NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A029000010006-3
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
17
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 2, 2006
Sequence Number:
6
Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 3, 1976
Content Type:
REPORT
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Thursday June 3, 1976 CI NIDC 76-130C
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to (:riminal Sanctions
DIA review(s) completed.
secret
(Security Classification)
Top Secret
State Dept. r~ppeove~~~rKefease 2007/03/08 :CIA-RDP79T00975A02~3o~orat,~0 I s'fication)
CIA-RDP79T00975A0290000~
J
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National Intelli ence Dail Cable for Thursd 6.
The NID Cable is for the purpose
in orming senior officials.
We have detected
anon in he past 48 hours.
We estimate that there are :now about 3,000 Syrian
roops and nearly 100 tanks in eastern Lebanon. This total in-
cludes two infantry battalions that have been at A1-Ma.~na since
mid-April. Some additional Syrian forces, consisting primarily
of an SA-6 missile brigade, are located just across the border
in Syria.
The Syrian troops that entered central Lebanon Tuesday
an moved to Shaturah and Zahlah apparently were from the ar-
mored brigade that has been astride the central Syria-Lebanon
border near Al-Masna since mid-April.
According to the US defense attache in Damascus, the
raga e was no longer in its border encampment when he visited
the area yesterday. A US journalist who traveled through east-
ern Lebanon yesterday reported that Syrian troops and tanks were
positioned at various locations from Zahlah to A1-Masna.
We are not able to confirm press reports that the
Syrian a~_r force has been placed on alert. It seems likely, how-
ever, that some Syrian air force units would be on an alert as
a general precaution.
no new Syrian forces moving into Leb-
There has been no significant resistance from Pales-
tinian and Lebanese leftist forces to the Syrian military advance
in eastern Lebanon. Syrian troops apparently issued an ultimatum
against resisting when they arrived iri Zahlah and easily dis-
armed the few who defied the order.
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We have no confirmation of press claims that Syrian
troops have been sent to Sidon to secure its port and oil refin-
ery complex. As many as 300 Syrian regular troops disguised as
Palestinian Saiga forces have been based in Sidon since early
April to intercept arms deliveries to leftist and Palestinian
forces. The Syrians have been reluctant to augment this contin-
gent because of Israeli warnings that Syrian troops must stay
out of southern Lebanon.
The US defense attache in Tel Aviv reported yesterday
t at the Israeli military does not appear to have increased its
readiness posture in reaction to the Syrian moves. In an unusu-
ally direct remark yesterday, Prime Minister Rabin said that he
saw no need for Israel to react against Syrian military opera-
tions against the Lebanese left. Foreign Minister Allon later
struck a more cautious note, stating that Israel reserves the
right to take more active measures should Syrian moves endanger
Israel's security.
The Palestine Liberation Organization, seconded by
Lebanese leftist leaders, called yesterday for an emergency
meeting of the Arab League to consider ways of blocking Syrian
intervention. So far, only Iraq has endorsed the Palestinian
request. Most Arab capitals are avoiding official comment on
Syria's actions; many will probably ignore the request. Some--
like Egypt--recognize that there is little the Arab League can
do to counter the Syrians, even if the majority of its members
were of one mind on the issue.
Kosygin's Discomfort
The escalation of the Syrian intervention on the eve
of Soviet Premier Kosygin's arrival in Damascus has obviously
put him in an awkward position. Kosygin had undoubtedly intended
to caution the Syrians that their policy in Lebanon was serving
US and Israeli interests by diverting Arab attention from the
struggle against Israel and by seriously straining relations
among Moscow's clients.
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from the Palestinians and the Lebanese leftists to rein in
Damascus.
criticism of Syrian actions in Lebanon, saying that Moscow op-
poses "imperialist interference" in "any form whatsoever." It is
doubtful, however, that at this point Moscow is willing to do
much beyond this kind of jawboning. The Soviets value Syria as
a counterweight to Egypt and want to avoid any action that might
encourage Damascus to rely on the US to arrange a settlement
with Israel.
Now the Soviets must contend with stronger pressure
Kosygin, on Tuesday night, made some veiled, public
President-elect :Llyas Sarkis has so far managed not
only to dissociate himself from. Syria's decision to intervene
but to use the Syrian move to advance his peace proposal. Sarkis
held his long-awaited meeting with leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt
yesterday and apparently gained his approval to convene round-
table settlement talks as soon as possible.
Jumblatt issued a statement following the meeting in
w is e gave unusually warm praise to Sarkis, calling him a
man of conscience and independence. Only weeks ago Jumblatt had
treated Sarkis as little more than a Syrian puppet and had re-
fused to accept the validity of his election to the presidency.
