The Rise and Fall of "technical college," but U.S. News & World Report had
Diamonds: The Shattering of a Brilliant Illusion (Simon him "drop out" of Petrozavodsk University, while
and Schuster), and is currently completing a book on Newsweek awarded him a di loma from the Rybinsk
international decepApproved For Release 2006/01/30 : C44 PePR 0147tWOAQRRI 1 1 a9 vocational school
 ARTICLE A E P \ r ved For Release ; O Ok - R - 1 P - 11 iff 1000100
ON PAGE 0
1 September 1981+
Central America briefing planned
The World Affairs Council of
Maine will open its season Sept. 6
with an off-the-record briefing on
Central_America by a former CIA of-
ficer.- __ _-..
The speaker Jot n- R..Horton..re-
signed from aCIA post in.May in the
belief that ''ideolp cai prejudices
were overriding a'n elki enc'e
judgments in some k areas."
Horton will sn xntlligence
rations anpoliiyinMexicoi
Cn tral America_nd willA.nswer
question.s,
Durin his 27- ar career with the
flop v e rs to
Latin America- He was the CIA's
cliff Z station in~Ulex~~o fin.. U.nt-
i uay -.and_..later~&eryesi a deputy
-chief of the agency's Latin American
Division.
He was recalled from retirement
last year to serve on the NatiiofalTin-
e Wince Council as o 66-r for
Latin America. The co mbnefing
will -be Har?aii first public appear-
ance since his resignation.
The talk will be held at 5:30 p.m.
on Sept. 6 in the Pavillion of the At-
lantic House resort in Scarborough.
The Atlantic House is on Rpute 207
at Prouts Neck-
The tax-deductible admission fee
is $25 for Council members, $35 for
the general public. The council
stresses that Horton's remarks must
be treated as private and not for gen.
eral publication. For reservations or
information, call the WAC office at
Westbrook College, 797-7261.
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 CIA-RDP90-01137R00
RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
41 EAST 42nd STREET, NEW Y
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
STATION'
NEWS
CNN-TV AND THE
CABLE NEWS NETWORK
DATE OCTOBER 8, 1983 8 PM CITY
-'BRD?ADCA917 E; CERPT
NEWSCASTER: The C.I.A. deals in secrecy. That's its
business. Reporters, it follows. have a touch time, finding out
what's aping on inside C.I.A. headquarters. But Intelligence
expert David Wise has learned of some personnel moves not widely
publicized elsewhere. In his commentary tonight. Wise suggests
what implications those moves could have.
DAVID WISE: Covering a secret intelligence agency is a
little like covering the Kremlin. They don't talk much but
what happens inside the walls. So, reporters have to draw
conclusions from little things. like who shows up at public
appearnces. or what shifts in personnel really mean.
jr) the same spirit. it's valuable to explore some quiet
shakeups. that have occurred inside the C.I.A. Little or nothing
has been said publicly about these changes, but word has a way Of
seeping out to those who watch the walls.
In the first chance, C.I.A. Director William Casey has
tapped two former clandestine operatives to handle the agency's
dealings with Congress and the press. J. William Doswell. is
former Richmond .public relations man who headed Casey's
Congressional and press relations, has left C.I.A. Casey split
the job in two. He named Claret George, until now the second-
highest clandestine operator in the aoency, to handle Congress.
He put George Lauder, another former spook, in charge of public
r r .
a. ~ oars.
C.I.A. hands deny that the agency's desire to shore up
Congressional and public support for its covert operation in
Nicaragua was behind these moves.
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010009
OL.L L ~J r-i\L
ON : 2'_ C E
THE ATLANTIC
November 1982
CHOOSING A STRATEGY FO
WORLD WAR III
BY THO'tiL4S POWERS
N THE YEARS SINCE 1945, DISCUSSION OF STRATEGIC
nuclear policy in the upper reaches of the American
government has centered on a single overriding ques-
tion-what to do if deterrence fails." The phrase is char-
acteristic of the rigid etiquette that governs official talk
about nuclear weapons. It means war, and especially a big
general war between the United States and the Soviet
union-v.,ar of the old-fashioned, all-out sort. in which
even fear of The Bomb would take second place to the
straggle. Officials have learned to be wary of talking in
public about nuclear war. It just gets them in trouble. But
in private they talk about war all the time. None of them
wants such a war. In truth, none of them expects it-now
or ever. But deterrence could fail. What do we do then?
For the general public, nuclear war means something
like the end of the world-a single burst of destruction in
which cities would be fiiclcgd off the face of the globe in a
whirlwind of fire. That is not the way military men look at
things. They may vaguely threaten to scrape Russia fiat
down to the primeval gravel, but that's mainly fer show, to
put the other side in a serious frame of mind. 'When the
balloon goes up," as they sometimes say, the time for
threats is past. Then you have got to fight, not just kiss
the kids good-bye and push the button. The general public
may be content with the awful either/or, but the military
instinctively rebels against the idea that the end of deter-
rence is the end of everything else.
When war comes, armies fight with the weapons at
hand. Nuclear weapons are a prominent feature of the ar-
senals of both sides. How are they to be used? What should
we point them at? How many should we fire in the opening
salvo?
In the early days of the nuclear era, the bombs were so
cumbersome, so hard to deliver, and above all so few that
they were reserved for only the most dramatic targets. As
a practical matten that meant cities. In 1945, it meant
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the late 1940s, it meant Mos-
cow and, Leningrad. In the fail of 1948, for example, the
United States had about 100 bombs, but the early bombs
took two clays to assemh'_e by a team of twenty-four. We
1 ' n- h -o assemble them all at once.
t
m
times didn't even know how many bombs we had. Until
1948, the only airplanes that could deliver the bombs were
specially modified B-29s, slow craft, vulnerable to attack
en route, so limited in range that they had to be based in
Europe. Military targets tend to be small, numerous, pro-
tected, hard to find and hit. For purely technical reasons,
then, the first nuclear weapons were pointed at "strategic"
targets, that is, targets the loss of which might affect the
morale or the war-making potential of the enemy. The
wars of the late 1940s, if they had taken place, would have
lasted a few weeks, and would have consisted of devastat-
ing blows on Russian cities. ports, and industrial sites.
By the early, 1950s, these problems had been solved. The
AEC agreed to let the Strategic Air Command (SAC) keep
bombs on its airfields. We had a_fleet of new intercontinen-
tal bombers to deliver them. The bombs themselves had a
much longer "shelf life" and didn't have to be assembled
from scratch immediately before use. Above all, they were
more numerous. We had entered, in the phrase used by
professional strategists, the era of nuclear plenty"-in
which we still find ourselves. It is also the era of choice.
When you've got only three weapons, as we had in July of
1945, it's not hard to decide what to poirt them at. When
you've got thousands. as we have now, and when you can
hit any thing in a known location on the surface of the
earth, as we can now, and, above all. when the Soviets can
retaliate in kind, then you have to think hard before decid-
ing what to hit and when to hit it. The decisions imply the
course of the war we are likely to see "if deterrence fails."
When Jimmy Carter entered the White House, in Janu-
ary of 1977, he probably would have clone away with nucle-
ar weapons altogether given the choice. This may sound
like the inevitable preference of any sane man. but none of
Carter's predecessors had shared it. Nuclear weapons
solve certain kinds of problems; in particular, they are
cheaper than men and tanks. Carter's predecessors had all
chosen nuclear weapons rather than press Congress or
NATO allies to come up with money for men, and tanks
enough to face the Russians on what is called the -central
front" in Europe. Eiserhower's first secretary of defense.
Charles 'ilson, once said, We can't afford to fight limited
. C.. ,.
ea
CC n ..,a? e
w' e 'fight a big wars and if there is
SisuEch nergy bombs C as ommi- ion A hi was ret rn ClAon 3e ~ t~ arter w?as a tranger
th n i'? rer to the :_i: Force in adv2.nce. The general some- to `rattling on in 1977: he had not been over and over this
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A_t. -EARED
NOTRE DAME NEWS
=
G=$=~ ~_~. February 1982
In the CIA, says Ralph MoGe
you have to do is tell the truth.
Ralph McGehee '50 joined the Central
Intelligence Agency in 1952, shortly after
he was-cut from the Green Bay Packers.
He's not sure why the CIA approached
him, but 'during his intelligence training he
met so many other pro football dropouts
that he suspects the agency considered
the-National Football League. a prime
recruiting ground.
When the Korean War ended in 1953
McGehee joined the agency's clandestine
operations section as a case officer. Over
the next two decades he served in the
Philippines, Taiwan, Japan, Thailand and
Vietnam. He did the routine work of an
intelligence officer: recruiting agents,
conducting investigations, and maintain-
ing liaison with the local police and
intelligence organizations.
During that era the CIA's main
struggle was against Communist
insurgency in Southeast Asia. That
struggle was a losing one. Of all the information often is politicized- In -
countries in the region, today only theory, the agency provides accurate and'
Thailand remains allied to, the West, unbiased information to the President so l
McGehee thinks he knows why our side he can make wise decisions regarding
lost the rest. . national security- In practice, when a -
In 1965 McGehee directed an intelli- President is firmly committed to a
gence gathering effort in a province in particular policy (such as military
northeast Thailand where a Communist victory in Vietnam), the agency shapes
insurgency was beginning. After a its information to conform to that policy J
detailed, yearlong study, McGehee re- Bad or even inconvenient news is
ported that he had found a popular unwelcome. That is an abiding theme in
movement so broad, pervasive and deeply the history of intelligence, and it is the
rooted that purely military measures were rock on which Ralph McGehee
unlikely to defeat it. foundered.
McGehee submitted his findings to the After he submitted his dissenting
agency but, -after a brief period of praise report, McGehee's career took a nose-
for this work, he ran into an official wall dive. He was shuttled from one low-Icy
in Washington, job to another. He was promised
His findings, he explains, ran counter promotions but never received them-
to the official Washington view that He was frustrated as he watched his
Communist insurgency was a form of country wage the wrong kind of war ink
pants who were duped or forced into
joining guerilla units who took their arms
and orders from outside.
McGehee maintains that intelligence
clandestine invasion, and that the Southeast Asia, one he knew was
natives involved were unwilling partici- doomed to failure. He did what he cowl
Hppruveu rur release cuuoiu iiou -. '..iM-rCur,vu-u i i a i rwuu i uuuauuu i -tv-
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F T1CIE APFEfsR~TJ
ON PAGE S
s:. I
Taylor 'Branch
THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY
April 1982
n August 1955, John Prados tells us,* the CIA's
Richard Bissell went to the White House to show
President Eisenhower some pictures that had
been taken from an airplane more than ten miles
above the earth. Greens, fairways,and sand traps
were clearly bible in the aerial shots of the Augusta
National Country Club in Augusta, Georgia, which was
not only the home of the Masters but also Ike'sfavorite
golf course. The photos clearly impressed the president,
who recognized the topography of certain memorable
holes. Then Bissell played his trump card. He pointed
out that the pictures actually revealed the presence of
golf balls on some of the greens, as well as the flags in
the cups. This truly impressed Eisenhower, who must
have reflected that sometimes he had trouble seeing the
cup when standing over a ten-foot putt. Bissell, on the
strength of the demonstration, asked for permission to
develop a U-2 spy plane that could produce such pic-
tures from even higher altitudes, and Eisenhower, who
was normally skeptical of new rrtilitarygidgets,heartily
approved. Thus, through crafty persuasion and awe-
some technology, the CIA won its battle against the air
force for control of a new spy system.
With technology that has long since made Bissell's
U-2 obsolete, the secret services now stand on perma-
nent watch against nuclear attack. Simultaneously, they
grapple clandestinely with their adversaries in localized
conflicts that policy-makers want to keep quiet, fearing
Armageddon. These two functions have brought spy
organizations to the forefront of modern politics since
,World War 11, as intelligence activities have expanded
on both the highest and lowest of roads. The same
Richard Bissell who showed Eisenhower thegolfcourse
photographs planned the Bay of Pigs invasion.
The Soviet Estimate is a readable and even-tempered
chronicle of the higher road-the effort of the CIA and
military intelligence services to keep track of the Soviet
nuclear arsenal. Prad os has assembled the first compre-
hensive record of American performance in this field,
matching predictions of Russian strength against what
ends up actually happening in the arms race. Working
from National Intelligence Estimates that, ironically,
are the most sensitive and yet the most publicly debated
spy products we have, he labors to separate the contri-
butions of hard fact from those of prejudice, and he
makes convincing judgments about the bureaucratic
wars within the intelligence community.
The human element of intelligence mistakes was
more easily exposed during the early years, when the-
spy network was relatively unsophisticated. Shortly be-
fore a 1955 Soviet-American summit meeting, the Rus-
sians invited Colonel Charles E. Taylor, theairforceat
tache in Moscow, to watch an aerial parade at Tushino
Field. Sitting in the reviewing stand, Colonel Taylor
Taylor Branch is a contributing editor of The
Washington Monthly.
was astounded to watch 23 Bison bombers fly over in z
succession of formations. As Prados notes, this was
twice the number of Bisons attributed to the Russians
only a few months before and four times the number of
B-52s then in existence. Taylor's alarming report quick-
ly became the basis for another drastic upward revision
of the National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet strategic
bombers.
What Colonel Taylor had no way of knowing at the
time was that the Russians were so insecure about the
American lead in nuclear weaponry that they had cir-
cled their few Bisons repeatedly over the airfield as a
blustering show of strength. The Russians fooled the
Americans---especially the air force, which was eager to
be fooled so that it could build more B-52s--and there-
by helped create the "bomber gap," which was the first
major hoax in postwar strategic intelligence.
Several years later, about the time the CIA and the
army and navy managed to push the air force back
toward reality on Soviet bombers, the Russians
launched their Sputnik. They also tested some ICBMs
before they were expected to, causing a wave of appre-
hension in the United States. The 1958 National Irtelli-
gence Estimate predicted that the Russians would solve
all their test problems almost instantaneously, and that
Moscow would produce and deploy up to 1,000 ICBMs
by 1961. By contrast, the United States had only ten
ICBMs in 1960. This was the "missile gap" There was a
great public scare, and the shape of the weaponry in-
volved encouraged journalists to imply that national
manhood was at stake, along with survival. The Alhop
brothers reported that the Eisenhower administration
was about to "flaccidly permit the Kremlin to gain an
almost unchallenged superiority."
As is well known, John Kennedy was elected on his
virile pledge to change that with a greatly accelerated
ICBM program, but by the time he took office the mis-
sile gap was revealed to be a larger hoax than the
bomber gap. The CIA, joined by navy and army intel-
ligence, now realized that the Russians had produced
no ICBMs at all. The air force, after a Strangelovian
campaign of resistance during which Strategic Air
Command generals went so far as to claim that Cri-
mean War memorials were actually Soviet ICBMs in
disguise, finally conceded. -
The result of all this confusion was the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency, Secretary of Defense Robert Mc\ama-
ra's well-intentioned but ultimately counter-productive
effort to end public disputes between the military intelli-
gence services. To McNamara, such squabbling was
inefficient as well as politically embarrassing. Hewanted
a unified, accurate military position on intelligence mat-
ters. In the DIA, however, he got an agency that tended
to produce brokered intelligence compromises that were
*7he Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Anal vsisand
Rrssian Military Strength. John Prados. Dial, 517.95.
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REPORTS; INC.
RADIO lv
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20015 656-4068.
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
PROGRAM CBS Reports STATION W D V M TV
CBS Network
DATE January 23, 1982 9:30 PM CITY Washington, DC
SUBJECT The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception
MIKE WALLACE: The only war America has ever lost, the
war in Vietnam, reached a dramatic turning point 14 years ago this
month. The morning of January 30th, 1968, across the length and
breadth of South Vietnam, the enemy we thought was losing the war
suddenly launched a massive surprise attack. It was called the
Tet offensive. And the size of the assault, the cacualties, the
devastation caught the American public totally by surprise. But
more than that, it caught the mighty American Army, half a million
strong, unprepared for the enemy's bold strikes in all of South
Vietnam's cities.
As the fighting continued, it became clear that the
ragged enemy forces we thought were'being ground down had greater
numbers and greater military strength than we had been.led to
believe. Before they were finally pushed back, those Viet Cong
forces had left behind a nagging question in the minds of millions
of Americans: How was it possible for them to surface so brazenly
and so successfully at a time when Americans at home were being
told the enemy was running out of men?
The fact is that we Americans were misinformed about
the nature and the size of the enemy we were facing. And tonight
we're going to present evidence of what we have come to believe
was a conscious effort, Indeed a conspiracy, at the highest levels
of American military intelligence to suppress and alter critical
intelligence on the enemy in the year leading up to the Tet offen-
sive.
A former CIA analyst, Sam Adams, introduced us to this
evidence and he became our consultant. What you're about to see
are the results of our efforts over the last 12 months to confirm
h i s f i nd gVed li ftwew 06/flP0C:BMA? DPP Q1i137 A0'i)0?0dd1e9 a n d I
f1:lr_FC IN. WASHINGTON D.C. ? NEW YORK ? LOS ANGELES ? CHICAGO ? DETROIT ? AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES
 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-0113
ARTICLE APPEA EE'D
ON PAGE `
THE PUBLIC HISTORIAN
Winter 1981
The Hitorian as Fore
Policy.Analyst: T
Challenge of the C1
PxioP ssioNAL i-nsTOBxAI s and the institutions of Ameri
policy have been engaged in increasingly fruitful relal
years since World War II. rust as individuals like Geo: _
and Herbert Feis have. linked the- worlds of diplomacy and his-
torical research, so the profession has established. "institutional
beachheads"' in the historical offices of the Department of State,
the military services, and in smaller numbers, the Departments of
Defense and .Energy. In these offices historians working as his-
torians have applied rigorous scholarly standards in editing pri-
mary sources, most notably the Foreign Relations of the United
? This paper is a revised version of a talk presented at the annual meeting of the
Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association, University of Southern
California, August 1950.
This material has been reviewed by the Central Intelligence Agency to assist
the author in eliminating classified information. However, that review constitutes
neither CIA authentication of material presented as factual nor a CIA endorsement
of the author's views or those ascribed by the author to others (including current
or former officials of any nation).
1. The concept is taken from Otis L. Graham, Jr., "Historians and the World of
(OH-Campus) Power," The Public Historian, Volume I, Number 2 (Winter 1979),
34.
01981 by the Regents of the University of California
0272-3433/81/010015?11$00.50
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/30: CIA-RDP90-01137R0
Jcseah Q. Harsch
IVY :,).?II Cpl t
10 'love:nner 1981
Colonel Qaddafi
is difficult.=
The latest disclosures about Americans working for Col.
Muammar Qaddafi of Libya seem to clear .up' one point.
Libya was able to invade its southern neighbor, Chad;-last
November not because - Libyans were --aided in this
undesirable (from the-United States' point of view) operation
by the Soviet Union but because-some 20 American pilots, .
mostly recruited in or around Miami, were willing to take the
colonel's money. "~ t J
The money, incidentally came from selling. Libyan. oil to:
American oil companies- Libya is the third-largest- exporter,
of oil to the US.
There is now a vigorous feud between the US and Libya.
On May 7 the US closed down the Libyan Embassy 1w
Washington. -
The feud reached its peak on Aug. 19 when planes from&.
US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean shot down two Libyan.;
jet fighters in airspace claimed.by Libya but considered to be
international in Washington. = ' -
The feud has been kept going since-then by the dispatch of
US reconnaissance planes to the Sudan after the assassina-
tion of Egyptian President Sadat: There was suspicion in.
Washington that Colonel Qaddafi might take advantage of?
political uncertainty in ? Egypt to invade the Sudan. Also,
there has continued to be a lively propaganda duel between
Washington and Tripoli.:'. - - -
The feud began before-Ronald Reagan'-and, the Republi
cans took over the White House in January. Previous to that
Washington had withdrawn-its diplomatic community from,.,
Libya. There was supposed to be some danger that the. colp
nel might be tempted to do to them what the-Iranians had
done to Americans in Tehran
' . ?- .
The Carter administration had atone-time tried, to get-:?
along with Colonel Qaddafr_:_Bruther Billy's. notorious deal
ings with the Libyans ; were= not originally-opposed at the
White House. Ia fact Qaddafghelp-was.urrited?'over the-.
Iranian - hostage affair:.:_There`was almost a~_ eourts'rip: of
.y__
Libya into 1979..
But then- things began to go sours Libyans~vere;.suspected
of having, tried to carry out:-a political exe ion :inside the
US. Libya was believed to be a main -source "ofrweepons for-.:-
PLO- forces in Lebanon,. The PLO is unpopular iogWashing-
ton. The Libyans are also believed- to be a main source of
weapons to the IRA- (Irish Fepublican-Army in_Northern.
Ireland, but Washington has never tried seriously to stop the
flow of funds from the US to Libya for the purchase of those
guns.
So there was bad blood between Washington and Tripoli
before Mr. Reagan took over.. But Mr. Reagan picked up the
theme eagerly. One of the first orders issued from the White
House by Ali,. Reagan-was-forprepar-atiou of a plan "to make
life uncomfortable" forCblonel Qaddafi. ?It fitted in with his'
campaign theme' of 'Masobvi* being the prime source=of world'
terrorism
Also in the first days of the Reagan administration the'I
White House asked for documentation of that charge of Mos-?
cow being the prime source of world terrorism. Previous CIA :
reports had failed to produce solid evidence to support the"
assumption. The new CIA chief, William J. Casey, ordered',
his staff to try again- It is the first publicly- exposed case of -'
the CIA being instructed to support a White House thesis. ?
In theory-the CIA produces expert, objective information;
It is not supposed to start from a conclusion and then hunt
around for possible evidence to back it up. That job belongs to
the propaganda department of any government. ' .
The CIA has still to come up with any hard evidence that
Moscow did train Libyan terrorist agents, provided Libya.
with terrorist weapons, planned joint terrorist' operations
,with Libya, or used Libya. directly, for its own purposes.
These things may have happened.There'is as yet no pub-
lisped hard evidence that they did. -, -.
But we do have hard evidence that two American ex-CIA.
agents. Edwin Wilson ana Frank Terpil, have long been run
ning-a:major service operation for Colonel-Qaddafi. Their-
work has included shipping (illegally)- US terrorist-type;-.
weapons to Libya, recruiting former Green Berets for train
ing terrorists in -Libya, setting up a little factory inside the. ?
-palace in Tripoli to manufacture terrorist weapons, and re--,
cruiting American pilots to supply Libyan troops in Chad.
On the public record it now stands that the: US.. not the,,
USSR, is the prime provider to Libya- of terrorist-weapons
and techniques-
This is just one place where the real world fails to-fit the,.
world of Mr_-Reagan's campaign rhetoric. It is one reason -
why his foreign policy is coming in now for widespread criti-?
cism. Too much of it is founded, on ideological assumption
rather than on known-fact.:. r_, ;
1/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001-9
 ARTICLE APPE,9roved For. Release 2006/01/30: CIA-RDP90-01137R0001000
014 PACE NEVI YORK TD-C'5
~
18 October 1981
,SOVIETMTERROR TIES
CALLED OUTDATED
Haig:Based Accusation on:.
J. S.. In'te'lligence Officials Say
,Can Administration charges that the
-Soviet Union was directly helping ter-
rorists were essentially based on infor-
mation provided a decade: ago by a
~tCzechoslavak? defector, - according to
. senior intelli gene officials:
"What we are hearing is this l0 year-
told testimony. coining back to us through
'WestEuropean intelligence and some of
our own C-IA people." one official said.
.
"There is no substantial new evidence."
'z- The defector, Maj.' Gen. Jan Sejna,
= was said to have been closely associated
WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 --Early Rea-.,
Decade-Old Information
EyLESLIEH.GELB
General Under C.I.A. Protection
>?General Sejna, who remains, under
C.I.A. protection, could not be immedi-
ately reached for comment. In response
to an inquiry, a C.LA. press officer said
any questions to him would have to be
relayed by letter..
After Secretary Haig's initial re-
marks, the C.I.A. prepared a study that
the Director of Central Intelligence, Wil-
liam J. Casey, rejected as inadequate.
He ordered other studies that, officials
said, also did not satisfy his conviction
;In the early 1960's, the kremlin estab-
lished training and support centers in
the Soviet Union and in other countries
.,for Libyans, Iraqis, North Koreans, An-,
- golans, members of the Palestine Liber-
The purpose was to help these groups
with guerrilla techniques and weapons
tion.,,
But later some of these centers were
Baader-Meinbof gang;. the Red Bri-
gades and the Japanese Red Army.-:,
??. The Soviet Union. -almost certainly
'block them. But there is also little evi-
dence to show that the Soviet Union was
in any way directing terrorist actions.
Some intelligence experts say "it
should not be necessary. to draw pia
tures," as one put it, to establish Soviet
responsibility and Soviet benefit from
the activities. Others say that the Soviet
Union .created the centers for one pur-
pose -- support of national liberation
movements - - and, that the centers
turned into Frankenstein monsters, that
Sejna Reported Direct Link
General Sejna was said to have told
Western intelligence agencies at the
-time that the Russians had trained ter- .
rorist groups like the Baader-Meinhof
gang of West Germany and the Red. Bri-
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I r -r? ? r r'- ?? ' t:- r? L L r :. r? _L --. ~ 14 :' }' 8 2 :^ r ? Y R WWII REPORT
i i f t .iLsive crash
mgrams such as the MX missile to prevent- the
The
Soviets frrmArt of "I6b f aRV- CIAi &Eg,
experts say.
It the crash catca-trip programs tall o~verie next
decade, says one analyst on Capital Hill, the ultimate
cost or one mass
could be "beyond
West and the vic
default, all at a ti
of the Soviet sy:
apparent."
Complicating. e:
the Central Intel.
analysts and mil
consistently low S.
producing them,
way they_used to,.'
President Rea
William J. Casey,
deputy director, e:
CIA's analytical p4
ma tiorr hearin
yet been undertal
analyzes Soviet r
grams. - -
The Bulletin he
---- Current Cl
spending (61 to 6f
the actual Soviet
mates to be 108 1
rate for rubles in
exactly what is b
single accurate co
-- CIA estima
percentage of nati
percent to 13 Pi
probably 18 percen
- CIA estirhat
purchasing as a p
machinery are too
over 50 percent th'
'EOs and 35 percent
.- The -CIA es
better, and unless.
estimating Soviet n
to be even further o,i in rive years than it.:s now.
-- The CIA was apparently caught unawares b}i the
introduction, refinement ordep]oymert quantity or tb:
ing of at least 18 major new Soviet we?nrars system and
technologies. ' - -
- Also, analysis of the annual Posture S`ateirents :j
the various Secretaries of Defense agat-2-.,
developments shows the CIA was caught by m :re --a.
or extensive development or dloymw?t than it.zird'
expected of numerous system and ch - -
ing;
- A large deployment of Soviet rnedi
the late 1 ^50spnd early 1ses;
A large deployment ? of m'?~,?. ,#,~ti
range ballistic missiles (? I/ rBBMs) in the e od;.
-- The deployment of a second genemt on. pc- sub-
launched ballistic missiles (S1MLI,, f 3'N S% on- tip
of Yankee-class subs in the raid-1s"613s;-'
The deployment of zn'ultiple i de ndentl f',~rgeta-
ble reentry vehicle (-NMV) w-ae4 il52,LU_ bt?;
e~ ~t-
4+ [:Iiru
9P
 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100
Ae I CL ~1P1 11s:.S
0z PAG.
