NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 3, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
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Top Secret
November 3, 1975
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 3, 1975
LEBANON: Another
ineffective cease-fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
SPANISH SAHARA: Madrid turns to
UN for solution of decolonization problem . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
SPAIN: Concessions
by Communist Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
PORTUGAL: Leftists see arrests of officers
as confirming their fears of right-wing coup . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
ROMANIA: Ceausescu's remarks during
visit to Portugal bound to irk Kremlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
SYRIA-ISRAEL: Apparent reduction
in high level of alert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
CHINA-INDIA: Indian patrol ambushed . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
JAPAN: Possible revision in
Fourth Defense Plan program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
RHODESIA: Prime
Minister meets with Nkomo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 3, 1975
Street fighting in Beirut slackened only slightly yesterday after yet another
cease-fire-the 12th in the past seven months-was arranged.
Some of the heaviest fighting to date took place in the capital on Friday and
Saturday. This was before Prime Minister Karami, who has taken over personal
direction of security matters, could persuade leaders from the Phalanges Party and
main Palestinian groups to meet with him Saturday night to hammer out the terms of
the new truce.
Previous cease-fires have been used primarily to replenish depleted supplies rather
than to seek a genuine solution to the situation. There is no reason as yet to believe the
present cease-fire will be any different.
Prime Minister Karami has called a meeting of the national dialogue committee
for today. The committee, which is charged with seeking a political solution to end the
fighting, has made little progress thus far and has not held a session for almost two
weeks. Because of the sharp deterioration in relations between Karami,a Muslim, and
key Christian leaders-President Franjiyah, Interior Minister Shamun, and Phalanges
chief Jumayyil-the committee seems unlikely to make much headway.
Karami angered both the Phalangists and Shamun's National Liberal Party last
Friday by taking charge of security affairs, previously in Shamun's hands. Karami also
accused the forces controlled by Shamun and the Phalangists of instigating the most
recent flare-up in fighting in the capital. Fears that Karami himself will resign, however,
have abated. He indicated publicly Sunday that he intends to remain prime minister
until the security situation is under control.
Lebanese army o icer
told the defense attache that Syrian forces had engaged Lebanese army units near
Zahlah.
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It seems likely that Syria has, at a minimum, reinforced its Saiqa units inside
Lebanon because of the increase in the fighting late last week. The Syrians may also
have spread rumors that Syrian regulars had intervened or were about to intervene in
order to put pressure on the-Phalangists to accept a new cease-fire,
e continue to believe,
however, that Damascus will use its forces only to posture and does not want to
send its regular forces overtly into Lebanon for fear of provoking an Israeli military
counterreaction.
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National Intelligence Bulletin November 3, 1975
Spain's new search for a UN solution to the Saharan problem was brought
about by Algeria's strong opposition to Madrid's bargaining directly with Morocco
and Mauritania on the issue and by Morocco's unwillingness to call off its planned
mass march into the territory.
Prince Juan Carlos' surprise one-day visit to Spanish Sahara yesterday has now
committed the new leader's prestige to support of UN efforts. Moroccan King
Hassan remains equally committed to gaining recognition of Morocco's territorial
claims.
Madrid presumably decided it had little alternative to going along with further
efforts under UN auspices, in view of Algeria's determination to resist a bilateral deal
between Spain and Morocco. Such a course would, moreover, provide international
legitimization for a demonstration of resoluteness by Juan Carlos to uphold Spain's
obligations toward Spanish Sahara. The prince's trip to the territory also
demonstrated his solidarity with the army, whose backing he realizes is essential.
The UN Security Council resolution passed yesterday calls on Secretary
General Waldheim to resume consultations with the concerned parties. It omits any
reference to the UN trusteeship arrangement that Waldheim has discussed with Spain
and the North African states involved. The proposal apparently called for Spanish
withdrawal early next year and temporary UN administration of the territory.
It is not readily apparent what further inducements Waldheim can offer the
parties to the dispute to head off a confrontation between Morocco, Spain, and
Algeria.
fl r assan, oweve ,
may fear that any referendum would reveal n sentiment for
independence.
