WHY CHINA LEAKED RUMORS OF SOVIET BASES IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R001000030069-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2006
• Sequence Number: 69
• Publication Date: May 30, 1975
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Re1Offl S?Qty', 1i~11V:
By Guy Halverson
Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
Pentagon intelligence officers are increasingly a
1.eport sth
Washington
prehensive about
be seeking air or nav
1J1 aJV Uaa a a~..w....
a e e a legations - mace by the government of China and
carried in a dispatch out of Peking by Japan's Kyodo News Service -
hare not been confirmed by either the Soviet Union or Saigon.
Some State Department analysts speculate that the report may have
been deliberately "floated" by China to prevent such a base agreement
at some future time.
But if Moscow Vietnamese basis, intelligence sources he2re
note, the Fx' itical and militaar repercussions wou e t iroughout
,,ast sia:
China would he directly "flanked" on two sides by the Soviets, who
already have major army and naval installations at Vladivostok in the
P~orth EJacific The port however, is closed by ice in winter.
1 0. 0 \Y 1975
0030069-6
Harbor in North Vietnam during, the Vietnam warriod, it is
not believed here that the Soviets bad actual bunkering
facilities on land. Haiphong Harbor can usually accommodate
only a small number of vessels. .
In recent weeks, it is noted, the Soviet Union has sent a
number of cargo vessels to South Vietnamese ports.
In the Kyodo news dispatch, the Chinese were reported to
have said that the Soviets had asked Vietnam for use of former
U.S. military bases "in compensation for the huge amount of
aid" that Moscow gave North Vietnam and the Viet gong
throughout the Vietnam war.
y 4 They Soviets would have a military "presence" close to the
Philippiees and Indonesia. Japan, it is believed, would feel threatened
by such a base in the South China Sea.
o Assuming that base rights included a naval port such as the giant
naval facility left by the Americans at Cain Ranh Bay the Soviets would
have a major refueling post on the 25,000-mile run from Vladivostok to
the Indian Ocean.
"I think the Soviets would be anxious to get anything in the way of
bas~,,, rights if they could," says an Indian Ocean-Soviet expert at
Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International
Studies.
"If they did get base rights in South Vietnam, when the Suez Canal
coons they would then have support facilities to the Indian Ocean from
two directions - from the north via the Black Sea and fron.-I Vladivostok
in the east."
IiIoscow, intelligence experts note, now maintains roughly 20 vessels
in the Indian Ocean region. At one point the number reached 35.
Some State Department officials, on the other hand, remain skeptical
about Soviet intentions. '
"Such a (Vietnamese) base-rights bid at this time would seem to put
Hanoi in a very difficult position and could conceivably jeopardize the
thin edge that North Vietnam wants between the Soviets and the
Chinese," one official says. "The Chinese would certainly see such
base rights as a threat."
At present,_State Department sources say, while Soviet aid to Hanoi
heavily outweighs Chinese aid in overall dollar figures, China is far out
front in quantity.
,North Vietnams AK-47 rifle is supplied by China.
I3iit at the same time, according to State Departm-mt analysts,
Sovi..et.; might be tempted to beg the question of military "base rights,"
by seeking "fishing rights' for Soviet ships which could be used
occasionally to allo?.,, Soviet vessels to make port calls.
Approved For Release 2006/05/24: CIA-RDP80BO1495ROO1000030069-6