LETTER TO MR. RICHARD HELMS FROM JOHN ALEX MCCONE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01086A000900220030-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 57
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2001
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: February 6, 1968
• Content Type: LETTER

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JOHN ALEX MS CONE
612 SOUT1~ FLC VIER STREET
LOS ANGELE_?, 90017
6 FEL~ruaz'Y 1968
D?ac Dick:
Arleigh Burke has asked me to car~zent on a series
of articles on the Cuban R~:is:~i~-s Crisis ~o;T Mario La2o
for possible publication in the Reader's Digest.
I have written rqy viers on the articles and attach
a copy of the letter. I can add nothin, to ghat I have
said in this letter, copy of v~hich I have also sent to
Dean Rusk.
Feeling that someone cn ycur staff m;-ght at some
et into this question, I attach the complete file,
point g Dda"io Lazo ~rhich ~rere
including the chapters vrritten by
forararded to me by Arleigh Burke.
,R,(aru- personal regards,
Mr? Richard Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
ti~ashinoton, D? C?
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~,x. Mario Lazo
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JOHN ALEX MS CONE
612 SOUTH FLOV~ER STREET
LOS ANGELES 90017
23 Februaxy 196a
Dear bir. Lazo
This is a harried reply to your let+?ar of 12 Febraa:Yy.
In fact I am dictating this letter to you as I drive to tY.e
airport.
Understandably a book smitten by a man of your kro:~rledge
and connections and st u~ding undoubtedly vrill ba a valuable
contribution to a public and?rstanding of the developrents in
Cuba both before and after the ult2rrataiirsall y mustlbe included
cussion of the missile crisis q yn tsm tcd __ to
in such a book. Ho-rrever, one is tempted -~ v..~.y p
adopt the position that a military attacl: by air or indercon~lly
invasion vrould be the bsst co'arsc to follo~~s but I am P/
convinced that history ti'='ould havo dealt harshly with the Unitod
gtat~s had such action been ta'>ten.
I am confident that time rti11 see Cuba restored to the
co:~~~71unity of nations of the ~lestern gP.nisphero and that she Z~rill
again occupy her rightful position of importance and influence.
I look upon the presznt psriod during which Cuba is going throu~,h
the grea.t~st of agony, vrith sadness bat I do not despair of the
future .
y7ith respect to the r~cferences to me personally, I am a'rare
that a great deal has bee.1 smltter_ in periodicals and in books,
including the book by bir. Abel; tl:ersfore I ta-,e no exe~ption to
the references made to ne Frith respect to the ears trct.~~~ nosrld
long before the raid-rangs missiles ti~ere dis..ov..rcd;
issued and tha fact that I, with othsrs, took a "hard line. By
that I~mean thatif thetUnited states eras toaremain secu~r~essiles
must b,, removed
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(EXECUTIVE RE~~~;~Y FtIE
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y1r. 4~a_rio Lazo - 2
23 February 19b8
I eras co2~vinced that the course adopted mould in all
probability accomplish our purposos and, furthez~nore, kn~;Y
that if it did not then sucl actions as might be necessar,~ '
to remove the threat would be taken. r~. sentEnca expressing
2ny Support of the actions taken ivculd be satisfactory and
you n:ay, if you ~nsh, add some reference to the possibility
of further actions if the quarantine failed.
I ~vould be delighted to see the final draft of your
chapters ar-d Vrill lo:~k for'~~ard to reading your book. I have
distributed o:21y ane copy of the c~iapters and that is in the
hands of bir. Nel2as, Dirsotor of the CIA -- tirith whom you are
u~-rdoubted)_y in touch. lnclci's2ltally, he and his a;;sociates in
that orbarsization hold you in the highest esteem.
I a~n leaving this morning for three tiYeeks in the Bahamas
and lvhilc 11~ould be delighted to see you, such a tweeting
Vtiould~havc to to}ce place late in ~~arch.
Yours very truly,
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February 12, 1968.
The Honorable
John A . 1`icCone
612 South Flov;er Street
Los Angeles, California 90017
Last Thursday I called Arleigh Burke to say
I was about to write you that my wife and I would be
glad to fly out to Los Angeles in case you vrould like'to
talk to me personally. He had just received your letter
of rebruary bth., which he read to me over the telephone.
I am afraid you have been unnecessarily disturbed over the
material sent you. Permit me, please, to give you this
background.
T/Iy plan originally was to write a book in Spanish
which would be sold in Latin America as a paperback. Then"
one of my friends, .a former client, suggested that it also
appear in Portuguese for Brazil. He is the President of one
of the largest American companies there and has a man who is
qualified to make the translation. Finally the idea surfaced
to have the book appear in hard cover in English. It has
been completed except for the chapter on the Missile Crisis
which will be one of about 25 chapters, perhaps 2 out of
26.
The book covers the Cuban events of the past decade
but it has a lot to do with the history, culture and tradi-
tions of Latin America generally. T-Zany of the leading per-
sonalities who participated in the Cuban events, both Cuban
and American, are personal friends of mine. I have 3 chapters
on the Bay of Pigs, the rnat;erial for Z~rhich I researc:~ed for
five years. ~T~y conclusions are very different from those
reached by Lyman Kirkpatrick. I am convinced that the in-
vasion plan was a masterful plan and should have succeeded.
~~le had many dealings with Castro and I once heard him say
the invasion plan was excellent.
There was never any intention to publish the
material you have in its present form. ;:hat you have was
written hastily, as a first draft, and intended really to
be a target t;o draw criticism. Nothing will ever be publish-
ed over my name if I can be shoTJn that it is not the truth.
I have always felt that the greatest homage one can pay to
truth is to seek it and adhere to it.
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 February 13, 1968
The Honorable
Jahn A. NcCone
612 South glower Street
Los Angeles, California 90017
There are two items I forgot to mention
in the letter I sent you yesterday:
1. Your vievas on the material
known to the owners of the Reader's
Digest. There was no hurry but I
Arleigh Burke sent you are fully
from Arleigh.
The sole purpose of ser_ding you the material
was to have the advantage of being; able to incorporate
any sum?;estion you might care to make.
2. Although there is very little
possibility that anything of mine
on the missile crisis will appear
in any magazine, I do not see how
I can leave a corrected, documented
account of it out of my book. Of
course I will be more than glad to
3.nclude the remarks you suggest --
that you were a member of the Bxecu-
tive Committee, supported the course
agreed upon, expressed no dissent and
feel in retrospect that a delicate
situation was handled properly.