Spain's acceptance of a UN role leaves Hassan little choice but to proceed with
the march. He has invested too much personal prestige to back down empty-handed
and is likely to begin the march within a few days. Hassan's failure to achieve some
satisfaction on Spanish Sahara would seriously undermine his ability to stay in
power.
Morocco will probably claim that Madrid's determination to stop the march by
force if necessary, rather than Morocco's own actions, is contrary to yesterday's
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Security Council resolution. Once marchers cross the border, however, there will
almost certainly be clashes with Spanish forces or armed partisans of the Polisario
Front, a pro-independence Saharan group supported by Algeria. Moroccan troops
deployed in the south are likely to intervene in that event.
Morocco has "categorically denied" press reports that its forces crossed the
border into Spanish Sahara yesterday and clashed with the Polisario Front. The
Moroccan information minister said, however, that he could not exclude the
possibility that pro-Moroccan residents of the territory might have "raised the
Moroccan flag" in some areas. It is possible that Moroccan irregulars posing as
Saharans crossed the border to establish a symbolic presence and clashed with a
Polisario force.
Algeria will support the Security Council's call for restraint. It wants to return
the Saharan problem to the General Assembly, which in the past has strongly backed
self-determination. The new Security Council resolution in fact pointedly refers to
the General Assembly's role in the Saharan question.
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National Intelligence Bulletin November 3, 1975
The Spanish Communist Party has apparently made significant concessions in
its bid to create a facade of unity between the two loose coalitions of the left.
The joint communique issued Saturday by the Communist-dominated
Democratic Junta and the more moderately leftist Democratic Platform of
Convergence would not condemn Prince Juan Carlos without a trial. The
communique was carefully vague on the crucial point of Communist demands for
the establishment of a provisional government and the calling of a national
referendum to choose between monarchy and republic. The statement issued this
weekend called for a "democratic break" with Francoism and referred generally to a
"constituent period" which would lead to a referendum. No deadline was set for the
referendum.
The other three main "objectives" listed in the communique were: amnesty for
political prisoners; freedom for labor unions and political parties and guarantees of
human rights; and full political rights and freedoms for regions such as Catalonia and
the Basque country. These are all issues on which there is broad agreement in the
Spanish opposition. Significantly, the communique closed with the statement that
the two coalitions, while remaining in contact and cooperating from time to time,
will continue to search for their own particular objectives.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 3, 1975
Leftist forces in Portugal are citing the arrest last weekend of two supporters of
former president Spinola to justify their claims that a right-wing coup is imminent.
The two former military officers, who reportedly left the country with Spinola
following the abortive coup of March 11, were picked up by security troops at a camp
for Angolan refugees in northern Portugal. They were said to have entered Portugal
secretly from Spain. The US embassy in Lisbon reports that several individuals with ties
to the conservative Portuguese Liberation Army may also have been detained.
Anti-Communist military leaders, including Prime Minister Azevedo, are
appealing for calm and unity to cool the unrest stirred by anticipation of Angolan
independence next week. An army spokesman yesterday denied leftist-inspired reports
that live-fire maneuvers are scheduled for this week. He labeled the story "alarmist"
and said such drills could only lead to a coup attempt from the right.
General Charais, commander of the central military region, warned the left in an
interview last week that any attempt on its part to overthrow the Azevedo government
and turn Angola over to the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola would spawn a right-wing power play. Charais believes that the left has
alientated a substantial portion of the population, creating the conditions for a
successful resurgence by the right.
The left has been agitating to abandon Lisbon's declared policy of impartiality
among the three Angola liberation movements and to support the Popular Movement,
but the Azevedo government does not appear likely to change its neutral posture and
further antagonize either the left or the right. In addition to internal pressures from
left-wing political parties, the press organs they control, and sympathetic radical
military officers, Popular Movement activists are arriving in Lisbon on refugee flights to
take part in rallies supporting the Popular Movement. The first is scheduled for tonight.
As the airlift of refugees from Angola comes to an end, conservative refugee
groups are certain to become bolder in registering their discontent with left-wing
support for the Popular Movement as well as insufficient resettlement assistance from
the Lisbon government. The bombing and sacking late last month of an Angolan
cultural center controlled by the Popular Movement suggests that the returnees do not
intend to shy away from violence. To counter the left-wing efforts, they have planned a
demonstration against the Popular Movement for later in the week.