Although Jumblatt coupled his praise with calls for
an immediate Syrian withdrawal, the tone of his remarks suggests
that he may now believe that cooperation with Sarkis is the only
way to effect a pull back of Syrian troops.
Jumblatt apparently also met yesterday with Bashir
Jumayyil, the son of Christian Phalanges Party leader Pierre
Jumayyil; we have not yet received information on the results
of the meeting. Representatives of the two leaders have been 25X1
working for weeks to arrange these talks. During the course of
the civil war, Jumblatt repeatedly rebuffed efforts to arran e
reconciliation meetin s with top Phalanges leaders.
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President Asad's personal prestige is heavily engaged
in t e latest Syrian intervention in Lebanon. If his gamble to
generate a political breakthrough there fails, it could seriously
damage his political position at home.
The longer the Lebanese crisis drags on, the greater
t e anger that the confessional strife might spill over into
Syria. There already have been attacks on members of Asad's
minority Alawite sect by members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the
group that serve:> as the cutting edge of conservative Sunni
opposition to the regime.
A greater danger is disaffection among the Syrian
mi nary. We have received numerous reports in recent months
that Syrian officers are disturbed about Asad's support for
Lebanon's Christians against Syria's ideological allies, the
Lebanese left anc~ the Palestinians.
A Syrian foreign ministry official claimed last week
a Asa had refrained from sending larger numbers of troops
into Lebanon because he feared that the Syrian army, which is
largely Sunni Muslim, would disintegrate if it were ordered into
action on a large scale against .Lebanon's leftist and Palestin-
ian Sunnis.
Minor skirmishes between Syrian forces and Lebanese
e is s or Fatah units are likely, but we doubt that Arafat
is willing to risk an all-out clash with the Syrians; Asad in-
creasingly has been able to intimidate the fedayeen and probably
is counting on Arafat's reluctance to challenge him militarily.
Asad is determined to .recoup the stature he lost when
e Syrian-engineered settlement in January collapsed by ensuring
the transfer of power to Syrian-backed president-elect Sarkis.
Despite Asad's reported concern about the overall re-
liability of the Syrian military in the Lebanese context, he may
well send more troops into Lebanon if the political stalemate
persists. Presumably, Asad secured the backing of his principal
military commanders before he committed additional troops this
week.
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Despite his domestic vulnerabilities, Asad is unlikely
o wi~ raw unilaterally from his commitment to engineer a Syr-
ian solution in Lebanon. The problem i=or him now is that even
if he should pull out of Lebanon, the civil strife probably
would increase to the point where it could spill over into
Syria. It could also lead Israel ultimately to conclude that
it must intervene to protect the Lebanese Christians and secure
its northern border area.
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Zaire and Angola cio not appear to be making much prog-
ress in implementing the reconciliat:i.on agreement reached in
Brazzaville last March between Zairi~~n President Mobutu and An-
golan President Neto. The two presidents continue their deep
distrust: of each other. Implementing the accord is also made
difficult by the vagueness of many of its provisions.
//Zairian President Mobutu's chief political ad-
viser recently told US officials that his country's relations
with Angola were becoming "embittered." He accused the Luanda
regime of reneging on the March accord.//
//The Angolans, he said, have refused to honor
the provision for the voluntary repatriation to Zaire of the
former Katanga secessionists who took refuge in Angola in 1963.
He claimed the Katangans will be given Angolan citizenship. He
also said that Luanda is unwilling for the next ten years to
accept Angolan refugees now in Zaire--another provision of the
accord.//
//The adviser also complained that 'the Angolan
government is dragging its feet on getting the Benguela railroad--
an important trade artery for Zaire---back into operation. He
said the Neto regime is demanding that Zaire pay for repairing
the bridge at the Angola-Zaire border. Zaire believes Angola
should bear the expense since Popular Movement forces destroyed
the bridge.//
//President Neto has recently accused Zaire, ac-
cording to Mobutu's adviser, of continuing to train guerrilla
forces of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola and
to assist them in cross-border operations. The adviser argued
that National Front troops are operating on their own and are
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not allowed to use Zairian territory. Mobutu reportedly has
tightened security along the border--and has closed the border
with Cabinda--in an effort to 'nto Angola.//
Rhodesian black nationalist leader Joshua Nkomo has
quietly arrived in Moscow on the heels of visits to the USSR
by Mozambican President Machel and Angolan Prime Minister
Nascimento.
