NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029300010036-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: September 22, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

Appr _ pG a ease
COMMENT _-- FILE _
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Wednesday September 22, 1976 CI NIDC 76-223C
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Top Secret
~ .~.
State Dept. review completed
t
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Wednesday September 22, 1976.
T e NID a e is or e purpose o in orming
senior US officials.
LEBANON; Situation Report
Page 1
ISRAEL-SYRIA: Reducing Tension
Page 3
SWEDEN - WESTERN EUROPE: Election Reaction
Page 4
ITALY: Parties Setting Strategies
Page 6
NATO: Radar System in Jeopardy
Page 8
SPAIN: Reaction to Reform Program
Page 10
CHINA: Post-Mao Leadership
Page 12
BRAZIL: Elections Stir Interest
Page 13
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LEBANON: Situation Report
The resumption of heavy fighting in Beirut and the
consequen decline in security in the area of the city where
president-elect Sarkis was scheduled to take the oath of office
tomorrow have forced a change of venue for the inauguration
that could raise constitutional questions about the legitimacy
of Sarkis' presidency.
The inauguration will take place, according to an
ement yesterday, in Shaturah, a city east of Beirut in
Syrian-controlled territory. Leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt de-
clared after the announcement that neither he nor his support-
ers among the parliamentary deputies would attend the swearing-
in ceremony, which must take place before Parliament.
Jumblatt's decision to boycott the ceremony and the
possibi ity that other deputies will choose not to or will be
unable to enter Syrian-controlled territory raise the possibil-
ity that there will not be a parliamentary quorum for the inau-
guration. Interpretations of what is constitutionally required
for a legal swearing-in vary among Lebanese constitutional ex-
perts, but many would claim that Sarkis would have no legal
mandate if Yie were not inaugurated in the presence of a quorum.
TPie venue itself is also likely to raise legal ques-
ions, particularly by Camille Shamun, who may be looking for
ways to obstruct Sarkis' take-over. Strict constructionists--
led by Shamun--contend that the oath-taking must be held not
only before a quorum but specifically in Beirut; a swearing-in
at.Shaturah would not, by their definition, legally entitle
Sarkis to the presidency.
As the recently appointed acting prime minister,
uld in this case legally assume power as acting head
of state. His decision on Monday to keep the cabinet in continu-
ous session until the inauguration in order "to take care of
any eventuality" may have been intended to facilitate his own
assumption of power, at least temporarily.
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ISRAEL-SYRIA: Reducing Tension
Syria's willingness to hold face-to-face meetings be-
ween yrian and Israeli military officers to arrange reunions
among Druze families separated on the Golan Heights may in part
indicate a desire by Damascus to take a more pragmatic approach
toward relations with Israel. Indeed, both sides may hope that
the success of the reunion program will encourage the other to
take a more flexible attitude on further negotiations.
Until now, the Syrians have scrupulously kept
irec con. acts with the Israelis to a minimum, preferring
whenever possible to bargain through a third party.
Israeli Prime Minister Rabin has publicly welcomed
e agreement on the Druze reunions as a "small step" toward
reducing tensions, but cautioned against jumping to any conclu-
sions about the longer range significance of the accord.
Possibly to encourage the Syrians, Rabin said he was
rea y o consider establishing an open border policy with Syria
similiar to Israel's "open bridges" policy toward Jordan and
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its "good fence" policy toward southern Lebanon. Both of these
programs provide for a regulated flow of goods and people
across Israel's borders.
Some Israeli officials have warned against exagger-
a ing ~e importance of the new arrangement, suggesting that
Asad may be responding primarily to pressures from the Druze
community in Syria. Asad, in any event, probably is trying to
enlist the support of Syrian Druze leaders for his Lebanon
policy, including their active assistance in undercutting Leba-
nese leftist and Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt's support among
Lebanese Druze.
SWEDEN - WESTERN EUROPE: Election Reaction
//The defeat suffered by Sweden's ruling S-o_cial
Democratic Party in the election last Sunday clears the way
for a r.on-socialist coalition government--the first in over
four decades. The election outcome appears likely to have re-
percussions elsewhere in Western Europe.//
//In ousting the Social Democrats, the Swedish
electorate did not reject social democracy but simply asked
for a respite from the demands of a highly centralized govern-
ment and the constantly growing burden of taxes to finance a
comprehensive social welfare program.//
//The Social Democrats, who had lost votes in the
as ree e ections, dropped on Sunday only 0.6 percent from
their 1973 performance. The nearly 400,000 18 to 20 year-olds
who voted for the first time may have contributed to the shift
in the Swedish voting pattern.//
Some of these voters may also have been impressed
wit t e stand taken by the opposition parties against the
plans of the Social Democratic government to expand Sweden's
nuclear energy program. Among Sweden's three non-socialist
parties, only the Center P-arty has a consistent record--in re-
cent years--of opposition to the nuclear energy program.
