NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029000010052-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 52
• Publication Date: June 30, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Wednesday June 30, 1976 CI NIDC 76-153C
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
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 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29000010052-2
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 Approved Fo
National Intelligence Daily Cable for Wednesday June 30, 1976.
25X1
25X1 The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing
senior US officials.
25X1
25X1
The Arab League foreign ministers will meet today in
Cairo for the second time this month to consider ways to halt
the fighting in Lebanon.
//The meeting was called by Egypt, which hopes
to appear the defender of Palestinian interests. By condemning
the Christians' current offensive against Palestinian refugee
camps, Cairo also hopes to put pressure on Syria to dilute its
role in Lebanon.//
//According to the US embassy in Cairo, the
Egyptians believe that Syria is encouraging and possibly collud-
ing with the Christian attack on the Tall Zatar and Jisr al-
Basha refugee camps.//
Lebanese parties on a political solution and for hindering the
Arab peace-keeping effort.//
//Despite the ostensible thaw in Egyptian-Syrian
relations, Cairo wants to demonstrate the other Arab states that
Syria bears the responsibility for preventing talks among the
In the closed forum of the Arab League, the Egyptians
may succeed in focusing the blame on Syria for the current
fighting, and perhaps in inducing some quiet pressure on Syria
to halt the Christian offensive.
Arab security force in Lebanon, but be unable to remove the ob-
stacles that have thus far hindered its formation.
The Arab foreign ministers are unlikely to condemn
Syria directly. They will probably reiterate the need for an
mediation mission yesterday.
Libyan Prime Minister Jallud, who has been trying to
arrange the entry of the league force, announced the end of his
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Jallud blamed virtually all the Arab states for the
tai ure of his efforts, and warned that Libya will now give full
support to the Palestinian and leftist cause in Lebanon. He also
announced---without explanation--that the arrival of Saudi and
Sudanese contingents of the pan-Arab force originally scheduled
for today had been postponed indefinitely.
Jallud was the sole channel for bargaining between the
Syrians, Christians, and the Palestinians, and his departure ef-
fectively ends attempts to halt the confrontation.
dallud's decision to return to Libya was apparently
prompted by the Christian take-over of Jisr al-Basha refugee
camp yesterday.
I I Most of the camp's residents apparently had evacuated
r-ne area and the leftists have begun shelling the camp's Chris-
tian captors. Palestinian and leftist forces trying to relieve
the defenders of Tall Zatar reportedly were driven back yester-
day as they tried to fight their way to the camp through the
Christian section of Ayn Rummanah.
Artillery attacks on Christian positions launched from
the museum area were similarly unsuccessful in halting the grad-
ual but persistent advance on the camp.
The battle for Tall Zatar has led to heightened vio-
lence in other contested areas of the capital, and threatens to
set off a major confrontation between the Muslim-controlled
western sector of the city and Christian east Beirut.
The US embassy reported yesterday that the areas around
the embassy and the American University of Beirut have already
begun to receive increased artillery shelling and mortar fire.
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I I There is growing concern within the diplomatic commu-
nity that foreign residents and embassies in western Beirut may
soon be in serious jeopardy. The British ambassador told US of-
ficials that he felt the Christians would attack their Muslim
and Palestinian adversaries in the western sector despite the
foreign presence.
J The West German embassy issued an urgent appeal yes-
terday tor its citizens to report for evacuation this weekend,
and has decided to reduce its staff to one man. The French em- 25X1
bassy has arranged another overland evacuation convo that is
tentatively scheduled to leave for Damascus today.
General Secretary Brezhnev's speech at the conference
of European communist parties yesterday was a standard recita-
tion of Soviet positions on Europe, the international scene,
and relations in the communist world. :Brezhnev made no new pro-
posals and broke no new conceptual ground.
The speech showed evidence of the 20 months of ideo-
logical wrangling that preceded the conference. Brezhnev spe-
cifically referred to "proletarian internationalism" and made
clear that Moscow still considers the term a concept that should
shape relations in the communist world. He labored to emphasize
the importance of joint efforts by communist parties, particularly
in turning aside efforts of the "imperialists."