With best wishes,
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TAB
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 Approved For i2elease 2006/01/03 :CIA-RDP80B01086A000900220030-7 .-_-- ---- ~~ ---~-~
JOHN ALEX M6 CONE
612 SOUTH FLOWER STREET
LOS ANGELES 90017
November 3, 1967
Dear Dick,
Attached are two documents prepared by George
Lenczowski, Professor of Political Science at the University
of California, Berkeley. Both relate to the current situation
in the Middle East.
There is nothing in the papers that will be new to
your area specialists, however, I thought they might add
to your very considerable inventory of information on the
Middle East situation and related problemso
With warm personal regards,
Mr. Richard Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.
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~.. .,. C ~.: ..... _
Does this give you any concern?
:= i.,0v:: ~vAN.?, ADD,^vCSS F.ti.7 ~HQ~'~'. = ~'?O. ~ D.~. ~ _
E~'. /DCI
p 6/d1/03~ : CF~BP'~
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15 .August 19b7
Los Angeles, California
I~r. Terence M. Less
61 L South Flower
bear Tesrxys
Under sepaxato cover l am sonding you
the book which is mentioned fn the attached
lottex which you may wish to acknowlesdge.
Sincearely,
Lnclasure
Distribution:
0 > Addressee w/basic letter and book under separate cover
1 ~ ER
1 - EA /DCI
STAT O/DCI (15 August 196?)
~~ ~e i~ za .!~
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 JOHN ALEX MS CONE
612 SOUTH FLOWER STREET
LOS ANGELES 90017
June 27, 1967
Dear Dick,
Coro Foundation is a local San FranciscolLos Angeles
organization that does nothing but train young men and women
to serve in Government positions -- Federal, State or local.
I suggest you pass this on to your personnel people
who might not be familiar with this source (although a limited
source) of administrative personnel with some training.
Mr. Richard Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.
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 CLASS OF SERVICE
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unless its deferred char- ~ ~ ~-~-~ ~ ~~ A
W. P. MARSHALL Il-r lh1r..~ LL.\~\
' actor is indicated by the
pr0[~l'[ s}'mbOl. CHAIRMAN OF THE BOAftD ,
The filing time shown in the date line on domestic relegrams is LOCAL TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is LOCAL TIME at point of destination
851P PDT JUN 15 67 LA710
SSB7~2 L B'lA5 32 PD SACRAMENT Q CALIF 15 512 P PDT `
RICHARD ~EATINGE M C CORQ FOUNDATION BANQUET t DELIVER BEFC~E
6 Pi's)
ELD~ATs~ ROOM THE MUSIC CENTER LQSA
ATTN h1ANAGER
THE GRGtiiT}i AND NATIONAL ACCLAIM GIVEN C~0 FOUNDATION I5 INDICATIVE
OF ITS SUCCESS? BUT THERE IS STILL A GREAT NEED FOR OUR CITI~NS
T 0 BE r30RE AGE ARE OF THEIR G ~dEP,NMENT AND PRCGRA MS THAT FLIRT HFR
THIS AIM MUST BE ENCOURP~GED? ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE: OF CALIFC~RNIA~
I EXTENI3 T 0 COF:O FOUt1DATIUN APPREC IP.T ICsV OF ITS SERUZCE AND
BEST t+]ISHES FCC MANY M(~E YEAP,S OF SUCCESSFUL ACTZViTYo TO
THE SOUTHrkN CALIFGRNIA CORD INTERNS GiHQ ARE THIS EVENING CELEBRATING
THE COPI~.EZ'JCV OF MANY HECTICy EXASFERATING9 BUT EDUCATION '
AND REWARDI\G I~iQNTHS OF CCr~D ASSIGNIy1ENTS9 I E;CTEND BEST WISHES
AND MY HQ~rE THAT THEY GJILL ENTER PUBLIC LIFE AND GC~VERNAtENT
'SF1201(R2-65)
SINCERELY
RONALD FaEAGAN GOVERNt~c Or CALi:FORNIA ,.o
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Since 1847 in San Francisco and since 1958 in Los Angeles, Coro Foundation has conducted its
Internship in Public Affairs - the oldest continued internship of its kind in California.
Of the more than 300 graduates, some 55% are directly employed in government, political work and
public affairs. But this is only part of the story. Other graduates, whether housewives or
stockbrokers, are almost without exception, active citizens serving on school boards, state and
local commissions, etc.
Government Service 33.1% 33.1%
Business, professions, journalism 23,$
LL. B, & Ph.D. Candidates 8.3
Homemaking and volunteer work 9.2
Civic ~. professional organizations 11.3 11.3
Teaching & educational administration 7.7 ~.~
Party officials, campaign specialists 3.3 3.3
Deceased or unaccounted for 3.3
loo.o% 55.4%
CORO FODNDATION
R E C O R D O F
G R A D U A T E S
L O S A N G E L E S
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GEORGE AIASSA, '48
City Manager
City of West Covina
FRANKLIN D. ALESHIRE, '48
City Manager
City of Palm Springs
KAREN J. BAUCUS, '66
Social Worker
County of Los Angeles
MARVIN R. BAXTER, '63
Investigator
District Attorney's. Office
Fresno County
MICHAEL A. BEDWELL, 'S8
City Manager
City of Menlo Park
ROBERT F. BEYER, '64
Admin. Asst. to City Manager
City of Menlo Park
WILLIAM R. FREEMAN, 'S9
Administrative Assistant to the
County Executive.
County of Sacramento
JOHN K. GEOGHEGAN, '61
City Administrator
City of Union City
EDWARD GERBER, '60
Sr. Admin. Analyst
County of San Diego
OTHO J. GREEN, '64
Exec. Dir. Neighborhood Youth Corps
City of Berkeley
ALFRED A. HODDER, 'S9
General Manager
Truckee Sanitary District
HARVEY K. HUNT, '65
Administrative Assistant
City of Rolling Hills Estates
EVERETT P, BRANDON, 'S8 GLENN KEN DA LL, JR ? 'S3
Director, Econ. Opportunity Council City Manager
City & County of San Francisco City of Thousand Oaks
F. JAMES BROWNE, 'S6
Community Relations Officer
Bay Area Rapid Transit Distr.
MALCOM K. CARTER, JR ? 'S9
Admin. Analyst
East Bay Municipal Utility Distr.
ROBERT M, CHRISTOFFERSON, 'S5
City Manager
City of San Dimas
MARIE BERTILLION COLLINS, 'S9
Deputy District Attorney
County of Alameda
HUGH W. DAVY, JR., '65
Administrative Assistant
City of Berkeley
JOHN E. DE VITO, '47
District Manager
Contra Costa County Water Distr.
S. ANTHONY DONATO, '61
Deputy City Administrator
City of Santa Maria
WILLIAM H. KRAUS, '61
City Manager
City of Beaumont
GARTH R. LIPSKY, 'S5 .
