NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028500010002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 2, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 2, 1976
ITALY: Socialists threaten
to withdraw support for Moro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
USSR: Pravda article on SALT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
CHINA: New Year's Day
editorial defends cultural revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
ALGERIA-MOROCCO: Algerian
press attacks increasing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
FTAI-SOMALIA: Serious
unrest likely in territory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
ARGENTINA: Service chiefs
agree President Peron must go . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
USSR: Fall-sown grain
crops seriously jeopardized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1
USSR: Trade deficits force
reliance on Western credits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
USSR: First T-class submarine
to pass through Bosporus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 2, 1976
Socialist Party leader De Martino has threatened to withdraw Socialist
parliamentary support for the Moro government next week-a move that would lead
to the collapse of the government and possibly to early parliamentary elections. A
final decision may be made at the Socialist directorate meeting on Wednesday.
De Martino's position had been that no decision should be made on support for
Moro until after the Socialist Party congress in February. Several factors probably
encouraged him to take a harder line, among them:
--De Martino's rivals in the party maintain that continued support for Moro
limits the Socialists' ability to compete with the Communists in the next
elections. The rank and file seem to be giving more support to this view,
hindering De Martino's plans to emerge from the congress with a solid majority
behind him.
--The Socialists have found themselves increasingly isolated in parliament on
issues important to their constituency, such as the medium-term economic plan
and legalized abortion. In the debate taking place on abortion, the Christian
Democrats have formed an ad hoc alliance with the Communist opposition to
thwart Socialist efforts to give women complete freedom of choice.
If the Socialists follow through on their threat, the ensuing government
problems are likely to be among the most difficult and protracted of the postwar
period. The Christian Democrats cannot form a workable non-Communist
government without the Socialists, but the latter are not likely to cooperate unless
some formula can be found that increases Socialist influence in the government
substantially and/or associates the Communists with the government in some way
short of actual participation in the cabinet. The Socialists believe that they cannot
compete with the Communists at the polls unless the latter are forced to take some
responsibility for government actions.
The Christian Democrats, who are preparing for a party congress in March,
remain deeply divided over how to respond to Socialist demands. The collapse of the
Moro government in present circumstances would thus increase the possibility that
the parties might resort to early parliamentary elections in an effort to break the
deadlock. Some Socialist leaders favor elections because they feel their party stands
to gain more if the elections are held next spring instead of in May 1977, as now
scheduled.
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 2, 1976
Pravda on New Year's Day published a statement on strategic arms limitations
that reaffirms Soviet interest in a new agreement. The article is signed "Observer,"
indicating Kremlin endorserrent.
None of the issues now under discussion is addressed. Instead, the article strikes
out against US citizens who have charged the USSR with failure to comply with
existing strategic arms limitations agreements. It accuses such people of trying to
frustrate US-Soviet detente for "various selfish political aims." It labels as
"concoctions" allegations that the USSR has exceeded limits on ballistic-missile
launchers or is seeking to interfere with technical means of verification. The article
cites statements by President Ford, Secretaries Kissinger and Rumsfeld, and former
secretary Schlesinger to the effect that Moscow is not in violation of existing
agreements.
Acknowledging that "certain questions" may arise regarding fulfillment of
strategic arms limitations, Pravda states that such issues must be resolved by the
standing consultative commission. The article notes that not all the USSR's
questions regarding US compliance with strategic arms limitations agreements have
been "fully eliminated," but: it does not accuse the US of violating any agreement.
The discussion of compliance is unusual. It appears intended to channel
complaints into established forums and to indicate that such complaints will not
interfere with the business of negotiating a new agreement. The article puts the
Soviets on record as being ready for a new accord, but it gives no hint whether they
will modify their negotiating positions in order to bring about another agreement.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 2, 1976
The New Year's Day editorial carried in all of Peking's major publications
expressed satisfaction with last year's economic and scientific achievements but
reflected continuing behind-the-scenes maneuvering in the political sphere.
