PERSIAN GULF SECURITY: THE IRANIAN THREAT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00232R000100140005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2007
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: May 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

f Secret
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Persian Gulf Security;
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The Iranian Threat
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Directorate of
Intelligence
The Iranian Threat
Persian Gulf Security:
Information available as of 22 May 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This paper was prepared b
of the Office of Near East-
South Asia Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations and the National
Intelligence Council. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, Persian
Gulf Division, NESA
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NESA 82-10182
May 1982
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Persian Gulf Securit :
The Iranian Threat
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Key Judgments Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf states are deeply worried about the
prospect of an Iranian victory over Iraq as well as about Iranian military
intentions. They fear Iraqi resistance will crumble and President Saddam
Husayn will be overthrown, leaving them vulnerable to increasing Iranian
subversion and military pressure.
After the war Iran's leaders can be expected to turn their attention
increasingly to the Gulf to assert their dominance in the region. But they
are unlikely to launch major military operations against the Gulf states or
their oil facilities. They almost certainly do not want to risk retaliation
against their own vulnerable oil installations or provoke Western
military intervention, especially not when victory over Iraq appears almost
within reach. Instead, Iran probably will continue to combine intimidation
and subversion with positive inducements to weaken Gulf support for
Iraq-support on which Saddam Husayn has become increasingly
dependent.
Fear of Iranian intentions has prompted the Gulf regimes to tighten
internal security and close ranks. Their highly publicized meetings of the
Gulf Cooperation Council have included much posturing designed to deter
Iranian aggression. Progress toward intelligence and defense cooperation,
however, will be slow.
To counter Iran and its radical Arab allies, the Saudis and other Gulf
Arabs will need to seek additional external security and political support.
Gulf interest in a rapprochement with Egypt probably will quicken. The
Saudis have already taken some private steps to improve ties with Cairo.
Gulf cooperation with other regional moderates-Jordan, Tunisia, Paki-
stan, Morocco-probably also will increase.
Some Gulf states will also try to appease Iran to temper its hostility. Saudi,
Kuwaiti, and UAE leaders have made private overtures to Tehran, offering
to help pay for war damages.
In extremis, the Gulf states will look to the United States for help. Some
have already expressed increased interest in US arms. Saudi Arabia has
implicitly relied on the presence of US-manned AWACS aircraft since the
start of the Iran-Iraq war as a deterrent against Iranian attack. US actions
and in some cases inaction, however, are raising doubts about US aims-
doubts fed in part by Israel's aid to Iran. There is also growing internal
pressure on the Gulf regimes to put greater distance between themselves
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NESA 82-10182
May 1982
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and the United States because of the US "failure" to restrain Israel
elsewhere. US support for Israel will constrain the willingness of these
regimes to seek additional direct American support.
Iranian-sponsored subversion aimed at fomenting popular uprisings among
Gulf Shias may become an increasing danger to the security and stability
of some Gulf states. If the present war ignites a broadbased Shia revolt in
Iraq, that threat could be significantly magnified, inspiring flareups,
probably on a smaller scale, in Bahrain and possibly Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait.
Over the longer run Gulf rulers must worry about the less tangible
inspiration Iran's victories will provide other religiously motivated would-
be revolutionaries-Sunni as well as Shia. The ingredients that contributed
to Iran's revolution-popular disaffection over social injustice, corruption,
and growing materialism and secularism-exist in varying degrees in the
Gulf states as well.
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Persian Gulf Security:
The Iranian Threat
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Iran and the Gulf
Iran, by virtue of its size, resources, and historic
ambitions, can be expected to turn its attention
increasingly to the Gulf after the war to assert its
dominance there. Indeed, a military victory over
Iraq-which now seems inevitable-will reaffirm the
faith of Iranian leaders in the universal validity of
their revolution and add impetus to their drive for
regional hegemony.
How much Iran's internal problems will act as a
constraint on its actions in the Persian Gulf region is
uncertain. But the temptation to champion the cause
of revolution in the Gulf-whether out of conviction
or political expediency-probably will prove irresisti-
ble to Khomeini's would-be successors. Fearful of
Western retaliation, Tehran is likely to rely on con-
ventional diplomacy, backed by veiled threats, and
subversion rather than military force in pursuing its
objectives. The Iranians have already made one effort
to overthrow Bahrain's government last December
using Shia dissidents. They will continue to train,
arm, and finance other Gulf revolutionaries sympa-
thetic to their fundamentalist ideology
A major hurdle Iran faces is the lack of sympathy
between Shia and Sunni Muslims. The Sunni major-
ities in most Gulf states may prove a natural barrier
to the spread of Iran's Shia revolution. Still, the
Iranians probably are convinced they can overcome
these sectarian differences and exploit the same popu-
lar grievances against corruption and the spread of
Western, secular influences in the Gulf that led to the
downfall of the Shah.
