NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028700010006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 3, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
Top Secret
N2 678
DIA & DOS review(s) completed.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 3, 1976
PORTUGAL: Disagreement
among top military officers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
USSR: Treatment of differences
arising at party congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
CHINA: Teng's status
still unresolved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
WESTERN EUROPE: Representatives
at Soviet party congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
EASTERN EUROPE: Diversity noted
in speeches at Soviet congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
DENMARK: Tightening of foreign
naval and aircraft access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
ITALY: Socialist party
congress begins today . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
MIDDLE EAST: Fatah-Syria rivalry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
MOROCCO-ALGERIA-SAHARA: Possible new
military operations against Polisario Front . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
MOROCCO: King Hassan's position
on his 15th anniversary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
SOUTH AFRICA: Preparations for possible
Mozambique-Angola insurgent threat . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . 15
USSR: Impact of harvest failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 3, 1976
A bitter disagreement among Portugal's top military officers could foreshadow
an open split between left- and right-wing factions in the Revolutionary Council.
Conservative newspapers yesterday published a strong attack by air force Chief
of Staff Morais da Silva on President Costa Gomes and Foreign Minister Melo
Antunes, both left-leaning members of the Council. The criticism focused on the
role played by the President and foreign minister in gaining recognition for the
Soviet-backed government of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.
The Revolutionary Council remained deadlocked on this issue for weeks before
authorizing Costa Gomes to extend recognition. In his speech, Morals da Silva
publicly disassociated the air force from the President's action.
Criticism of Melo Antunes also appears to have been prompted by the foreign
minister's recent efforts to tout army Chief of Staff Ramalho Eanes as the military
candidate for the presidency. The air force chief denounced attempts to present an
"armed forces candidate" as "paternalistic" and said such a move would provoke a
deep split in the armed forces. Earlier, Prime Minister Azevedo, another leading
contender for the presidency announced he would not run as a "military" candidate.
Morais da Silva also warned that unnamed left-wing forces, rather than "wait to
be routed at the ballot box," might foment a coup attempt from the right, and then
put it down by a well-prepared counter-coup. He offered no evidence for such a
plot, but abortive coups have shifted the political momentum in Portugal twice in
the past 12 months.
Council members until now have papered over their differences in order to
present a united front against the communists and the far left. Morais da Silva's
attack may mean that such bitter controversies as that over Angola have now made
unity impossible. Rightist officers may have decided to press for the removal of
Costa Gomes and Melo Antunes now, even though the coming elections are expected
to sweep both of them from power.
If the air force chief is being used as an agent of change, he has good
credentials. He was the first top military figure to call for the removal of former
prime minister Goncalves last summer and had a hand in the removal of former
security chief Otelo de Carvalho.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 3, 1976
Events at the Soviet party congress have confirmed the growing distance
between Moscow and the significant West European communist parties on such
benchmark issues as "Maoism" and "proletarian internationalism"-the catchword
for Moscow's primacy in the communist movement. The public display of
differences clearly came as no surprise to the Soviets, and rather than fighting the
independents head-on, the Soviets appear determined to do what they can to
minimize the differences and avoid any sense of irreversible estrangement.
The Soviets have not tried to conceal the existence of this dispute. They have
reported the speeches of both sycophants and independents, and Brezhnev has met
with both Cunhal of Portugal and Berlinguer of Italy, who respectively epitomize
extreme examples of the two tendencies. Pravda even put a photo of the
Brezhnev-Berlinguer meeting on its front page. The Soviets can thus make a plausible
case that they have treated everyone with something like even-handedness.
At the same time, the Soviets-beginning with Brezhnev's opening speech-have
not hesitated to make their own views clear. Their reaction to the various shades of
opinion has been made evident in the congress "applause meter"-the frequency and
duration of applause for each speaker.
The emphasis placed by the Soviets and their sycophants on the dangers of
"Maoism" suggests that the Soviets want to avoid a proliferation of ideological
factions so they can concentrate on one enemy at a time. The Soviets do not want
to revive the image of themselves as a beleaguered giant, lashing out at heretics and
traitors on all sides, an image that would clash with the positive mood they are
trying to create at the congress.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 3, 1976
The Chinese leadership still seems locked in a struggle over how to resolve the
status of Teng Hsiao-ping. This impasse is reflected in conflicting signals from
Peking.
