NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028600010016-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2004
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: February 10, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence
Bulletin
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February 10, 1976
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 10, 1976
CONTENTS
ITALY: Moro to form one-party
minority government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
FRANCE: Results of French
Communist Party congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
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ICELAND-UK-NATO: NATO official
to meet with British on fishing dispute . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
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GREECE: Increasing difficulty
containing left and right extremes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
YUGOSLAVIA: Tito's health
apparently improved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
BALKAN AREA: Conference identifies
nonpolitical areas of cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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INDONESIA: Jakarta thwarts
UN fact-finding team on Timor
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 10, 1976
Aldo Moro apparently has been able to circumvent resistance in his Christian
Democratic Party to forming a one-party minority government. He is expected to
report back to President Leone today and begin drawing up a cabinet.
The Christian Democratic directorate was sharply divided on Friday over
whether to expose the party to the risks of governing alone. Opponents of the idea
argued that a Christian Democratic government would quickly find itself in trouble,
because Moro had failed to win solid enough backing from the other center-left
parties for his economic program. The j ey parties-Socialists and Republicans-had
offered to abstain on a parliamentary confidence vote-thus permitting a
government to be formed-but had reserved the right to oppose portions of the
economic program.
Although Moro did not persuade the two parties to change their positions, he
managed to improve the atmosphere over the weekend by getting Socialist chief De
Martino to make a public promise of "maximum good will" in parliamentary debate
on the economic package. That, combined with a push from President Leone, who
strongly supported Moro's effort in a statement on Sunday, apparently helped Moro
and his chief ally, Christian Democratic leader Zaccagnini, to outmaneuver Christian
Democrats-opposed to forming a government.
Hampered by divisions in his own party and dependent on a volatile
parliamentary majority, Moro will be heading the most fragile government Italy has
had since 1972. Moro recognizes this, but is trying to buy time in the hope that the
Christian Democrats and Socialists will be able to iron out their differences after
party congresses tentatively scheduled for March. The question of early
parliamentary elections will resurface if the two parties cannot come to terms then.
None of the governing parties is satisfied by the outcome of Moro's month-long
negotiations, but the Communist Party will see more advantages than disadvantages
in the new situation.
The avoidance for now of early elections gives the Communists more time to
build on the local electoral gains they scored last summer, while the weakness of
Moro's new government will increase the Communists' opportunities to exert
behind-the-scenes influence in parliament. Meanwhile, the Communists will, as they
have for the last month, point to the political deadlock as further evidence that their
party ultimately must be brought into the government.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 10, 1976
The French Communist Party congress ended on Sunday, with the delegates-as
expected-unanimously supporting George Marchais' proposals designed to move the
party away from Soviet-style orthodoxy.
Marchais called on the French Communists to modify their domestic image
primarily by dropping references to the "dictatorship of the proletariat." He
criticized Soviet efforts to "subject" other parties to a "uniform dogma" and to
restrict human rights in the USSR and Eastern Europe. At the same time, Marchais
emphasized his party's continued desire to cooperate with Moscow in the "joint
struggle against imperialism." The French party has few conflicts of interest with
Moscow on foreign policy, and the voters ii: is wooing are not deeply interested in
those issues.
Marchais also revived an old communist proposal for a "union of the French
people." His call for such a "union," based on an issue-by-issue agreement among
"like-minded progressive forces," seems designed to test the possibility of a joint
campaign with orthodox Gaullists against such government programs as popularly
elected delegates to the European parliament. At least one orthodox Gaullist has
already said the idea has possibilitiel
The major reaction has come from the Socialists, the Communists' major
partner in the left alliance, who see Marchais' proposal as an effort to outflank them
on the right. In an official party statement issued before the congress, the Socialists
argued that the Communist effort to present a liberal image was a political ploy
fdpginnprl to offset Socialist electoral pains rather than a real decision to reform.
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In Moscow's view, the French party's "declaration of independence" is a
painful blow with profound and disturbing implications. As the French party moves
in the direction of the Italian, it seems to reinforce a pattern, dismaying to Moscow,
in which the growth and success of Western parties is concomitant with their
deviation from the Soviet line. Moscow's banner of world communist leadership will
be further frayed and a new temptation will be created for the East European
parties.
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February 10, 1976
The Soviets can hardly ignore Marchais' open attacks, aimed as they were at
some of the most sensitive points in Soviet doctrine and practice. Even before the
French party congress, the Soviets sent oul: an unusual letter on "anti-Sovietism" to
all fraternal communist parties, in which the Soviets tried to defend themselves
against various criticisms launched by ""imperialists" but also by certain communist
parties.
