NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010045-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: November 28, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 28, 1975
CONTENTS
PORTUGAL: Abortive rebellion
claims first political victims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
SPAIN: Limited amnesty does
little to relieve tensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
JORDAN-ISRAEL: Complaints
about Israeli overflights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
JAPAN: Union lbaders
seek end to strike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
ANNEX: The Political
Opposition in Spain
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 28, 1975
The abortive military rebellion which was crushed by pro-government forces
has claimed its first political victims, Army Chief of Staff Carlos Fabiao and security
chief Otelo de Carvalho. The government announced that both resigned yesterday,
but did not link their resignations with the leftist rebellion.
The anti-Communist majority in the Revolutionary Council had sought their
dismissal for weeks because both men openly encouraged leftist dissident groups
within the armed forces.
General Fabiao, once one of Portugal's most highly respected military officers,
has received much of the blame for the divisive political factionalism in the army.
Last month, he was severely criticized for giving in to the demands of rebellious
soldiers in the north. On several occasions recently, he appeared to give his approval
to radical movements in the military. He has been replaced temporarily as army
chief of staff by an obscure infantry lieutenant colonel.
Inasmuch as Carvalho was stripped of his commands earlier this week, his
resignation was largely pro forma. Carvalho is widely credited with having planned
and executed the April 25, 1974 coup which ended nearly 50 years of authoritarian
rule. He had become the standard-bearer of the radical left, however, and in recent
weeks the Communists also rushed to his defense as he came increasingly under
attack for his failure to support government policies.
President Costa Gomes has announced that the government will withhold
judgment on who was responsible for the paratroopers' rebellion until an official
inquiry can be held. Fifty one officers and enlisted men captured during the uprising
are being held under detention in the north.
In the absence of formal charges, both the Socialist and Popular Democratic
parties have rushed to seize the political initiative by blaming the Communists.
Socialist leader Mario Soares said the "principal guilt" rests with the "minority
parties"-a euphemism for all parties left of the Socialists-headed by the
Communists. The Popular Democrats charged that the Communists were guilty of
creating the conditions which led to the mutiny. While Communist Party members
discreetly avoided any direct participation, military officers believed to have close
ties to the party did appear to play a major role. The Communists are also vulnerable
because of their strident calls for the government's resignation just prior to the
rebellion.
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November 28, 1975
On Wednesday, both Costa Gomes and Foreign Minister Melo Antunes were
quick to reassure the public that the leadership would continue to pursue its aims
now that the major leftist opposition in the military has been crushed. The President
reiterated. his faith in a democratic, pluralistic system for Portugal, saying that
legislative assembly elections-scheduled for early next spring-would be held as
promised.
Antunes, firmly rebutting Communist demands for revamping the government,
said that leftist criticism of its present composition had been unfounded and that it
was entirely capable of carrying out its duties. Antunes added that the political
parties-the Communists included-will continue to play an essential role in the
revolution.
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National Intelligence Bulletin November 28, 1975
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The limited pardon issued by Spanish King Juan Carlos on November 26
appears to have done little to heal political wounds or reduce the prospect for an
open break between the new regime and the leftist opposition.
Yesterday, as 81 foreign delegations-including the presidents of three
Common Market countries-met in Madrid to honor the new King, the Spanish
government continued its censorship policies by seizing the latest edition of the
country's leading political weekly magazine because it contained a speculative article
about Juan Carlos' liberalization plans. On Wednesday, police had announced the
arrest of 30 young people, mostly students, in northwestern Spain for holding an
illegal political meeting, and there were scattered reports of other arrests elsewhere
in Spain.
Many leftists reacted angrily to the King's royal pardon, and riot police
yesterday broke up two demonstrations-in Madrid and in the Basque city of San
Sebastian-in which noisy crowds demanded total amnesty for political prisoners.
The political opposition has been calling on Juan Carlos to grant a general amnesty
for the roughly 2,000 political prisoners held in Spanish jails as a token of his serious
intention to carry out meaningful reforms.
