SOVIET MANPOWER PROSPECTS FOR THE 1970'S

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001900030121-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2005
• Sequence Number: 121
• Publication Date: October 1, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

STAT
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Soviet Manpower Prospects
for the 1970's
S-6514
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Intx:oduction
The Soviet Union has not published data on the ex-
pected growth of the labor force during the 1970's; soirre
Soviet and Western economists ha?;e expressed concern about
the adequacy of future manpower supplies (1) . After reviewing
the major changes in the size and composition of the Soviet
population, labor supply, and labor force during the 1960's,
this article presents projections of the trends in manpower
availability and the composition of the labor force for
the 1970's and discusses some of the implicat'.ons of these
trends for future . economic growth.
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Trends in the 1960's
Population and Labor Supply
1. Between July 1965 and July 1970, the total popula-
tion of the USSR increased by i...9 million, substantially
less than the growth of 16.6 rullion during the first half
of the 1960's. The labor supply, however, increased by
more than 10.5 million during 1966-710, compared with 4.7-
million million during 1961-65. (see Table 1) .
Table 1
USSR: ? Trends in Population and Labor Force, 1960-70 (a)
(Million Persons, Mid-year)
Absolute Chance
1960
1965
1970
1961-65
196`
Category
Total Population
214.3
230.9
242.8
16.6
11.9
Of which:
Population 14
years of age
and older
151.3
161.7
178.2
13.4
13.5
Full-time students
9.5
18.2
21.2
8.7
3.0
Labor supply (b)
141.8
146.5
157.0
4.7
10.5
Labor force
110.6
?117.9
124.2
7.3
6.3
Armed forces
3.3
3.2
3.3
-0.1
0.1
Civilian labor force
107.3
114.7
120.9
7.4
6.2
(a Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals
shown.
(b) Population 14 years and older, minus full-time students.
-2-
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2. The slowdown in population growth was caused by
sharply diminished birth rates in recent years and slightly
higher death rates. The birth rate fell sharply from
24.9 per thousand persons in 1960 to 17.4 per thousand
in 1970. This decline was caused both by the decrease in
the number of women in the prime child-bearing ages (20 to
34 years) as a result of the low birth rates during World
War II and by a decrease in the average number of children
per family. The increase in the death rate, from 7.1
per thousand persons in 1960 to 8.,2 per thousand in 1970,
reflects the gradual "aging" of the Soviet population. In
other words, a larger proportion of the population was in
the upper age groups where death rates are higher. As a
consequence of the diverging trends. in the birth and death
rates, the natural increase (the net addition to the popula-
tion) in 1970 was only about half the rate in 1960, 9.2
per thousand persons compared with 17.8
3. Several factors accounted for the relatively small
? increments to the labor supply in the early 1960's _ Because
of World War II, fewer persons were reaching working age in
the early 1960's. In 1962, for example, there were only 72%
as many youths 15 to 19 years of age as in 1959. By 1970, the
number of persons 15 to 19 had.grown to 87% above the 1962 level.,
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reflecting the effects of the postwar baby boom. Moreover,
reforms in education cut the number of youths available
for work in the early part of the de;awe and increased the
supply of youths in the late 1960's. The conversion of the
elementary and secondary schools from a ten-year system to
are eleven-year system in 1959 delayed the entry of teen-
agers into the labor supply. At the same time, the Soviet
Union embarked on a campaign to increase the share of
youths continuing their education beyond the elementary
grades. During 1961-65 the number of full-time students
nearly doubled -- from 9-5 million to 18.2 million -- with
most of the growth occurring in general schools (3).
4. In the latter half of the 1960's, the number of full-
time students increased by only 3.0 million, despite a rise
of 9.6 million in the student-age population (12 to 24).
A cut in general education from 11 to 10 years beginning
in 1966 resulted in two graduating classes in June 1966 --
from the phased out 11th grade and simultaneously from the
10th grade. Each of the classes graduated about 1.3 million
and approximatley doubled the number of students entering
the labor supply that year. A slowdown in the rate of growth
of enrollments at full-time specialized secondary schools
(tekhnikums) and higher educational institutions (Vyssheye
uchebnoye zavedeniye -- VUZs) also contributed to the overall
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decline in the rate of growth of full-time students in recent
years. During 1966-70, enrollments at these schools rose
by 47% compared with 52% during 1961-65.
