NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028600010026-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 17, 2006
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: February 17, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
Boom 01=1
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National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 17, 1976
MOROCCO-ALGERIA: Apparent
clash in Sahara over weekend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CHINA: Criticism
of Teng spreading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
NIGERIA: Lagos returning to
normal after abortive coup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
ETHIOPIA: Undercurrents
of uneasiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
ARGENTINA: Peron
moves against enemies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
USSR: Soyuz-20 deorbited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
ICELAND: General strike
putting pressure on government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
ANNEX: Implications of the Lebanese Settlement
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 17, 1976
Moroccan and Algerian troops may have clashed again over the weekend in
Spanish Sahara.
,
Ian estimated regiment-sized Algerian force, supported by armor and artillery
conducted a hit-and-run attack on Amgala last Saturday, overrunning the Moroccan
infantry company defending the oasis. I the Algerians
wanted to avenge their defeat last month by Moroccans at Amgala. The Moroccan
minister of information later told the US ambassador that 32 Moroccan soldiers
were killed and a number captured by the Algerians.
Morocco's King Hassan sent a message to Algerian President Boumediene on
Sunday accusing Boumediene of again breaking promises he had made last summer
not to use Algerian troops in Sahara to fight the Moroccans. The King, according to
a Moroccan broadcast, challenged Boumediene to make known his intentions about
Spanish Sahara by either accepting an internationally guaranteed peace or openly
declaring war on Morocco.
The Moroccan version may be accurate, though we cannot confirm that
Algerian troops conducted the attack.
An Algerian broadcast has denied the Moroccan charge; it suggested that the
Polisario Front was responsible. The radio commentary emphasized that Algeria will
continue to support the Front fully in its struggle for independence for Spanish
Sahara.
The Algerian reaction suggests Boumediene still wants to avoid an open clash
with Morocco but that he will continue to support the Polisario Front's struggle
against the Moroccan and Mauritanian take-over of the disputed territory.I
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 17, 1976
Criticism of Teng Hsiao-ping in wall posters apparently has spread to many
areas throughout China. The posters are confined mainly to institutes of higher
learning but have appeared in the streets of Shanghai and apparently one other city
as well.
The poster campaign reportedly was endorsed over the weekend by the party's
official newspaper, which asserted that criticism through posters "terrifies only the
guilty."
Teng Hsiao-ping's political status seems still unresolved. Most Chinese officials
abroad have expressed confidence that he will retain important party and military
posts-an indication that they have received no official word that Teng is finished. A
Foreign Ministry official has said Teng is still a vice premier in the government. The
relatively few public appearances of Chinese leaders in recent weeks suggest that the
party's ruling Politburo is meeting, perhaps to decide Teng's future among other
issues.
A Chinese official reportedly has said that Mao designated Hua Kuo-feng as
acting premier because the time is not "ripe" for a permanent premier and that there
is "no appropriate person" for the job. If true, this statement would indicate that
Mao has indeed withdrawn his previous endorsement of Teng as Chou En-lai's
successor. Several Chinese officials stationed abroad have said recently that Chou's
successor may not be chosen for some time.
The party's leaders would set a dangerous precedent should they decide to send
Teng back to political obscurity. Teng is the highest ranking of hundreds-perhaps
thousands-of officials who were purged in the mid-1960s and have since been
reinstated. These rehabilitated officials occupy positions at almost every level of the
Chinese hierarchy. Teng's ouster would be an invitation for party leftists to attack
these officials; the result could be widespread disruption throughout most of China's
provinces.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 17, 1976
Such attacks may in fact have already begun. The party leader of Hunan
Province, a rehabilitated official, reportedly is under attack in wall posters that have
appeared in the streets of the provincial capital.
Most Chinese officials who have expressed.a view see the balance of power in
the leadership as clearly in favor of the pragmatists associated with Teng. Although
they may not have access to inside information and may be basing their judgment on
Teng's strong showing throughout 1975-and on the fact that many of his
supporters are now in important posts-it is perhaps significant that they are for the
most part optimistic about Teng's future and do not expect either foreign or
domestic policy to swing to the left as a result of the current situation.
