NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028700010026-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: March 15, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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Too Secret
Bull w- =1
National Intelligence
Bulletin
Top Secret
N2 699
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
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 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin
March 15, 1976
CONTENTS
LEBANON: Franjiyah's
refusal to resign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
EGYPT-USSR: Sadat's call for
abrogation of friendship treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
IRAQ: Deepening differences
between Baathists and Communists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
EC-SPAIN-ITALY: Concern over
US decision to curtail shoe imports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
ANNEX: West Europeans Concerned
Over Developments in Southern Africa
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 15, 1976
President Franjiyah announced yesterday that he will not resign unless he is
impeached by parliament and convicted by a high court, as provided in the Lebanese
constitution. Franjiyah's aides have refused to receive a petition calling for his
resignation signed by more than two thirds of the members of parliament.
The President, who had earlier said he would step down if asked by parliament,
is in effect saying that he will not resign under any circumstances. The high court
required to try impeachment cases has never been created, and could not be
established without new legislation signed by the president.
Franjiyah is stalling in the hope that Brigadier Ahdab will in the end allow him
to stay on rather than risk the new round of heavy fighting that probably would
result from an extended political impasse or from a military move against the
presidential palace. The President is gambling that leaders of the large Christian
militias, who favor his "legal" removal, would help him resist a military assault out
of fear that Ahdab, a Muslim, would never get around to having parliament elect
another Christian president once Franjiyah had been forced out.
Ahdab is increasing the pressure on Franjiyah to resign, and on the politicians
to force him to do so, but he has not yet followed through on his premise to form a
"military command council" to govern in Franjiyah's stead. Ahdab did say on
Saturday that he considers Franjiyah "as having resigned" and threatened yesterday
that he will use force against him, although he did not say when he would take this
step.
Ahdab presumably realizes that the unstable alliance of political leaders
favoring Franjiyah's resignation will fall apart if parliament is unable to negotiate a
solution soon. He nevertheless has allowed the political talks to g) on this long
because of indications that the right-wing Christian political parties might back him,
because the military high command is divided on whether to take more forceful
action, and because Franjiyah commands sufficient forces to mount a vigorous
defense of the presidential palace that might expose Ahdab to be backed by fewer
troops than he claims.
In fact, the US defense attache in Beirut has learned that there are only some
300 regular Lebanese army troops guarding the palace, although they are augmented
by an unknown number of irregulars from Franjiyah's home town of Zagharta.
Despite press reports to the contrary, there are apparently no pro-Franjiyah units of
any significant size at army bases near the presidential palace.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 15, 1976
The chances for a military showdown increased last night, when the
pro-Franjiyah radio station broadcast apparently authentic statements by Phalangist
leader Jumayyil and National Liberal leader Shamun declaring that the President's
resignation would not "constitute a solution" to the crisis. Phalangist and National
Liberal deputies in parliament have so far refused to sign the petition calling for
Franjiyah's resignation.
Khatib's forces, which receive limited backing both from Fatah and the
fedayeen rejectionists, over the weekend occupied some government buildings in
Beirut. Jumblatt, who originally opposed the coup, is now saying that it provides an
opportunity to "change the system."
Syria is still hopeful that it can control the security situation in Lebanon and
promote or force a political solution, but is running out of options.
Syrian chief of staff Shihabi, in a talk with Ambassador Murphy on Saturday,
indicated that the Syrians do not believe that the Liberation Army will be adequate
to maintain security in Lebanon, and that Damascus sees no possibility that the
Lebanese army or internal security force can be put back together.
The postponement yesterday of President Asad's trip to Paris, scheduled to
begin today, underscores the seriousness with which Damascus views the situation in
Lebanon.
There are as yet no firm indications that Damascus intends to use Syrian
regular forces to impose a solution on the Lebanese. The US defense attache in
Damascus reported over the weekend, however, that at least one Syrian division-the
3rd Armored at Al Qutayfah-may have increased its state of readiness.
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March 15, 1976
The attache believes that the 3rd division would be the one most likely to be
used if the Syrians did intervene militarily in Lebanon. On a tour of the Damascus -
Al Qutayfah area on Saturday, the attache found no positive indications that this
unit was being readied for intervention, but he did observe some minor military
activity that could be considered unusual.
Asad presumably is still very reluctant to resort to such a high risk operation as
the use of Syrian regulars in Lebanon, and Shihabi made it clear that he was only
confiding his own disgust with the situation and was not suggesting what course of
action Asad would finally take. Asad almost certainly prefers to continue Syria's
efforts to press the Lebanese to reach a political accommodation;
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The dilemma for Asad is that he has staked considerable personal prestige on
achieving a successful Syrian mediation in Lebanon. He is concerned to preserve the
enhanced stature as an Arab leader that he has gained through his efforts to date,
and he wants to avoid giving additional ammunition to his critics, especially
President Sadat.