City Administrator
City of Brea
DOUGLAS E. LORD, '64
Planning Commissioner
City of Richmond
RICHARD L. MANNING, 'S9
Community Relations Manager
So. Calif. Rapid Transit Distr.
WESLEY C. MC DANIEL, '61
Admin. Asst. to City Manager
City of Arcadia
CRAIG W. MC MICKEN, 'S4
City Manager
City of Roseburg, Oregon
GEORGE E. MORGAN, 'S1
City Manager
City of Palo Alto
LESLIE L, DOOLITTLE, '61
Administrative Officer
City of Morgan Hill
A. SONIA FAUST, '61
Deputy City Attorney
Honolulu, Hawaii
WILLIAM H. PARNESS, 'S0
City Manager
City of Livermore
ROY R. PEDERSON, '60
City Manager
City of Porterville
L. DALE FLOWERS, '65 CECIL S. RILEY, 'S5
Asst to County Chairman Assistant City Manager
Republican Central Comm., S. F. City of Oakland
JOHN K. ROBINSON., 'S2: t- ...,
Planning Commission Vice.,G#tmirs
EDMUND C. SAJOR; 'S6 ?~
Bay Area Rapid ,-Trans i t D'-s't'r: ~:
JAMES R. SCHON.ING, '66.
Rep. Central Comm., t.A.'County:
City of Sunnyvale
KENNETH H. SMITH, '4$''
City Manager
City of El Cerrito
WILLIAM B. STURGEON, X62 '.
Asst District Attorney,
HOWARD D. TIPTON, 'S9
City Manager
City of,Glendora
ROBERT G, VOLLMER, 'S3
City Manager
City of Palos Verdes Estates
RAYMOND W,WARD, '60
Assistaob General Manager.
Oakland-Alameda Coliseum
SAUL M. WEINGARTEN, 'S0
City Attorney
Cities of Gonzales $. Seaside
STEPHEN S. WEINER, '64
Economic Analyst.
B. A. R. T. D.
HORACE B. WHITE, 'S1
Asst to the County Exec.
County of Sacramento
RAYMOND H. WINDSOR, '63
Administrative Assistant
City of Wes t.,CoviOa_
ARLENE J. WILLITS, '64
Administrative Assistant
City of Hayward
MORGAN S. WOOLLETT, '63
Assistant Planner
City Planning Department, Oakland
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d
?
GLENN Y. ALLEN, 'S1
Associate Administrative Analyst
Joint Legislative Budget Committee
JUDSON C. CLARK, !63
Consultant,
Comm. on Government Organization
California State Assembly
ROBERT M, CLARK, '6g
Area Field Director
Republican State Central Comm..
HAZEL E. CLIFFORD, '63
Asst Field Secretary
Lt. Gov. Robert H. Finch
ROBERT L. COATS, '49_
No. California Vice-Chairman
Democratic Central Committee
WILLIAM C. DILLINGER, '48
Chief, Information & Education
State Department of Fish G Game
THOMAS J. DOOLEY, 'S6
Principal Administrative Analyst
Joint Legislative Budget Comm.
DIANE G. FEINSTEIN, 'S6
Vice Chariman,
Calif. Women's Bd. of Terms ~ Parole
Department of Corrections
R. WILLIAM HAUCK, '64
Senior Associate
Opinion Research of California
F, PATRICK HENRY, '48
Senior Planning Analyst,
Office of the Vice Pres. for
Physical Planning b Construction,
University of California
THOMAS R. HOEBER, '65
Assistant Director
Assembly Office of Research
JAMES C. HURST, X64
Exec. Asst to Director
Commerce Department
State of Michigan
IN ADMINISTRATIVE, LEGISLATIVE b POLITICAL AFFAIRS
AT THE STATE LEUEL
JACK B. JOHNSTON, 'S0
Personnel Officer
Water Resourtes Department
EDWARD J. KUSHNER, '64
Asst Program G Activities Mgr.
A. S. U. C. L. A.
KRIST A. LANE, '65
Assistant Administrative Analyst
Joint Legislative Budget Committee
JAMES A. LANE, '63
Consultant, Comm. on, Public Health
California State Assembly
BYRON P. LEWIS, '61
Associate Personnel Analyst
Trustees of the California
State Colleges
DAVID A. LIGGETT, '65
Area Field Representative
Republican State Central Comm.
ROBERT H. MENDELSOHN; '61
Administrative Assistant to
Hon. J. Eugene McAteer, State Senator
14th District
ERIC A. MOHR, 'S0
Supervising Transportation Engineer
California State P.U.C.
RAYMOND L. ROEDER, JR ? '63
Administrative Assistant
Office of the Speaker
Calif. State Assembly
PHILLIP H. SCHOTT, '62
Chief Administrative Officer
Rules Committee
Calif. State Assembly
JOHN M. SMART, 'S7
Principal Higher Educ. Spec!t
Coordinating Council for
Higher Education
WILLIAM L. STOREY, JR., '65
Assistant Administrative Analyst
Joint Legislative Budget Comm.
RAYMOND R. SULLIVAN, '63
Consultant, Assembly Comm. on
Revenue l; Taxation
California State Assembly
DONALD R. TEST, '65
Administrative Assistant to
Hon. Gordon W. Duffy,
Assemblyman, 35th District
KAY GANNON THOMSON, '64
Admin. Assistant for the
Centennial Fund Program
Univ. of Calif. at Berkeley
ROBERT M, MONTILLA, '48
Asst Administrator
Youth & Adult Corrections Agency
State of California
LOUIS R. NEGRETE, 'S8
Consultant, Assembly Committee on
Military & Veterans, Affairs
California State Assembly
VIGO G. NIELSEN,'65
Assistant Deputy Controller
State of California
0. James Pardau, '60
Consultant, Assembly Committee on
Nat''l Resources, Planning & Public Wks.
California State Assembly
MILTON VON DAMM, '60
Asst to the Vice President,
Educational Relations
University of California
ROBERT G. WALTERS, '60
Deputy Director
Office of Economic Opportunity
State of California
DONALD D. WEDDLE, '60
Field Representative
Hon. Jesse M. Unruh,
Speaker of the Assembly
GUNTHER J. ZORN, '62
Personnel Officer
State Dept. of Mental Health
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THOMAS C. BENDORF, 'S4
Asst to the Vice President
Eastern Region - Lockheed Aircraft
GEORGE W. F. CLIFT, 'S7
American Consulate General
Guayaquil, Ecuador
ANNE F. COLLINS, '62
Administrative Assistant
Economic Devel. Institute
World Bank
HELEN DEWAR, 'S8
Reporter
Washington Post ~ Times Herald
H. GLEN FISHBACH, 'S2
Chief Administrator
Peace Corps, Iran
i
CAPT. DONALD M. GRAYDON, 'S9
United States Army
Viet Nam
SAMUEL T, HATA, '62
Fiscal Management Officer
East-West Center, Hawaii
JOHN E. HEAN, '48
Management Analyst
Department of Public Health
District of Columbia
SUSAN E. ABEL, '65
Executive Secretary
Calif. Conservation League for
Legislative Action
CORDON BLACKLEY, '62
Mgr. of Chapters ~ Memberships
Bldg. Contractors Assn. of Calif.