The Socialist Workers Party, the largest non-Communist opposition group,
pointed out that even Franco had approved several similar pardons and charged that
the decree showed only that nothing had changed in Spain. Opposition Christian
Democrats were also disappointed, although they were more willing to look on the
pardon as a "positive step" which might be followed by others.
The decree has come under heavy criticism for the vagueness of its wording.
Much will depend on how the Justice Ministry interprets the law. The decree
provides for the reduction of prison sentences for political and common crimes, for
example, but it does not apply to terrorists, Communists, anarchists, separatists, and
certain kinds of monetary crimes. Opposition lawyers fear that the government
could limit application of the amnesty to common criminals and ignore political
prisoners entirely.
The decree also commutes death sentences that have been or might be imposed
for crimes that were committed prior to Juan Carlos' investiture on November
22-except for terrorists being tried under last August's anti-terrorist law. The
Communists will probably view this exclusion as confirmation that the government's
strategy is to try to isolate the party from the rest of the left. To counter this the
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party is trying to stir up broad opposition to the government. The Communists have
had little success in this effort so far, however, and the Communist-dominated
workers' commissions reportedly have now backtracked on their earlier call for a
national general strike within a week or 10 days of Franco's death.
According to a US embassy source, the attempt to convoke a crippling national
strike has been postponed until conditions are more propitious. In the meantime,
the Communist Party and the workers' commissions plan to instigate a series of local
"days of struggle" to help create a more favorable climate for a general strike. The
first of these localized strikes is planned for next week and will be limited to
construction and metal workers in the Madrid area.
There are several probable reasons for this setback to the Communists'
long-standing goal of a national general strike:
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--Workers are worried about inviting repression from the right, and are
disinclined to strike because of the increasingly difficult economic situation
and growing unemployment.
--Communists have reportedly encountered resistance to strike action from
non-Communists within the workers' commissions and strong opposition from
the two principal non-Communist clandestine trade unions.
The Communists remain insistent, however, that some form of "democratic
action by the masses" is required to put pressure on Juan Carlos' successor regime.
They probably see the labor sector as offering the best opportunity for counterin
government efforts to isolate the Communists from the rest of the left.
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JORDAN-ISRAEL
November 28, 1975
The Jordanians are becoming increasingly irritated at Israeli overflights and
have complained to the US about them.
Jordan's air force commander recently told the US defense attache in Amman
that he had come under pressure from King Husayn to intercept the Israelis. The
commander said the overflights had become insulting to the King and were causing
morale problems among Jordanian pilots. He said that, although he did not want to
lose aircraft in a confrontation with Israel or to invite Israeli retaliation, he had
considered setting a trap for the Israelis that could result in a shoot-down. He saw
little chance of success in such a venture. Although for the moment at least the
Jordanians have reportedly elected not to challenge Israeli aircraft, this decision has
led to increased grumbling in the military.
According to the Jordanians, the Israelis have recently increased the number of
their penetrations of Jordan's air space and are now overf lying Jordan once or twice
a week.
Although the Jordanian air force would be no match for the Israelis, continued
overflights by Israeli aircraft could force Amman to take action.
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National Intelligence Bulletin November 28, 1975
Japanese union leaders are looking for a face-saving gesture from the
government so they can cut short the strike launched by railway and other public
workers yesterday.
The illegal walkout, affecting nearly 19 million commuters, is designed to
dramatize the demand of public employees for the right to strike-a contentious
issue that has kept labor and government at loggerheads for more than 20 years.
Union leaders apparently launched the strike with some reluctance. Originally the
campaign was timed to coincide with the release of a definitive government decision
on the issue, but the government delayed the release, and union leaders now fear
that unless the strike is curtailed public opinion will turn against them. A similar
walkout in 1973 resulted in widespread public indignation, aimed largely at the
striking workers.
