NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029000010032-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: June 18, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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CIA-RDP79T00975A029000010032-4
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Friday June 18, 1976 CI NIDC 76-143C
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
1
&NONE&
State Dept. review completed
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 Approved Fo4
National Intelligence Daily Cable for Friday June 18, 1976
I The NID Cable is for the purpose o s_n orming
senior-US officials.
I IThe joint leadership of the major Palestinian and Leba-
nese e ist groups announced yesterday that the suspected assas-
sins of Ambassador Meloy and Counselor Waring have been arrested,
presumably by Palestinian security forces. The statement did not
identify the killers, but said they will be turned over to the
joint Arab security force that is to be created by the Arab League
to help police a cease-fire in Lebanon.
Several reports have suggested the killers may have
been members of the extreme leftist Lebanese Revolutionary Social-
ist Organization. //This group has close ties to and is believed
to have mounted joint criminal and terrorist operations with the
radical fedayeen Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
and with small Lebanese Communist groups.//
These groups have on several occasions attacked US in-
stallations and personnel in Beirut and Damascus. Although they
have sometimes sought sanctuary in Palestinian refugee camps,
they operate outside the control and often against the interests
of the major Palestinian and leftist organizations.
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These Lebanese and Palestinian extremists are the most
rabid opponents of Syria and the US, both in Lebanon and on wider
Middle East issues. They are also at odds with Palestinian and
leftist groups willing to negotiate a settlement of the Lebanese
crisis. The extremists are therefore eager to derail even the
limited progress that has been made toward ending the current
Palestinian-Syrian confrontation.
The assassinations have had a sobering effect on all
of the principal combatants, which has probably contributed to
a de facto cease-fire in virtually all areas of the country. Even
before the murders, however, an uneasy calm had begun to take
hold, apparently as a result of Libyan Prime Minister Jallud's
mediation effort and a general weakening of Palestinian and left-
ist resistance to Syrian military pressure.
//In recent talks with US officials, Syrian chief
of sta i a i expressed confidence in Syria's control over the
military situation. He confirmed that Syrian troops have secured
virtually the entire Bekaa Valley, noting that Syrian forces
along the Damascus-Beirut highway have moved as far west as Bham-
doun.//
//Shihabi said there were no plans to move any
closer to Beirut and that he would personally recommend against
such a move.//
//According to Shihabi, Syrian and Christian
forces have totally surrounded Tripoli. The Syrian blockade of
Sidon is apparently less complete, but Syrian troops are in a
position to interdict movement in the port and to control traffic
along the coastal road.//
//Shihabi's comments left an impression of Syrian
resolve to use its military advantage to enforce a settlement,
although he gave no indications of Damascus' next move.//
//The Syrians appear to have the choice of either
maintaining their current stranglehold on Palestinian and leftist
positions and waiting for their adversaries' submission to Syrian
terms or pressing for a more decisive military victory. The Syr-
ians will take no dramatic action until President Asad returns
from his European visit this weekend.//
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/Although recent pleas from the Palestinians and
leftists suggest that they are in a desperate mood, we have no
clear reading on their intentions. Yasir Arafat's absence from
Lebanon since late May has probably caused some uncertainty in
Palestinian ranks; however, his subordinates have generally been
more eager than he to confront the Syrians.//
Arafat--who may not be fully aware of the precarious
position of his forces--is seeking aid from a variety of Arab
capitals and will probably not come to his own decision until
he determines the amount of outside assistance he can muster.
//The Palestinians can expect no immediate relief
I Lebanese Christians warned again yesterday that they
wou not accept Algerian or Libyan troops in Lebanon, and if
defied would call for outside intervention.
//President Franjiyah--sensing that pressure for
his resignation may soon be renewed--announced Wednesday that
he was giving Interior Minister Shamun the foreign ministry port-
folio.//
//Although the move was intended in large part to
demonstrate Franjiyah's hold on presidential powers, it may also
be a prelude to Christian efforts to "internationalize" the crisis.
