NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029300010024-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: September 15, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Wednesday September 15, 1976 CI NIDC 76-217C
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Wednesday Sent_Pmher 15. 1976
e NID cable is tor the purpose o informing
senior US officials.
LEBANON: Situation Report
SOUTH AFRICA: Work Boycott
PANAMA: Demonstrations
USSR: Agriculture
MEXICO: Peso Support
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YUGOSLAVIA-ROMANIA: Talks
USSR: Kirillin
NORTH KOREA - SOUTH KOREA: UN Confrontation
IRAQ: President Bakr's Health
CANADA: Cabinet Shuffle
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LEBANON: Situation Report
I lArab mediators are trying to promote a meeting of
asir Ara at, Lebanese president-elect Sarkis, and Syrian Prime
Minister Khulayfawi in another attempt to implement the Damas-
cus accord concluded between Syria and the Palestine Liberation
Organization in late July.
I IThe Damascus accord calls for a cease-fire, Palestin-
ian a erence to the restrictive Cairo accords, and the opening
of roundtable negotiations under Sarkis. Efforts to implement
the agreement in July failed because the Syrians and Palestin-
ians were unable to agree even on the composition of a cease-
fire committee, and because of lingering Syrian suspicions that
the Palestinians were only playing for time to rearm and for-
tify their positions.
The pro-leftist radio in Beirut announced yesterday
that the PLO and its leftist allies had approved the meeting,
which is being pushed by the Saudi and Tunisian foreign minis-
ters and Arab League mediator al-Khuli. Christian leaders, how-
ever, have reportedly made their approval contingent on Presi-
dent Franjiyah being represented, and Sarkis has apparently in-
dicated that he will not attend such a meeting before his inau-
guration without Franjiyah's approval.
//Damascus has yet to respond to the proposal-,-"'
but presumably would welcome it. Syrian President Asad has 25X1
shown some renewed interest in a political settlement
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//Although battle lines have been almost static
over the past month, the Christians apparently have reason to
hope that their continual blockade and bombardment of Tripoli
will soon cause the city to fall from within.//
erva ions about the proposed tripartite meeting, insisting again
that Syria should honor its pledge to withdraw from Sawfar,
Jazzin, and the north as a first step towards complete withdrawal.
October 18, meanwhile, was named yesterday as the
a e or the start of the Arab League summit conference on
Lebanon. The summit will be held in Cairo.
Leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt has expressed some res-
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SOUTH AFRICA: Work Boycott
I The work boycott by blacks living in Soweto, near
Johannesburg, continued into its second day, with 70 to 90
percent absenteeism reported by the city's business firms.
The township itself was relatively quiet with only
a ew sca tered instances of violence. The neighboring town-
ship of Alexandra was cordoned off by police in an effort to
prevent the boycott from spreading.
wort boycott will begin there but perhaps not until next week.
F7 I
PANAMA: Demonstrations
//The Torrijos government, on the defensive do-
mestically after three days of demonstrations spurred by eco-
nomic discontent, is likely to press harder for movement in
the Panama Canal treaty negotiations in an effort to distract
its critics.//
//Violent demonstrations sparked by several stu-
dent groups erupted last Friday and again on Monday in Panama
City and its suburbs. There were peaceful protests again yes-
terday.//
I /Recent price rises were the demonstrators' pri-
mary concern. The disorders, which involved several thousand
people including hoodlums and looters, resulted in perhaps 200
arrests and reported damages of $2-3 million. The protests were
clearly aimed at the government, with almost no anti-US over-
tones.//
//President Lakas, who met with demonstrators Mon-
day, was reportedly given a 48-hour deadline to roll back prices.
Further demonstrations may take place if the government does 25X1
not meet at least some of the demands.//
Reports continue to circulate in Cape Town that a
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Total agricultural output in the USSR this year will
//Panamanian leaders are also concerned that if
the treaty talks are not resumed soon, the US elections could
delay negotiations.//
//Torrijos has several options. He could meet with
student s and even lower some prices, although this would aggra-
vate economic problems. Regardless of any economic moves, he
is almost certain to press harder for a resumption of treaty
talks and visible signs of progress to headline at home.//
//Torrijos could well decide to push for action
at this year s UN General Assembly. A less likely possibility
would be to use the US as a scapegoat domestically by alleging
economic pressures or destabilization efforts. This could in-
cite larger demonstrations that Torrijos might not be able to
control, and could also upset the negotiations.//
//Torrijos, with the National Guard solidly behind
him, does not yet face a serious threat, but domestic pressures
are mounting, and the decline in his popularity could lead him
to act without fully considering the possible results.
