NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028600010008-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 17, 2006
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: February 5, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 5, 1976
CONTENTS
UK-ICELAND: Events leading
toward outbreak of cod war . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
USSR - SPANISH SAHARA: Soviets
publicly tilting toward Algerians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
USSR-CHINA: Soviets release Chinese
as trade-off for helicopter crew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
LEBANON: Muslim leaders
argue among themselves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
SYRIA: Effort to maintain
momentum on Middle East date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
JAMAICA: Renewed violence in
West Kingston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
ARGENTINA-UK: Dispute over
Falklands escalates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
PERU: Labor unrest
worrying government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
GUATEMALA-BELIZE: New talks
on the Belize dispute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
CYPRUS: Makarios orders criminal
proceedings against opponent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
NATO: Move toward more
collaboration in arms production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
ANNEX: French Communists
Open Crucial Congresss
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 5, 1976
Events in London and Reykjavik are building toward another outbreak of the
cod war.
British Foreign Secretary Callaghan yesterday held a meeting in London of all
11 NATO ambassadors to outline the British position in the fishing dispute with Iceland
and to request support from Alliance members. He said the UK had bent over
backwards in search of an agreement but had met only with Icelandic intransigence.
Callaghan announced that British trawlers were to return to the fishing grounds
last night and that, if they are harassed by Icelandic patrol boats, British warships
will follow. He said London had agreed to an Icelandic proposal for renewed talks
on a three-month agreement, but added that chances for such a settlement were slim
because of political opposition in Iceland.
Icelandic Prime Minister Hallgrimsson, meanwhile, told a special session of
parliament yesterday the reasons why the cabinet rejected the latest set of British
proposals to end the fishing dispute. The Prime Minister said the British request for
28 percent of the total annual catch off Iceland was unacceptable. The British
proposal stipulated that the UK would get a minimum of 65,000 tons of cod and an
overall catch of 85,000 tons when including other species of fish.
Reykjavik contends that conservation considerations require that the total
catch for all countries fishing in Icelandic waters must be limited to 230,000 tons. A
British annual catch of 85,000 tons would cut into the amount of fish Icelanders
themselves could take.
Hallgrimsson did not specify what he intends to propose to the British at the
next meeting to discuss a three-month agreement. Foreign Minister Agustsson said
that, in the meantime, Iceland would continue to enforce the ban on fishing within
its 200-mile zone. Hallgrimsson added that if efforts to reach a settlement with the
British are not successful, Iceland will again have to face the questions of breaking
diplomatic relations with London and withdrawing from NATO.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 5, 1976
The Soviets are publicly tilting toward the Algerians in the dispute over Spanish
Sahara, but in order to avoid an open break with Morocco, they have refrained from
directly endorsing the Algerian-backed Polisario Front.
Soviet comment on last week's fighting between Algerian and Moroccan forces
has been slanted somewhat toward the Algerian version. Moscow reiterated its
support of self-determination in Spanish Sahara and, for the first time, took note of
the Polisario guerrilla movement.
The Soviets have, nevertheless, failed to bless the Polisario Front as a "genuine"
national liberation movement, and they have not come out four-square behind the
Algerian position. Late last year, the head of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity
Committee-the group that fronts for Moscow's relations with insurgent
groups-visited Algeria. At that time, he limited his public comment to support for
the "people" of Western Sahara. There is no confirmation of Moroccan-inspired
reports of Soviet personnel in Spanish Sahara or of Soviet arms shipments to the
Polisario guerrillas.
The Soviets probably think that they can profit from the increased tension
between Rabat and Algiers. Before the dispute, Soviet relations with Algeria had
been cool. The two were at odds over Algeria's independent Third World policies,
and economic and military ties had loosened.
The Soviets, however, quickly responded to Algerian security concerns last fall
by entering into a major new arms agreement, by sending some arms, and by urging
Libya to expedite the shipment of Soviet-supplied weapons to Algeria. Angola may
have affected the Soviet decision to assist Algeria. Moscow has used Algiers as a
major stop-over point for its airlift to western Africa and may have seen the military
aid agreement as a quid pro quo for use of Algerian airfields.
Somewhat at odds with the thrust of Soviet media accounts, Soviet diplomats
in Rabat have been stressing Moscow's neutrality in the Saharan conflict in an effort
to prevent further deterioration of relations with Morocco. They have even said that
Morocco's take-over of Spanish Sahara is a fait accompli that Algeria will have to
accept.
