NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029000010002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 1, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

s 7
AppRc0 j MQ- Release 2006/03/17
CIA-RDP79T00975AO29000P ?S-ecret 40i
(Security Classification)
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPA
RE REPLY
APPROVAL -
F--I
-DISPATCH I
I
RECOM
MENDATION
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:
1 0
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Tuesday June 1, 1976 CI NIDC 76-128C
1 0
1 0
DIA review(s) completed.
I. w
0
25
1
1
0
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
0
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
AMEMA
Top Secret 25X1
0
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A02900001
002-7 --1
J
0
 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29000010002-7
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29000010002-7
 Approved For R$Iease 2006/03/17: CIA-RDP79T00975AO
National Intelligence Daily Cable for Tuesday June 1 1976.
The NID Cable is for the purpose
o in orming senior officials.
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO290QO010002-7
 Approved Fort
Fighting increased sharply in Beirut and in northern
ana eastern Lebanon over the weekend, threatening to derail
even the limited progress that president-elect Sarkis has
made in arranging "roundtable" talks among leaders of the war-
ring factions.
The Muslim dissidents' "Lebanese Arab Army" mounted
heavy attacks on the northern Christian villages of Qubayyat
and Andaqat.
Leftist and Palestinian leaders in Beirut condemned
ut cou not stop the action, which they claimed was carried
out by a Lebanese officer sympathetic to Damascus in order to
justify increased Syrian military intervention in Lebanon.
Additional Syrian armored units--at least a battalion,
y a brigade--did move into the northern border area over
the weekend. Late Sunday some of these units were observed
just east of the Arida salient on the highway between :Rims
and Tartus.
The Syrian force almost certainly was drawn from the
Syrian 3rd Armored Division
saw what may have been
ni s o e same convoy heading north from the division's
headquarters at Al Qutayfah early Sunday.
Approved ForiRelease 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A029000010002-7
 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975,~029000010002-7
Right-wing Christian forces--mostly those controlled
by National Liberal leader Camille Shamun--have responded to
the Muslim attacks by shelling isolated Muslim villages far-
ther south, renewing their attacks near Zahlah in eastern Leb-
anon, and shelling nearly all Palestinian refugee camps in Bei-
rut.
The Christian reaction has been so severe that it ap-
pears almost certainly designed more to force Sarkis to ask
for additional Syrian troops than to counter leftist and Mus-
lim military initiatives.
The immediate effect of the Christian attacks, however,
was to prompt forces from Fatah, the largest fedayeen group,
to intensify their involvement in the clashes and to launch
several long-distance 122-mm. rockets at the Christian port of
Juniyah, north of Beirut.
Sarkis has been forced by the surge of fighting to
interrupt his political consultations, but the fighting so
far has not led any of the leading politicians to reject
his attempts at reconciliation. Sarkis' meeting with Jumblatt,
cancelled after Jumblatt's sister was murdered last week, ap-
parently will be held this week if security conditions permit.
On Sunday Sarkis sent a message to Arab League Secretary
Genera Riad parrying the latter's proposal for a general
Arab conference on Lebanon. Although Sarkis said he could not
make a decision on such a matter until after being installed
as president, his reply is in fact a rejection. It is
another reflection of his and Syria's unwillingness to allow
other foreign parties to play a central role in resolving
the crisis.
Damascus is again involved in a round of consultations
to consider its strategy in Lebanon. The leader of the Lebanese
arm of the Syrian Baath Party was in Damascus on Sunday, and
a delegation of Phalangist leaders is scheduled to arrive there
today.
I iPhalangist chief Jumayyil supports active Syrian in-
erven ion in Lebanon, but may have offended Damascus over the
weekend by urging the Soviets, on the occasion of Premier
Kosygin's visit to the area, to "undertake a positive role"
in seeking a resolution.
