NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028600010022-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 2006
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: February 13, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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op cri
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
February 13, 1976
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 13, 1976
CONTENTS
MOROCCO-ALGERIA: Moroccan forces
control Mahbes and Guelta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
UK: New defense cuts
to be announced . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
CHINA: Leftists step
up attack on Teng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
USSR-CHINA: Soviet reaction
to Hua appointment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
USSR - SOUTH KOREA - JAPAN: Naval
strength in Sea of Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
POLAND - WEST GERMANY: Stakes
in German vote on accords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
GREECE-EC: Council decision
on eventual Greek membership . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 13, 1976
Rabat confirmed yesterday that Moroccan forces now control Mahbes, the last
remaining Polisario stronghold in the northeastern Sahara.
Press reports from Rabat indicate Moroccan forces have also taken over Guelta,
another Polisario stronghold in east-central Sahara.
Morocco's military sweep against the Algerian-backed Polisario guerrillas is now
virtually complete. Moroccan and Mauritanian forces have occupied nearly all of the
towns and outposts in the Sahara.
Algeria has not yet responded to Morocco's latest military advance. Algiers'
decision not to confront Moroccan forces occupying these strongholds may have
resulted from a deal arranged by Egyptian and Saudi Arabian mediators. Although
Moroccan officials have said withdrawal of any forces Algeria may have had at
Mahbes was not part of the deal, Egyptian Vice President Mubarak may have urged
during his shuttle last week that the Algerians pull out to avoid a clash.
Meanwhile, Algerian President Boumediene and several other senior officials
flew to Tripoli yesterday for talks with Libyan President Qadhafi. The Libyans have
been Algeria's main supporter in its dispute with Morocco over Spanish Sahara and
have publicly admitted they are providing miilitary support to the Polisario guerrillas.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 13, 1976
A new round of cuts in the British defense budget, which is expected to
amount to $400 million annually through 1979, will be announced next week, and
specific details will be released in early spring. In discussions with the US embassy in
I ondon, British officials have stressed that these latest reductions involve the "tail"
and not the "teeth" of the British military establishment, and therefore London
does not feel obliged to consult formally with NATO before implementing its
decisions.
The Labor government in fact is balking at NATO consultations mainly for
political reasons. The level of defense spending has recently become a sensitive issue
that is attracting public attention. Prime Minister Wilson is sure to be attacked from
both the left and right when the new budget figures are announced.
The Labor left wing has long been critical of "excessive" British defense costs
Wd is certain to protest loudly that the military budget has still not been cut
enough. The Tories, on the other hand, have been effectively pushing the line that
the government should not be cutting back at all in the face of Warsaw Pact military
=rength. Wilson clearly regards NATO consultations as a pitfall that could result in
the government's being maneuvered into a position in which the Conservatives could
claim Alliance support for their position rather than for the government's.
London is prepared to explain and discuss the cuts with the US and West
Jermany in a bilateral context. Washington and Bonn will be provided with specifics
several weeks before the public announcement in late March or early April. British
officials have hinted that they would be open to suggestions but are very limited in
making changes in their plans before they issue the defense white paper late next
month.
This will be the third round of cuts in defense spending since Labor came to
:tower in February 1974. Britain's overall economic performance will be the key
factor in determining the ultimate level of the defense budget. If the economy picks
up, the government will be able to hold the line or perhaps even expand a little bit.
But if the recession persists and government resources shrink further, more
F'ductions will be in the offing.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 13, 1976
China's political leftists, having successfully blocked the appointment of Teng
Hsiao-ping as premier, are stepping up their attacks on him.
Wall posters attacking Teng began appearing at Peking University on February
10. The posters do not mention Teng by name but quote some of his well-known
statements, making it clear that he is the target of their wrath. They reiterate the
criticism that began on February 6 of "capitaliist roaders" in the party, an expression
used a decade ago to disgrace Teng durinc, the Cultural Revolution.