Such comments, along with Moscow's restrained reaction to Morocco's
detention last month of a Soviet fishing trawler suspected of carrying arms to the
Polisario Front, indicate that Moscow wants to balance its relations between Rabat
and Algiers. The Soviets have apparently taken to heart Moroccan King Hassan's
warnings of retaliation should they support Algeria directly. Moscow has significant
commercial interests in Morocco and still hopes to participate in the development of
the phosphate industry there.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 5, 1976
The Soviet Foreign Ministry's leading China expert, Mikhail Kapitsa, told
Ambassador Stoessel on Monday that Moscow has freed six Chinese as a trade-off
for China's release of the three Soviet helicopter crewmen. Four of the Chinese
reportedly were released immediately after China sent the crewmen home in late
December, and the other two shortly after January 1.
Kapitsa continued to belittle the significance of China's gesture, noting again
that it had been accompanied by a sharp increase in Peking's anti-Soviet propaganda.
Moscow, he said, had officially protested China's invectives in a note to the Chinese
on January 29.
Kapitsa said Moscow had no plans to send Deputy Foreign Minister I lichee-its
chief negotiator for the border talks-back to Peking because there was no reason for
him to return. China, he said, wants a continuation of the talks, but not a resolution
of the border problem.
As usual, Kapitsa was pessimistic about the prospects for a meaningful
improvement in Sino-Soviet relations until Mao dies. He was more optimistic,
however, about the prospects for some easing of tensions in the immediate post-Mao
era. He said that a close reading of speeches by the Shanghai radicals indicates that
they are less anti-Soviet than others in the leadership.
Kapitsa's appraisal of the radicals does not jibe with what he usually says or,
for that matter, with what the Soviets have been saying in the press. In fact, Soviet
media in recent weeks have attacked two of the Shanghai radicals Kapitsa mentioned
by name-Politburo members Yao Wen-yuan and Wang Hung-wen. Kapitsa himself
criticized Wang Hung-wen in an interview he gave to a leading Italian weekly
magazine on January 18.
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February 5, 1976
Lebanese Muslim leaders are arguing among themselves about how to divide the
political spoils that they expect to win soon from the heretofore dominant Christian
political parties.
The Muslims' immediate problem is how to apportion the handful of
parliamentary seats they will occupy after the system of Christian and Muslim
equality in parliament replaces the existing six-to-five ratio favoring the Christians.
The Muslim contingent in parliament is made up of several loosely organized
blocs that will compete for the additional seats. Politically powerful Sunni Muslim
leaders are reluctant to allow equal representation to the disadvantaged Shia
Muslims.
Socialist leader Kama[ Jumblatt has complicated the negotiations among
Muslims by offering to give up his demands for proportional representation, which
would bring more leftists into parliament, but only if the top government posts
reserved for Muslims are no longer designated specifically for either Sunnis or Shias.
Jumblatt has not been able to assume any of the top jobs because he is a member of
the Druze religion, a minority offshoot of Islam.
Christian leaders also are divided, mostly on how best to ensure Syrian and
Palestinian respect for the Christian prerogatives that will remain after a political
settlement. Leaders of the various Christian factions have been meeting over the past
week in an attempt to agree on a common approach before President Franjiyah goes
to Damascus to negotiate a final accord with Syrian President Asad.
The Christians have made little progress toward eliminating their differences,
but they have tried to paper them over by forming an umbrella right-wing political
group, the Front for Freedom and Man. Although this group will theoretically draw
support both from Christians and from conservative Muslims disenchanted with the
expanded Syrian and Palestinian role in Lebanon, it is not likely to assume any
political importance and will probably collapse quickly.
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February 5, 1976
The Syrian government is casting about for a way to maintain the diplomatic
initiative it gained by promoting last month's UN Security Council debate on the
Middle East.
The Syrians are uncertain how to move negotiations forward to their
satisfaction. For tactical reasons, they are giving serious consideration to trying to
reconvene the Security Council soon for another round of discussions on the Middle
East.
Damascus has been playing up, for domestic consumption, last month's nine to
one vote in favor of the Arab resolution as a "moral" victory. In fact, President Asad
is clearly not satisfied with the outcome of the debate, which resulted in three
abstentions in addition to the US veto.
The Syrians probably take some satisfaction in a belief that the debate
contributed to a more sympathetic understanding of the Palestinian cause in the US
and gained Asad's added prestige in the Arab world at the expense of Egyptian
President Sadat. They had unrealistically hoped for more, however.
Having failed to drive a wedge between the US and Israel on the Palestinian
issue or to move the US any closer to accepting Palestine Liberation Organization
participation in the Geneva peace talks, Damascus is now reluctant to relinquish the
diplomatic initiative. According to a Syrian Foreign Ministry official, a special study
group set up by Asad to evaluate the results of the recent Security Council session
has recommended that Syria seek to reconvene the council before Asad's scheduled
visit to France in mid-March.