ROBERT J. BLOOM, '62
Attorney
Legal Aid Society
New York, New York
JAMES H. BOWHAY, 'S6
Regional Representative
Council of State Governments
MICHAEL F, DILLON, '63
Field Representative
Calif. Taxpayers Assn.
MARK GALLON, 'S9
Dir. of Special Events
City of Hope
DANIEL P, GOODWIN, 'S9
Administrative Assistant
The Salvation Army Youth Center
IN WASHINGTON and in other U. 5. GOVT POSITIONS
DAVID JOHNSON, 'S1
Chief
Educ'1 Opportunities Grants Branch
Office of Education, H.E.W.
MARSHALL KELLEY, '49
Financial Manager
Office of Post Comptroller
Fort Meade, Maryland
PETER A. LAUWERYS, '63
Director
Farm Workers Opportunity Project
Oxnard, California
C. JEREMY LEWIS, 'S7
Field Representative
Congressman Jerry Pettis
33rd California District
TINA LOWER, 'S2
Assistant to Director
Nat'l Instit. of Public Health
Washington, D.C.
TAD MASAOKA, 'S0
Intergroup Relations Advisor
Dept. Housing ~ Urban Development
PATRICIA M, MC FEELY, '64
Pacific Coast Reg. Office Field Rep.
Community Action Program
Office of Economic Opportunity
BARBARA J, MONAT, '62
Personnel Specialist
Internal Revenue Service
E. D. P, Specialist
Republican National
LT. COL. ROGER L. RANCK, '49
Executive Officer, Director of
Surveillance b Reconnaissance;
Asst Chief of Staff for Intelligence
HENRY SAMORISKI, '49
Consultant to Rep, of Indonesia
A.I.D., State Department
ALEX A. SILVA, JR ? '62
Administrative Assistant
Nat'l Instit. of Public Affairs
Washington, D. C.
RONALD F. THAHELD, 'S7
Program Coordinator
Mid-Willamette Valley
Community Action Program, Oregon
HERBERT G WEGNER, 'S2
Latin American Regional Director
CUNA-AID
Canal Zone, Panama
MICHAEL R, CORDON, '65
Program Director
Junior Statesmen of America
SIDNEY C. MC CAUSLANO, '65
Administrative Assistant
Oregon Research Institute
PAUL MALDE, 'S2
Regional Manager
Calif. State Chamber of Commerce
BENJAMIN S. NEUFELD, 'S5
Executive Secretary
Nat'l Council on Ag. Life ~ Labor
Washington, D. C.
EDWARD J. REITH, 'S3
Executive Director
Peninsula Manufacturers Assn.
PAUL J. RICHARDS, 'S9
Executive Secretary
San Joaquin Co. Econ. Devel. Assn.
FRANCIS H, ST. DENTS, 'S9
Administrative Assistant
Hospital Council of So. Calif.
GROVER SIMMONS, 'S8
Regional Manager
Governmental Relations
Calif. Assn. of Manufacturers
W, KENNETH NORRIS, '49
Executive Director
Calif. Agricultural Conference
THEODORE W. PAULSON, '60
Executive Secretary
Dominguez Industrial Council
MORTON RAPHAEL, 'S9
Associate Director
Bay Area Health Facilities Planning
Association
DOUGLAS E. STWEART, '62
Dir. Community Relations
Planned Parenthood, Inc.
THOMAS W. SULLIVAN, '47
Assoc. Director
United Crusade, Sacramento
BARBARA T, WILLIAMSON, 'S5
Staff Associate
Taconic Foundation, N. Y.
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 pp~oved for Releasg,,2006/01~ CIA-RDP80B01086A00090022~
,,E, ,
'
..
MEMORANDUM FOR: ~!1r. Helms via.
Admiral Taylor
Attached is a proposed response to Mx . McCone
about. recxuitng at the Coro Foundation ,
Recommend your signature .
~G~i.~
(DA
approved For Release 2006/01/03 :CIA-RDP80B01086A0009002~0
 ~pprCFORM M0. 2q7 Use previous editions
i-a~ L~7I
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` UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
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TO NAME AND ADDRESS DATE
INITIALS
I
Deputy Director for Sur"t
18 H
,~
?~
I~
2
Executive Direct=
Com troller 12
3
Director of entral
Inte11'r ence 12 H
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE
REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO,
DATE
Director of Personnel 5E56
~ AUG 1967
ASSI
03
 Mr. John A. McCone`
Joshua Hendy Corporation
612 South Flower Street
Los Angeles, California 90017
Rather than attempting to cover these
points with you on the telephone, I am send-
ing along the paper itself; which should be
easier for you to handle. .. It is unclassified,
as you will note, and was written at my re-
quest for a talk with you.
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'THE DIRECPOR OF CENTRAL INTEWGENCE
=~ : -
Approyed For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP80B040$~A000900220030-7
I assume that this is what you wanted.
Cordially,
Richard Helms
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SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR DCI's USE IN CONVERSATION
WITH MR. McCONE
1." I have had my people examine your proposal
about a buffer zone running along the Egyptian-
Israeli border. The reaction of most was that
this would be a very difficult thing to get the
Egyptians to agree to, because it would involve
Egypt in giving up sacred Arab soil and would mean
at least passively admitting the end of belligerency
toward Israel. Some thought that the Egyptians
would almost automatically look on a buffer zone
proposal as a Western attempt to trick them into
doing something which was favorable to Israel.
2. Despite the political difficulties, it
deserves further study. If such a buffer zone
proposal were to be put into effect, the Egyptians
would have to gain from it in some manner .or at
the very least not appear to lose. You mentioned
that matters could be arranged so that the Egyptians
would get considerable profits from the oil pipeline
to be built across this buffer zone. This would
be one element. The political angle is more
important. For example, the major Arab participation
in this international project might help; so would
the incorporation of a slice of Israeli territory
in this buffer zone. (The Israelis would probably
refuse, though.) This could not run all the way
from the Gult of Aqaba to the Mediterranean because
at the lower end any strip of territory would have
to include the Israeli Port of Eilat and that would
be out of the question. The proposal would be more
acceptable to the Egyptians if it came from European
sources rather than from the United States,.