THE WASHINGTON POST
12 February 1981
Back in' 1976, when George Bush was head of the
Central Intelligence Agency and in charge of preparing
the .annual-National Intelligence Estimate, he stirred
_up a big brouhaha by going outside the government
for a "second opinion" on the'critical -question of the
To:the'distinct discomfort of the-professionals on the
inside, -Bush_called?-in Harvard. Prof. Richard Pipes, -a
Russian;history scholar, and.close-student of Soviet of
"Team-B''witlia mission-to second-guess the findings;.
of the o0"i?al government estimators (" Team A"). - ;r
Thenet effect=was to introduce into the final. re
port-a.. mnch:dimmer vievV:ofythe Soviet=Union's
global atrategy,:of its military-capabilities; of its de-1-
..signs for-world: hegemony and-.of-its willingness tar
Today George Bush site in, the vice president's of,-,
fice in the White House. And right-:across the street
.
in the Executive Office Building;' in :an office-with. a
'
"
splendid
view-' of ,Washington'; landmarks,. sits : the '
same Prof. Pipes. He is-now on- the inside-Asa' menraC'
her of the:National- Security Coanciistaff-a' mem
ber, Yo b*,h
t: say, o?-' Team-A,with:: a view ofci
Soviet, intentions that, if anything, l ay grown grim 1<
Along:with the:restofthe Reagan NSCstaff Pi
es
p
;
under'tigh .wraps na public ; pronouncements,
other-than ocral telephone calls, But-it is not hard toc
get- a grasp of his current thinking from assorted re-
cently published wort , with a.little unattributable in:;
struction from the professor himself ;
worth taking; iffor no 'other reasori:than what it tells;
'you, about the Reagan -team's taste-. in Sovietologists.
Just howdirect a hand he wrll'have'iri policymaking is'
-hard-.to`;SRY? ZeMtary-of State=Alexander. Haig is
a11-acrd-end-allof foreign policy
"formation
" He will-
.
.
have Walter Staessel, a former ambassador to Mosco'
top man for policy planning
Paul' Wolfowita
,
(anotherformermember, incidentally,"of,"Team B").
Still, Pipes will be the reigning White House,
Soviet scholar, working for National Security Ad.-
,viser Richard Allen, who will be reporting. to the
president--. through White., House= Counselor Ed;
Meese. One way or another, then, the thinking ofd
Richard-Pipes is pretty much assured. a hearing.:
What you find in his writings are the scholarly under-,
?pinnings for much of what both Reagan'and Haig have
been'-saying--about the Soviet-hand in world terrorismi
-and/or; Moscow's-master plan for world domination.,:: ^<
`1'he-roots-'of Soviet terrorism, indeed of.niodern;
tercor+m,"..:I?ipes .wrote recently, date back to 1$79,;
when an _oiganization called`"'I'he People's Will" was
createdf ifi. a- small Russian town, Lipetsk This small-
band of political assassins, which, among other things,-
murdered Czar Alexander g Pipes argues; is the true
"source of all modern terrorist groups;: whether-they be~
named, the Tupamaroe,, the Baader-Meinhof - group;r
the Weathermen, Red Brigade or PLO."
Today, Pipes maintains that the Soviet Unionl
"encourages and employs terrorism because terror-
ism is a handy and relatively cheap'weapon in their
arsenal.to..destroy Western societies.. - . We must
expose itssupport-of terrorism as widely as possible.
JIt=must be made absolutely clear that these ac-
tivities cvill no longer be tolerated.
On the -broader question of Soviet designs, Pipes.
reaches far back into pre-Communist Russian history
for his theory that niilitaryhas always been the domi,
nant element in-Russian society
"Militancy-that: is, a commitment to violence and'
coercion and its principal.instrumentality, milita-
rism,,,.he wrote recently,. seemto'me as central to
Soviet communism as the pursuit of profit to societies,
with market-oriented economies,','.:.; . = v : :'.
In entart' magazine last year he argued in grit
article `called 'Soviet Global.. trategy' that `iblarxis
Leninisn2asby its very natiire?/a militant doctrine." l ,
is. also,, he-went on, "an' international doctrine.-` .?
-The phases in?the.evolution-of mankind-are global
scope-and cannot be contained (excepktransitionally)
within the lin its:of the nation-state."
He sees Russia as historically,expa rsio, perpet
wally seeking to acquire new territory, which` requires'
new- buffers;- which 4n`fiirn- must be 'assimilated, re- .
`quiring yet more. buffers;=inan endless process. Th'
Soviets; he insists;-will not, hesitate -.ta use nuclear
weapons,, not.as deterrent, ,- or a. threat-but actually-
-use the'mras,a.part-of global:strategy:-The: ultimate
aim indeed a necessity. for: the'succesaof Marxist^~
Leninism-is the destruction of'capitalism
: Ronald Reagan, it `mind : be argued, needs little err
couragement in these beliefs. But anytime he's looking
for intellectual and historical reinforcement, he will find
it right across the street, in the office of Prof Pipes; ,-'?
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/30: CIA=RDP90-09137
== 117'pf.3_ b
By H son E. Salisbury
s Ronald Reagan and.-
his advisers sit downs
in the Oval Office t
map. American strat
egy for the 1980's, the..'{
Russian actuality that
confronts them may be-,-
less formidable than.
what - some of them
may have perceived..
But this is not neces-
sarily a cause for re-
joicing. Greater dangers may arise - ,
from debilitating Soviet weaknesses
than from supposed Soviet ..military.
might
Probably not since-World.-War
when the Soviet Union struggled to__
evict its German invaders, has the long
view from the Kremlin windows been=-4
so bleats. The solutions to crushing.Y
problems at home and abroad seem be-.__
yond the grasp of Soviet planners.
The real world that Leonid I_ Brezh- _
nev and his elderly Politburo comrades
acknowledge in the privacy of their
meeting rooms contains few of the su-
that dominate Pravda's=.
perlatives
-political verbiage. ? - -
It is, in fact. becoming increasingly
evident that the principal danger to.:
world peace is not posed by the nefari-
ous schemes of Communist plotters set-
on fomenting revolutions and over-
whelming the West with militarymight, but by the Soviet Union's reac-
tion to failures and frustrations that
stem from incurable flaws within its
own creaky system. ~.-
This assessment is, obviously, by--
pothesis_ No one, perhaps not even any -
of the solemn old men who sit around
the long table in the Kremlin palace,
has all the facts. And certainly not this
writer. But it is not -diffi5--
h
NEW YORK TIMES :MAGAZINE e.~
1 FEBRUARY 1981
portantly, a profound crisis in the
chronically unsettled Soviet barrier
zone-this time in Poland, an area that
poses unusual historic hazards for Rus-
sia. And there is the 4,600-mile frontier
with China, guarded by one million
Soviet troops, about one quarter of the
Red Army, and backed by countless nu-
clear weapons targeted against China's
principal cities. For 10 years, this enor-
mous Soviet force has been positioned
against a perceived threat of war with
China- There is nothing at present I'I
to suggest that this apprehension of im-
danger will disappear in the t.
pending
next decade.
The view westward is no more reas-
suring. Now that detente has gone down
the drain, the United States and its
European allies (plus Japan) loom
threateningly on the Soviet horizon as
an entity more suspicious of Moscow
today than at any time since the height
of the cold war. In Soviet eyes, the I4
United States and its allies are per-
ceived as a capitalist monolith of ramp-
ant military and economic strength, a
colossus that grows more and more for-
midable in violation of every precept of
Marx and Lenin. -
When Mr. Brezhnev casts his atten-
tion inward, on his own country. he con-
fronts evidence even more disturbing.
Until 10 years ago, the Soviet gross na-
tional product rose at a buoyant rate of
8 percent to 10 percent annually. Since
1970, the rate of growth has dwindled.
The G.N.P. for 1980, United States ex-
perts estimate, increased by barely 1
percent- Not since Stalin launched his 1
first five-year plan more than 50 years
ago has so sluggish a peacetime growth
been recorded- Soviet agriculture, in
particular, is a catastrophe: Annual
shortfalls of millions of tons of grain
have, time and again, put the Soviet
Union in the humiliating position of
being dependent on hostile powers, in-
cluding the United States, for help in
struct a semblance of the tour d
anzon _ feeding its 260 million citizens. -
on which Mr. Brezhnev must be basing = The history of recent years, a history
his calculations- The closer President - of decelerating Soviet production rela-
Reagan and his advisers can replicate rive to American growth, contains no
the view from the Kremlin windows,. evidence that Moscow can quickly re-
the more effectively will the new ad- 1 verse its economic stagnation. The lat-
ministration be able to construct an
American policy to deal with any Soviet
threat.
There can be no question that the re-'-
ports Mr. Brezhnev receives from his
aides depict an inte CQ' rl aW I
replete with hostile, intractable and
dangerous elements. There is, of
est C.I_A_ statistics indicate that the
United States, despite its own economic
woes, now outproduces the sclerotic
Soviet Union by 40 percent. Put another
ass me eexxpe contteenu or-speidm
for every $6 allotted by Moscow in the
accelerating arms race without crip-
ment of Soviet military capability, con- i
cluded that the Soviet Union was engag-
ing in a massive arms buildup - al,
though many Western analysts now b--.1
have this was neveractually achieved:
Earlier, an in-house team concluded,-
that the C_L_A_ had been underestimat-?
ing what the Soviet Union was spending l
on defense. Its calculations indicated
that the Soviet Union's defense spend-j
ing was actually in a range of 11 per-
cent to 13 percent of its G.N.P., not the 6.
percent to 8 percent previously estimat-
ed. The 1976 C_T_A_ figures, which Team
B used in reaching its conclusion abcut
the Soviet defense buildup, were based
on a reassessment of the ruble's real
purchasing power in the Soviet Union.
These currency adjustments, however,
do not affect the amount of military
hardware. produced by the Soviet
Union,
That same year, other military ex-
perts estimated'that by 1980 the Soviet
Union's defense spending would rise to
an annual rate of 18 percent of its-'
G.N.P. By way of contrast, the United
States has recently been spending
about 6 percent of its G_N_P_ on de--I
fense.' President Carter's-1982 budget
projected a defense increase of 5.3 per-1
cent (about 5.6 percent of the nation's
G_N_P_) for the next fiscal year.
Current. C_IA-estimatesof Soviet de--
fense spending .calculate the increase
annually during the late 1960's and 70's
at about 3 percent to 4 percent, roughly
equal to the growth of the Soviet G.N.P.
in recent years. What now interests
Western defense experts is the future
relationship between Moscow's arms
spending and its sluggish G:N.P.
Is the bad news for Leonid Brezhnev
good news for the new President of
United States?, It sounds like good .I
news. It sounds very optimistic. But
there is a paradox here. Weakness,
particularly internal weakness, in a
world power can sometimes be more
~Qg O9QQDtls ength. A secure na-
-ion negotiates with confidence. A na-
 l
THE BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE
25 January 1981
Roman adviser. Pipes insists he's the 'latter
By Nina McCan
Globe Staff
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_Ichard ..Pipes arrived
In America on-his 17th
birthday. July 11.194Q
He and his father and
mother had fled from
the Nazi Invasion of Poland.
One of his most vivid minnorles
of his new country wpm seeing an.
advertisement with a quotation
from B "min Franklin.
"It &" something like, 'Unfore-
seenevents need not change the
course of men's lives..' I laughed..I
had witnessed the outbreak of war
In Poland, seen my house de-
stroyed. been forced to leave home
and nrtgratr thousands of miles."
The chasm between American
optimism and the Eastern Europe-
an expe'ience-of the ravages of war
has shaped Richard Pipes' view of
.the world arse. for the next few
. years. Pipes will have a hand in
shaping America's foreign policy.
The Harvard txofessor -will be the-
Mat t viet Union or
the n lnistration -
tlonal Security Council.
Hey-is one of the leading figures
In a, group of intellectuals who are
lumped together under the label
"neoooaaervative. '-many of whose-
memo-write for the combative
Commentary magazine- Pipes
shares with them a conviction that
America has grown soft and sleepy
about national defense and a deter-
mination to lead a reawakening.
. Pipes says he and and like-
winded members of the Committee
on the Present Danger are "the
-same kind of people who. in 1936 or
119V. would have backed Churchill
fn_Etg1ard. [People who said] Gee-
?t{iany is arming. preparing for war,
and we are doing nothing."
Substitute the words "Soviet
-Union" for "Germany" and you
have a rough notion. of Pipes'' ap'
proach to US-Soviet relations.
Pipes is the latest In a series of
Soviet experts to serve In the high-
eat councils In Washington. Like
those who have preceded him, from
Charles E. (Chip) Bohlen and
Qeorge Kennon to Henry Kissinger.
Zbigniew Brzezinsla and Marshall
Shulman. Pipes brings his own in-
terpretation of US Soviet relations
to the Job. . .
- Although he shares a common
Eastern European background
with Kissinger and Brzezineki.
forced me to choose between Rua-
sian history and my other int-n-
ests.'
Pipes makes his home with his
wife Irene In a handsome old house
on.a quiet side street in Cambridge.
(Two grown sons live In other parts
of the country.) Japanese prints,
paintings and pieces of sculpture
fill the rooms, evidence of his con-
tinuing interest in art. But .other
Interests -- In phottr, raphy, cross
country skiing. and swimming --
have fallen by the wayside in re-
cent years 'as pipes has devoted
more and . more of his time to the-
debate over US foreign pol.'cy:. '
He first caught the eye of Wash-
Ington insiders in 1970 when he
delivered a paper on US-Soviet rela-
tions to the Ameilean Historical
Association. An aide to Sen. Henry
Jackson (D-Wash.) liked the paper
andPipes became a consultant to
Jackson's Permanent Committee
on Investigations.
But It was not until 1978 that he
gain n.ati ?na attention r~henj ei
headed the "B-tea " %k - group of
hon-governmental experts brought
in by President Ford's Foreign In-
telligence AdvIsory Board to assess
~a estimates, of Soviet strength.
The experts looked at the same
da
Central Intelligepce A cv (Ct,
and came to startlinety different
cnnc]us~~s,T
The team's highly.critlcal report
charged that the CIA had corsls-
tently underestimated the nature
and extent of the Soviet threat. It
warned that the Soviets would
soon be militarily superior to the
_-US and could use that superiority
to force US withdrawal from cru-
cial areas like the Mideast. -
Coming in the midst of the Nix-
on-Ford era of relatively good rela-
tions with the Soviet Union, the re-
port struck at the very foundations
of the Strategic Arms Limitations
Talks (SALT) and created turmoil
within the Intelligence community.
Out of the "B tearn"came the
Committee on the Present Danger
(there was some membership over-
lap), and a widely-discussed article
in Commentary In which Pipes set
out his views on Soviet strategy. -
In that article, entitled "Why
the Soviet Union Thinks It Could
Fight and Win a Nuclear War." he
argued that Americans have been
deluded into believing that the So-
r` pprovcfi -~F 'e Base 20b W6' t~ .. A-AM&-UTP37R600100090001-9
- 7r. T -,x 5D
the doctrine of .detente which Kis-
singer first espoused and more re-
cently downplayed. -
The problem with detente -- the
pursuit of arms limitation, trade
agreements and a stabilized US-So- -
viet relationship - Pipes argues, is
that .the- Russians aren't playing
by the same rules. While American
strategists talk about nuclear par
ity and deterrence, the. Soviets are
aiming for superiority and, uitV
mately. victory. -
Often described as a "hard-
liner" " or "hawk." Pipes prefers to
think of himself as a realist..
"'If you want to prevent nuclear
war, or tacontain the damage, you
have to look at it realistically.-
Pipes said In an interview last
week. "That does not mean I am in
favor of nuclear war You would
have to be insane (to favor such a
war) . , . I am a veriy pacific person
I don't even own a gun."
Pipes Is partic'ularly,czitical of
the notion,-which he says has been
sold to Americans by a succession
of political leaders of both parties,
.that nuclear war bL -unthinkable!*
and "unlmag)nab1e - . -
"The Idea that the explosion of
one nuclear bomb means the end of
mankind leads to paralysis." he
says. "You have to look at it very
coldly, . , . If a physician is confront-
ed with a terrible disase, he is not
likely. to cure it by tearing his hair
out. You want wphysician who Is
cool," -
A tall, slender man whose dark
hair Is in retreat from a high fore-
head. Pipes personifies ,cool.Jug-
gling an interview and a steady
stream of phone calls from well-
washers, 'he managed to be gra-
cious. pleased and unflustered.
Pipes is an expert on 19th cen-
tury,Rusalan who has spent 34 of
his 57 years at Harvard. first as a
graduate student and then as a
professor. As he tells it. if the Har-
vard history department had been
.more flexible, he might not be on
his way to Washington now-
. After a couple of Mrs, at a
small college in Ohio and three
years In the Air Force, Pipes came
to Harvard Interested In thehistory
of art and philosophy. which he
wanted to combine somehow with
the Russian studies he had begun
at Cornell under Air Force aus-
pices. "The history department
was very strictly set up, then and
 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137ROO01000900
IN THE NATIQN a C.I.A. "reassessment of Soviet zriilt=
Lary spending, which concluded that--
such. spending had jumped from 6 to 8 -
percent of the gross national product
eT ]' to it to 13 percent -- or "doubled," as
?l Y Cr American hard-liners liked to put it.
The Tea
$
m
estimate is now gospel i
among conservatives of both parties,
including Mr. Reagan and his advis.
ers; but if they bring as hard an eye to
the new gap as Mr. McNamara did to
that of 1961, they'll find that what the
C-1-A. actually said about the appar=
ent Soviet increase in defense spend-
ing was as follows:
This does not mean that the impact
of. defense prod
grams on the Soviet
no
m L~ increased - only that
-,_The Reams
aan.Administration has a our ap reciati f
071CL APZWN~F_*3
r"4 .r NEW YORK Tz 8
9 JANUARY 1981
new case of an old malady on o this impact has
new case o .A dy - military changed. It also implies that Soviet de-
s-Secretary:,of Defense-- : fense industries are far less efficient
designate Caspar Weinberger testified than formerly believed,"
I' at his confirmation hearings, the new . Arthur M. Cox, a former State De-
l team will come into office believing partment and C.I.A. official, writing in
that it must-bridge a strategic gap that the Nov. 6 New York Review of Books,
now gives the Soviet Union a distinct interpreted this to mean that the Soviet
advantage over the United States- military effort absorbed more- Soviet
Twenty years ago the Kennedy Ad- G.N.P. than previously believed not be-
minisKratlon took over with much the cause defense spending actually had
same view. "just 'as Ronald Reagan - doubled but, because the C.I.A. had
campaigned last year on the supposed .: raised its estimate of how much Soviet
-.Iead the Russians bad taken in mili- G.N.P. was absorbed by inefficient
tary power, so John F. Kennedy made military production. Thus, in January
much in 1960 of the "missile gap" he 1980, the C:I_A. reported that Soviet-
-and other critics of. the Eisenhower - "defense activities" for 1970679, esti-
Eldministration bell eyed to exist. mated in constant dollars, "increased
Then as now, . there was official at an average annual rate of 3
per- backing for that notion. The Air Force cent" -' about the same rate at which
reported that by-1964 the Russians..- the U.S. and its NATO. partners have
would have the ability to produce sevw - raised theirs in the last four years.
eral. times the number of interconti- Paul Warnke, the former Carter Ad-
nental ballistic missiles that the U.S.- - . ministration arms negotiator, ad-
planned. The - House Appropriations ... vanced much the same thesis at a de-
-Committee forecast a 3-to-1 Soviet bate sponsored by the Center for De-
lead in ICBM's by. the end of 1962.. fense Information in New' York last
Once in power;. however, Mr. Kenne- Oct. 15. In rebuttal, Lieut. Gen. Daniel
dy's Secretary of Defense, Robert S. ? 0. Graham, retired, 'a member of
McNamara,;' discovered that neither - Team B and a former Director of De..
U-2 .- flights nor other intelligence fense intelligence, failed - at least in
means ;could- verify any extensive my view - to refute the Cox-Wade
number.-- of :t-Soviet -ICBM launching : interpretation.
sites- By2-November. .1961; : Hanson- .. - General., Graham insisted that a
Baldwin,: the :military'editor' of The. ' _ :.. Soviet defector had confirmed the sup-
New York_Tunes,'= could report that posed increase in Moscow's military
new1Defense Department estimates- program_- Citing another factor in
put SovierICBM strength at 30 to 75, ":`Team B's conclusion, he also sug_
instead of the 206 to 1,000 the -missile -: `gested that the Russians had "poured
E?. gappers`bad variously predicted. The 200 times the U.S.-effort into civil de-
United States then deployed 180 Atlas .. ---- :fense" in preparation for starting a
'`. missiles, and had 18 more ready to go nuclear war. But Secretary of Defense
on line; `with=': the second-generation Harold Brown has derided the idea
=Minuteman nearing deployment. that civil defense could: save Soviet
-.Mr.- Kennedy never officially disa- cities from an American attack, even
vowed the missile gap, but he never re- ;.- after a Soviet first strike. Mr. Cox said
ferred to it'again,:either. That doesn't the Russians contend their effort is
mean, of course;:that-Mr. Weinberger .:' - only a defense against a much- more
e and Mr. Reaganr are- infor the same '= _ limited attack by the Chinese.
experience,.but.it does suggest that = Mr. Weinberger, athis hearing had
they might :well.: stays loose, until. ;. the good sense to reject the current fad
? they-ve seen all. ;the;..: e~+idence on -:_,.for fixed-percentage increases in mili-
today's reputed gap.
The basic ~yspending and to pledge to restudy,
source for that gap is the the -- Carter Administration's over-
report of "Team: a ; group of .ex--?.. blown basing plan for 200 MX missiles
?-peres on military' and Soviet .
?t J46 '1. V e' 1ia? A 0OOO1-9
_-- ?~~v pruciaimea, as in 1960, but.no- better
JleYe4. Thjs view washeavily based on _:.j documented then than True -
 A To JI For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010009
THE WASHINGTON POST
29 December 1980
~i'owla .-Evans and Robert Novak
I e- ~: a~-' 'v__-e`:-_as . SA
The confidential. recommendation to
'President-elect Reagan for "a pause". in
new SALT talks, coupled with the possi-
bility of defense strategist William. Van
Cleave's becoming' Reagan's -arms con-
trol negotiator,-points?to-a decisive break.
with-.arms control -philosophy that. any:
SALT.treaty is a-good SALT treaty.'
:The'unpublicizedproposal for Reagan:'
to go- slow _in- new superpower nuclear;
arms talks-came-10 days ago from.-the
.transition team.turned lose on, the Arms.
Control: and- Disarmament Agency. Now
required ' reading by?Reagan's national
security rstrategists,-'the -report.. is de-
scribedby_those who have: studied it as'
"exactly ~ _~: what==; the ?:= president'elect='
_ wants
complete disclosure -_of :..widely: alleged-
Soviet violations of' ast agreements and`
ir'.,sts that the reb-ilding of U.S.. mill- I
tary strength: to provide a margin of
-safety" should' precede a? new SALT
That happens to'coincide-with.'arms
control philosophies . long held by Van.
Cleave, the brilliant iconoclast whose un-
diplomatic candor has cost him the Rea-
gan administration posts he most want-
ed:- the second 'or third top Pentagon job-
under Defense Secretary Caspar Wein--,
berger. ? During': the presidential -cam
paign, Van Cleave- was Reagan's princi{
pal adviser on arms control, a policy area
intimately known to. the ...University of
Southern California prafesssor.
= What Weinberger and other top-level
Reaganites. have found. abrasive about
Van. Cleave- both: during the campaign
and more recently-in. the poet-elections
transition could be.his greatest'asset as
chief -American negotiator 'with stony=
faced Opiet' bargain-hunters- in-,. the
Kremlin. "Bill as our nuclear'anns `nego-'J --' - Wiz control and national. security
tiator," a Reagan insider privately re- strategy ..., a pause in all arms control _
marked, "would be exactly right in send- negotiations" is essential.
ing. Moscow the, message that Reagan is
4 If, as. expected, that ` becomes the
one president who won't be roiled over
president-elect's policy,.the Reagan on SALT.": ministration' would follow an arms. can
Van Cleave was a member of the 1971 trol strategy, exactly opposite that of-
72. control negotiating team but re- Jimmy Cdr four years s ago- Carter
arter
signed befoie_-the .Nixon administration_
h ? C A T IP
y
VI
I accepted and signed SALT I in Moscow - but when he got an agreement 2'/a. years:
'in 1972. But in' testimony before a Sen-1 _ , " , . .
Jackson; he-warned that the treaty con- _ ? ..., Neu x,. ,,,, 4_ yuu III L e
Senate:. _
tamed weaknesses that might prove dan-
Reagan.s transition '.tearri' warns
serous in the. future a prophecy that against "unilateral arms reductions" b
`has come-all too. true in the past eight the United 'States in hope y
: of.enticing
years..: Soviet reciprocity. That is a deliberate:.{
w=.:. Van Cleave'also served'on Team B, rem;nd
f th
Ali
ero
e
cei11Wonderlad
.--n the famous arou of outside ex erts a arms control theory of the Carter admin-
ointed in 1976 ten- ntral f me i- i;tration during its blinkered days when .
ence director rye us as a check-1
Carter claimed the West no longer need-
on t LA's own exert assessment'ot
have (;;n "inordinate fear" of commu-
UlS and Soviet militarystren~th.? ;.;, nism_The report's strongest ???
b axwment
Conceivably, Van Cleave, whose repu-. for going slow is that SALT. has become
Cation for intellectual honesty. emerged, "a permanent excuse for Western failure]
unscathed from his battles with Wein- to come to grips with the Soviet military
rg
B
d
th
R
a
i
id
s might
"
e
er an
o
er
e
gan
ns
er
hll
dit V Cl
, caenge, acumaneave himself
l '! ,
deci a that b
in
hief
t
e
g c
n
ro
negotiator :.is. a challenge not". large,
enough for him. Reagan agents sounding:
him out on the prospect think he can be
won over, mainly with the argument that
no one else could have as much symbolic'
The shrewd move to confront 'the o
viets with the" cold-steel will and deter-
mination of Bill- Van Cleav& as chief
American SALT -negotiator could help]
put arms control, which is clearly an im-i
]'
An- equal argument might be found lire
tionship, into proper perspective after I0;
the strong tone of the ACDA-transition t years of dangerous experimentation. ` - i
team's report- to the president-elect and - - Senate critics who would try to slice
the fact that it' is having an enthusiastic down Van Cleave would soon learn thii
reception by senior Reagan advisers. The fact:.. Reagan wants a new SALT treaty,
team. was headed by- .James Malone, but a treaty that is good, not bad or only
ACDA's -.general counsel =. during the fair, for the United States..With Van`;
Nixon-Ford' administration. ,Its: central Cleave as his negotiator,.-.he would `noe
proposal: that until completion " of a `lose any sleep worrying:- ; ~~i
"thorn: ph; .interagency-reassessment, . f.