A more immediate Iranian aim is to weaken Gulf
support for Iraq. As its oil revenues have fallen and
the costs of the fighting have mounted, Baghdad has
become increasingly dependent on Gulf financial aid
to continue its war with Iran. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates have provided
more than $20 billion in interest-free loans and
recently decided to cover Iraq's losses from the closing
of the oil pipeline through Syria. That could cost them
an additional $4 billion this year. 25A1
Having sporadically tried the stick, Iran now seems to
be trying the carrot to neutralize the Gulf states. It
recently pressed the UAE, for example, to mediate
the conflict with Iraq and has even invited UAE
President Shaykh Zayid to make a state visit 85X1
Tehran. If inducements fail, Tehran probably will
again resort to threats, propaganda attacks, subver-
sion, and possibly sabotage to try to intimidate at least
some of the smaller Gulf states. 2 X1
Iran's Military Intentions
A major military attack on one or more of the Gulf
states appears remote. Nevertheless, Gulf leaders are
increasingly worried about Iranian military intentions
as a result of Iran's latest gains against Iraq. The Gulf
states know their forces are no match for Iran's and
that their oil facilities are extremely vulnerable to
Iranian air or seaborne attack. Even with the
AWACS aircraft, for example, the Saudi Air Force
and ground-based air defense system near Dh25M
could not counter a surprise Iranian airstrike on Saudi
oil installations. The time and distances are simply too
short. Iran's operational fighter-bombers-about
100-could strike anywhere in the Gulf in a matter of
minutes from their bases in Bushire, Bandar Abbas,
and Shiraz. 25X1
In a worst case, attacks on Saudi oil facilities could
reduce oil exports to as low as 2 million barrels per
day. Restoring exports to 6 million barrels per-
well below Saudi Arabia's present capacity of more
than 10 million barrels per day-could take several
months, perhaps longer. 25X1
Iran's restraint probably reflects its leaders' fear of
provoking US military retaliation against their own
vulnerable oil facilities. The war also has forced them
to concentrate their military resources against Iraq
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Persian Gulf Region: Oilfields
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These remain major constraints on Iran. This does not
mean, however, that the Iranians will not resort to
further airstrikes or even small-scale commando raids
against one of the Gulf states as a form of intimida-
tion. Tehran might calculate that the United States
would not react strongly to isolated incidents so long
as the flow of oil to the West was not directly
leading Sunni and Shia merchant families to maintain
itself in power. In recent years these methods have
become less effective in dealing with discontent
among Bahrain's 140,000 Shias, who make up 65
percent of the population but occupy the bottom rungs
of the social and economic ladder. ?X1
many Shias increasingly resent the
dominance of the largely Sunni ruling elite.
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Subversion: The More Likely Threat
For most if not all of the Gulf states, Iranian subver-
sion is the more likely threat.
Iran has focused its efforts on the Gulf Shias and has
done little to make common cause with local leftist
dissidents or Sunni Muslim fundamentalist groups,
such as the Muslim Brotherhood. In Bahrain, Shia
fundamentalists have actually worked against leftist
groups. This may change as a result of Iran's growing
tactical alliance with radical Arab states (Libya,
yria, and South Yemen), but we have not seen
In the short run the most serious dangers to internal
security in the Gulf states probably will be sporadic
outbreaks of Shia violence sparked by Iranian mili-
tary victories against Iraq or by Iranian-inspired
terrorist attacks. These could trigger harsh govern-
ment reprisals against Shia dissidents, which could in
turn sharpen Sunni-Shia communal tensions and
spark further violence. The danger is greatest in
Bahrain, where authorities may yet face a strong
challenge. The situation is less serious but still worri-
some in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which have large
Shia minorities.
Gulf State Strengths and Weaknesses
Bahrain. One of the poorest Gulf states, Bahrain is
the most vulnerable to Iranian-inspired subversion.
The Sunni Khalifa famil has traditionally relied on
Imembers of the island's
As a result, militant Shia fundamentalists hav2iuld
a receptive audience for proselytizing. The Tehran-
backed Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain,
led by an Iranian cleric (Hadi Muhammad Modarasi),
has been especially effective in recruiting adherents
among young, disadvantaged Shias. Most of t25X1
conspirators arrested in the coup plo
inspired in December were under 25
The government also faces opposition from th X1
lamic Call Party, another Shia fundamentalist group,
which receives financial support from Tehran. Over
time the Call Party could become a more serious
threat than the larger Islamic Front because it is
making inroads among the island's traditional Shia
religious leadership. Both the Front and the party use
Bahraini mosques, religious meeting halls, and study
groups as covers for fund raising, recruiting, and
spreading antigovernment propaganda. These forums
could serve as rallying points for antigovernment
demonstrations, as the did in Iran before the revolu-
tion.