1
3. The Egyptians are probably aware that
the Israelis themselves have talked of building a
pipeline from Eilat to the Mediterranean. Your
propos~.l could be put to them as a way in which
they could prevent Israel from building that
pipeline, thus getting the profits from it themselves.
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4. On the pipeline itself, the key question
i.s whether it is more economical to bring oil
around Africa in large tankers, say, 100,000 tons
and up, than through the proposed pipeline. You
may have examined this yourself, but I should think
that the oil industry would be able to give \/various
cost figures . ??.M Mw....r/
5. In the matter of international facilities ,
other than a pipeline, you are no doubt aware
that this is one of the most barren and arid
spots in the world. There is very little rain-
fall, and only a small population, along the
northern coast between E1 Arish and the Gaza
Strip. There is some underground water flowing ~~~~-~h
dov~rn from the mountains ~ to---the-sough . Any extensive
agriculture work would require either large scale
de-?salinization 'or the discovery of underground
wager resources in quantities considerably larger
than those known to exist. An Egyptian drilling
program in recent years has brought in some more
waiver from artesian wells. This could support
some more people at substance levels, but not very
ma~iy. The shortage of water would of course affect
an;y other international facilities -- educational,
re:~earch, free port, or whatever -- which might
be constructed in this twenty mile buffer zone.
Water problems of course are not insoluble. Kuwait
supports a population of nearly one-half million
almost entirely on de-salted sea water.
'6. In many ways a buffer zone along the Syrian-
Israeli border would be easier to deal with in
physical terms. This in an area which has a
population, in normal times, of about 100,000 people.
It has a certain amount of farm land, but it is
by no means one of the more fertile parts of Sy
It would be entirely feasible to have surface connection
between Northern Jordan and the sea through Lebanon
through this area. This would be of benefit to
Jordan because of assured access, even if longer
thhan the direct route West from Aman, given Jordan's
u:;ually bad relations with Syria.
. ,~.
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1 ~ JUL X967
~,,
Mfr. J~ha Alen l~vicCone'''
812 oath Fiowsz Str+set
~vez .e~rxgei.ea, Csilfc~r~.a ~9i?Oi7
bear Jahea.,
i h~-ve checked lnta t~-e c~eatia> at the dai~ay iaa contact
with which y~ati refaarsed to ire ynur letter n#
July re a~ in ~ 4~t been sn sd~~ixeiatrative ~elsy which ie
reo~av re~oiveet sud th+t approprists ee#fics wii.~ vary ahnzLiy be
gettixigsn touch wi m y~ suggested.
I x~nch appreciate your interest izf t3~ts rostter set t3t~wnk
you fir calling th+et prnbiem #~ my attentit~rx~.
'with warm persnrea~l regar~da.
CJs/.Richard Helms
Sincerely,
tLd }~ r~~ ~~t
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 ia._N WILL CHECK CL FICATION TOP AND BOTTOM
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
_ OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP ~
ACTION ~ DIRECT REPLY ~ PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL ~ DISPATCH ~ ~ RECOMMENDATION
CONCURRENCE ~ ~ INFORMATION ~ ~ SIGNATURE
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 Approv
UNCLASSIFIED
RNAL
FIDENTIAL
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
EXTENSION NO.
C/CA Cord Meyer, Jr.
DATE
2 Februar 1967
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each com`nent.)
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FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS n ~ n rnyFln T~ INTERNAL
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 ;~ ''
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22 July 1963
Dear Mr. McCone:
I enclose the report of the committee of consultants which
you appointed to examine the estimative process in the light of
the Cuban experience and to make recommendations for improving
Sincerely yours,
/signed/
JOSEPH R. STRAYER
Dayton-Stockton Professor of History
Princeton University
Contents:
Introduction
Recommendations
Annex A, "Preconceived Notions"
Annex B, Rejected Proposals
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INTRODUCTION
1. On 17 May, 1963, the Director of Central Intelligence asked
Professors Robert Bowie of Har vard, Klaus Knorr of Princeton,
Joseph R. Strayer of Princeton, and Col. George Lincoln of the U. S.
Military Academy to examine the estimative process in the light of the
Cuban experience, and to make recommendations for improving it.
Professor Bowie received a form of consultant's contract not compatible
with his other committments and this mistake was not corrected in time
to make it possible for him to serve on the committee. The other three
members of the committee met for three days (8, 9, and 10 July 1963),
in the office of ONE, exchanged draft proposals during the next week,
and met again on 18 July to discuss the final form of their report.
20 It is obvious that no thorough investigation of the estimative
process could be made in this brief period. A number of estimates
dealing with Cuba and the USSR were read, two development files were
studied, and a few members (or former members) of ONE were inter-
viewed. As consultants, the members of the committee have read, over
the past few years, a number of estimates, both in final and in draft form.
In addition, Dr, Strayer was a member of the Board of National Estimates
from July 1953 to September 1954. Nevertheless, none of us feels that he
is in any position to make emphatic and final judgments about existing
estimative procedures.
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3: Twq of committee believe that a stud depth of the
estimative process by a small group of informed outsiders (not our-
selves, we hasten to addj might yield valuable results. Such a study
would require access to-all constituents of the intelligence community
and knowledge of personnel as well as procedures. It would take
several weeks, if nQt months. For these reasons the third member of
the committee believes the project is not feasible, and he doubts that
it would be useful.
4. The discussion and suggestions which follow are only opinions
offered by partially informed outsiders. Perhaps we are fairly typical
consumers, and our report might be taken as representing the reactions
of some consumers to estimates. But we should emphasize that we have
not studied the problem in depth, and that therefore many of our sugges-
tions may be superfluous, impractical, or just wrong-headed. We should
also emphasize that our suggestions deal almost entirely with details of
procedure, and that even the best procedure will not guarantee good
estimates. The essential thing is to find and retain men who have wide
knowledge, broad vision and good judgment. As long as the intelligence
community has such men it will do a good job, whatever its procedures.
COL. GEORGE LINCOLN KLAUS E. KNORR JOSEPH R. STRAYER
CHAIRMAN
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The best way to remedy any deficiencies which occur in the
estimative process is to have full and careful discussion of each prob-
lem. In theory the present machinery should ensure such a discussion.
In practice, we believe that there are some obstacles and we offer the
following suggestions as means of reducing or removing these obstacles.
1) Cut down the number of coordinated papers.