An article in People's Daily on February 29, co-authored by the authoritative
political commentator, Liang Hsiao, marked an escalation of the attacks on Teng.
The article, while not identifying the "capitalist roader" it attacked, cited one of
Teng's well-known statements, thus leaving no doubt who the target was. Several
provincial radio broadcasts since then have also used this formula.
Political wall posters attacking Teng appearing in the streets of Peking still do
not use his name, but posters attacking Teng by name have appeared in universities
in Peking and in several provinces. Some provincial officials who, like Teng, were
brought back from political disgrace after the Cultural Revolution, are also being
criticized by name in provincial posters. Moreover, those Chinese leaders most likely
to be supporting Teng are not making public appearances, but those who are
probably among his main opponents have appeared frequently.
The attacks on Teng, whether indirect or explicit, have thus far stopped short
of calling for his removal from office; significantly also, Teng's brother appeared in
public on February 23. The People's Daily article of February 29 stated that the
pro-Teng forces in the party "have enormous power in their hands" and
"congratulate each other," suggesting that Teng's current status may be less bleak
than it appears on the surface. Some officials abroad have said Peking has sent no
official guidance on the Teng Hsiao-ping question-an indication that Teng's enemies
have not yet fully had their way with him.
In contrast to earlier statements that Teng retained his party, government, and
military posts, Chinese officials late last week ducked the issue with statements of
"no comment." On March 1, however, a Defense Ministry spokesman said there had
been no personnel changes in the army's leadership, indicating Teng still holds the
title of chief of staff. This would suggest that he also continues to hold his other
important party and government titles. Moreover, the spokesman again denied the
existence of a directive announcing the replacement of the defense minister, a man
who presumably is supporting Teng. Whether Teng is actually exercising authority in
his various positions, however, is far from clear.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 3, 1976
The importation of foreign technology has long been a subject of debate in the
leadership even before Teng Hsiao-ping returned to power. Some leaders seem
concerned that China will become overly reliant on foreign countries, but Teng
Hsiao-ping and others in the leadership support the current policy of purchasing
technology from abroad. An attack in People's Daily on those who seek to
modernize China's economy by "asking foreign countries for assistance" suggests
that the foreign trade policy-and the larger question of rapid modernization raised
by Chou En-lai in January 1975-is indeed at issue and that, depending on the
outcome of the current leadership struggle, some adjustments in the current
economic plan may be made.
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 3, 1976
Speeches by delegates from major West European Communist parties at the
Soviet party congress have reflected the West Europeans' growing disposition to
dissociate themselves from Moscow's style of communist rule.
The West Europeans stressed their own parties' national identity and the need
to form alliances with non-communist forces. They played down the international
aspects of communism and the Soviet leadership role. The standard condemnations
of anti-Sovietism, for example, were not made by the Italian, French, or Spanish
delegates.
The Italians were the most heretical. Party leader Enrico Berlinguer emphasized
that his party's autonomy was the reason it had captured the support of an
increasing number of Italian voters.
The congratulations Berlinguer offered to the Soviets for their progress on
East-West issues were marred by his failure to express full "solidarity" with the
Soviet party, as he did at the last Soviet congress in 1971.
He also implied that his own party's acceptance of certain features of Italian
foreign policy-including membership in NATO-had contributed toward better
East-West relations. The same passage also suggested that Italy's "international
alliances" help protect the Italian people from "foreign interference." By not
specifically mentioning the US in this regard, Berlinguer was ambiguous enough for
his audience to conclude that he was talking about both the US and the USSR.
In an apparent attempt to improve the atmosphere between the two parties,
General Secretary Brezhnev met with Berlingueron Monday. The two leaders issued a
joint statement recognizing the need for international cooperation and mutual
respect for each party's autonomy. The full statement is not available, but an Italian
spokesman said differences of opinion were evident in the talks.