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Shia Muslims in the Western Persian Gulf Area
INDIGENOUS
POPULATION
. Percent Shia
NOTE: Figures for Saudi Arabia are
for the Eastern Province only.
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The government probably can cope with externally
based dissidence but may find growing internal dis-
content and unrest more difficult to handle. Iran's
recent victories over Iraq and the Bahraini Govern-
ment's decision to try the 73 young Shia coup plotters
are creating tension. Because the execution of even
some of the plotters probably would have provoked
unrest in the Shia community, the Bahraini Govern-
ment on 22 Ma announced prison sentences for the
plotters.
As long as demonstrations do not mushroom into
widespread disorder, the government's special riot
police can handle them. If the security situation
seriously deteriorates, however, Bahrain will have to
turn to the Saudis and its other allies in the Gulf for
help. The Saudis could airlift National Guard units to
the island relatively quickly in an emergency. Also,
the UAE has Moroccan troops in its employ that
could be used to aid Bahrain. Gulf security officials
have done little or no planning for such a contingency.
Bahraini leaders are aware of growing sectarian ten-
sions and have shown clemency toward the plotters.
The Shia community is too small (280,000 or
5 percent of the native population) and too isolated
from the Sunni mainstream to represent the threat to
internal stability that Shias in Bahrain do. But be-
cause the Shia population is heavily concentrated in
the Eastern Province where the oilfields are and
makes up almost a third of ARAMCO's work force,
Shia dissidents pose a potential threat to the oil
facilities. 25X1
To counter this threat Saudi authorities have tried
hard to strengthen security in and around key oil
installations and to root out local Shia dissidents. In
addition to arresting dissident leaders and penee
dissident groups, the government has:
? Stationed National Guard units near some large
Shia townships.
? Arrested Shia theology students returning from
Iran, where they received political indoctrination.
? Banned travel to Iran by Saudi citizens.
? Sharply restricted the travel of Iranians in order to
disrupt their efforts to infiltrate agents provocateurs
into the Shia community. 25X1
At the same time Saudi leaders have made an effort
to appear more responsive to legitimate Shia g13?yX 1
ances. Modest increases in government development
assistance have been earmarked for projects in Shia
townships. In addition, King Khalid and Crown
Prince Fahd have paid visits to the area and made a
point of conferring with Shia community leaders.
ARAMCO, long the largest employer of Shias in the
province, also has sought to maintain good relations
with its Shia workers and the Shia community. As a
result many Shias have develoned a vested interest in
the status quo. 25X1
There has been remarkably little Shia subversive
activity in the ARAMCO work force and no attic
at sabotage. That does not mean that isolated acts of
sabotage will not occur. An Iranian victory over Iraq
could stir latent discontent, but Saudi authorities
probably can contain any violence, by force if neces-
sary. 25X1
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Kuwait. Iran's ability to foment unrest in Kuwait over
the short run appears slight. Kuwaiti security forces
closely monitor Shia dissidents and the large Iranian
expatriate community (40,000) and have been fairly
effective in dealing with subversive and terrorist
threats. Moreover, the ruling Sunni Sabah family has
made a conscious effort to spread the country's oil
wealth among all segments of society, including the
170,000 Shias who make up 30 percent of the native
population. As a result the Iranian revolution has not
created the strong antiregime sentiment and serious
sectarian tensions it has in Bahrain or to a lesser
extent in Saudi Arabia.
Most Kuwaiti Shias are not enthusiastic about the
Khomeini regime. Many leading Shia merchant fam-
ilies initially supported the Iranian revolution, but
they have become increasingly disillusioned with the,
regime's harsh treatment of Iranian bazaari mer-
chants, with whom Kuwaiti Shias have strong person-
al ties.
Nor has Iran's Islamic fundamentalist ideology struck
a sympathic chord among the large and diverse
foreign population in Kuwait, such as the Palestin-
ians. Kuwaiti leaders rely on their close ties to the
Palestine Liberation Organization and especially
Fatah leaders to ward off threats from more radical
Palestinian groups.
shaykhdom like a private estate. 25X1
ere are 25X1
no known Shia dissident groups in the s aythdom.