Men who have too much to do in too short a time may not
see all possibilities or sense the full impact of changed
conditionse Pressure to meet deadlines forces limitation
of discussion? Effort devoted to trivial papers means less
time and energy for major problems. It would require more
knowledge than we possess to determine what papers should
be eliminated, but we suspect that many "country papers"
fall in this category. We also suspect that requests for
coordinated papers are made, and accepted, too easily.
But in any case, there is overloading and it has bad results.
(Note that we do not recommend any increase in
personnel. The number of people now involved in the
estimative process is about as large as can be used
efficiently. More people would simply mean more spe-
cialization and more meetings. What is needed is the
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-overall vi and time in which to develop and
discuss ite This can be done only by a small group
of carefully selected men).
2) Make sure that there are always men with a
wide variety of views and experience on the Board of
National Estimateso The present distribution of member-
ship on the Board seems well designed to achieve this end.
As we understand it, it includes a core of men with long
experience in intelligence, other men who have worked
in the foreign or armed services, and a younger group who
will move on to other positions after a few years on the Board.
We suggest that it might be helpful when there are vacancies
to add two or three rotating members who would serve for
only a year or so. These men could be borrowed from other
branches of the government or from universities. If
properly selected, they could contribute new ideas and
encourage re-examination of accepted formulae.
3) Make sure that diverse opinions of other members
of the community are fully represented in contributions and
coordination meetingso Here our knowledge is limited and
our recommendations are only tentative. We believe that
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.that the p lem of overloading is even m serious
outside CIA than inside. Some representatives apparently
have little time to inform themselves or to think about the
problems which they are supposed to discuss. We are
also uneasy about the tendency to concentrate military
contributions in the DIA. There are often sharp differences
of opinion among the armed services. Expression of these
differences can be very helpful in forming sound judgments.
4) Call in a small group of consultants when diffi-
cult problems are to be discussed. We advance this idea
with some hesitation and we realize that it might cause
more trouble than it was worth. But it might be a way of
getting new points of view and of avoiding blind spots. Two
or three consultants would probably have a greater impact
than a single outsider who might hesitate to contradict
the insiders.
5) Indicate in some way when earlier estimates
are being quoted or paraphrased. There are many ways
of doing this (footnotes, quotation marks, etc.) and any
one would be satisfactory. But attention should be called
to repetitions, in the hope that this would lead to
re-examination of accepted positions.
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somewhat bol er m estimator e impact
of U. S. policy and attitudes on the rest of the world. This
is a difficult and dangerous task because it can lead to implied
criticisms of U. S. policy. But it seems to us that failure
to do this is one reason why preconceived ideas (which are
still correct) sometimes cause faulty estimates. To be
specific: if the Kremlin in the early months of 1962 had
reason to think that the posture and resolution of the U. S.
were weak, then it should obviously have estimated that the
risks of the Cuban adventure were not unduly high. Thus
the accepted doctrine that the USSR would avoid grave risks
was probably correct; the error was caused by the failure
to estimate that the Kremlin estimate of U. S. policy had
changed.
?) Make more information about attitudes and
methods of foreign intelligence organizations available
to estimators. We believe, for example, that the Kremlin
attaches more importance to certain kinds of evidence, and
less to others, than the U. S. intelligence community would
do. We suspect that what information has been acquired
about Soviet intelligence procedures is not very widely
disseminated. But if the Kremlin does use a peculiar scale
- R4 -
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Zn weighin evidence and if this is not gene ly known,
then the result is bound to be a faulty estimateo One
reason for inadequate estimates on Cuba in 1962 was
that the intelligence community, as a whole, believed
that Soviet leaders must realize how dangerous the intro-
duction of IRBM's and MRBM's would beo Better knowledge
of Soviet intelligence procedures might have made it possi-
ble to suggest that the Kremlin was undervaluing the evidence
which should have led it to this conclusion.
8) Keep a constant watch for signs that a mutation
in an existing pattern is about to take place. This is pro-
z ...
bably a superfluous and useless recommendation. Certainly
everyone is on the look-out for such signs and it is much
easier to identify them in retrospect than at the moment
when they occur. Existing patterns can accommodate them-
selves to a large number of new ingredients and gradual
changes bring about only gradual shifts in policy. But
there are some new ingredients so large or so sharp that
they may break the old pattern and it is not entirely
impossible to identify theseo Again to be specific, in
1962 the unprecedented situation in Cuba and the Sino-Soviet
dispute were probably such ingredients o
-R5-
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? 9) e a few validity studies in de~I At present,
validity studies usualT y involve only a comparison between
a new estimate and the immediately preceding estimate on
the same topic. Often there has not been enough change in
the interval between the two papers to reveal errors or biases.
Our experience in studying the Cuban series of estimates
leads us to believe that there would be some value in making,
from time to time, a validity study of a whole group of related
papers. This might expose persistent biases, rigidities, and
inconsistencies, We know that one such study of a group of
Soviet estimates was made some years ago, We suggest
that more exercises of this sort would be useful, but with the
caveat that if they became too frequent (say more than one
or two a year) their value would sharply decrease. We also
suggest that some of these studies be made by consultants,
both to reduce the burden on the ONE Staff and to ensure a
fresh point of view.
Next to the problem of full discussion. comes the problem of
communication., Tt seems to be fairly well agreed that estimates often
leave less impact than they should, and that important ideas are missed
by hasty readers. Nothing can be done to change the fact that everyone
-R6-
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 in government ha~oo mn.ch to read and that hastS~aders will always
miss significant points. I~To one style or form of presentation will be
equally effective with all readers. But perhaps something can be done
to make it easier for most consumers to read estimates with more
understanding.
1) Put key sentences at the beginning of each
section of the estimate, e. g. "We believe that the food
problem in Cuba is ~is not) causing unrest. " Reasons
for the statement should follow. At present many impor-
tent statements are made only after a long list of pr.o' s
and con's and thus lose their full impact. Conclusions,
as now written., do not always remedy this fault. Perhaps
a string of key sentences at the beginning of an estimate
would be better.
2J Call attention to possible courses of action
which might have serious consequences, even if the estimate
is that they are highly unlikely. 'Too many readers think
that "probably not" equals "never, " or that "the possibility
cannot be exclu~.ded" actually means that it is excluded.
Positive rather than negative formulae would help, but
we must confess that we are not very good at devising them.
Perhaps a phrase such as "there is at least a twenty per
~R7-
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dent chan at" approaches what we need nd perhaps
a little more argumentation showing the advantages which
might result from the adoption of unlikely courses of action
would make the consumer take them more seriously.
3) Emphasize new ideas or facts . Well informed
readers find much that is familiar in estimates, especially
in the larger estimates. This lulls them into missing
useful new rraterial. ~ Perhaps some typographical device
(e. g. side-lining- could be used to indicate places where
significant new ideas and facts are introduced. Or perhaps
more of the historical and purely descriptive material could
be put in annexes .