If Teng's future party role is now at issue, as seems the case, and the party
leadership cannot agree on whether to allow him to remain as de facto number-two
man in the party-another of Chou En-lai's positions that Teng assumed last year-a
prudent course might be to demote him slightly.
A similar situation occurred in 1974, when a party vice chairman was under
widespread attack in posters throughout the country. His demotion in January 1975
to that of an ordinary member of the Politburo apparently silenced his critics.
In any case, Teng's current troubles, which almost certainly are being
orchestrated by some important party officials in Peking, have probably caused the
party's leaders to reassess the leadership alignment. Regardless of where Teng comes
out, there are bound to be some changes in the pecking order, and should Teng
emerge with his party position intact, his current detractors may find themselves in
hot water.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 17, 1976
Lagos appears to have returned to normal following last Friday's abortive coup
attempt, which resulted in the slaying of head of state General Muhammed. Borders
and airports remain closed to international travel and a dusk-to-dawn curfew
continues.
Reports indicate the coup attempt was initiated by a handful of dissident
soldiers. The willingness and ability of the armed forces to quash the rebellion has
met with widespread approval, indicating that the coup plotters acted without broad
support.
Following a meeting of the ruling Supreme Military Council on Saturday,
armed forces chief of staff Obasanjo was named head of state. He is the first member
of the influential Yoruba tribe to hold this position. The former commissioner of
transport, Lieutenant Colonel Yar'Adua, was promoted to general and will assume
the portfolio of armed forces chief of staff.
Obasanjo has vowed to continue Muhammed's policies, which will undoubtedly
include a strong stance against minority rule in South Africa and support for the
Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. In a speech last
month, Obasanjo bore down hard on Angola and implied that the importance of oil
as a political weapon should not be ignored.
Although there are rumors that the US was implicated in the coup attempt, no
official accusation has been made. Nevertheless, the Nigerian news media, which
have become increasingly controlled by the government, have hit hard at US
operations overseas. Last month, the government ordered that the US Foreign
Broadcast . Information Center at Kaduna be shut down without offering
justification. The Nigerian press, however, alleged that the center is controlled by
the CIA.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 17, 1976
Two prominent figures from the Haile Selassie regime were killed over the
weekend, allegedly while resisting arrest. Numerous others were arrested.
Addis Ababa radio provided little explanation, announcing only that the
government had taken action against "opponents of the Ethiopian revolution."
Those killed and arrested may have been suspected of collaborating with the
Ethiopian Democratic Union, an organization led by other well-known members of
Ethiopia's former aristocracy. The Democratic Union has been conducting guerrilla
operations in western Ethiopia and is believed to have a number of supporters in
other parts of the country.
some members of the ruling military
council have become increasingly concerned that the Democratic Union is gaining
popularity in the provinces. They believe the Union's advocacy of a return to private
ownership of land has a strong appeal among a wide variety of people who oppose
the council's nationalization program.
The council members are concerned that the Union, by winning over large
numbers of farmers, will be able to cut the flow of food supplies to Addis Ababa.
Some farmers have recently protested the council's socialist policies, especially the
price controls on their products. In some instances they have burned their crops
rather than sell them at the government price.
The council members believe the Union does not now pose a military threat to
the government. Before the arrests and killings were announced, the US embassy
reported that there was a marked undercurrent of uneasiness and a general
expectation, of disorder in Addis Ababa. For the first time in months, rumors of a
possible coup are again circulating. The uneasiness is partly attributable to the
disappearance of staple foods from the markets.
Increasing student and worker unrest have added to the malaise. Large numbers
of deserters from the government's rural work program have returned to Addis
"Ababa. Students and workers in the capital have staged several demonstrations in
recent weeks. Buses have been stoned and burned in other towns.
The growing malaise is also being fed by:
--The government's continuing difficulties in dealing with insurgencies in
Eritrea and other provinces,
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 17, 1976
--rising tensions on the border with Somalia, Ethiopia's traditional enemy,
stemming from a recent clash between French and Somali forces on the border
between Somalia and the French Territory of Afars and Issas.
The arrests and killings this weekend will further erode public confidence in the
military council. Most Ethiopians will probably view the events as the be-ginning of
more repression, which is sure to create more unrest.