The Soviet rebuttal of Marchais' charges will probably continue, but the
Soviets, who abhor open ideological splits lin the communist movement, will refrain
from pushing the dispute to the breaking point. This does not mean, however, that
they will supinely accept the French party's deviation. Recognizing that overt
pressure would be counterproductive, the will prob try to get the French back
in line by more subtle, gradual methods.
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 10, 1976
NATO Secretary General Luns arrives in London tomorrow for another round
of talks with British officials on ending the fishing dispute with Iceland.
British Prime Minister Wilson outlined a bargaining package designed to get
negotiations going again. London will ask Luns to relay an offer to reduce the
number of trawlers within the 200-mile zone, restrict the catch, and agree to respect
all conservation zones. In addition, London would withdraw its warships if
Reykjavik agrees to stop harassing British trawlers during the Luns mission.
Reykjavik refused to curtail its harassment tactics last month while Luns was
on a similar mission. London was forced to withdraw its frigates, thereby leaving its
trawlers unprotected, before Reykjavik would agree to talks. Trawl-cutting incidents
continued during the talks, and Wilson eventually ordered the fishermen to haul in
their nets if individually challenged.
Luns' task in Reykjavik will not be easy. The Icelanders will probably be even
more determined than they were during his last visit when he labeled the Icelandic
negotiating position "intransigent." In the meantime, Britain has incensed the
Icelanders by sending back its frigates to the disputed zone. In addition, domestic
political pressures have risen to the point which will make it very difficult for the
Icelandic government to make any major concessions.
Iceland plans to withhold the posting of a new ambassador to London during
the current tense situation in the fishing dispute. The last Icelandic ambassador was
transferred to Bonn recently and, although his replacement is read to go to
London, the new ambassador is being withheld as a protest.
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 10, 1976
The Caramanlis government is facing increasing difficulty in containing the left
and right extremes while also preserving Greece's fragile democracy.
Last month, Prime Minister Caramanlis ordered the arrest of a rightist
newspaper publisher for charging that the government and opposition were
collaborating to discredit the militar
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 10, 1976
President Tito's brief appearance on Yugoslav television Saturday and staff
preparations for his foreign travel next month suggest that his latest health problems
are not serious enough to immobilize him.
In mid-January, Belgrade had announced the postponement of Tito's trip to
Mexico and Cuba because of a bout with sciatica and influenza.
Tito's travel plans for March are reportedly being fleshed out. He is scheduled
to visit Mexico from March 10 to 12, and then will go to Cuba. Later he will visit
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 10, 1976
The communique of the recent 11-day conference of all the Balkan countries,
except Albania, keeps the door ajar for similar future gatherings.
The participants, middle-level officials who met in Athens from January 26 to
February 5, managed to identify a number of nonpolitical areas of cooperation for
their governments to consider, including agriculture, commerce, energy,
transportation, telecommunications, and the environment. The communique makes
clear that a second conference will depend on whether the participating governments
decide that such multilateral cooperation would be "useful and acceptable."
Yugoslav press accounts do assert that "most" participants are convinced that a
second session will be held soon.
The conference was inspired by Greek Prime Minister Caramanlis, who viewed
it as an opportunity to apply on the regional level the principles of detente adopted
at Helsinki last summer. He also considered it a way to secure his country's northern
flank against any possible adventurist actions by Turkey. Although most delegates
evidently tried to avoid politics, some reports claim that the Bulgarians clashed with
the Romanians over Bucharest's alleged effort to promote transformation of the
Balkans into a "zone of peace." The other participants, particularly Yugoslavia and
Romania, had from the outset regarded Bulgaria's role as that of a Soviet surrogate.
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 10, 1976
The Indonesians have thwarted the UN fact-finding team's efforts to visit
Fretilin-held areas of East Timor.
Secretary General Waldheim's special representative left Australia for Geneva
on February 8 after trying for a week to arrange safe passage to consult Fretilin
leaders in East Timor. Waldheim, who is visiting Australia, said he did not consider
the representative's mission terminated, but set no timetable for his return.
Jakarta paid lip service to the need to support the UN mission's efforts, but at
the same time accelerated the military occupation of remaining population centers
and airfields. The Indonesians then professed to be unable to guarantee safe passage
because of the unsettled situation and left the UN representative with no other
option than to meet Fretilin representatives in exile in Australia.
Jakarta will now attempt to delay raising the Timor issue at the UN as long as
possible. The Indonesians hope that by the time the topic does come up for
consideration, they will be in a position to argue that Timor's integration into
Indonesia is an accomplished fact and that the UN no longer has a role to play.
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