The bulk of the editorial was devoted to a defense of the cultural revolution of
the mid-1960s and of the policies that grew out of that period. This positive
assessment of the cultural revolution emerged suddenly last month in a series of
articles. They seemed to reflect dissatisfaction from the party's left wing that
cultural revolution policies were being criticized, and in fact overturned. Unlike the
December articles, the editorial was generally less strident, refrained from singling
out rehabilitated officials, and did not call for harsh action against those who are
reluctant to follow the policies of the cultural revolution.
The editorial was accompanied by the republication of two poems written by
Chairman Mao in 1965, just prior to the cultural revolution. One poem alludes to
the revolutionary spirit of the civil war, while the other is critical of those who were
afraid of the upcoming cultural revolution. The poems were quoted liberally in the
editorial and were treated as important reading material for 1976.
Although the editorial's defense of the cultural revolution was balanced by calls
for unity and continued economic progress, the editorial quoted a new statement by
Mao that unity and stability do not mean the end of political struggle. The major
struggle under way is over whether to retain the educational policies of the cultural
revolution. Mao himself recently endorsed changes in educational policies that in
essence reverse those of the cultural revolution. This has prompted an outcry from
the party's left wing, and the Chairman has reportedly given his approval for a
debate on the issue.
The editorial set strict limitations on this "great debate," which is to be carried
out under the firm leadership of the party. In this regard, the editorial strictly
prohibited the formation of "fighting groups." This suggests that the education issue
is getting out of hand or at least reflects Peking's determination to keep the debate
from becoming a disruptive force.
The derogatory reference to fighting groups follows by one day the publication
of a letter to Mao from a group of university students. The students claimed they
were "fighting" and "hitting back" in Mao's name at those who want to make
changes in the educational policies of the cultural revolution. The editorial's
prohibition of fighting groups may in fact be Mao's response to the letter and his
disapproval of such tactics. In any event, while the education debate will be allowed
to continue, bellicose students, such as those who wrote to Mao, seem to have
received a public-and official-dressing down.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 2, 1976
No new themes or formulations appeared in the editorial's relatively short
foreign policy section; attacks against Moscow were every bit as sharp as Chinese
propaganda prior to the release last weekend of the Soviet helicopter crew.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 2, 1976
Algerian press attacks against Morocco's expanding control of northern Spanish
Sahara are becoming more vitriolic.
In a lengthy diatribe on December 30, Algeria's party newspaper, El
Moudjahid, for the first time called for the overthrow of the Moroccan monarchy.
The party organ occasionally exceeds official guidelines, but this article may have
been officially inspired. Earlier this month an Algerian official implied that Algiers
might remove restrictions placed on Moroccan dissidents living in Algeria.
Algeria is also venting its anger at Morocco's move into Sahara by harassing and
expelling Moroccan nationals living in Algeria. The deportations began on December
11, the same day Moroccan troops were officially welcomed in the Saharan capital
of El Aaiun. According to press accounts from Rabat, 30,000 Moroccans have been
deported on the pretext of being illegal residents. An estimated 350,000 Moroccans
live in Algeria.
Despite these actions, Algerian officials in private do not seem overly exercised.
They have denied speculation that Morocco and Algeria have withdrawn their
ambassadors from each other's capitals. The Algerian officials maintain that their
envoy is home for consultations; the Algerian charge in Rabat expects him to return
early this month.
Morocco, for its part, has been making conciliatory gestures to Algiers. A senior
Foreign Ministry official who visited Algiers on December 29 to discuss the
expulsions of Moroccans was apparently unsuccessful. According to a source of the
US embassy in Rabat, the Algerians underscored their "sovereign right" to deport
aliens and left the impression that the expulsions are likely to continue.
Some Moroccan officials in Rabat are concerned that Algeria is about to allow
the Polisario Front, a Saharan guerrilla movement, to announce a provisional
Saharan government. A senior Algerian official stated on December 30, however,
that the Front did not plan to make a declaration of independence. He characterized
such a move as premature. So far, the Algerians have portrayed the Front only as a
liberation movement. 1
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Kenya
Ethiopia
Yemen
(SFina)
Socotra
Yemen (Aden)
Indian
Ocean
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 2, 1976
France's announcement on December 31 that it will grant independence to the
French Territory of Afars and Issas by June 1976 could trigger serious unrest in the
territory, as well as subversion by Somalia.