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,,ltTI CL_ A? 'D
0;3 r AGiL
-,._._S~~ecal u-7he NewYarlt Tlmq
W_ 5HI TGTON, Dec :7' - President--
elect Ronald - Reagan's transition team.
for, the- Central,InteUigence. Agency has
proposed several sweeping changes in, the
organization. and. operations of -the na-
tion 's,intellioence; programs, including,
increased _emphasis- on: covert..: action:
abroad, according to Mr. Reagan'ssadvis
The aides said that "a preliminary re-
port on the C.L.A. was completed late., last:
week and is to be,subroitted toMr. Rea
gan's transition headquarters, tomorrow The panel is headed, by-3. William Mid
dendorf: 2d,.,.foriaer, Secretary.-.,of ;,-the
,Navy, whois.presidenttof Financial.Gen-tl
:eral.; Bankshares,':.a Washington-based;
bank holding company -
Tn addition-.to, calling" for an-enhanced,'
.rule-,and increased'finarcing for covert.'
activities,., report-. recommends
greater attention-:to- counrerintelligence
to combat what is. viewed. as a growing.
threat of Soviet:espionage-and interna-;
Central liernrds System
-This could be accomplished, the report
is said to suggest, through the, creation of
a.central records system that would be-
used by both the C-I -a-.:and domestic"law-=
.enforcement agencies, including the Fed-1
? eral Bureau of Iavestigat icn_ Such, a=
,move has been resisted. by Government.
officials in the. past= t e-gro and that iti
could pose a threarto the civil lberties or
American citizens -
The report,:Mr. Reag ts.aides added,:
NEW YORK TIMES
Q DEC DflER 1980
also recommends the establishment of a
competitive system of intelligence analy- I
sis; intended to provoke wider debate on III
sensitive international issues. Under the
proposal, the Central Intelligence Agency
would be forced to defend its conclusions
against those of other intelligence agen-
cies, such as the Pentagon's Defense In-
telllge ceAgency- . . - "
'According to several aides, these steps
could be taken without legislation. But
they, added that the proposals, and the
transition effort itself, had already
prompted deep anxiety and debate within
the agencies. Moreover, the wide-ranging
debate over the structure of the intelli-
gence-bureaus and the quality of intelli- '
ger_ e,-they produce have recently exacer-
bated-long-standing tensions on the.Sen-
ate Intelligence Committee.
Ti;ough Mr. Mittendorf declined to dis-
cus_s.th4 report, he said in an interview
yt~rday that he favored a more "ag-
gressive"' approach to intelligence and
tliat..the report's recommendations were
ai n d at "increasing the productivity" of
the intelligence agencies.
William H..Casey, Mr. Reagan's cam-
paign director, who is a strong prospect
for the post of Director of Central Intelli-
gence, is known to hold similar views.
However, it is not known whether either
Mr--Casey or Mr. Reagan will approve
the transition team's recommendations.
Tb`a proposals are similar to several
contained in a recent report prepared for
-seribr Reagan advisers by the Heritage
Foundation, a conservative Washington-
based: research group. However, the
propt:sals touch on a number of complex
isstiea that have been debated for years
by intelligence officials. ?
Among the most sensitive of the
proposals is the call for the competing
centers of analysis. Many intelligence ex-
perts believe that the idea is good in prin-
ciple but difficult in practice; as a previ-
George Bush, then Director of Central In-
telliger_ce and now Vice President-elect,
to appraise Soviet military potential and
intentions.
Trouble in the Agencies
The group, known as-Team B, con-
cluded that the C.I.A. andother agencies
had underestimated the Soviet buildup
and that. Moscow was bent on achieving
strategic superiority. The effort sharked
an acrimonious debate in intelligence cir-
cles and upset C.I.A. analysts when re-
ports of Team B's conclusions appeared
in the press.
Reagan aides contend that under its
plan, the competing analyses would be
provided not by- outsiders but by such
other intelligence bureaus as the Defense-
Intelligence Agency. While the Reagan
aides believe that this approach would,
improve the overall quality of American
intelligence, C.I.A. officials maintain
that the Pentagon intelligence apparatus
is not capable of functioning as an effec-. .
tive counterweight.
Moreover- some intelligence experts
contend that competing centers of analy-
sis, as once existed, would overempha-J
size disagreements among intelligence
agencies. The President now receives a
consensus view from the Director of Car.-
tral Intelligence in so-called National In-
teligence Estimates, in which disagree-
ments among intelligence bureaus are
usually noted only in footnotes. , -?
ALongstandingDebate .--.: --
The report's recommendation that a
"central file" be established to enhance f
coordination of counter-intelligence ac-
tivities is, likely to be opposed by civil
growing debate over the push for a larger
liberties groups. The file would contain
data collected on the activities of sus-
pected foreign agents, including, their
dealings with Americans. Such groups as
the American Civil Liberties Union have
maintained that this information could-
violate citizens' privacy rights- - -
Finally, there has for years been a
' Reorganize
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 I
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A ITICLE kFFEA"i2D
G rAG3' _
N ZW YORK TIMES
7 DECEM3ER 1930
~~ ~ went missiles in Cuba, which ended
when the Russians, confronted with Su- I
Buildup
perior American power, agreed to with:
marked a turn in the Soviet-American
ajo ssu - eaga ai~mscompetition.
Although the United States was build-
T .... ?`
ing up at a faster rate in the early 1960:s,
By RICHART BURT ? ..,G .....~........ r .. D_. _
RT BU initiative. Intelligence specialists believe
`
SpecW to TM twee.... , ;: = that, after the 1962 crisis and the ouster of
WASHINGTON, Dec 6 -The steady Four years ago a debate was stirred inl Nikita S. Mnrushchev from power in 1964,
g}?'owth of Soviet military power, a matter America,, intelligence circles after a Moscow's leaders vowed ahat never again .
ofprime concern to-the incoming admin- would the Shout Union allow itself to be
stration of President-elect Ronald Rea- group of academic specialists was asked humiliated by the United States.
ga.ii; bas emerged as one of the most trou- by George Bush, then Director of Central Consequently, during Leonid I. Brezh- _i
-bang problems facing the United States Intelligence and now Vice President- nev's tenure, the Soviet military budget I
'ahd its western allies-. elect,- to appraise Soviet military poten- is estimated to have grown by 3 or 4 per-
` N.llos West military buildup, in the view teal and intentions. The group, known as., cent annually-in the late 1960's and in the
of some American specialists, could sig- Team B, concluded that the C.I.A. and 1970's_
other agencies had underestimated the , :toting this growth, William R. Perry,
Its Power and Limits
First of three articles
cialists such as Richard E: Pipes, a Har-
and who directed the Team B effort, int
political domination-In the view of others point
fl of insecurity deeply to Moscow's buildup to assert.that it bar-
e
.
it_re ects?a.sens
rooted in Russian history. burs aggressive designs..:
.. Also not easily answered is the question, : Other : specialists; including Arthur
shish country is the more powerful: the ;Macy .Cox, a former State Department
Soviet Union, with 3,658,000 in the armed and C.I.A. analyst, contend that there is a
services, based on conscription for two or danger of exaggerating the Soviet build-
three years and an obligation in the re- up. Theyassert that Moscow, from its
Serves to the age of 50; or the United point. of view, faces threats from nearly
States, with its force= of 2,050,004 volim- every direction and feels it must rely on-
tears. militarypower:
=? An Issue-01 National Concern As much as a fifth of the Soviet military
budget, it is estimated, is directed not
In the area otnuclear weapons there is against the West but against China. And
agreement than the Soviet Union has at- -Soviet forces in Europe have another pe-
tained "strategic parity" with the United ripheral.- function: keeping, the Eastern
States: European allies in line.
Ira.: conventional forces,the- Soviet .:- Most of the Soviet units. added to the
Union is ahead in numbers- of weapons. area since 1987 were sent in during the
and troops. But this superiority is viewed Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia
as- offset by American?:-.achnolog:cal su- in 1968. Soviet forces in Eastern Europe
premacy. The Soviet Union is trying to. would also be likely to participate in any
catch up and in such- categories as intervention in Poland that the Soviet
ground-combat vebiches.is said to have .Union might decide to make. ':. ,.
surpassed theUnitedstatesz -. Moscow's nuclear. potential ? is can-
As the Presidential election campaign strained, in some respects, by Soviet-
illustrated, the debate over Soviet' mili _ American arms agreements. : -
tary power has become an issue of na- The 1972 treaty on antiballistic missiles
tiorl concern. puts limits these defensive systems, and
bath sides appear willing to continue to
In part the focus on Moscow's military... ccuiply with the 1972 interim accord on
riigat reflecs concern in the Pentagon long-range offensive missiles, which set
and in Congress over the status of the existing arms totals- as ceilings: 2,358 for.
American military. with some asserting the Soviet Union and 1,710 for the United
that American forces have declined in. States.'That accord did not cover long-
size, quality andseeamness. range bombers.
Floarever the Soviet Union's.-buildup The Reagan Administration, iRepubli-
lenged by air.' Cox and Franklyn D. Holz-'
man, an economist at the Harvard Rus,
sian Reeear'cla Center.. They contend that
the C.I.A.'s practice of calculating the
sir.7t of the So;-et military budget it the-
ea~-lent dollars it would cost the
United. States exaggerates the cost of
m ;npower, which is paid less in the,
Soviet Union.
Mr. Holzman and other experts agree'
that, with an economy 60 percent that of
the United States,'"the Soviet Union now
spends at least as much for the armed
forces as the United States, or the equiva-
lent of $165 billion a year.
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown
said early this year that the balance be-
twtt the United States and the Soviet!
Union should not be viewed in isolation
but rather in the context of the respective
allied military efforts. . : ..` , -
.According to Pentagon experts, the ,
al.li?s in Western Europe spent 376 billion.
for defense 'east year compared with. $20
billion by the East Europeans. The Inter-
'national institute for Strategic Studies.
s i that the Atlantic alliance's total.
sp-ending thus slightly exceeds that of the.
Warsaw Pact.:.
.At the same time, the: institute con-
tends that the Soviet bloc spends its mili-
tary funds more efficiently because. it
uses standardized Soviet equipment.: :-
Interviews Interviews with American intelligence
aides, defense officials and academic
specialists indicate that Moscow has in-
creased its power in-nearly every mili-
tarysector..,: ~= rOZD
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AF.TiCLE A=
oz. ____
THE WASHINGTON POST
25 October 1980
use of force against the domestic op- I
position, although the White House.,
First of rx series
By Scott Armstrong
." %V,13hfngWn P0,68*f1 Writer
During the revolutionary turmoil.
?:that pulled down the shah bf Iran;
President Carter clung to the belief
.though the shah, himself had lost -{
faith in his own power, a five-mortli
investigation by. The Washington
Post' has found:
Two months before the shah fled.
=to exile, when Iran was aflame with.'
protest,: the president's national se-
curity adviser personallY telephoned
the Iranian ruler, targirg him to use
military force to smother the e~
lution.
-A few' weeks later, the president
was advised to abandon the shah by,-.:
is aAt ,outside foreign policy expert,?
whom he called in for counsel. Tell .-
r the shah to take a long vacation,
the president was told, and begin
preparing for a new government in
Iran. The president said he couldn't;
do that to an important allied leader:,
and wouldn't. : =?
Indeed, in that same period, State
Department sources say they. worked,,,
to soften the 'draft of a message from'.'.
Carter to the shah, urging again the;;
insists that no. such message was ev-
er sent Secretary- of State Cyrus B.
Vance and his top aides feared such
a message would lead only to con-
siderehle bloodshed .arid po,"ibly civil
war, : turrrioil that could only worsen
America's position in the future of Jr-
The president field, to his hope,;
.even when : most. of his top foreign
policy advisers were:,urging him to.:.
ease the shah off his throne.and be-
in the transition to.whatever iolit-
-In:'I
,orces--would follow in. power.
once one., of the_ shah's
c
,hest.supporters,' abled his ei~~
n~on to-?Washinoton.The presi-:
en attitude, he_;said,.;was "short~
arid- did'not unclerstand:NvI;ere.
IN-
77
in -ariy.Case he-I
3nontn later,
sr~Svas gases=`:permanently?eled
the-American president was su
_ r- ;
f rani el'= -on
x~d~dr~_by'conf[ictiriR ~-
e .+,he;,.Peacock-- throne',-c'o'uld
9 r dne'person, ironically, who blew
r certainty -that ` -the - shaixwas
~c ai was Mohammed Reza-Pahlavi
91e. shah, notwiF.hstaiidinohis rep-.
"tuna: as'? a "bloodthirsty tyrant;: di
ele enth-hour, :advice from;
w+o`agtrators and opposition ? leaders.I
lie, was convinced : in his own` mind
-that force could not prevail -for long.
He lizew that he was slowly dying of
cancer and-was an_'dous?to leave hehind'
a stable nation that his young son could-
xWe Finally, confused by conflicting
signals . from ? the.,-United, -States and ;
pressured by European leaders to ab-'71
dicate; the shah in his last- month in
r moved- to- accommodate they
m ocierate opposition, to live 'with some:
:digit and relinquish some of his vast;
?cxised of abandoning the-shah prema-
tnxely. In fact, Carter still hoped to pre- ,
serve the shah's paver., long after in-
telligence reports and tap foreign policy.
advisers insisted, as a zdatter of realism, .the United States- xnua:-assist- the or
derly; transition to whatever political,
forces, were going to'displace the pea-
.cock throne
This much is cert2iii: The fall of-the'
shah involved a bitter though collegial
contest- among the presidents key- ad-
visers, contending for control over- fo.r-
etgga .policy and veering back and forth--
in their- prognoses for-events, staiemat-'-,
ing policy with their disaggreem_ents.
Zbigniew Brzedin3ld,-the president's'
national security adviser,- appears in-,'
-transigen't in this account, stoutly re-
sisting the "unthn>kable" outcome that -
..:lay ahead, demanding the toughest pot-'
icy line and ultimately: prevailirg over-.
.others who saw the'future more clearly.
Vance, preoccupied .with other mat-
ters,. arms talks witd'the' Soviet Union
!or the F,gyptian: Israelipeace talks, was
.strangely inattentive, to.tha-alarm bells::
within his own department until it wa..s:
Ibo late to make a difference- v ?i
end the U.S. intelli7erce comet .ip
,arise` aain,'. seems ; y_.'oezt-0ac6s,
,Ji perceiving the realities of- pu.ar.:
di~coistent ; within 'ari a; alLnation
Sornein governmentdid'see the picture
it x - 'clearly,. but :.their. perceptions
siii ply did not'get:tlz ugh to- rile Ares='
ident and his. policymakers,`.especially=
if =their distasteful--warnings -collided? -
ivitl the establ hed.-official
Still, this is not just-diplomatic`his
'tomi'_ The events. in `Vasbington"and
'Tehran that presaged the triumph: of
lution remain with'us
Tom
all- tha
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ARTICLE ~ NEW Y(PV TXt-"
OT FAGS 20 0CT0BED 1980
Why. the U.&; Since I
Has -been, m1sper1celvinb
VH t .1 tren
0 'M"litary, S`
By Arthur Macy Cox
WASHINGTON-A few weeks before?the inauguration
of President Carter in January 1977;. the dramatic condo-'
sions of a new Central Intelligence Agency estimate were
leaked to the news media- The study reportedly found that
the Soviet Union was moving rapidly to achieve military su-
periority over its adversaries and was acquiring.a combina-
tion of strategic offensive and. defensive forces that would
permit it to fight and win a limited nuclear war. The so-
called Team B report has had dramatic-and continuing im-
pact on the defense debate in the United States, especially in
the Congress- But the Team B findings, though never ad-
equately challenged by the Carter Administration, are
based on misinterpretation of the facts..
Team B was made up of 10 military experts, all hard-
liners, who were asked by George Bush, the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence at that time,. to make an independent as-
sessment of Soviet military strength. Though none of them
were members of the C:I.A. professional staff; Mr. Bush
nevertheless adopted their analysis as the official. C.I.A.
estimate, rather than that of Team A.. the regular C.I.A.
staff analysts. According -to Lieut. Gen. Daniel 0. Graham,
one of the members of Team B, there were three major fac-
tors that influenced the Team B re-evaluation: A.differ ence
in the strategic doctrines of the United States and Soviet
Union; a new C.I.A. estimate of Soviet defense spending
civil defense is primarily for the purpose of providing some
protection in the event of war with China. ..
Undoubtedly the greatest impact on public opinion..
came from the Team B assertion that the Soviet Union has
doubled its defense spending. Most members of Congress
believe this today. So, it seems, do most editorial writers.
The C.I.A.'s revision has become part of the conventional.::.
wisdom of defense policy..
Richard M. Nixon in his new book "The Real War"..
writes; "In 1976 the CIA estimates of Russian military
spending for 1970-1973 were doubled overnight as errors
were discovered and corrected... -Thanks in part to this in-
telligence blunder we will find ourselves looking down the ?i
nuclear barrel in the mid-1980s." But Mr- Nixon
Team B
,
,.
the Congress, and the news media have been rnis informed..
The true meaning of the C.I.A. report has been missed. Here
is, the C.I.A.'s explanation for its change of estimate: as
published in its 1978 report: "The new estimate of the :^??rire..
of defense in the Soviet [gross national product] is almost
twice as high as the 6 to 8 percent. previously estimated. This
does not mean that the impact of defense programs on the
Soviet economy has increased - only that our appreciation
of this impact has changed. It also implies that Soviet de-
that concluded that the percentage of the Soviet Union's fgnse industries are far less efficient. than formerly be
lieved"(Italics aremine-)_
So while the C.I.A. increased its estimate of the percent-
age of Soviet gross national product spent on defense from
The C C.I.A. As B report has 6-to-S percent to 11-to-13 percent, there bad in fact been no
-1
doubling of the rate of actual defense spending- C.I.A. ana-
had. a _ dramatic and continuing. lysts had been crediting the Soviet Union with a degree of in-
dustrial efficiency that was close to that of the United States.
i riac t' on debate for veirs : _ What they discovered was that Soviet defense production, in
fact, was not efficient. Thus, the Soviet defense effort was ab-
sorbing a greater share of the gross national product than
gross national product absorbed by defense had jumped
from 6-to-8 percent to 11-to-13 percent; and the discovery of
`a very important Soviet civil defense effort. Team B as-,
serted that the civil defense program meant that the Rus-
sians were preparing a capacity to survive an American
counterstrike 4---
On civil defense, at least, the Carter Administration has
rejected the conclusions of Team B. Secretary of Defense
Harold Brown said last Aug. 17: '~ I don't think massive civil
defense programs are going for succeed in protecting the
population of countries that try it. I think that the Soviet
civil defense program, although it probably is 10 times as
big as ours, would not, in my judgment prevent Soviet indus-
try or a great fraction of the Soviet population from being
destroyed in an all-out thermonuclear war::. In a limited
[nuclear] war It you target cities they're not going to be
saved by civil defense " ? ? ? "t
previously believed. What should have been cause for jubila-.
tion became the inspiration for misguided alarm.
In fact, there have been no dramatic increases in Soviet
defense spending during the entire. decade.. In its official
The Soviet Union itself acknowledges that civil defense)
measures would provide little protection against the United
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 -oved For Releas ,QO,Aq /3 :, -RDP90-01137R0001
22 SEA`-1i R 1980
} q NI gonction are plaguing the strate-
pT gic Mrly warning and communication
L fl S system. In t ,#o instances over the last !
Rrompt a 107 i nand in Chey,:nne biourtain, Colo_,1ave ,tr ` 10"' al which to ssi'iedes and b43- ens were made
By RICHARD BURT
Specal tothsN wY'r'.c Ttu
ready for take-off_ Congre ai.,nal audi-
tors meanwhile, reported eerier. this
}
year that a new generation of c4u~puters
for the military's worldwide command
C_
1_
States military, long used to having a ire becoming increasingly vulnerable- .il handle the demands created by a major!
'} military crisis. The existing system; i
- tima. Mr- -Brown said last
clear edge over the soviet Union in nu- ~~ -? - a
Clear r?iight, is being forced to adjust to a? month, the Soviet Union might now be 1 moreover, is considered vulnerable and
new era in which the American strategic ble to destroy all 1,053 of the Air Force's inadequate-
arsenal is becoming -outdated and ever and-based missiles in their underground -Capacity to Retaliate
Fiore vulnerable..;:
II In recent statements, President-Car-
;ter, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown
and other senior officials have asserted
ghat, in the area of nuclear weaponry, the
United States is still "second to none." At
the sane time, however. Mr. Brown -and
his too aides have started to contend that
if present trends in the nuclear balance
continua, the United States, by the mid-
1990's, could find itself vulnerable to nu-
clearblackmailbyMoscow. _
- Mn Brown, for example, told a group
last month at the United. States Naval
Defense.
Is the U.S. Prepared?
Second of seven articles.
Under Secretary of Defense for research meant the United States was in danger of
Armed losing its capacity to retaliate after a
told a House.
eerin
i
d
,
g,
eng
n
an
Services.. subcommittee that Soviet- ! Soviet nuclear attac't_ They said, mare-
bomber defenses wen e rapidly imp.rovind over, that intelligence reports indicated
and that over the next 10 years Moscow I that American nuclear forces, as a whole, !
were still superior to the Soviet atter.?
could find a means of detecting and de- terms of readiness and relibi'.it-;, a
stroying.the Navy's 41 missile carrying though Soviet forces were considered
submarines. more powerful. -
9Components of the nation's nuclear In addition, they said that Mr. Carter
arsenal are wearing out. The mainstay of had approved numerous programs over
the Air Force's nuclear bomber forces, the last three years meant to remedy the
the B-52, is about 20 years old, and offi- emerging nuclear deficiencies. Although
cialsreportthat theplanes stifferfrom an in 1977 the President canceled the B-1
increase in expensive maintenance prob- bomber, which was proposed as a re-
lerhs_ The service's 53 Titan 2.-missiles. placement for the B-52 force, officials
said that Mr_ Carter's decision to equip
f
or
also been in place
meanwhile the older bombers with air-launched
two , decades have and have recently been cruise missiles in the next.Iew years
plagued by a series of well-publicized ac- would guarantee the Air Force's ability
cidents The problems besetting the Titan . to penetrate Soviet air defenses through
2 were vividly demonstrated in Damas- ' the 1950's. - ? ? -
cus,-Ark., last week when a fuel. tank of The 1,600-mile sane missiles, which
one of the missiles, punctured by a falling fly at treetop altitudes; would permit I
socket wrench, exploded and sent a cloud B-52's to "stand off" from Soviet air de-
of toxic chemicals in t9 the air. i fences, a less demanding role that offi
i ' 1 bel'eve will save wear and tear on
a s
War College in Newport, R.I., that, with-
cut improvements to the ballistic rnis
silts anal heavy bombers that make up
l the country's deterrent force, Washing-
ton could face "at best a perception of in?
feriority, at worst areal possibility of nu-
clearcoercion." . -
the~~ manufacturing nuclear weapons are said
Throughout the 1950's and 60's
,
United States led . the Soviet Union i to be in bad: repair. A confidential report
nearly every measure of strategic power prepared recently for flue Department of
including numbers of missiles and bon Energy, the agency assigned the task of
ers, warhead totals and overall weapo producing nuclear, warheads,` concluded
performance- But Moscow; spending that "serious deterioration of equipment
much as three times more than Washing- and utilities has occurred over-the past
n on nuclear forces during the 1970's is several years which could seriously im-
t
o
generally seen as having attained who pair our ability to meet the nuclear weap-
1analysts call "rough parity".in strategic ohs. [requirernentsl forecast 'for the
e Pentagon; sides said that
power `1's." AtLi
-In a national intelligence estimate pre- :over the last 15 Years, several vired by the _entra i ntel iT epee A enc went-plants producing critical materials
Administration officials maintain that,, anew version of the Army s lance tacti-
Carter Washington has begun cat'missile bad slowed by.18 months be-
under Mr
in nearly every measure o nuclear caps- delays in weapons p g -
i itv by 1995. cial, for example, said the deployment of
ea 7r y us tyear, it was estimated that -and components for nuclear warheads
oscow cou surpass the nit to es had been- shut, producing significant.
- ro rains- One offi-
.
to counter Moscow's - growing missile cause of a shortage of plutonium for the-
power. Nevertheless, military specialists system'swarbead.
acknowledge that several serious prob-
. ridified in the next few years, includin
19 The Government's facilities _ for 1 'et
I } theagingbombers_ - -
these:- 'A r d.For ten iAse 2006/01/30 ? CIA-RDP90-01.137R000100090001-9
1
Farther in the future; Secretary Brown
and other senior Pentagon aida_s are ex-
cited about the prospects for deploying a
Stealth bomber, which would be nearly
~'jnvisible to Soviet radar..
At sea, the Navy this year deployed the
first of a new class of Trident missile sub-
marines that will gradually replace the 10 '
Polaris vessels built in the 1960's. Each of 71
the new submarines will carry 24 Trident
1 missiles, a 4,600-mile-range missile that I
..? 4American-missing an-dMmber ogees
 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-0113
- WORLD PRESS /
By ALAN BERGER.
papers were describing congressional
efforts to pass tough new laws protect-
;- ing-the CIA. a front-page article in the
-London Sunday Times implicated the
-agency in shady dealings reminiscent
of the disclosures made five years ago
in: -the Senate's, Church committee
hearings on intelligence activities.
The Sunday Times article-,was-an
investigative. report looking into"a se-
ries of mysterious disappearances and,
violent ' deaths around the world."
Heroin traffickers and couriers as well
as :bank- officers-and CIA-. personnel?
-.--have- been among the "dozen or so"
people who disappeared mysteriously
or died violently. "Police on four con-
tinents are trying to find the exact.
link between these .deaths, .the CIA
`-and the collapse of a. Sydney'(Austra-
'=1ial-based bank, Nugan Hand Interna-
tional. ' the Times reported=-.
Saying;' the story-.has.-a..plotwar-'
-thy of John Le Carne," the Times'-'in---
:._:vestigative team, offered-these "initial
",conclusions' from-its inquiriesc
a "Nugan Hand, .which. boasted
fices or.- representatives in a dozen
$1 billion, was a banker far the heroin
a "And there.is evtdence'that 'the
bktddi:
an was nurure. -n may evez;
have been set up, by the CIA.".;
One strand of the intricate "Nugan
.'Hand affair" begins in Australia with'
- -_a Melbourne-.coroner's., Inquest -into
the murder of a young couple, the Wit-.
sons, whose bodies-.-we re dug up re-
Gently from shallow graves near "a
? surfing beach.. The Wilsons, who were
. -both . shot In the head. ' had s. been ?
alleged heroin trafficker who 'Import-
-".pd 48 kilograms of heroin worth-$2
BOSTON GLOBE
7 September 1980
Before their death,?the Wilson:
told Australian police everything
knew about Clark's -heroin o!
tions., Subsequently,. two. senior,
:cials of Australia's Federal Narc
Bureau who were in the pay of
nd
d hi
t
f th
a a
e
m
apes o
e ikons resentative' who had served with the.;
.making their statements." Clark has I OSS (a forerunner of the CIA) and
long since disappeared, but, according i been a commander in Vietnam. Nu
to the Times, "Melborne's coroner a-, Hand's .
T..:_....n n:g,_.
n
.said tie was in no'doubt that Clarkl services?manager for Civil Air TransP -I
hired hit men to kill the Wilsons." port, another. CIA-owned- company.
Official investigations of those re-
cords that survived the collapse of the
y
Nugan Hand bank revealed that Nu-1 . the failed attempt to rescue. the Ameri
gan Hand had been "banker to bi,g 1 can hostages in Iran."
ly.the senior-and most sinister traf-
ficker was Terrence Clark.-
-On Jan. 27 of this year. Frank Nu-
gan cofounder of Nugan Hand, -"was
.. found shot dead in hia Mercedes-Benz
sedan on a lonely road, in the Blue
.Mountains, 100 mites- west of
Sydney." After Nugan's ? death, his
American partner, Mike Hand.,
.phoned the bank's, :business associ-
ates and told them,, according to the
Times account: "You're 'not going to
believe this, but` it looks like. Frank
.ripped off a stack of money."