Total Labor Force and Civilian Labor Force
5. The relatively slow growth of the labor supply
between 1960 and 1965 did not retard the growth of the
labor force. During this period, the total labor force .n-
creased by 7.3 million, compared with an increase of 6.3
million between 1965 and 1970. The average annual rate of
growth of the labor force declined from 1.3% during the
first half of the decade to 1.0% during the latter half.
The increase during the earlier period was made possible by
rising labor force participation rates of both males and
females. For example,- the proportion of males 20-29 years of
age in the labor force increased from 91.0% in 1959 to an
estimated 95.6% in 1965 and the employed proportion of f--
males in this age group from 80.4% to 86.1%. Except for
teenagers, the participation rates of all adult age groups
are estimated to have increased during 1961-65. Participation
rates among teenagers 14-19 years of age fell during this
period because a larger share of youths attended full-time
schools.
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6. The rise in participation rates in the early
1960's was the result of a labor policy employing both coercion
and incentives to get non-working adults into the labor
force. During 1958-61, various republics passed so-called
"antiparasite" laws, which subjected non-working adults to
compulsory labor and exile. Under these laws, youths who
dropped out of school and failed to go to work, as well as
persons engaged in illegal private activities, were coerced
into "socially useful labor" in state-owned enterprises or
on collective farms. The antiparasite laws were modified
during 1965-67, narrowing the concept of parasitism and
abolishing drumhead proceedings by extra-legal commissions.
7. Authorities sought also to assist employment of
housewives by expanding child-care facilities -- the number
of places in state-run nurseries and kindergartens doubled
from 3.1 million in 1960 to 6.2 million in 1965. During
the same period, the total number of pre-school age children
declined from 34 million to 33 million. Consequently, the
proportion of children cared for by state-run institutions
rose from 9% in 1960 to almost 19% in 1965.
8. The USSR tried to match jobs and workers by
alleviating unfavorable employment situations in. small towns.
Participation rates for household members (other than the
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head of the household) were lower in small urban areas than
in larger industrial centers. Jobs for wives and other
adult family members were often non-existent in towns where,
for example, industrial activity was limited to one or two
plants. As a result, Soviet authorities tried to broaden
employme.at opportunities for smalltown households by pro-
hibiting new factories - in urban areas. This policy has
tended to boost adult participation rates (4).
9. Labor force participation rates are not believed
to have increased during the latter half of the 1960's. By
1965 they had reached levels, except for youths, beyond which
expansion was nearly impossible. Moreover, some labor
policies of the regime may have begun to have a negative
impact on participation rates. Beginning in the mid-1950's
the regime introduced.a series of welfare reforms, expanding
eligibility fcr retirement pensions and. increasing the
size of the benefits. These reforms culminated in 1965 when
I5 to 30 million collective' farmers and their families were
places. under a state social insurance system. Until then,
the establishment of pension programs on collective farms
had been optional and entirely at the expense of the
individual farm. As a result until 1965 many farms had
no program at all, and those with a program usually failed
to match the benefits received by workers at state enterprises.
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10. The expanded welfare system has permitted many
persons to retire who would not otherwise be able to do
so. During 1966-70 the total number of pensioners increased
from 26 million to 41 million, more than twice the annual
rate recorded during 1961-65. The law in effect during the
late 1960's granted Working pensioners emtloved in various
urban occupations only half of their pensions (75% if
employed in the Urals, Siberia, or the Far East) regardless
of earnings. Those employed in agriculture and mining
received full pensions. In 1965, 1.5 million persons, or
15% of all old age pensioners, received retirement pensions
while continuing to work in state enterprises. In 1956,
however, 60% of all pensioners worked.
Structure of the Civilian Labor Force
11. The share of civilian labor force engaged in
agriculture declined from 43% in 1960 to 31% in 1970 (see
Table 2). During 1961-65, an average of one million persons
annually moved to the cities from the countryside, spurring
the growth in the non-agricultural labor force. Since the
mid-1960's, the rural-urban migration has slowed to a trickle;
the slowdown was attributable, according to Soviet sources,
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USSR: Trends in the Civilian Labor Force by Class of
Worker and by Branch of the Economy, 1960-70 (a)
(Million persons, midyear)
Absolute Change
Category
1960
1961-65
1966-70
Total civilian
labor force
107.3
114.7
120.9
7.4
6.2
By _class of
worker
Workers in the
l
i
a
soc
economy
(b)
97.8
106.0
113.2
8.2
7.2
Self-employed
and unpaid
family workers
9.5
8.7
7.7
-0.8
-1.0
By sector of
the economy
Agricultural
sector
46.6
42.3
37.5
-4.3
-4.8
Non- ag ri c u l-
. tural sector
60.7
. 72.4
83.4
11.7
11.0
Industry
22.6
27.4
31.6
4.8
4.2
Services
20.1
.26.4
32.1
6.3
5.7
Other (c)
18.0
18.6
19.7
0.6
1.1
a. Because of roun3ing, components may not add to the totals
shown.
b. Including wage and salary workers in state enterprises
and workers on collective farms.
c. Including forestry, transportation, communications, and
construction.
