NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010038-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: November 22, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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National 1 ntel l igence
Bulletin
Top Secret
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 22, 1975
LEBANON: Violence continuing 1
SYRIA-ISRAEL: Reaction to fedayeen
attack on Israeli settlement 2
PORTUGAL: Another possible compromise
solution to government-leftist differences 3
SPAIN: Juan Carlos proclaimed King 5
ICELAND -WEST GERMANY: Tentative
agreement reached on fishing issue 9
ITALY: Christian Democrats'
council to meet Sunday 10
JAPAN: Miki says no general
election "for the time being" 13
MALAYSIA: Razak faces
political confrontation 14
ANNEX: The USSR's High
Profile in Angola
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National Intelligence Bulletin November 22, 1975
The violence of the past three days in the Beirut suburbs threatens to draw the
large Christian and Muslim militias into sustained fighting. Persistent efforts by the
extreme left to incite greater violence have already prompted an increase in
kidnapings and sparked exchanges of fire in central and eastern Beirut.
Armed clashes have also been reported in the Tripoli-Zagharta area of northern
Lebanon.
The government's 300-rnan shock force, created early in the week, has begun
patrolling the streets of Beirut. The force was designed primarily to apprehend
snipers and stop firefighters in the city center, and it will be of little or no use in
halting the widespread shooting in the suburbs.
Leftist politicians are apprehensive at Karami's recent moves to bypass the
national dialogue committee-where the left is dominant-in favor of personal
negotiations with President Franjiyah. Socialist leader Kamal Jumblatt, although
continuing to support Karami as Prime Minister, late this week held a press
conference to repeat his preference for working through the committee and his
frequent calls for electoral reform.
French mediator Couve de Murville arrived in Beirut on November 19. He is
engaged in consultations with all major Lebanese and Palestinian political and
religious leaders.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 22, 1975
Tel Aviv is likely to interpret the fedayeen attack on an Israeli settlement
Thursday night as part of an effort by Syria to increase tension as the expiration
date-November 30-of the UN forces' mandate approaches. The attackers, who said
they were from aSyrian-based unit of Yasir Arafat's Fatah, got back to Syria after
killing three Israelis and wounding another. ',
This was the second terrorist infiltration of the Golan from Syria in less than a
month. In late October the Israelis ambushed a group of Fatah infiltrators, killing
two and capturing five. The prisoners said they had received extensive support from
the Syrian military. That operation had been the first instance of fedayeen
infiltration from Syria since the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement was signed
last year.
The Israeli government will be under strong domestic pressure to strike back at
the Palestinians, especially in light of the Israeli casualties and the terrorists' escape.
Any retaliation, however, is more likely to be made against fedayeen bases in
Lebanon. The Israelis do not want to contribute to tension with Syria just before
the UN mandate is due to expire.
The Israelis nevertheless will tighten security measures on the Golan and
initiate more aggressive patrolling of the disengagement line. Such activities increase
the risk of clashes with Syrian troops along the narrow UN buffer zone.
Official Israeli reaction to the terrorist incident has focused on fedayeen, rather
than Syrian, involvement. A Foreign Ministry spokesman emphasized yesterday that
the attack again demonstrated that the fedayeen, including Arafat's followers, are
terrorists who have no place in the framework of civilized nations.
DIA believes that while the Israelis would not lightly make a decision to attack
terrorists located in Syria, they would do so if they perceived their security interests
were sufficiently threatened, despite the possible repercussions. The fact that this is
the second recent terrorist attack from Syrian territory, and one which involved
casualties, raises the possibility that the Israelis will at least consider launching a raid
against terrorists in Syria.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 22, 1975
Portugal's anti-Communist leaders yesterday backed away from a direct test of
wills with the extreme left, and another compromise solution may be in the making.
The all-military Revolutionary Council met yesterday to discuss the
government's refusal to carry out its activities, apparently laying the groundwork for
such a compromise. The council:
--Criticized the government's action and instructed Prime Minister Azevedo to
ensure the normal functioning of the government until a solution is found.
--Called for immediate talks with the political parties to find a common
platform, which could involve "remodeling" the government.
--Named a leader of the anti-Communist Melo Antunes group, Vasco Lourenco,
to replace extreme leftist Otelo de Carvalho as commander of the Lisbon
military region.
--Dissolved the special "military intervention force" set up to enforce the
government orders.
Following a meeting late yesterday between President Costa Gomes, Azevedo,
and Carvalho, it was announced that Carvalho would retain his post as Lisbon region
commander until at least Monday, when an extraordinary session of the
Revolutionary Council, convened by the President, will take place. If Carvalho's
ouster does stand, it will mean that all four of the country's military regions will be
headed by officers loyal to the Azevedo government.