The French Communist Party reinforced the independent line taken at its own
congress last month by not sending party chief Georges Marchais to Moscow. It was
the first time the leader of the party has not attended a Soviet congress.
His substitute, French Politburo member Gaston Plissonnier, did not, as
Marchais did last month, accuse the Soviets of abusing human rights, but he called
for guarantees for individual and collective freedom and defended "French-style
socialism."
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 3, 1976
Plissonnier criticized the Soviets for being too lenient on Giscard's foreign
policy, which the French Communists see as being more Atlanticist than that of his
Gaullist predecessors. By raising this issue, the French party is again indicating that
it expects Moscow to halt what it sees as interference in French politics designed to
bolster the French left's opponents.
Plissonnier made clear that while the French Communists are aiming for more
independence in their domestic activities, they are not renouncing cooperation with
Moscow on foreign policy issues. He pointed out, however, that "proletarian
internationalism" no longer means that the Soviets can expect acceptance of their
interests as the common good at the expense of the interests of the other parties.
Spanish party leader Santiago Carrillo attended a meeting of Spanish and
Italian leftists in Rome rather than the Moscow conclave. Dolores Ibarruri, who has
been in exile in Moscow as honorary president of the Spanish Communist Party,
delivered the Spanish address to the congress. She gave only a lukewarm
endorsement of the Soviet party in contrast to her laudatory remarks in 1971, when
she praised it as the "vanguard in the world's advance toward socialism."
Portugal's party chief Cunhal gave a more traditional performance. He pledged
the eternal friendship of the Portuguese party and insisted that Moscow's leadership
is essential for the world communist movement. Anticipating his continued loyalty,
the Soviets scheduled Cunhal as the first West European speaker on the second day
of the congress. In 1971, Cunhal spoke on the tenth day.
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 3, 1976
Speeches by the East European leaders at the Soviet party congress highlight
the political differences that exist in the "socialist camp."
The Bulgarian, East German, and Czechoslovak spokesmen continued to court
Moscow's favor by stressing across-the-board fidelity. The Hungarians still rely on
their ability to extract both Soviet economic assistance and a degree of tolerance of
their domestic policies in return for faithfully following Moscow's lead in foreign
policy.
The remarks of the Polish, Romanian, and Yugoslav delegates reflected their
particular national circumstances. Poland, for example, has carved out a special
position for itself as the "second" socialist state; Romania remains impudent enough
to stand alone; and Yugoslavia, not a member of the Soviet alliance system, rarely
hesitates to voice its disagreements with Moscow.
Poland's Gierek said most of the right things at the congress, including
endorsement of the European and world Communist conferences, but paid only
slight attention to ideology. Instead, he stressed the amalgam between socialism and
national interests and traditions that the Poles claim to have achieved.
He also called for "common action with other democratic movements," a
formulation included in other East European speeches only by Romania's Ceausescu
and Yugoslavia's Dolanc.
Speeches by Ceausescu and by Stane Dolanc, Tito's number-two man in the
party, closely resembled each other both in structure and content. The similarity of
their speeches strongly suggests that the two men completed coordination of their
views on February 25, when Ceausescu talked with the entire Yugoslav delegation at
the Romanian embassy in Moscow.
The Romanian and the Yugoslav speakers had some cautiously optimistic
words for bilateral relations with Moscow. Throughout their speeches, however, they
emphasized the right of each party and state to develop its political line
independently and in a "creative" manner. This emphasis-together with their
downgrading of proletarian internationalism, the codeword for Soviet leadership of
world communism-was designed to undercut Moscow's pretensions to hegemony.
Dolanc and Ceausescu praised nonalignment, a topic Brezhnev had only lightly
touched on. Furthermore, Dolanc chose to use the congress to assert that it was the
Yugoslavs themselves-not the Red Army-who had liberated Yugoslavia during
World War II. Although he acknowledged that the Soviets had made the "decisive
contribution" to the overall victory in Europe, Dolanc quickly added that the
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 3, 1976
Yugoslav war effort, also, helped the "general cause of the anti-Hitlerite coalition."