Thorbjorn Falldin, the Center Party chairman and the
pro a e new prime minister, had originally supported the gov-
ernment energy program but became skeptical after studying
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potential environmental dangers. The Liberal Party never
strongly opposed the energy program, and the Conservative
Party supported it. Both of these parties were big winners in
the election.
//Once the euphoria generated by their election
vic ory as worn off, the non-socialists face the problem of
reconciling their long-standing differences over domestic pol-
icies and beginning negotiations for a coalition government.
The apportionment of cabinet seats and the hammering out of
policy on a number of issues may be difficult. Coalition
leaders may decide to resolve the nuclear energy issue by call-
ing a referendum.//
//The Social Democrats will be closely watching
or any signs of a crack in the non-socialist front. Despite
Palme's promise to "give them a chance," he may try to woo
away the Liberals if the non-socialists appear stymied in
coalition negotiations.//
If the bourgeois parties succeed in forming a gov-
ernmen he Social Democrats, with their strong support in
the Swedish labor federation, will present a formidable oppo-
sition. This will probably become apparent in the next six
months when bargaining on wages and other issues must take
place on a national scale.
/Perhaps nowhere in Western Europe were the
e ec ion results followed as closely as in West Germany. Chan-
cellor Schmidt's Social Democrats, who face a close election
on October 3, are probably worried that the outcome in Sweden
may be a harbinger of trouble for their own party.//
//Despite denials by West German government
ea ers a the Swedish election will have an impact, other
European socialists see signs of a shift to the right that
will help all conservative parties.//
//In Finland, where the five-party coalition of
rime finis er Miettunen resigned last week, the Swedish re-
sult is expected to benefit the local Conservative Party in
municipal elections on October 17 and 18. The Finnish Conser-
vative Party is the fourth largest in the country, but it has
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been excluded from the government since 1966 because of Soviet
distrust of its leaders and policies. The other non-socialist
parties may also receive a boost and--if new parliamentary
elections become necessary--could cause a significant change
in the composition of the next Finnish government.//
//In Denmark, politicians will watch public opin-
ion po s c osely in the next few weeks. Prime Minister ,Tor-
gensen's minority Social Democratic government has been tol-
erated by opposition parties for the past year because polls
had indicated that there would be no significant changes in
relative party strengths as a result of an early election.//
ITALY: Parties Setting Strategies
With the Italian Parliament opening next week, all
t e mayor parties are trying to work out tl-ieir strategy for
what promises to be a crucial round of political maneuvering.
Prime Minister Andreotti's lack of a parliamentary
ma~ori y means that the legislature will be a more important
.political arena than in the past. Andreotti was able to take
office last month only because the Communists agreed to abandon
their traditional opposition status and join the Socialists,
Social Democrats, Republicans, and Liberals in abstaining on
Andreotti's vote of confidence.
Because none of these parties is represented in An-
reo i s cabinet, the final shape of the legislative program
will be influenced, more than in the past, by parliamentary de-
bate--in which the Communists have the potential to play a dom-
inant role.
One Christian Democratic parliamentarian obviously
spore or many of his colleagues in noting recently that the
new parliamentary balance has put his party in a "danger zone"
with respect to relations with the Communists. Many Christian
Democrats fear that their party could easily slide into a leg-
islative alliance with the Communists that could eventually set
the stage for Communist chief Berlinguer's "historic compro-
mise"--a governing partnership between the two parties.
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Christian Democratic leader Zaccagnini underlined
this problem in a major address this week, in which he said
that the new situation required the closest possible liaison
between the party's leadership and its parliamentary delegation,
Christian Democratic legislators today begin a four-
ay caucus that is likely to focus on the question of how to
deal with the Communists in Parliament. The Christian Democrats
will also be taking up a broader question: how to establish a
positive image based on something more than anti-communism.
Various Christian Democratic groups have been discuss-
ing a issue in recent weeks. The group that has received the
most attention is one convened by first-time senator Umberto
Agnelli--vice chairman of Fiat and younger brother of Fiat
chairman Giovanni Agnelli. Addressing about 50 Christian Demo-
cratic legislators in early September, Agnelli argued that in
order to stop the drift of the reform-minded middle class to
the Communists, the Christian Democrats must shed their popu-
list conservative image in favor of a technocratic one based on
"efficiency, productivity, and modernization."