The council's other decisions are more ambiguous. They seem to indicate that
the Antunes group-which has a majority on the council-has backed away from its
former strong support of the present cabinet. The cabinet is made up of Socialists,
center-left Popular Democrats, anti-Communist military officers, and a single
Communist.
The council's criticism of the government's suspension of activities is puzzling
because the Antunes group reportedly helped instigate the move. According to one
report, Antunes may be thinking of leading a new government of leftist
administrators.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 22, 1975
Portugal's anti-Communist forces may no longer be pursuing a common
strategy, beyond preventing the government from falling into the hands of the far
left. If the Socialists and Popular Democrats are convinced that a government shuffle
will keep their opponents at bay until a general election next year, they will
probably agree to the shuffle even if it involves a short-term gain for the
Communists.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 22, 1975.
Juan Carlos, proclaimed King of Spain today, is the country's first ruling
monarch since his grandfather, Alfonso XI II, fled the country in 1931.
Personally designated and groomed by the late Franco, the 37-year-old Juan
Carlos has in public maintained a studiously correct deference to the general and to
Francoism. As Prince, he was careful to give Franco, who could always have named
someone else as successor, no excuse for displeasure. Privately, however, Juan Carlos
has over the past few years confided to leading Spanish reformers and visiting
dignitaries from Western Europe and the US that he would like one day to liberalize
Spanish institutions. He has made clear he intends to bean active chief of state and
to resist firmly any attempts to turn him into a figurehead.
There is little positive enthusiasm in Spain for Juan Carlos or the monarchy,
but there is a widespread disposition to support him for lack of a better alternative.
If he succeeds in preserving law and order while gradually opening up the political
process, he will gain more positive acceptance. The task will be formidable, and we
are far from certain that he has the qualities to meet it.
Juan Carlos remains largely untested in the political arena, despite a 40-day
period as acting chief of state during the summer of 1974 when Franco was seriously
ill. He has tended in the past, when he has had to make decision
key advisers.
The constitution suggests the prime minister will be the most powerful man in
the new government. Much, of course, will depend on the personalities involved.
There is enough leeway in the law to allow a strong chief of state to exercise
significant power.
Under the constitution, the chief of state:
--Commands the armed forces-although Juan Carlos' command will probably
be only symbolic.
--Presides over the cabinet.
--Approves and promulgates taws and provides for their execution.
--Acts as final arbiter in disputes between high government bodies such as the
cabinet, the legislature, and the judiciary.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 22, 1975
--Ousts prime ministers with the approval of the 17-man advisory Council.. of
the Realm.
--Chooses a prime minister from a slate of three persons selected by the Council
of the Realm.
These powers are restricted, however, by a requirement that all official acts of
the chief of state be approved by one of four persons: the prime minister, the
president of the Parliament, the president of the Council of the Realm, or the
minister whose office is involved in-the decision.
Juan Carlos has said he knows it is urgent for him to demonstrate his own
support for a more liberal system. He has pointed out, however, that this cannot be
done overnight and that he must take into account what would be acceptable to ,the
military, which will be his main support.
Leaders of the leftist opposition have intimated that they are disposed to give
Juan Carlos a period of grace. Any such period is likely to be short. If change does
not come quickly, the left is likely to turn against him.
Juan Carlos believes that if the monarchy is to work in post-Franco Spain; he
must show it to be an effective agent of social change as well as an influence for
political stability. Last fall, he expressed his frustration over the constraints imposed
on his future capacity to maneuver politically. He mentioned specifically the system
of limiting his choice of prime minister to the three candidates chosen by the
Council of the Realm. He also mentioned that he would be saddled with many of
Franco's appointees to the ruling party's national council. They hold their positions
for life and are also members of parliament.
In contrast to Franco, Juan Carlos has traveled widely. He made official trips to
the US in 1971; Japan, Ethiopia, and West Germany in 1972; France in 1973; the
Philippines, India, and Saudi Arabia in 1974; and France, Finland, and Iran in 1975.
Juan Carlos admires and respects the US and would like to see Spain become a
member of NATO. He reportedly said last fall that he regards diplomatic relations
with the USSR, China, and East Germany as "worthless." He added that he opposed
any move toward legalizing the Spanish Communist Party.