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 17, 1976
President Maria Estela Peron has taken the offensive against her enemies, calling
for constitutional reform and temporarily closing a prominent newspaper that has
become one of her harshest critics.
Her most recent move was to adjourn congress last night-an obvious bid to
thwart a renewed attempt at impeachment.
Late last week, Peron called for a constituent assembly to rewrite the
constitution before the next national election. Her public statement did not spell
out the changes she wants, but the move may be related to the controversy over the
date for the next national election.
The constitution now provides that the election be held within six months
prior to inauguration day, May 25, 1977. Major opposition parties have strongly
protested against the date previously set-next October 17-on the grounds that it is
an important Peronist holiday; the date, of course, also does not fall within the
six-month period called for in the constitution.
Peron has also condemned an amendment enacted in 1972 by the former
military government, which reduced the president's term from six to four years. She
may conceivably be seeking to reinstitute the six-year term and, perhaps, even make
it applicable to her present stay in office.
President Peron frequently insists that as Juan Peron's chosen successor, she
intends to finish out her term. Her defiance in the face of growing adversity has
served to confuse her opponents in the past, but her closure of congress could force
the military to intervene. Until now, the military has publicly shunned this course
by insisting that the politicians should remove her by legal means.
Peron has lost almost all of her former allies, including much of organized
labor, but the latest protest against her administration, a call for a "strike" by
business leaders yesterday, was only partially successful.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 17, 1976
The Soviets' unmanned Soyuz-20 spacecraft yesterday separated from the
Salyut-4 space station and returned to the USSR after 91 days in orbit. We believe
this mission was a prelude to the launch of a manned spacecraft that will probably
attempt to establish a new record for manned space flights.
The Soyuz-20 was launched on November 17 and docked with the space
station two days later. There is no indication that new systems or operational
techniques were tested, but Moscow has announced that biological experiments with
different plants and living organisms were conducted.
The longest Soviet manned space mission to date was conducted last year when
the Soyuz-18 crew remained in orbit for 63 days. No major problems developed
during that flight,
In view of the apparent success of the Soyuz-20 mission, the Soviets will
probably attempt to launch a manned spacecraft within the next few months. That
mission will probably last about 90 days and thus set a new record for manned space
flights. The US Skylab-3 crew was in orbit for 84 days in 1974.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 17, 1976
The general strike that began in Iceland today is putting additional political
pressure on Prime Minister Hallgrimsson, who is already concerned that his coalition
government may break up unless the fishing dispute with the UK is settled soon.
Union and management negotiators have been meeting with a government
mediator in marathon sessions for the past two weeks, but the two sides are still far
apart on the issue of wages. Progress has been hampered by the inability of
government leaders to take a major part in the talks because of their preoccupation
with the cod war.
The main union goal is to tie wages to the cost-of-living index, a link that the
Hallgrimsson government suspended last year. The annual rate of inflation is
currently about 60 percent.
Hallgrimsson might pressure the employers' association to make additional
concessions. Most union leaders are taking a hard line on the cod war, and the Prime
Minister's room for maneuver in restarting talks with London would be restricted
further if he resists union demands for higher wages.
If the strike call is fully heeded, some 40,000 persons will stay away from their
jobs. State employees are not involved in the dispute, so essential utility services will
not be affected. The last general strike in Iceland was two years ago and lasted six
days.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 17, 1976
EC-ANGOLA: The EC Nine are moving toward diplomatic recognition of the
Popular Movement as the sole government of Angola. The subject was surely
discussed at the EC political directors' meeting in Luxembourg that began yesterday.
Some reports indicate that the political directors are working out final arrangements
and that the announcement will be made this week. The EC agreed late last year to
act simultaneously on Angolan recognition. The Nine have apparently decided to act
at this time because of the Popular Movement's military successes and because most
members of the Organization of African Unity now recognize the Movement,
making certain that it will win OAU recognition.
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February 17, 1976
Implications of the Lebanese Settlement
The political reforms announced by President Franjiyah on Saturday. meet
most of the demands of Lebanon's old-line Muslim leaders, yet they preserve the
most important prerogatives of the country's Christian minority.