The specifics of the transfer of power are yet to be negotiated, according to a
French spokesman. Paris presumably will try to avoid any arrangements that might
throw into question the shaky leadership role of Ali Aref Bourhan, current president
of the local governing council.
Anti-Aref groups in the territory, with an eye on gaining power following
independence, will almost certainly demand to play an important part in the
negotiations, especially those having to do with future elections. If refused a role,
they may take to the streets in an effort to oust Aref, who was the target of assassins
in early December.
Neither Aref nor any other leader can speak for a majority of the territory's
population. There is a fundamental conflict between the Afars and the Issas, the two
major ethnic groups, but each is also beset by deep division in its own ranks.
Aref was installed by Paris in the 1960s because he was willing to support
continued French rule and was able to keep the Afars in line. After years of
defending French control, Aref became convinced that his more radical opponents
in Djibouti were gaining ground by their demands for immediate, unconditional
independence. He came out for independence early in 1975, but he has carefully
orchestrated his efforts with the French.
Aref's acceptance-or perhaps his advocacy-of France's additional decision to
maintain its military presence in the horn of Africa will be a sore point. Aref, of
course, recognizes that the decision will be used against him, but he probably
believes the French presence is necessary to guarantee the territory's security against
any overt threats by Somalia.
Although Somalia has given lip service to the concept of independence for the
territory, President Siad's government seeks to incorporate it into Somalia; the Issas
are ethnic Somalis. Mogadiscio also is attempting to gain a voice in the arrangements
leading to independence. In a sharply worded diplomatic message to Paris last
month, Mogadiscio warned that a number of steps should be taken before the
French give up political control. Among other things, the Somalis indicated that a
government led by Aref would be unacceptable to Mogadiscio.
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 2, 1976
Somalia could react to the French announcement by increasing its support of
the Front for the Liberation of the Somali Coast, a small Somali-backed Issa group
headquartered in Mogadiscio. Somalia could then support guerrilla incursions into
the territory.
Mogadiscio's claim to the role of spokesman for the Issas is weakened by its
apparent loss in recent years of much of the support it had among members of the
tribe. Many Issas have little use for Siad's leftist, authoritarian regime. Many Somalis
who live in Djibouti left Somalia to seek economic opportunities they felt they
could not find under Siad's government.
Amid indications earlier this year that Aref would probably lead an
independent government in Djibouti, Ethiopia renounced its own historic claims to
the territory. Addis Ababa would, however, consider a direct threat to its economic
interests any territorial government that was either pro-Somali or sympathetic to the
Afar rebels in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa's vital rail route to the Red Sea terminates in
Djibouti.
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 2, 1976
President Peron is continuing to resist military demands that she either resign
or take an immediate leave of absence.
The three service commanders and their staffs met again on December 29 to
discuss her continuance in the presidency and unanimously agreed that she must give
up power. Advised later about the decision, Peron reportedly rejected the generals'
desires, insisting that she must remain chief executive without conditions.
Nonetheless, she offered to change her cabinet and remove two staunch supporters,
her private secretary and a Peronist labor chief. The three commanders replied that
the issue of her removal from office is not negotiable.
Although the situation is at an impasse, the generals' decision that the President
step aside appears irreversible. The longer she refuses to leave, the firmer the generals
will become in their belief that a solution can begin only when she is removed from
power.
Meanwhile, the President continues to lose support within the congress. On
December 31, the Chamber of Deputies voted "no-confidence" against its
president-a staunch supporter of Peron-and in effect called for his resignation. On
December 26, a motion calling for impeachment proceedings against President Peron
on grounds of incompetence reached the Chamber of Deputies. Although this move
will undoubtedly gain more support than an earlier effort, opposition forces
probably will not be able to muster the two-thirds majority required for passage.
Debate on the motion, however, will further discredit the President.
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USSR
Snow Cover Protection Against Winterkill,
Mid-December 1975
Percentage of Normal Soil Moisture,
1 December 1975
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 2, 1976
Below-normal temperatures and inadequate snow cover are seriously
jeopardizing the USSR's fall-sown grain crops. The prospect of extensive winterkill is
heightened because the seedlings entered winter dormancy weakened by drought.