Brezhnev was careful to note that each party is prin-
cipally responsible to its own working class and that relations
among the parties should be governed by equality and respect
for each other's independence. Brezhnev made no case for Moscow's
primacy; indeed, he said that "no one had proposed an organiza-
tional center" for the world communist movement.
These sentiments have been expressed by the Soviets
before and will not convince the independent-minded parties.
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Romanian President Ceausescu, who spoke immediately
after Brezhnev, stressed the themes of non-interference in the
policies of a national party and the need to respect the diver-
sity of conditions and the independence of each party and coun-
try. Yugoslav President Tito, who is scheduled to speak at the
opening of today's session, will also articulate the views of
the independent-minded parties.
Brezhnev took several swipes at China and Chairman
Mao but made no effort to read the Chinese out of the movement
or to dwell on their ideological apostasy. His diffidence prob-
ably stems from a desire to avoid a defense of the Chinese by
any of the participating parties. Moreover, with the prospect
of Mao's death very much on the minds of Soviet leaders, there
may be some interest in not pushing anti-Chinese themes too
hard.
The Soviet party chief devoted considerable attention
to European affairs. He again was defensive on the European se-
curity agreement concluded last year, arguing that the USSR and
its allies are doing better than the West in living up to its
humanitarian and cultural interchange provisions. At the same
time, he made clear that Moscow will stick to its own interpre-
tation of what are, and are not, appropriate ideas to be ex-
changed. He also indicated that Moscow is disappointed that the
West has not been more interested in increased economic ties
with the USSR.
Brezhnev was positive about "detente." He said that
the parties should help make it "irreversible," an adjective
that has reappeared after an absence from May Day slogans. Brezh-
nev made clear his belief that "detente" had helped promote ad-
vances by "progressives" in Europe and setbacks to "facism" in
Portugal, Greece, and Spain. He also went out of his way to cite
the "outstanding success" of the Italian Communists in the re-
cent election.
The Soviet leader gave an extended account of various
disarmament proposals that have been thus far turned aside by
the West. His purpose seemed to be to support the thesis that
accusations concerning growing Soviet power and designs in Eu-
rope are groundless and the work of malevolent forces.
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Brezhnev mentioned a proposal regarding the withdrawal
of nuclear-armed warships from the Mediterranean. He alleged
that the US had turned it down. Brezhnev first made such a
proposal public in a speech in Poland in July 1974, but it has
not been a standard feature of the Soviet disarmament litany.
I I The party chief pledged efforts to improve relations
with the US but also expressed irritation with the delay in
strategic arms limitations talks caused by "responsible circles"
in the US. He referred to the increase in the US defense budget
as evidence of forces working against the relaxation of tension.
This approach is in keeping with Brezhnev's party congress
speech and subsequent Soviet commentary on the cooling in Soviet-
US relations, although his remarks on SALT were somewhat sharper
than previously.
Tensions between Greece and Turkey are growing as a
Turkish seismic research vessel prepares to enter the contested
Aegean Sea.
Turkish officials said last week that the vessel--the
Sismik I--would enter the Aegean on July 7. According to other
reports, the Sismik I--which has been in drydock--will leave
Istanbul on July 7 for a shakedown cruise and not arrive in the
Aegean until late July or early August.
Ankara is using the ship to assert its claim to a
share of the potential mineral wealth of the Aegean seabed and
to offset opposition charges that the government has not pressed
Turkish rights in the area. The government has been vague, how-
ever, on which locations in the Aegean it intends to conduct
seismic explorations.
There are indications that Ankara may make only sym-
bolic thrusts into the disputed waters in the hope of minimizing
Greek reaction while obtaining the desired domestic impact.
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Athens will. take a dim view of any Turkish incursions
into disputed waters. Last week the Greeks expressed concern to
the US that a Turkish. air exercise scheduled for July 6 and 7
off Izmir might be timed to coincide with activities of Sismik I.
