NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028500010012-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: January 8, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
January 8, 1976
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 8, 1976
CONTENTS
LEBANON: Heavy fighting in
almost all Beirut suburbs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ITALY: Moro
government falls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
TURKEY: Possible move to undermine
Prime Minister Demirel's coalition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
CUBA-GUYANA-ANGOLA: Guyana may be
stopover on Cuban airlift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
GREECE: Conference on Balkan states
probably will take place soon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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ICELAND-UK: New
ramming incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
ANNEX: Latin American Arms Purchases
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Beirut, Lebanon
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Traditional Muslims
Mtditell',w w Sea
Al Ashrafiyah
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Ussain al Arai dt:st
Phataanges
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;aides Ar 1ans
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Tail a'tar
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January 8, 1976
Heavy fighting erupted yesterday in almost all of Beirut's suburbs, following
the collapse of negotiations to end the Christian blockade of two Palestinian refugee
camps. Sustained clashes could soon spread to central Beirut and the hotel area.
If the Christians do not lift their blockade, Fatah and Saiqa fedayeen units may
enter the battle in force for the first time. For political reasons, Palestinian leaders
are reluctant to be drawn into the fighting, but they consider on the other hand that
they cannot bow to the Phalangists' demands or permit the Christian militias to
prohibit access to the camps.
The major fedayeen groups could, within days, commit as many as 5,000
troops to the fighting in Beirut. This would upset the rough balance of Muslim and
Christian military strength that has prevailed over the past several months. The
balance could not be redressed by involvement of the army, as the number of the
army troops who are still available for security duty is inferior to the number of
Palestinians.
Palestinian forces have concentrated on heavy shelling from Tall Zatar camp
into adjoining Christian areas, and on attacking the predominantly Christian district
of Horsh Thabet. Less intense clashes occurred yesterday throughout the Christian
and Muslim neighborhoods on the east side of Beirut River.
An adviser to President Franjiyah confirmed to a US official this week
that the Christians' position has hardened in private negotiations as well as in their
public stands.
The adviser claimed, however, that the next move is up to the Lebanese
Muslims and the Syrians. He alleged that Karami has been unable to secure general
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Muslim backing for a list of specific reform proposals that he promised Franjiyah,
and that Damascus is refusing to accept a Christian proposal that any comprehensive
agreement be guaranteed by an international police force including Saudis and
Kuwaitis as well as Syrians.
The deadlock in negotiations and the return of heavy fighting have brought
normal political activity to a halt. The cabinet failed to hold its weekly meeting
yesterday, and Karami's "higher coordination committee"-the only institution that
has regularly brought leaders of the warring factions together-was boycotted by
leftists and Palestinians protesting the Christian blockade.
Syrian Prime Minister Khaddam reacted on Tuesday to calls by
ultraconservative Lebanese for the partition of Lebanon by threatening that Syria
will annex the country if an attempt is made to divide it into legally separate
Christian and Muslim states.
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The resignation of the government yesterday presents the country's party
leaders with basic political choices. Another shuffling of cabinet portfolios would be
only a temporary measure. An early parliamentary election may be the only way
out.
The Socialist Party brought about Prime Minister Moro's resignation by
withdrawing its support in parliament. The Socialist decision came after months of
analysis led Socialist leaders to conclude that their party must take the initiative or
eventually risk its survival as a separate political party.
The Socialists concluded that any new partnership with the Christian
Democrats must be based on two conditions:
--that the Christian Democrats agree to programs that would appeal to the
leftist voters the Socialist want to capture;
--that any new government consult more openly and formally with the
Communists so that they cannot use their opposition status so effectively in
electoral competition with the Socialists.
The latter condition-aimed as much against the Communists as the Christian
Democrats-is likely to be the major stumbling block to any new agreement. Had the
Socialists waited until after the Christian Democratic congress scheduled for March,
the latter might have found a way to compromise on the issue. As of now, however,
the Christian Democrats are deeply divided over the wisdom of openly qualifying
their opposition to the Communists. A majority of Christian Democrats appear to
feel that dealing with the Communists more openly runs the risk of sliding into
broader and irreversible collaboration with them eventually.
