NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029000010016-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: June 9, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Wednesday June 9, 1976 CI NIDC 76-135C
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
CIA-RDP79T00975A029OOTdtpl,S#cret
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
(Security Classification)
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The resolution also authorizes a committee composed
National Intelligence Daily Cable for Wednesday June 9, 1976
I The NID Cable is for the purpose
of informing senior US officials.
I I The Arab League foreign ministers, who gathered in
Cairo late last night to consider the Lebanese crisis, adopted
a resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire and the replace-
ment of Syrian troops in Lebanon with an Arab security force.
Late press reports from Beirut say Syrian President Asad has
accepted the resolution.
The resolution appears to be a compromise between ad-
vocates of a Palestinian call for an immediate, unconditional
withdrawal of Syrian forces and those hoping to avoid a direct
challenge to Damascus. The resolution describes the joint Arab
force as a "token" security force and gives no timetable for
the replacement of Syrian troops.
of the Arab League Secretary General and representatives of Al-
geria, Libya, and Bahrain to go immediately to Beirut to "coop-
erate" with "all concerned parties" in arranging the cease-fire.
Although the resolution expresses support for the Pal-
estinian revolution and determination to protect it from "all
dangers," it carefully avoids direct criticism of Syria's actions
in Lebanon and any suggestion that the Arab League is dictating
to Damascus.
I I The speedy action by the foreign ministers clearly
caught Damascus off guard. According to reporting early yesterday,
Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam was planning to arrive in Cairo
today to counter Palestinian charges. Syria's representative at
the session yesterday warned that Syria would not accept any
resolution until Khaddam "had been heard."
We have no confirmation from Damascus that President
Asad has, in fact, accepted all provisions of the resolution--
as the Beirut press asserts. We would expect any Syrian endorse-
ment to be qualified to reflect Syria's adamant opposition to
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the introduction of other Arab troops in Lebanon. Asad, however,
may have accepted the League's call for a truce in principle in
order to avoid total defiance of a joint Arab decision. The Syr-
ians, moreover, have run into unexpected, stiff opposition in
Lebanon and may even welcome a respite.
25X1 Late yesterday, Syrian armored units reportedly had
finally broken through at Ayn Sawfar on the east-west highway
to Beirut and were near Alayh, a leftist stronghold and the home
of Kamal Jumblatt.
are running high in Damascus, and there are numerous rumors of
serious unrest within the regime.
The domestic returns on Asad's use of Syrian troops
against t e main Palestinian forces are not yet in, but tensions
//The US embassy reports that none of these rumors
has checked out thus far, and that there are no indications that
Asad faces an imminent coup. Nevertheless, some of his senior
military advisers reportedly continue to oppose his policy of
armed intervention.//
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The urgency in Asad's present situation apparently
was brought on by a serious miscalculation of the Palestinians'
willingness to resist increased Syrian intervention.
One of Asad's goals is to gain greater control both
over the PLO and the "rejectionist" fedayeen to ensure their
cooperation in future Lebanese political negotiations and to
ensure more responsiveness to Syrian direction on the broader
Middle East peace questions.
Mistrust between Asad and Arafat has been deepening
for weeks, and Asad progressively has shown a willingness to
intimidate militarily the forces under Arafat.
His problem now is that he is coming under fire from
nearly all sides in the Arab world for his assault on the Pal-
estinians, and he cannot afford simultaneously to alienate rad-
ical and conservative Arab states.
Given the outside Arab pressures that are building on
Asa d, it seems unlikely that he will be willing to sustain mil-
itary action against the Palestinians for much longer. On the
other hand, he has staked too much on securing a satisfactory
outcome in Lebanon to respond to the current Palestinian pressures
for a substantial withdrawal of Syrian forces.
Asad will continue his efforts to rein in Arafat, to
lure elements of the leftist Lebanese Arab Army to Syria's side,
and to preserve Syrian primacy in eventual negotiations.
The Military View
The latest US embassy assessment notes that the height-
ened atmosphere of tension in Damascus is caused largely by pop-
ular awareness that Asad apparently has at last determined to
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close down the Lebanese civil war and to involve Syria as deeply
as may be necessary to do so.