The government is unlikely to compromise in any meaningful way. Public
employees have not only long been the most militant and politically active of all
union workers, but they are also closely allied with the Socialist Party, the major
opponent of the ruling Liberal Democrats. In any case, the conservatives
undoubtedly calculate that popular reaction to the transportation tie-up will work
to their advantage
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MEXICO: An anti-government union faction may try to hold a large rally in
Mexico City today in defiance of a government ban. The downtown site is near the
US embassy; a violent clash with police is possible. Members of the faction, who
were expelled by the government early this year from an electrical workers union,
which they dominated, have the support of several far left worker, student, and
farmer organizations in their effort to regain control of the union. The government
is concerned that this support will erode its own control of labor and grow into a
strong challenge from a united left-something the government has not had to worry
about since the student problems of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Echeverria
administration has called for the support of the entire government-run labor
establishment to beat back the challenge.
November 28, 1975
THAI LAND-LAOS: The Lao government, as a demonstration of "good
intention," has given permission for Thailand to remove the patrol boat grounded in
the Mekong River during an incident on November 17. Vientiane has emphasized,
however, that the boat is in Lao territory and has asked that the Thai inform Laos in
advance of the time and date of the recovery operation. Two factors probably
contributed to the Lao decision: recognition that a prolonged cut-off of goods from
Thailand, particularly gasoline, hurt the Lao more than the Thai, and a belief that
Laos had already derived the maximum propaganda mileage from the incident.
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National Intelligence Bulletin November 28, 1975
The Political Opposition in Spain
The political opposition in Spain has been weakened by nearly four decades of
proscription and today consists, for the most part, of poorly organized survivors of
political parties and regional organizations.
Many of the groups have "exile" as well as "interior" party structures.
Personalities are often more important than the groups they lead, and rival factions
are divided as much by their devotion to different leaders as by ideology. Opposition
leaders last year attempted to overcome differences by moving to combine their
parties into a coalition. They made some progress, but the emergence of two rival
coalitions destroyed any visions of a unified front.
The initiative for a merger came from the Communists, who pushed the
formation of the Democratic Junta in the summer of 1974. The Junta fell far short
of Communist hopes, mainly because of a legacy of distrustamong Spanish leftists,
who remember the ruthless Communist purges of anarchists, Socialists, and others
during the closing days of the Spanish Civil War. Most Socialists and Christian
Democrats refused to join. The most important non-Communist party to join was
Tierno Galvan's Popular Socialists. Tierno has considerable personal prestige and
some influence in leftist circles, but his group is very small and lacks popular
support.
Easily the Strongest
The Communists are easily the strongest and best-organized force in the
opposition. They number about 5,000 active members in Spain and at least twice
that many abroad, mostly in France. The party, outlawed since the end of the Civil
War, was harshly repressed by the Franco government-in contrast to Franco's
toleration of many other opposition parties-and Communist leaders have rarely
ventured into Spain. Santiago Carrillo, now 60 and living in Paris, has beensecretary
general since Dolores Ibarruri accepted the honorific title of party president in 1960.
The main source of the Communists' strength is their dominance over most of
the workers' commissions formed in the 1960s. Communist organization, discipline,
and financial backing have helped make the commissions the most dynamic political
mechanism available to the Spanish worker. The commissions will be particularly
useful to the Communists if King Juan Carlos does not open other avenues by which
the workers can take their grievances to management.
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The Communists also have at their disposal an instrument for political
propaganda in Radio Espana Independiente, which broadcasts from Romania. The
Communists find some support in the Spanish universities and have gained
considerable influence in the media. Their attempts over many years to infiltrate the
military have produced no apparent results. The basic Communist aim, however, has
been to encourage the neutrality of the military during the post-Franco evolution of
Spain's political system.