-=Then;. after calling in. a liquidator
and "blaming his former partner for
everything that had :gone wrong,
::.Hand: disappeared.": In. his : wake he
?' left. -what the Times described as ,
"chaos.---Records were missing,' and
there were debts totaling,$50 million.
Buf.most puzzling of all to the Times.
-And the Manila's - 'consultant' was
Gen.-Ray Manors, a Vietnam veteran.
who Is now helping the CIA to anal
ze
Another;- associate of -the :bank
mentioned in-'the Times- investigation
was Walt McDonald, an economist j
who was a CIA "consultant" for 25
years and a close friend of John Ar-
thur Paisley. the CIA's deputy head of
the Office-of the.Office ?of strategic!
Research. "whose bloated body,was!
fished out of Chesapeake Bay, NId..' in'1
1978" with '40 pounds - of diving`
weights -strapped to his waist and a".1
buillet hole behind the left ear." Spec-..
ulatively; the Teams raised the possi-
bility of 'a link from the Nugan Hand..
affair to=- Paisley: that -would:-run-
throw h McDonald.,
- -A less-speculative link was to for
mer.'CIA. director William.-'Colby.:.
whose visiting card was found on thL
dead body f Frank Nugan: Colby tole- {
the Times he "was simply Nugan's U$ tt!
legal advisor., "There was-no connect
was that ."almost no creditors have ton betwee Mr. Nugan and my Intel
n
publicly-emerged to=stake.. their+ ligence background, he said. _ :'..
claims: Why? a
:-The Times' explanation was-"that
Nugan s Hand's chief client was the'
.CIA:;and that the bank was set up to
move-. covert funds into ? Southeast
? w uw a ua~~;
:.ninemonths.'!~RM iPi M j.3e 2006/01/30 :CIA, RDP90-01137R000100090001-9
-.:Australian cL y of Victoria.
 AF ? -r Cs, A pakE
`~ - n AG_ %&_L_
BOSTON GLOBE
3 August 1980
7, n
Directed-energy w e a p o n s are de~ ' t?ojecr r ora is, omy pars of witKt
a arentl is a large Soviet -bearn
By John Bierman vices that can send concentrated de-, pp Y
at weapon effort. For- .what the,
il
of
u
m
es
sands
o Th Glb structive beams tho
Special teoe bet
ei US Air Force once believed was a
Tese are
-
:,WASHINGTON. - Much of the tremendous Velocft]es,-. American intelligence.. community ther.high-energy, lasers, which travel clear underground teat site at So' rfpa
seems convinced the Soviet-Union is , -at the speed of light, and destroy or d]s- ?.latinsk.- '.'Semi-F." as, it is ars t n to
US intelligence - now al;pears to be.
on the brink. of developing a range of.. able their targets?by heat: or particle mother experimental site for beam
directed energy weapons -the "death beams, which travel slightly slower: weaponry. Like Saryshagan, Semi-P is
rays" of old-fashioned science fiction- Particle beams are like controlled and in the desolate Kazakhstan Republic-
Meanwhile the Pentagon I& be lat directed bolts-,of .lightning, which Another facility, at Krasnaya
edly accelerating its own program in achieve their destructive effect by Pahkra, about 30 miles south'of Nlos
an attempt to catch up: punching a hole in .their target. cow. is put in the "gee whiz" category
Unlike the strategic. nuclear %veap- _ by US intelligence, because of the cali-
I
For sometime. the central Intelli- they could render obsolete, her of work apparently going on i n
n. a
gene Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelli- ons, which the beam weapons would not wreak mass underground cavern. Here the Soviets'
gence- Agency and Air Force lntelli destruction. Instead, their .effect. ,
... have report ~edl} developed the i;rorrnd-
genre have been at odds over just how would be precise and concentrated,
i based laser, which may be able to put
far advanced the Soviets:'are?.in this
revolutionary branch'of weaponry.
According to -Aviation- Weekly: in
formation collected and analyzed dur-
ing the past. few months indicates the
Soviets now -,.have an operational,
land-based laser,-weapon : capable of.
putting low-orbiting US'spy satellites
out of action.-And;: according to the'
authoritative technical weekly. they
also have an even more awesome par-
ticle-beam?device in, the preprototype
stage. ,
Until. - recently. Air-. Force-. Intelli-
gence was unable to convince the rest
of the intelligence. community.-- and
consequently the US government.:-.
thatthe Soviets were forging ahead in
this crucialm branch of-weapons, tech-
nology; which the US has been ursu-
ing: at what a, senior Pentagon. scien-.
tist concedes is "an academic pace.,'-...
Maj.-Gen. George F Keegan, head:-,
of Air Force Intelligence:: resigned In.
1977 in protest when the'Administra-
tion did not heed his warnings. Now
he feels vindicated, and many inside
the Pentagon, agree:
Interviewed at his=`borne near
Washington this weekennd; `}(eegan
. said;-!-.-'It gives me little ` pleasure to
have been proven rlght:5_,,-~:,.?
':"The'development'of beam .weap-
ons is even more momentous than the,,
development' of the atomic ,bomb. Its
Iriiplfcations for the=security-..of the
frelt world. in this decade;. are so awe-
to be military, not civilian., satellites, Big Bird and li14l1
For example, beam weapons- ci- ? The widely-respected Aviation
ther earth-based or. mounted on space Week also reports that US analysts
stations - could destroy or disable en- believe the Soviets are close to perfect-
emy recon na issance satellites. Opera t ing a multishot, land-based laser that
ing from space, they could intercept - could hit US satellites 3000 miles in
and -destroy enemy, intercontinental the air, while a longer-range program
missiles within seconds of launching. would threaten .early warning sa.tel~
The first superpower to make such .rlites orbiting at 25,000 miles,
weapons systems operational would Meanwhile, US intelligence has in-
therefore be able to blind its opponent', formation the Soviets are developing
by taking out the "eyes of its spy sat= ': an 11-ton space sta. tion- that- could -!
ellites, and neutralize its armory of ? take such weapons aloft within` this
strategic missiles. Hence Keegan's: decade. Operating from space, they
somewhat apocalyptic view of their ' would be immune to the problems
significance. caused-. by._.the.. earth's atmospheric....
According to Aviation Week,...t.he, conditions. most ominous recent evidence of Sovi Aviation `Week's -military editor :,l
et progress in this, field has been. pro Clarence Robinson, cites as additional
l
vided by a soy satellite that.spotted a? evidence-of Russian superiority in
huge laser or particle beam device at a;. particle-beam weapon research the
Soviet ballistic nissile slte.at,Sarysha-' fact that three out of four accelerators
-gan, near the-Rsso-Chinese,.border. -being tested in the US.are based on.
Constructfon'at'the site reportedly . Soviet designs....
began last November,: and Air Force Politics has been a major factor in _1
Intelligence estimates-: about it began the US failure to move ahead as quick
to appear within three .months- Avi- ly as the Russians on beam weapons t
ation Week quotes one-intelligence an-
alyst as saying "There.: is. no doubt-:
that they are,bullding something _at'
that location and no doubt that it is
an energy-directed weapon. The differences of opinion are-only over. what
kind of beam weapon it might.be."
US intelligence has reportedly giv-
en the Saryshagan? project the code-
name "ToraThe guiding scientific
act/deYr-icIA'4b V I 7t
,Let
RIX
' ncal comprehension of thisggvernmet
~ ii1'mriat lrariers'of the?free world: '.'
- chatov Atomic Energy Institutd in
Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000
 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010
ARTIC] E APPEMU'~D
Sv4~'-
ON PAG' _~ NV1itI 1UI' ViCC1\ a OF r"," I
28 July 1980
Technical Survey
Soviets Bui I
Washington-Directed-energy weapon
that could be the first step in a revolution-
ary concept of warfare is being con-
structed by the-Soviet Union at Sarysha-
gan, a ballistic missile range near the
Sino-Soviet border in Southern Russia,
according to high-level U. S. officials.
Many U. S. intelligence analysts believe
the weapon is an early prototype of a
new-design charged-particle beam device,
ir~ctedEnergy
Construction at the site began last
November, according to U. S. officials,
and Air Force intelligence estimates began
to appear in February with briefings to I
high-level officials of the Carter Adminis-
tration by late spring.
USAF officials have been briefing other
service intelligence agencies on the Tora
project and Air Force officers are hoping
for agreement on a National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE).
U. S. officials are closely watching the
Saryshagan installation, and the high reso-
lution from the U. S. KH-1 I reconnais-
sance satellite has convinced a number of
experts knowledgeable on Soviet charged-
particle beam physics that the device is a
design with the imprint of Soviet physicist
A. I. Pavlovski. His work at the Kurchatov
Atomic Energy Institute in Moscow is
evident in the betatron and in the use of
explosively powered generators, U. S. offi-
cials explained.
Pavlovski has achieved fame and has
been named to the Soviet Academy of
Sciences for his work with pulsed power
systems. He has- been instrumental in
developing high-power compact genera-
tors for use with air-cored betatron accel-
erators, and the U. S. has many drawings
and photographs of the -generators. and
accelerators from Soviet scientific litera-
ture along with the physics computations-
"The power supply for charged-particle
accelerators, operating in the single pulse
regime, usually is effected from condens-
ers of inductive storage devices of electri-
cal energy," according to Pavlovski and
several of his associates. "More frequent-
ly, condenser banks are used, whose power
capacity often reaches tens and hundreds
of kilojoules and have, a mass of many
tons. These power supply sources can be
used mainly under steady state conditions.
At the same time, there are problems that
require the use of transportable accelera-
tor facilities. Because of this, a power
supply system has been considered for
high-powered, pulsed air-cored beta_tr_ns-
from magnetocumulative generators with
a specific power capacity that is greater by
a factor of thousands or tens of thousands
than condenser devices. The generation of
powerful electrical pulses iii the generators
is achieved by the efficient conversion of
the, chemical energy of explosives into
electromagnetic energy by means of com-
pression of a magnetic field by conductors
6t78 1y0er ,T-art]
b'fOTT3U$
and that it may be used within a year or so
in tests against ballistic missile targets.
If successful, it could open a whole new
era of warfare in which beams of energy
are used to engage and destroy targets-
Directed-energy weapons, according to
top-level Defense Dept_ officials, could
bring about a radical change in the bal-
ance of power in the world.
There is general agreement among some
U. S_ intelligence agencies that the device
at the range located in Kazakhstan is a
directed-energy weapon-a generic term
encompassing both particle-beam and
high-energy laser weapons- The device
being constructed at Saryshagan is code
named Tora.
"The argument that once existed
between. Air Force, Defense and Central
Intelligence agencies over whether the
Soviets are involved in developing
charged-particle beam weapons and their
rate of progress is no longer valid," one
Pentagon official said.
"If we were looking for a smoking pistol
two years ago, we've got one now," one
U. S_ beam weapons expert said. "Particle
beams as weapons are real, and we can see
the Russian machine taking shape from
overhead stuff," a reference to photo-
graphic reconnaissance satellites.
There still are some differences of opin-
ion among U. S. analysts and physicists on
the facility being constructed at Sarysha-
gan. Some of the officials believe it could
be a pulsed-iodine, exploding flash wire
pumped, high-energy laser. The predomi-
nant opinion, however, is that the device is
an electron-beam, air-cored betatron ac-
celerator using a series of magneto explo-
sive generators to produce the high power
-pulse necessary to accelerate the beam.
"There is no doubt they are building
something at that location,-and no argu-
ment. that it is a Russian' directed-energy -
weapon," one analyst said. "The differ-
ences of opinion are only over what kind A.
a beam weapon it might be." - -
Approved For Release
When Pavlovski talks about the mobili-1
ty of the system to power a betatron
accelerator at the power levels he hints at,
according to U. S. experts, he is making a
thinly veiled reference to a weapons appli-
cation. -
From the U_ S. reconnaissance photo-
graphs, Defense Dept. officials said, there
can be little doubt that there are rows of
magneto explosive generators all lined up
behind required shielding. Wires lead:
from them to an intermediate location,
and from there to an electron injector and
to accelerating modules of. the betatron-.
What seems to be confusing the issue
over. whether it is a particle-beam or high-
energy laser is recent information from the'
Soviet Union through a variety of intelli-
gence methods on development of a pulsed
iodine laser..
- - -
-"There is no monolithic service position,
no clean and convincing particle-beam
position," one physicist said-, "based on thel
somewhat equivocal information. We have
excellent photographs of the outside of they
machine, but none of the inner workings of
the accelerator. What is convincing is that
there are Pavlovski generators powering
the long, cylindrical device which certainly
resembles a betatron accelerator.
"Soviet scientists emphasize pulsed
pumping-of iodine lasers and that confuses
the issue. But you don *t need a long path
of that kind for a high-energy laser weap-'
on. It would tend to be a stubby, compact
design, not a long, thin' accelerator-like
machine." -
In an effort to determine if the Soviets
are making a scientific breakthrough inI
laser weapons with a short wavelength
iodine laser at Saryshagan, the Air Force
has contracted with the Los Alamos scien-
tific laboratory to build and test an iodine
pulsed laser along the lines of the device at
the range. I -
"It really doesn't matter much whether
it's a particle-beam or a laser weapon,"I
one U. S. official said. "What's important
to remember is that it has an awesomei
supply of energy from explosive genera-
tors, and it has a movable nozzle to aim
and control a beam. There is little doubt
from the location that the Soviets intend
to test it in the atmosphere against dynam-
ic targets."-
The Soviet Union has a large-scale
high-energy laser weapons development I
program and a massive charged-particle
beam effort, according to U. S. intelli?
100 ee#1ro9tes. The Soviets already have
an operational carbon dioxide gas dynamic
laser weapon pumped by an electron
beam. S_ analysts are eYnrrcdna r-nn- 1
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___WRTICLE APPRA-RED
ON PAG
COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIYr;
JULY/AUGUST 1980
Between Vietnam and Afghanistan,
the press forgot a lesson: beware of Pentagon sources.
Recent national security coverage reveals
a militant press-and few conscientious objectors
by ROGER MORRIS
eorge Kennan called it the greatest "militari-
zation of thought and discourse" since World
War II. With the embassy hostages languish-
ing in Teheran and Soviet troops crossing the Afghan
border American opinion this winter bristled with a
strident, frustrated chauvinism-and, from sea to
shining sea, American journalism bristled with it.
In part, the coverage of events may have only mir-
rored the national mood or heated political rhetoric,
but much of the season's combativeness clearly be-
longed to the slant and conventions of the news media
themselves. "The Chill Of A New Cold War," "Back
to Maps ,and Raw Power," headlined Newsweek and
Time, respectively, over January stories that thorough-
ly justified their titles. Writing from what he called "a
sense of black despair," syndicated columnist Joseph
Kraft joined a widespread and sometimes bitter edito-
rial attack\on what was seen as misguided restraint in
Washington. The Carter administration had shown
"no stomach for striking a deterrent posture," Kraft
complained in an early February column, and "has not
yet faced up to its responsibility as a superpower."
For'most of the media, the meaning of the Iranian
and Afghan crises seemed plain enough: ? the. United
Roger Morris, who has often written on foreign affairs for
the Review, is a contributing editor of The New Republic.
James Matthew Lyons helped to research this article. .
STAT
States had become ominously weak, and its Soviet en-
emy defiantly, perhaps decisively, stronger. "A wide
spectrum of military leaders," The fashington Post
somberly reported on January 3, a few days after the
Soviet occupation of Kabul, hoped that recent events
might at least have "a shock value that could prove,
beneficial." These crises should underscore U.S. mili-
tary needs, said the unnamed leaders, and. "help cure
the Vietnam `never-again' hangover of the American
public-"
Of the urgency of those "needs" there appeared lit-
tle doubt. The New York Times's venerable military
correspondent, Drew Middleton, wrote a steady
stream of articles on the subject from January through.
March. Drawn from a variety of "experts at the Pen-
tagon," Middleton's catalog of American military dis-
abilities seemed enough to give the fainthearted pa-
triot grounds for emigration. It would take a decade to
"redress" recent Soviet military gains, he reported-
The Merchant Marine and Atlantic fleets might be
fatally weak in wartime, he explained in a pair of ar-
ticles. In another piece he warned that "without a state
of national emergency or a tougher system of produc-
tion priorities," there would be a two-year lag in in-
creased production of new weapons. Another ominous-
article-reported that prominent Israeli military sources
had learned of huge Russian arms caches in the Mid-
dle East. To top things off, on March 9 Middleton
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137
rICLE AFFZ:%~!.D
ON ?AGE.
STRATEGIC REVIEW
Summer 1980
DEBATE OVER U.S. S 1 .TEG]
A MIXED RE-CORI)
LES ASPIN
THE AUTHOR: Congressman Aspin is Chairman of the
Oversight Subcommittee of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence and serves on the House Armed
Services Committee and the Government Operations Com-
mittee. He was first elected to Congress in 1970. Aspin
served in the U.S. Army from 1966 to 1968 as an economic
adviser in the office of the Secretary of Defense. He is a
graduate of Yale University, received a Master's degree from
Oxford University and a Ph.D. in economics from the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology.
IN BRIEF
The charge has resounded in recent times that the United States intelligence community has chron-
ically and woefully underestimated both the pace and, magnitude of the Soviet strategic build-up.
Yet, an analysis of the available record of forecasts with respect to eight major Soviet weapons de-
velopments-extending from the first Soviet A-bomb explosion in 1949 to the improvements in So-
viet ICBM accuracy and yields in the 1970s-shows that the performance has been mixed, consist-
ing of overestimates as well as underestimates, and in at least two instances of predictions that
were on or close to the target. Few of the mistakes that have been committed in forecasting can
be attributed to errors in intelligence gathering; most of them have been the function of more-or-
less inevitable- human- foibles. With the demise of SALT, estimates of future Soviet strategic pro-
grams are apt to be wider off the .mark than they would have been under a SALT 11 Treaty, because
the reference points provided by the Treaty for U.S. intelligence have been removed, and precisely
because the human element in intelligence evaluation and forecasting is thus again maximized.
"It is . . . a matter of record that the growth of
the Soviet ICBM force was underestimated for a
decade after the 'missile gap' by the entire intelli-
gence community-including Pentagon 'hawks.'-
Gen. Daniel O. Graham, USA (Ret.)
Lt.
he death of SALT II turns the focus of
U.S. strategic intelligence away from
"verification"
"forecasting." SALT provided for some
degrees of restraint and certainty: We knew
how far the Soviets were allowed to go, and the
`But the history of the past twenty years shows task was to verify their compliance with these
quite the reverse. Few indeed are the instances restrictions. Without SALT, there are no limits
when the Soviet military threat later turned out to or guidelines. The United States must rely
be greater than the estimated 'worst case.' Usually, purely on its skills in strategic forecasting-in
the governments experts overestimated the danger."
ro ectin the future, including future Soviet
Approved For R R@p 0f/$a ,sklA-ReVc1 g 1 0 OM bilities.
 ,........... , Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-011371
IRTICIii. A?YFAR-~D
02~ PAGy__
S'.i'RATEGIC REVIEW
SUMMER 1980
DEBATE OVER U.S ST A TEGF
A POOR RECOR-E
WILLIAM T. LEE
THE AUTHOR: Mr. Lee is a consultant to several govern-
ment agencies and private research organizations, and he
has written widely on Soviet military strategy and economic
matters. Mr. Lee served with the Central Intelligence
Agency from 1951 to 1964. He is the author of Soviet De-
fense Expenditures in an Era of SALT (USSR Report 79-1).
Congressman Aspin's assessment, while heralding a welcome Congressional attention to the prob-
lems of U.S. strategic forecasting of Soviet weapons developments,. does not portray accurately the
U.S. intelligence community's past performance in this crucially important arena. His scoring of the
eight cases of forecasting selected not only is too generous to the CIA and other U.S. intelligence,
agencies, but it also neglects the relative weight of the mistakes committed-particularly in the
failure to forecast the formidable build-up of Soviet strategic capabilities in the 1970s_ The record
of intelligence estimates becomes even.more grievous 'when looked at in the larger compass of the
'CIA's responsibilities, notably its estimates of Soviet defense expenditures. A rati faed SALT II Treaty
could not ease the problem; the solution, rather, lies in badly needed improvements in the intelli-
gence interpretation of the ample evidence available.
ongressman Les Aspin has offered an
assessment of U.S. intelligence fore-
casts of Soviet weapons systems devel-
opment and deployment that says, in effect:
We have won some, lost some and tied some.
Moreover, he implies that this is about the best
one can expect from intelligence forecasting of
Soviet weapons technology and deployments-
Congressman Aspin's assessment is welcome
on three counts. First, it needs pointing out, as
he does, that the U.S. intelligence services have
mates as well as many underestimates. Second,
public recognition of some of the intelligence
underestimates by a member of the Congres-
sional Select Committees on Intelligence is long
overdue. Third, at a time when the Congress
and the Executive Branch are negotiating a
charter to govern the activities of covert intelli-
gence collection and action, our attention needs
to be focused also on the neglected question of
how to accomplish improvements in the intelli-
gence analysis and projection of Soviet forces
a mixed reco Ml fP a P5t 9S9i&AQW"b3A: CIA tJP MrW 01Q8o9QIl01V'Se are about a
development: there have been some overesti- decade late in realizing that the repeated and
 ,3}a3 E13It7CKSMTrH - Intelligence Agency, and Seymour Weiss,
spxtal eo beN.e '*' f Ttme~ former director of the Bureau of politico.
WASEfj4d- ON, May 24-Late-in 1976; i~rfiIitaryAffairs at the State Department.
as Jimn~f Caster-was preparing to enter the- White House the American ;ntolli- ; other active figures worms
t
closely with Richard V. Allen, Mr-- Rea-
gan's principal campaign coordinator for-
mament . Agency; Laurence H. Silbea .
man, former Deputy Attorney General
and Ambassador to Yugoslavia; Robert`s
W. Tucker, a political science professor j -
at Johns Hopkins University, and Lieut.
Gen. Edward L_ Rowny, who *id as
the Joint Chiefs' representative at the
strategic arms talks to oppose ratifica-
tion of the second strategic arms limita-
tion treaty.
"It's a Republican gz pup, right astr ide
of Republican views ontoreigo policy and
defense," said Mr, A11en, a -1-?-year-old
specialist on Soviet and international eco-
nomic affairs who was Deputy Assistant:
President ixo
"'Th
t
diff
=
n_
o
ere are
er
ences i thin the group, but if we have any
area where there's unanimity, it would be
.or increased defensespending.".
Beyond that, the w-ritings of the intel-
lectual inner circle reflect a somber
world view, akin to Mr. Reagan's but pos-
sibly more pessimistic. Long before the
Soviet intervention in Afzhanistan
aroused new -skepticism about detente
and Soviet strategy, the Reagan advisers
were .disturbed by the buildup of Soviet
power and Soviet outward thrusts and
alarmed at what they saw as the leis of
tary of Defense Roberti. Ellsworth; for-
mer-Deputy Secretary, of the Treasury
C'naris E: Walker:: Adm. Thomas H.
f strategic. panty -with. the'- U--n_ited
Gies but for nuclear superiority '
This estimate of the- Soviet Union's
long-term strategic-buildup and its inten-.
tions, a striking dissent from American
intelligence estimates over theyears. be-
came sharply controversial. TMembers of
the outside panel, known as the "B team"
because the. Government's intelligence
experts were called the "A team," were
)accused of being alarmist, hard-liners
l bent on increasing' American military
'programs or scuttling the strategic arms
limitation talks. -
Since then..the= American intelligence-
agencies and even president Carter have
come to accept the B team's central con-
clusion- about Moscow's strategic goals.
Moreover;.members of the B team have.
become key foreign policy advisers to
Ronald Reagan, the almost certain Re-
publi can Presidential nominee.
The foreign policy and defense advis-
ers to the former California Governor,
now numbering over 90, have been ex-
tended beyond predominantly- conserva-
tive Republicans to include such experi-
enced officials as former Deputy Secre-
vas of outside experts who contended foreign policy. are Fred C_ 11de, former
uti
a-encecc-mmuni was}oltedby aforcet
critique rom an officially--appointed
American nuclear superiority and the'
general shrinkage of American power.. ?'_
re inn o
a
_
Chiefs of Staff,.`and-a sprinkling of such !.`.. - 5_,.v-_
Democrats-as-'Jearie'.J' Kirkpatrick; a ,`-:Writing in Comnientary in July 1977,
Georgetown University professor of gov- Professor Pipes, who headed the B team,
ernment_ hued-that the American concept otrnr'
clear -deterrence-was becoming out--I
r
] t? M be
I3
df
s
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CIN 2.) 1930
Advisers V;-ew'.
of So let into t -on>
an
u
? . e
n? em
s moded because the Soviet union was
At the core of the working groups is a preparing to fight and win a nuclear war.
i hand."ul of key B team members -- Wit= The Russians, he wrote, sought "not
liam. R.?Van-Cleave,a defense-policyana- deterrence but victory, not sufficiency in
lyst at the University of Southern Califor- weapons but superiority, not retaliation
nia; Richard E. Pipes, a Harvard histo- but offensive action." He added that "the
rian who has. written many books on the regime is driven by ideology, internal
Soviet Union; Lieut. Gen. Daniel O. politics and economic exigencies steadily
- - -.
pared ?, ,.. ~._-.- .,... __. w ri ~. J
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010009000
1:134 Y`J_- ~'1?,l ins
r
~
rr
1-
o 'v P 1.CrT.'.._ 13 rlAy 1930
By RICHARD BURT.
submarine-launched rockets by 1995..
Together with about 1-,000 weapons that
could be carried by Soviet grabens, the
intelligence group's "high estimate"` for
Soviet warheads in 1995 Is 17,CW, officials
viet ucie r 'E dam = --
Is Envisioned by enu
WASHINGTON, May. 112 _..American
i:iteili-trice services have concluded that
'I t !.he? next few years the Soviet Union.
c~)uid achieve an edge over the United
Crites in every major measure of strata
s?.c?- nuclear power,, including overall
iiurrihers?of missile.warheads, CarterAd-
1 ministration aides said today.
he aides said that the projection-eras
i,ne of the principal findings of a national
incelligence estimate completed by the
Central Intelligence Agency and other
;Tovernuwnt intelligence bureaus. The
estimate is now being circulated among
h? h-level policy mai ers and has-been
i ??ntedtnPr[sidentCarter.
ricoording to officials familiar -wn the
iin,=tnent, the Soviet Union, in.. the ab?-
:E?ance of the new nuclear arms treaty,
could posers a missile ? arsenal in 1985
c--ipahle of delivr.ring-.as many as?16,000
i?,:,clear -+a.rbeadsi against: the United
Estates. Otficials estimate that the United
Scats, in the same yeax,isliltely tohave
a _,rissile fore equipped with about 8,0'ai0
Debaie Ver Ip nber3
Some military expertts' contend that
bith Washington and. ioscow possess 50
many :nuclear warheads that ccsnpari-
s,;%vs of total numbers does not make
r Ich differerca..E3owever, American of-
ticials have traditionally pointed to
-rarheadss to argue
W shin.gtatu's lead in
zaL Moscow has not .surpassed the
u i noted States in strategic power- - ? -
\ioreover, some academic specialists
b-eiieve that. growth in'the numbers. of
Soviet nuclear warheads in the coming
d.m ade could-neutralize the Adnlinistra-
tico's plans for building a new mobile
missile, the MX.