The posters accuse Teng of opposing Chairman Mao's educational policies, but
the propaganda reportedly contains a broader attack on him, including a threat that
his fate will be the same as other fallen party leaders. The official party newspaper
yesterday published its second attack within a week on "capitalist roaders who
refuse to repent." This theme has been picked up in several provinces.
The party's left wing undoubtedly smells blood in the wake of Teng's failure to
be appointed premier and presumably is now engaging in an effort to purge him
from his remaining party and military positions. Unless the national media begin a
daily propaganda barrage against him and posters appear elsewhere throughout the
country, it would be premature to conclude that the left wing will marshal enough
support to remove Teng from office.
Teng has not appeared in public since he delivered the eulogy at Chou En-lai's
funeral on January 15. His very presence on the Chinese political scene has been a
constant source of irritation to the left. In view of the current attacks on him, it
would be prudent for him to stay out of the limelight. A continued and prolonged
absence, however, would strongly suggest that he had been unable to surmount his
troubles.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 13, 1976
Soviet media are replaying foreign press accounts which stress that Hua
Kuo-feng's appointment as China's acting premier is evidence of serious political
turmoil in Peking. The media have also observed, however, that Hua may have been
a compromise candidate acceptable to both moderates and radicals.
A Soviet embassy officer in Peking characterized Hua as a good administrator,
well suited to the task of building China and with more foreign policy experience
than is generally assumed. He commented that Hua had been less vindictive than
ocher Chinese spokesmen in his statements against the Soviet Union.
The official said Moscow expects no early change in China's foreign policy as a
result of the appointment. He professed, however, to see some diminution in the
output of China's anti-Soviet propaganda since the appointment and said that
ultimately it might be a positive development for Sino-Soviet relations. We have
detected no appreciable change in China's propaganda treatment of the USSR; the
Soviet embassy frequently takes an optimistic line on developments in China that
c:diuld have consequences for the USSR. Nonetheless, the Soviets are probably
relieved that Hua is apparently a moderate with no specific history of anti-Sovietism.
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National Intelligence Bulletiln February 13, 1976
South Korean and Japanese newspapers have recently expressed concern over
the congressional testimony of the US chief of naval operations concerning the
military position of the USSR vis-a-vis the US in Asia. The Koreans reacted most
strongly to the reference to Soviet "supremacy" in the Sea of Japan.
The Soviets are indeed the strongest naval power in the Sea of Japan. Over the
past few years their Pacific Ocean Fleet has been strengthened by the addition of
newer submarines and surface ships. This fleet now consists of about 110
submarines, 60 major surface ships, and about 325 naval aircraft, not all of which
are based along the Sea of Japan.
The Soviet navy is highly active in the Sea of Japan, and much of this activity is
easily detectable by the South, Koreans and Japanese. Soviet surface ships sailing to
stations in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, for example, must pass through three
straits leading out of the Sea of Japan that are bounded by Japanese or South
Korean territory.
Perhaps the most easily perceived is the fleet's naval air arm. Bomber,
reconnaissance, and antisubmarine-warfare aircraft are frequently in the air over the
Sea of Japan and adjacent waters. Last September the Japanese Foreign Ministry
lodged a protest with Moscow over Soviet violations of Japanese air space.
During their infrequent visits to the Sea of Japan, major US surface units are
kept under nearly constant surveillance by the Pacific Fleet. The Soviets regard the
presence of US carriers in the Sea of Japan as an opportunity for naval aviation units
to practice wartime reconnaissance missions and strikes against naval task groups.
Because of North Korea's present naval superiority over the South, Seoul is
especially sensitive to any apparent diminution of US strength in the Sea of Japan.
The South Korean press has recently pointed out that the Korean war ended
successfully only because the high seas were under US control. The inference is
clearly that US naval power might be negated by Soviet superiority if and when
another war broke out on the peninsula.
At least one newspaper offered a solution, urging Seoul to improve its
antisubmarine warfare capabilities and then to build a submarine fleet to match that
of North Korea.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 13, 1976
Seoul is already moving toward improving its ASW capabilities, with emphasis
Placed on ship- and shore-based helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. The South
Koreans originally considered acquiring their own attack submarines to counter
those of the North, but-after discussions with senior US officials-opted instead for
developing air and surface ASW techniques as a countermeasure.