4' 1Vlake sure that the consumer is reminded of
key items in other estimates, This is probably an
?For example, there was a very important change in. the Cuban
estimate of 19 September, 1962 (SN1E 853-62-. Up to that time, all
estimates and memoranda had asserted that the USSR had little to
gain. by placing MRBIVL's or 1RBM's in Cuba. SNTE 85-3-62, on the
contrary, pointed out that the Kremlin might see decided advantages
in such a deployment. But no emphasis was put on the fact that this
was a changed estimate and we suspect that few readers noticed the
shift. One of our group; reading the Cuban estimates seriatim
(which few consumers ever have time to do) still failed to observe
the fact that. there had been a change on this highly significant point.
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unn.ecessa caution, but there is some da r that drafters
of an estimate will assume that consumers remember related
estimates as well as they do, For example, in SNIE 85-3-62
a little more emphasis might have been placed on the fact
that the estimate of the number of operational Soviet ICBM's
had recently been sharply reducedo
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ANNEX A
In response to one of the requests put before us, we have
examined the estimates on Cuba from January 8 to September 19, 1962,
It is generally acknowledged that there was a failure of intelligence, in
the sense that USIB did not warn the government that the Soviets might
be planning to place offensive ballistic missiles in Cuba, and indeed
suggested that such a decision was unlikely, though not impossible.
This failure has been widely attributed to the presence of "preconceived
notions" which prevented ONE, and in fact the entire intelligence community
from making a proper judgment. We therefore find it useful to make some
observations on the function, utility and drawbacks of such preconceived
notions. To do so is in fact indispensable to any search for remedies
designed to minimize these drawbacks.
In dealing with a major country, intelligence officers approach
their task with a set of expectations of likely patterns of behavior.
This is especially true in the case of the Soviet Union, the most
frequent target of intelligence. This set of expectations, sometimes
called preconceived notions, is based on a professional knowledge of
political structures, processes and personalities in the country concerned.
It is the distillate of years of experience and has been tested by, and
refined through, repeated intelligence estimates. It must be understood
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that the formulation such a set of expectations abo a country's
likely patterns of behavior is both inevitable and indispensable. It is
inevitable that, in doing their job, professionals will, more or less
deliberately, build up the set. It is indispensable because the set is
a most valuable tool in producing timely, coherent, articulate and, on
a probability basis, accurate intelligence, If no pattern can be estab-
lished, then prediction is almost impossible, and significant variations
can be demonstrated only by comparison with an already accepted norm.
Nevertheless, these sets of expectations have their limitations
and drawbacks. The history of intelligence is full of instances in
which an opponent achieved surprise by adopting a course of action
that seemed unlikely in view of the set of expectations dominant among
intelligence officers. The Japanese attack in Pearl Harbor is one of
the most conspicious examples, We are not concerned here with what
may be called "technical surprise." A "technical surprise" is not
incompatible with the prevalent set of expectations. The surprise occurs
because the opponent was successful in concealing a particular capability
or in keeping a particular course of action secret. We are concerned
with an opponent's behavior that surprises because it is incompatible,
or seems to be incompatible, with our prevalent set of expectations.
There are three possible causes of this type of surprise,
First, the opponent's basic pattern of behavior may change as
a result of changes in leadership or various other important conditions,
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and our se o expec ions may not register this cha quickly and
correctly. Our set, in other words, is out-of-date. Intelligence
professionals must obviously be on the alert for such changes and,
generally, take care that their working set of expectations does not
become obsolete, stale or unduly rigid.
"Second, the opponent may act irrationally. Irrational behavior
is, of course, very difficult, if not impossible to predict. It may take
all sorts of directions that make no sense to the rational mind, Only
if a country's leadership has a record of frequent lapses into irration-
ality will this observed fact become incorporated into our set of
expectations. But even then the estimate of future behavior will be
extremely difficult.
Third, the opponent may adopt a course of action that seems to
us to be in conflict v~ith our set of expectations, but actually is not.
A set of expectations is based on the attitudes and predispositions that,
we have learned, strongly affect the opponent's behavior. The important
point to note is that attitudes, though they shape behavior, do not determine
it. Behavior also depends upon the information which the opponent possesses.
It is this information which brings his attitudes into play and which gives
him a basis for calculating the advantages and disadvantages of a course
of action. Hence, we may go wrong in an estimate, not because our set
of expectations is faulty, but because we assume that the opponent acts
on approximately the same information that we have. Clearly, to minimize
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this source of. possi
intelligence failure, we requi _
not only a good
set of expectations but also some idea of the infox?mation that the opponent
uses in his cost-gains calculus.
We do not think that the failure of the intelligence community
to predict the Soviet deployment of medium range missiles resulted
essentially from its set of "preconceived notions" about the Soviet Union.
In our opinion, the community`s set of expectations was, at that time at
least, sophisticated and reali.sti.c. According to the set, the Soviet Union
was considered unlikely to depart from its cautious behavior in the military
field or to undertake actions involving a high risk of war with the United
States. That this expectation about Soviet behavior was basically correct
was, after all, confirmed by the great caution with which Khr.ushahev-acted
when the missile crisis broke in October.
Nor do we believe, as some experts have suggested, that the
Soviet decision was largely irrational. It is true that the Berlin state-
meet, Chinese criticism, and possible differences of opinion within the
Soviet leadership had put Khrushchev under some pressure to score a
success in foreign policy, It is also true that during the last year he has
seemed somewhat less sure of himself than before and has abruptly
reversed himself on several issues. But while he and other members of
the top leadership may have been perplexed by current difficulties there
is no evidence to suggest that they became reckless gamblers. At the
most, they may have been a little more willin to take a chance than
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they would have bee nder other circumstances, A a strong case can
be made for arguing that Soviet behavior was entirely compatible with
rational decision-making,
We believe that more important factors in the Soviet decision
were inadequate information and, resulting from this, an erroneous
assessment of the situation, They did not have the fund of information
about the mood and temper of the US government and people which the
intelligence community thought they must possess. They saw the balance
of advantages and disadvantages differently from the way Washington
officials thought they should see it. It is in this area that the intelligence
community failed although we defer for the moment the question of the
extent to which the community can be held accountable for the failure.