//Athens believes it must oppose all Turkish
research activity outside Turkish territorial waters so as not
to appear to acquiesce in Ankara's broader claims. Greek Aegean
forces will reportedly raise their level of readiness when the
Sismik I enters the area, although they will probably be under
orders to avoid a direct confrontation.//
For their part, Turkish officials recently assured
the US embassy that Ankara does not intend to follow a provoc-
ative course and does not plan to provide the Sismik I with a
military escort. F77 I 25X1
//ThEe Spanish Communists reportedly intend to
step up efforts to secure a government commitment to legalize
the party.//
The Communists apparently believe that the govern-
ment's reform program is beginning to isolate the party from
the democratic opposition. Recent Communist setbacks include:
--The deadlock in negotiations among the opposition to
form a united labor front.
--The apparent decline of the Communist-backed Democratic
Coordination as a common opposition front.
--The reluctance of the democratic opposition parties to
demonstrate their solidarity with the Communists by opting out
of the government's reform program.
I
//The Communists have reportedly been stymied
in their attempt to negotiate directly with the government.//
I Communi s t
leaders have indicated a willingness to deter legalization un-
til after the parliamentary election tentatively scheduled for
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next spring. So far, however, intermediaries from the govern-
ment have given only what the Communists consider to be "unac-
ceptably vague" hints about lifting the ban at some unspecified
future date.//
//As a result, the Communists are preparing to
take to t e streets in the period leading up to the mid-October
referendum on the government's proposed constitutional changes.//
//Efforts will reportedly be concentrated in
the labor sector where the Communist-dominated Workers' Commis-
sions will try to foment strikes and demonstrations. Although
they plan to concentrate on the labor sector, they will report-
edly also launch a sharp attack on the monarchy.//
The Communists apparently hope that this campaign
will en le them to bargain labor peace and support for the
monarchy in return for the party's legalization.
I 25X1
the government is concerned about the prospect o a or trouble
this fall and wants to avoid a serious test with the Communists.
There are differences within the government, however, on legal-
izing the party and a decision is unlikely until after the par-
liamentary election.//
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The party's long-standing efforts to enhance its im-
age by proclaiming independence from Moscow were highlighted
yesterday by Carrillo's hard-hitting speech at the European
Communist Parties Conference in East Berlin. He stressed that 25X1
the Spanish party no longer regards Moscow as the center of the
Communist movement and he explicitl rejected a return to ear-
lier ideas of internationalism.
//A spirited debate is going on in the Icelandic
press over whether the US should provide compensation for use
of the US-manned NATO base at Keflavik. Some cabinet ministers
of both parties in the coalition government have given quali-
fied endorsement to various compensation schemes, although none
of these provide for a direct rental payment.//
Foreign Minister Agustsson has not publicly supported
compensation and told a US embassy official that he does not
think his government will call for a renegotiation of the de-
fense agreement. He indicated that the debate is a natural con-
sequence of publicity about "huge" US payments to other coun-
tries with American bases. Agustsson said the compensation de-
mands might also stem from the euphoria following the outcome
of the fishing dispute with the UK, and could subside as public
attention turns to other issues.
//Agustsson did, however, say that the debate
should not be taken lightly and he advised the US to provide
increased aid for civil aviation improvements at Keflavik,
funds to supply thermal heat to the base, and a larger reim-
bursement for the use of Icelandic roads by US troops.//
//Iceland's ambassador-designate to the US also
attributed the pressure for more aid to the publicity surround- 25X1
ing US compensation to other countries. He said that joint ven-
tures, such as US-training for Icelandic air controllers, might
divert attention from other forms of aid.//
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//France's rationale for excluding its troops from
both the common ceiling and the Allied presentation on force
totals at the Vienna force reduction talks makes clear that
Paris opposes both an explicit and an implicit limitation on
French forces in West Germany.//
//On June 10, the Soviets took the unprecedented
step of disclosing figures on Warsaw Pact ground and total man-
power in Central Europe, and requested similar updated NATO
data. Paris took this occasion to register vigorous opposition
to continued inclusion of French forces in Germany in data to
be given to the East or to counting them under the common ceil-
ing. The Allies were surprised by the French move, despite
Paris' arguments that its position was consistent with basic
French policy on non-participation in MBFR and that it did not
intend to cause a breakdown in the Vienna talks.//
//The consequence of the exclusion of approximately
60,000 French troops from the common ceiling would be to in-
crease the asymmetry of reductions required. It would thus
greatly reduce the chance of Soviet agreement to the Alliance's
major goal of achieving a Warsaw Pact - NATO common ceiling on
manpower in Central Europe. Moreover, there would be no MBFR-
related restrictions on the size of French forces in West Germany.//
//For the moment, the Allies are waiting to see if
bilateral demarches will induce the French to agree to some
compromise. If not, the Allies will have to examine whether the
common ceiling is viable in the face of France's refusal to be
counted.