The season's stationary high-pressure system over Siberia came early this year,
bringing unusually cold temperatures to the country's winter grain areas. If the
winter continues to be dominated by this system, and if heavy snowfall does not
occur soon, cold temperatures may kill up to one third of the crop.
The low levels of soil moisture also will inhibit the growth of spring grains
planted to replace winter-killed plants. Moreover, similarly low soil-moisture reserves
in several major spring grain areas are a harbinger of poor sowing conditions in May.
The scars of this year's drought have not healed in the Urals and surrounding
regions, and more precipitation than normal will be essential for average or better
yields.
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National Intel
ligence Bulletin January 2, 1976
Continued large hard-currency trade deficits are causing the USSR to rely more
heavily on credits backed by Western governments. Moscow has already warned US
officials that the lack of Eximbank credits is causing the US to lose a substantial
amount of Soviet business.
In recent weeks, the Soviets have approached the French, Italians, and
Canadians for further credits, even though the major share of the $4.2 billion in
general-purpose credit lines already granted by these three countries has not been
used. Since mid-1974, the USSR has received a total of $6.5 billion in
govern ment-backed general-purpose credit lines from countries that customarily
make them available-Italy, Canada, the UK, and France. During this period, the
USSR has also received $4.5 billion in project-associated credits from Japan, West
Germany, Italy, and France.
Soviet officials have recently pressed Western governments to enlarge the
general-purpose credit lines:
--In December, the USSR asked Canada to increase the $500-million credit line
granted earlier in the year. The Soviets said the $500 million had been
allocated to specific projects, but they would not list the projects that would
exhaust the existing credit line. Few if any actual contracts have been signed.
--The Soviets informed France in November that they would soon be seeking
credits beyond the $2.8 billion Paris granted in December 1974. Again, Soviet
officials claimed that the existing credit line has been earmarked, but they
refused to specify the projects involved.
--During a November visit, Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev queried Italian
officials about additional credits beyond the $900 million granted in
September. Given the large value of Soviet deals' under negotiation, Italian
officials stated that additional credits would most likely be offered.
Moscow's desire to arrange additional credits before existing ones are exhausted
can be traced in part tD hard-currency problems. By lining up additional credits, the
Soviets can better decide which country's firms should be approached for a
particular order and what total value of equipment can be purchased over the next
few years. Soviet reluctance in stating which projects have been allocated to existing
credit lines is understandable; Soviet bargaining positions with foreign firms would
be significantly reduced if the firms knew that Moscow was committed to purchase
equipment being negotiated.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 2, 1976
The Soviets have been informing US officials that, despite a marked preference
for US equipment, the lack of US credits will force them to make purchases
elsewhere. Within the past week, Soviet officials have stated that some $800 million
for oil-industry equipment will have to be diverted from US-based firms to their
foreign subsidiaries and/or to West European and Japanese firms. In another case,
the bulk of orders for the Cheboksary tractor plant will be made in 1976, but the
major share would go to West European and Japanese firms or US subsidiaries
producing in those countries.
These recent statements to US officials concerning the loss of orders may have
been orchestrated in Moscow to support Soviet contentions concerning the adverse
effects of a lack of Eximbank financing. The shortage of hard currency and a
growing debt service, however, make it important for the USSR to secure the most
advantageous credit terms available; many potential orders for the US will continue
to be diverted abroad because of the lack of US credits.
On December 28 a diesel-powered, torpedo-attack submarine, believed to be a
T-class, passed through the Bosporus Straits into the Mediterranean, the first Soviet
submarine to do so since May 1973.
If the submarine were indeed a T-class, it would be the first out-of-area
deployment for this latest model Soviet diesel attack submarine, which first
appeared in 1973. The Black Sea Fleet is believed to have two operational units, the
Northern Fleet one.
Under the Montreux Convention governing naval use of the straits, submarines
that transit the Bosporus southbound are supposed to put in at a port for repairs or
overhaul. The Soviet submarine could operate with the Mediterranean Squadron for
some time, but it would then have to call at a port for yard work. It could also make
an obligatory dockyard visit in the process of a permanent interfleet transfer to
another Soviet operating area. In May 1973, two W-class units shifted from the
Black Sea to the Soviet Baltic Fleet for overhaul.
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