NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028900010048-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2005
• Sequence Number: 48
• Publication Date: May 28, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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Friday May 28, 1976 CI NIDC 76-126C
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Friday May 28, 1976.
e NI Cable is or the purpose
ot in orm.ing senior US officials.
The murder in Lebanon yesterday of leftist leader
Kamal Jumblatt's sister has led to another postponement of
the critical meeting between Jumblatt and president-elect
Sarkis.
I Sarkis conferred with several other Muslim leftist
leaders yesterday after crossing the "no-man's land" between
the Christian and Muslim lines in Beirut, and had planned to
meet with Jumblatt last night.
I lIt is unclear what effect, if any, the killing by
unknown gunmen will have on Sarkis' mediation efforts. Jumblatt,
before going into seclusion at his estate just south of Beirut,
issued an appeal to his followers not to seek revenge.
Despite some sharp exchanges of artillery fire, the
undeclared truce generally appears to be holding, and both
Jumblatt and Christian Phalangist leaders have recently made
conciliatory gestures, raising hopes that the roundtable
discussions being promoted by Sarkis will come off.
25X1 I I A reputable Beirut newspaper reports that Jumblatt
has dropped his demand for the immediate withdrawal of Syrian
troops in favor of Sarkis' proposal for a gradual pull-out of
Syrian.forces.
I Phalanges leader Jumayyil, who has been a strong
advocate of greater Syrian involvement in Lebanese security
matters, has indicated in turn that he is prepared to negotiate
the establishment of a purely indigenous security force.
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French Proposal
Algeria has joined other Arab states in condemning
French President Giscard's proposal to send a peace-keeping
force to Lebanon. In parallel messages on Tuesday to nonaligned
heads of state and to presidents Asad and Sarkis and Palestine
Liberation Organization chairman Arafat, President Boumediene
characterized the French initiative as foreign intervention.
Boumediene warmly praised the efforts of Asad, Sarkis,
and Arafat to resolve the Lebanese crisis and urged them to
oppose threats of direct foreign military intervention.
According to diplomatic sources in Algiers, the Alge-
rians view the French proposal as an attempt to thwart their own
initiative in Lebanon. The Algerian press claims that Algeria,
Iraq, and Libya have been working in concert over the past
week to bring warring Lebanese factions to the conference table.
for f yan and Iraqi envoys visited Algiers.
Boumediene's messages were sent the same day that sen-
Boumediene's criticism probably also reflects the poor
,
state of Franco-Algerian ties. Relations have been marred by
the pro-Moroccan stance Paris has taken in the dispute over
Western Sahara, French unwillingness to meet Algerian demands
to renegotiate natural gas prices, Algiers' recent conviction
of three French engineers for engaging in "economic espionage,"
and the expulsion from France of some Algerian immigrant
workers.
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Rhodesian security forces recently killed two guer-
,
rillas about 65 kilometers (40 miles) northeast of Salisbury,
according to press reports.
This was the first such incident so close to the capi-
tal since the insurgency increased last January. A popular white
resort near the scene of the clash has closed because of the
security situation.
I ILast week, a white farmer and his son were killed and
another w ite farmer kidnaped and taken to Mozambique by guer-
rillas, according to press reports. White civilians have also
been ambushed in recent weeks on major roads in southern Rhodesia.
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Negotiations continue in Nairobi to break the deadlock
a the UN Conference on Trade and Development, which has
been meeting since early this month.
Although the conference is scheduled to end toda
y,
it may be extended through the weekend as the delegates
from 154 participating countries try to resolve contentious
commodity issues. Should the talks collapse, there might be
a reversion to the confrontation atmosphere that characterized
relations between the industrialized and developing countries
prior to the UN special session last fall.
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//Although rivalries within the insurgent leader-
1
ship have served (and will continue) to hinder effective action,
the Rhodesian insurgents' military capabilities have increased
over the past year.//
//--They are better armed and trained than ever before.