Though quiet-mannered and rather diffident in public, in private Juan Carlos
has what Spaniards call "the Bourbon charm"-informal, friendly, and bluff. He is
articulate, inquisitive, and well-informed. He is also physically vigorous and an
accomplished athlete. He is free of the congenital illnesses-such as hemophilia-that
have plagued some members of his family. A competent linguist, he speaks English,
Portuguese, French, and Italian, in addition to Spanish.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 22, 1975
Juan Carlos has been married since 1962 to Princess Sophia of Greece, the elder
daughter of the late King Paul and Queen Frederika and the sister of deposed Greek
King Constantine II. Since his marriage, Juan Carlos seems to have gained
self-confidence. Sophia has provided emotional support and is a positive influence.
They have a son and two daughters. Now that Juan Carlos has become King, his son
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Na Tonal Intelligence Bulletin
November 22, 1:975
Iceland and West Germany have reached tentative agreement an a two-year
pact regulating West German fishing. in waters around Iceland.
Bonn apparently is ready to sign the agreement, once it is approved by the
Icelandic cabinet and parliament. The West German negotiator stated on November
20 that signature could take place within ten days.
Under the agreement, West German trawlers will be permitted to operate
within Iceland's 200-mile fishing. zone and catch up to 60,000 tons of fish annually.
Bonn made clear, however, that it does not officially recognize Iceland's unilateral
declaration of the 200-mile zone.
Although the catch limit is less than Bonn would have liked,. the West Germans
are pleased that the agreement is for two years; previously, Iceland wanted the
agreement to be renewed annually.
Iceland's negotiations with the British are in recess after the breakdown of talks
in Reykjavik last weekend. Both sides were still far apart on setting a catch
limit-the British want 110,000 tons but Reykjavik has offered only 65,000 tons.
London will have difficulty making more concessions because of the increased
operational costs to trawlermen caused by high fuel prices. fceland also is under
strong pressure from political., labor, and other special interest groups not to make
further concessions.
Some of the acrimony that developed in the talks last weekend was attributed
to the current British negotiator, who tacks sufficient background on the subject. A
Foreign Office spokesman indicated that a m-ore experienced negotiator might take
over for the British side when talks-.resume.
Icelandic coast guard patrol vessels, meanwhile, continue to harass British
fishing boats operating inside the 50-mile limit. Three boats had their trawls cut this
week, despite the introduction of several civilian patrol ships assigned to protect the
trawlers. Fishing captains have threatened to pull out unless London provides naval
protection, but the British government probably will avoid such a move unless the
Icelandic ships fire on the trawlers.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 22, 1975
The principal deliberative body of Italy's Christian Democratic Party--the
207-member national c-ouncil-meets Sunday for the first time since the ouster last
July of former party chief Fanfani. His removal was inspired by the sharp
Communist gains made in nationwide local elections last June.
The Christian Democrats are still far from agreement on how to prevent the
Communists from repeating their success in another round of local elections next
spring and in the 1977 parliamentary race. Although the council's first order of
business will be to set a date and begin preparations for a party congress, the
Communist issue will dominate debate. The question of how to reverse the trend
toward the Communists has polarized the Christian Democrats, and two groups are
now vying for control of the party.
One group centers on Prime Minister Moro and interim party chief Zaccagnini.
It includes most of the party left as well as some centrists, like Foreign Minister
Rumor, who have gravitated toward the left since the last elections. These Christian
Democrats share the conviction that their party will have to change its image. by
shifting leftward and drawing the Communists into a "competitive dialogue" in
order to compete-with them at the polls.
While the "dialogue" proposal is vaguely formulated, its proponents apparently
--To put more emphasis on tangible issues than ideology in defining the
differences between the Christian Democrats and the Communists; they think
anti-communism per se has declining appeal for the Italian voter.
--To limit the Communists' ability to exploit their opposition status by forcing
them into an open discussion of legislative proposals with the governing parties.
The rival group, which draws most of its support from the party center and
right, has a majority in the national council. Its leaders-including Fanfani, Budget
Minister Andreotti, and Defense Minister Fortani-believe. that shifting to a policy of
open "dialogue" with the Communists would risk a gradual slide into broader
collaboration with them. This group maintains that the party's image and policies
should continue to center on the unqualified "opposition" to the Communists
expressed by the last Christian Democratic Party congress in 197.3.
The center-right forces have been increasingly disturbed that advocates of the
"dialogue" thesis now hold the top posts in both the party and the government.:.... No
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November 22, 1975
one is prepared to provoke a government crisis. by challenging Moro now, but the
group is determined to substitute one of its own-Forlani is the frontrunner-for
Zaccagnini as party leader. The latter was never a major contender for the top party
spot. He agreed- to occupy it on an interim. basis after theChristian Democrats failed
to agree on a successor to Fanfani.