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to the rapid increase in rural incomes in recent years.
Offsetting somewhat the migration patterns of the 1960's was
the trend in the number of self-employed and unpaid family
members working on private plots. Employment in this
sector of agriculture reflected the changing policy
toward private farming during the decade, increasing in the
early 1960's as restrictions were eased, decreasing in late
1960's as restrict-.ons were tightened. Nevertheless,
throughout the 1960's the total agricultural labor force
declined slowly, following the general trend since 1950.
12. A second structural change occurring in the
civilian labor force has been an increase in the number of
workers in the services sector as a proportion of the non-
agricultural labor force, from 33% in 1960 to 38% in 1970 (5).
The 60% rise in employment in the'services sector was about
half again as large as the growth in the industrial work
force during this period. The Soviet Union has apparently
reached the state of development where the pace of expansion
of employment in industry slows while the rate of employment
growth in tertiary activities accelerates. Considered as
"unproductive" by Soviet planners, the USSR's services
sector was given generally the lowest priority until recently.
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As a result, while the urban population increased by 65%
between 1940 and 1960, the number of persons employed in
domestic trade activities in urban areas rose by only 60%.
Between 1960 and 1966, however, employr,+, tt in urban domestic
trade increased by 39% while the urban population grew by
20%. Since 1960, planners have come to realize that the
inefficiencies in the distribution system had an adverse
effect on the labor force. The hours required each day for
the -average Soviet family to provide its household needs
causes absentcaism and lower productivity and forces some
housewives to stay out. of the labor force.
Trends in the 1970s
13. The Soviet Union entered the 1970's concerned
about its manpower prospects. Shortages of skilled workers
and labor in large cities have been longstanding features
of the Soviet labor scene. Beginning in 1967, however,
articles appeared in the press concerning a general,
nationwide manpower shortage. After annual plans for the
labor force were exceeded in 1960-65, a shortfall in the
manpower plan for industry occurred in 1966. In 1967,
only three-fourths of the plan for additional wage and salary
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workers was met, and planners revised downward the man-
power goals for 1570 established in the five-year plan
(1966-70). The tight labor market did not ease during 1969-73.
Indeed, industrial employment grew by only 1.4% a year
during 1971-73, compared with the usual 3% to 4% annual
rate of growth. The chairman of the RSFSR Committee for
the Utilization of Labor Resources, K. No-rikov, attributed
the labor shortage to the following factors: -
* nn insufficient rate of growth in labor productivity;
O An inability to raise participation rates from
their already high levels;
e A reduction in the rural-urban migration;
o An excessive cone-ntration of industry in large
cities;
e An increasing delay in youths joining the labor
force because of longer schooling; and
o A misallocation and a misuse of existing labor.(5a).
14. The current situation of a generally tight labor
market is likely to prevail in the foreseeable future. The
evidence does not suggest, however, that Soviet leaders
are facing a massive or irreversible manpower shortage.
The, present enormous inefficiency in the use of labor, as
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 evidenced by the fact that the labor force in the USSR is
half again as large as that in the United States but is
able to produce only about one-half the amount of goods
and services, provides vast opportunities to improve the
productivity of the existing labor. Partial success in
making use of such opportunities for labor saving would
tend to offset, at least in part, the effects of the several
adverse manpo:?:er trends described below.
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Population and Labor Supply
15. During the remainder of the 1970's the total
population of the USSR is expected to increase by 24
million, or about 1% a year (see Table 3) -- the same
rate recorded during the last half of the 1960's. Incre-
ments to the adult population during the 1970's will be
affected increasingly by the sharp decline in the birth rate
in the 1960's. Between 1970 and 1975, the adult population
will grow by 16.5 million, 'compared with about 12.5 -pillion
education.
The teenage segment (14 to 19 years) of
the total adult population will decline from about 15%
in 1970 to 13% in 1980. However; growth in labor supply -- the
source of labor force growth -- will be determined not only by
demographic: changes but also by the regime's policy toward
during 1976-80.