The reforms do not include the fundamental political changes sought by the
radical leftists and some Muslim religious leaders, but they may lead to greater leftist
representation in parliament, and they promise a variety of lesser concessions in the
form of social and economic measures.
If the reforms are implemented soon, Lebanon may win a period of peace that
could last several months or even a few years. If Christian leaders attempt to delay
implementation of the changes or to introduce qualifications while their promises
are being translated into laws, the fighting probably will resume. This might prompt
Syria and the mainline fedayeen groups to withdraw their support for the political
compromise, and could lead ultimately to still more fundamental changes in
Lebanon's system of government.
In his speech outlining the reform package, Franjiyah sought to balance
concessions for the Muslims with reassurances for the Christians. He promised the
Muslims that Lebanon's constitution will continue to "evolve by experience" to
accommodate needed changes in the political system, that the government is
committed to social justice, and that the country will never abandon its "Arab
character."
At the same time, the President assured the Christians that the 1943 national
covenant will be preserved, that the Palestinians will be expected to adhere to their
past agreements with the Lebanese government, and that Lebanon will retain its
"sovereignty."
The Approved Document
Franjiyah said that the reforms are outlined in a written document that has
been approved by the Lebanese cabinet and will soon be presented to parliament.
There is little chance that parliament will fail to approve a political settlement that
has been approved by leaders of the country's principal political groups, but there is
a chance that politicians on both sides will use the time before parliament acts to
raise new political demands or objections.
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February 17, 1976
Once it is approved by parliament, the new document, which Franjiyah termed
"a declaration of a course for national action," apparently will augment rather than
supplant the unwritten national covenant and the existing constitution as the basis
of Lebanon's political system.
As outlined by Franjiyah, the most important points of the reform package
provide for:
--Continuing the existing system of distributing the top political posts: the
president will be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and
the speaker of parliament a Shia Muslim.
--Providing equal representation to Christians and Muslims in parliament, and
revising of the election law to provide for the proportional representation of
sects within each major religion.
--Electing the prime minister by parliament, instead of his being selected by the
president.
--Changing the procedures to be followed by parliament: certain "issues of
destiny" will require a two-thirds majority. The parliament will continue to
elect the president, but it will now require 55 percent of the votes if the
candidate fails to receive a majority on the first ballot.
--Transferring some power from the president to the prime minister; all decrees
and bills will be issued jointly.
--Decentralizing and establishing a merit system in the civil service.
--Drafting a new defense policy and strengthening the army.
--Establishing an administrative body. to plan economic development and
committing the government to "universal social justice" through economic and
social reform.
I Ia new cabinet will be formed
soon, and that a parties to the political settlement nave agreed that some action to
implement each of the specific reforms will be taken within one month after a more
representative government is installed.
Lebanon's old-line Muslim leaders, including Prime Minister Karami, are in an
awkward position as a result of the Christians' approval of the reform package. The
Muslims' political prestige rests on early implementation of the reforms, yet strict
adherence to the terms of the accord would increase the political power of the
disadvantaged Muslim and leftist groups that threaten the political positions of the
old-liners.
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February 17, 1976
The good will of the traditional Muslim leaders will be tested with the issue
that must be faced first: reallocation of the seats in parliament. Unless the
membership of parliament is expanded, the Muslims will gain only five seats. This
number would be insufficient to satisfy the six or seven Muslim blocs that are
already in parliament, and would, if the reform provisions are implemented
equitably, be given primarily to Shia Muslim and leftist groups rather than to the
already influential Sunni Muslims.
The Sunni Muslims may decide to endure criticism from their leftist and Shia
associates by tacitly cooperating with the Christians in delaying reconstitution of the
parliament or by pushing ahead with the recent plans to extend the life of the
present parliament and allow it to elect a new president late this summer.
The old-line Muslims are likely to conclude that the increased representation
they have won for Muslims in parliament is insignificant. Their major gain is in the
increased power of the prime minister relative to that of the president. Because the
Sunnis control the post of prime minister, they will seek to build up the post further
and probably will not attempt to make parliament significantly more powerful than
it has been in the past.
Karami, a Sunni Muslim and a strong prime minister, gains most from the new
agreement.