Approved Fpr Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T009f75A029000010002-7
 Approved For
A Lebanese Communist Party leader drew attention to
strains between Syria and the USSR on Sunday by claiming
publicly that Moscow opposes Syrian military intervention in
Lebanon.
I Soviet Premier Kosygin begins a hastily arranged
trouble s ooting mission in Damascus today.
I Kosygin has just completed a similar visit to Iraq,
ere preliminary signs are that he was only partially
successful. Talks between the Soviets and the Iraqis were
described as "cordial and frank," a good indication that not
all problems were resolved.
In recent months, Moscow has become increasingly
concerned-over both Syria's and Iraq's growing ties with the
West, and with the way both countries have been treating their
Communist parties.
The Soviets are also displeased with the failure of
either government to support Soviet calls for reconvening the
Middle East peace conference at Geneva and to denounce
Egypt for abrogating its treaty with the USSR.
I IWith Syria, there are additional problems stemming
rom amascus' failure to consult fully with Moscow about
Syrian policy on Lebanon, its reported request for debt
rescheduling, its friction with Soviet military advisers, and
its apparent unwillingness to grant the Soviets all the
additional access they seek to Syrian ports since the Soviet
navy's withdrawal from Egypt.
Kosygin surely is not sanguine about his prospects
tor success but probably hopes to be able to alleviate some
frictions and check the downward trend in Soviet relations
with both Syria and Iraq.
The Soviet premier may also seek to mediate the recent
problem that has arisen between Syria and Ira over Ira 's
cessation of oil shipments through Syria.
25X1
Approvedi For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00974AO29000010002-7
 Approved F
//Icelandic Foreign Minister Agustsson, Fisheries
Minister Bjarnason, and British Foreign Secretary Crosland
met in Oslo yesterday to begin negotiations designed to end
the "cod war."//
//The ministers say they have made some progress
on Monday, and they hope to wrap up negotiations by tomorrow.//
//The talks were made possible when London accepted
the Icelandic precondition that British frigates leave Ice-
land's unilaterally proclaimed 371-kilometer (200-mile) terri-
torial waters. London has also ordered British trawlers near
Iceland to cease fishing while the talks are taking place.//
//The two sides reportedly will negotiate a
six-montn. Interim agreement that will permit 24 British trawlers
to operate within the 371-kilometer zone and to fish within
35-55 kilometers of the Icelandic coast. The British vessels
will be obligated to respect Iceland's conservation areas.//
//Such an agreement would, lead to an improvement
in bilateral relations and could lead to a restoration of
diplomatic ties.//
//The two sides are in effect only buying time,
however, and it is unclear what will happen when the interim
agreement expires on December 1.
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975 029000010002-7
 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29000010002-7
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29000010002-7
 Approved Tor Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T009754029000010002-7
//The Tanzanian and Zambian governments are a
-
p
parently uneasy over their bilateral relations with the USSR.
Both governments are seeking to restrict direct involvement by
non-African states with the Rhodesian guerrillas. Soviet suc-
cesses in Angola have probably increased their qualms about
Moscow's intentions in southern Africa, although Tanzania, at
first favored Soviet aid to the Popular Movement during the
civil war.//
//Dar es Salaam's suspicions have apparently
sharpened in the past few months following the arrival of a 50-
man Soviet advisory team to survey and set up a Soviet-supplied
air defense system.//
Approved Fir Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79TOP0975AO29000010002-7
 Approved Fob
I //The Soviets have delivered some $5 million
worth of-equipment to Tanzania
//Tanzania accepts the Soviets as fellow social-
ists and o icially welcomes their aid to nationalist guerrillas
in southern Africa. President Nyerere, however, regards the
USSR as a great power whose sympathies with the third world,
especially Africa, are suspect. China, Tanzania's closest
communist friend and a major source of arms, has undoubtedly
encouraged this view.//
ambia badly needs the technical personne and
other assistance Moscow provides, and Kaunda is unlikely to end
the aid relationship.