For their part, the Communists do not relish the prospect of a confrontation
now among the governing parties. The Communists saw their interests served best by
Moro's continuation in office. That gave them the opportunity to work discreetly in
parliament to further Communist leader Berlinguer's aim of an eventual
rapprochement with the Christian Democrats, while maintaining Communist
credentials as an opposition party.
President Leone has the option of refusing to accept Moro's resignation or of
insisting on a parliamentary debate followed by a vote of confidence. The President,
for example, refused to accept former prime minister Rumor's resignation in 1974,
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because Leone thought the political and economic situation too precarious to permit
a government collapse. Rumor eventually succeeded in patching up the feud. Leone
has a similar view of the current situation, but he will probably conclude that the
differences that led the Socialists to abandon the government are deeper in this
instance.
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January 8, 1976
Pressure may be building toward a parliamentary showdown between Prime
Minister Demirel's shaky coalition government and the opposition that could affect
the pace of the negotiations on the US bases and a Cyprus settlement.
Opposition leader Ecevit, who appears to be confident that his Republican
People's Party can win the next parliamentary election outright, seems to be laying
the groundwork for a campaign to undermine Demirel's coalition and precipitate a
government crisis that would probably lead to early elections. Ecevit has already
applied pressure by:
--asserting that the government lacks a working majority in parliament;
--fanning rumors about internal coalition problems;
--challenging Demirel to join him in a coalition to prepare for early elections;
--canvasing parliament for votes to unseat Demirel;
--attacking the government's inaction on a broad range of problems.
These moves appear to be only re arator to a direct attack on the
government in the National Assembly.
Ecevit may have singe out the-
government's 1976 budget bill-which must a passed by March 1-fora test case.
He needs to attract only 11 votes from independents and splinter party deputies to
defeat the bill.
Ecevit's apparent belief that circumstances favor his moving at this time is no
doubt colored by the continuing instability within the government coalition.
Demirel's most troublesome coalition partner, National Salvation Party leader
Erbakan, remains agitated over the Prime Minister's decision to vote for Ecevit's
candidate for speaker of the lower house of parliament. In keeping with his history
of obstructionist tactics in the cabinet, Erbakan directed a party spokesman to
announce last week that the Salvationists would "tolerate" the coalition another
month and then reconsider their participation.
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 8, 1976
In recent public statements, Demirel seems to be trying to give the impression
that he is game for a fight. There remains, however, the possibility that the Prime
Minister-beset by problems on all sides-could be persuaded by a sustained attack
from Ecevit to view early elections as a way out.
Ecevit will have a difficult time convincing a majority in the National Assembly
to approve early elections. Even members of his own party are reluctant to incur the
expense of a campaign and risk losing their seat before elections become mandatory
in 1977.
Even if unsuccessful, however, a frontal attack by Ecevit on the government
would seem likely to make Demirel even more immobile on major issues than he has
been in recent months. If successful, such a move could play havoc with attempts to
resolve the problems of Cyprus and the US bases in Turkey by bringing in a
caretaker government that would r bably hesitate to make major decisions.
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Havana may be using Georgetown, Guyana, as a secret shuttle stop for its
military airlift to Angola. A local civil air official has told the US embassy in
Georgetown that civil air flight logs at Georgetown's Timehri airport show a total of
five Cuban flights to Africa since December 21. The official said the five flights
involved ten aircraft, most if not alI I L-1 8s, rather than the Bristol Britannia aircraft
we have been observing on other legs of the Cuban airlift. The local Texaco manager,
however, who claims he controls the only refueling facilities at the airport, told the
embassy on January 5 that no Cuban flights to Africa had been refueled since
December 22.
It is possible that the Texaco official's records list the Cuban aircraft as being
supplements to the regular weekly flights, reflecting false Cuban declarations
designed to hide the fact that they were actually part of the troop airlift. It is also
possible that the official's records show fuel sales to the government of Guyana or
some other entity which then performs the actual refueling of the Cuban aircraft.