The study group would apparently have Syria submit another resolution for
Security Council consideration. If the vote seemed likely to go the same way it did
last month, the group proposed that Syria seek adoption of a "uniting for peace"
resolution calling for an emergency special session of the General Assembly. This
formula was used to get around a lack of unanimity among the permanent members
of the council during the Korean crisis in '1950 and in connection with both the
Suez Canal and Hungarian episodes in '1956.
The Syrians probably realize this tactic would have little practical effect on
negotiations. Damascus, however, remains opposed to Syrian-Israeli talks under US
auspices or to reconvening the Geneva talks without PLO participation.
The Syrian leaders probably remain convinced that they can expect no new
meaningful US peace proposal until after the US election this year. Both for
domestic and foreign policy reasons, Asad would like to avoid the appearance of
passively acquiescing to such a prolonged diplomatic stalemate. Consequently, he
appears to be trying to fashion some sort of strategy for keeping the pressure on the
US and Israel over the next several months.
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ntelligence Bulletin
February 5, 1976
Partisan violence in the slums of West Kingston was renewed earlier this week,
causing the deaths of a policeman and four civilians.
The fighting, between neighboring gangs attached to the two major political
parties, occurred on the eve of a voter registration campaign. In the past, both
parties have used such occasions to try to force members of the opposition to vacate
their homes in order to prevent voting registrars from placing their names on voting
lists.
A gang of thugs under the control of Minister of Housing Anthony
Spaulding-a leading member of the left wing of the ruling People's National
Party-apparently provoked this round of violence. It is likely that, as in the past,
Spaulding acted independently of Prime Minister Manley. Spaulding may be trying
to extend his own base of support so he can pressure Manley into accelerating his
move to the left.
The slum fighting adds to the general lawlessness in Kingston and strengthens
the impression that Manley has only tenuous control of his party. The Prime
Minister is already under heavy attack from the opposition party and the right wing
of his party over his failure to restrain the left and for his plan to create a
"self-defense force" within the party.
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Argentina yesterday escalated its dispute with the UK over the Falkland
Islands.
I an Argentine
destroyer sought to halt the British research vessel Shackleton near the islands and
threatened to fire into its hull when the Shackleton refused to comply. An
Argentine Foreign Ministry communique confirmed press accounts that warning
shots were actually fired across the Shackleton's bow.
The Argentines have refused to recognize British sovereignty over the
Falklands, and the century-old dispute has been made worse by Argentine suspicions
that the research vessel will look into the possibility of oil deposits in the area. To
press home their protests of the Shackletori expedition, the Argentines asked the
British to recall their ambassador last month.
Argentina is hardly likely to get involved in a shooting incident with the UK, at
least not deliberately, but the issue provides President Peron's administration with a
useful diversion from its domestic turmoil. Further harassment of the Shackleton
can probably be expected.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 5, 1976
Increased labor unrest and the prospect of a Civil Guard strike are worrying the
+jovernment.
Despite President Morales Bermudez' promise on January 30 to take another
look at a recent wage-limiting decree, one of Peru's largest labor unions staged a
48-hour protest strike on Monday. Although some 140,000 workers in Lima
reportedly walked off their jobs, little disruption was noted in the city. Other unions
did not participate in the strike but are on record as opposing the wage limitations.
The threat of a coordinated nationwide strike-considered unlikely at this
+ime-continues to worry the government.
Peru's Civil Guard, meanwhile, is considering a strike today to commemorate
he first anniversary of a work stoppage by Guard members that resulted in civil
disturbances. The planned two-hour strike would allow Guard members to visit
Iravesites of their fallen comrades. Some Guard officials doubt that any strike will
!ae of long duration and believe that the protest will be confined to a widows' march
.ind a demand for salary raises for Guard members.
Should the strike last longer, however, the government may be faced with the
iieed to call in armed forces personnel to maintain order in the capital. The military
eportedly have contingency plans to secure Lima within two hours, but military
leaders will be wary of overreacting to avoid a reoccurrence of last year's bloodshed.
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February 5, 1976
Delegations headed by Guatemalan Foreign Minister Molina and British Foreign
Undersecretary Rowlands will begin new negotiations to resolve the Belize dispute
next Monday.
The outlook for an overall settlement is not promising. Right-wing pressure on
Guatemalan President Laugerud for recovery of Belizean territory remains high, and
Guatemalan intransigence is expected on territorial concessions.