Despite the political turmoil, the 19-man Revolutionary Council is attempting to
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carry out business as usual. The Council did not, as rumored, take action against army
chief Fabiao or security head Carvalho at its session last weekend. It did, however,
approve the long-awaited legal framework for the investigation and trial of nearly
1,300 members of the former regime's security police, who have been detained without
charges since the April 1974 coup. The Council also set up a tribunal to deal with
persons implicated in the March 11 coup attempt and announced its intention to arrest
civilians possessing military arms.
The anti-Communist members of the Council may have decided to delay plans
against Fabiao and Carvalho because of the concerted campaign by left-wing military
and civilian groups to equate their removal with rightist plots to take over the
government.
no er i e y obstacle to a anti-communists
is President Costa omen, who has served as the major stumbling block in previous
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 3, 1975
Romanian President Ceausescu clearly used his four-day official visit to Lisbon
to show Bucharest's determination to pursue its own interpretation of Communist
doctrine.
Ceausescu pressed for closer Romanian-Portuguese ties both to increase his
international prestige and to try to head off a radical swing to the left that could
bring Portugal under considerable Soviet influence.
Little of what Ceausescu said in Lisbon will sit well with the Kremlin. His
comments to his Portuguese hosts, particularly regarding the cooperation of all
political parties-Communist, socialist, and even "those sections of the bourgeoisie
that wish to serve the homeland"-are doctrinal heresy of the first order. Moreover,
they clash directly with the recent Zarodov article in Pravda condemning those
Communist leaders who dilute revolutionary zeal by cooperating with
non-Communists. Ceausescu also reaffirmed Romania's strong devotion to the
principles of independence and opposition to every form of interference in the
internal affairs of others.
Additionally, in his toast to Prime Minister Azevedo, Ceausescu praised the
Romanian-Portuguese Friendship Treaty of last June, the first between NATO and
Warsaw Pact countries, and drew a parallel between Lisbon's problems and those
that once confronted Bucharest. Romania, he said, solved these difficulties solely in
conformity with its own conditions.
Ceausescu's visit and the array of powerful leaders traveling with him suggest
that he faces no serious problems at home, as some rumors have claimed. Members
of the delegation include Stefan Andrei, party secretary for foreign relations;
Foreign Minister Macovescu; Nicolai Dorcaru, presidential adviser on security affairs;
Deputy Premier Draganescu; and army chief of staff Colonel General Ion Coman.
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Syrian military forces apparently have red at least slightly, the high level
of alert they assumed more than a week ago.
The Syrians do not appear to be preparing for imminent hostilities, according
to the US defense attache in Damascus, even though their forces remain in an
increased state of readiness. During a tour of the Damascus area last Thursday, the
attache observed more troops than usual departing on pass. Among the troops
observed were personnel from the four Syrian divisions stationed along the Golan
Heights and members of the Saudi contingent at Al Kiswah, some 12 miles south of
Damascus. The attache also noticed that vehicle workshops at Al Kiswah had closed
for the weekend, despite the large amount of equipment awaiting repair.
Meanwhile, Syria and Saudi Arabia have continued preparing for their joint air
and ground exercise, already twice postponed. The US defense attache in Jidda
reports that current Syrian plans call for a practice exercise to be held Wednesday or
Thursday, with the actual exercise to be held the day following the practice. Part of
the exercise will include an airdrop of about 120 paratroops near Dumayr, some 30
miles northeast of Damascus. This operation will be supported by Saudi F-5 fighters
operating from an airfield in northern Jordan. According to the US defense attache
in Amman, 12 Saudi F-5s are scheduled to arrive in Jordan today and depart next
Monday. The Jordanians reportedly will not participate in the exercise but will
provide airfield support and radar assistance to the Saudis.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 3, 1975
CHINA-INDIA
New Delhi has protested the Chinese ambush of an Indian patrol on October 20.
Peking has so far remained silent on the matter. There are no indications that either side
is moving to reinforce the border.
The incident, involving a six-man Indian army patrol and 40-50 Chinese troops,
took place in Arunachal Pradesh, according to the Foreign Ministry, but an Indian
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army officer told the US consulate in Calcutta that the clash was inside Sikkim.