Franjiyah and Shamun have been seeking outside help for months
and may now want to take more formal diplomatic action.//
//Of all the Christian leaders, Franjiyah and Shamun 25X1
have been the most intransigent and the most willing to pursue a
military solution to their dilemma.//
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//The Philippine government's opening bid in nego-
tiations on he status of US military bases reflects President
Marcos' more nationalistic posture in foreign policy. He appar-
ently intends to press for an agreement that will give him the
option to phase out the US military presence within the next ten
years.//
//The Philippine draft agreement presented on Mon-
day imposes highly restrictive limitations on operational, lo-
gistic, and administrative activities of US forces. It would
confine US forces to the use of Clark Air Base and Subic Bay
naval station and require the US to relinquish all other instal-
lations in the Philippines.//
//Prior approval of Philippine base commanders
,
would be required for most US flights, routine exercises, and
port calls. US combat operations would also require prior ap-
proval and nuclear and toxic chemical warfare weapons would be
prohibited.//
//The draft agreement also vests broad authority
in Philippine base commanders and circumscribes the authority
of US commanders over US military and civilian personnel and
equipment by requiring that US activities conform to Philippine
laws and regulations.//
//Philippine negotiators have not yet specified
i
the total amount of US security assistance they will demand,
-j
but the draft agreement calls for defense support to be distrib-
uted over five years, including an unprecedented cash payment.
The draft also appears designed to terminate US statutory and
contractual restrictions on the use of military equipment trans-
ferred to the Philippines under earlier assistance programs.//
//The Philippine proposals would limit the new base
agreement to a term of five years, with provision for extension
for only one additional term of five years. Either party could
terminate the agreement upon written notice of one year. The
present base agreement expires in 1991.//
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//Some of the highly restrictive limitations almost
,
were inserted for bargaining purposes, and the Fili-
certainl
y
pinos apparently are prepared for protracted negotiations. Pres-
ident Marcos is anxious to secure increased US financial and ma-
terial support for his armed forces and defense industries, and
he is unlikely to press his more extreme demands to the point of
jeopardizing the achievement of these objectives.//
//Marcos probably will insist, however, that the
tinal agreement contain language that will validate his claim
to complete "sovereignty" and jurisdiction over military bases
used by US forces and will recognize the superior authority of
Philippine base commanders.//
//In responding to post-Vietnam trends in
East Asia, Marcos is moving toward assigning higher priority to
alignment with his partners in the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations than to maintaining the traditional political and
military relationship with the US. Marcos defined his new pri-
orities in his independence day message on June 12, citing a
"new dimension to our independence" that will. emphasize "free-
dom" in foreign relations as well as in internal affairs.//
//He specifically noted that both the "new
nations" and the communist powers have questioned the Philip-
pines' independence because of its "close collaboration" with
the US.//
//In his June 12 speech Marcos disavowed any inten-
tion to "embark on a rash course of complete self-reliance in 25X1
defense." He emphasized, however, that the Philippine position
will be based on the principle that "sovereignty and extraterri-
toriality are non-negotiable issues."
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CUBA-BARBADOS-AFRICA
1
gin regu ar
air service between Havana and Luanda on June 29
ith i
, w
nterme-
diate stops at Barbados, Guinea, and Sierra Leone. The flights
may replace those now being made by Aeroflot IL-62s between Ha-
vana and Luanda via Conakry twice weekly.
I
r Id
two flights weekly, departing Havana on Tuesdays and Frridays.
The Cubans will use Bristol Britannia aircraft, with a seating
capacity of about 100, instead of the larger DC-8s acquired ear-
lier this year from Canada.
u d e
tion that they be used only for civilian purposes, and the Luanda
flights will almost certainly involve military as well as civil-
ian passengers and cargo.
r
agreemen
to permit use of Barbados as a stopover are not clear.
Barrowt
came under fire last year when Cuba's use of Barbados as a re-
fueling stop for flights carrying troops to Angola became pub-
lic. This latest act if it is turned into a campaign issue proba-
bly will add to the problems the Prime Minister and his party
face in the national election at must be held by December.