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-~--- Table 3
USSR: Trends in POulation and Labor Force, 1970'80 (a)
(million Persons,
NIi dYear
70
1975
1970
197175
1976-80
Total population
19
242.8
254.6
267.7
11.8
13.1
of which:
Population
12.7
14 years of
age and older
178.2
194.7
207.4
16.5
Full-time students
21.2
23.5
21.3
2.3
-2.2
Labor supply
157.0
171.2
186.1
14.2
14.9
Labor force
124.2
134.9
146.9
10.7
12.0
0
Armed forces
3.3
3.3
3.3
0
Civilian labor
6
131
143.6
10.7
12.0
force
120.9
.
a. Because of rounding, components may not
totals shown.
add to
the
16. Education goals for the 1970's have not been
announced, and the past history of sharp . swings ii: policy
-- from rapid expansion in the early 1960's to slow growth
in the late 1960's -- makes predicting the future policy
hazardous. if a policy is followed of expanding full-time
education, it will tend to restrict the growth of the labor
force by holding more youths in school. If a policy prevails
of. Providing universal, full-time education to youths 7 to 18
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in Student enrollments in .he latter half of the decade.
years of age while expanding higher and. secondary specialized
education at the rate recorded during the 1960's, the
number of students would increase by more than half by
1980 while the resulting dearth of young workers would
restrict the growth of the labor force to less than 1% a
year. These results suggest that Soviet leaders would find
this to be an unacceptable policy.
17. Soviet authorities could follow a "neutral" policy
toward education, holding labor force participation rates
of youths at current levels and allowing enrollment in
fulltime education to fluctuate according to the number of
youths. This would result in an increase in the number of
students during 1971-76, but a slight decline would occur
thereafter. This policy would not substantially depress
the rate of growth of the labor force during the 1970's.
Consequently, for projection purposes, it is assumed that
the USSR will follow the latter policy -- that labor force
participation rates among school-age youths (14 to 24) will
remain constant. It should be stressed that the growth
rate of the projected labor force would be lower to the
extent that official policy calls for a continued increase
in this sense, the projection set forth below can be viewed
as an upper limit with the possibility that actual employment
may not reach that level.
-15-
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Total Labor Force and Civilian Labor Force
18. The total labor force and civilian labor force
are projected to increase by 10.7 million during 1971-75
and by 12.0 million during 1976-80.* Thus, during the
1970's the labor force is expected to grow more rapidly than
during the late 1960's, but the increments to the labor
for.::e will gradually diminish after 1975. Given the assumption
of the leveling off of student enrollments in 1976 and
declines in 1977-80, the average annual rate of growth of
the total labor force will be slightly higher during the
1970's than during the 1960's; 1.7% compared with 1.2%.
19. The projection of civilian labor force is based
on the assumption that the size of the armed forces will
not change. A reduction in the armed forces would swell the
ranks of the civilian labor force and ease the manpower pinch.
* The methodology used in making the projections is described
in, Prospects for Soviet Fconc.mc Growth in the 1970 's, Bruselles ,
1971, p. 141-142. For the period 1970-80 the total labor force
was projected by applying estimated labor force participation
rates derived from 1970 census data to estimates and projections
.of the population by age and sex. The components of the
labor force were projected as follows:
The armed forces were assumed to remain constant throughout
the period.
The labor force on the state farms and on collective farms for
1971-80 is found by projecting least squares regression lines
based on 1959-70 data. The following relationships were derived:'
state farms Y = 7,051.21 + 243.61 X (R2 = .74)
collective farms Y = 31,154.12 - 929.11 X (R2 = .95)
where X is time denoted by yearly periods (e.g. 1971 is period 13) .
The non-agricultural -labor force was derived as the difference
between the total civilian labor force and the agricultural
labor force.
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Under similar conditions in the late 1950's and early
1960's, demobilizations were carried out. But tensions
arising from the China border problems and the invasion of
Czechoslovakia have caused a gradual expans.on of military
manpower since 1965. Moreover, the pressures that led to
the maintenance of the present level of military manpower
are unlikely to subside, precluding a sizable demobilization
during the remainder of the decade.
Structure of the Civilian Labor Force
20. More uncertainty is involved in projecting the
structure of the civilian labor force than in estimating
its size Decause of the influence of planning decisions
on the allocation of labor and because of Soviet reticence
concerning future goals. Projections by class of worker
assume that the trends of th?: 1960's for collective farmers
and self-employed family workers will continue during the
1970's. The in :rease in the state labor force (wage and
salary workers) is derived as a residual -- total civilian
labor force minus collective and unpaid family workers.