Nkomo undoubtedly hopes to capitalize on his long-
s.an ing ties with Moscow--he has received financial and politi-
cal aid from the USSR since the early 1960s--by obtaining more
Soviet support to :bolster his faltering position among Rhodesia's
rival nationalist leaders. Since the collapse of his talks with
Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith in March, much of Nkomo's in-
fluence among Rhodesian blacks has shifted to more militant ri-
vals who had opposed the talks.
Some members of Nkomo's moderate internal faction of
e rican National Council are said to be ready to break with
him because of his refusal thus far to join the insurgency
against the Smith regime.
In contrast to the heavy publicity that attended
Machel's and Nascimento's recent trips to the USSR, the Soviets
have made no announcement of Nkomo's visit. Moscow is anxious
not to offend Machel and his fellow black African presidents by
appearing to deal with a single Rhodesian nationalist leader.
The Soviets may be reluctant to become too closely
i enti ied with Nkomo in the public eye, particularly in view
of his declining political fortunes. The Soviets have, in fact,
been in recent contact with some of Nkomo's rivals.
Moscow's low-key treatment of Nkomo's visit is also
consistent with the Kremlin's cautious handling of the situation
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in both Rhodesia and Namibia in the wake of the conflict over
Angola. Moscow appears sensitive, at least for 'the moment, to
the damage that could be done to its relations with Washington
if it adopts a more aggressive policy on southern Africa.
Philippine President Marcos' first state visit to the
USSR appears to be proceeding according to plan.
The Soviets have given Marcos the top-level attention
he demanded as a prerequisite for the trip. Marcos has had two
sessions with President Podgorny and other Soviet officials and
one "friendly, businesslike" meeting with General Secretary
Brezhnev. The two sides yesterday announced the establishment
of diplomatic relations and the conclusion of a trade agreement.
At the Soviet dinner in honor of Marcos, Podgorny
stressed the need for all Asians to work together for regional
"peace and security." This phrasing is the new formulation the
Soviets have adopted to seek Asian support for Brezhnev's seven-
year-ald Asian collective security idea. A Lao communist dele-
gation endorsed similar language in the communique issued at
the end of a recent visit to the USSR.
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//The Soviets have invited five countries to ob-
serve e military exercise "Sever" to be held in the Leningrad
Military District from June 14 to 18. The exercise is the second
to which the Soviets have invited observers since the conclusion
of the Helsinki agreement.//
//Norway, Finland, Sweden, Poland, and East Germany
ave received invitations. The invitations appear to have been
restricted to Helsinki signatories nearest the exercise area.
Observers invited to the first Soviet-announced exercise in
January were also from neighboring countries.//
//Each of the five countries will be allowed to
send two officers in addition to i efense attache in
Moscow.
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The fatal shooting of a young Italian communist last
;ae~a neo-fascist campaig
and the Christian Democrats i
n wor
n the
xer
ir
W111 n
continu
eap U(JLil Li1
ing effort
C 1Cll.
to dis-
credit the neo-fascist party,
the
cou
ntry's
fourth larg
est.
Several parties expect to ben
efit,
bu
t the C
hristian De
mocrats
in particular hope to offset
part
of
the exp
ected defec
tions to
the left in the balloting on
June
20
and 21
by drawing
support
away from the neo-fascists.
The communist was killed in a confrontation following
a neo-fascist rally held last Friday in a Communist Party - dom-
inated town near Rome.
The incident is likely to deal a sharp blow to neo-
fascist leader Giorgio Almirante's effort to gain a sense of
legitimacy for his party--something he seemed close to doing
during the last parliamentary election in 1972. Protest votes
helped Almirante win 8.7 percent of the ballots in that campaign,
nearly double the neo-fascists' post:-war average. Since then,
however, the party has been increasingly associated with illegal
activities. Party members or supporters have been r_harged with
complicity in incidents ranging from minor violence to coup
plotting.
The Communists, Socialistic, and others on the left
are citing the latest incident as another indication that most
serious violence comes from the right. The Communists probably
hope to pick up some of the protest vote garnered by the neo-
fascists in 1972. The Communists benefited to some extent from
neo-fascist crossovers in areas sucYi as Naples in local elec-
tions a year ago.
The Christian Democrats stand to gain even more, how-
ever, rom a decline in the standing of the neo-fascists, since
some of the gains made by them in 1~a72 were 'the result of defec-
tions from the Christian Democrats' right-wing. The Christian
Democrats have seized on the incident to condemn Almirante's
party in the strongest terms. Prime Minister Moro is urging anti-
communist voters to support the Christian Democrats rather than
the neo-fascists, arguing that such votes will be wasted unless
they go to his party.