The Lebanese leftists and some radical Muslim religious leaders received no
satisfaction of their fundamental demands: that the Maronite Christians give up the
presidency and that the religious basis of Lebanon's government be abandoned.
Nevertheless, they are not likely to attempt to spark new hostilities until they see
whether or not the government implements the promised economic and social
reforms. Some of the leftists will be satisfied with limited measures; others will be
cowed by the overwhelming military presence in Lebanon of the Syrian-controlled
Palestine Liberation Army and by the decision of the major fedayeen groups to
cooperate with the Liberation Army in-enforcing the cease-fire.
The only leftist who has promoted a coherent set of political demands over the
past several months has been Socialist leader Kamal Jumblatt. His party platform
calls for extensive education and social welfare programs, a merit system in the civil
service, proportional representation in parliament, an independent judiciary, reform
of the election system, and some reduction in the powers of the president.
Although Jumblatt probably will complain that the reforms announced by
Franjiyah promise only part of what he has been recommending, he may
conclude-if the reforms are actually implemented-that he has won as much as he
could reasonably expect. If his party, which has the largest leftist militia, is satisfied
and counsels respect for the cease-fire, the other leftists almost certainly will be
unable to upset it.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 17, 1976
Leaders of the large Christian political parties presumably decided that they
could accept the reform package because it perpetuates Christian control of the
presidency and-theoretically, at least-leaves in force the 30-year-old national
covenant. In addition, the Christians, even before endorsing the final version of the
reform package, received a reaffirmation of Syria's commitment to guarantee
Palestinian respect for past agreements limiting fedayeen activities in Lebanon.
According to one report, leaders of the right-wing Christian militias are
confident that the Syrians will withdraw the Palestine Liberation Army from
Lebanon eventually, and hope that Damascus in the meantime will force the
fedayeen back into the refugee camps.
The Christians reportedly believe that even if the political settlement falls apart
and the fighting resumes after the Syrian-controlled troops leave, they will at least
have won an opportunity to regroup and rearm.
If the cease-fire holds and the reforms are implemented, the Christians, in
theory, will be left with much less power to initiate public policy because the
president will be forced to share his authority to issue decrees with the prime
minister. In practice this will not change much; the fragility of Lebanon's political
system over the past several months has obliged the president to secure approval of
the prime minister before taking any important step.
However the reforms are implemented, the Christians will retain a veto since
the president can withhold approval of proposals backed by the prime minister. This
is likely to become important as the Christians attempt to restrain the more
powerful prime ministers, including the assertive Karami, who probably will push for
extensive government programs in education, health, and housing.
Several of the provisions in the reform package will work to protect the
political position of Christian leaders.
--The provision that parliament must approve important issues by a two-thirds
vote will ensure that Muslim deputies cannot recruit a small number of
dissident Christians and pass measures harmful to conservative Christian
interests.
--The provision for the election of a president by a 55-percent majority after
the first ballot makes it unlikely that Muslim members would be able to use a
similar strategy to elect a president from one of the small Christian liberal
parties despite right-wing Christian opposition.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 17, 1976
The reforms dealing with the civil service and the army are not designed to
protect the Christians' position, but they appear unlikely to strengthen the Muslims
either. Equal representation is guaranteed in the top civil service jobs, and the
Christians for the foreseeable future will be better able to compete for those
positions to be covered by a merit system. 4
To the extent that the administrative offices of the government are
decentralized, it will only increase the capabilities of the Christians to establish a
truncated Christian state if they should ever conclude that partition is necessary.
Christians and Muslims will attempt to interpret the provision providing for a
new defense policy and a strengthened army to their own advantage. In the past, the
leftists and some Muslim leaders have favored enlarging the army and arming it in a
way that it can better defend against Israeli attacks; the Christians have favored
arming the force so that it can better preserve internal security.
Because the army is now partially disarmed and wholly demoralized, it is
unlikely that it will be able to play a forceful role in internal security for several
months, and it is certain that the army will not provide a deterrent to Israel for
years, if ever.
Continued peace in Lebanon, therefore, will depend on the continued
willingness of Syria and the large Palestinian groups to control the Lebanese and
fedayeen radicals, and on the willingness of the leaders of Lebanon's private militias
cooperate in implementing the current political a reement.
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Top Secret
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