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 Approved Fort
The Israeli government has reaffirmed its long-standing
policy o refusing to negotiate with hijackers. It has not yet
indicated what action it may take to recover the 70 or more
Israeli citizens who were aboard the Air France jetliner hijacked
on Sunday and still held at Entebbe airport near Kampala, Uganda.
The hijackers are demanding that Israel and several
other states--including France, West Germany, Switzerland, and
Kenya--surrender certain Palestinian prisoners they are holding.
Tel Aviv is apparently trying to concert strategy with these
governments to press for the hostages' release.
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During the past year, Israel has generally refrained
from undertaking military reprisals in reaction to Arab terrorist
attacks and will likely act with restraint in the current case
provided the Israeli hostages are freed without harm.
Tel Aviv probably suspects that one of the hijackers'
aims is to provoke an Israeli reprisal in the hope that this would
somehow generate more tangible Arab support for the :Palestinians
whose current plight in Lebanon has evoked surprisingly little
reaction from other Arabs.
It appears likely that this attack, like several
may have been carried out by a group
recent terrorist incidents
,
of terrorists of several nationalities created only for .a specific
operation. //The hijackers' demand that the girl friend of the
Venezuelan terrorist Carlos be freed by the French points in
this direction.// Carlos, who was involved in the attack late
last year on OPEC headquarters in Vienna, has operational contacts
in Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East.
The involvement of either Carlos or the PFLP raises
ossibility of Libyan collusion in the hijacking.
ther
th
f
p
ur
e
There is no evidence thus far to directly link Libya with the
incident, but Libya has in the past cooperated with both Carlos
and the Popular Front in planning terrorist acts.
//Kuwaiti investment banks are claiming that they
ut of the lucrative management of large inter-
ft
l
o
e
are being
national bond, note, and stock offerings because of their partic-
ipation in the Arab boycott.//
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//Under present boycott rules, an Arab firm may
appear as an underwriter with a blacklisted firm but may not
participate in any co-management arrangement when a boycotted
company is involved. Blacklisted established international finan-
cial houses, such as Rothchild, Lazard Freres, and Warburg, have
apparently convinced the international financial community that
their participation is more important than that of newer Arab
institutions.//
//The Chinese response to Pakistani Prime
Minister Bhutto's recent request for additional military assis-
tance reportedly exceeded Pakistani expectations. China, how-
ever, was less generous with its offers of economic assistance.//
//China has agreed to supply 150 T-59 tanks,
50 MIG-19 fighter aircraft, 54 "large" field guns, and a number
of naval. gunboats. Deliveries of the MIG-19 fighters are to be
completed within a year, and the new T-59 tanks could begin ar-
riving as early as October.//
//The value of deliveries under new and ear-
lier agreements could exceed $50 million this year and next--
the highest level of Chinese military assistance since 1972,
when Pakistan was rebuilding its armed forces after the 1971
war with India.//
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//On the economic side, Chinese officials
apparently turned down Bhutto's request for $400 million in proj-
ect assistance, pointing to about $100 million still available
under old credits. The Chinese stressed the need to complete
projects already under way before embarking on major new under-
takings. So far we have seen no indication of a response to
Bhutto's request for $150 million in Chinese credits for pur-
chases of agricultural equipment.//
//Bhutto went to Peking last month seeking
assurances that normalization of Sino?-Indian relations would
not proceed at the expense of Pakistan's "special relationship"
with China. Chinese promises of increased military assistance
were clearly designed to allay such apprehensions and perhaps
to moderate any Pakistani disappointment on economic aid. The
US embassy in Islamabad reported that the Pakistanis seemed
"reasonably pleased" with the results of Bhutto's visit.//
//The state of Sino-Pakistani relations will
have an importan earing on China's bargaining power with India
as the two countries move toward discussion of such important
bilateral issues as their border dispute.//
//The Indians, for their part, have said they
would use the level of Chinese military assistance to Pakistan
as a touchstone in determining China's real interest in normal-
ization with India. The new agreement will probably not be too
alarming to the Indians because no new weapons are included.
