EAST ASIA BIWEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002200010012-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: May 31, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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ore~gn
Assessment
Center
East Asia
Biweekly .Review
31 May 1978
Secret
RP EABR 78-011
31 May 1978
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31 May 1978
CONTENTS
The Contenders i.n the Narita Controversy 1
The opening of Japan's new international
airport marks an important victory for
the government in dealing with a 12-year-
old controversy that has incited rnany
bloody conflicts and hundreds of demonstra-
tions.
North Korea: Succession Issue Lurches Forward. 4
.North Korean President Kim Il-song's be-
hind-the-scenes effort to groom his son,
Kim Chong-il, as his successor continues
to move by fits and starts.
Papua New Guinea - Indonesia: A Try at
Understanding . . 7
The visit of the Papua New Guinean Foreign
Minister to Jakarta has not resolved long-
standing differences but may have helped
promote fuller mutual understanding.
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The Contenders in the Narita Controversy
:Japan's new international airport at Narita, a town
in Chiba Prefecture about 38 miles from Tokyo, finally
opened on 20 May after 12 years of controversy. The
fight aver the airport has pitted the government against
a curious coalition of conservative farmers and radical
groups. Although the radicals are continuing their har-
assing tactics, the opening of the airport is an impor-
tant victory for the government in handling the long-
simmering Narita controversy.
The Farmers' View: The site for the new airport
was chosen in the early 1960s because of its topography,
its proximity to Tokyo, and its advantages in providing
new facilities for Japan's air traffic network. From
the outset, however, the government's effort to speed
construction of Narita ran afoul of the farmers who owned
the land designated for the airport site. As a conse-
quence, Tokyo invoked the right of eminent domain to
force reluctant owners to sell their property for the
main section of the airport--a tactic that deviated from
the government's past practice .and the normal Japanese
style of reaching a consensus on the problem. Further-
. mare, the government's failure to obtain support from
nearby residents who apposed the airport because of the
noise, increased traffic congestion, and potential safety
hazards it would create, widened the controversy over the
new facility.
Many of the farmers who owned lands slated to become
second and third runways of the airport held off selling
their property and protested the actions of the govern-
ment along with those who had been forced to sell their
farms. The plight of the farmers, publicized by a
sympathetic press, attracted many supporters, including
labor, environmentalists, leftist opposition parties,
and radical student groups. As a result, the government
postponed opening the airport when it was completed in
19.72.
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The Radicals' View: The Narita issue was viewed from
a dif event perspective by the radical student groups.
In particular, it offered a new rallying point after the
end of the Vietnam War and a means for the radicals to
align themselves with the "workers and peasants" in a new
antigovernment cause.
Although several radical organizations backed the
farmers' cause, the Japan Chapter of the Fourth Interna-
tional, a pro-Communist student group, took the lead in
trying to prevent the opening of the airport this spring.
The organization, which claimed responsibility far the
destructive raid on the airport in March, saw its campaign.
as a means to gain entry into the core group striving for
unification of the Japanese radical leftist movement.
Overall, an estimated 5,1304 to 6,00? members of
radical groups provided farmers with the necessary man-
power and funds to continue their campaign against the
airport. Even so, the violent tactics used by the radicals
undercut much of the taublic svmtiathv that the farmers had
enjoyed.
The '
e government as been nego-
ia ing wi a ari a armers and residents to win
over most of the local opposition. Ironically, that
effort was aided by the radicals' March attack on the air-
port. With the successful opening of the airport, many
of the farmers owning land needed for additional runways
are now planning to sell to the government.
In dealing with the radicals, Tokyo has been careful
not to create an image of government suppression or
police brutality, which could shift public support back
to the anti.-Narita forces. While Prime Minister Fukuda
admitted the government. had been too lenient with the
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radicals throughout the postwar period, he clearly care-
fully measured his response. Moreover, Fukuda stressed
the distinction between the farmers and the radicals by
focusing only on the radicals as a "grave challenge" to
a democratic system of law and order.
Government security officials were concerned, however,
about their ability to cope with the airport protests.