--Over the past year, the size of the combat ready insur-
gent force has doubled to about 3,500 men out of an estimated
total of 11,500 insurgents.
--The availability of sanctuary and base areas in Mozambique
since late 1975 and increased external logistical assistance
have improved insurgent infiltration and operational capabili-
ties.
--Tanzanian and Mozambican military forces are playing an
increasing role in support of the insurgency.//
//Although insurgent capabilities will almost cer-
ain y con inue to improve, the insurgents are likely to achieve
only limited military successes over the next year or so un-
less they receive extensive foreign combat assistance.//
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1//Rhodesian security forces are well trained and
equipped, and they are enhancing their counterinsurgency capa-
bility.//
//--Rhodesia will continue to mount cross-border, hot pur-
suit raids into Mozambique, at least until insurgent border se-
curity and air defense capabilities improve.
--Rhodesia will have to rely increasingly on blacks and
white mercenary personnel.
--Thus far there have been no signs of disloyalty among the
black security forces, but if the Rhodesian military situation
deteriorates, some blacks could begin to reconsider their posi-
tion.
--Rhodesian security forces will continue to depend on out-
side sources for military equipment, POL, spare parts, and am-
munition as well as on the continued movement of such supplies
through South Africa.//
//The level of insurgent activity will probably in-
crease, and more sophisticated equipment, particularly air de-
fense equipment in Mozambique, is likely to be used.//
//--Rhodesian security forces can probably cope with the
anticipated increases in insurgent activities over the next year
or so. But a significant spread of insurgency beyond the present
concentrations in the border areas or a substantial and sustained
increase in guerrilla activity would severely strain the army's
limited capabilities.
--Infiltration into Rhodesia from Zambia and Botswana
would even further disperse Rhodesia's limited manpower and
stretch its limited logistical system.
--Sophisticated air defense equipment in the border area
would take its toll on Rhodesia's slow flying, subsonic aircraft.
--Rhodesian security forces would be no match for a large
conventional military force with sophisticated ground equipment
and air support. F77 I
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I IUN Secretary General Waldheim announced yesterday that
Syria has agreed to another six-month extension of the mandate
for the UN observer force on the Golan Heights. Damascus re-
portedly has not attached any political conditions to its ap-
proval.
I According to UN Undersecretary General Urquhart,
Syria prefers that the Council's renewal resolution be
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patterned after one passed in November 1974. That resolution
took note of efforts to establish peace in the area and ex-
pressed concern over the prevailing state of tension.
The Syrians reportedly have asked that the forthcoming
Council resolution depart from the earlier one by omitting
reference to the 1974 Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement.
Damascus presumably wants to avoid an indirect en-
dorsement of step-by-step negotiations, and to underscore its
contention that the UN force will remain on Syrian territory at
Syria's sufferance and not as a result of any legal commitment.
The Israelis maintain that the presence of the ob-
server force is an integral part of the 1974 disengagement agree-
ment, and that renewal of the mandate is a simple technical ob-
ligation. They are not likely to contest Damascus' proposal to
omit mention of the disengagement accord. The resolution passed
last autumn contained no such reference.
I srael does not want to take any action that will
further establish the practice of repeatedly negotiating the
terms of the renewal.
Syrian President Asad's willingness to renew
the mandate in re urn only for a visit from Waldheim suggests
that his freedom to make foreign policy is not now significantly
restricted by extremists within the Baath Party.
I Cuba appears ready to open regularly scheduled air
service to several points in Africa, perhaps this summer.
he most likely destinations are the capita s
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of Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Angola. Havana
signed air agreements with Angola in mid-May, Guinea-Bissau in
early April, and Sierra Leone in February.
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The ninth East German party congress
which ended
,
Saturday, provided an unmistakable reminder to East Germans
that the party intends to enlarge its already predominant
role in all areas of society.