Thus the danger in the present situation is that Asad, despite his caution and
his desire not to provoke an Israeli reaction, could decide that some form of
intervention by Syrian regulars is a necessary risk to protect his heavy political
investment in Lebanon and to preserve his Arab leadership credentials.
The Israelis also face a dilemma in assessing the current situation. They
recognize that Syrian leverage is crucial to resolving the crisis, but are uncertain
about the security vacuum created in the sensitive southern border area by the
collapse of the Lebanese army.
Tel Aviv probably would respond to a substantial Syrian intervention,
especially in southern Lebanon. They might stay their hand, however, if the Syrians
confined themselves to northern Lebanon or the Beirut area. Even a limited Syrian
move, however, would be likely to trigger an increased Israeli alert and some
mobilization.
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i i ary au on ies in e viv reporte ate ast wee tat srae i forces in
the north had increased their alert and were watching developments in Lebanon
closely.
Egypt has remained unusually silent on the recent turn of events in Lebanon.
Cairo was reported late last year to have readied a contingency plan for military
intervention in Lebanon in the event of further deterioration, but almost certainly
will await further developments before taking any precipitate action.
It is unlikely that the Egyptians would move into Lebanon in the midst of their
current crisis with the Libyans and their diplomatic tangle with the Soviets. For the
moment, the Egyptians appear to be avoiding public comment that could stir up
further trouble or provoke Syria.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 15, 1976
President Sadat's call last night for the abrogation of the 1971 Egyptian-Soviet
friendship treaty indicates that he has finally written off any expectation of putting
his relations with Moscow on an even keel and will no longer make even a pretense
of maintaining a civil relationship.
The 15-year treaty itself is essentially a meaningless document-providing only
vaguely for "all-around cooperation" and for Soviet help to Egypt in "eliminating
the consequences of (Israeli) aggression"-it has, however, served as a symbol of
continued amity between the two states through the many upheavals in their
relations over the last five years.
Sadat did not specifically mention other agreements with the Soviets such as
the accord, scheduled to run through March 1978, that permits them the use of
naval repair facilities at Alexandria, but it seems entirely possible that abrogation of
this accord will follow. The friendship treaty and the port agreement are not directly
linked. The port agreement predates the treaty by three years, but the treaty has
provided a rationale for what Soviet presence remains in Egypt.
The Alexandria shipyard is the only major repair facility available to the Soviet
Mediterranean fleet. Although the Egyptians denied Soviet vessels access to other
Mediterranean ports last year, Sadat has thus far avoided tampering with the
Alexandria facility, presumably in the belief that his control over Soviet access there
might give him some leverage to press for a resumption of arms shipments.
Sadat seems now to have given up any hope that more arms will ever be
forthcoming, and he probably no longer believes that pressure on Moscow will be
fruitful. In fact, he seems to have concluded that the friendly gestures he has
recently made to Moscow will also be of no use in bringing Moscow around to a
more accommodating stance on the arms issue, and he is convinced that the Soviets
are now trying to bring him down.
Sadat has tried in recent months to make a tentative peace with the Soviets,
even to the point of publicly affirming that he had stopped the propaganda war with
them and of openly acknowledging that Soviet and Egyptian policy are in accord on
some issues.
Moscow's reply over the last month or so-which Sadat outlined in his speech
as the reason for abrogating the treaty-was to refuse further overhauling of MIG-21
engines and to refuse permission for India either to overhaul the engines or to
provide Egypt with aircraft spare parts. Because of this embargo, Sadat said last
night, all of Egypt's arms will become "scrap metal" within the next year or year
and a half.
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For the Soviets, Sadat's abrogation of the treaty will have important symbolic,
and perhaps practical, consequences. Moscow places more stock in such treaties than
their substance warrants; it regards a friendship treaty as a tangible expression of the
desire for, if not necessarily the fact of, a close and congenial relationship. Egypt's
abrogation will be seen not only as a declaration of present antipathy, but also as an
expression about future bilateral relations.
The Soviets will be discomfited by the fact that it was Sadat, not they, who
took the initiative and the abrogation will revive memories of the ignominious
expulsion of Soviet advisers from Egypt in 1972.