//At the same time, the embassy sees Asad as con-
tinuing in firm control.// We doubt that he would have committed
the bulk of Syria's 3rd Armored Division to Lebanon without the
concurrence of most of his military commanders.
Much of the unease within the Syrian military over
armed intervention in Lebanon previously has stemmed from fear
of an Israeli military reaction, and the absence of an Israeli
response may have substantially reduced the criticism levied
at Asad from within the military
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The USSR has been publicly re-emphasizing its interest
in an early conclusion of a new strategic arms limitations agree-
ment since the signing last month of the US-Soviet treaty on
peaceful nuclear explosions.
I Evidently cheered by the successful outcome of the
prolonge negotiations on that treaty, Moscow has been playing
up its symbolic significance for US-Soviet relations in general
and for SALT in particular.
At the signing ceremony on May 28, General Secretary
Brezhnev, flanked by most of his fellow Politburo members, ex-
plicitly affirmed Moscow's intention to seek a new strategic
arms pact.
other spokesmen have subsequently asserted that the
treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions provides a stimulus to
agreements on "other disarmament questions." Pravda last week
carried an article exhorting Washington to move "as soon as
possible" toward a new SALT agreement.
Such statements are in contrast to the reserved atti-
tude Moscow had displayed earlier about the prospects for an
early breakthrough on SALT.
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The Soviets' increased public attention to SALT appar-
ently reflects hopeful readings of developments in the US rather
than any substantial change in the Soviet negotiating position.
The Soviets have been encouraged by President Ford's showing in
recent presidential primaries in the face of attacks on the ad-
ministration's policy toward the USSR.
I The Soviets were also pleased by President Ford's re-
a irma ion last month of his commitment to SALT, and reported
his Los Angeles statement in their domestic press.
Moscow probably still remains skeptical of the chances
for a new SALT agreement this year. The Pravda article warned
that "advocates of reasonable policy expect from the Republican
administration not only words.. .but also concrete actions" toward
translating the Vladivostok understandings into a final accord.
Criticism of the US along familiar lines continues--
specifically attacking the B-l, Trident, and long-range cruise-
missile programs.
I I A more optimistic public position serves several Soviet
interests. It contributes to an image of the USSR as the champion
of disarmament, and it helps to offset an impression of
staana-
tion in the Soviets' "peace program." 25X1
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The Greek government has made it clear publicly that
it will continue to allow port visits by ships of the US Sixth
Fleet despite recent demonstrations and parliamentary criticism
directed against them.
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The issue was raised in parliament last Friday by dep-
uties of the Moscow-backed Communist Party and Andreas Papan-
dreou's radical Socialist Party who called for a referendum on
the issue. They also accused the government of not implementing
the agreement between Greece and the US that abolished the home-
porting of US ships in Greek ports.
I IDefense Minister Averoff emphasized that home-porting
had ceased as of January 1, but announced that US ships would
be permitted to visit Greek ports and that this policy would not
be discarded because of the wishes of a minority.
Canada's recent decision to purchase 128 Leopard tanks
Prime Minister Caramanlis' shift to partisan politics in the
face of challenges to his leadership from the left.
Greek security police clashed with demonstrators on
both Rho es and Mykonos; the government eventually asked that
the ships leave to avoid more serious violence. In the mean-
time, a limited schedule of port visits has been resumed, in-
cluding one, to a port near Athens last week, that was carried
out without incident.
from West Germany is an initial step toward meeting the commitment
it made last fall to maintain and modernize its forces in Europe.
Some details of the purchase remain to be worked out.
Canada is trying, for example, to persuade West Germany to offset
some 30 to 50 percent of the Leopards' cost--tentatively estimated
at about $160 million--by purchases of Canadian products.
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Averoff's performance is a reflection of
Ottawa's decision to buy the Leopards reverses reported
plans made in 1970 to phase out tanks on grounds they were of
no use in Canada. The Liberal government, however, yielded to
domestic pressures and to the urgings of NATO allies.