Continuity, security, heightened ideolo
ical
i
i
g
v
g
-
lance toward the West, and the problems of party organization
and youth were the principal themes. Party chief Honecker
stressed East Germany's unswerving loyalty to Moscow, insisted
that the two German states have separate identities, and une-
quivocally supported "proletarian internationalism," the term
the Soviets use to mean loyalty of each communist party to
Moscow.
The congress endorsed a new party program and th
e
government's economic plan for 1976 to 1980. The plan calls
for maintaining consumer price stability but makes clear that
any future rise in living standards will be closely tied to in-
creased productivity.
The Politburo was expanded and now has 19 full
b
mem
ers.
No one was removed from the ruling body, another mark of Hon-
ecker's emphasis on continuity and stability. The new members
reflect the party leader's decision to appoint experienced ad-
ministrators who already have exercised responsibility generally
as party chiefs in East Germany's administrative districts.
State security minister Erich Mielke was
r
t
d
p
omo
e
CO
full Politburo membership in a.clear demonstration of Honecker's
endorsement of the man in charge of the secret police.
The promotion of Berlin municipal part
lead
y
er Konrad
Naumann to the Politburo is in line with the importance of his
district and his skill as a political manager. Naumann has the
task of carrying out the party's ambitious plan to develop East
Berlin into a world capital over the next decade.
I I Egon Krenz, head of East Germany's youth organization,
was elected a Politburo candidate member. His selection illus-
trates Honecker's policy of using service in the youth organiza-
tion as a steppingstone to party leadership. Honecker once headed
that organization, and most of the current district arty leaders
began their careers in it. F77 r
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The OPEC oil ministers, concluding their first day of
discussions in Bali, reportedly have agreed to realign oil
price differentials based on a price scheme already used by
Algeria.
The Algerian plan makes use of current freight dif-
ferentials but bases quality differentials on variations in the
value of the products yielded by individual crudes in major
markets.
Discussions on a price increase and a new site for 25X1
the OPEC headquarters, currently in Vienna, are to take place
today. If these issues are resolved, the meeting may end today,
one day earlier than originally anticipated.
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The estimated dollar costs of Chinese military
procurement in 1975 rose some 12 percent over the almost
constant level of the preceding three years.
Procurement as used here is a measure of what it
would cost to reproduce the Chinese programs in the US. It
includes only the cost of producing military equipment, not
any costs associated with research, development, testing, and
evaluation, or those for facilities, personnel, operations,
and maintenance.
The estimated annual dollar costs of Chinese military
equipment have fluctuated sharply over the past 10 years. The
changing political situation has been partly responsible.
During 1967--the first full year of the Cultural Revolution--
military equipment procurement declined by about 25 percent to
$2.2 billion. When the Cultural Revolution ended and Sino-Soviet
tensions heightened, military procurement rose rapidly to a
level of almost $5.5 billion in 1971.
I In 1972, military procurement again declined, to
about. 3. billion, where it remained until it rose again
to about $3.6 billion last year. At present, Chinese military
procurement in dollars is less than one third that of the US,
and about one sixth of the estimated dollar cost of Soviet
procurement.
The major factor in both the magnitude and the
pattern o the estimated dollar costs has been the variation
of China's aircraft production. Between 1966 and 1975, procure-
ment of aircraft exceeded that for any other type weapon. Much
of the decline after 1971 resulted from a sharp drop in air-
craft production, but there was some slowdown in almost all of
the Chinese weapons procurement programs.
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The distinct rise in estimated procurement costs in
1975--although the level is still much below the 1971 peak--was
caused largely by procurement of more costly aircraft and by
some increase in ship production.
China's past history of sudden bursts and reductions
in defense production makes it difficult to judge whether the
upturn in 1975 is a temporary phenomenon or the beginning of a
long-term trend. Over the next several years, as the Chinese
begin to replace obsolescent equipment with more modern systems,
procurement costs can be expected to grow somewhat even if pro-
duction in terms of numbers of units does not increase. In 1975,
for example, the increased production costs of a few relatively
more modern and expensive weapon systems more than offset sav-
ings from the reduced productLn of older and cheaper weaponry.
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