EAST ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002200010014-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: December 27, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

National
dlli,EiF&Iease 2005/08/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02200
Assessment
Center
East Asia
Review
Secret
RP EAR 79-009
27 December 1978
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 Approved F
EAST ASIA REVIEW (U)
27 December 1978
CONTENTS
UN Secretary General To Visit Indochina (C) . . . . 1
UN Secretary General Waldheim apparently will
visit both Kampuchea and Vietnam in early
February. (C)
Japan: Relations With Eastern Europe (U) . . . . . 3
Despite the quickened pace of contacts be-
tween Japan and Eastern Europe in the past
year, Tokyo's objectives in developing its
economic and political ties in the region
remain modest. (C)
Indonesia: Prisoner Releases (U) . . . . . . . . . 5
With the release this month of two batches
of Communist detainees, Indonesia will have
freed 10,000 political prisoners this year.
(C)
New Zealand: Prime Minister Shifts Tactics
Following Close Election (C). . . . . . . . . . . 7
In the aftermath of the 25 November parlia-
mentary elections, Prime Minister Muldoon has
swiftly appointed several previous backbench-
ers to his cabinet and has relinquished his
administrative responsibilities as leader of
parliament. (C)
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Okinawa: Liberal-Democratic Party Return
to Power (PI . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
The victory of the Liberal-Democratic Party
(LDP) gubernatorial candidate in Okinawa--the
first in 10 years--continues the trend of con-
servative victories in local elections this
year. (U)
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UN Secretary General To Visit Indochina
UN Secretary General Waldheim apparently will visit
both Kampuchea and Vietnam in early February. Several
countries, including the United States and China, en-
couraged the trip to help deter or limit a major
Vietnamese dry-season offensive against the Kampucheans.
or December.
Kampuchean Vice Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs
Ieng Sary extended an invitation to Waldheim when he
was at the UN in mid-October. Like the Kampuchean steps
to improve diplomatic relations with several Southeast
Asian states, a planned tour of Angkor Wat for Bangkok-
based diplomats, and the recent invitation for American
and British journalists to visit Kampuchea, the invita-
tion to Waldheim seem designed to forestall Vietnamese
military attacks expected to be launched in late November
visit.
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Southeast Asian states, concerned that a major
Vietnamese drive might lead to the installation of a pro-
Vietnamese regime in Phnom Penh, joined the US and China
in urging Waldheim to schedule a trip as early as possible.
Waldheim announced in early November that he would accept
the Kampuchean invitation, but made it clear that he
wanted to visit Vietnam at the same time. The Vietnamese
had invited Waldheim to visit the year before, but showed
little enthusiasm for a trip this fall. Although Kampuchea
quickly accepted Waldheim's proposal for a late November
or early December visit, the Vietnamese stalled and
eventually suggested that a visit next summer or possibly
in late March and April would be preferable. 25X1
Waldheim subsequently scheduled a visit to Thailand,
Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Kampuchea in late
January and February, indicating that he would follow
through even if the Vietnamese did not extend an in-
vitation. Last week Hanoi apparently agreed to a February
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Although Western diplomats had initially expressed
hope that the visit to Kampuchea might help ameliorate
repressive domestic policies there, it is unlikely that
the Secretary General will be able effectively to press
the issue. Waldheim's trip will help legitimize the
current regime, however, and will enable the Kampuchean
leaders to focus attention on the threat of Vietnamese
aggression. Together with pressures on Hanoi exerted by
other states concerned with the stability of the area,
the visit could cause the Vietnamese to scale down their
plans for militar action in the coming weeks.
27 December 1978
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Japan: Relations With Eastern Europe (U)
Despite the quickened pace of contacts between
Japan and Eastern Europe in the past year, Tokyo's ob-
jectives in developing its economic and political ties
in the region remain modest. Japan hopes steadily to
expand economic relations, to help diversify its trade
pattern over the long term, and to develop further its
political channels of communication. The Japanese also
hope to use the East Europeans as a litmus to test
Soviet attitudes toward Tokyo and as conduits to trans-
mit Japanese views to Moscow. The visit last month of
Japanese Foreign Minister Sonoda to Budapest and Prague
and the trip of Polish Prime Minister Jaroszewicz to
Japan, and earlier visits to Tokyo by Bulgarian President
Zhivkov and Yugoslav Vice Premier Sefer have all partially
fulfilled these objectives.