Pakistan, however, has for some time been pressing China to
provide F-9 fighters--China's best tactical aircraft, a deriva-
tive of the MIG-19--and the subject may again be under active
discussion.
Soviet Premier Kosygin and the heads of government of
most o the eight other CEMA member-states are expected to meet
in East Berlin from July 6 to July 8 for their annual session.
to a Soviet economist, a major item on the
Accordin
g
will be long-term coordination of economic plans. This
d
agen
a
subject is so difficult and nebulous that no firm decisions are
25X1
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likely to be made at. the meeting. Poland's abortive effort to
raise food prices last week provides an unsettling backdrop and
will inevitably draw discussions toward current problems.
All the East European member-countries are being buf-
feted to some degree by the economic pressures that prompted the
Polish proposal to increase prices. Some of the problems can be
attributed to price hikes on Soviet raw materials, and the East
Europeans may take advantage of the Polish riots to seek new
short-term benefits from Moscow. The Soviets have their own
troubles in the consumer area but, with Poland fresh in mind,
could be willing to make some concessions.
I I A recent Soviet-Hungarian agreement to exchange Soviet
of and other raw materials for Hungarian agricultural products
over 15 years has been described as the forerunner of similar
accords. The East European members may see economic advantage
in securing long-term commitments if the accords do not unneces-
sarily divert goods that can be sold in the West. Moscow also
probably sees political advantage in linking the East European
economies more closely with the USSR.
The participants will probably review progress on
various point projects--such as the Orenburg pipeline--in which
the East Europeans are helping develop Soviet raw material re-
sources. In recent years, Moscow has obtained greater participa-
tion by the East European countries in these projects and probably
will push for more participation, perhaps in return for short-term
concessions.
I I The communique that will come out of the meeting will
prod the EC to give prompt consideration to CEMA's recent draft
proposal for cooperation, and may try to give new impetus to the
Soviet proposals for. European discussions of key economic problems.
Last week's riots in Poland present the Hungarian
leadership with the difficult decision of whether to implement
the price increases on meat products scheduled to take effect
tomorrow.
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The price hikes--which average 33 percent, but may
be much steeper for some meats--were announced last November.
Before the Polish price plans collapsed last Friday the Hun-
garian finance minister said that his government would proceed
with the planned increases.
Party leader Kadar delayed rent hikes in early 1971
in reaction to the Polish riots of December 1970. The price
increases planned for meat were originally slated for 1972,
but were delayed then because of worker grievances and differ-
ences within the leadership on economic issues.
The consumer's pocketbook has been squeezed lately,
and there is evidence of increased grumbling and some food
shortages. While price increases do not carry the political
symbolism they do in Poland, they have been a matter of sensi-
tivity. In fact, a Hungarian deputy premier admitted last Thursday
that the situation has produced "a certain strain" between the
party and the people.
In light of the Polish developments, the Soviets may
also prefer that the Hungarians not boost prices. A decision
on the boost could emerge from the meeting that Kadar and So-
viet General Secretary Brezhnev are likely to hold at the cur-
rent European Communist party conference.
For domestic reasons, Budapest may not wish to damage
its credibility by retracting a decision on the public record
for so long, particularly since the economic rationale for the
increases is still present and the proposed increases are mild
compared to those deferred in Poland.
The regime's decision will probably take into con-
sideration that the population has not been as volatile as the
Poles over the issue of price increases. Older Hungarians ap-
parently are still inhibited by the events in 1956, and many
may fear a public outburst would upset the relatively good deal
that has evolved under Kadar. 25X1
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