While-othe~ as acts of fete llitelllg ice
is:tmate.:have apparently caused hs-
putts; the projections cn warhead num-
bers have, been welcomed by diverse ele-
rneucsiritheGovernmenL,' ' ;:, ?:?
sign a smaller portion of American mis-l
siles against targets in China and a lamer :
number a gainst the Soviet Union. ?
The balance in strategic forces has
been gradually shifting against the
United States since the late 1960's, when
?Mosctn initiated p.togl ams to deploy new ;
land-and sea-based ballistic missiles.
During the 1970's, the Soviet Union was'.
able to establish- an edge in such meal-
ures of strategic power as overall num-
bers of missiles and long-range bombers
azd.the total-payload that these systems
Clear U.S. Advantage in, 'iembers
But. the, United States; with a larger
part.ol its -missile forts equip--_d w:itia
multiple ?-rheads, possessed a i adran-
tagt over the Soviet Union in the 1970's in
the number?.,?bf ; nuclear-. weapocs that
could - be delivered : by : -the, two sides'
forces. Accordingly,. in the annual De-
fense Department report in January, Sec,
rotary of Defense ?Iarold Bra-, .m said that
Washington possessed a total force of
abort 8,lX) warheads on its land- and
seams ~_- r2issiles, c cnpa.re-d with 8,V W
for `Iioecow. -
Officials said that over the next five
years, the .American total'-yas unlikely to
change significantly. In 151.5, the said,
the laird-bled missileorce -:wild be
equipped with about 2, l CO warheads while
sea-based roc ets would carry about
Air : orce bombers, they added; could
deliver: another 3,C XJ nuclear weapocs,
consisting of bombs and air-launched
During the same perfcd, the afficlals
said, the intelli,aerce estimate Arta
that without the new arms pact Mcscaw
outdid put as many as 11,090 warheads on
its existing force of 1;140 land-base Mis-
sile'; and as many as 5,0)0 additional
warheads could befitted to Moscow's 950
Proponents of arms Control "fn:--the
W-bite-13ouse and. the?-State -Department
said- the estimate demonstrated the' im-
portance of approving the strategic arms
pact., which -w uld place limits on. nu.m-
b'rs of Soviet warheads. The reaty,
signed June 18, 1979, was before the Sen-
ate when the Soviet Union intervened
militarily in Afghanistan. The
Adminis- tration then asked that consideration. of
I the pact be postponed as part of its effort
to induce Moscow to withdraw its forces.
At- the Pentagon, officials said the re-
plort strengthened their case for deploy-
ing the Air Force's new MX mobile mis-
sile, which-would give American forces
an additional 2,000 warheads in the late
A ged F-?e Retease 2066/01130?
- Other defense aides said that Moscow's
growing nuclear' arsenal.. set against
Washington's improved political ties with
The officials said that If the new arms
treaty . was finally - ratified, this total
could be cut by about half. By placing a
ceiling of Flt) ?on land-bbased' missiles -
ffia multiple warheads and by i
d r
i
a
pe
e4u
1 freezing numbers of nuclear bombs, that
J
could be placed on individual 'missiles,
the new accord, officials said, would per-
mit Moscow to deploy culy about 8,500
warheads through 1983. -
 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000
:ll~ L f. JS-_
By .Michael Getler
Washin[LOn. i4m, Scslt writer,_,
An extraordinary- split has . Bevel..
oped between military and civilian
telligence agencies over conclusions-
-reached by the director of the Central.
Intelligence Agency about the balance
of strategic rnilitarv= power between,'
the-'United States.and the Soviet Cu-,
.ion-..
The military--agencies;area-arguing-.
-.thatM:the.C[Asumriary,.of?;a top-se-
cret government-wide- assessment af
the Hower- balance,: which does to
:President Carter, not represeiata-
tive" of: the analytical work that went--
into preparing that assessment..
-Perhaps more= iuiport antly, -the mill.
tary contends that the: job of compar--
ing: U.S::-and.:.Soviiet. forces and, how
they might fare in. an- atomic struggle':
constitutes what is called a '-net' as-
sessment" Preparing - such assess'
ments, they?eontend,-is the prerogative?-
of?the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Defense Department rather than. the..;
CfA.
The - CIA,.. this argument goes,
should confine ?itself-tofiguring out
what the Soviets are doing..
The.. dispute -centers on the latest
version of the National Intelligence
Estimate, which does from the nation"
top intelligence. - officer, CIA. chief
Stansfield Turner, a - former admiral,.,
to the president
That Turner is at the center of this
dispute is-not surprising. The ex-Navy
man. has been the target of some criti-
cis._from both military. and, civilian--;
defense officials in'recent- years'as he,
under Carter's-orders, :has--solidified
his'somet'imes- controversial,.-codtrol..
over-the nation's-ihtelligence'-appara-
tus.
Because .the: National Intelligence
Estimates are widely circulated''a'mong
the top rungs of government and'*are
so authoritative,. these estimates :have
great. importance within the bureau=-
cracy in sl"ialling-.future U.S.-.national':
security. policy`on many issues:`*". - :'
--Officials-say that,the-NIE sure ary'
contains what', is-`called a "footnote
but-which in fact is a sharp dissent by .
-the Pentagons -:military-run , Defense-
Intelligence Agency (DIA) --together
with the--intelligence chiefs- of-:the:
three armed services -- , '? ..~ :.
Approved
THE 'iASHINGTON POST
9 '-lay 1980
~ , dministratian . sources -: call the
t;readth of. the- split with .the civilian
formed Pentagon -source says:- "It is
fair,ta-say this.,is:probably as strong
an -assertion of. dissent: on the-part of
the-DIA,.to-thy director-of?.cen':.ral-in_
telligence" as has c eezn ;registered. =
The-Sta;,e,Department's--'-Bureau of
Intelligence ?ahd Research aid: the su
per-secret National. security:._:a;ency
did--notr:joikt- _ia the, di sseat,:;.sources
The actual conclusions ofthe report
a xehighly:cassified;:but.source -sUg-
'gest they- cons; a, mixed.- bag of- as-_ailv
sessments that trouble the military=
On the one hand',-the defense agen=
cies are said to believe that the report
underestimates the-.'relmtiye momen-
c . military
t:of the- Soviet 'strat et g
um
..buildup: -in comparison to that of
United. States, arguing iii. effect, that
the.:picture---iss' evext'.'g comer-` than
presented -tiff _
Yet ?the' `nnilitafy" also'?cofltends
other sources say, that.: the new report
overestimates the Soviet-? threat that,
could^.: he -mounted against.-the -Penta-'l
gon'splanned ti super-i -issile. 1
The.-military is counting on the MX
as its. ,future land-based, long-range
miss ileforce.: Critics contend the-Sovi-
ets,-with-their bigger missiles, -will a1
ways be able to lob enough atomic
warheads at _ the MX s elters to make
surv:wal of _a~-feiv.:'af tliehz-notworth
at.l
the- huge`:oost,: esizmated -by= some
iililI 'ti: Supporters ..off
more $60
MX argue that the Russians wouldn't
that fashion;; ' _ -
rise their miss il s in
-: CI. Officials :sa~r_- that full-scale net
as se3sments;!inrolving;st}ch things, as
paper tivar;.games:< t : ,figure.;out; who
-wins, :are :indeed,., thePentagon's. jolr.
Re; CIA claims,-zit is,. ;n..ot doing-.that
but rather has been using "amore so-
phisticated forna of-. analysis in recent
years":. arid,. "adding some juci ;meats"
to? its.findings rather than- just count-
ing Soviemiasiles_.::
-,:The::CIA . offici.alsiicontend =the
many.peopla. within .the'; government
find this-technique helpful, in, assess
ing.the..power.-balance,. a:claim-con-
`? firmed: in interviews: with'civilian off:-
cials elsewhere in''governmeint=
Sbxne CIA. officials. suspect' the mill-
tary objections -at this:_time,:may have
a.n "element- of.,polities.:to=them seer=
in perhaps to take advantageaf an
election year to support th ose arguing
for higher. defense spending in face of
the Soviet threat
Pentagon sources suggest it undvetb=
tedly. will be left -to the president to
.resolve.he -dispute over:. who--does
what-kind'-6f The're'port
summary also. has.-gone to-.-.Capitol
Hill, and sources say. the House sub-
committee, af' ...tell genee- oversight-
p'robablywill. begin closed- loon hear,,
ergs next-.week on the report,. includ-
irg: the ,disputed _` footnote-" ? ,:
,:;.The I's at tonal ._.Inteliigen _ sti
mates, produced by--the entire. u.S. in-.
telligence community;.'normally: 'in-
clude at least two. main volumes,-.the
summary and- the back-up factual and
analytical data. ? - >;i ;r ?. ,. -TMr :=.':'.,1
The-summary` section'-bft1he'dlspu -
ted` NIE, number 1138, was 'compl'eted
in mid-March.-The second volume: o?
back-up data is scheduled to he urea--
lated very soon ; sources indicate, ?-?. - :,
In the past; . there have been othe.r.-
dissenting- footnotes to these report
Lute officials suggest they, usually]
have' been over - technical matters, t
d
ba
e
such as the
[a ovCr the range ur.-t
the, new Russian Backfire bomber and
whether it is aimed at U.S.' targets or
other targets -closer- to the S_ ovi.et__Un.
ion-in?China..
-,'In the current='dispute, the-DI:' and
military ehie-Is axe understood to have
"disassociated.'-. theim ellea from . -the
summary .presented:?by -Turner, cont
tending that-it concentrates?,too much.-
-q"-u- and gives..,
too little welgat to Sovie.mi:litary
doctrine, policy;-: overall capability,
momentum. and future Programs.:-
::SirnilarLY; thez=tnilitary_Js -said---to
contend; that-the kind.of analy'sis?used
in.-the summary -distorts?,judginents.
and that these=-are shaped too much
by U.S. thinking, rather-than on So-
viet thinking; bix strategic matters:- ..-
-Though ?Tui-iier also' is'-not without
his critics elsewhere in the civilian;.
run agencies t of: government, =_ on this .
issue the--former admiral- seems--to:-
`have supporters.
One adx imiatratioh:sourtea%says he,
haq grudging-?=- admiration for
Turner in,?re?using- to.budge.from his
position, once he -and:bis analysts-are
`
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-ar-e _r
 Approved For Release 2006/01/30: CIA-RDP90-01137R000100 90001-9
THE NATION!
5 April 1980
r SOVIET INTENTIONS
e CO-L.A.s
Debate
DALE VAN ATTA
community which moves with one voice and makes
irrefutable conclusions based on vast technological
and human resources has been eroding ever since
the Iranian revolution caught them by surprise in the winter
of 197879- The mixed reviews they have received over their
predictions and advice regarding the Afghanistan invasion
has further challenged any notions of infallibility. -
Ignored in most of the commentary on "intelligence
failures," however, is a basic issue that has caused a deep
schism among key analysts for more than a decade-the in-
tentions of the Soviet Union. Only the analysts, reviewing
covert information from ingenious listening devices and
spies, are expected to give their final estimation to the Presi-
dent. But it turns out that they don't know any more than the
rest of us-or at least have the same disagreements over such
issues as the usefulness of the SALT 11 treaty and Russia's
next step after taking Afghanistan.
No document has shown this schism more clearly than an
internal Central Intelligence Agency paper coded "Top Se-
cret Umbra" and entitled: "Understanding Soviet Strategic
Policy, Objectives." The relatively dry but erudite account
of splits in the community over this issue was authored by-a
C.I.A. analyst, Fritz Ermarth, and disseminated to about 100
top policy makers on December 8, 1975, in the National In-
telligerce Daily, a supersecret newspaper. The unprecedent-
ed decision to publish such an analysis immediately after the
appearance of the "National Intelligence Estimate," which
represented the community's consensus on the subject that
year, was explained by the editors as an attempt to air "the
spectrum of arguments that specialists in the intelligence
community had to deal with in reaching the estimate's key
judgments."
he concept of a monolithic American. intelligence
nsiders agree that Ermarth's analysis still holds:'up
and reflects even more accurately the "groupings";of
analysts over the Afghanistan situation today than it
did for those on the SALT II debate at the time. Er-
_LL marth, who is now a high-level strategic adviser on'the Na-
tional Security Council, began:
very elusive. Pertinent evidence is voluminous; but it almost
never speaks for itself. Interpretation of the evidence always -
involves our preconceptions about the Soviet Union as a na-
Because of their som
documents, Ermarth observes, U.S. analysts "do not have
complete and explicit intelligence" on Soviet military doc-
trine. `Although Nye differ on important details, analysts in-
side and outside the U.S.- intelligence community tend to
agree on the broad outlines.... Soviet doctrine clearly pos-
tulates that war-waging forces are desirable for both deter-
rence and conflict, emphasizes counter-force capabilities and.
targeting, and stresses the value of preemption as well as the
need to have a survivable retaliatory capability." -
Where the analysts divide, however, is on the questions of
the sway of the military in the Politburo and the importance
Soviet leaders attach to military doctrine. Continues Er-
marth: - - -
Where we differ most is on how important doctrine actu- ?
ally is for Soviet policy or how well it-reflects the actual
thinking of Soviet leaders.
Some of us believe that it is quite literally prescriptive for
and descriptive of Soviet behavior. They point out that the
Soviets have serious deployment or R&D [research and
development] programs in all areas required by their war-
fighting strategic doctrine. Whatever the obstacles, the
Soviets keep plugging away at the requirements of doctrine,
perhaps only falling back temporarily when technological
problems are severe, as in the ABM [anti-ballistic missile)
: _
area.
Others tend to regard Soviet doctrine as much less pre-
scriptive for actual military policy. They.see in it a good deal
of pretense and exhortation really intended to support troop
morale, ideological prejudices, and parochial service inter-
ests. They point to the quasi-religious themes of "victory".
and "superiority" in the literature as examples- _
They believe that Soviet political and military leaders are
free to ignore doctrine when they make practical decisions,
as these leaders have-habitually ignored or manipulated the
ideas of Marx or Lenin. In this vie'-Y, Soviet decision-makers
admit to themselves that attaining the requirements of doc-
trine is vastly more difficult than Pontificating on them- -
As for assessing the role strategic power may play in any
Soviet foreign policy move, that too is difficult, according to
Ermarth, because "again we have to start with ambiguous
evidence and divergent interpretations.'.' -But he is able to
narrow down the divisions into two rough groupings:
Some of us believe that the Soviet acquisition of overall
strategic equality has given the USSR a new platform from
which to exploit opportunities and to press its global in-
terests?even to the point of accepting strategic confronta-
tion with theU_S. They believe that the political role of stra-
tegic power impels the USSR to increase that power which
will, in turn, give the USSR even greater sway in the world.
Others take the view that at present levels the two sides'
strategic forces tend to cancel each other., out and that,
always cautious, Soviet behavior in 'potential confrontation
areas-will be governed primarily by local risks and oppor-
tunities Those of this opinion believe it to be not onlyobjec-
tively true, but also to be shared by the leaders of the USSR.
tion, internatiA> _ i F% c 2(~lgt~ /~veCIA~RDP90-0
?;:
and the condition of our own country.
 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001-9
BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS
March 1980
Qu ry
For a Ciochmrai on N,I,
tlltnal ti'tCIII-gence I,siial: ititi, I
would like it, eoniaet l.tl'n;e:' Ill iI tI \
anti ei~'iii:in inteliiP1.0
people \thtt p:u-ti:i rated in r]ral'tini-,.
eaitinl- or ;ip r'tn-inq: National tn!el!i
Bence tatini rtes or thco;c t enhlt :t;
signed to the Ofti,:c of National
Estini tc,, the N:tti,)n;d Seeut'ilt
Council staff. liihtttrv Intclligern_c
stalls. Or
inter' ;1~crteti' aria!}riical
working ~~1 )ntlti hettl ~l.'11 I )ti[) ,1114
1904.
Please contact I):t:ti l F'Iamher .
220 West 91rd Street. New Yvr.,
New York 10025.U.
r
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 f 17 ::L:'? ved For ReI~ q~ Pffl/Rqy R '8p ?fj c Pot
o; 'AG P. 25 February 1980
m
s .Rr Ju T
.&d to
Cfl~ dr X.
Strategic
Washington--Defense Dept_ factions
pressing for a new manned bomber are
demanding more accurate U._ S_ intelli-
gence estimates of the Soviet Union's stra-
tegic
- The bomber proponents claim that the
U. S. must move immediately toward eith-
er a stretched version of the General
Dynamics FIB-111- with increased range i
and payload, or to the Rockwell Interna-
tional B-1 to counter Soviet strategic supe-
riority.
According to several high-level Penta-
gon officials, President Carter's decision
to halt B-I production and to delay engi-
neering development of the MX advanced
ICBM was-the result of faulty National
Intelligence Estimates. The Carter B-1
decision came after he received Central
Intelligence Agency estimates of Soviet
strategic weapons strength issued in
December, 1976_ This was the most recent
National Intelligence Estimate at the time
Another Defense Dept. official added in response, but we would still be gather-
that there already is a severe problem with ing information on the location of the
the ICBM leg of the triad surviving an attack, and we must be capable of saving a
attack by Soviet ICBMs now on line, and portion of the force in reserve for second
that there is no way for the U. S. to begin strike or war Fighting capability. This I
to reverse this situation until the MX i gives an added impetus to acquiring a new
system starts to become operational in manned bomber-pronto," he said. ? .
1986. But it will be 1989 before MX is ii The official explained that rif~ the U. S
fully operational. USAF asked for an early warning system and b
initial operational capability of 1983 but over-the-horizon radars could determine
could not get the Administration to move that only the Minuteman force was under
the missile into engineering development attack, the U. S. could have the options of
because of the intelligence estimates, the trying to ride out such an attack or could
officials emphasize. _ launch on warning- "But we reed a new
stem early warning
rt s
y
defense .suppo
Because of the vulnerability of the spacecraft to aid us in making targeting
ICBM force, the U. S. must look at the assessments, and funding has been delayed
bomber leg of the triad to take up the on it," he said.
slack in warhead delivery. "We only need Part of the problem is that Defense
a bomber system through the.1980s, but it Secretary Harold Brown is expressing
must be more efficient than the Boeing doubts about the capability of the B-1 to
B-52 in terms of being able to penetrate penetrate Soviet air defense and survive.
Soviet air defense," one service official
said. He added that the Soviets are testing Penetration Feasibly
new-technology weapon systems now at "That logic doesn't hold up," another
The President's decision to delay the
cruise missile program also was based on
inaccurate intelligence estimates, the offi-
cials claim. In the 1976 National Intelli-
gence Estimate Carter used in deciding on
B-1 bomber production, the CIA esti-
mated the Soviets' capability then and
where they would be vis a vis the U. S. in
1982 and 1985, the officials said. "And
they were off by an order of magnitude in
estimates of real Russian nuclear weapons
capability," one Pentagon official said. .
He added that in the spring and
summer of 1978 a new National Intelli}
genre Estimate was prepared that for-the
first time began to pick up Soviet strategic
nuclear weapons momentum, ICBM accu-
racy, basing.and numbers of reentry vehi-
cles being deployed- The year before that
the Strategic Air Command had already
determined from available information
that the USSR had reached parity with
the U. S. and that the momentum was
continuing with the aim of achieving
nuclear weapons superiority.
In the last two National Intelligence
Estimates, in 1978, and again in 1979,
there were massive jumps in the analysis
of Soviet nuclear force capability, one
official contends.
Sary Shagan that make not only bombers pefense Dept_ official said, "1f the pilots
but cruise missiles as well vulnerable if the flying tactical aircraft in NATO countries
U. are successful. He added that the must penetrate Soviet air defenses their
U. S. already is in the early phase of survival chances are at least as good and
looking for a countermeasures system, probably not as good as a bomber
Officials in the Pentagon believe the ppabhardened to the nuclear environment wih
U_ S. is now in a position where there are countermeasures equipments. So you see,
few choices available to the President. The the implications in this logic go far beyond
Minuteman force could be virtually elimi- a new manned bomber. We are convinced
noted by a first strike Soviet attack, they that we are smart enough through a
said, so that in reality the U. S. will be combination of tactics and electronic
able to rely only on its bomber and subma- countermeasures to keep pace with. the air
rive-launched ballistic missile forces in the defense threat:'.
1980s. He added that the Tactical Air Com-
Part of the problem,-ant official said, is mend, Strategic Air Command and U_ S.
that the U. S. will only receive information Air Forces Europe are all confident that
of "a gross attack warning within the first aircraft still can penetrate the USSR and
few minutes from an early warning satel- survive_
lite. If it is not degraded by jamming." He
said it would be 15-18 min. before U.S.
targets could be determined.
"ICBMs and SLBMs could be launched
The U. S. has invested 10 years in devel-
opment time and about 55 billion in the
B-1 bomber program. "There is no doubt
that the B-1 is the best penetrating
aircraft the U.S. has ever developed, am
if we can manage to live with the cost w,
should acquire it," the official added- "Bu
we could get the stretched FB-1 11 a yea
or so faster and at $7 billion less than th
B-1. In - today's climate of a significan
USSR nuclear weapons advantage it wi
be hard to get anyone to say that the
year's difference may not be important-"
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AAT1CL 3C?P r7
b:# FAG -- _
But Critics Despair
That Spy Agent
Can't Do_Good Job.
Second of to arricJe
By Henry S. Bradsh er
. washingtonStar Staff Writer _
-Looking casual in a navy blue
cardigan but speaking intensely, -
Stansfield Turner gazed out the glass,
wall of his office, atop, the CIA head- I
quarters at Langley, over the bare
dusky woods toward the distant
lights of Washington and exuded
confidence about his organization-
"I'm just very optimistic these
days," Turner said. "I've been very
impressed by the quality of our
human intelligence- activities," the
CIA director said. And U.S. technical
intelligence is superlative, he added..
In other government offices in the
city, most of.them looking across
concrete courtyards at other-offices
instead of having spacious views, in
the private, offices of people who-
have left the government, in small.
restaurants, rants, in telephone' calls from
coast to coast, others talk about the.
CIA. too:
Some, like 'former. CIA Director'
William E. Colby and former Deputy
Director Enno Henry Knoche, talk
for quotation about things like re-
strictions on the agency. But most
prefer to discuss the agency's prob-
lems from the protection.._ of. anonymity.
Turner understandably is'angered
by this, especially on.the most emo-
tional aspect of his three-year tenure
at Langley, the forced retirement of
people from the. clandestine serv-
ices. He argues that he rejuvenated
an aging agency.
"The? next time someone tells--
YOU, he said. "that Turner fs-the -
stupid bastard who cut the size of
the agency. out here, look at the
color of his hair.. ?.. This is a young,
man's game, and we are better equip-
ped today than we were three years
sago" for clandestine operations.
.: 1
THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
5 February 1980 1
The CIA is composed of three main;
branches. The clandestine or opera-
lions branch handles spying and
covert operations. like 'intervening
? secretly in other countries'- affairs
or organizing guerrilla movements..;
Another branch supervises techni--
cal intelligence, including recon-41
naissance satellite photography and
communications intercepts. An ana-
lytical, branch pulls information {
together for government policymak-
ers.
The controversy that has marked
Turner's almost three years at the
agency focuses on the, operations
branch. There is also widespread but
less publicized distress around
Washington about analysis.
In both cases, Turner inherited
problems. His.critics say he exacer-
bated them; his supporters contend)
that he has done much to clear them
Once Was Twice as Large-
The Vietnam war and-the CIA's)
"secret army". in Laos, added to
.worldwide spying. pushed the num-.
ber of agency operatives to 8,500 in I
the late 1960s. - roughly double itsj
present size. As the Nixon adminis-1
tration began to reduce U.S. commit-
ments in Indochina,?personnel had
to be reduced by attrition, transfers
and other means.
During his brief tenure as CIA
director, James R. Schlesinger,
speeded up a cutback. Colby, his!
successor, continued the program, I
and so did George Bush during his
year as director. Most sources agree
that they were handled sensibly.
Then President Carter took
'.Turner from his navy admiral's com-
mand and sent him to- Langley. He
arrived with what the old CIA hands
considered to be a skeptical, even
hostile, attitude.
This set a chilly tone to his take
over, despite 'his own explanations
that he simply wanted to.bring bet-
ter management to'a sometimes un-
coordinated operation.- His suspi-
cions of the need for drastic changes
were quickly reinforced by the
resignation.of John Stockwell, a 40-
-year-old agent in the unsuccessful
CIA effort in Angola.... . _.- :...
sent out the-first 212 pink slips on j
Oct. 31, ?1977-
Although. smaller than previous'
cuts, this one was handled differ
:-ently and hit harder at lifetime,;
professionals in the spying and para-
military trades.
Says Cuts Helped Agency
"The cuts in personnel that every-
one still complains to me about have
strengthened the agency's covert ac-
'?tion capabilities," Turner said
"You don't run a good, strong
paramilitary or covert action pro-
gram with.a bunch of 5:-year-olds;'
he said.. "What I've done is cut out
high-grade superstructure ...and ::
doubled the input into the clandes-
tine services .. so that we have a
group of young tigers, and there's
enough accumulated experience
and expertise around to- guide
them." _ .;
This is strongly challenged by peo-
ple in a position to know.
- "Whatever Turner says, they can't
puton a show," says a Pentagon offi-
cial who is very familiar with the CIA's present operational capabil-
ities. 'We know that over -in? this [
building..'' ---_-
Other sources spell this out
more detail- One says the CIA's corps.i
of paramilitary specialists who could
help organize, for instance, a more !
effective Afghan resistance to Soviet".
control has declined from about 200 -1
to, 80,: aud- many of the 80 lack the -
broad experience needed. for effec
tiveness. _:.: ? _ .:
But Colby comments hat, if the
people in. an operational area feel
CIA help is vital, they will find ways
to-speed it up. , . ? ? . ?
The '.worst, part ''of. Turner's..
changes, numerous present.and re=
tired officials say, is what they did to-
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is now coming: oaci up,. vipers say -
that.it is at best bumping alongside-.,
*WINIA suffered; but contends it'_
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FAG3?
THE WASHINGTON POST
31 January 1980
e Isi''FaleSaid
sv Need. far....SALT
' But' with 14,000 Soviet warh
By Michael Getler
and Robert G_ Kaiser House,x.Pentagon. and, State. I).epart-
-
some -11,000-., could be aimed ' at
recent days
washlattton Post Scat writers rnent,said in interviews in
that the prospect of.a..world, without
threat and calling the whole MX
The nation's top intelligence ? offi-
now conceived,into quest
eet, a
? SALT- -aa_starkly defined by.the new
cials this week are completing a grim
N LE , -could jolt the country and the
To maintain survival of half
new estimate predicting that without ,
Senate-into the. realization that SALT
MX force-under- an uncontrolled
:
a Soviet-American strategic ? -arms
viet'?expansion; specialists say:
is. now more urgent than ever
agreement, Soviet rockets in 1989 -will. II
the first crude estimates.'itndert
be able to rain nearly 250 percent
But" other administration officials- numerous sources on Capitol Hill
-indicate it could mean tripling
more atomic warheads on the United
land needed in Utah and tievad
States than they would if constrained
Tressed the belief that the' Senate
handle still more silos and do
by SALT II and successor agreements.
otild:hever be convinced to act favor
.e cos
The new National Intelligence Esti- th t
ably. oil -SALT"Il this year while So-
It is this kind' of calculation
mate--NiIE 1138-79-indicates that by vie
~i'ineriean relations; are tense. -
top civilian'officials believe
1_ 89, the. Soviet could. have about.
some
"tit title'`the intelligence .estimate is
14,000 highly. accurate warheads 'classified; some government
have what one called '"a pro
mounted on . their land-based missile
t O rr at[yfieii1s' who support SALT' are will-
sobering: on. people'
force aimed at the-United States. Urt
iriq to"'lliscuss the broad figures psi and impact' on
captions. of:_what=the realities
der current plans, the United States
vateljf;:believing-they support the case
world without SALT will mean.
would have only a fraction of this for the treaty77
The idea of ? building a budge
amount. By U.S. estimates,-the Soviets
ing Mai -that might not even
critics in the Senate and else-
would have about 6.000 such warheads
:mission is .certain:to -reope
b reject' alarmist views of the
under a SALT II treaty, which would
ill silos, 'almost - quadrupling- SALT I agreement an" offensive
orld?} ithout SALT, arguing that the its
arguments and _ start: new- on
expire in 1985 but could be extended. ?