Barring last minute hitches Cuba will be '
A recent Barbados press account said th
The leasing agreement for the DC-8s ' 1 d
The reasons behind Prime Minister Bar
'
SOUTH YEMEN - IRAQ
Relations between the leftist
ove
g
rnments in South
Yemen and Iraq, until recently close, have deteriorated sharply
//amidst indications that Aden believes it has been the target
of subversive activity by Baghdad.//
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_14 4- urfaced earlier this month when Iraq pub-
s
The ispu e
licly criticized South Yemen's rulers for adopting a law prohib-
iting contact between South Yemenis and foreign nationals, in-
cluding other Arabs.
onded by accusing Baghdad in a newspaper
s
d
p
en re
A
editorial of using diplomatic cover to contrive plots, train
spies, and buy agents. In addition, the South Yemenis charged
the Iraqis with abandoning Arab rights by concluding agreements
with the Shah of Iran.
to reports reaching the US embassy in
din
A
g
ccor
North Yemen, members of the Iraqi educational mission in South
Yemen have been accused of inciting their students to demonstrate
against Aden's recent normalization of relations with Saudi Ara-
bia
S al other South Yemeni policy actions may
r
J/ eve
have contributed to the tension between the two governments, al-
though these so far have not been mentioned in propaganda from
Baghdad.//
//Aden's leaders for example, have recently pro-
hibited Eritrean separatists from using Aden as a transshipment
point for weapons destined for the rebellion in Ethiopia; Bagh-
dad is an important backer of the Eritreans.//
//Iraq may also be expressing displeasure over
South Yemen's apparent accession to demands by the Saudis that
Aden wind down support of the leftist rebels in Oman as part of
the price for a Saudi - South Yemeni accord.//
lomatic relations between Aden and Bagh-
A b
eak in di
p
r
I
dad, should it come to that, would not have much impact on either
side. The economically hard-pressed South Yemenis have received
h
i
t
limited financial aid from Baghdad, but their new ties w
Riyadh should provide an alternative.
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SOUTH AFRICA
Rioting in Soweto spread at least briefl
last ni
ht
y
g
to Kagiso, another all-black township near Johannesburg. After
two days of racial violence--the worst in South Africa since the
Sharpsville "massacre" in 1960--at least 50 are dead and more
than 250 have been injured.
South African authorities say they have the situatio
i
n
n
Kagiso well under control, but they have not yet been able to re-
store order in the sprawling Soweto ghetto. Thus far, police have
arrested over 100 rioters as well as some locally prominent black
leaders.
The government's handling of the rioting has drawn
predictably sharp criticism from the South African English
language press. UN Secretary General Waldheim issued a statement
yesterday criticizing the South African government and calling
for an end to its policy of apartheid.
I I Government officials have ordered a special investiga-
tion to look into the disturbances. The riots were sparked by
opposition to the government's policy of insisting on the use of
the Afrikaans language in all-black schools. Emotions are running
high, and further incidents may occur in other urban areas.
The riots are certain to embarrass the South African
government and may make it difficult for Prime Minister Vorster
to appear as conciliatory in his discussions with Secretary
- - '- l d , . .
Kissin
ger nex
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The sixth Soviet Writers' Congress will convene on
Monday in Moscow. Some 600 delegates representing 8,000 writers
will be present. The congress, meets at five-year intervals;
this one may define more clearly the direction of Soviet cultural
policy and the limitations of Soviet political and social comment
under new party secretary Zimyanin.
At the Soviet party congress in March, Zimyanin was
named to the post left vacant by Petr Demichev's earlier demo-
tion to minister of culture. For more than 10 years, Zimyanin
had served as chief editor of Pravda as well as chairman of the
Union of Journalists. The leadership's failure to replace Demi-
chev more rapidly resulted in an ad hoc approach to intellectual
matters characterized by arbitrariness and frequent but incon-
sistent reprisals.
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In recent months, there has been fragmentary evidence
that thought is being given to granting writers more flexibility.
The controversial writer Vasily Shukshin posthumously received
the Lenin Prize, the country's top cultural award, in late
April.
Bulat Okudzhava, a poet and song-writer whose satir-
ica wor s have won wide popularity, has reportedly been per-
mitted to hold public concerts after a long period of silence.
A surrealistic story by Vasily Aksenov was published in the
Soviets' Literary Gazette.
I Probably most significant is the publication of Yury
ri onov s House on the Embankment, a book carrying the message
that passiveness pays off, now as under Joseph Stalin.7
Trifonov implies that the main character, in further-
ing his own career through opportunism, fear, and rationaliza-
tion, is representative of many Soviet intellectuals in both
the Stalin era and the present day.