Details of the incident are sketchy. The Indian army's Eastern Region commander
told a foreign diplomat on November 1 that the four Indian soldiers killed on the 20th
had been tortured.
Although the exact location of the incident has not been revealed, New Delhi has
taken great pains to emphasize that the attack took place in an area on the border long
under its control. The common border-in dispute since the 1950s-has been the site of
infrequent clashes between Chinese and Indian troops since the border war in 1962.
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National Intelligence Bulletin November 3, 1975
Faced with a sluggish rate of economic recovery and public apathy toward
defense, Japan Defense Agency Director General Sakata has suggested a revised
approach in the formulation of the Fourth Defense Plan program, scheduled to
begin in March 1976.
Sakata believes that the planning effort must be geared to Japan's new
international environment-a view that places priority on political considerations
and looks toward the next ten years as a "time of peace" for Japan. He hopes to
strengthen cooperation with the US and has proposed significant reductions in
ground force personnel.
According to Sakata, future defense planning would emphasize the concept of
"Limits on Defense Power in Peacetime" first introduced in 1973. This calls for the
development of forces necessary to deter or repel sudden, small-scale attacks.
Additionally, the Self-Defense Forces' role in natural disaster relief operations would
be significantly increased.
Defense Agency officials acknowledge that maintenance of the Japan-US
Mutual Security Treaty is essential as a deterrent to large-scale nuclear attack: since
there is little likelihood of a massive conventional attack, the ability to repel
small-scale surprise attacks is a proper goal for the Self-Defense Forces.
Economic considerations undoubtedly played a major part in Sakata's
proposal. As a result, defense-related expenses are to be held to previous levels-no
more than 1 percent of GNP. Sakata particularly wants to bolster weaknesses in
antisubmarine warfare, air defense, and logistic support by cutting ground force
personnel by one third (36,000 personnel). The proposal to assume disaster relief
responsibilities would further strain ground force capabilities.
The public's general indifference to defense matters, combined with the often
open hostility of the political left, has been a major stumbling block to any
significant expansion of the defense forces. Sakata has been well aware of the
problem and has had some success in his attempts to promote a national public
dialogue concerning defense questions.
Sakata wants to achieve a consensus among Defense Agency uniformed and
civilian officials, but his proposals for peacetime limits and ground force reductions
are likely to encounter resistance from the uniformed services, which still favor
defense planning on the basis of potential regional military threats. The chief of the
ground staff, General Miyoshi, reportedly is so vigorously opposed to the reduction
that he ma be forced to resign if Sakata's proposals are accepted.
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National Intelligence Bulletin November 3, 1975
Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith's meeting with Joshua Nkomo is the first
open contact between Smith and a black nationalist leader since the abortive
Victoria Falls conference last August.
Smith's overture to Nkomo may well harden the recent schism in the African
National Council. Nkomo was elected president of the council by a congress held in
Salisbury in late September. The congress convened despite the opposition of Bishop
Muzorewa, who was confirmed in December as head of the council-an amalgam of
several nationalist groups that agreed to a truce with Smith. Muzorewa's followers
boycotted the session that elected Nkomo council president.
Although Muzorewa has advocated a negotiated settlement, his break with
Nkomo made the bishop dependent on exiled insurgents who want to resume
full-scale guerrilla warfare. Nkomo, on the other hand, is a former insurgent who
turned against militancy because his group is relatively weak militarily.
r~ Smith may hope that opening talks with Nkomo will head off a new guerrilla
like the other three African presidents who have been
trying to mediate a Rhodesian settlement, Machel will find it difficult to back the
non-militant nationalists unless Nkomo shows that he has broader support than
Muzorewa among all active Rhodesian nationalists. A week ago, Muzorewa's
adherents staged a rally in Salisbury that produced a much larger crowd than the
gathering that followed Nkomo's election to the presidency of the council.
It is unlikely that Muzorewa or any of the exiled insurgents has a larger
personal following than Nkomo's. Rather, the larger turnout for the Muzorewa rally
may reflect tribal opposition to Nkomo's faction, which has drawn most of its
members from a minority tribal grouping.
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Nevertheless, if Nkomo is to neutralize such apparent support for leaders who
are calling for a liberation war, he must extract much more favorable terms from
Smith than the latter yet appears ready to concede.
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