USSR: Agriculture
be about the same as in the poor year of 1975. A large increase
in crop output will be offset by a sharp decline in livestock
production.
We now estimate Soviet grain production this year at
million metric tons, up 5 million tons from our estimate in
early August. Although grain is the USSR's single most impor-
tant crop, other crops as a group rival grain in their impact
on agricultural production and on the country's net import po-
sition.
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I I Potatoes--an important food and feed crop--are a par-
e titute for grain and can either make up part of a grain
shortfall when plentiful or substantially swell Soviet require-
ments for feed grain after a poor crop. Sunflower seeds supply
three quarters of the vegetable oil and sugar beets provide
four fifths of the sugar consumed yearly in the USSR. Cotton
exports earn sizable amounts of hard currency.
I lOur preliminary estimates indicate that the Soviets
wi harvest about 90 to 95 million tons of potatoes, close to
their average production for the past five years, and about 85
million tons of sugar beets, 28 percent more than in 1975. Cot-
ton and vegetable crops will approach all-time highs, and the
sunflower seed crop will be only 10 percent below the 1973 rec-
ord level.
he 19 percent jump in crop production will be offset
by an estimated 13 percent drop in output of livestock products--
the result of earlier distress slaughtering. Meat production
probably will be about 12.5 million tons, off 17 percent from
1975. Milk production will be roughly 85 million tons, a drop
of 6 million tons from last year, and egg output could be off
as much as 17 percent.
The expected increase in feed availability offers hope
to consumers for some relief from shortages of livestock prod-
ucts. September should see a moderate increase in meat produc-
tion from the severely depressed July level, but shortages will
persist during the rest of the year.
I J The current expansion in herd inventories reflects
good pas ure and forage crops this summer and the larger grain
harvest. By January 1, hog numbers will reach an estimated 90
percent of the January 1, 1975 level, and poultry, 95 percent;
both represent more rapid recoveries than occurred following
the 1963 distress slaughter. Cattle numbers, which have changed
little throughout the period, will be about 2 percent above
January 1, 1975 levels. The average slaughter weight of cattle,
however, will still be down substantially.
The improved crop prospects for the year reduce the
need for imports of agricultural commodities--notably grain--
and release for export greater quantities of cotton, sugar, and
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vegetable oil. Last year's poor harvest disrupted the USSR's
traditional agricultural trade patterns, as imports of farm
commodities mushroomed while exports fell substantially.
Unless there are quality problems with this year's
we expect the Soviets to hold grain purchases to about 14
cro
p,
million tons. At current prices, purchases of this size would
cost roughly $2 to 2.5 billion. Last year's purchases of 27
million tons cost almost $4.5 billion.
With a good sugar beet crop, the USSR may increase
ar exnnrts. Exports of vegetable oil will be expanded, cot-
su
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ton will again be available for sale, and meat purchases will
drop to more normal levels.
MEXICO: Peso Support
I I Mexico will support the peso at a level 37 percent
e ow its dollar value before the currency was floated two weeks
ago.
I I The move, announced on Sunday, is an attempt to elim-
inate uncertainties created by the government's failure to pre-
pare the people for the float and to reassure them that the
government is in control of the situation. The public impression
that a new parity has been set with the announcement, however,
could lead to a greater outcry if there are further changes in
the peso's value.
By not referring to its action as a repegging of the
peso, e government hopes to keep open its options for further
adjusting the value of the currency if the current exchange
rate becomes unsupportable.
The government's announcement came as the peso con-
inue o strengthen against the dollar. The peso's value edged
up slightly last week to 4.90 cents on Friday from 4.87 cents
on Wednesday. The new supported level would be just above 5
cents; before the float it had been pegged at 8 cents.
I Pressures resulting from skyrocketing prices, shortages
of goo s, and labor's demand for a quick return to a fixed rate
of exchange apparently led President Echeverria to decide in
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favor of early establishment of a supported level for the cur-
rency. Mexican officials had been saying earlier that an ex-
tended float was necessary.
I I Echeverria's yielding to pressure raises doubts about
is u ure anti-inflation programs. How far his government is
prepared to go in controlling inflation will be made clearer
when it announces new official price levels and the size of a
promised wage increase for federal workers.