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 8, 1976
The conference of Balkan countries formally proposed by Greek Prime Minister
Caramanlis last August will probably take place in Athens later this month at the
"expert" level to examine the possibilities for greater inter-Balkan cooperation in
the areas of trade, communications, energy, and culture.
The Greek government says its primary aim in sponsoring the conference is to
contribute to an improvement in relations in the region in accord with the spirit of
the European Security Conference in Helsinki last summer. Greek Foreign Ministry
officials have emphasized that no political connotations should be attached to the
Greek initiative and that it does not portend a shift in Greece's traditional
pro-Western orientation. Caramanlis' primary motivation appears to be his desire to
secure the support or at least neutrality of his communist neighbors to the north in
the event Greece's relations with Turkey deteriorate further. He was probably also
motivated by a desire to preempt any similar initiative by the Turks.
Caramanlis first broached the idea of such a conference during his visits to
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Romania last spring and summer and followed this up with
formal invitations to those countries as well as to Albania and Turkey on August 20.
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Romania accepted while Albania declined. Suspicious of
Greek motives and worried about a negative impact on the internal political scene,
the Turkish government held off until late December before accepting the invitation.
Ankara's delayed positive response appears to have resulted from the Greek and
Turkish foreign ministers' agreement in Brussels last month to make a sincere effort
to settle their differences.
For their part, the communist states bring a legacy of mutual suspicions, and in
some cases outright irredentism, to the conference. Albania's refusal to attend stems
from a blanket distrust of its neighbors' motives. Yugoslavia suspects that Bulgaria
will serve as a Soviet stalking horse at the conference. Romania may well be the one
communist state most interested in rapidly advancing regional cooperation as one
means of weakening its reliance on the Soviet alliance system.
All the participating countries have in principle accepted January 26 as the date
for convening the conference.
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A new ramming incident: will make it difficult for Prime Minister Hallgrimsson
to continue his low-key approach to the fisheries dispute.
The Icelandic Coast Guard announced one of its cutters was rammed yesterday
by a British warship about 35 miles offshore. No injuries resulted. The ramming was
claimed to be a deliberate attempt to damage the patrol boat, since there were no
trawlers in the area.
Until now Hallgrimsson has maintained a moderate approach to the issue. He
has given no indication, however, that he is prepared to resume negotiations, even
though London has made known its willingness to reduce the demand from 110,000
to 90,000 tons. Hallgrimsson and most other noncommunists have avoided closely
associating the fishing dispute with the presence of the US-manned Icelandic
Defense Force or NATO membership. He has also ruled out for the present a break
in relations with the UK.
This new incident will make it more difficult to resist growing pressure for
government action against the UK. Hallgrirnsson,may decide to raise the issue again
,in the UN Security Council or to recall his ambassador from the UK. A full break
with London now, however, is unlikely.
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Major Latin American Recipients of Non-US Arms
January 1970 to Mid-1975
= Value of a n< ^ ered material
Major Non-US, Arms Suppliers to Latin America
1,400 January :[970 to Mid-1975
1?302
1-,200
Value of undelivered material
Value of delivered material
643
221
F 'I
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Between 1950 and 1970, the US supplied approximately two thirds of the $1.8
billion total value of arms, military training, and support delivered to Latin America,
excluding Cuba. In the late 1960s this relationship began to change.
The desire of Latin American states to upgrade and modernize their inventories
conflicted with policy restrictions on the amount and type of materiel the US would
provide. In addition, some of the equipment could not be provided by the US, either
because it was not available in US surplus stocks or was considered too sophisticated
or too expensive for Latin American needs. Consequently the Latin Americans
began to seek other sources of equipment. Between January 1, 1970, and July 1,
1975, non-US suppliers provided more than 70 percent of the $1.8 billion of
military assistance delivered to Latin America. An additional $1.9 billion had been
contracted for but was not yet delivered. The US undelivered contract value as of
July 1, 1975, totaled about $400 million.