He also made a half-hearted effort to balance his defense of "workers'
self-management" and "direct socialist democracy"-concepts alien to Soviet
doctrine-with a passing reference to the Yugoslav party's efforts to secure the
"ruling position of the working class."
The Defense Ministry will soon issue a decree tightening restrictions on access
of foreign naval ships and military aircraft to Danish territory in peacetime. It is
designed largely to discourage encroachment by Warsaw Pact forces conducting
surveillance and exercise activities in Danish territorial waters and airspace.
Innocent passage through waters designated as international straits-the Sound
and Great and Little Belts-has been somewhat liberalized. Advance notification is
the only requirement for simultaneous passage of more than three warships of the
same nationality.
The new restrictions will apply to internal waters and those within the
3-nautical-mile limit. Foreign warships that previously could transit these waters or
anchor close to shore for up to 48 hours without advance notification will be
required to provide prior notice and request special permission to stay. In addition,
military aircraft must receive prior permission to fly in Danish airspace, including
that over the Sound and Great Belt, previously a free-passage area.
Denmark has become increasingly concerned over expanded Warsaw Pact naval
and air activity during the past decade. Danish and NATO naval exercises are
frequently monitored by Warsaw Pact ships, and Denmark has registered complaints
of harassment. There also have been cases of deliberate violation of territorial waters
by Pact warships, particularly those of East Germany and Poland. Recent incidents
involved two Polish training ships that made unannounced calls at two Danish ports
on February 19 and 20.
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March 3, 1976
The Italian Socialist Party's national congress opens today in Rome. The
decisions taken by the Socialists, together with the results of the Christian
Democratic congress later this month, will determine whether the two parties can
avoid early elections and settle on a formula for a new coalition-still the only
realistic alternative to Communist participation at the national level.
Socialist leader De Martino is hoping to use the congress to unify his party
behind a strategy aimed at protecting and enhancing its pivotal role in Italian
politics. Only the Socialist Party, Italy's third largest, can guarantee the Christian
Democrats a non-Communist majority in parliament, but the Socialists have
concluded that they may ultimately be relegated to a marginal role unless certain
political trends are reversed.
Specifically, the Socialists want to force the Christian Democrats to abandon
the practice of seeking behind-the-scenes support from the Communists in
parliament, while professing opposition to the Communists publicly. In the Socialist
view, this informal coordination process allows the Communists to put their stamp
on government programs while retaining their freedom to criticize from the
opposition. The Socialists see themselves as tainted, meanwhile, by their
participation in Christian Democratic - led governments during most of the last 12
years-a situation which the Socialists believe to be largely responsible for the
Communists' ability to outpoll them with Italian voters who are moving to the left
in increasing numbers.
The Socialists see in these trends the potential for their own decline and for the
eventual consummation of the alliance that Communist chief Berlinguer wants with
the Christian Democrats, i.e., the "historic compromise."
The Socialists therefore will try at their congress to distinguish themselves from
both the Christian Democrats and the Communists. Comments by various party
leaders over the last few months suggest that to accomplish this the Socialists will
seek to draw a distinction between the party's long-range goals and its short-term
tactics. The Socialists are likely to say that their long-term goal is a grouping of
leftist forces, including the Communists, that would replace the Christian Democrats
as the dominant political force. That proposal is intended to stand in opposition to
Berlinguer's strategy of seeking cooperation with the Christian Democrats-a
concept that still troubles more militant leftists.
Socialist chief De Martino has repeatedly said, however, that the leftist
alternative will not be feasible until the Socialists have increased their electoral
strength with respect to the Communists and until the latter have severed their
remaining ties to Moscow.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 3, 1976
For the near term, the Socialists are willing to collaborate with the Christian
Democrats, provided that the Christian Democrats:
--give theSocialists more influence over policy in a new government, possibly to
the extent of dumping the two smaller parties, Social Democrats and
Republicans, who have always participated in center-left coalitions;
--agree to consult the Communists openly, in order to make them accept more
responsibility for government actions.