The Soviet leadership is almost certainly over how best to handle the
Egyptian situation. The hard-liners may argue that Sadat's action is further evidence
that the USSR cannot do business with him. They might even press for a sharp
retort, perhaps arguing that Sadat is further evidence trouble, and therefore if
Moscow remains unyielding, he will either come around or be replaced. Moscow's
perception of Sadat's political trouble may have prompted Soviet rejection to his
recent political overtures.
Those Soviet officials who have argued for a more flexible policy-and who
wanted to reschedule Egypt's debt repayment and resume some military aid will
counsel a waiting game. They can argue that thus far the inflexible policy has
widened the breach with Cairo without impairing Sadat or strengthening the USSR's
putative friends in Egypt.
The People's Assembly will meet tonight in Cairo to vote on the draft bill Sadat
has submitted abrogating the treaty. Assembly members gave Sadat a standing
ovation when he called for the abrogative, and the bill is thus expected to meet a
little opposition.
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March 15, 1976
Differences between Iraq's ruling Baath Party and the Communist Party have
deepened significantly in the last several months.
Communist leaders fear a split within their party unless the Baathists increase
the Communists' role in the government. The Baathists, however, have no intention
of granting concessions and are continuing to suppress Communist activity.
In the past, Baathist tolerance of the Communists has been a matter of
expediency designed in part to mollify the Soviets, whose military support was
essential for operations against the Kurdish dissidents. With the collapse of the
Kurdish rebellion last March, however, the Baathists acted to reduce Communist
influence.
Following the Iranian-Iraqi accord signed last March, the Communist Party
began to lose members-especially younger ones-and suffered a decline in morale.
The Baathists also intensified their efforts to eliminate Communists from senior jobs
in the civil service and from teaching positions.
The Communists had cooperated with the Baathists, primarily out of fear of
damaging reprisals. Communist leaders now realize that the ruling party intends to
continue trying to undermine their party in order to eliminate a potential
competitor. The Communist Party is now under internal pressure to take a hard
stand against Baathist moves and, as a result, has begun to strengthen its covert
organization.
Despite the Communists' awareness of Baathist intentions, there is little they
can do to stop the Baath Party's drive to undermine their party. The demonstration
of force last month by the Baathist People's Army, together with its control of the
armed forces, precludes a military challenge by the Communists. Since the Baath
Party will continue to refuse meaningful concessions to the Communists, the
Communists face a bleak future.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 15, 1976
Spanish and Italian officials, in their continuing attempts to head off a US
decision to curtail shoe imports, are now stressing possible political repercussions as
well as familiar economic arguments.
Italian officials suggest that such a move by the US would hurt the ruling
Christian Democratic Party in the event of national elections and, on the heels of the
Lockheed and CIA controversies, would increase public criticism of the US.
The Spanish minister of industry has publicly linked the shoe import issue to
ratification of the recently negotiated US-Spanish treaty of friendship and
cooperation, which has drawn fire from some politicians on the left and right. US
import restrictions would focus attention on the treaty, infusing the issue with
nationalist sentiment and intensifying current economic concerns.
The Spanish minister of commerce has told the US embassy that a US decision
to curtail imports would increase unemployment at a time when Spain is
experiencing its worst recession in 40 years. This would, he said, cause further labor
unrest and jeopardize an orderly evolution toward political liberalization. The
minister noted that Spain's shoe manufacturing industry is concentrated in areas
that have so far been free of labor unrest.
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March 15, 1976
West Europeans Concerned Over Developments in Southern Africa
West European governments are increasingly concerned over developments in
southern Africa. The EC will meet this week to discuss the implications of Soviet
and Cuban involvement and NATO will take up the matter in a regularly scheduled
session now set for March 24.
The EC's response to events in southern Africa had until recently been muted,
largely because of French reluctance to participate in any concerted action that
could undermine Paris' own standing with the black African states. West Germany
and the UK, however, are pushing hard for a common policy, on the grounds that
action must be taken now if there is to be any chance of checking Soviet and Cuban
influence.
In NATO, Paris has taken advantage of West European reluctance to involve the
Alliance directly to block proposals for special political consultations.
Angola
All EC members have recognized the Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola. EC member states are likely to increase their aid, since all nine consider
Agostinho Neto a genuine nationalist who desires assistance from Western Europe in
order to reduce his dependence on the USSR.
While the Nine recognize the Soviet and Cuban presence as a fait accompli,
they discount the possibility of a major clash between Cuban and South African
troops anytime soon. They believe the new government will for some time be
preoccupied with internal problems.
Even though the EC recognizes it has a major stake in developments in South
Africa and Rhodesia, only the UK has made an effort to use its influence there.