Laugerud has broadened the National Council on Belize by adding
representatives from the military and each of the political parties. Heretofore, the
council had been composed solely of distinguished citizens. By including military
and political representatives, the President is evidently trying to spread responsibility
for the outcome of the talks. Nevertheless, he may find it difficult to prevent the
politicians and the military from forcing him to adopt a hard-line position in the
negotiations that would be unacceptable to the UK.
Cypriot President Makarios has ordered criminal proceedings against Nicos
Sampson for his role in the July 1974 coup and the illegal take-over of the
presidency that triggered the Turkish invasion. This action is a sharp departure from
Makarios' policy of placating rightists since his return to Cyprus in December 1974.
The decision to move against Sampson, who runs an anti-government
newspaper and has his own private army, was made on Monday. Police have been
placed on alert in case Sampson's followers try to retaliate.
Makarios says Sampson's continued plotting against the government prompted
the move. It may well be, however, that Makarios is in fact responding to pressure
from the left to prosecute those involved in the coup and his own desire to settle old
scores. Makarios once said he would get even with those involved in the coup "one
by one." Makarios is probably also reacting to charges from abroad that his
government has done little to solve the assassination of US Ambassador Davies in
August 1974, in which far rightists have been considered likely suspects/
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'Ten European members of NATO's military organization and France agreed in
Rome this week to move toward greater collaboration in arms production.
Organized as the new Independent European Program Group, the 11 will meet
outside the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance in order to emphasize a
European identity and to accommodate French objections to association with
NATO's inteqrated military command. The group committed itself to strengthen the
"European factor" in the relationship with the US and Canada and to ensure that
Western Europe maintains a modern industrial and technological base.
At the same time, the group resolved to maintain Alliance cohesion. The
rench accepted without difficulty the language of the resolution designed to ensure
ihat the new European assertiveness is intended to develop a manner compatible
with the interests of NATO as a whole. Even so, the French emphasized that the
qroup's own work should proceed independently of NATO.
The resolution embodies the desire of France and the others to maintain
national capabilities. The Europeans, however, also agreed to formulas that would
relax somewhat the usual insistence on a fair national return for each participant in a
project.
Although the initial commitments to collaboration are modest, the principles
adopted could be a first step toward more systematic intra-European cooperation.
[he most ambitious specific element of the present resolution may be the call for
coordination of future equipment needs and replacement dates.
Arms officials will meet in six weeks to work out a detailed work program, and
the group will convene again at the political level in June to assess progress.
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including eight Dravidian Progressive Federation members of Parliament and
hundreds of party cadre. Indian police are extracting from local party personalities
February 5, 1976
INDIA: Little opposition has materialized in Tamil Nadu following New
Delhi's dissolution of the state government on January 31. Some isolated incidents
occurred on Monday and Tuesday, but none was of much consequence. Officials of
the Dravidian Progressive Federation, the regional political party that ruled the state
until declaration of president's rule, are apparently holding firm to their plan to
avoid any activity that could get out of hand and lead to violence. Even so, Prime
Minister Gandhi's government has moved harshly to forestall opposition. About
6,000 people reportedly have been arrested since president's rule was imposed,
written pledges that they will not undertake any political activity
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French Communists Open Crucial Congress
February 5, 1976
The 22nd French Communist Party congress, which opened yesterday and ends
on Sunday, may well be one of the most important congresses since the party was
founded in 1920. It is being billed as the congress that will ratify the leadership's
decision to move the party from Soviet-style orthodoxy.
Party leader Georges Marchais apparently has convinced the party leadership
that the party must move in this direction if it is ever to restore dynamic growth. He
points to the fact that the party has been unable to expand upon the roughly 20
percent of the vote it has won during most of the postwar period. To overcome this
inertia, Marchais entered into a leftist alliance with the Socialists in 1972 under a
"common program for governing."
Many in the French party-and the Soviets-had serious doubts about this
alliance and about the doctrinal compromises required by the program. They felt
vindicated when election results and public opinion polls showed that the Socialists
had exploited the alliance not only to attract previously uncommitted voters but
also some Communist supporters.
Marchais has not wavered in this course, but internal resistance did oblige him
to attack the Socialists publicly. These quarrels helped mollify those Communists
who believed the Socialists were advancing at the expense of their party.
Marchais has now restored what to him is a sufficient measure of party unity,
discipline, and self-awareness. According to party officials, membership is up, morale
is high, and the leadership is agreed that the party should resist any Soviet effort to
return it to orthodoxy.