Sonoda's chief mission in Hungary and Czechoslovakia
was to present Tokyo's interpretation of the recently
signed Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty--that
is, that the treaty was neither anti-Soviet in content
nor did it portend the formation of China-Japan-US
entente. Both the Hungarian and Czechoslovak Foreign
Ministers expressed concern that Japan may be forced to
adopt an anti-Soviet policy by China, but Sonoda assured
them that Tokyo would not bow to Peking.
Despite Prague's and Budapest's interest in in-
creased trade, investment, and scientific and technological
assistance from Japan, Sonoda's visit did not result
in substantially enhancing such ties. A joint communique
issued in Prague announced-the creation of a commission
to study bilateral trade and economic issues and the
conclusion of an agreement on science and technology,
but the Japanese Foreign Ministry does not expect these
to lead to a significant expansion of economic ties.
Japanese-Czechoslovak trade totaled $80 million last
year, with a $10 million surplus in Czechoslovakia's
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favor. By contrast, Japan's 1977 trade with Hungary
ran heavily in Tokyo's favor--$49 million in exports
to Hungary compared to only $11 million in imports.
Hungarian Foreign Minister Puja expressed concern over
this imbalance, but Sonoda apparently did not make any
commitments to remedy the situation.
The timing of Polish Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz's
visit to Japan may have aroused anxiety in Moscow since
it came on the heels of the ratification of the Sino-
Japanese treaty. During the visit, Polish officials
implied to the Japanese that Warsaw had placed itself
in a "sensitive position" by going ahead with the visit
as scheduled. Although he accepted the Japanese inter-
pretation of the anti hegemony clause, he noted his mis-
givings about China's interpretation and about Peking's
use of the clause in its anti-Soviet campaign. During
the visit, Polish and Japanese officials signed a treaty
of commerce and navigation in addition to a number of
agreements concerning scientific and technological co-
operation, cultural exchange, export of Polish products
to Japan, and the extension of $450 million worth of
credits to Poland.
Visits to Tokyo earlier this year by Bulgarian
President Zhivkov and Yugoslav Vice Premier Sefer focused
primarily on economic issues, but produced few substantive
results. The Japanese rebuffed repeated Bulgarian requests
for special economic considerations, such as a long-term,
low-interest loan for a port project on the Black Sea,
asserting that Bulgaria's per capita GNP was too high to
warrant such treatment. Tokyo, however, did agree to
set up a joint economic commission to review annually
trade and economic relations between the two countries.
Because of Yugoslavia's six-to-one trade imbalance with
Tokyo, the Japanese agreed to establish a joint govern-
mental commission to review trade and economic relations
and to begin negotiations on agreements on double-taxation
and cooperation in science and technology.
27 December 1978
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Indonesia: Prisoner Releases (U)
With the release this month of two batches of Com-
munist detainees, Indonesia will have freed 10,000
political prisoners this year. Those released are among
the last of up to 200,000 Communist suspects rounded up
after the unsuccessful Communist coup attempt in 1965.
Most were released by the early 1970s, but about 30,000
were still in detention camps two years ago when Jakarta,
stung by increasing international attention to the large
number of its political prisoners, announced a phased
release program. About 10,000 prisoners were freed in
December of last year.
Slightly fewer than 10,000 Communist suspects remain
in Indonesian jails, and Jakarta promises to release them
over the next year. About 1,400 of these are considered
hardcore and unrepentant. The Indonesian Government
appears intent on going through with the release program
even though both the military hierarchy and much of the
general populace are apprehensive over the subversive
threat from confirmed Communists. Those released have
been encouraged--though not compelled--to enter government
resettlement projects where they could be watched, but
about 80 percent have opted to return to their home areas
despite the difficulty of finding land or getting jobs
from employers reluctant to hire persons with a history
of political problems.
Indonesia's uneasiness over the prospect of releas-
ing the remaining hardcore prisoners is in line with its
initial reluctance even to consider releasing any members
of a group it saw as a major security threat. Although
Jakarta felt obliged to respond to expressions of concern
over the issue of political prisoners from the United
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States and other governments and to publicity by such
groups as Amnesty International, it tried to impress on
foreign critics the special circumstances that, in its
view, dictated the indefinite detention of large numbers
of prisoners.