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long-range patrol aircraft contract with Lockheed unless a new
financing arrangement could be worked out. //Lockheed hopes to
present another proposal with new financing to the cabinet by the
end of June.//
//The tank purchase supports Prime Minister Trudeau's
statements following the cancellation of the aircraft contract
that Canada would still live up to its NATO commitments. Defense 25X1
officials are concerned, however, that the long-range patrol
aircraft program will lose momentum if the Lockheed deal is not
Ottawa decided last month to cancel a $1-billion
I I The general staff of the Angolan armed forces yesterday
ordered all its troops in Luanda confined to barracks until to-
morrow. Staff headquarters cited a pending reorganization of the
armed forces and preparations for armed forces day.
These reasons are not entirely convincing since armed
forces day is almost two months away. It seems more likely that
the order is tied to the factional dispute within the Popular
Movement and may be part of a power play by the military against
the political wing of the Movement.
Late last month, the general staff announced a plan for
reorganizing the military. The key provision of the plan called
for moving the armed forces political commissariat from the gen-
eral staff to the Popular Movement central committee. President
Neto rescinded the announcement the following day, claiming that
it had been issued without his sanction and that certain parts
of it contradicted provisions he had already approved.
Neto's real reason for rescinding the plan may have been
to thwart an attempt by the military leadership to increase its
influence in the central committee of the Popular Movement. The
ruling party's military wing is made up largely of blacks who
resent the predominant role in the government of the mulatto-
dominated political wing. F__ I
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A brief terrorist attack yesterday in Nouakchott,
Mauritania, was apparently carried out by Polisario Front guer-
rillas opposed to the Moroccan-Mauritanian partition of Western
Sahara. It was the first such incident in the city.
I I Polisario forces in recent weeks have increased their
activity within Mauritania and probably will attempt further
operations in the capital. Although Mauritanian officials are
likely to increase security measures in and around the city,
they will be hard put to forestall such attacks because of the
city's vulnerability.
Nouakchott is on a flat plain extending into the de-
sert. u1 dings within the presidential compound, in particular,
are easily targeted from outside; they are among the tallest in
the city.
Mauritanian public reaction. to the guerrilla attacks
is likely to be expressed in a show of renewed support for the
government's policy of partition of Western Sahara. President
Ould Daddah has wide support in the government and with the
general public. Any attempt by Polisario guerrillas to use ter-
rorism to try to undermine the President is likely to backfire.
F77 I
I he editorial commission seeking to complete prepara-
tions for the proposed European communist party conference con-
venes today in East Berlin for a two-day meeting. The Soviet
delegation is led by Politburo candidate-member Ponomarev. The
second-ranking Soviet delegate, party secretary Katushev, visited
both Romania and Yugoslavia during the past two weeks in an ap-
parent effort to iron out differences that have prevented
scheduling the conference.
The meeting today in East Berlin has been billed by
participants as the "final" negotiating session, but that asser-
tion may not hold true. In addition to Soviet efforts with the
independent-minded parties, those parties have been engaged in
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a last-minute flurry of consultations among themselves. The
latest such talks, concluded only yesterday, were held in Rome
between Italian Communist leader Berlinguer and Stane Dolanc, 25X1
th
e number-two man in the Yugoslav party. F_ I 7FXi
Hard-line Argentine military officers ar
t
i
e
ry
ng Co
force President Videla to take a tougher stand on subversion
and a variety of other issues. This could confront Videla with
serious human rights problems and divisions within the military.
Videla and advisers who share his moderate and
th
di
me
o
-
cal approach toward national reform are trying to curb the arbi-
trary arrests by police and armed forces security services, com-
pile a list of those detained, and halt vigilante-style activi-
ties against suspected and known leftists by semiofficial death
squads.
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Hard-liners opposed to these and other government pro-
posals--ranging from ambassadorial appointments to revising for-
eign investment laws--include a number of high-ranking army
officers who have a sympathetic junta member in Admiral Emilio
Massera.
//Massera and his army colleagues do not appear
bent on ousting Videla as President, but rather are determined
to force moderates out of the President's circle of advisers.//
Only then, they apparently reason, can the government impose
discipline on the labor force, destroy the influence of corrupt
and irresponsible politicians, and eliminate the well-entrenched
leftists.
I I The junta's image is already suffering from its ina-
i i y to control right-wing terrorism. Moreover, labor and po-
litical leaders are increasingly concerned about Videla's ina-
bility to enforce the moderate line he promised on taking office.
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