According to Agnelli, the Christian Democrats have
gone as far as they can "waving the anti-Communist flag." Now,
he says, they must de-emphasize ideology and confront the Com-
munists with detailed substantive policies.
Agnelli's proposals are stimulating debate in the
par y, ut the reaction has generally been skeptical. Conserva-
tives maintain that the party must stand far more than technical
competence, while the Christian Democratic left distrusts the
managerial elite that Agnelli represents.
For their part, the Communists are apparently having
'th unease among the rank and file over the party's
indirect support for a Christian Democratic government. In a
major speech this week, Berlinguer went out of his way to try
to convince Communist supporters that he is not selling out to
the Christian Democrats.
Berlinguer forcefully rejected the thesis that his
party is becoming a social democratic one and asserted that it
would continue to pursue traditional Communist goals within the
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Italian context. He assured his audience that the Communists
would insist on a significant policy voice now and continue to
work for full participation in the government.
-CIA, DIA, INR-
NATO: Radar System in Jeopardy
//The UK's support for a new and costly NATO air-
orne ra ar system appears to be weakening.//
//The radar system--known as the Airborne Warning
an on ro System--would correct a deficiency in Western air
defenses by its ability to detect low-flying enemy aircraft.
Because of the billion-dollar cost of the system, its adoption
is considered a major test of NATO's commitment to make more
efficient use of its resources by jointly purchasing a common
system. //
//In the face of domestic pressures to reduce de-
ense seen ing, the UK had been in the forefront of those argu-
ing for a joint approach. It is the only major ally, for example,
that has earmarked funds to procure the system's most expensive
.component--a fleet of specially modified Boeing 707s designed to
provide a permanent radar umbrella over Western Europe.//
//NATO was set to make a decision on the system
as spring, but did not. Funding for research on the AWACS
system is continuing, but a decision on procurement was post-
poned until December. This met the interests of some NATO members,
such as West Germany, which were interested but wanted to delay
a decision for either political or budgetary reasons. London
somewhat reluctantly went along with this compromise.//
//The uncertainty about support within the Alliance
or e sys em has led London to urge consideration of a less
costly bilateral US-UK system. At the same time, British repre-
sentatives have indicated they were considering the development
of a purely British alternative system.//
//The UK has not renounced or qualified its commit-
men on S, but senior Defense Ministry officials have repeat-
edly said that design refinements in the proposed British Nimrod
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system have resulted in "real confidence" that it will adequately
fulfill British requirements. The Royal Air Force, moreover, is
reported to have shifted its support to Nimrod.//
//The British have also begun to adopt the German
view a' AWACS must be a "NATO-wide" system, and not one in
which only two or three of the allies participate. There is
growing skepticism in London that Bonn will reach a decision on
AWACS by January--the maximum time London will allow for a NATO-
wide decision.//
//New budgetary pressures and a reduction in the
va ue o e earmarked funds due to exchange rate fluctuations
have reduced the effective amount of Britain's original AWACS
commitment of about $550 million to only $425 million. Moreover,
the AWACS allocation--earlier regarded as untouchable--now ap-
pears as subject to scrutin a~; an other defense budget item.
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Spain: Reaction to Reform Program
Although the Spanish opposition Democratic Coordina-
ion as issued a tough statement rejecting the government's
reform program, public and private comments by individual op-
position leaders have been less negative. The government's
move appears to have created considerable disarray among the
opposition.
The communique of the Democratic Coordination last
weekend maintains that the crisis of the transition period
cannot be solved as long as Francoist institutions are retained.
It demands the formation of a provisional government, the elec-
tion of a constituent assembly, and freedom for all political
parties.
The communique is similar to a denunciation issued
by the Communist Party last week. The Communists appear to be
increasingly concerned that the democratic opposition will
participate in the parliamentary election next year even if the
Communist Party is excluded.
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Relatively moderate pronouncements by individual par-
ties wit in the Democratic Coordination since last weekend
have blunted the cutting edge of the communique. The Socialist
Workers' Party, while labeling the government's program "in-
adequate," has left room for negotiation by saying it would
participate in the reform process if all parties are allowed
to campaign freely and if effective safeguards are provided to
prevent manipulation of the election by Francoist officials.
Privately, a Socialist leader told the US embassy
a is party considers the proposals made by Suarez an im-
portant step forward, "although we cannot say that publicly."
Other opposition figures have publicly applauded some aspects
of the program, and Christian Democratic leader Ruiz Gimenez--
who reportedly led an unsuccessful bid to tone down the Demo-
cratic Coordination communique--issued a favorable statement
on behalf of his party.