'American procurement policy.
S& ie& wiI1 not. reach- the high num=
These still secret figures are- the
the
For examples some members o
b?rs oi~ warheads predicted in _
first concrete contribution to an emer-
gress. and administration officia
I_l."because they v ill :.Trot "need
gency debate within the government
already talking privately abou
them=~=
about one consequence of the Soviet
g earlier ideas for missile
owi
By extending the new intelligence
invas:an of Afghanistan, and subse
can be carried aloft and fired fro
"esttnTate` out to 1989, the intelligence
.quent derailing of SALT II, that has
planes.. Other ideas are to mo
officials throughout the government
received scant public attention thus
ward- a new class of less expe
who prepare iational=Intelligence Es-
fare
- more accurate- missile-carrying
timates for the-president. cover the pe-
This debate- is ? prompted by the
marines; or- even to go back t
riod in which the new U.S. super-mis
widely - pereived. conclusion that the
idea of in`stalliii "anti-ballistic' m
sile, the- MX, is supposed to be fully
( BM) `defenses around- existin
United States is in danger of enteril!g
deployed.
sile silos to-protect ? against - a
into a tense pericd of confrontation
The United States is'currently plari-
tYBl3's... are banned by the SA
with the Soviet Union without a ci-
ning to build 200 of. these huge mis-
treaty,'::so. reverting to them
herent or broadly supported policy of
riles,.each - carrying 10 warheads. The'
amount- to "the- death- of arm
dealing: with 7tut le tr weapons.. =
- idea is,to- truck. them: around concret'e
troll,' -:one official. said. ` :
The administration hoped it had "
racetracks" in desert valleys of Utah
? For now- President. Carter h
such a policy-built around the SALT II
andj`Tevada,. hidingitem at randozii
Glared a. Policy of respecting the
treaty and,a program of new strategic
in'=4;60Q~concrete` sh'elte'rs as?
on arms contained. in both the S
arms procurement that went with .it. protec?
tion::against a Soviet=strike.:.The.sys-
and..Il agree.ments.' The Soviet&
Even before the Soviet invasion of Af
tem~xs estimated to cast?between $30
'.ingness . to do the "same, " whe
billion: and $100 hillipn
ghanistan,'this policy like the treaty -was in. serious trouble, but now it
pons. has lapsed and the SA
But:'the arcane arithmetic ' of n it_
appears to be on the verge of unravel-
treaty has not .been ratified;. w
clear forces that drives the armsrace
ing: _ -_.-,.- -._., ._. _ :.
tested this spring. - : ? _: - .
":could., change drainaticallyl without
Senior administration officials now
To continue respect?rig the SA
SAL?T"limits in- force,'"raising ques-
limits, the-Sovietswill probably
tions about whether-this-=MX. project
see a dangerous paradox-that the to- viet invasion of Afghanistan, poter_-
L a?'schere. of--unprecedented '- cost
tially a threat. to U.S. security, has-
'and. complexity-is.the right answer.
prevented_ passage of a Soviet Ameri-
'Under SALT, government special
can arms agreemett that they, beli&-ve
fists estimate the Soviets could epos
clearly serves the. countrys security
sibly aim 3,000 warheads-at the iIX'
interests.
silos, with the ? rest of their arsenalI
For these officials, the new National
aimed.at.other U.S.. missiles and mili-
Intelligence Estimate provides proof
tary and civilian. targets: about half-.
that SALT II would put crucial con-
straints on a Soviet missile buildup the attack, MXtheyforce believe would , surviveenoughato still
that otherwise oltj. O
thre
Y Se 26. /L PP3'~t C'Il~t. 91 0!tpb900100090001-9
vivability oft i~a
eads,
'-the
the
projr
s
ion..
' the
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ALT I
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Several -' officials in the.--White
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4'r?1~ N K~1 Sr+..hw
CN PAGI'
Professional Note
MARINE CORPS GAZETTE
January 1980
Q1V
by Capt Roger E. Mahoney
Earlier this year the Marine Corps
was welcomed into the national in-
telligence community when the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence, retired
Adm Stansfield Turner, notified the
Commandant of his decision to ele-
vate the Marine Corps to observer
status on the National Foreign In-
telligence Board (NFIB). It is not in-
significant that this move followed
closely the elevation of.the.Con:tman-
dant on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
What needs to be explained in light
of this move is what part the Marines
can play in intelligence matters on the
national level: Or perhaps just as im-
portant-what benefit will the Corps
realize from this enhanced stature?
Figure I displays the members of the
NFIB and shows the kind of company
the Marine Corps will enjoy as a
member of the national intelligence
community.
The mission of the NFIB is to ad-
vise the Director of Central In-
telligence on national intelligence
matters, including the budget. The
Board helps coordinate national in-
telligence. production and seeks op-
timum coordination between all in-
telligence collectors, producers, and
users. The NFIB is thought to be the
only forum where representatives of
the entire intelligence community
come together to discuss common or
singular problems.
The role of actually aiding in the
production of national intelligence is
a tricky matter. The HQMMC intelli-
gence division is certainly riot suffi
ciently manned to allow the taking on ;
of a major role in the preparation of;
national intelligence products. The
Marines have always been, and will
probably continue to be, intelligence
users and not producers. It is not an
unforeseen possibility, hogvever, that';
we will be tasked to contribute ana-
lytical personnel, from time to time,
to aid in the formulation of National.:
Intelligence Estimates (NIEs).
An NIE, usually classified, is a na-
tional level judgment rendered at the
direction of the President's National
Security Council. It is based on
review and analysis of all intelligence
available which bears on the subject.
The Director of Central Intelligence
has under hits a staff of topically or
regionally designated National in-:
telligence Officers (NIOs). When P..
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001
2TI.CLE i ~ E iR D
TEL ;li~':G JC n~ (.';iIa-ingt.o ,, )el.
'
7__ ?~i GL 1 27
JUn 10/79
body iaentuieu.: as. LIVI
ByTOETRFNTO..,,u~u~.,w,.--.:......
and RICHARD SA.NOZA and to produce witnesses .who be-_:: loyalty to the agency,. where he..1
heve he was murdered. worked for 21 years and. partict-'
WASHINGTON - A member of Several of the experts on Soviet, paled in'developing some of the
the secret U.S. team formed to weaponry,.who served on the B.` assessments that came under the
check independently on CIA as Team said yesterday Paisley was-y; scrutiny of the B Team.' sessments of Soviet . military the prime suspect of leaks that re The B Team's role was to see if
stremgth says someone ought to suited in news articles damaging. -I' the CIA -and Paisley had done
-find out why information about the to their secret mission. a thorough lob in assessing Soviet
group's activities was leaked. The reporter who wrote the 1976:_ 'strength. Paisley. served as.execu--.,,.
Deceased ex-CIA official John story confirmed that Paisley was tie director or coordinator of the..
A. Paisley has been identifiecf as a a prime source for his New York team and had access to the highest.." source of the leak. And Seymour Times article. -David .Binder's,: level ofclassified material.
-:-
Weiss, one of the leaders of the se- story revealed That some mem-'.A
cret team. said yesterday it could hers of .B Team thought the CIA. When he, disappeared last year
.be that Paisley was working for had undet'cstimated Soviety, milt= he was working on-a report for the
-the Soviets. Other members of teh "', Lary, strength The story shocked".
CIA raft ofut th B Team. pso e thA
unit - known as the B Team the intelligence-? community be-'. boat; the Brirep `wheel it tvas
pooh pooh the notion, but Weiss; cause. the team's very existence:' adrift .in,e Chesapeake
e tivas supposed lobe top secret.. found Bay _ .; :..e *? eakv.,
said he thinks some investgativ th
body ought to check into Paisley's Binderconceded that while it i9r..
motives. The B Team was fortned in 1976 :a
by George Bush, then CIA director
highly+:unusual to=revealt.confi= and now a Itpubliean presidential
Paisley; then.supposedly retired dential source, he-was doing.so in The team was made presidential
from the CIA; served as liaison be- this case: because, he believes hi at now a his co nenderl defense experts, none
tween the agency and the secret B source, Paisley, is. dead.. He wrote: connected with the CIA, who were.!
saccess, U.S. intelli-
Team. He died mysteriously while a recent I,cok I1ladazinearticle on given ted t a w wsailing on the Chesapeake Bay.=;. *by Paisley maynaye.eommitted_
gence given
ecrets weapons and sys-
Sept. 24. He was identified yester suicide:;`::.
day as the' source of at least one ems information.:
'vVeissi =a former State Depart`:. -Weiss and other B Team mem
major leak in 1976 about the -B _.ment; official who was amIn -' I;A
Team s highly classified wark~ ?..i hers said their report concluded, -.Based on -stories, in the News-. dor. tb the Bahamas-when he serv';i that the assessments done b~+ the,!
Journal papero about Paisley, his ed?on the B Team said that prior.to'?- CIA "grossly" underestimated ?I
press revelations. about.Paisley's:=Soviet military. strength. Because
role in the U.S. -intelligence corn- CIA activities he had no reason to information leaks about the B
munity, a crepardcies .in-;the suspect that the-55-year-mold offi-. :Team would tend to discredit it's
.identification of his body, the U.S. I ? i might have been'disloyal. He - findings Weiss -theorizes U S
a
`Senate Select.Committee on Intel-
'ligence has been investigating the
case since last October.
,
ct
now says that in light of recent die- : policymakers would be. less in- 71 e, -r A T
-Closures, Paisley,.,, ''could have
been working forthe ether side.'
. ` :.QtheT membersofthe B Team
h conerefic -today to
release new evidence shesays was sa however; ~ that Paisley may
verlooked in, the- autopsy=ofthei
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THE BALTIMORE SUN
27 June 1979
Was sus
ec
Wilmington (API- Several . members
of a secret T.S. intelligence team claim
3chhn Paisley was the prime suspect of'
leaks to newspapers about their project,
according to the Wilmington News-Jour-
nal.
Mr. Paisley. a- former Central Intelli-
gence Agency official who served as a lial'
sons between the agency and the team, dis-
appeared while sailing 1nr the Chesapeake
Bay September 24.
The secret "B Team" of experts on the
Soviet Union -was. set up by the federal
government to test CIA assessments of So-
, strength, according to the
viet military
newspaper. -.. .
The article quoted David Binder, a re-
porter for the New York Times, as saying
Mr. Paisley was the prime source for?hb.
article about the team's highly classified
work
In that story, air. Binder wrote of the B
Team's. opinion that the CIA had underes-
timated Soviet military strength. Mr
Binder told the News_JouT that while
it is highly unusual to reveal a coaf'idestial
source,, he was doing so in this. case be-
cause he believed Mr. Paisley was dead---.
Some members of the team told the
NewsJournal that they felt Mr. Paisley
may have leaked the information out of
professional loyalty to the agency where
he worked for 25 yeaM During that time,
be participated in developing some of the
assessments the B Team was scrutinizing-'
The B Team's role was,
done a thorough
and Mr. Paisley-had
in asae ng met length.
s aisle
r
- Seymour Weiss, a former StawDepart
tent official, said a Soviet agent would
want to discredit the team's conclusion
that the CIA was "underestimating Soviet
strength." He said such discrediting would
.prevent U.S. policymakers from reacting
? by getting tougher."
.. M,- Weiss said that anyone connected
with leaking secrets from.the team could
be a double agent:
At the time-Mr. Paisley
fOr the disappeared.
he was working on a repot
about the B Team project, the newspaper
said. A draft of the report was found on his
boat when it was found- drifting-on the
Chesapeake Bay, according to the artide.
Meanwhile, an attorney for Mr. Pais-
-
ley's estranged wife has. callea press
evidence.
conference for today to present
that the former oficial, who was thought-
to have committed suicide, was murdered.-,
The press conference Was. scheduled
for Solomons, Md., near?wbere Mr. Pais-
ley's boat, the Briliig. Was found aground--.
last fall.' ..,
The body identified as Mr. Paisleyrs.
was. recoveered a week later, floating is
the bay. The body was weighted with div
ing belts and a bullet wound was found in
trf?
the head.,:_:.~.;.- ... .. , ~_.:.:.,~ ~~=w?Y:?._
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Article appeared
on page B-7
Jack Anderson
THE WASHING TON POST'
17 June 19 79
SMT ISpeeding the Arms
sew issues are more confusing to the average American than SALT IL Ex.pertswith the hestiniormation and the best intentions have come down on did- metrically opposed sides of the contro- versy. So how is the bewildered citizen supposed to figure out, what, it's all: about? On the face of it. SALT seems straightforward . enough: Strategics Arms Limitation Talks.. Judging it onthis basis, most Americans have sup. ported what they understandably see. as an agreement that will put a lid on
our extravagant defense spending_ But our associate.' Dale- Van Arta; after reviewing scores of, top-secret documents and interviewing- several knowledgeable . intelligence- . sources; found the picture: confusing and co
tradictory. However; :. one =`.thing.emerges crystal clear.: The treatysigned by President Carter and -Soviet boss Leonid Brezhnev in Vienna will
stimulate the arms.-rae,'not stop, it. That was the case with. SALT I, and.there ?is no reason .to suppose SALT ITwill have a different effect.:... .. ?:t ? To put' it bluntly, the Russianscheated on SALT L The Americans re sponded by. trying. _to.: - develop new weapons, such as -multiple-warhead missiles, that would meet. the letter of the treaty, if not its spirit=a technique) that might be called-"legal cheating.,, ?.~
in, b th.. case _the-results - . were:. the same: increased mruitary spending, not disarmament. The difficulty is the=. SALT agree-
meats seems to be that they are based on the premise that,. to prevent a.ntr
clear holocaust, each of the superpow-
ers must have enough deliverable bombs to ensure the other's destruction ---on equal terms of horror.. If either the United States or the Soviet Unioncould wipe out the other without itself ;suffering .total obliteration, .SALT would be a failure. Former - Defense secretary Robert McNamara, with pos. sibly unintended.irony;..terms this con- cept "Mutual Assured Destruction" MAD. _ Former President Nixon and his n tional security Svengali, Henry Kissint ger, spelled out the four operating prim- .
"L Maintain high confidence that
our second strike [retaliatoryl capabil-
ity is sufficient to deter an all out sir
prise attack on our strategic forces.
" 2- Maintain forces to insure that the
Soviet Union would have no incentive
to strike the United. States first in a
crisis.
"3. Maintain the capability to deny;
the Soviet Union the. ability to causei
significantly more .deaths and "in-
dtistrial damage in-the United States iu i
a nuclear wax than they themselves
would suffer.
"- Deploy defenses which limit dam.
age from small attacks or accidential
launches to
a low level."
Insiders
told us, that .these "Dr,
Strahgelove" guidelines have not been
n-
changed by
Under SALT I,. the four MA]) prmc`~
p
ies actuallyprovided the impetus for in-
creased
military spending .to develop
new. missiles that would be our in-
surance against World._ War .111, The
agreement limited the"number of mis-
sties Permitted each nation--a ceiling
that had not yet been reached-but not
the number of warheads in each missile
Both Russia and the United States
used that loophole . in SALT I to in.
crease their nuclear stockpiles without
actually violating the treaty. Not con
tent with such legal stretching of the
Pact's provisions, the Soviets simply re-
sorted to violations of the SALT Iagree-
meat,
the record indicates: .
American adherence, generally, to
the letter
of the treaty put the United
States in
a declining strategic osition
vie-a-vie-'the Soviet Union. S:~LT I al-
lowed
once superior strategic position.
To counter this development, the
pentagon asked for and received big-
ger
and bigger appropriations to de-
velop more frightening
gr weapons, on
a,tnds thatwe must keep abreast of
the Soviets' legal- and extralegal armx
buildup
The same thing began ' happening
again even before the SALT II treaty was
signed, President Carter has explained
that SALT II demands that we-inerease
our armament to the ceilings set by the
latest. agreement. Political, analysts told
ciples of ),LAD in.: the top-secret Na-, us that only under the shadow of SALT
tional Security Denis wg4ym i si J Rb1e9 3716 of June 24,1969;for a guidance ofl sewn - to the Russians..
our military leaders- ,. , - - would. such increased military expen&
tares gain public acceptance.-.'..::
ace
The long term increase in defense
spending serves a short-term domestic)
political goal: It may appease Senate ~
hawks who would otherwise vote
against ratification of the SALT agree.
ment. Carter, meanwhile, is selling
SALT II on the basis that, without the
treaty, the arms race would be even {
hotter. This, of course, is a theory that
can never be proven.
However, using all the facts at their
disposal, analysts in. the Central lntelli.
gence Agency have raised doubts about
the theory. According to one of the
CIA's secret National Intelligence Esti-
mates, the experts concluded: "If a
SALT 11 agreement is not achieved, we
believe that the. Soviet._ leaders' objec-
tives for their strategic forces would be
`much the same.".: ? -.: ?.
Warning that. the Soviets can be ex-
pected to be far-more aggressive with
fl',e agreement than we will be, a CIA I
estimate explains:' 'Deeply held tdeo'
logical and doctrinal convictions impeli
the Soviet leaders to pose as an ulti
mate goal the attainment of a dominant;
position over the West, particularly the;
U.S., in terms of political, economics
cial and military strength." - -
=- Whether ' this: eternal goal of "Soviet
policy will be affected by SALT It and, so, to what extent, the CIA Cannot to l ! i
In the end, the experts concluder ?
all seems to boil down to this:.WtlCor
.without SALT Z- -the best deter_ nt:o
both sides is mutual ignorance of inten
tions. The Russians-don't know :?wha
the man inthe''White?House would.dol
in` a particular. situation.'. and we-doh'
know what.-the-men. in the,
w Krek
ould do.'
In an' uncezrtain: world; uzictaihty}
maybe our best hopeforsurviva?_?
R000100090001-9
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ARTICLE i FF- THE WASHINGTONIAN
ON PAGE _ May 19 7 9
Edited byJoseph Goulden
i he r grey rue
Turner Is in Trouble
Another wave of departures at the
Central Intelligence Agency-
many of them under pressure-
has so outraged some senior offi-
cials that one of them, in only
halfhearted jest. is advocating a
"coup d'etat"-to topple Director
Stansfield Turner.
Certainly Langley contains the
classic ingredients for revolution:
an autocratic and unpopular lead-
ership, a demoralized citizen-
ry, loss of pride, and bumbling
performance.
The person being pushed by the
intelligence community for Tur-
ner's chair is Frank Carlucci, his
present deputy. A skilled bureau-
crat. Carlucci is one of the few
hizh-level Nixonites to retain
power in the Caner administra-
tion. He first gained prominence
as a troubleshooter in HE%'/, then
luckily sat out the Watergate
years as ambassador to Portugal,
and came to the CIA in 1977.
Although Carlucci has no in-
telligence background, pros re-
spect him as a talented adminis-
trator with the good sense to keep
his hands off daily agency opera-
tions_ "As director," says one
official, "Carlucci would be
content to work as a manager and
not try to play superspy."
Turner commands no such re-
--
spect among intelligence career-
ists serving under hint. He is
blamed for the current brain-drain
of resignations that is stripping
the agency of what one person
calls its "intellectual cadre. " The
more than 300 resignations since
January 1 include such key fig-
ures as William Christison. chief
of the office of regional and'
political analysis; Vincent Hey-
man, chief of the operations
center: and Sayre Stevens, deputy
director of the National Foreign
Assessment Center.
To insiders, these departures
are even more serious than
Stanfield Turner
Turner's ''Halloween Massacre"
in 1977, when he summarily
fired, retired- or reassigned more
than 800 clandestine operatives.
many by terse form-letter.
"In 1977," one official says,
"Turner got rid of the spooks.
This time he got rid of the
brains." Even loyalists concede
the CIA was overloaded with
Cold War-era covert officers. Yet
they decry Turner's ouster of
analysts responsible for refining
the rivers of raw intelligence that
flow in daily from agent and em-
bassy reports, satellite pictures,
and electronic intercepts.
1'Iay 1979
Rightly or wrongly, the view
within the CIA is that Turner is
preoccupied with self-promotion.
He wants to incorporate the De-i
fense Intelligence Agency, the:
Pentagon's spy branch. into the
CIA, and elevate the post of di-!
rector of Central Intelligence to,
Cabinet rank.
Turner lost both these attempts
during the last round of budget'
writing. But he continues to curry favor with the White House, and
particularly with Zbigniew
Brzezinski_ Carter's national-
security adviser- Turner is ac-
cused by subordinates of rewrit-
ing National Intelligence Esti-
mates to avoid any SALT 11 or
detente ripples. He is also said to.
have cut off the agency's Iranian
desk from key message traffic
during the Shah -s final turbulent
days. Defense Secret`rv Harold
Brown, also knocked off the
routine list. dispatched a. spy of
his own to pilfera copy of one key
cable from the National Security
Council.
Prognosis: The intelligence
community is capable of toppling
an unwanted dire,-tor-witness
the hapless Theodore Sorensen,
The same voices are now being
raised, in quiet congressional of-
fices and elsewhere- against
Stang field Turner- By fall, expect
Jimmy Carter to see Turner as
heavy baggage and find some-`
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ARMED FORCES JOURNAL. INTERNATIONAL
April 1979
Grim Ne I Xn+elligence
AueSam_ent Released
On USSR Sfl teg c Arms
A NEW NATIONAL iNTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE, NIF I 1-3-3. "paints a dark:,_
picture" of Soviet strategic arms pr( r?s:
than its prcdecessor, completed in the fall
of 1977, informed Administration sources
have told AFJ. The highly classified new
assessment is nicknamed "NIE Eleven and
Three-Eights."
According to sources who took part in
preparing the assessment and are
intimately familiar with its final content, it
contains "nothing new or startling, but
shows things moving more rapidly than
before." Specifically, "the Minuteman
problem is coming faster," according to
one source, a reference to the land-based
missile's increasing vulnerability to a
Soviet first strike because "the whole
accuracy picture" of Soviet ICBMs is
"changing dramatically." Contributing to
Minuteman's earlier than expected
vulnerability is the fast rate at which the
USSR has been "fractionating" its missiles,
that is, adding greater numbers of
warheads to them-
Sources say the new assessment projects
"much uncertainty on Soviet force
loadings," how many warheads of what
type each missile carries. "We don't know
how they're loaded; we can't look under the
nose-cone." Under SALT II, the Soviets as
well as the US would be prohibited from
deploying land-based intercontinentali
ballistic missiles with more than ten
warheads each. However, a New York
Times report of March 14th by Richard
Burt says that the CIA has evidence the
Soviets have been adapting their largest
missile, the SS-l8, to carry 14 warheads.
The SS-18 was tested more than a year;
ago, in October of 1977, with a new,
warhead called "Mod 4" that
demonstrated an accuracy cf 0.15 nautical!
miles, or less than 300 meters. Thei
Defense Department tells AFJ that it hasj
no evidence the Soviets have deplo}?ed
ICBMs with an accuracy better than 500
meters. N .: Eli
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ARTICLE APPEARED WILMINGTON NE14S JOURNAL
ON PAGE (_ 1 April 1979
is ea a2:: kri
? ~
'i~
?
r
~
!'
'
,
,.
:
a
.
_:
?~ 7
.r??a ..cr
BY JOE TRENTO >:?.
Because of its concern-about Paisley's fat
and
e
-
and RICHARD SANDZA -' its. possible effect on. the SALT situation; t e U S.
a"
lsnteSlt Cmitt on Ielli e lun
ea_eecomeentgeneached
WASHTh ETON Former. CIA official-John.A+-- .
man investigationinto?the Paisley
Paisley
.participated ln.the negotiations-of -the first .That investigation: :became bogged in
down
strategic arms limitation treaty, intelligeuce.sources anuary-and the committee- asked,:the JustiCe? De-
confirmedlastweek: .partment for_help.-,TbefFBLiwas then asked to
Paisley was "'in Helsinlf, Finland to .advise:?the' , ,;reviewthe- information available to the Senate..:
U.S. negotiators.-on the. nation's capability to tnoni- 3 ".?~''?The: outcome,-reported- last.
vreek -=didn't make
'tor _Soyiet compliancewith the treaty,. according. to- the-,Senate committee feel any better: Sources inthe?
intelligence-"sources: The treaty was signed in 1972 : `= ~ Senate have-told- the--Sunday-News Journal that the
Paisley's disappearance while sailing. in Chesa- FBI. merelLconfirmed the finding of the Maryland-
'peake- Bay-I last--year?`had; caused grave concern State Police- that - Paisley probably committed ?sui-
1
among members-of tlthe4J;S..Senate and the: intelli=::,-,':tide- .The. Justice- Department-_reeommended no:
genre community. further Paisley investigation:
Their concern ceriters'arbund the SALT II treaty '-"-The CIA has 'repeatedly denied' that-any- classz~-
currently. being negotiated:-Senators - and other - fled documents were found among Paisley's papers.