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under similar conditions in the late 1950's and early
1960's, demobilizations were carried out. But tensions
arising from the China border problems and the invasion of
Czechoslovakia have caused a gradual expansion of military
manpower since 1965. Moreover, the pressures that led to
the maintenance of the present level of military manpower
are unlikely to subside, precluding a sizable demobilization
during the remainder of the decade.
Structure of the Civilian Labor Force
20. More uncertainty is involved in projecting the
structure of the civilian labor force than in estimating
its size necause of the influence of planning decisions
on the allocation of labor and because of Soviet reticence
concerning future goals. Projections by class of worker
assume that the trends of the 1960's for collective farmers
and self-employed family workers will continue during the
1970's. The increase in the state labor force (wage and
salary workers) is derived as a residual -- total civilian
labor force minus collective and unpaid family workers.
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Non-agricultural Labor Force
21. During the current decade the non-agricultural
labor force is projected to increase by approximately one-
third, from 83.4 million to 114.5 million (see Table 4).
Trends in employment among the sectors of the non-agricultural
labor force during the remainder of the 1970's can only be
conjectural.
22. So far during the 1970's industrial employment
has grown by 1.4% a year. The projections arbitrarily
assume that the industrial labor force will grow at the
same rate in 1974-80 -- a pace much slower than the annual
average of 3.4% recorded during the 1960's. As a result
of this assumption about three-quarters of the increase
in the non-agricultural labor force in the projection occurs
in the non-industrial sectors.. The services sector is
likely to receive the largest number of new workers in the
1970's. If employment in the services sector grows at
the same rate as recorded during 1961-68, one out of every
two workers added during the 1970's to the non-agricultural
branches will be added to the services sector.
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Table 4
USSR: Trends in the Civilian Labor Force by Class
of Worker and Branch of the Economy, 1970-80 (a)
(Million Persons, Midyear)
Category
1971-75 1976-80
Total civilian
labor force 120.9 131.6 143.6 10.7 12.0
By class of
worker
Workers in
the social
economy (b) 118.5 130.5. 141.9 12.0 11.4
Self-employed
and unpaid
family
workers 7.7 6.9 6.0 -0.8 -0.9
By sector of
the economy
Agricultural
sector 37.5 33.4 29.1 -4.1 -4.3
Non-agricultur-
al sector 83.4 98.2 114.5 14.8 16.3
Industry 31.6 33.8 36.3 2.2 2.5
Other (c) 51.8 64.4 78.2 12.6 13.8
a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the
totals shown.
b. Including wage and salary workers in state enterprises
and workers on collective farms.
c. Including forestry, transportation, communications,
construction, and services,.
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23. In the projection, the agricultural labor force
declines by 22% or 8.4 million persons -- from 37.5 million
in 1970 to 29.1 million in 1980. In 1980, approximately
one worker in five will be employed in agriculture, com-
--? pared with about one worker in three in 1970 (6). Recent
projections of the US economy in 1980 indicate that only
three workers in 100 will be employed in agriculture. The
projection for the Soviet Union implies that a steady growth
will occur in the productivity of the agricultural labor
force in the 1970's. At the same time, the projections
.assume that Soviet agriculture will not achieve a break-
through sufficient to permit a large-scale shift from
agricultural to non-agricultural employment.
24. It is further assumed that employment during the
current decade in the subsectors of agriculture -- state
farms, collective farms;, and private plots -- will follow
the trends recorded during 1959-70. As a consequence the
labor force on state farms would increase by 31% during
the 1970's and account for more than two-fifths of the
total agricultural labor force in 1980 compared to one-fourth
in 19 70 .
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If past trends continue, the number of workers on collective
farms will decline by almost one-half by 1980, from 20.3
million in 1970 to 10.7 million in 1980. Labor on private
plots will be reduced by about 22% and account for only
"about 21% of the total agricultural labor force in 1980.
Implications of Manpower. Trends for Economic Growth
25. At best, the average annual rate of growth of
the non-agricultural labor force during the 1970's is
expected to match the average 3.2% yearly rate of the
1960's. If participation rates decline or agricultural
problems -cause labor to be diverted to that sector, the
growth of labor supplied to the non-agricultural sectors
in the 1970's could be substantially less. A slowdown would
retard the growth of the Soviet economy. Several detailed
studies of economic growth rates is postwar Europe have
postulated that abundant labor is necessary to sustain the
growth process. For example, Charles Kindleberger concludes
that:
The major factor shaping the remarkable economic
growth which most of Europe has experienced since 1950
has been the availability of a large supply of labor...