Seven Latin American recipients-Brazil, Peru, Argentina, Ecuador, Venezuela,
Chile, and Colombia-accounted for most of the non-US arms transaction during this
period (Figure 1). Although Peru is the leader in the value of arms actually received,
deliveries under existing contracts will probably make Brazil the largest recipient
within the next few years.
The nearly $1.9 billion in non-US arms still to be delivered to these seven Latin
American countries is over 50 percent greater than the value of non-US equipment
received between January 1, 1970, and mid-1975. For all major recipients, except
Ecuador and Chile, at least 77 percent of this sum will be used for expensive naval
ships and associated equipment. Deliveries to Ecuador will be balanced among the
armed services. Chile has not purchased major military hardware since the coup in
late 1973, and deliveries under prior contracts are almost complete.
Four West European major suppliers-the UK, France, West Germany, and
Italy-provide the lar est share of the non-US arms for the seven major Latin
American recipients II Almost all transactions have been sales under
long-term credit as opposed to grant aid. France has delivered the most materiel
through mid-1975, but, with continued delivery of costly naval ships, the UK will
overtake the French. Although the large dollar value of assistance makes Italy one of
the four major suppliers, almost 70 percent of Italian sales between 1970 and
mid-1975 were made to Peru. No other major supplier has extended more than 38
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percent of its assistance to any one Latin American nation. Less than 10 percent of
Latin America's foreign arms purchases have come from countries outside of
Western Europe and the US. Canada, Israel, and Brazil account for most of that
total.
The desire of some of the Latin American countries to upgrade and modernize
their inventories is best reflected in the types of equipment acquired
"Purchases include some of the more sophisticated materiel currently available on
the world market. This is especially evident in the acquisitions of major naval
warships, with each major recipient buying at least two submarines. In addition, all
but two of the major surface ships-the Alnnirante Grau and Tre Kroner, purchased
by Peru and Chile, respectively-are new construction. Equipment for the air force is
the second-largest category of purchases, with each major recipient buying at least
10 modern jet fighters.
France is the leading supplier of major ground materiel.
I the
only major items of ground equipment provided by nations other than France are
artillery pieces from Italy and three minor suppliers, four 155-mm. self-propelled
howitzers from Italy, Tigercat SAMs from the UK, and Cobra antitank missiles and
UR-416 armored personnel carriers from West Germany. Italy's 1973 sale of four
Alpino-class destroyer escorts to Peru broke the UK's virtual monopoly on the
supply of newly built major surface warships. West Germany has matched the UK in
the number of submarines and patrol boats provided. The greatest diversity of
equipment appears in the supply of aircraft. France, the UK, Italy, and Canada have
supplied the fighter aircraft, and nine countries are supplying transport aircraft.
Latin American countries view themselves as modern nation states and have
actively sought arms reflecting this status. This has been and will remain the prime
motivating factors behind their acquisition of sophisticated weapons. Naval and air
equipment continues to be the subject of current materiel negotiations. Although
regional arms limitation proposals have been discussed since 1958, no agreement is
anticipated.
Because Latin America has been remarkably free of major military conflicts,
Latin countries as a whole have consistently spent a smaller proportion of their gross
national product on defense than have other developing nations. Between 1966 and
1972, the average annual outlay in Latin America was about 2 percent; since then it
has dropped to less than 1.5 percent. Average expenditures of all Third World
nations were more than 5.5 percent, and the figure for the Middle East was almost
12 percent.
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Latin American military budgets typically allow 10 to 15 percent of total
expenditures for procurement of foreign arms. By spreading delivery and repayment
over a number of years, countries have made large arms purchases without seriously
straining their balance of payments. Although the annual payment on the military
debt has increased to some $300 million to $400 million during the past three years,
Latin American countries should be able to meet current repayment schedules
without jeopardizing economic development:.
Because arms spending has not imposed an excessive drain on Latin economies
and the Latin American arms market has been vigorously exploited by West
European nations, we believe that the pattern displayed since 1970 will continue to
characterize Latin American arms acquisitions.
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