The Christian Democrats have so far been unable to reconcile internal
differences over how to respond to the Socialist Party's conditions, but they will
have to do so at the Christian Democratic congress, which opens on March 19. Most
Christian Democrats favor giving theSocialists more influence in the government but
oppose actions that would publicly qualify the Christian Democrats' traditional
opposition to the Communists.
The Christian Democratic position on that question will be influenced heavily
by the outcome of a leadership struggle now under way between the supporters of
Christian Democratic chief Zaccagnini, who favors an open "dialogue" with the
Communist opposition, and the party's center-right leaders, who are convinced that
such a policy would add to the Communists' increasing respectability and lead
inevitably to broader collaboration with them.
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March 3, 1976
Palestine Liberation Organization and Fatah leader Yasir Arafat is concerned
about Syrian activities in Lebanon and Jordan, but an overt move by Damascus to
oust him from his position appears unlikely.
When Syria promised to guarantee that the Palestinians would adhere to
regulations governing their activities in Lebanon, Syrian President Asad did not seek
Arafat's concurrence but merely informed him of the decision. If necessary,
Damascus would logically use the Palestine Liberation Army-which it largely
controls---to enforce adherence. Arafat therefore views the PLA presence in Lebanon
as a potential threat to his leadership.
The Syrian-backed Saiqa fedayeen group has also been at odds with Fatah on
several occasions, and its leader, Zuhair Muhsin, may be a contender for PLO
leadership. Saiqa has reportedly increased its size and has probably also sought to
acquire more influence in fedayeen councils. Nevertheless, Fatah is considerably
larger and more effective, and Saiqa alone cannot seriously mount a political or
military challenge to its position. Saiga can pose serious problems for Fatah only as
an instrument of Syrian policy.
Fatah is also suspicious of Syria's developing cooperation with Jordan. Fatah
leaders fear that Syria has agreed to a Jordanian move to regain the west bank and
represent the Palestinians there. If this should happen, Arafat would suffer a major
setback that could unseat him as the Palestinian leader.
To demonstrate his independence of Damascus, Arafat has courted Rejection
Front fedayeen to form a unified front and has enlisted Egypt's support in claiming
that moves by Jordan are counter to resolutions of the 1974 Rabat summit
conference. Nevertheless, Arafat still depends on Syria for logistic as well as political
support, and he is not likely to risk open confrontation now in order to maintain
independence. As long as Arafat does not no too far. Syria will probably not overtly
move against him.
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*Rabat
Canary Is. MOROCCQ^
SAHARA
CANARY ISLANDS
(SP-)
24th parallel
ALGEBI
Findout
GRAN
CANARIA
Tapia
M O R O C C O
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 3, 1976
The US defense attache in Rabat reports that the Moroccans may soon begin a
new phase of military clean-up operations against the Polisario Front.
The purpose would be to eliminate the large number of Polisario forces which
Rabat believes are located in the Zemmour mountains around Guelta in Spanish
Sahara and in the area north of Bir Moghrein in Mauritania. The Moroccans
reportedly also are planning to clean out small pockets of guerrilla forces in southern
Morocco as far east as the Algerian border.
Rabat believes
Polisario forces are also poised for operations in these areas. King Hassan ordered all
forces involved in the January and February sweeps in northeastern Spanish Sahara
to regroup at El Aaiun, Semara, and Tan Tan. These forces probably would be used
should the sweep be resumed.
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King Hassan today marks his 15th anniversary on the throne with his domestic
position stronger than it has been in many years as a result of his success in forcing
Spain to relinquish its Saharan territory to Morocco and Mauritania.
Hassan probably will devote much of the major speech he is scheduled to give
to Morocco's plans for Sahara. Among other things, he may announce how the
territory is to be partitioned with Mauritania; most of Sahara north of the 24th
parallel, including the rich phosphate deposits, reportedly will come under Moroccan
control.
Almost all Moroccans, including those who oppose the King's autocratic style
of rule, have supported Hassan's campaign to annex at least part of Sahara. His
success in the face of Algerian opposition has, at least in the short run, enhanced the
security of his throne. The opposition political parties, which have long sought
political liberalization in Morocco, are weak and divided and pose no threat to the
King.