..Both prefectural and national police officials came under
heavy criticism for the .failure to blunt the 26 March at-
tack. The officials claimed, in turn, that the public
security laws-did not give the police sufficient author-
ity to control the situation. The use of Molotov cock-
tails in the attack and the subsequent discovery of lethal
weapons in one of the radical camps reinforced the call
for more stringent security measures. As a consequence,
the government was able to pass new legislation to permit
police to enter private property within a two-mile radius
of the airport to remove structures used by the radicals
for their operations.
Nevertheless, government officials have proceeded
gingerly. Although the government was legally empowered
to remove-all 33 such structures and concrete "'fortresses"
built around the airport, the Ministry of Transportation
only banned use of two of the buildings for one year.
The fact that the Ministry did not include the most famous
of the opposition shelters--the "Number One Fort," which.
anti-Narita protest leaders plan to turn into a museum
to commemorate their struggle--is a signficant concession
that Tokyo clearly hopes will dampen further protest. In
a related mane, the government released on bail' two of
the three anti-Narita protest leaders who were. arrested
during the March raid.
In .future negotiations with the farmers, the govern-
ment will most likely meet their demands for new farmland.
outside of the airport area as well as substantial fnan-
cial compensation. Although settlement of these grievances
will improve the political atmosphere, the po-lice are con-
cerned about possible reprisals- from small underground
radical groups whose activities are difficult to control.
Extremely tight security at the air ort will therefore be
maintained for same time to come.
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North Korea: Succession Issue Lurches Forward
The long term effort by North Korean President Kim
I1-song to groom his son, Kim Chong-l, as his successor
continues to move by fits and starts, The son's candi-
dacy received a shot. in the arm in mid-January when the
Pyongyang-based clandestine radio that broadcasts to
South Korea openly raised the succession issue,. With-
out actually naming the son, it argued that Kim
Chong-il--the "party center"--was the best qualified
to take over the reins from the elder Kim.
In late January the North Korean Communist Party
issued a letter urging the use of "speed battle" tac-
tics to carry out the new seven-year economic plan.
The speed battle concept is linked directly to Kim
Chang-il. It is modeled on a labor-intensive produc-
tion campaign instituted by Kim I1-song in the late
1954s known as the f'chollima" or winged horse movement.
It emphasize, the total mobilization of available man-
power resources to achieve a selected goal in a short
period of time.
In early February Pyongyang revealed that the
founding date for the North Korean armed forces would
be pushed. back from 1948 to the beginning of the anti-
Japanese guerrilla war period. That change has the
effect of boosting the revolutionary credentials of the
elder Kim, who is credited with organizing and leading
partisan forces against the Japanese in the early 193f3s.
The change also advances the cause of Kim Chong-il, who
is portrayed as "inheriting" the ?'revolutionary tradition"
? of Kim I1-song. It complements the son's efforts at
exhorting the North Korean populace to accept sacrifices
and display the zeal that is said to have characterized
the anti-Japanese guerrillas.
Over the past several years there have been subtle
hints in the North Korean press that not everyone is
enthusiastic about the aspirations to leadership by the
President's 3?-year-old son, and these nuances continue
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to manifest themselves. For example, an editorial in
the party daily on 18 May criticized those who viewed
the implementation of the January letter as a "temporary"
task rather than a long-range one. An editorial in
February took the unusual step of chastizing party
workers who were overly concerned about wages. These
admonitions may reflect resentment from the rank-and-
file caused by excessive reliance on speed battle
techniques that call for long hours of overtime work
under arduous conditions and without adequate compensa-
tion.
Differences over the utility of speed battle tactics
also are evident from time to time in the various formula-
tions used in the media to describe party policy. The
January letter put the concept on a par with the elder
Kim's chollima movement. An editorial in the party
newspaper on 12 May seemed to minimize the younger Kim's
movement somewhat by calling for workers to implement
economic tasks in the chollima spirit "supplemented with"
the speed battle spirit.