Most French Communists are still bitter toward Moscow over the Soviets'
implied preference in 1974 for Giscard over the left's candidate, Mitterrand. Since
then, the French Communists have been unhappy about Soviet refusal:
--to change their preference for a non-leftist government in France;
--to approve, unequivocally, the French party's alliance with the Socialists;
--to accept, in general, the policy of some West European Communists of
seeking alliances with non-communist progressive forces.
Al
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February 5, 1976
Although official Soviet commentaries have come down on both sides of the
issue of what methods West European Communists should use to gain power, the
French Communists seem to have concluded that Moscow is unable to accept their
course.
As 1975 drew to a close, the French party's opposition to the Soviets during
preparatory meetings for the conference of European Communist parties hardened.
At that time, Marchais began a series of well-publicized actions designed to separate
his party from the Soviets.
--He criticized Soviet treatment of political dissidents and challenged Moscow
to deny the existence of prison camps in the USSR.
--He signed a joint declaration with the Italian Communists, accepting the
freedoms associated with democratic societies and opposing "all foreign
interference" in their countries' domestic affairs.
--He proposed dropping the phrase, "dictatorship of the proletariat," from
party statutes.
In his opening speech to the congress, Marchais reiterated these themes.
A Deeper Dispute
In proposals to drop the phrase, "dictatorship of the proletariat," Marchais
was, in effect, broadening the argument with Soviets from a tactical disagreement
over how a communist party achieves power to a deeper dispute over what a
communist party is.
Marchais has said publicly that the French party no longer aims at a
"dictatorship of the proletariat." Dictatorship, he said, reminds the electorate of all
the unpleasant things the party wants to put behind it; proletariat, he added, is
unsuitable when the party wants to emphasize its appeal to a broader range of the
electorate.
A senior French party official recently reminded an interviewer that the phrase
is symbolic of Soviet domination of the communist movement. In rebuttal, a high
Soviet party official told a Western correspondent that "the dictatorship of the
proletariat is and remains a basic principle" of international communism.
When the shift is confirmed by the congress, the Communists may be able to
take some of the edge off of the French Socialists' standing as the left's most
dynamic party. The shift will also facilitate cooperation between the Communists
and orthodox Gaullists. The Communist and Gaullist deputies share a strong
nationalistic bias in dealing with such issues as defense policy and European
integration. A2
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An Open Question
The question of whether these moves-and the others that are likely to
follow-are a sign of a real change or just a political tactic will remain open for some
time. The history of the French party shows a number of attempts at autonomy
from the Soviets, including a short-lived disapproval of the invasion of
Czechoslovakia.
The French party probably faces a debate after dropping the phrase,
"dictatorship of the proletariat," from its statutes. Historically, a party that rejects
this aim-even the highly independent Italians have not gone so far-is no longer
regarded by Moscow as a Leninist party. Many French Communists are dogmatists
who fear just that, while many French voters will remain skeptical that a mere
change in phraseology will mean a real change in intent. The former-and
ultraleftists-will contest the change in wording, and the leadership will be driven
either to retreat or to argue its case at great length, much of the time in public.
Reports indicate that the party Politburo ventured into this exercise in
"anti-Sovietism and reformism" almost unanimously. Present unity, however, is not
necessarily proof against future challenge.
A senior party official has indicated that Marchais and his supporters are
seriously concerned about whether they will be able to bring along the old-line,
pro-Soviet rank and file. If disaffection should appear, it could be
exploited-probably with Soviet encouragement-to undermine or unseat Marchais.
Never very popular and weakened by a serious heart attack early last year, Marchais
would be vulnerable if the Communists continued to lose ground to the Socialists.
Marchais may try to ease any resentment among the rank and file by publicly
supporting the Soviets whenever possible, a relatively easy price for the French party
to pay. There are few real conflicts of interest between the French Communists and
the Soviets in foreign policy, and the French voters the party hopes to woo are not
deeply interested in foreign policy anyway.
Nothing But Trouble
The party will gain nothing but trouble in its attempt to change if:
--the rank and file continues to follow a dogmatic pro-Soviet line in dealing
with the other leftists;
--there are more than a few defections from the party to the ultraleft;
--the party cannot moderate the hectoring, intolerant tone that characterizes its
statements and symbolizes its essential Stalinism to the electorate.
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This essential Stalinism cannot be altered overnight. The transformation of the
French Communist Party into a movement like the "liberal" Italian party will take
years of adaptation, and the process will be marked by stops and starts, even if the
goal does remain consistent.
If the party can sustain the appearance of change over the next two years it
could deeply affect French politics. If a steadily increasing number of French voters
become convinced by the March 1978 legislative election that the Communists are
becoming a democratic party, the fortunes of the left alliance will greatly improve.
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Top ecret
Top Secret
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