.government officials uneasy-about-arms limita-_ But sources-in the.intelligence community-have told
tion are trying to determine-) -whether: -;--the:. Sunday.-News .Journal that--among Paisley's,
disappearance has anything-to do with-his intimate : - papers; -was a top-secret CIA .telephone directory,
-knowledge- of the nation's=intelligence;network: He -: which.-contains the. names of employ ees~p----both
was especially-lolowledgeable --about?ahe??nation's undercover, and otherwise.
super-secret spy satellite system-L-the veryreason : In, the past the CIA has pressed for. prosecution
-he was sent to the SALT I talks:: . ; of people,who have. removed telephone- directories -
: Committee--members- are,-also upset::about the:: ` from headquarters at Langley, Va. Last:year-one
handling of a note found-: in Paisley's - personaL. =man was-sentenced to l5 years in prison, for- stealing
papers. - The note, according to a source, on. the: . a- telephone= directory- that was less sensitive. than
.committee, -was in-Paisley's handwriting and said,- -the one in Paisely's papers:: The-phone books. would
"Now; what-about Shevchenko?". be very valuable to Soviet agents , tantamount to
:..The CIA destroyed the note,.telling thecommit giving them. a blueprint for-penetration' .an intelli
tee it had no signifieance;?a committee.source said. 'genre source said.. ri; i J-
Arkadyi N:. Shevchenko,? who until -his: defection. _ ;Paisley, was- deputy' director?-of, strategic. re-? :
.Held the top Soviet job at.the U:N., was the Soviet's: =_ .search at.the CIA when. he: retired in 1914::.He.was
lea ding. expert- on disarmament: Shevehenko defect-;_ `:subsequently given several assignments on'contract - STAT
edlastAp:- i.:i~ryv-`;-: ?~, _x:r. ~. ?=:~::untilhi di appe ~,,:. r ::;~
CIA or_ _L Co n ~ ""ea.a~~: >_ .. S 5 arance:-T~; ?. ;~ ?.3._ 3i?';i.:~t
ntii < -
;..._: The y ued tor#use;rommez-t'
isley cases !e
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TFIE GEORGETCI1 + INTEFNATIONAL NEWS
GEORGETOUTYi UNIVERSITY
13 March 1979
Intelligence reports so released-including,
according to Latell, "soma of the agency's
By Bill Mcllhenny most important analytic works"--have
grown in number from only 29 in 1972 to
Until.. a,few, years ago, [CIAh, foreign 'approximately 150 lastyear
intelligence' analysts were perhaps the most ',Among the works :,received'. through;
obscure-participants in the foreign policyti ~ - DOCEX have been estimates of Soviet and
process..:-^T~ Chinese energy capabilities and analyses of
During the I-ast five years -orso, mostbf-"' political elites :;::_?--__
-V that has changed dramatically as the average-,'-'"- ':. Further,: although hey -.must stilt - be-
CiA analyst has emerged from his previous =-. canscientous: with ;regards-to. sensitive-;
anonymity- and silence- sources; C!'A analysts are encouraged- to-
participate:.: and` function?-much. as their
So asserts Dr. Briar,'Late1F, former Asso-- academic counterparts"in 1977 alone, 300-
ciate Coordinator for Acadmesc relations-;, analysts attended conferences-and conven-
and External-Analytic Support in, the Cen.-. .clone in their-areasofiritarestandwarding...-
tral Intelligence Agency Ire fearth e past,;: to Latell," they open.y and freely identified
five years : have seen numerous far-reaching _-their agency - affiliation.'rrLikewise. Latell
changes-including structural- reorganize- assorts; a "vigorous new effort
is currently
tion-which,: have in effect, opened up the ;iunderway -to- add a number of additional
CIA's. research- and ,analysis, components- experts to our panels of consultants."? . ti. ,
The result has been to make these cam-:_.:-_ ^`,Perhaps _ - one of- the most important-;
ponents more responsive to a greater public = internal CIA reorganizations was the cre-
and private audience. Latell,_ who is cur-? etion last year of the Nations{, Foreign
rently at Georgetown teaching a course on Assessment Center. -.The= center, .which
the revolutionary process in Latin.America, . _ Latell stresses is "completely overt,'" con-
states that because of this. new openness,-.. -_:solidated "all of the CIA components that-
"'the public derives more from itstax dollars, do. substantive research aid estimates under
spent for intelligence. and the CIA has a single management-" .-The center special-
_
ene fired from useful critiques from outside lets? he continues, "
b examine and assess the
political , economic, military, scientific, and
:Typical of these changesis the CIA's in- technological affairs of foreign countries."
creasing participation (since 1972). in the -The center is organized into several offices,
Library of Congress' Document Exp.[9iting ? such as tnc Offices of Ecoriomic Research
Proles - (OOCEX), by whim- unclassified ? Political . Analysis, arid- Gaographic. Re..
studies are distributed to subscribers out- - search
which Latell likens to v
ri
,
a
ous
side. -of -the-, government. Among these .: - departments at a university.-we operate as
b
su
scribers are over 100 university libraries. 1
-.Approve d For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-011378000100090001-9
 CONGRESSIO
ST-AT
much so that it has almost- become a is in the best of American traditions of Issued a report in 1978. This. of course,
cliche. After-all, who can be against hu- standing up for the underdog-the op- is a public report. _
man rights? Who? pressed. The majority on the committee,. who
But is it not time to bridge the gap Mr. President, let us begin this Senate -are our colleagues and with whom we
between rhetoric and action? To my : with a pledge--a pledge to lead the move- share the closest association, concluded,
mind, the time for action is long overdue. meat for human rights both here and - that "past national intelligence esti-
Th a -a ste s this body can -abroad. mates could have profited from drawing
_4A c
r p
take and I want to make one specific The hour is already late. in experts on Soviet strategic questions
suggestion today" Butwe can do no less. N from outside the intelligence community,
..Lau.4a...6uw .ago., w..r..._ ____ THE LATEST ESTINLATE;3 Ur'
War II--the Genocide Convention.- Feting assessments from such sources." this treaty is simple- declar-- :.. VIET STRATEGIC. STRENGTH .. _ : However; it went on to fault the "eom-
?
-p~
ppge ..
ing genocide an international crime.-.'-, Mr. MoYNIHAN. Mr. President, Sen. : petitive analysis'.'.-- -,experiment on the
d
th
t'
a
s
whether it is committed-in times of war::: ator WALLOP and I wish to take.the time .groan
or peace What could be morn straight- of the senate today to discuss a matter The composition of .the- B Team dealing
forward? More ethical? We are 'simply. of very large' consequence, .in : our view with Soviet objectives wad-so structured that
attempting. to outlaw- the heinous,. out-: '_ My distinguished colleague, the senior the ou eme a exercise was pre-
d T are me - - termihed and the experiment's cxintributi=
au-
i
i
n
m
rageous, crime -of genocide-t
re mass : Senator from Wyo lt; an lessened. The intelligence agencies were cast
murder of-members of racial: ethnic, na-.' :. `bers .of the Intelligence Committee and in,: the- role' of . "doves" when
over the years inc iss ox supporters os cometiozne poor to LuBuwi Yuc LusYYC.s o[ views.; :..-:_,,.: ? ~_
U__ i
th` hi h th Intelli ence Committee
n
the Genocide. Convention grown-
10 wi c e g . -'"In separate views-appended to the ma- .
number so that now every major sell; ;: deals.: Indeed, we do so today in large
, _a__, --_ - .___4__ ...o e,.o . 4 - . l,oo;, ,mina, . jority report, Senator WALLOP and I. in '
can Bar Association-And' even:. more irn- - cycle- in, the activities of the executive YLLAY 1111e very ea=Yeuce ul UM. n teaLLL
.- - .. . ,_ - - - -1- L-___L __ _._L ...e .._ r-m +., .:was a siLai of the serious auestions which
Truman., Kennedy, Jobnson:_ ..Nixon, -:: cuss a matter which would not neces- " 1Le4Li rlscll cvuLT.rlullg trur ac:cuiacy yr
our estimates - of Soviet strate
ic
g
Ford, and Carter have repeatedly.called.. sarily be possible to discuss later on.
~. ,_ ~~L aL_ ,_a_~ __~--L ... strength- we hothnoted thFrimnorts~nre.'
rassmeni wu.u uC uvvswauo - - aua- .' __ and are in?the process o[ doing- so has gone
Of days with proper consideration -and 'Soviet, intercontinental ballistic missile [in the past year] from heresy to respect-
ocuy. 1-i - .?.._.. ._? ,- ---- - -- - - -- P NOW, Mr. President, the purpOSe _of
As my colleagues have heard me say there lids been a growing concern that, , - our rising resident is now some evi-
time and again, the case for ratification : the intelligence community may have
trop For the benefit of.been- generally underestimating the'ex-'. dence on this matter in the form of an
i
t
l
e em s g.
s x
r e
y
-, my 20 new colleagues. I. would like to re tent, the dynamism, and the seriousness . open letter to President Carter, signed
view the case for ratification. of purpose of the Soviets' long and per 'by more than: 170 retired generals and
First, the United States is ..the only sistent buildup of their military and, in admirals. I asks unanimous consent that
major Western nation that has failed to particular, of their strategic forces. ? ~; -'_this letter, published, in the New York
TY....er i..-+ C..nA.... L_ _--J s, -
Lo snore winning Us iu. LL, OJLUVIY LUValMir7. r .. ~. .. u. .. ... .:
ordered: ;
no sense to ask our representatives: to =been one:of.the inspired actions of the... '.'.:.,.,::.,-;_..?, .? .l .:;:Y `''
' _ - .. . _?..aL.__. _L_a____ t__'.v,.r__ __~ .a ~_ -. .-..(See exhibit'1`1?,:c;?.,-_...__.?:._
-
-
O Vasa ....` __
..: r.:. -._. _. .r +._
. again-.oy. our Lacs. or aCLion'-vi.n,l?IAIl?_'?. aaw~.+..,s.a+..uc,.a aa~o,a
rights treaties here in the Senate_' time'=:t the Honorable George Bush - :7Y1The National: tnteutgenca >9timate;..the
-_._ - -_ - - _ _:.vt Gli?:)1AT'L+S+idb rr Q. a.,.-,rww.n..i.r-M.r_
-
?:
TaonaL law requrres .tna: 'rY.eZUr,.il 41L- Y[i r_; USaWLL iS ULLL-1JCL ULL5LUZ IUe sLLIL V LL43.UG= ia.st - that the Soviet Union is, heading -for -
:Y j..
major' nations of the, world. Our ratifi :thesGovernmentwho had; over the yearss :superiority-not.:: parity is :the anilitarv'
cation will speed the development or m-: Laren a generally more somber -Viewoi.?,_ arena.-.This represents a complete reversal-?'
ternational law in'this vital humarrrighta %;-the Soviet military buildup, was assigned:- or official judgments that were a substantial
spur renewed interest in-.n?m ngntS.... to sec .-L Dvv1cb ucluavror surnutetj vL treaties by the newly emergent nations. explanations other than those offered in' I hasten_to point out that I have not
. ence long. after- these:' treaties??rwere -; ments and which might better -account mate to which the retired officers refer...'.
-
. Fourth,President Carter ' fas
made The B team report was critical of past' speak -soo freely about it in open session.:
human rights the cornerstone ofour fns estimates of Soviet, strategic strength For this reason, I wish to speak now on
eign policy-a move which many. of us in, and reached somber assessments- of the -the basis of the open letter and of an.
the Senate have both urged: sand.- ap- challenge posed by it. Unfortunately, article in the New York Times of Janu-
plauded. But our . Nation's represent-:,,: information concerning this report, ary 12, which discusses the letter. I feel
atives need the tools to carryout this -which,. like the national estimates them justified in doing this on the grounds.
policy and this treaty will.-strengthen. -selves, was highly classified; was leaked that these 170 retired generals and ad-
- their hand. .. : < to the press at the end of 1976. As a re- mirals probably -possess sufficiently good -
: And, finally, ratification- is importan suit, the Select .Committee on Intelli- 'connections to know what they are talk-
because it is the right thing to do. It gence undertook an investigation of the - -ing about. and being men of, good char-
an imuortant amied&tarld.l k?Amd abeam ie>llieades as it wai AW_An8R sir lnAalirMu&tton. would not inis-
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30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00 1
Mnuary .25, 1979
 STAT
A l ve A-9 p, or Release 2006/01/30: CIA-RDP90-01137R0001
ON ?AGE? w~.w THE BALTIMORE SUN
24 January 1979
In the nation
t,- with paint at Ohio State
ligenca Agency recruiter was splattered
with` red paint during a demonstration at'
,..,.-.Ohio State University yesterday.
The recruiter, a woman whom Ohio
State 'police refused -to. identify.. was'-
doused with paint but not: injured as she
worked in the placement office of the Col-
lege of Engineering
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 Approved For Releag612OD6,gii'N1'P37R000100090001-9
Article appeared 22 January 1979
on page A-16
Disposal Urged
Os CIA -Files
For 3 Men in
confined.the head of a foreign politi-
cal party to a mental hospital at the
height: of the : Cold War. and. consid-
ered - disposing of. him - when he.' re-..
fused to stay .put:.,
The 29?year-'old political-leader, who
had been working clandestinely for
the. agency, was one of three "disposal,
problems" described... in'.: ?CIA : docu-:;.
ments released last. week under the
Freedom of Information Act.-
The, heavily censored documents-
made public at the request- 'of - the
Church pf,.Scientoiogy---did, not reveal
the fate of the three men.
A-1952 memo discussed the disposal
of an unidentified "young,'. ambitious,
bright" leader of a small political
party . "ostensibly working for . inde?,
pendence of an. unidentified foreign
count
zy. _._..,... .. .
The memo -said the CIA arranged for
him to betaken into custody by his
'-The -?Central intelligence Agency
telligence agency.
country's police after learning he . was.
considering. selling. out to- another" in- i
The document said the young politi.
cian was held in prison for six months
until he -became a "nuisance". and the
police "told our- people .to take him
back-'-
it
said the CIA then put him in a
mental' hospital "a''s a psychopathic pa-
tient":..even though "he. is not a. psy-
chopathic personality."
"He.has-now been in a,-hospital-for
several-', months and-- the hospital au-'
thorities.,now, want.. to- get him `out
since--he' is' causing considerable trou-:'
he ," `th e: document said.
. The memo, then. -suggested brain-
washing the agent into sticking by the
CIA. If that fails; it said, -"disposal : is
perfectly O.K." : - . .
-A 1951 memo asked-a- "senior repre
sentative".,.of an unidentified depart-
ment for .help in -disposing.-, of two..
other.troublesome agents: ''
"These. two men are disposal prob-
lems,-one because of his lack of abi1-'
ity to carry out a mission and another:
because he cannot get along with
the chief agent of... the. --project, the,
memo said. ': - -. . - _
The memo, in an. indication that at
least one-of the agents was being'held
in solitary confinement, said he "is al--
ready-somewhat stir-crazy-?anct ?-lras
tried to escape twice,"
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/30: CIA-RDP99
ART 1 CL AI F ARE.D WAS?1r11GTON STaa.R
eti'1 YlHn T.%1VV 1 (Y7111
By Robert Pear
washiagton Su Staff W iter-
:;This is one of many_new responsi =~
biltiies- assigned to the attorney'
3general by a presidentaii.d a Congress.:
;'anxious to curb abuses, by the intelli
.
._{gience agencies
"" IN AN EXCEUTIVEorder:last year;;
restructuring the intellligence com-
K,munity, President Carter'"gave the-'
attorney, general a large role in over-
seeing and monitoring all-intrusive
activities that might invadecitizens'
privacy.
Sometime ' soon; probably next
month. Chief Justice Warren E. Bur-
get will designate' seven;Jederal
judges to sit in Washington- on -a spe-
cial court like.nabother court in the
.,.. ? , ..?:, :..
world
- - The tribunal: willconductsall. its
business in:-secret and will- have. one
main purpose. to approve 'or - disap-
prove warrants for electronic surveil-
lance of spies, counterspies, embas- ,, . ?I. have had responsibility for hold-
sies, international: :,. terrorists, ingthe intelligence community.to the
saboteurs and, in exteptional- cases, i . rule of law," Attorney General Griffin
American citizens with-information I 13. Bell said in a recent speech.
deemed essential to national security. :Bell., who spends one-fourth of his
The judges, drawn.f rom. different time-on. intelligence matters, must
regions of the country, will-been- ,,issue or approve, procedures for
Masted with some of the most;sensi- numerous activities such as television -
tive secrets of the FBI the."Central . surveillance; undercover participa-
Intelligence Agency and the"National _,tion: in domestic organizations and";
Security Agency. F. u N the FBI s foreign intelligence pro-
"The most skilled foreign. intelli- gram .---
gehce agents in the world:-will be = On Dec. 21, Bell met with, CIA Direc-
seeking this information,'-" Defense .`. tor Stansfield Turner and Chief Jus-
Secretary Harold Brown predicted. tice?. Burger. to discuss security
Court orders will identify the tar procedures for the new foreign intel-
et of surveillance, describe the tech- ligence court
g et 'of is not known yet, where the
veillance." _:. -.-_ ..;=.; .;,?, ". _ THE COURT WILL be anew venture
in-every-way, as critics pointed out
THE - NEWS COURT '-was 'one_ of debate on the billlast year.
`several checks on the intelligence m~1:.:''.- :,;..
community. required -bythe:.Foreign'- = = ,Rep.' Robert McCIory;-?R-Ill.,:' de-
:Intelligence Surveillance Act a U979.- ,;dared; "Thi special-court itself is un
.---in signing the measure las~O to- : 'r,precedented: The secret hearings are
-ber, President Cartersafd:tbA ':it "re--: ,;:.unprecedented. The secret record is
quires, for the first time, a prior judi-~ :.;'unprecedented." Never before, lie.
cial warrant _fQr all electronic - `-'s4d has a court.-been bl to pass
surveillance for: fdfeiga.iaielligence - upon>the exerise~o re:cecutive au-_I
or counterintelligence- purposes in thorfty with-regard. to national se-
-the United States in which- communi-
. ,clarity and foreign. affairs:
cations of U.S. persons might be inter-, '."? 4On the other side of the political,
ce ted " =
i
I~
F_ D
b
s
r
nan;
ert
pectrum, Rep. Ro
p
? . electronic surveillance of
authorize
d surveillance 01
Previously, presidents claimed an :,Mass., also denounced the bill,-saying
h
l
m
i
h
d
s use
anne
un
icat
on c
com
arm s u
"inherent" constitutionab:right to it was':-`totally unprecedented- in_the c ?ei? ,,,,
exciT;
aps for fo
o
S
n
f A
h
i
J uaaa
axo
w
sto y o
ngl
-
ole i
y powers- This type of wsur-
eign intelligence purposes, even ?prudetice_' rr_
vi-illnnrp it yp of warrantless
when there's
fo
rrant when
in
ale-
a na
napp
g
.:
Kennedy and We currentdirecCVra VL
phones.to gather evidence of a crime: the FBI,, CIA and NSA all endorsed the cepting communications of an Ameri~
..., can citizen--_
ney general wo v ,,pp ~re~q Dp 1
any application o MN io _courtt~ dectsions abou Mat late ll>,-
"'Judges add an"'auraoflegaiity to
-?
':the process. ..," said Sen.; Malcolmf
-electronic surveillance authorized by
,,.the special court: would be ipso facto`
ton university law professor;.tound it,
q
curious that governiaent;officials
`would support a bill supposedly cir
cumscribing their' authority. "That;
to their enthusiasm for the bill:'.--.' z
-=The American. Civil Liberties
Union supported the proposal, even-
Amendment
'= ACLU FAVORED the bill because it-
repealed an-."inherent" presidential
- meat and finally set a criminal stand-
U.S. citizens or. permanent resident-.
In other words, whenever a citizen.
there must be evidence that his activi--
ties may involve:' a crime..:
The new law, sets carefully grade
aliens; somewhat less-. protection' to !
and illegal aliens; and still less protec-
- The distinctions, may- seem irrele--
Truong; the Vietnamese expatriate
.gets of surveillance in several cele?_:;
brated cases-
-.general, without a-court order, can,
 AWPX#Al For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001000
ON PAGE i ce.
THE NEW YORK TIMES
12 January 1979
1'0 Reared. TOP Military Offic
W
Carter oFa Soviet h 1e
By DREW MIDDLETON
more than 170'retired generals and ado
mirals have warned President. Carter of.
what they describe as an "increasing
Soviet challenge'' to the United States.
In an open letter, they said a National
Intelligence Estimate that is described as
"the most authoritative U.S., Govern-
. meet evaluation of intelligence data" had
--finally acknowledged that the= Russians
were "heading for superiority snot parity,
aroma
in the military
The letter said an -Americana intera-
gency study orr the global military bal-
ance concluded recently that "in a nonnu-'
clear conflict between the Soviet Union
and the United States in the Middle East;
Israel alone might deter Soviet combs
forces' intervention or prevent the com
pletion of such deployment."' -_ . -. .-
Were it not for the ability of Israel's
ground forces, the officers declared, the
United States would have to station sig-
nificant forces and equipment in the Mid-)
dle East... ..;- _ _,. .
Soviet Objectives Described
The signers, among whom were 6
generals, 15 lieutenant generals and 4 ad-
mirals, included Adm. Elmo It. Zumwalt
Jr.. former Chief of Naval Operations;
Gen. Paul L Freeman Jr.. former ArmY
commander in Europe; Gen
Park-
er. former Army chief of staff in Europe;
Can. Albert C. Wedemeyer. who w
commander of the-.China theater a
operations at the end of Worid.War II'.
Maj. Gen John K. Siaglaub, former chief
Maj. Gen: George 7. Keegan Jr., forme
chief of cnteliige+ace, . United Stares
reel's value an an ally that can defend i
_- o
.self oval
th
to avoid sending American-fore n
'irn al- obj
The Soviet- Union'sr'peii
tives" were described'as the neutralize
lion of Western Europe; partly by deny-
ing it access to oil., the encirclement of
China and, the isolation of the . United
States.
The letter said the Soviet focus on th
.Middle East to reach these objectives
represented "a real and growing that
to Western security." It said Soviet infl ?
ence and power bad expanded in the east,
ern Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the
Persian Gulf, Afp had come
under Soviet control and ""an~~ iC
forces" were harms
the in Iran and Turkey: - -, -- -?
Cuban mercenaries were described as
carrying out Soviet policies in Angola,
Ethiopia, Zaire. Syria and Lebanon. -- --
Debate on Arms Accord
In appealing to the President to "re-
store the global military balance,,., the
writers foreshadowed what is expected to
be a national debate over the second;
strategic arms limitation treaty~E~el
absence of an. -indispensable
equilibrium," they- said- "we oppose a .
''deal' that freezes the current imbalance
and reinforces permanent. Soviet strate-
gicsuperion :.:-:-~::
tY-=-
.:Theletter said thecha3lena ~.~'
ing in these areeas:
? 9The Soviet Union has developed seven.
ICBM-missile systems since.1965, the
United States one.
9The Russians have invested heavily.
in submarine-launched ballistic missiles
and modernized theirlCBM's
49Th e so-called Bacldire bomber, which
the letter lists in the Soviet strategic arse.
' naI although the-Russians dal) it a medi-
um-range aircraft, "is capable of deliver-
ing weapons anywhere in the., United
States without ref'aelina ? :.:.:
41 Soviet advances in multiple indeep n,
ently targetable re-entry vehicles
are rapidly overcoming the
American lead in the quantityand quality
of nuclear warheads- . : ? ,' =
The development of 'Soviet naval
power threatens vital sea lames that pro.
vide resources essential to, the United
. States..---_-.- -------??-_,_.-
. 'she writers also mentioned a point
raised by nuclear scientists? academic
students of Soviet polity_ and many for.
ei-t and American -. intelligence
viet defense literates . et-
"S
o
:analysts:
the western doctrine of.
presse
rel J ?".^';^~ ? It relects.
l
speed#ically the notion thatQnuclear stwrua
red ve and win- a nuclear.
turgid to fights i
war."
_..- 1vlr: nu? ? including Israel
taon of "g enuinepeaCe,
and Japan as well as the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001
DES MOINES REGISTER
5 January 1979
Taccountab
It was only a few.:years ago, backfired. in. the faces of theirl
during the turbulent 1960s and planners: the phony revolution in-
early'70s; that government intel- Chile;,.: the. planned murder of'
ligence agencies rampaged out of Fidel Castro; and. the it itallation.?
control.- opening mail; breaking . of and support for Mohammed,
into homes and. offices,. illegally Reza Pahlavi as shah of Iran..:;
tapping telephones;: infiltrating :,;,.The FBI: should be required by
community .:: organizations, .-,,law to restrict~itself to-the inves '
planning murder; ::overturning Ligation of actual.: or- suspected
governments...:ft,: crime: It, must not, be- allowed to
Thousands.~r.. -o:f;. iinnocent pervert the criminal law by using;:
American-_ citizens: became. itto harass political dissidents or
The public isr -potential`-, prey commit ' burglary.- Similar re-?
today,. because Congress has strictions.must ne:placed on the
failed to enact a comprehensive,-; : NSA.'-
law governing operations- of.the ' - These organizations have~
Central IntjUj&Mco Agency;..the. aerated for years on the basis of=
Fea Bureau of investigation, vague-laws and, in the case of the
and the.National. Security.,;;:-NSA a secret executive order:
Agency :Admittedly, it will be difficult to=
The. legislation is foundering write a : -law- tight enough to..
because of an increasingly ;con- protect the privacy -and secur-
servative Congress, the opposi-. :. ity of Americans . and flexible
tion of many,;,-intelligence- - enough to enable the intelligence.
public and the inherent difficulty.;:.. "hut it surely - is not impossi
of. drafting a workable, fair law. ble,` and various independent
Failure to. enact such a law groups that-have investigated in-.
would be disastrous-The CIA, the telli;ence abuses have urged that
FBI and the NSA have:.. dem- it be ,done; including the Rocke-
onstrated devastatingly for many:: feller'.. Commission and the'
to operate effectively `and: 7 ,;v;. ..y thout
public clamor; it will-
.
honorably outside the law, and be easy for CCongress to evade its.
d t
Congress : cannot . be' truste
o responsibility and permit the in-
perform its oversight functions. ' telligence community to go its-
Such a law should,.require the -::?own;.,way 'accountable to, no -one
CIA to restrict its activities to but: itself: Before that happens,
the collection! of :intelligence. the Congress and- the electorate:
That's what it was created to do. should ; remember the wisdom of
It was not created to plan the as- Y' philosopher-George Santayana;~
sassination of foreign leaders, _ar_'H Those who forget the mistakes of
play assorted dirty tricks. the pasta are doomed to repeat
those tricks have consistently , them.,.
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137ROO0100090
1, iT}C-~~ AP'P: Rx'1Z THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
ail FL 24 October 1978
Question Centers on Documents He Handle
The Washington-Star that federal- investigators--
will complete their investigations within 10 days.
The CIA has.. denied -that -Paisley.- who retired
from the agency in 1974 but-continued to serve as a,'
consultant on Soviet military affairs. had access to i
classified materials or that classified materials I
were found on his sailboat or in his Washington
apartment
? The committee is expected to review-those.docu
ments that were turned over to the CIA by Pais-?.:;
ley's wife. The Star has learned that; those docu-
ments concerned work that Paisley was doing as
coordinator of the CIA's B Team, a panel of civil-
ians who do contract work for the agency.:
The B Team made a recent assessment-of ?Soviet
military strength based on highly classified infor-. -.
mation that it received from the-CIA, according to
the source. The.CIA's A Team;-a group of agency
employees who are given the same information as
the B Team and asked to make an assessment.
Senate Panel 'Presses its Paisley Probe'
nl. - gave a much "softer" report on Soviet military
13ybllchaelD.Davl
VashingWnStar Staff Wmer ? ?? - -_: capabilities in a report it issued last February-- -
Despite a Maryland State.Police declaration:_ THE COMMITTEE source said that the differ-
that forms s h CIA o and kil killled ed .John A. himself Paisley almost ence in assessments "is not. significant" but that
month, eSe 'earlier. ehis - Paisley's work with the team "by the very nature
gene the Senate Select Commiti on Intore of the reports he wrote" indicated thathe did have
access to classified information. -? - - - ---?
off Paisley's s work. work. an investigation into the nature,
o Pai - The source said.the committee is attempting to
The She committee is afied. documen ents to o sten -:- -etermine whether the documents recovered from
mine wheethther certain' classified documents .paisley's sailboat and from his apartment should
which Paisley.had had. access had been handled: have
approhavebeenkept under stricter security.
Last wately
appropriately, i. Tssaid. Smith, e The source said the committee does not.-at this
L
Last week Cot Thomas h snvstigat rs be-
time believe that there was an intelligence com-?!