There also seems to be some disenchantment with Kim
Chong-il's of-forts to instill among the populace at large
the work ethic of the anti-Japanese guerrillas. A
feature on Pyongyang radio on 14 May on one of the
slogans minted by Kim Chong-il carried an introductory
endorsement by Kim Il-song. The endorsement had a
highly polemical ring to it not unlike those observed
during the Chinese Cultural Revolution when Mao's
authority was used to muffle opposition to highly
egalitarian schemes put forward by Mao's extremist
adherents.
All of this "toing" and "froing" in the media is a
reliable sign that the status of Kim Chong-il's campaign
is essentially unchanged. Kim 11-song is moving slowly
on the issue in order to build up the son's political
acceptance and legitimacy and to avoid a lame duck
status for himself. During this testing period the
son is being kept out of the public eye. His name is
not used in the media, he does not appear at leadership
turnouts, he has never met with foreigners, and in the
past two years even photographs of the younger Kim have
been withdrawn from general circulation.
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This approacta, however, is creating some problems.
The regime is hating increasing difficulty coping with
foreign press speculation about the son's status.
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Papua New Guinea - Indonesia: A Try at Understanding
-Papua New. Guinean Foreign Minister Olewale's visit
to ,Indonesia on 14-21 May may have. helped set the stage
for a more productive relationship. Bilateral relations
have-been marked by Indonesia's patronizing attitude to-
ward Papua New Guinea and by its suspicion of Papua New
Guinean complicity with dissidents from the adjacent In-
donesian province of West Irian. Papua New Guinea views
its relations with its populous neighbor as second in im-
portance only to its special relationship with Australia.
Although`it-tries to convince itself that Indonesian ab-
sorption of Portuguese Timor was not the forerunner of a
similar military adventure against Papua New Guinea, it
is still somewhat doubtful of Indonesian intentions.
The problem of West Irianese dissidence has kept bi-
lateral relations uneasy and probably dominated the talks
in Jakarta. Although West Irianese armed rebels may num-
ber as few as 50 and are only a nuisance to Indonesia,
-they have at least the sympathy of the some 2,000 West
Irianese believed to be living in Papua New Guinea. Ja-
karta believes that this sympathy, plus the sanctuary
afforded by .Papua New Guinea, could faster the rebel or-
ganization's growth. Although Papua New Guineans feel
some concern for fellow Melanesians in West Irian under
insensitive Indonesian rule, Jakarta tends to exaggerate
this kinship. Port Maresby is absorbed with building a
sense of nationhood among its many and often mutually
hostile clans and has no extra energies for championing
the West Irianese cause.
ort
Moresby's policy is to jai i ego or er crossers and
to emphasize to West Irianese exiles that it will not
tolerate plotting against Indonesia on Papua New Guinean
territory. Nevertheless, Port Maresby finds it hard to
enforce its strictures along the mountainous, overgrown
500-mile border. A recent rebel announcement of a cabinet
list--including several West Irianese who had adapted
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Papua New Guinean citizenship--prompted intemperate crit-
icism from an Indonesian Embassy officer in_Port Moresby.
The Papua 1Vew Guinean Government was miffed to the extent
of considerin5 a request far his recall.
Against this background, the decision to go ahead
with Olewale's visit reflects a mutual desire to put a
good face on present relations. The Indonesian reception
for oiewale seemed more sincere than that accorded Papua.
New Guinean Prime Minister Somare in January I-977, and
the length of the visit--eight days--suggested the im-
portance the Indonesians attach to good relations.
Concrete results were few. It was agreed to con-
tinue an arrangement for visits to Indonesia by Papua
New Guinean agricultural trainees, and bath sides ex-
pressed interest in exchanges of newsmen, Olewale re-
iterated Port Moresby's resistance to a longstanding In-
donesian request far the return of all illegal West
Irianese border erossers an grounds that Fagua New Guinea
was not sure that those who are political activists would
be treated humanely.
Despite this rebuff, there seemed to be some change
in Indonesian attitudes, One Indonesian foreign affairs
official said Olewale's explanations helged the Indonesians
appreciate the difficulties Papua New Guinea faces in
curbing the West Irianese dissidents. Relations will
probably continue to fluctuate aver the rebel issue, but
there may be a greater disposi
than to indulge in propaganda.
3I May 1..978
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