Efforts to draft a final document for the European
communist party conference were postponed late last Friday when
an editorial commission meeting in East Berlin adjourned. The
preparatory phase was to have completed arrangements for the
long-delayed conference.
The adjournment--which will reportedly last 10 to 15
days--is intended to give individual party leaders a chance to
review progress and to conduct bilateral discussions on unre-
solved issues.
Italian and Yugoslav delegates say that some "funda-
mental" substantive issues are not yet resolved. They have none-
theless suggested that there is still a chance that a "con-
sensus" can be achieved.
Whatever concessions the Soviets may have made before
the East Berlin session to placate the Romanians and Yugoslavs-,
they were not adequate for the other independent-minded parties
there.
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This was probably the reason for the adjournment. The
Romanians are now also saying that Moscow has reneged on a defin-
ition of "proletarian internationalism"--a euphemism for Soviet
domination of the movement--which was arranged in prior bilateral
talks with Moscow.
The leading independents will probably use the inter-
ruption to press Moscow for further modification of the document.
I ITo head off such pressure for changes, the Soviets, on
e ina day of talks in East Berlin, published an article in
New Times designed to answer their critics. The article denied
any intent to dominate the movement but implied that the Western
communists were falling for a "bourgeois trap" in advocating a
form of communism different from that in the East.
Responses from the French and Italian parties indicate
continuing worries about Moscow's assurances.
I IRecent reports from Soviet Georgia indicate that the
situation there remains unsettled. Acts of arson and bombing
continue and are evidently the work of criminals angered by the
ruthless, three-year crackdown by party boss Shevardnadze on
the corruption and graft that flourished under his predecessor.
An American correspondent, recently returned from a
week in Tbilisi, was told by local contacts that since the
crackdown got under way, there had been some 250 acts of sabo-
tage starting with the widely reported burning of the Tbilisi
opera house in May 1973.
Shevardnadze's inability to end the acts of sabotage
seems now compounded by a quarrel with Georgian intellectuals.
As long as Shevardnadze concentrated on the problem of economic
crime and avoided a direct assault on Georgian nationalism, he
appeared to have a measure of public support and the backing of
Georgian intellectuals. As late as the fall of last year,
the intellectual community was still
generally satisfied with Shevardnadze's leadership.
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The clean-up campaign did not bring improvements in
the economy, however, and now a series of Russification measures
reportedly has the Georgian intellectual community in an uproar.
The American correspondent found evidence of consid-
erable nationalist ferment. He ascribed this to recent Russifi-
cation measures in education. All books used in higher and sec-
ondary education reportedly must now be approved in Moscow;
since January, all candidates for higher degrees must submit
their theses in Russian as well as in Georgian.
I I The correspondent was told of an open flare-up at the
Georgian writers' congress two months ago. In a sharp attack on
Russification, a prominent local writer quoted Lenin on correct
nationality policy, asserted that Soviet Minister of Higher Edu-
cation Yelyutin should be tried for crimes against the national
constitution, and boasted that Georgian students are able to
read Georgian texts from the sixth century--before the Russian
language existed.
These remarks were accompanied by wild applause from
the audience. The Georgian minister of education was subsequently
prevented from speaking by the hooting writers, and Shevardnadze
himself was given a hearing only when he made it clear that he
would not be driven from the platform.
Shevardnadze's influence appears to be at an all-time
low, and for the first time questions are being raised in Georgia
about his ability to continue in office.
The republic's party chief's problems are Moscow's
problems. While they are local in nature
they are potential sources of considerable
embarrassment to t e regime in Moscow.
Jamaica's ailing economy received a major boost last
week at a meeting of the four Commonwealth leaders in the Carib-
bean when Prime Minister Eric Williams of Trinidad and Tobago
promised generous financial support. Jamaica's Prime Minister
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Michael Manley, however, was less successful in achieving his
political goals. He was unable, for example, to persuade
Williams to endorse charges that the US is engaging in a cam-
paign of "destabilization" in the Caribbean.
At the meeting, Trinidad pledged budgetary and bal-
ance-of-payments aid to Jamaica of $77 million over the next
five months. Barbados will provide $7 million in support, and
Guyana will extend credit worth about $3 million. The aid pro-
vided by Trinidad and Barbados will be at the 8.85-percent in-
terest rate charged by the World Bank.