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The public preoccupation with violence inspired by
t e neo-fascists and other right-wingers is tending to obscure
perhaps greater responsibility on the part of left-wing extrem-
ists for the growing campaign violence. Few voices have been
raised against such violence from the left.
//The British pound dropped yesterday to close at
a record low of $1.7235 in confused and heavy trading. The Bank
of England apparently did not intervene to check the slide.//
//The heavy sterling sales yesterday followed
specu a ion that the British Miners' Union will reject the
government's new pay guidelines in the voting to be announced
next week.//
//We :believe, however, the miners will vote to
accept another round of wage restraints by a narrow margin. In
addition, a special Trades Union Congress meeting on June 16
is expected to approve the new wage guidelines by a substantial
vote, and this could give the pound a psychological boost.//
//The rise last week in the US prime lending rate
was a so a actor in the pound's decline, partially offsetting
the buoying effect of London's recent interest rate hikes.//
//Sterling has fallen 15 percent since it broke
through the $2.00 level in early March. T,ze Bank of England
has spent roughly $3 billion defending the pound since then,
and market analysts are increasingly questioning the Bank's
ability to stop a further decline. Figures released yesterday
indicate that London has already used almost half of the pro-
ceeds of an $806 million drawing from the International Mone-
tary Fund and a fo:r_eign currency borrowing of $235 million by
the public sector in May.//
//There is increasing speculation in the financial
market that the UK may be forced to take tougher economic ac-
tions, such as .further budget cuts. Labor's left wing, however,
has already dealt the government one embarrassing defeat over
spending cuts and could do so again if its views on social wel-
fare are ignored./,/
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//Sterling's decline will aggravate British infla-
ion, a rea y rising at a 14-percent annual rate--about twice
the average for other major developed countries.
//The European Community Commission, anticipat-
ing further demand for loans from the $3-billion EC cammon
borrowing facility, is planning to raise the $700 million that
has not yet been loaned to member states.//
//The EC is looking to the New York market be-
cause of -the relatively favorable interest rates available
there. The Commission also plans to ask the EC Council within
the next few months to increase the common borrowing facility's
limit to $6 billion.//
//The Commission expects that Italy will be a
major beneficiary of any new .loans from the facility. Italy
lacks adequate medium-term funds to cover its potential foreign
exchange needs, and last month arranged a l.l-billion short-term
credit from the EC and the Bank for International Settlements.
Commission officials believe Italy wants assurance that medium-
term funds will be available to cover repayment before using
these funds.//
/It is uncertain whether the EC members will go
along with an additional large loan for Italy. Member attitudes
will inevitably be influenced by the political composition of
the government that emerges from next month's national election.//
/The Community in any event would again make any
new loan conditional upon Italy's agreement to impose tough
austerity measures. Although the EC called for such conditions
before, it is probable that it would seek firmer commitments
from Rome than it has in the past.//
//Italy also has $500 million in short-term credit
outstanding to the US Federal Reserve Bank. Rome's $2-billion
fold-backed loan from West Germany comes due this September.
Bank officials in Bonn are considerin convertin it to a long-
term loan.
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//Israel is going ahead with production of the
in igenous y designed main battle tank, the Chariot. According
to the U5 army attache in Tel Aviv, the first series production
model will be completed early next year.//
//Some problems were noted during the testing of
prototypes, but Israeli defense officials apparently believe they
can be overcome.//
//The attache estimates that Israel could produce
40 Chariots in the first full year of production, but he be-
lieves that financial restrictions probably will cut the first
year's output to about half that. Under full production, up to
120 of the new "tanks could be produced each year.//
//The design of the Chariot incorporates some
innovations to improve its survivability, but it is primarily
based upon technology of the 1950s. It is larger than most mod-
ern Soviet and Western main battle tanks. It weighs about 56
metric tons and has a British-designed 150-mm. gun, which is
standard on most Israeli tanks. The Chariot can travel at 51
kilometers per hour (32 miles per hour), equipped with a 900
horsepower engine.//
//The new tank will supplement Israel's mixed armor
force of nearly 3,200 US-, Soviet-, and British-built tanks.
Over the next several years, most Chariots will probably replace
some of Israel's World War II-vinta e Sherman tanks and captured
Soviet tanks.
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Top ecret
(Security Classification)
1
Top Secret
sra . elease 2007/03/08 :CIA-RDP79T00975A029000010006-3
(Security assi ica ion