The implications of the Soviet presence in the Sea of Japan are not as serious
for Tokyo as they are for Seoul, but the Japanese are concerned about the impact
That any apparent erosion of US military strength in the Far East might have on the
overall balance of power in the Pacific. Tokyo, for example, is upgrading its ASW
capability, and Japanese defense officials acknowledge that future defense planning
may have to include provisions for a greater Japanese role in protecting key sealanes
near home.
The scandal in Tokyo over payments to Japanese officials by the Lockheed
Corporation, however, has delayed the government's plans for modernizing its ASW
forces. Tokyo had decided to purchase more than 100 ASW aircraft from Lockheed,
but the government has announced that the decision is now under review.-
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 13, 1976
I Iparty leader Gierek will suffer a major political
setback it the West German parliament rejects the Polish-FRG accords signed last
fall. While Gierek has a personal stake in the implementation of the agreements, it is
highly unlikely he would lose his dominant role in Polish politics if Bonn did not
ratify.
Gierek and West German Chancellor Schmidt personally opened the way for
the agreements during their talks in Helsinki last August. The accords provide for
emigration of 125,000 ethnic Germans from Poland in return for West German
credits of about $400 million at favorable interest rates and a contribution of nearly
$500 million to a Polish pension fund. The legislature in Bonn must approve the
pension accord.
I Polish war veterans and "others" are not satisfied with the
Giere c mi t ea and would be quick to take political advantage if it were
rejected by West Germany. He claimed that such a setback would provide a focal
point for disparate groups to coalesce in opposition.
West German rejection of the pension accord, would
very likely prompt a Polish diplomatic and propaganda o ensive questioning Bonn's
commitment to detente in general and to reconciliation with Poland in particular.
Gierek undoubtedly would feel obligated to mount a counteroffensive, if only to
seize the political high ground.
The strength and character of Polish opposition to the accords should not be
overdrawn. The war veterans probably feel that the proposed German payments are
not enough, but would be dissatisfied with any reasonable sum mentioned. Gierek,
of course, may be trying to tell Bonn that collapse of this agreement would only
escalate Polish demands and thus lead to a complete impasse.
The fate of the pension agreement in the West German parliament remains
uncertain. Recent political developments in Lower Saxony increased the margin of
strength of Christian Democrats over the Schmidt government in the upper house of
the national parliament. The Christian Democratic national leadership has publicly
stated that it opposes the agreement with Warsaw.
However, the Christian Democratic leadership has had difficulty from the
beginning in reaching a firm decision over the accord. Some in the party suspect that
Schmidt will reap political benefit in the October national elections if the opposition
appears to be obstructionist on foreign policy issues.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 13, 1976
The EC Council's unqualified endorsement of early negotiations looking
toward full Greek membership in the Community by the end of the decade has
received an enthusiastic response in Athens.
Prime Minister Caramanlis, who has placed much of his prestige behind his EC
initiative, hailed the Council's decision as one of historic significance for Greece that
will help safeguard democracy and improve the living standard of the people. He was
obviously pleased by the Council's rejection of a three-stage accession process for
Greece-proposed earlier by the Commission. The uproar created by the
Commission's reservations indicates that their incorporation in the Council's ruling
would have caused Caramanlis serious problems at home.
In making its decision, the Council clearly placed more weight on the political
desirability of Greece's entry than on the economic and structural difficulties for the
Community alluded to by the Commission. Council President Thorn, moreover,
noted that Greece's problems with Turkey-also raised by the Commission-will not
aiiect the negotiations and that no political preconditions will be imposed on the
Greeks. Greece has agreed that, as a member, it will not veto Turkish membership.
Actual negotiations between the EC and Greece will probably not begin for
another six months. The Greeks would like to secure full membership by 1978, but
Community sources expect the accession process will take at least until 1980.
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