EC leaders have only cautiously supported London's efforts to convince
Salisbury to modify its policy. UK officials fear that time is running out, however,
and they hope the EC can soon develop a common position on Rhodesia that would
strengthen Prime Minister Wilson's hand in dealing with Prime Minister Smith's
government.
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Despite the French role as the principal supplier of arms to South Africa, Paris
does not appear to have tried to influence the Vorster government on issues
affecting southern Africa. French President Giscard announced a cutback in arms
sales to Pretoria last fall, but this was intended primarily to counter domestic
criticism and further cement French ties to the black French-speaking states. The
West Germans also have tried to deemphasize their significant commercial
relationship with South Africa over the past year.
South Africa has asked NATO to issue a demarche calling on Pretoria to
withdraw from Angola, apparently to enable Prime Minister Vorster's government to
save face at home should it decide to pull out its troops. NATO is not likely to
accede to Pretoria's request because it regards southern Africa as beyond its sphere
of activity. Moreover, most of the allies are reluctant at this time to go beyond an
exchange of views within the NATO forum.
The EC, on the other hand, agreed last week to issue a low-key, confidential
demarche urging Pretoria to withdraw its troops from southern Angola immediately.
The Nine also plan to suggest that Prime Minister Vorster attempt a conciliation
with Neto on the grounds that the threatened spread of hostilities in the area must
be reduced.
Pretoria will also be told that France and the UK do not intend to veto a
resolution condemning the South African presence in Angola should one come
before the UN Security Council. London, in fact, has indicated it might even vote in
favor of a resolution condemning South Africa alone.
Several black African states are expected to raise a question this week in
conjunction with a Security Council debate called to consider compensation to
Mozambique for imposing sanctions on Rhodesia. The West Europeans and some
African states are working to postpone UN consideration of the Angolan issue from
this month until May.
The EC's important trade relationship with South Africa might cause the UK
and France to reconsider their anti-veto stance should the Security Council call for
economic sanctions against Pretoria. Nevertheless, sentiment is growing within the
Community to take strong action if Rhodesian obstinacy and South African
complicity continue.
The Nine have decided against a public objection to the presence of Cuban and
Soviet military personnel in Angola. They feel their declaration last month
condemning the presence of all foreign troops in Angola was sufficient.
France, in particular, has refused to condemn the Soviet and Cuban roles,
presumably out of concern that such a decision would undermine its policy of
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developing strong ties to former French and Portuguese colonies. Another major
consideration is Paris' desire to obtain security guarantees from certain African
states for the Territory of Afars and Issas when it becomes independer t.
Community Assistance
EC members plan to increase financial and economic assistance to black
governments in southern Africa to help counter Soviet influence. Zainbia and Zaire
will be the principal recipients, and efforts are being made to balance the program
with assistance to Angola. Some EC members strongly favor providing aid to
Mozambique as well and would support the creation of a special fund to compensate
Mozambique for imposing sanctions against Rhodesia.
West Germany recently expanded its aid program to the region, notably with a
$14-million capital and commodity loan to Zambia. The UK is planning a
$10-million capital loan to Lusaka, as well as grants for Zaire and Ancola that could
total $4 million.
Both London and Bonn are pushing for a substantial EC aid commitment to
complement these efforts. Most EC members, including France, seem receptive, and
a decision is likely by next month.
The Community will probably agree shortly to an emergency humanitarian
relief program for Zaire and Angola. Meanwhile, the EC Commission is studying
other means to step up multilateral aid to Zaire, Zambia, and Angola, concentrating
on food aid and efforts to keep the Benguela railway open.
The Nine foresee additional assistance channeled to Angola, and possibly
Mozambique, as soon as these countries join the Lome Convention-the preferential
trade and aid accord linking 46 developing, primarily African, states to the EC.
Angola is likely to apply to the Convention in early April, and West Germany and
Italy will probably push for a favorable and rapid Community response.
Bonn and London have tried to focus the EC's attention on Western Sahara in
the hope of avoiding a repetition of the embarrassing disarray in the EC caused by
France's haste to recognize Angola. Although both Morocco and Algeria have been
trying to enlist EC support, the Nine are unlikely to formulate a common policy
soon.
Most EC members have maintained a balanced position on Western Sahara. This
need for evenhandedness was reflected in the Community's recent decision to
renegotiate parts of its trade and aid accords with the Maghreb states.
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France, once again out of step with its partners, favors the Moroccan position,
although it wants to preserve its ties with Algiers. Paris has agreed, thus far at least,
only to allow a group of EC political experts to study the issue and come up with
recommendations.
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