The armed forces, from whose ranks came the leaders of two abortive coup
attempts in 1971 and 1972, remain the chief threat to Hassan. While the military has
supported the Sahara campaign and morale seems to be high, its commitment to
Hassan personally is questionable. Moroccan officers chafe under their direct
subordination to him and resent his continuing distrust of them.
The military probably views its role in securing Sahara primarily as an
opportunity to vindicate its honor and recoup some of the prestige it lost following
the two coup attempts. If the Moroccans get bogged down in a long and costly
counterinsurgency effort or suffer a defeat in a confrontation with Algeria, the
military might well again turn on King Hassan.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 3, 1976
The South Africans are preparing contingency plans in the event of an
insurgent threat from Mozambique and Angola.
South African defense forces began preparations for identifying targets in
Mozambique and Angola during a conference in Pretoria on February 23. The target
list included transportation hubs and junctions, ports, and all military facilities
including barracks. Defense officials have apparently concluded that expanded
assistance from Mozambique to Rhodesian guerrillas and the potential for increased
conflict in Namibia present a significant threat to the security of South African
borders. Pretoria does not believe that there are Cuban military personnel in
Mozambique at this time. There is concern, however, about unconfirmed reports of
large Soviet or Cuban weapons deliveries-including tanks-to Mozambique.
The South Africans are undoubtedly concerned about their own security in the
face of expanded Mozambican assistance to Rhodesian guerrillas. They are also
worried about the likelihood of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
supporting insurgents in Namibia or entering into direct confrontation with South
African forces in the buffer zone established in Angola by the South African
government. South African forces in the Angolan-Namibian border area have
recently been organized as a unified tactical command to improve command,
control, and administration in order to counter a possible Cuban-Popular Movement
offensive there.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 3, 1976
The impact of last year's harvest failure is being increasingly felt by Soviet
consumers. The embassy has begun to receive reports that food shortages in rural
areas have become a topic of conversation in Moscow. Residents of Moscow are
being appealed to by friends and acquaintances to "bring or send bread, meat, and
milk." Grumbling by the Moscow "man on the street" is said to be widespread
because the problem is not receiving attention at the party congress.
Other recent reports confirm that food supplies in. rural areas continue to
deteriorate, while supplies in urban areas still appear adequate. Recent embassy visits
to Riga, Baku, Kishinev, and Irkutsk found most foodstuffs available, including meat
and a reasonable assortment of bread.
On the other hand, reports from scattered rural areas refer to poor food
supplies, including the total absence of sugar, potatoes, macaroni, butter, or milk
and little or no meat. Bread is usually available, but quantities are sometimes
reported as "barely adequate." Meat and milk supplies in rural areas may be tight for
some time, since there are also reports of acute shortages of hay and grain to feed
private livestock.
Moreover, despite massive imports of grain, feed shortages are still causing
slaughtering of livestock in the socialized sector. The latest official statistics on the
number of livestock on collective and state farms indicate that cattle herds-whose
numbers had been largely unaffected by feed shortages-are now beginning to
decline. In addition, hogs and poultry, which bore the brunt of the harvest shortfall.
last fall, were 23 percent and 9 percent respectively, below last February's level'.
Nevertheless, our evidence does not point to a crisis situation, although further
deterioration in the next few months is expected.
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 3, 1976
BRAZIL-ANGOLA: The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
reportedly has offered to buy Brazilian heavy trucks and armored cars. The Brazilian
Foreign Ministry does not believe that its industry can supply vehicles in the time or
quantity desired by the Angolans. It expects the Popular Movement will eventually
deal with the French, although a small number of Brazilian armored cars may still be
purchased. Foreign Ministry officials look on the arms offer as a gesture of
appreciation for Brazilian recognition, which was at first heavily criticized by
conservatives within the military/security establishment. The Foreign Ministry may
also point to the arms request as an indication of a possible desire by the Popular
Movement to become less dependent on the Soviets and the Cubans.
I I
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 Top S&VWfed For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79T00975AO28700010006-7
. Top Secret
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO28700010006-7