//Ambassadors from the nine EC and 20 Arab League
states, along with representatives of the Palestine Liberation
Organization, recently agreed in Luxembourg to undertake several
rather modest--but nonetheless important--steps to expand and
intensify economic ties.//
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975,~029000010002-7
 Approved IFor Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A029p00010002-7 25X1
//Permanent committees were set up to monitor coop-
erative e orts in agriculture, industry, government services,
finance, trade, science and technology, and cultural and labor
matters.//
//They agreed to concentrate initially on projects
in areas such as telecommunications, vocational training, trade
promotion, foreign investment, port congestion, and agricultural
development. Only limited progress was made on the more complex
issues of trade diversification, benefits for migrant Arab work-
ers, the transfer of technology, and financial cooperation.//
//The EC avoided a divisive political debate on the
Middle East at the three-day conference, and the Arabs came
away satisfied that they had succeeded, at least partially, in
enhancing the political character of the dialogue since inten-
sive and generally constructive exchanges had dominated informal
conversation in Luxembourg.//
//The PLO representative, speaking for the Arabs,
surprised the EC delegates by inviting the Nine to play a role
in the Middle East commensurate with the community's prestige
and economic power.//
//The next session of the dialogue will be held in
an Arab capital later this year, and the Arabs will robabl ask
that it be convened at the ministerial level.
//The UK's annual economic growth rate may not
reach the government's projected 4.0 percent through mid-1977
if interest rates continue to rise. Last week the Bank of
England raised interest rates for the second time within a
month. The minimum lending rate now stands at 11.5 percent,
2.5 percent higher than the April level. There is some specu-
lation that the rate may soon be increased by another 0.5
percent, equalling last October levels.//
Approved) For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T009175A029000010002-7
 Approved Fclr Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T0097PA029000010002-7
//The Bank's decision came on the heels of renewed
downward pressure on sterling. The interest rate increase may
stem the flow of funds out of Britain, provided foreign interest
rates remain unchanged, but it will discourage domestic business
and consumer borrowing, particularly if mortgage and other long-
term rates also rise.//
//Manufacturing investment fell by 13.5 percent in
1975. It was expected to fall by an additional 5 to 8 percent
this year, but we now think an even larger drop may be in the
offing. Consumer spending may not increase because of the higher
interest rates and depressed real incomes.//
//Real output rose by 1.1 percent during the first
quarter o this year as a result of increased consumer expendi-
tures and a surprisingly large improvement in the trade bal-
ance. This is slightly better than the last quarter of 1975.
The continuing rise in interest rates is likely to slow further
growth this year and into 1977.//
//The low growth rate will make it more difficult
to reduce unemployment, which is at a record high. On a season-
ally adjusted basis, total unemployment in early May stood at
1.25 million, up 16,300 from the previous month. This could
cause strains in the presently harmonious relationship between
the Labor government and the unions.//
//The left-wing of the trade union movement continues
to hammer away on the theme that the government is not doing
enough to bring down unemployment. Earlier this week, for ex-
ample, the leftists helped organize a "Day of Action" involving
protest marches by several thousand workers throughout the
country.//
Approved Fir Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T0097AA029000010002-7
 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29000010002-7
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29000010002-7
 Approved For
Mexican President Echeverria's disillusionment with
Cuba's Angolan policy has led him to cool Mexico's relations
Echeverria has been cautious, however, about publicly
expressing his displeasure with Havana. In late January he
called for ending all foreign intervention in Angola, but
avoided specific mention of Cuba. It was Castro--responding
to Echeverria's veiled criticism--who postponed the visit to
Mexico that had been scheduled to begin March 18.
The Mexicans were clearly relieved, but maintained
that the invitation remains open for later this year.
I Cuban Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs Carlos
Rafael Rodriguez arrived in Mexico last Wednesday and at a
press conference refused to confirm or deny whether the Castro
visit will take place. Echeverria has continued to welcome
other official Cuban delegations.