According to press reports, the Democratic Coordina-
ion is now drawing up an alternative program that could set
the stage for serious negotiations with the government.
While the opposition struggles to coordinate its cam-
paign, e government is turning its attention to the Basque
region, the scene of further demonstrations and violence last
week. Interior Minister Martin Villa has just visited three of
the four Basque provinces. In meetings with a broad spectrum
of provincial leaders, he reportedly discussed reinstituting
pre - civil war special Basque economic and political privileges
strengthening the authority of local officials over the national
police. As an earnest of the government's good will, Martin
Villa ordered police to tolerate display of the Basque flag,
according to press reports.
While clearly attempting to convey the government's
willingness to respond to legitimate Basque grievances, Martin
Villa made no banes about the importance of guaranteeing public
order during this transitional period. He also reaffirmed the
Prime Minister's commitment to leave to the next parliament ma-
jor decisions affecting relations between regions and the Madrid
government.
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CHINA: Post-Mao Leadership
Peking has not convened a meeting of the party Cen-
tral Committee to begin discussions on a post-Mao party leader-
ship. Almost all members of the Central Committee, including
the large number based in the provinces, were in Peking during
the period of mourning, but most of the latter have now returned
to their home bases to hold local memorial services on the day
of Mao's funeral.
The Central Committee has been deeply divided since
e ea of Chou En-lai in January and has not successfully
concluded a meeting all year. It is possible that party le-aders
postponed the meeting because they expected it would produce
little in the way of results and might only increase tensions
between the major contending factions.
The party cannot duck the succession question indefi-
ni e y, ut a divisive meeting at this time could undermine the
carefully constructed facade of unity that the leadership has
displayed since Mao's death. It is conceivable that the contend-
ing factions are playing for time in hopes of strengthening
their position, and that one faction will push for a meeting
when it feels sufficiently strong.
A gauge of which faction feels stronger may emerge
from the propaganda line in the next few weeks, especially re-
garding the future course of the campaign to criticize Teng
Hsiao-ping. As Mao entered his final days, more conservative
elements in the leadership were able to use the economic ef-
fects of July's earthquake to tone down the campaign and empha-
size production themes. Leftists will probably try to rejuvenate
the campaign in order to attack a number of rightists who are
currently members of the Central Committee.
It seems unlikely that the Politburo, which is em-
powere o act when the Central Committee is not in session,
will itself try to resolve the succession issue. //When the
Politburo acted in April to dismiss Teng Hsiao-ping and to ele-
vate Hua Kuo-feng to the premiership and the first vice chair-
manship of the party, the decision was condemned by many Chinese
as "unconstitutional."//
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 In addition to temporarily postponing a showdown over
the succession issue, the party leadership still has not an-
nounced what it plans to do with Mao's body. There may be some
disagreement over this issue. The fact that there has been no
official statement, in contrast to the detailed and meticulous
announcement on procedures to be followed during the mournin
period for Mao, suggests continuing sensitivity.
Brazilian municipal elections, scheduled for November,
ave ecome the focal point of national politics. Ordinarily
these contests have relatively minor impact, but this year they
will constitute a national referendum on current government
policies.
The government party and an opposition were created
y press ential decree in 1966. Since the congressional elec-
tions two years ago, in which the opposition party made unex-
pected gains, the two organizations have acted like duly con-
stituted political parties in taking stands on major controver-
sial issues.
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President Geisel has tried to bolster the fortunes of
the pro-government party by identifying his policies with it.
At the same time he has frequently used his decree powers to
suspend the political rights of opposition politicians who have
denounced the military-backed regime.
Disenchantment with the Geisel administration is grow-
ing an is not confined to the opposition party. Since 1974,
Brazil's economic growth has slowed considerably. Serious bal-
ance-of-payments problems have forced the government to impose
import controls and other unpopular restrictions on foreign ex-
change, and inflation is running at an annual rate of approxi-
mately 40 percent.
Continued press censorship, harsh internal security
practices, and official corruption are also topics of public
debate, especially now that Geisel has eased restrictions some-
what on the press and political parties. These liberalization
moves have been criticized by prominent military conservatives.
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We believe the opposition party probably will do very
well in t e November elections, especially in major metropolitan
areas. The government has already taken steps to limit its
losses by passing a law that severely restricts the candidates'
use of radio and television for campaign purposes.
//If the opposition makes the expected gains,
i wou increase tension and friction in the government and
military and may well jeopardize the tentative liberalization
that has characterized the first two years of Geisel's term.//
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Top Secret
(Security Classification)
1
1
Top Secret
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