Most Indonesians are not concerned about the pro-
longed detention of the Communist suspects, whom they
see as the instigators of the turmoil following the 1965
coup attempt. Extended detention without trial has been
both customary and in accordance with Indonesian law,
and Indonesian officials tend to equate "legal" with
proper. Vice President Adam Malik, in his former role
as Foreign minister, argued that practices the US saw
as violations of human rights were in accord with domestic
Indonesian laws and thus were an internal legal matter.
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New Zealand: Prime Minister Shifts Tactics Following
Close Election (C)
In the aftermath of the 25 November parliamentary
elections--a cliffhanger until a number of tight con-
tests were finally decided--Prime Minister Muldoon has
swiftly appointed several previous backbenchers to his
cabinet and has relinquished his administrative respon-
sibilities as leader of parliament.
Muldoon's National Party held onto its majority in
the 92-seat parliament by a slim margin--the National
Party won 49 seats, Labor 41, and the Social Credit
Party one, with another seat still in doubt. The sagging
New Zealand economy was an important factor in the ero-
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By divesting himself of the parliamentary leader-
ship role, which saw him at the center of so many par-
liamentary wrangles in the past, Muldoon obviously hopes
to appear responsive to his party's appeal to tffm hl.-,
sails somewhat in the interest of party unity. 25X1
In addition, Muldoon brought six young party mem-
bers into his cabinet and catapulted his most junior
cabinet minister into the tough senior labor portfolio.
The New Zealand Prime Minister may have stilled party
criticism of his campaign performance with this cabinet
shakeup, but the real question is whether he can moderate
his politic style and at the same time provide firm
leadership.
For its part, Labor has reacted to the close elec-
tion with its own personnel shifts and the creation of
several study committees, the most important of which
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are the economic and electoral groups. Labor will be
looking at the question of parliamentary voting and
proportional representation. Labor managed to gain a
slight edge in popular vote over the government party-
some 8,00_-1() votes a total of about 1.7
million.
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Okinawa: Liberal-Democratic Party Return to Power (U)
The victory of the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP)
gubernatorial candidate in Okinawa--the first in 10
years--continues the trend of conservative victories in
local elections this year.
The success of the LDP candidate, former Dietman
Junji Nishime, will underwrite the political dominance
of the conservatives in the prefecture and is likely to
further strengthen the local government's positive at-
titude toward the US military on the island. Nishime,
however, still faces a prefectural assembly in which
the reformists retain a narrow edge and an entrenched
bureaucracy whose loyalties are to the reformist-con-
trolled trade unions. Any change in these attitudes
will only occur gradually as Nishime consolidates his
control.
Although the reformists have opposed the US mili-
tary presence over the years, the issue is no longer as
politically sensitive as in the 1960s. For example, the
"Anti-A-and-H-Bomb Council," which supports the re-
formist parties, is no longer able to generate mass
campaigns against US bases. In addition, organizations
such as the US Base Workers Union, which provided most
of the recruits for anti-base and other radical move-
ments, have seen a decline in membership.
During the gubernatorial campaign, Nishime enjoyed
several advantages over his opponent. A number of
high-ranking LDP officials, including Masayoshi Ohira,
who was recently elected Prime Minister, came to Okinawa
to campaign for him. Nishime also had the advantage of
quickly winning the LDP's endorsement after the unex-
pected resignation of the former governor. By contrast,
reformist candidate Hideo Chibana, the former prefectural
assembly chairman, required the approval of six separate
organizations. Chibana was not as well known as Nishime
and probably did not generate much enthusiasm either
among the committed leftists or among the important,
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uncommitted voters. Nishime's focus on unemployment as
his key issue was apparently an important factor in his
victory as was his ability to use his LDP connection
to obtain central government funds to assist Okinawa's
economy.
The election of a conservative governor culminates
a series of electoral successes that began last April
when a conservative won the mayor's seat in Okinawa City,
thus ending a 20-year reformist reign. So far, the LDP
has won 19 out of 26 local elections this year. For
example, the LDP won by a substantial margin a special
election held in Hirara City, where the reformist
mayor and numerous other key city officials had been
indicted on corruption charges. The city of Hirara
had been a reformist stronghold for a decade and this
victory now gives the conservatives control of five of
10 Okinawan municipalities.
As in other local elections, the voters' choice of
Nishime showed their preference for an administration
that stressed the need for promoting industry and
growth of employment. The election coincided with the
launching of the new administration of Prime Minister
Ohira and could lead to further LDP victories in pre-
fectural and local elections scheduled to be held in
Okinawa next year.
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