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0P9000010002-7
 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00974A029000010002-7
I Commercial ties and plans for technical cooperation
between the two countries have not been disturbed by the change
in diplomatic atmospherics.
--In late January, the first meeting of the Mexican-Cuban
commission on scientific and technical cooperation was held in
Havana.
--In early February, Mexico purchased 20 fishing boats from
--Later that month, a Cuban delegation visited Mexico
to sign an agreement calling for the joint investment of $6.4
million to build two sugar mills, one in Cuba and one in Mexico.
--Other agreements have been reached in the fields of
sugar production, iron, chemicals, and stainless steel.
--In early March, a group of Mexican industrialists
visited Cuba to sign a cooperation agreement between pharmaceu-
tical industries.
--Following the visit of a Mexican delegation to Cuba in
mid-May, the Mexican Foreign Trade Institute announced the sale
of $2.4-million worth of industrial and agricultural products
to Cuba.
I ICooperation continues in the fields of education and
culture as well. Mexico's secretary of public education visited
Cuba in mid-March. As a result of the visit, an agreement
was signed early this month on an exchange of programs in
education, culture, films, radio and television, architecture,
and sports.
I IAn important factor governing whether the Cubans can
u y restore the amity that existed with the Mexican govern-
ment before Angola is Havana's current diplomatic campaign to
convince world opinion that a timetable has been established
for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.
During his recent Mexican visit Rodriguez refused
,
however, to give public assurances about a Cuban withdrawal
from Angola. In fact, he told a group of newsmen that if a
withdrawal were to occur, it would be officially announced by
the Cuban and Angolan governments. 25X1
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79TOP0975A029000010002-7
 Approved F
anamanian-Cuban relations have recently cooled as
a result of Cuba's Angola adventure and an incident in
= Panama that heightened Panamanian suspicions about Cuban
intentions there.//
//In the wake of Cuba's Angola involvement
cleared by Torrijos.
the controlled Panamanian press published several articles cri-
tical of Havana's African role. The items were undoubtedly
//Panama's ties with Cuba also contributed
for a Latin American summit meeting in Panama in June foundered
after a number of Latin American leaders refused to attend
because Castro had been invited.//
o a diplomatic e arrassment for Torrijos. The General's plan
//Despite some uneasiness on the part of Torrijos
and his military colleagues about ultimate Cuban intentions,
the Panamanian leader is unlikely to allow relations with Cuba
to be disrupted. A break with Cuba would open him to charges
that he is bowing to Washington's wishes. It would also deprive
him of the advantage he thinks relations with Cuba give him
in placating the Panamanian left.//
Approved Fo
 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29000010002-7
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29000010002-7
 Approved ~
USSR-MOZAMBIQUE
Mozambican President Machel's visit to Moscow produced
little immediate support for his country's ailing economy.
/Machel signed contracts for medical aid, technical
services, an surveys to be funded under a $10-million credit
extended early in 1975.// Moscow may provide additional credits
once the studies are completed. The Soviet pledge so far repre-
sents less than 5 percent of the total world assistance com-
mitted to Mozambique since independence in 1975.
//China is the largest donor, offering $60 million--
over a quarter of the $205-million total. Aid from the West is
over $110 million, and an additional $25 million has been com-
mitted by Eastern Europe, OPEC, and other developing countries.//
Only small amounts id have been disbursed to date.
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00915A029000010002-7
 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29000010002-7
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29000010002-7
 Pr AV AV Adw AV Aar AV AV AV AV
7
proved For Release 2006/03/17 CIA-RDP79T00975AO29000010002-7
0 Top ecret
(Security Classification) 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
.0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
1.0
0
0 '0
0 Top Secret 0
(Security apssi ca ~ongr --Release 2006/03/17 :CIA-RDP79T00975A029000010002-7
0 law 'Aw ',~ IAW 'Aw 'Adw Iddw Adw 'Aw AA