PROSPECTS FOR ESCALATING HOSTILITIES BETWEEN NICARAGUA AND HONDURAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000902260030-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 2006
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: December 8, 1982
• Content Type: SNIE

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S N I E 83.2-82
PROSPECTS FOR ESCALATING
HOSTILITIES BETWEEN
NICARAGUA AND HONDURAS
Information available as of 7 December 1982 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department-of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ............................................................................................................ 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................................................... 3
DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................. 5
Background ................................................................................................... 5
Increasing Tensions in the Border Region .................................................. 7
The Anti-Sandinista Insurgents ....................................................................
Nicaraguan Force Deployment and Capabilities .......................................
Forces Potentially Available From Cuba ....................................................
Soviet and Other International Support for Nicaragua .............................
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SCOPE NOTE
Within weeks after coming to power in July 1979 the Sandinista re-
gime of Nicaragua established training camps for guerrillas from El
Salvador and began to work with them in using Honduran territory to
move guerrillas and weapons into El Salvador. This, along with other
actions of the Directorate and the growth of the anti-Sandinista
insurgency, produced a series of actions and reactions by both Nicara-
gua and Honduras that has led to increasing levels of violence along
their border. (s NF)
This Special Estimate is prompted by a number of recent events
and intelligence reports suggesting that the level of hostilities could
increase sharply. These include:
- The steady growth in the Sandinistas' military capabilities.
- The increased activity in 1982 of the anti-Sandinista insur-
gency.
- The relative military weakness of Honduras, which has
I Ia military organization far weaker than that of
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Nicaragua.
Nicaragua's actions in continuing support to the Marxist-
Leninist guerrillas in El Salvador and Guatemala, along with
its role in supporting the extreme left from Costa Rica and
Honduras.
This Estimate examines the prospects for hostilities on the Nicara-
guan-Honduran border over the next three to six months. It briefly
I
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describes the background to the current situation; summarizes the
military assets in Honduras and Nicaragua
1 and estimates the likelihood of different
1 types of major hostilitiel
2
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KEY JUDGMENTS
In the next three to six months:
- We expect that the anti-Sandinista insurgency inside Nicara-
gua will grow further, and that there will be increased
combat between anti-Sandinista guerrillas and Nicaraguan
forces in the northern Nicaraguan border region.
- We estimate that, for i erent reasons, neither Honduras nor
Nicaragua will deliberately initiate a full-scale war within
the next three to six months; we estimate the probability of
this occurrence at less than 10 percent.
3
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DISCUSSION
Background'
1. Shortly after taking power in 1979 the Sandinista
regime in Nicaragua began establishing guerrilla train-
ing camps and taking other actions in support of the
Marxist-Leninist guerrillas and subversive movements
in Central America. Nicaragua also became a main
conduit for Cuban-supplied arms and assistance for
regional insurgents. The chief target of these actions
has been El Salvador, but the Sandinistas also have
supported the arming and training of Guatemalan
guerrillas as well as Honduran and Costa Rican ex-
treme leftist groups. The Sandinistas have provided
vehicles, explosives, and other support to Salvadoran
and Honduran radicals for terrorist actions against
Honduras
2. Besides working with Cuba to export subversion
in Central America, the Sandinista regime also is
carrying out a buildup of its military forces unprece-
dented in the region. Beginning in late 1979, the
Sandinistas have transformed an irregular force of
some 5,000 guerrillas into a well-organized regular
ey have received large quantities o ovie
B oc arms-artillery, medium tanks, armored person-
nel carriers, helicopters, in
light air defense weapons
They also have built at least 30 new military bases an
training facilities since their takeover in 1979. This
military buildup has greatly upset the regional mili-
tary balance
3. The actions of the Sandinista government began
to cause increasing problems for Honduras. Since
August 1979 the Sandinistas have worked with the
Salvadoran guerrillas using Honduran territory as a
main transit route for arms flowing from Nicaragua to
the insurgency in El Salvador. The Salvadoran insur-
gents also began to use the disputed Honduran-Salva-
doran border area as a safehaven, and they established
an extensive support network, including safehouses, in
several Honduran cities)
4. Generally, the Honduran Government made no
response to these actions until early 1981. After the
failed January 1981 insurgent offensive in El Salvador,
the government of Honduran President Paz Garcia
began to show increased concern about the threat to
Honduran stability caused by the Sandinistas and
Salvadoran guerrillas.