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YUGOSLAVIA-ROMANIA: Talks
I During their talks in Yugoslavia last week, presi-
en s eausescu and Tito evidently concentrated on coordinat-
ing their strategy toward Moscow and on scotching speculation
that there are differences between them.
I Tito, reportedly tired after the Colombo summit and
suffering from an "acute liver disease," nevertheless went
all out to show that Belgrade and Bucharest have no problems.
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He greeted Ceausescu at the airport and saw him off despite
Yugoslav protocol rules that exempt him from such fatiguing
duties.
I I The two leaders held lengthy discussions that re-
portedly underlined the closeness of their views on all ques-
tions of mutual interest. One highlight was Tito's signing of
a joint declaration, the first part of which closely follows
Ceausescu's ten principles of national independence and non-
interference in internal affairs. Belgrade had previously re-
sisted Romanian requests for such an endorsement.
I uIn the declaration the two presidents emphasized
their determination to cooperate closely in pursuing their in-
dependent courses. They also:
--Praised the free exchanges of views at the recent Eu-
ropean communist conference.
--Voiced anxiety that certain powers are seeking to "le-
galize" the right to interfere in the internal affairs of
others--a reference primarily to the so-called Brezhnev
doctrine.
--Welcomed the Helsinki accords, but noted the lack of
concrete steps to implement them.
--Stressed the need for positive achievements at the
follow-on meeting in Belgrade next year, which, they fear,
Moscow is seeking to play down.
--Reaffirmed their intention cautiously to pursue multi-
lateral cooperation in the Balkans.
--Emphasized nonaligned issues, praising the Colombo
summit for renouncing "all forms of foreign domination
and exploitation." Moscow and it allies have criticized
some members of the movement for accusing both the USSR
and the US of attempting to exploit the.third world.
I During the talks the two leaders also reiterated
standar pledges of "all-around assistance" to national libera-
tion movements, and called for democratization of the United
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Nations, dissolution of military blocs, and the creation of a
new international economic and political order.
The two sides signed a number of bilateral economic
cooperation agreements inc
new hydroelectric project.
Deputy Premier Kirillin told Ambassador Stoessel
last week that the next five-year plan is almost completed and
that the Supreme Soviet will meet next month to approve it. He
also said that the 15-year plan for 1976 to 1990 is far from
completed and has shrunk to a 10-year plan for 1981 to 1990.
Work on the plan may be one of the tasks assigned
to a new institute of Systems Research established under the
directorship of Dzherman Gvishiani, deputy chairman of the
State Committee for Science and Technology and Premier Kosygin's
son-in-law.
I I Kirillin, who is chairman of the committee for science
and technology, said that the main focus of Gvishiani's insti-
tute would be on forecasting developments in the Soviet economy
and state. Gvishiani's idea is to concentrate on comprehensive
planning, embracing all fields. One problem, according to Kiril-
lin, is that forecasting is now scattered among more than 100
institutions.
When asked how the new institute's work would relate
to that of Gosplan, Kirillin replied that he thought the insti-
tute should help Gosplan in formulating long-term plans. The
relationship may be strained, since the use of forecasting has
been a divisive question among Soviet economists.
I Gvishiani's institute is a gain for mathematical
economis -s who, under the leadership of N. P. Fedorenko, have
pushed for more forecasting in planning and the use of systems
analysis and the program-goal principle. Their approach has
been fought by traditionalists, especially those in Gosplan.
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North Korea is once again on the diplomatic offensive,
hoping to build a communist and third world majority behind its
position at the UN this fall. Pyongyang's supporters recently
submitted a resolution calling for the withdrawal of "UN forces"
and an end to "foreign aggression" in Korea.
Pro - South Korean forces have filed a counter reso-
lution, emphasizing the need to maintain some kind of armistice
machinery in Korea and to include Seoul in any future Korean
security talks.
Although the outlook could change as a result of hard
lobbying by Pyongyang and Seoul, it now appears that the outcome
at the General Assembly this fall will be essentially the same
as last year when two conflicting Korean resolutions were passed.