With the exhaustion of Europe's excess supplies of
labor, in the early 1960's, the high rates of economic
growth of the 1950's are slowing down...(7).
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The manpower situation in the Soviet Union has resembled
the conditions in Western Europe: labor was in relatively
large supply in the 1950's and in increasingly short supply
during the 1960's. The projected rate of growth in the
labor force indicates that this stringency may ease slightly
in the USSR during the 1970's. Other factors that may tend
to reduce the effect or economic growth of future
additions to the labor force include:
? A slowdown in the rate of growth of capital stocks,
O A shift of employment from sectors with relatively
high productivity to sectors with relatively
low productivity, and
O A slower rate of growth in the quality of the
labor force.
26. Structural shifts in the labor force during the
1970's are likely to depress the growth rate of the
economy. The growth rate of labor productivity in industry
traditionally has been much greater than the rates for
? other sectors of the economy. This meant that the contribu-
tion to economic growth of an additional worker in industry
was greater than an additional worker employed in any other
sector. For years, economic growth was stimulated by the
process of expanding the work force rapidly in sectors with
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high rates of growth of labor productivity. During the
1960's the structure of the labor force in the USSR began
to shift. Additions to the industrial labor force slowed
while workers were added to the services sector at an
accelerated pace. This trend is expected to continue in
the 1970's.
27. Recent projections of the labor force of the
United States through 19'0 indicate trends analogous to
those projected for the USSR. One US study estimates
that the shift in the structure of the labor force from the
producing sectors to the services sectors will cause a
slight decline in the average annual growth rate of the
economy from more than 3% a year during the 1960's to
2.8% annually during the 1970's (8). The differential in
the growth rates of labor productivity between the producing
and services sector is narrower in the United States than
in the Soviet Union. Thus the impact on the growth rate
of the economy of a shift in the structure of the labor
force from the high-efficiency producing sectors to the
low-efficiency services sectors could be much greater in
the Soviet Union than in the United States.
28. A third factor that may impede the economic
growth rate of the USSR in the 1970's is a possible slow-
down in the qualitative improvement of the labor force.
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Education is the most important qualitative factor -- it
&termines both the types of work an individual can do
and his efficiency in doing them. Edward Denison estimated
that between 1950 and 1962 the increase in the educational
attainment of the labor force contributed about 15% to
the economic growth of the United States and approximately
5% to the growth of nine countries in northwestern Europe (9)
The median years of school completed b.? the adult population
serves as an indicator of the educational attainment of the
labor force. According to estimates and projections made
by the US Bureau of the. Census, between 1960 and 1970 the
median years of school atvLined by the adult population
in the Soviet Union rose by 24%, from 5.9 years to 7.3
years. Between 1970 and 19 80 , the median years of school
is projecte't to grow by about 11%, to 8.1 years (10) .
This suggests that whatever . contribution education
made in the past to Soviet eoonomic growth was probably
greater than its impact in the future.
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Footnotes
(1) A manpower shortage is defined by Soviet economists
as the difference between the total number of workers
called for in the plan and the number of workers
actually employed.
(2) Definitions of terms used in this article are as
follows: adult population includes all persons 14
years of age and older; labor supply is the adult
population exclusive of full-time students; and labor
force is the employed portion of the labor supply,
including the armed forces as well as the civilian
labor force.
(3) Grades 7 through 11 only. Students in grades 1 through
6 of the full-time general schools are assumed to be
less than 14 years of age.
(4) Despite the prohibition, complaints about the continued
concentration of investment frequently appear in the
Soviet press.
(5) The services sector includes education, health, housing,
communal economy, trade and catering, banking and
insurance, government administration, and science.
(5a) Kornmunist, No. 13. 1969, n_ 99-]OR-
(6)
(7) in ecerger, Eurone's Postwar Growth: The
Role of Labor Sunnly, Ca_-wridge, Massachusetts, Harvard
University Press, 1967, p. 3.
118) Gilbert Burck, "There'll Be Less Leisure Than You Think",
Fortune, March 1970, p. 88.
(9) Edward F. Denison, Why Growth Rates Differ: Postwar
Experience in Nine ,estern Countries, The Brookings
Institution, Washington, D.C., 1967, p. 229-317.
(10). US Bureau of the Census, Estimates and Projections of
Educational Attainment in the USSR: 1950-1975,
Series p-91, No. 16, by Ann S. Goodman and Murray
Feshbach, Washington, 1967, p. 17.
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