5. Since taking office in January 1982 the demo-
cratic government of President Suazo Cordova has
begun an even more active role against leftist regional
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Increasing Tensions in the Border Region
7. Although there had been sporadic violence in the
Nicaraguan-Honduran border area since the Sandinis-
ta takeover in 1979, the situation has become increas-
ingly tense this year. The Sandinistas declared a state
of emergency in March 1982 after anti-Sandinista
groups destroyed two bridges. It has since been extend-
ed repeatedly. While most of the recent clashes have
been between Nicaraguan forces and anti-Sandinista
insurgents in Nicaragua, troops from both countries
also have fired on each other, and both have claimed
0
8. Honduran and Nicaraguan officials have protest-
ed and denounced each other's actions in the various
border incidents. Amidst the accusations, however, the
two governments have conducted discussions with the
advertised aim of avoiding the possibility of war. The
Honduran and Nicaraguan foreign ministers have met
three times on the border situation since March 1982,
most recently in Managua this November. Though
their statements betoken willingness to act jointly to
defuse the situation, they continue to insist on differ-
ent approaches to the problem-Tegucigalpa supports
a regional solution (emphasizing an end to Nicara-
guan-Cuban support for all leftist guerrillas), whereas
Managua maintains that the problem should be solved
bilaterally (emphasizing an end to support for all anti-
1 Sandinista groups).
9. Meanwhile, armed incidents have continued in
the border region, and Nicaragua has sharply in-
creased its military presence there, while Honduras
has added to its far smaller border presence. Since
September 1982, Nicaragua has begun emphasizing
the threat of an imminent invasion by anti-Sandinista
forces supported by Honduran troops. Allegedly this
was to be done under the cover of joint US-Honduran
military maneuvers, originally scheduled for early this
December. Although the postponement of the joint
exercise has calmed the situation, both countries con-
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The Anti-Sandinista Insurgents
15. In Nicaragua's view, the potential threat to its
regime comes not just from the Honduran armed
forces but also from the anti-Sandinista insurgent
groups-principally the Nicaraguan Democratic Force
FDN).
The insurgents are equipped with small
arms and have recently been getting heavier weapons
such as mortars and rocket launchers. Additional
guerrillas may soon be operating in southern Nicara-
gua
16. The anti-Sandinista forces appear to be increas-
ingly effective in conducting small-scale actions-
harassment, ambushes, and sabotage operations. They
have avoided large-scale clashes with Sandinista regu-
lar forces. Despite their increased activity, we believe
they are unlikely to be capable of successful attacks on
major Nicaraguan units for the period of this Estimate.
Nicaraguan Force Deployment and Capabilities
17.
mce the declara-
tion of a state of emergency in March 1982, numerous
reserve and militia units have been mobilized and
deployed to the Honduran border to supplement regular
units there. More recently, tanks and armored personnel
carriers (APCs) have been
19. The Nicaraguan Army and Air Force continue
to receive new equipment, 25X1
The Army recently received a shipment o about 25
armored vehicles apparently including both tanks and
APCs. 25X1
repor e ly are destined for Nicaragua. Nicaragua has
trained pilots for, but still has not acquired, MIG jet
fighter aircraft.
much ool the border also
ability to employ armor.
21.
It he Nicaraguans
have had major difficulty countering the unconven-
tional tactics of the anti-Sandinista insurgents. The
Army has relied on large-scale sweep operations,
primarily by reserve and militia units, which have had
limited success.
18. The Nicaraguan Air Force is still a relatively
small organization with limited capabilities. F
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25. In terms of air support, the Cuban Air Force is
one of the largest and best equipped in Latin America,
Forces Potentially Available From Cuba
he s would be superior to te
Honduran Air Force's Super Mysteres. From its inven-
tory of J attack helicopters,
Cuba could also deploy some units to Nicaragua if
necessary. I
Cuba would defend Nicaragua in the internationa
arena with a vigorous diplomatic campaign, especially
in the United Nations and the Nonaligned Movement.
Soviet and Other International Support for
Nicaragua
28. Moscow has been careful to play down its direct
commitment to the Sandinista regime. Moscow and
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Managua do not have a "friendship" treaty,I
31. The Soviets are well aware that they are not in a
position to challenge the US militarily in the Caribbe-
an. The Soviet naval presence in the region is modest
and primarily serves intelligence-gathering purposes.
From time to time the Soviets deploy naval task
groups to the Caribbean to show the flag and exercise
with the Cuban Navy. Early in December, a cruiser, a
frigate, an oiler, and a diesel-powered submarine
arrived in Cuba. The visit coincides with Cuban
Armed Forces Day and with the 26th anniversary of
Castro's landing from the rebel yacht Granmal
military strategy against its neighbors.[
Also in Nicaragua are num ers o 5X1
persons belonging to established Marxist-Leninist ter-
rorist groups from other Latin American countries-
for example, Tupamaros (Uruguay), Montoneros (Ar-
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34. The Sandinistas' close links to extreme leftist 25X1
groups in the region are a major part of Nicaragua's
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Likelihood of Different Types of Conflict
36. We believe that there will be increased combat
between anti-Sandinista guerrillas and Nicaragua over
the next three to six months. We base this judgment on
the following:
- Anti-Sandinista forces probably will grow and
step up their guerrilla operations inside
Nicaragua.
37. Meanwhile, tension between Nicaragua and
Honduras probably will remain at a high level.
- Ideological conflict between democratic Hondu-
ras and Nicaragua will increase as the Marxist-
Leninist Directorate continues internal repres-
sion, the export of subversion, and forging ties
with Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.
II
40. It is less likely that either Honduras or Nicara-
gua will deliberately initiate a full-scale conventional
war within the next three to six months. II
41. The current or potential level of icaraguan
cross-border attacks could lead to war through miscal-
culation or unpremeditated escalation by either side
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