The aid package will do much to alleviate Jamaica's
balance-of-payments problems and will provide Manley with
greater room for maneuver as he prepares for a national elec-
tion, which it now appears will be held late this summer. Ear-
lier estimates had been that Jamaica would have a $50 million
deficit in 1976. Although reserves will increase by an estimated
$20 million this year, import restrictions adopted in March, to-
gether with other adverse factors, including a decrease in sugar
and bauxite production, will contribute to a likely 5-percent
decline in real gross national product.
Steps were also taken at the meeting to increase re-
gional economic cooperation, a policy :Long advocated by Williams.
The four states agreed to "evolve without delay" a common pro-
tective trade policy and to expand regional trade in fertilizers,
cement, automobiles, and consumer goods. Jamaica agreed to give
import priority to motor vehicles assembled in Trinidad. Some
progress was made toward the establishment of a regional air
carrier, which presumably would be dominated by Trinidad's Brit-
ish West Indian Airways.
The communique issued after the meeting did not address
charges by Manley, Burnham of Guyana, and Barrow of Barbados that
the US has attempted to "destabilize" their governments. It did
call for concerted action to reduce the vulnerability of the re-
gion to external pressures and to affirm that stabilization of
the region is the paramount objective of the Commonwealth mem-
bers in the Caribbean. This perfunctory treatment of the charges
owed much to Williams, who has resisted pressures to identify
Trinidad with the more radical views of his Commonwealth part-
ners.
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Manley has not been dissuaded from accusing the US of
trying -o upset his government. On Sunday, in preparation for
the showing of an anti-CIA film in his constituency, he taped
an introduction to the movie in which he insinuated that the
CIA was interfering in Jamaica's internal affairs. Foreign Min-
ister Dudley Thompson and other government officials, as well
as the ruling party's newspaper, have been even more direct in
their charges.
Following a recent poll which showed Eanes with a wide
lea , Azevedo denounced his opponent as "dangerous" and said that
a vote for Eanes, whose political views remain somewhat obscure,
"would be like writing a blank check."
One of Azevedo's close associates told US embassy offi-
cials that the attack was calculated to provoke an ill-considered
response from Eanes, but the gambit appears to have failed.
Such concessions in exchange for an Azevedo endorse-
ment would probably assure Eanes' election. While Eanes' refusal
can be viewed as a measure of his confidence in an election vic-
tory, it also probably precludes an important post-election role
for Azevedo, whose political leanings Eanes reportedly finds
suspect.
I I Meanwhile, an Eanes campaign trip to the Azores has
riggere a flare-up by separatist groups. On the main island
of Sao Miguel early Wednesday a crowd of several hundred angry
youths threw a small bomb and shouted for a referendum on autonomy.
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The demonstration, probably the work of the independence-
minded Azorean Liberation Front, seemed less a personal attack
on the candidate than a protest over Lisbon's delay in satisfying
the islanders' aspirations for broad autonomy.
Although the majority of Azoreans probably still pre-
fer autonomy to outright independence, extremists appear to be
serving notice that they consider prompt action on the autonomy
demands the first order of business for the new government.
Eanes also encountered some difficulty yesterday as
he campaigned in the southern part of Portugal. Supporters of
another candidate, the former security chief Otelo de Carvalho,
clashed with Eanes' backers in several towns. In Evora, some of
Carvalho's supporters attempted to storm a car in which Eanes
was riding. During the subsequent melee, six people were wounded
and one reportedly was killed. 25X1
Failure of the members of the Intergovernmental Council
of Copper Exporting Countries to extend the 15 percent production
cutback due to expire on June 30 is likely to have only marginal
impact on world copper markets. Traders on the London Metal Ex-
change reportedly have already discounted the news, and prices
by major copper producers are unlikely to be lowered.
The cutback in both production and sales instituted
by Council members in late 1974 failed to reach its goals. In
1975, a production cutback of 215,000 tons represented only 8
percent of output by Council members and only 4 percent of pro-
duction in non-communist countries.
The cutback failed to halt the decline in copper prices
in the face of a 16-percent drop in demand in the non-communist
countries. A return to full production in the second half of this
year may have a depressing influence on prices. Earnings by the
developing countries, however, should be boosted by more sales and
higher average prices than prevailed a year ago. Major producers,
such as Chile, thus do not want to restrict copper output.
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