State Police' said investigators the - promise or that Paisley was involved withthe theft'
the MP i l ey- himself
I ay to death and fell into th the earlier this yearof satellite documents.. - - .
bay from om the e deck of his 31-fast sailboat. But,'he "The 'committee has a mandate-to see that
said, the death officially is classified as "an unde- - ro procedures ; /,areare- used in the' handling - of
and'that is what the cam-i
termined death" because the evidence is not cart- intelligence ligece documents,
elusive enough to make a formalruling of.suicide.. _ mittee is doing in?_the.Paisley case,"' the source
A-SOURCE close to the -Senate' committee told said. -., ? I
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001000
JOURNAL OF.THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICES
INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE STUDIES
March 1978
West look Fasts
Understanding the Soviet Military Threat: How CIA
Estimates Went Astray By W. T. Lee (National Strategy
Information Center Inc, New York, 1977), $2.60, 74 pages
In 1976, a heated debate arose amongst senior members
official CIA estimates of Soviet defence spending. As a
result President Ford's national security advisers set up a
second team of specialists to make an independent assess-
ment of Soviet defence spending, using the same sources
as the official CIA team.
The independent team assessed Soviet defence effort
at approximately double the official estimate. The official
estimate has since been revised, in fact doubled, to bring
them in to line with the independent teams high figure,
but many US commentators still consider this to be a
significant underestimation of the actual Soviet military
budget. .
In his paper the main portion of which was originally
written as a chapter of a larger study (Armes,. Nfen, and
Military Budgets-Issues for Fiscal Year 1978, Crane
Russak, NY, 1977) the author seeks to throw light on the
preparation of the two estimates, and explain why the
first official estimate was so very low. He has succeeded
in producing an admirable summary of the main points
of the estimates debate, and in giving a clear account of
how the two estimates were arrived at. This alone makes
the work worthy of attention.
The author, however, is far less enlightening as to why
the estimates differed so widely, and why the CIA were so
ready to adjust the official estimate to agree with the
independent team. In this latter regard, the work poses
more questions than it answers, and casts a shadow on the
integrity of the official CIA team. In view of the fact
taut :ac ~.'hu1e esumates controversy has become a burning
political issue, this result may not be accidental.
C. N. DONNELLY
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 C
C
C,
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ARTICr?8 A_~P.h 1) THE NEId YORK TIMES
ON PAGE -_ 'y 30 April 1978
Closer C.I.A.- hire
H o s~ ' ~ se ~ :
on Agency's Independence
By RICILARD BURT
-r-2 N-Lw 1=k mmes
WASHINGTON, April 29-The Carter
Ad.-rninistration's drive to make analyses
prepared by the intelligence community
more relevant to White House needs
is raising questions in Administration and
Congressional circles over whether the
Central Intelligence Agency is able to ex-
ercise independence on sensitive policy
This concern is said to be reflected
in a report by the Senate Intelligence
Committee scheduled for release in the
near future, which suggests that a much-
;publicized C.I.A.. study on Soviet oil
i production may -have been manipulate
by the White House- -
I The committee report says that the
study's conclusion that the Soviet Union
would become a larger importer of of J.that analysis work on important intelli-
in the early 1980's was probably wrong ! gence questions was performed by his
but that the White House used the predic own staff.
:tion to develop public Support for Presi w staff. T A
Some officials maintain that this epi- in the Nixon years by its disagreements
sode, which occurred last year, is symp- with Defense. Secretary Melvin Laird,
tomatic of a new set of delicate problems who contended that the agency's esti-
.that the Administration is encountering mates of the growth of Soviet military
.in trying to make intelligence estimates capabilities were too low. In the early)
more relevant to Administration policy. 1970's, Mr. Laird argued with Mr. Helms
With too foreign policy officials taking -over whether a new Soviet missile, the
an important role in determining what SS-9, was equipped with multiple war-
!the C.I.A. addresses, the agency.may be ;heads. Although the C.I.A.'s contention
too accommodating, some aides suggest that the missile did not possess such a
"when the White, House orders' up a capability - was ultimately proved right
study." one agency official said, "it is the dispute badly damaged the credibilit
usually pretty clear what results it. is of C.I.A. estimates.
looking cor." - - -
~ Central Section Dismantled
The Administration has made a .con
certed effort, in its plan to reorganize -? Morale was further weakened when
the intelligence establishment and in r James R. Schlesinger, upon becoming
cent changes made by the Director, o '.director of the agency in 1973, responded
Central Intelligence, Adm. Stansfiel to concerns over intelligence bias by dis-
Turner, to strengthen and centralize as. mantling the central analysis section in
`sessment capabilities that withered in the the agency, the Office of National Esti
Vietnam period and were further weak- mates. Aided by the Board ? of National
ened by interagency feuding in the Estimates, a group of academics and spe-
-Nixon Ford years. cialists who advised on intelligence ques-
-tion
Addressin the office had built a reputation
g New Questions' _ s. i
n
'began last-summer, is also designed to Mr. Schlesinger replaced both the Board
redirect intelligence work to such new and the Office of National Estimates with
'problems'as terrorism and nuclear prolif- a group of national intelligence officers,
eration, which are of growing interest each responsible for a' different area of
to policy-makers. These steps have won analysis. "There-was a feeling," one offi-
the approval of most intelligence-officers cial recalled, "that they were a bunch
as well as the two congressional intelli-
:....' of staff officials whose basic job was
genre committees. - to match intelligence evidence to the
But in undertaking these changes, views of the White House.". -
several intelligence officials said recently, .. Now, in the Administration's effort to
the Administration has begun.to confront make sure that the C.I.A.'s views are not
a familiar problem: how to insure that shunted aside, the role of the Director
intelligence information that appears to.
has been strengthened and an effort his
run counter to existing policy is neither been made to insure that Admiral Turner
suppressed: nor -distorted. This problem, sees Mr. Carter at least once'a week.
officials said, first emerged, in a serious At the same time a Cabinet-level intelli-
Approved For Release 0194/3&hCI X17-0 13 iRG
genre. information as Secretary of State
Cyrus R- Vance and Secretary of Defense
Haro1d.,R_Brown to_ define, their. needs
According to intelligence officials who
served at the time. C.I.A.- estimates that
appeared to challenge President John-
son's policy of increasing military com-
mitment to South Vietnam were ignored
by such top foreign-policy aides as' 1;u-
gene Rostow, the Presidential national
security adviser. Accordingly, communi
cations between the C.I.A. and the White
House became increasingly strained. A
the former Presidential adviser
,McGeo ge Bundy, testified recently be
fore Congress, C.I.A. Director John
McCone's access to President Johnson de-
clined sharply after 1966.
- The estrangement persisted during
President Nixon's first term, when, ac
cording to one former official, the C.I.A.
.became, "a service operation for Henry
Kissinger. The official said Mr. Kissin
ger, as Presidential adviser, strongly dis-
trusted Richard Helms, then the Director
Within the agency, Admiral Turner In
October established the National Foreign
Assessment Center, headed by Robert R.
Bowie, Mr. Turner's deputy for national
-.intelligence. Officials say that the center,
similar to the old Office of Estimates,
?' is designed to improve analysis by pulling
together estimates done by different
C.I.A. offices and other. agencies.
There is widespread agreement that
C.T.A. studies now have greater visibility
in the' Government and that agency re-
ports are becoming more useful to policy-
makers. The problem, as the official put
it, !'is that while C.I.A. -work is no. longer
ignored, there is a growing danger that
intelligence and policy will become.indis-
-
tinguishable,"
Reinforced by Turner
This danger is said to stem from the
.Administration's attempt to make the
Director of Central intelligence a more
influential figure--a tendency that, has
been reinforced; officials say, by Admiral
Turner's 'strong appetite for political
power. =
- ? "They may not know it," said a former
high-ranking intelligence- official, "but
they are on the verge. of turning the
Director- of Central Intelligence into a
- -
political job."
In the case of the C.I.A. study on Soviet
.oil production, the Senate committee hasi
..not accused the agency of shaping. its[
findings to meet White House needs. The'
committee reportedly has suggested that;
the C.I.A. made an analytical error in!
its- report,_ but more troubling, according.
to some committee officials, is that Mr.
Carter announced the findings last. April
in'dramatic fashion at a press conference,
-in an- obvious appeal for support for Ad-
rninistration energyplans.
_ In some other cases in the last year,
some members of the Senate committee
believe: the. C.I:A., has bent facts to meet
'White House views. One example is-saidt
'to- be : a contention by the agency -that!
a proposed Soviet-American accord limit-{
ing strategic arms could be verified using))
reconnaissance satellites, an opinion ap-I
parently questioned- by several- .intelli-i
,genre officers. : . ? .
Another alleged instance is the failure
of the C.I.A. to warn the White House'
of possible dangers in moving ahead with
Mr. Carter's plan to withdraw some
30.000 ground forces from South Korea.
"It was pretty?clear that the Presiderri
had made up his mind on the issue, so
the agency simply fudged over 11 ~ geet~-
?tion of whether the pullout would'c ?hfe
a military risk." a member of the Senate I
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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-13
THE WASHINGTON POST
29 April 1978
What the Next Treaty Is Up .gainst
The White House team is understand- main is a frozen frame of. mind that
,ably elated by the ratification of the - goes back almost 30 years to the early
days of the cold war.
- Panama canal Trento t,,.+ it i
s
`very useful rehearsal for the far .more
important battle coming up over . the
terms of the U.S.-Russian agreement on
the limitation of strategic arms.
Treaties, which require two-thirds
approval by the Senate, have seldom
been the upper. chamber's finest hours,
for on critical occasions the opposition,
-in _the_ -wounded words of Woodrow.
't=Wilson, has often been led by "little
bands of willful men." . '- -
No two. "bands" seem to be alike,
however. The one that. shattered Wil-
son by. rejecting U.S. participation in
his .League of, Nations dream was
largely motivated by isolationism and
political partisanship. The opposition
was led by prominent Republicans such
as the late Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge of
-Massachusetts-
" In the Panama Canal fight, there was
an outburst of old-fashioned jingoism,
with the hard core of opposition com-
ing from an ad'hoc coalition of Reagan-
type Republicans, and ultra-
conserva-tive Democrats, mostly provincial in
character. _ -_~
The opposition to SALT II is different
:--and more formidable. The leaders
are worldly and experienced in foreign
affairs. Partisanship is not a factor;
some of the chief critics have held high
office under liberal, Democratic presi-
dents. They are respected for their in-
telligence . and knowledge,. plus their
.record of- atriotic public service. But
what conspicuously unites them is a
seemingly unshakable suspicion of any
arms agreement that is as acceptable to
Russia as to the United States..
Their apparent conviction or fixation
(depending on how you look at it) is
that the United States will somehow
get the worst of any deal. In any case,
no president, Democrat or Republican;
has so -far been able to negotiate a
SALT pact that satisfied them. -
Since Richard "Nixon and Gerald
Ford were unable to win over their
SALT critics, can Carter succeed where
.they failed? It's a tough challenge, but
first the administration has to under.
stand what it is up a9k0Vkod** 6;
l
Dr. George B. Kistiakowsl~._ a nu I
clear authority and President Eisen-!
hower's highly respected assistant for
science and technology, thinks the
problem originated in NSC-68, a Na
tional Security Council paper produced
in 1950 under the chairmanship of Paul
Nitze. It warned President Truman, in
effect, that Russia was out to conquer;
the world, including the United States,
and would stop at nothing. - ,
Kistiakow?ky takes special note of
Nitze because he is perhaps the most
articulate spokesman. for the SALT,
critics and because his words carry:
weight, owing to his distinguished ca-:
reer in government as, among other'
things, deputy secretary of, defense, l
secretary of the navy and a SALT nego-
tiator.
Some years after NSC-68, Nitze
helped draft the panicky "Gaither Re-I
port," which in 1957 secretly warned
Eisenhower-that Russia was overtaking
the United?States rfnilitarily, including
missile development. Eisenhower, un-
impressed, pigeon-holed the alarm; but
it leaked out, and in 1960 John F. Ken-
nedy made the so-called "missile gap" a
successful. election issue,
After becoming president, Kennedy
`.- discovered the "gap" was ' largely th
figment of . overheated- imaginations
and he had the grace to admit it. A year -
later, in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis,
"America's nuclear- superiority was so
great that Russia was forced to ba
down.
.."During the missile buildup, the test-
ban debates and the ABINI scares of
the 60s," Kistiakowsky observes, Nitze
was a high Pentagon official, and
more recently "was a member of the
Team B' and one of the moving spirits
of the Committee on the Present Dan-
Team 13 was the designation for an
outside group of hardliners who
charged that the CIA underestimated
the Russian threat. The Committee oat
' the Present Danger is a relatively newI
defense-minded organization that also
been steadily dwindling. even in the
..Shortly ,before Ford and Chairman I
Leonid Brezhnev met and agreed in
principle on SALT II, Nitze, one of the
negotiators, resigned as a sign of no
.confidence in the agreement, although
the final terms had not yet been re~-
solved. -
When Paul Warnke, who servedwith
-
Nitze at the Pentagon,.was named as
..s Carter's chief SALT negotiator, Nitze
opposed his nomination, and ever since r
has been leading the attack on Warn-
f - ke's efforts to get a new arms agree-
anent.
It isn't as if Nitre were a lone voice,
for his state of mind is snared by other
prominent cold warriors. As . Kistia-
kowsky says, 'men of Nitae's persua.
sion are entitled to their opinion, and
no one should question their motives or
their good faiths'. But the American
public, he adds, may well ask whether
their opinion "is 'a reflection of reality
or a repetition of the all too familiar,
myth-making of the past." -
It is difficult, he says, "to regard
these doomsday scenarios as anything
more than .baseless nightmares." That's
the-message Carter must get across to
the American public if he hopes to get ..
SALT H through, for the opposition :i
won't succumb to the kind of appease-
went and blandishments that marked .i
the Pan
ama Canal finale.
ea v- #eTct#000100090001-9 -
 ARTICLE APrEAR: D THE NEW YORK TIMES
ON PAGE 4- Approved For Releas~3006AWarlA-ADP90-01137RO0
Senators -Assail '76 C.I.A. Estimate of Soviet. Power;
By DAVID BINDER.
gpetai o :he Yes York Time! -
WASHINGTON, Feb. 16--The Senate;
Select Committee on Intelligence nas'
criticized the Central Intelligence Agency
and, implicitly, the Ford Administration
for the handling of a ccntroversial ehori l
to analyze. Soviet strategic capabilities
and a'.ms in 1976. - - .
In 2L a-report issued- today,-the 17-member
panel said the attempt to. estimate Soviet
capab ilities , through "-'competitive anal-
ysis" by separate-teams--cne. from' inside
the United .States intelligence' community
a!d-the other made.,ue! gf,_outside special-
ists--had been- compromised _ by press
leaks and by one-sidedness.
The estimate caused some c&ntroversy
after it was reported on Dec.126. 1976,
in The New York Times that both teams
had co-ciuded tI t the:Soviet Union was
striving for strategic superiority. over the
. St'tes.
United
There were allegations at the time, also
alluded to 'n the. committee report, that
members of the se-called B t_am of out-
side specialists had deliberately. conveyed
.information about the comFetitive anal-
ysis to the press to undermine the argu-
ments of theA, team of inteligence regu-
lars. ? ..- _ . .. r'; ? - .-
-Today's report noted`thatche competi-
tion was undertaken at the request of
the President's Foreign Intelligence Advi-
sory Board, which was disturbed about
what it believed to be optimistic intelli-
gence estimates -of' Soviet strategic
strength. The board was-abolished last
year by President Carter. ' -- a -
While praising the contribution or the
team of outside specialists as "most re-
warding" on technical questions; the Sen-
ate panel, following a year of study, said
competition on estimating -Soviet strate-
gic aims was -"more - c6iitroversial% and
less conclusive" than relying on a- single
estimate.-;
-,'=The panel also asserted that the B`team;
headed by Prof. ;Richard _Pipes;_,head of
Harvard - University's Russian Research,
Center, "reflected the views of only one!
segment of the oach spectrum,"
the Soviet
servative -app
Union. -
Three Senators Dissent
The committee criticized - the intelli-
gence community, particularly the C.T.A.,
for basing its so-called national intelli-
gence estimates of the Soviet Union's
military power "narrowly" on "hardware
questions" of weaponry. Instead, it said
the agency should address "the wider
framework of other dynamic . world
forces, many of which are essentially the
creatures of neither U.S. nor Soviet initia-
tive or control:'
The-committee report was issued with
dissents from three senators. .
Senator Gary Hart, Democrat of_Colo-
rado, charged that "the use of selected
outside experts was. little more than a
camouflage for a political effort to force
the national intelligence estimate, to take
a more.'bleak view of the Soviet strategic.
-
threat."'
.. Senator Daniel "Patrick Moynihan,
Democrat of New York, said the B team
nation of a i:oviet drive for superiority
in .strategic arms "has gone from heresy
t) re?pectability, if not' orthodoxy" in
"what. might be called official Washing-
ton."
And Senator Malcolm Wallop, Republi-
can of Wyoming, accused the committe^
majority of attempting "to denigrate the
B team" by conveying- the impression
that the group of evaluators assembled
by the C.I.A. contained many differen
points of view while the, outsiders consti-
tuted "a narrow band of-zealots." _ _ -- ; ~ -
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 Approved For Releas RffiR
ARTICLE :APPEAPED 10 MARCH 1978
O V PAGE
John P. Roche!
Intelligence estimate and. a grotesque eportJ
The Senate Committee on TeamB is chided for its pect you would servative" to make accu-
issued a report bias, its position has been underestimate (Soviet rate statements? The logic
Intelligence
last month on the ?1976 adopted in essence by the developments) once ,or seems to run backward: 1)
exercise in which an in- president, the secretary of twice or three times. If you all people of good will want
house government intelli-. Defense, a Brookings Insti- underest mate the eighth to avoid war; 2) if Brezhnev
genre group ("Team A") tution study, Sir Harold Wil- time, real y, you ask for a & Co. are not men, of good-
and a group of knowledge- son and, on the left, the Chi- change.: t we underesti- - will, there will be war;
able outsiders ("Team B"). nese communists. mated a inch and tenth therefore 3) Brezhnev & Co.
were given .the same data.: As Sen. Pat ;Moynihan put time." must be men 'of good will;
and 4) anyone who says dif-
on Soviet strategic capabil- it, dissenting from his This d gged inaccuracy
ity and objectives and-', brethren: "The subject of led in 19761to the president's ferent is -a chauvinist-
asked to submit their as-. the 'Team B' report has- Foreign [ntelligence Advi- hysterical conservative: 'a
sessments. Team B. led by been before our committee sory Boai?d, a group of pri- war-lover= : -
the distinguished Harvard for a year now, during. vate citizens since abol- Auto-hypnosis is - cer-
Russian expert Richard -.which, if I am not mistaken,. ished by 'President Carter, tainly protected by the
Pipes, found Team A's rather a striking shift has to suggest the two-team First Amendment, but there
evaluation wholly inade taken place in the attitude contest. `I'Ae proposal was, are practical reasons why
quate for both downplaying of what might be called offi- of course.',' bitterly opposed our intelligence services
Soviet -strength and wil- - cial Washington to the then- by the relevant bureaucra- - should not be permitted to
lingness to employ it. There unwelcome views of this "cies and, \when it was ap- make a career of it. But be-
was a great brouhaha at the - group of scholars -and offi- proved by' President Ford, cause of this weird media
time because the central cials. Their notion, that the .the word) went out that response to Team B, or the
thrust of Team B's critique Soviets intend to surpass Team B. was picked by -Committee on the- Present
was leaked to the press.. the United States in strate- biased, anti-detente, con- Danger (to which I belong),
Now comes the intelli- . gic arms and are in the servativest - there is no verification of
gence committee, in gro- process of doing so, has As Sen. ;ary Hart said in track records. Paul Nitze
tesque fashion, deprecating gone from heresy to re- his supple nentary opinion does not dance with joy
the technique of bringing in spectability. if not ortho-? to the recent committee re- watching Moscow play fast
outsiders and insinuating doxy." port', the concept of "com-- and loose with SALT; in-
Team B was packed with Why then, if Team B was petitive an4lysis and use of deed, the accuracy with
Bolshie-bashers. Deploring. on target, should the coni- selected outside experts, - which he has called the
leaks, "worst-case" think- mittee expend so much was little more than a. shots is profoundly depress-
ing, and the emphasis on - effort attacking its creden- camouflage for a political ing. We would, all be
military criteria, the com- tials? Well, as usual, there effort to force the national happier to be proved wrong.
mittee never raised the key is a history, in this case of intelligence estimate to
question. Indeed, at the out National Intelligence Esti- -take a more bleak view of Finally, if knowing your
set the report.states that'.. mates consistently undere- the Soviet strategic threat.." customers - -is . to , be
no attempt (has been ?- stimating Soviet capabil This epi$ode illustrates a "biased," we confess-to
made) to judge which ities- general. pi'+oblem in media bias. I recall in the 1940s
group's estimates concern- - :: bias: the designation of being bitterly denounced as
ing the USSR are correct"! _ In- a.?Washington speech,.- anyone wLo suggests the a Red-baiter by the Stalin-
The point of an intelli- last spring, Fred C. Ikle, '? Soviets are building mobile ists for saying Trotsky had
Bence estimate, at least in a Paul Warnke's predecessor. - missiles ot'?killer satellites a been murdered by the GPU; !
rational universe. is to' as director of the Arms Con-, "conservative,". or -'-in father of KGB. Pravda'said
present an accurate pic- -.trol"and Disarmament Ag- George Kennan's- phrase - he was "killed by a disillu-1
ture. Thus iris ironic that in ency,-stated bluntly that-"in; a devotee:- of "chauvinist sioned follower,"-Jacson-l
the same time frame that. 'intelligence-you would ex rhetoric.'. Why its it "con- Mornard. Last year in Mos-?l _
J - _ : COW, at the 60th- anniver-
sary of the-Bolshevik Reva
tution,. Ramon Mercader,
alias-Jacson-Mornard, was j
made a "Hero of the-So
Union-" I was "biased." but .
was I inaccurate?
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 ARTICLE 71PPE4RED
WASHINGTON STAR (RED I n r)
ON PAGE__,44:/ Approved For RJie (IVV/30 : CIA-RDP90-0.1137R0001000
By John J. Flalka
Wa3singum Star Pact Wriiee
The CIA informed President John-
son in 1963 that Israel had the atom
bomb,- but Johnson told. then-CIA"
Director Richard Helms to drop the
matter, according to a former high-
ranking CIA official. .
"Don't tell anyone else," Johnson
is quoted as saying, "not evert Dean
Rusk (then secretary of statey and
Robert McNamara.. (then secretary,
of defense)."-
The Johnson-Helms. conversation
was described in a secret briefing to .
a dozen top officials of - the -Nuclear
Regulatory Commission in February
1976 by Carl Duckett. then the CIA's
third-ranking official. NRC investiga-
tors later interviewed Duckett and
printed a four-page account of his
story in their report, a- heavily cen- -i
sored version of which was released
last weekend-.
ACCORDING TO the document..
Duckett briefed the NRC officials as
part of a commission inquiry into -
whether nuclear material had been
diverted or -stolen from the United
States.----- - - . . "
The report is part of the agency's
internal investigation of allegations
that its executive director misled two
congressional committees when he
told them last summer the NRC had
"no evidence" that, there had ever
been a nuclear diversion.
Censors- at the NRC had cut holes
in many pages of the 252-page docu-
ment,. eliminating any reference to-
"sensitive" aspects of - the case.
which involves a- chain of circum-
stantial evidence developed by the
CIA- - that highly enriched uranium
was somehow diverted to Israel from.
a private nuclear fuel plant at Apollo,
In most copies that were stamped , he was interviewed about the Duck-
"unclassified" and released by the ett briefing a month ago during a
NRC, the Duckett interview was en- closed session with House and Senate
tirely cut out, leaving holes in the investigators. According to, several
pages and even in the index where - Persons who .were present. Helms'
'
Duckett
s name appeared. However
;
..
a copy of the report obtained by The
Washington Star contained" a seg-
ment of the Duckett interview.%
Joseph J. Fouchard, the NRC's
director of public affairs, said he had
no Comment on how the information
had appeared in an unclassified vex'- -
Sion of the report. A similar account
of the Duckett briefing appeared in -December in Rolling Stone maga-
fold Helms to Keep 'It Quiet
e
aS TOW -,12 o
The -account states that "Mr. -'
Duckett raised the . question of
whether the U.S. had intentionally al-
lowed material to go to Israel. He
"said that if any such scheme was
under consideration, he would have
known about it and he never heard so
much as a rumor about this. He,
therefore. does not believe there is
-any substance to this allegation." - .
Duckett said the CIA drew up a
"National Intelligence Estimate" re- -
porting Israel's A-bomb capability in -
1968 and stated that he- showed it to
Helms.
Helms, he said, 'fold him not to
publish it. He said Helms. said he
"would take it - up with President
Johnson." - " " -
- Helms, according to Duckett, later.
replied that he had spoken with John-
son and that Johnson had told him to
keep quiet about the matter. _
HELMS COULD NOT be reached
- immediately for comment. However,
memory was hazy about what John-
. son's reaction had been.
Duckett has refused to respond to
reporters' phone calls since rumors
of his involvement in the Apollo case
began circulating several months
peatedly told Congress and the press
that there has never been evidence of
a' diversion of "significant quanti-
ties" of highly enriched uranium or
plutonium, both- of. which can -be
made into nuclear weapons. -
"By the end of the-meeting it was a
pretty somber group." Duckett later
told NRC investigators. He said that F
William A. Anders. then the NRC
chairman, told him that "in light of
the, sensitive nature of the informa-
tion he was going to go-to the White'
House." - - -
The report - states that Anders
called James E. Connor, secretary to -
President Ford's Cabinef, and said
he couldn't tell. Connor-what had been
.discussed in the briefing because of
"classification considerations," but
stressed that the White House should
have the briefing. - - -
Another commissioner, Richard T.
Kennedy, - went to Lt. Gen- Brent
Scowcroft.? Ford's assistant for na-
tional-security affairs, and' old Scow-
croft the briefing had "raised ques-
tions but no answers." - -
Shortly afterward the Ford'
administration reopened an investi-
gation into the Apollo company.-.
-Nuclear Materials and Equipment -
Corp..- which had been investigated -
by the AEC.and the FBI during the.-
mid-1960s when the company re- .
ported that 202 pounds of highly en- "
riched uranium it had been process-
ing under a series of. government
- The interview notes that by 1976 contracts had been lost. At the time
"from the CIA's intelligence point of . of the suspected diversion, the United -
view.-the--diversion did not matter" States was virtually the only supplier ---
because by. that time Israel had of highly enriched uranium for com-
beguni producing plutonium weapons -? mercial purposes in the-world.
- - from a small nuclear "research" ? AT-.THAT P O I N-T " t h e
? IN THE INTERVIEW with NRC- reactor that had begun operating in government's safeguards on highly .-i
investigators. Duckett'noted that the the mid-1964x. enriched uranium rested mainly on
CIA had verified-in a number of ways The incident, however. matters to 'the metal's value, roughly. $4,500 a i
that Israel had become.a nuclear - the NRC and -the- Department of pound. The'regulations assumed that
weapons power.-A type of bombing Until just recently, officials -
'-from the NRC and DOE's two a company would guard the material
practice done by Israeli A-4 jets, pre-,, like old. NUMEC, however, re- ?I
Duckett said, "would not hAyqxXaftd, FoMMbW& 1~9 .39 Ei/Q 41 790 0' ( u1P1ih90?6-ffi-%hen.the loss --
sense unless it was to -deliver a nu- mission an a nergy esear could not be eiplained.- promptly -
Clearbar*ib-"_ and Development. Administration re- _: paid the AEC more than $1 million. 11
011TNT