Some of Forlani's supporters have urged him to move this weekend in order to
stop what they see as a drift toward- the left under Zaccagnini. That argument,
however, will seem less persuasive now that Zaccagnini has backed away from. his
earlier insistence on postponing the party congress as long as possible. Under a
compromise reached last week, it was reportedly agreed that the congress will take
place in late February or early March.
fn addition, Forlani is reluctant to push his candidacy now because he wants
more time to widen his majority. To the irritation of some of his center-right
supporters, Forlani is increasingly showing signs of independence and is trying to
reach an accommodation with Moro and- Zaccagnini. to doing so; Forlani is
attempting to avoid an internal party split similar to the one that plagued the
Christian Democrats in their preparations for the elections in June. Otherwise, the
Christian Democratic leadership and policies could draw the opposition of the
party's own left wing, at a time when the Christian Democrats' major task is to win
back voters who have been drifting leftward.
Downgrading- the role of the party left could seriously hinder efforts by the
next Christian Democratic leader to rejuvenate the- party's grass-roots organization.
To compete successfully with the Communists and Socialists, for example, the
Christian Democrats must revive their ties with the industrial working class. One
hopeful sign in this respect is the renewed interest in party affairs shown recently by
the leader of the Christian Democratic - oriented labor confederation-Italy's second
largest. The Labor leader is a supporter of the Moro-Zaccagnini tine, however, and if
that is shunted aside, Christian Democratic labor leaders may turn their backs on
the party.
The Christian Democrats' internal struggle is being followed closely by the
Socialists and Communists, since neither can calibrate its strategy until the outcome
is known. For different reasons, both the Socialists and Communists hope the
Christian Democratic left will retain an influential voice in party affairs.
fn the Socialist view, the Christian Democrats would then be more likely to
adopt the kinds of policies that the Socialists feel are necessary to justify renewed
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National Intelligence Bulletin November 22, 1.975
participation in the government to their own constituents and to Communist
supporters they are trying to capture. The Communists, on the other hand, favor the
"dialogue" idea, because they see it as an opportunity to dilute Christian
Democratic hostility toward them and encourage the broader acceptance.. the
Communists feel is needed if they are to achieve their longer term goal of entering
the national government.
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Na#ional intelligence Bu letin
November 22, 19.75
Prime Minister Miki returned from last weekend's economic summit conference
affirming that he will not call a general election "for the time- being," a move that
signals a continued truce-however shaky-between Miki and. his conservative party
rivals.
Miki hoped the pub.)icity surrou.ndi.ng his international- role would. boost his.
sagging domestic popularity and. perhaps. enable. him- to call an election this year.
Miki- assumed the prime ministry as a compromise. choice after a deadlock Last
December between more powerful contenders nearly split the ruling: Liberal
Democratic Party; he needs,an election to give him a popular mandate:and improve
his power- position in the party.
The critical decision on the timing of an election rests? with the: conservative:
party leaders, however, and: they remain opposed to an early election. that could
extend' Miki's stay in office for some time. The Prime Minister needs their support in
the current Diet session and may well have agreed to sidetrack his.ele.ction ambitions
to get it. Miki must gain passage of three crucial revenue bills before the session
closes next month. He also faces a labor union -government confrontation over the
contentious issue. of public employees' right to strike.
Neither Deputy Prime Minister Fukuda nor Finance. Minister Ohira-Miki's two
leading challengers-is now sure of his ability to prevail in a head-on confrontation,
and both are concerned that a showdown could bring the party close to an open
break.
Despite the truce, a number of party Leaders are exploring. the possibility of
selecting another interim prime minister,, pending party elections to choose a more
perma-Went leader-a move that could gain momentum if Miki falters in the next Diet
session that begins in January. For his part, Miki may calculate now that the
prospects for reviving his own election ambitions will be better in the spring.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
79T00975A028300010038-6
November 22, 1975
The political confrontation between Prime Minister Razak and Selangor chief
minister Harun is reaching a critical stage. Harun has refused to accept political exile
as Malaysia's permanent UN representative, and he could use his contacts within the
government to challenge Razak's own position.
A cabinet shuffle reportedly announced on November 19 could reflect an
effort by Razak either to neutralize or ensure the support of those ministers who
could waver between Harun_and the Prime Minister.
Although a resort to force by Harun and his supporters cannot be ruled out,:. it
seems more likely that the present confrontation will be resolved politically within
the councils of the ruling United Malays National Organization. Harun, thanks to the
widespread support from the party's rank and file and his leadership of the party's
influential youth organization, is in a strong position. Razak, in fact, may have to
abandon his efforts to send Harun into political exile if he is to maintain his own
grip on power
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National Intelligence Bulletin
The USSR's High Profile in Angola
November 22, 1975
The Soviet Union moved quickly last week to recognize the Popular Movement
for the Liberation of Angola as the sole legitimate governing authority in the former
Portuguese territory and to establish diplomatic relations with it.