When the pro - North Korean UN resolution was
passe as fall--for the first time--and the pro - South Korean
resolution was passed by only a narrow margin, it appeared that
Pyongyang might have enough momentum to achieve an outright
defeat for Seoul this year. Recently, however, a number of
developments have improved the prospects for passage again of
South Korea's resolution:
--Divisions in the nonaligned movement. At the Colombo
summit, the nonaligned countries had difficulty obtaining
a consensus on political problems, such as Korea. Although
North Korea rammed through a harshly worded resolution, at
least 23 of 85 attending countries--in an unusual display
of dissent--registered formal reservations. About half of
the reservations came from long-time Seoul supporters, but
nearly half came from states that abstained on both Korean
resolutions at the UN lastyear.
--//An improved pro-Seoul lobbying effort. South Korea and
its principal backers--including the US, Japan, the UK, and
Canada--have been meeting periodically in New York to co-
ordinate lobbying efforts around the world. The Japanese
and British, in particular, are taking on more responsibil-
ity for promoting South Korea's case. These efforts proba-
bly contributed to the criticism of the North Korean
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resolution at Colombo. The lobbying probably also influ-
enced several of the nonaligned states which co-sponsored
Pyongyang's resolution last year to indicate recently that
they may be open to a more balanced approach.//
--A more extreme pro - North Korean UN resolution. While
it is not as harsh as the Colombo formulation, the pro-
Pyongyang UN resolution this fall is more extreme than any
presented at the UN in recent years. Indeed, the tone seems
poorly designed to woo many votes from the growing bloc of
UN members who, weary of the annual Korea debates, want to
avoid any greater involvement with either side.
--Panmunjom. The incident advanced North Korean objectives
insofar as it drew world attention to a tense situation in
Korea and to the continuing US presence there. Even so, the
fallout from Panmunjom at the UN seems likely to favor
Seoul's prospects slightly because--except in the communist
and radical third-world states--North Korea has been held
responsible for the incident.
On the other hand, there are factors favoring the
North Koreans. Pyongyang has won priority for its resolution
this year, which will improve its prospects a bit. Reporting
from Colombo indicates that North Korean diplomats have polished
somewhat their often blunt and abrasive negotiating tactics.
I I Even in the event that the North's resolution passes,
and the outh's fails, the damage to Seoul is likely to be
limited. The result could be additional pressures for US troop
withdrawals, some erosion of Seoul's international standing, and
a limited blow to South Korean morale.
The General Assembly's action will not, however, be
legally binding on any party. An adverse vote is unlikely to
affect the South Korean economy or Seoul's relations with its
major allies or tradin artners, or to seriously hurt confidence
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IRAQ: President Bakr's Health
The US interests section in Baghdad has been in-
formed by a British embassy official that President Bakr suf-
fered a stroke on August 27.
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/This latest incident in Bakr's history of poor
ea , w l includes recurring heart trouble and diabetes,
may speed up the consolidation of power in the hands of 39-
year-old strongman Saddam Husayn. Should Bakr die or resign
soon, the transition would probably be untroubled, although
Saddam Husayn's hold on power might be threatened if he is un-
able to secure the backing of the military--where Bakr's
strength has been based.//
//During the past four years, it has become clear
that Sad am Husayn is the dominant figure in the regime by
virtue of his control of the Baath Party organization and the
party's pervasive security apparatus. Saddam's ascendancy has
been facilitated by the declining health of Bakr, who has for
some time largely been relegated to a ceremonial role.//
I //If Bakr leaves the scene, Saddam Husayn's long
range pro em of retaining the loyalty of the military coun-
cil could become more difficult. Saddam may even arrange to
have a trusted military figure succeed Bakr in an effort to
persuade the generals that their interests will continue to be
represented in the post-Bakr regime.//
I _;~ /The generally distant and often strained rela-
i Saddam--who heads the party's civilian wing--and
senior military men were exacerbated by his sudden promotion
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in early January to the rank of Lieutenant General. Saddam had
neither military service nor rank prior to his appointment.//
//The move, making Saddam Iraq's senior officer
after Bacr, presumably was intended to strengthen his hand
when Bakr, who is head of the party's military wing, steps
down.//
I IThe cabinet shuffle Prime Minister Trudeau announced
as nigh-t is aimed at increasing support for his Liberal Party,
which is now at its lowest ebb since he took office in 1968.
I I Foreign Minister MacEachen took over the post as gov-
ernment leader in the House of Commons as well as that of deputy
prime minister. The public works minister and postmaster gen-
eral were also replaced.
I _;~ //The shuffle will improve the Liberals' tarnished
image, u alls short of the overhaul needed to end the malaise
of the Trudeau government.//
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