It is fairly clear in retrospect that the intelligence community
both underestimated the gains that Moscow believed it could derive from
introducing offensive missiles in Cuba and overestimated the risks which
the Kremlin thought it ran in adopting this course of action. In reading
the various estimates seriatim, we were struck by the fact that, although
the question of the deployment in Cuba of Soviet medium-range missiles
was raised in a Memorandum to the Director of January 8, 1962, it was
con.cl.uded repeatedly until early September that the Soviet Union could
not thereby add substantially to its strategic capabilities. The reason
given was that targets in the United States capable of being reached by
medium-range missiles from Cuba were already covered by ICBM's
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deployed on Soviet ~,
ritory. Only on September 6
re doubts raised
about this conclusion, The Special NIE of September 19, conceded that
Soviet planners might see some advantage in deploying IRBM? s and MRBM? s
in Cuba in order to supplement the limited number of ICBM? s believed to
be operational in the Soviet Union. The delay in coming to this conclusion
is surprising in view of the fact that it had been estimated several months
earlier that the USSR had only a small number of operational ICBM? s. In
this situation one obvious way for the Soviet Union to supplement its small
force of ICBM? s was to deploy a proportion of its large supply of medium-
range missiles within appropriate striking distance of the United States.
We are not, in fact, sure that such a deployment constituted, objectively,
a substantial improvement of their strategic position, though Soviet planners,
of course, may well have thought so. We are sure, however, that the Soviet
Union would have gained enormously in prestige and, indirectly, greatly in
the military balance of power and deterrence, if it had succeeded in
installing "offensive" missiles in Cuba and maintaining them there. Soviet
leaders, like all rational leaders, must be expected to accept a higher
level of risk for great gains than for small gains. We note that this was
not acknowledged in the estimates we examined.
Even when it was admitted that the Soviet Union might secure
possible strategic advantages by employing IRBM?s and MRBM's in
Cuba(SNIE 85-362, September 19, 1962), the conclusion remained that
the Sovie~~v~d~e~~a~@ 4~O~1~1a~~~~~~~g~gq+~d,~ t~0~~at
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and acceptance of s reat a risk would represent a ~ arp departure from
Soviet practice. This was the crucial view that prevented assigning any
high degree of probability to the course of action that the USSR pursued.
However, this view was ,yustified only if the Kremlin assessed the risk
factor approximately as it was assessed in Washington. The intelligence
community thought that the risk was very high, It knew it to be so. Yet
it is fairly clear in retrospect that the Soviet leaders did not share this
knowledge, that they assessed the risk at a lower level and that, given
this assessment, their deployment of "offensive" missiles in Cuba, did
not seem unduly risky to them. In that case, their action did not, as
they saw it, constitute a sharp departure from their normally cautious
military behavior,
The extent to which the intelligence community can be held
accountable for neglecting the possible gap between their information
and our information is not clear to us. Such gaps are a possible source
o.f intelligence failure to which the professional should be alert.
retrospect it would certainly have been better if the possibility of. this
gap, and its possible implications, had been acknowledged in the estimates.
If i.t had been, it might have qualified the impact of an erroneous
conclusion.
On the other hand, it is patently very difficult for our intelligence
services to have sufficient knowledge of Soviet intelligence to ascertain
or predict intelli ence failures in the Soviet Union. Moreover there
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is reason~to believ at much of the intelligence co unity, including
ONE, is not provided with such knowledge of Soviet intelligence activities,
and their organization as is available to a part of the community. Yet
this is the kind of knowledge which would have been required for a correct
prediction of the Soviet move in Cuba.
Moreover, the intelligence officer is also handicapped in speculat-
ing about national differences in estimating the risk of particular courses
of action as long as he may not take relevant United States policies fully
into account, and have adequate information about these policies and their
implementation to the extent that they are known, or must be assumed to
be known, to the Soviet Union.
However, even if these handicaps were removed, or at least
appreciably diminished, the cQ'hsumer of intelligence would be wrong
to expect the intelligence community to be able in all cases to obtain
sufficient information on the opponent's estimates of the advantages and
disadvantages of contemplated courses of action. For this reason alone,
and not necessarily as a result of "preconceived notions," the best
intelligence service cannot help failing from time to time. It v~o uld
be unfair and utterly unrealistic, in our opinion, to expect otherwise.
Ori the other hand, the inevitability of occasional failure does
not justify either complacency" or resignation. No organization stays
at the same level of performance over a long time -- if only because
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of changes m perso el -- and there may always be ~ om for improve-
meat. There are good reasons for reviewing institutional practices
from time to time with a view of raising the batting average by a few
per cent.
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ANNEX B
Rejected Proposals
We have considered, and have rejected as impractical, the
following proposals.
1) "Devil's advocates", professional dissenters, etc,
We hope that the intelligence community will always include
tough minded, skeptical individuals who will advance unpopular
ideas and who will query accepted doctrine. But any attempt
to institutionalize this function would be self-defeating, No
one can be skeptical all the time and the views of a man who
was being paid to act as a professional dissenter would not
carry great weight.
2) Dual or multiple estimates, For example, one
group might make an estimate from the Soviet point of view
while another estimated the same problem from the US point
of view, The difficulty here is what to do in case of disagree-
ment, Either some higher group would reach a final decision,
in which. case we would be back where we started, or the
consumer would make a final estimate, in which case the
community would have abdicated its responsibility. Moreover,
there is certain artificiality about this procedure which wo uld
probably erode its value very quickly.
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a e~ss a for o reac agreed ang~e in
estimates, and encourage dissents. It is possible that under
pressure of time some dissents which might have been helpful
are never made. But while a few footnotes are useful in alerting
the consumer to the difficulties of a problem a steady diet of
footnotes would blunt his attention. If there were too many
points on which agreement could not be reached the consumer
would have to make his own estimate and the community would
again have abdicated its responsibility. In short, dissents on
minor points should not be encouraged, and it seems unlikely
that dissents on major points are, or could be suppressed.
We note that in the Cuban estimates of 1962 (and in others
which we can remember) the worst mistakes were not caused
by suppressing disagreements or by watering down correct
judgments in order to obtain an agreed text, They were caused
by mistaken judgments which were held almost unanimously
throughout the intelligence community,
4) Make more effort to keep estimates up-to-date by
issuing frequent revisions, Carried to an extreme, this would
obviously lead to a confusion between estimates and current
intelligence. Even a moderate increase in the number of
revisions would probably do more harm than good by forcing
estimators to concentrate on minor fluctuations in policy rather
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 overtaken by events nothing can be gained by issuing a hasty
revision which simply says that the preceding estimate was
wrong. When a situation has gone operational revision of
earlier estimates should wait until there are some firm indica-
tions of new policies and courses of action. At this point current
intelligence will give policy-makers the flow of information which
they require. To refer once more to our case study, we doubt
that more frequent revisions of the basic estimates on Cuba
between 1 August and 19 September, 1962 would have changed the
opinions held by the intelligence community in any important
way.
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