One immediate benefit of recognition was the le al fi leaf Moscow laced over
the airlift of military equipment to the Movement,
Recognition also got Moscow in
on the ground floor in Luanda, and its diplomats are pressing hard, particularly in
Africa, to persuade other states to establish relations. On the negative side, however,
the Kremlin's uncompromising diplomatic and military support for the Popular
Movement has drawn sharp anti-Soviet responses from a number of sub-Saharan
nations.
High Visibility
The high visibility of the Soviet role in Angola is a break with the past; fihree
years ago Moscow seemed to be losing interest in the Popular Movement. Weakened
by factional strife and no longer able to speak as the unchallenged leader of the
Angola liberation struggle, the Movement did not seem likely to force an end to
Portuguese rule. Its ros ects chan ed with the fall of the Gaetano regime in April
1974, however,
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it would not be surprising to see Soviet military advisers and technicians
turn up in Angola. Moscow, however,
would almost certainly prefer to avoid-or at least emit-a siza a involvement of its
own military personnel and to rely on Cubans to support the Popular Movement in
the field.
The Soviets have had to pay a price for their assistance to the Popular
Movement. For one thing, their relations with some of the most influential states in
Africa have suffered a setback. A number of these states were particularly upset over
Moscow's getting out in front of the Organization of African Unity on the Angolan
recognition issue.
Nigeria has publicly criticized the Kremlin's "flagrant interference" in the
affairs of Angola and privately deplored the Soviet disregard of OAU efforts to
effect a reconciliation between the territory's warring liberation groups. Lagos has
denied overflight rights for Soviet aircraft carrying materiel for the Movement.
Zaire's President Mobutu, who supports one of the Popular Movement's rivals
in Angola, may break diplomatic ties with Moscow. Kinshasa sees the substantial
Soviet military build-up in Angola and in Congo as a direct menace to Zairian
security and is actively seeking to have this threat brought to the attention of the
UN Security Council.
Tanzania's President Nyerere, a staunch supporter of the Popular Movement,
has expressed regret over Soviet involvement in Angola.
Soviet pressure on Uganda to recognize the Popular Movement ruffled OAU
chairman Idi Amin's feathers and was one reason for last week's "temporary"
rupture in relations between Moscow and Kampala.
Reaction outside of sub-Sahara Africa so far has been more muted. The Soviets
clearly will be discomfited if the issue is brought before the UN, and may have some
A2
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National Intelligence Bulletin November 22, 1975
concern that their action in Angola will be cited as behavior not in accord with
Moscow's professed commitment to relaxation of tensions. But Moscow almost
certainly expected a sharp reaction to its activities, and the decision to pull out the
stops for the Popular Movement was based on the calculation that the gains were
worth-the price.
Soviet Objectives
Angola is a rich prize compared to the other former Portuguese African
territories; it has major resources of oil and other minerals. The Soviets have no
compelling need for these resources, but they might want, for example, to use
Cabindan oil to supply some of their East European clients. They might also want to
hinder Western access to resources in the area.
Strategically, Angola may be of some interest to the Soviets if they ',are
contemplating expansion of their naval activities in the South Atlantic. Politically,
an Angola run by people well disposed to the Soviets could provide a platform from
which Soviet influence might expand into adjacent areas, particularly southern
Africa. None of the Soviet objectives will be reached overnight, and Moscow may
not necessarily expect a quick return on the investment it has made in the Popular
Movement.
The specter of China looms large in Soviet thinking, and China has, at least
until recently, supported another Angolan faction. Moscow would like to put the lie
to assertions from Peking that Soviet imperialists do non support the aspirations of
the Third World. The message to would-be revolutionaries is that association with
Moscow pays off, and that-the Soviet Union does-not stint in supporting its friends.
A related message may be intended for the US-that the USSR has the will and
the capability to compete with the US for influence in peripheral areas of-the globe.
The heavy domestic coverage the Soviet press has given Angola also raises a
possibility that internal political reasons contributed to Moscow's support of 'the
Popular Movement.
Angola may be seen as providing an opportunity for the Kremlin to
demonstrate adherence to and support for revolutionary movements, detente
notwithstanding. More important, if things go reasonably well, Angola can be cited
as tangible evidence that the correlation of forces in the world, despite some
setbacks, is moving in ways favorable to the Soviet Union.
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