Most Shias have been thoroughly intimidated by the
government's large security forces, manned by Saudi
and Yemeni mercenaries. Nearly one of every 24
residents in the country is either a member of the
police or of the armed forces, which are commanded
by members of the royal family. The Shia community,
moreover, knows that Saudi Arabia would not hesi-
tate to send troops to restore order if necessa5X1
The UAE and Oman. Shias in these two Gulf states
are too few to pose a significant threat. The Emirates'
30,000 Shias, concentrated mainly in Dubai and
Sharjah, seem more interested in making money than
in engaging in politics. We know of no organized Shia
dissident groups in the UAE or of any UAE Shias
who have undergone terrorist training in Iran.
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UAE security forces are sufficiently large to cope
with internal disturbances
Qatar. Qatar's 25,000 Shias are strong supporters of
the Iranian revolution and deeply resent the domi-
nance of the Sunni Al Thani family, who run the tiny
Oman's British-led internal security forces, in con-
trast, are aggressive and effective. Moreover, the
country's diverse Shia community (13,000)-the
smallest in the Gulf-has been generally quiet. Like
most Omanis, the Shias have benefited from the
decade-old economic develo ment program initiated
by Sultan Qaboos. 25X1
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Gulf State Options
Until Iran's recent breakthroughs around Dezful, the
Saudis and other Gulf Arabs had hoped the Iran-Iraq
war would end in a stalemate and mutual exhaustion.
None of the Gulf states wanted Iraq to win decisively
at the start any more than they want Iran to win now.
Either outcome will upset the balance of power in the
region and encourage the winner to pursue an aggres-
sive policy toward its immediate neighbors.
The Gulf leaders also have expressed fear that an
Iraqi defeat will trigger widespread popular unrgst in
Iraq that could spill over into the region or result in
the overthrow of Saddam Husayn by a more radical
group that would pose a threat to their security. This
could tip the balance in the Arab camp in favor of the
radicals and leave the pro-US states in the Gulf
increasingly vulnerable.
The Saudis, therefore, believe their only choice is to
shore up Saddam Husayn. But there is little they can
do beyond offering more financial, logistic, and politi-
cal support. At the same time they and other Gulf
Arabs realize Iraq may not be able to serve as a buffer
against Iran much longer and are actively looking for
a way out of their dilemma
The Gulf states, for example, are supporting media-
tion to end the war by the Islamic Conference and
others. They have even made overtures recently to
Tehran, offering to help pay for war damages, in
order to encourage Iran to cease hostilities and ne oti-
ate. So far these offers have fallen on deaf ears
The Saudis also have sought to influence Iran since
the Bahrain coup attempt by orchestrating a series of
highly publicized defense, interior, and foreign minis-
ters' meetings in the Gulf Cooperation Council to
demonstrate Gulf solidarity. In addition they have
signed internal security cooperation agreements with
each of their GCC partners, except Kuwait, as well as
25X1 with Morocco.
In all likelihood they will have to look increasingly
outside the Gulf region for help. Riyadh and Baghdad
are beginning to look to Egypt as a counterweight to
Iran and its radical Arab allies, Syria and Libya.
Iraq, for example, has been buying Soviet ammunition
and spare parts from Egypt with Saudi money'*X1
some time. The Saudis have also indicated they are
eager to bring Egypt back into the Arab fold. Private
security and military cooperation-training, supplies,
and perhaps Egyptian advisers-may grow in the
months ahead.
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The Saudis and other Gulf Arabs probably wiNl
seek more security assistance from other allies in the
Near East-Jordan, Morocco, and Pakistan. Morocco
already has 1,500 to 2,000 troops in the UAE.
Pakistan is in the process of transferring enough
soldiers to man a reinforced armored brigade in Saudi
Arabia. And there is a good chance that cooperation
between the Saudis and the Jordanians will grow in
North Yemen and the Gulf. 5X1
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I ITo ward off Iranian aggression Bahrain
played up t e presence of US naval vessels after the
arrest of the coup plotters. Both Bahrain and the
UAE have expressed strong interest in obtaining US
fighter aircraft. Saudi Arabia continues to rely on the
implied US commitment to its defense represented by
the AWACS aircraft.
The Gulf states, however, will remain wary of a more
formal security relationship with the United States.
Differences over the Palestinian issue and growing
Arab frustration over US support for Israel are
creating internal pressure on the Saudis and other
Gulf Arabs to put greater distance between them-
selves and the United States. None of these regimes
can afford to ignore Arab public opinion without
undermining their credibility at home and leaving
themselves vulnerable to Arab radical as well as
Iranian-inspired subversion.
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