On international issues, the attitudes and positions of the Spanish Communists
are close to those of the Italian Communists. Carrillo's relations with Moscow have
been particularly strained since he denounced the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia
in 1968. Like Berlinguer, Carrillo stresses his independence from Moscow and has
criticized the Portuguese Communists for their hard-line tactics. Carrillo professes to
favor a more gradual approach to change. He recently said, for example, that he
cannot object to the US military bases in Spain as long as the Soviets keep troops in
Czechoslovakia.
A second opposition coalition, the Platform of Democratic Convergence, was
formed last summer as a counterweight to the Communist-controlled Junta. The
Platform has some 15 opposition parties, organizations, and trade unions, but is
dominated by Socialists and Christian Democrats. Its program calls for a new
democratic constitution to create a federal state and a number of autonomous
regions.
Most of the groups adhering to the Platform would accept gradual evolution
toward a democracy like others in Western Europe-although there is considerable
squabbling over how gradual the evolution can be. The Platform probably has tried
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to accommodate too many viewpoints. One extremist group recently withdrew to
protest the Platform's moderation regarding the transition period, and another is
expected to follow suit.
The Socialist Workers Party-the major Socialist faction in Spain-is the
dominant force in the Platform and the Communists' main rival on the left. The
Socialist Workers Party and its affiliated trade union were revitalized in 1972 after
party "young turks" in Spain wrested control from "old guard" exiles in France.
The party is now led by Felipe Gonzalez, a young, articulate lawyer from Seville.
Four Christian Democratic factions-Ruiz Gimenez' Christian Democratic Left
and three regional groups-have joinedthe Platform, and a fifth, Gil Robles' Popular
Democratic Federation, is expected to join soon. Gil Robles and Ruiz Gimenez say
that the various Christian Democratic factions are already collaborating closely, and
that some form of union is inevitable, but the diversity and bitter personal rivalries
among these factions makes effective unity unlikely.
Little Cooperation
Cooperation between the Junta and the Platform coalition has been limited. In
early September they did join in condemning the government's new law on terrorism
and its execution of five terrorists. A few days later, Carrillo misrepresented the
joint communique as an agreement on a common program, leading several Platform
groups to issue immediate denials. In spite of the friction, the two again issued a
joint communique at the end of October, this time setting out objectives for the
transition period. Agreement, however, took two weeks of arduous negotiation and
some major concessions from the Communists.
Major i erences do separate the two coa i ions:
--The Communists and others in the Junta reportedly hope to merge the two
coalitions into a single popular front. Platform leaders are not prepared to go
beyond establishing a committee of coordination.
--The Junta believes that the structure of the Spanish government must be
completely reorganized. Platform leaders believe that modification of the
existing structure will be sufficient.
--The two differ over how to handle demands for autonomy in the Basque
provinces and Catalonia.
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All opposition groups are in general agreement that the two most pressing
issues in post-Franco Spain will be amnesty for political prisoners and legalization of
political parties. The partial amnesty issued by Juan Carlos on November 26 has
done little to reduce tensions on this important issue. The royal pardon, which
commutes death sentences for crimes prior to Juan Carlos' investiture on November
22 and reduces some prison sentences, falls far short of the opposition demands for
a general amnesty for all political prisoners. The decree excludes Communists as well
as terrorists, anarchists, and separatists from the reduced sentences.
There are deep disagreements among Spain's established leaders over whether
actions such as amnesty and legalization of parties should be taken and, if they are,
whether the Communists should be included. At this point, Juan Carlos seems likely
to exclude the Communists. Some members of the opposition believe that exclusion
will only benefit the Communists and that the Communists could be challenged
more effectively in open competition. The Communists would almost certainly react
to exclusion by stepping up their opposition to Juan Carlos.
The King probably believes that excluding the Communists would be an
acceptable risk, in view of the pressure he will come under from conservative
members of the establishment. Jose Antonio Giron-a powerful Falangist
politician-and other prominent figures of the far right have publicly condemned the
idea of active political parties in Spain. Juan Carlos knows that Giron and his
followers have played a major role over the past year in scuttling Prime Minister
Arias' limited moves toward political pluralism.
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