NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028200010025-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 6, 2006
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: October 6, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 6, 1975
CONTENTS
PORTUGAL: Azevedo steps up efforts
to tighten control over military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
PORTUGAL-USSR: Soviet leaders cultivate
ties with new Lisbon government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
PORTUGAL-AZOR ES-MADE I RAS: Independence
movements in islands lose momentum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
NETHERLANDS: Parliament reportedly
will oppose proposed defense cuts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
EAST ASIA: Import restrictions threaten
economic recovery among textile exporters . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
PHILIPPINES: Marcos' purge creates
uncertainty in military, civilian circles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
NIGERIA: Regime unveils political program . . . . . . . . . . . 16
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
ANNEX: Interagency Memorandum on Implications
of Events in India and Bangladesh
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October 6, 1975
Prime Minister Azevedo has stepped up his campaign to restore military
discipline, but he continues to face outright defiance from leftist units.
Government efforts to transfer disruptive soldiers as a short-term solution to
growing indiscipline are being hotly contested. Radicals have banded together in
such organizations as "Soldiers United Will Win" and "Revolutionary Action of
Army Enlisted Men," and have allied themselves with extreme left-wing political
parties. They probably are receiving veiled support from the Communists, who
officially continue to support the Azevedo government.
Last weekend, an army transportation training unit in Porto was disbanded
after enlisted men voted to resist the transfer of two leftist officers and several
enlisted men. Some of the soldiers issued a statement warning that the "struggle has
not ended." They were immediately supported by a coalition of six far-leftist
parties, which called for "mass action" to protest the unit's dissolution.
Pro-Communist demonstrations in Porto were broken up by troops late
Saturday night and early Sunday morning. Other demonstrations were reported in
southern Portugal and near Lisbon. "Soldiers United Will Win" has called for a
demonstration this evening in Porto.
Radicals have succeeded in preventing the transfer of more than 40 soldiers,
accused of participating in anti-government demonstrations, from Beja air base in
southern Portugal. The government sent loyal paratroops to break up a
demonstration of several hundred leftists outside the base, but the transfer orders
were later rescinded. The soldiers will also be allowed to participate in nonpartisan
political demonstrations.
In the Lisbon area, leftist units are continuing their campaign to cast doubt on
Socialist Party claims that a leftist coup was planned for last week. The internal
security command, headed by General Carvalho, publicly denied Socialist allegations
that some units in the command were involved in plotting against the government.
One of the accused units issued a statement charging the Socialists with wanting to
install a right-wing dictatorship.
In a press interview, Prime Minister Azevedo sided with the Socialists and
blamed the far left for the breakdown in military discipline which prevents the
government from exercising complete control over the Lisbon area. This assertion
was borne out by the reported refusal of radical soldiers at the main arsenal to
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October 6, 1975
comply with Azeved,.)'s order to supply more automatic rifles to a dependable
regiment. The radical soldiers have helped the far left smuggle arms from the arsenal
to sympathetic cadres.
Azevedo's decisiveness in combating rebellious troops may be undermined by
the return yesterday of President Costa Gomes from official visits to Poland and the
USSR. Costa Gomes is noted for his willingness to compromise and has weakened
anti-Communist forces in the past by trying to avoid a confrontation at all costs. He
may see Azevedo's actions as dangerous and seek to curb his authority.
During a speech yesterday marking the founding of the first Portuguese
republic in 1910, Costa Gomes emphasized the need to heal divisions among the
people and the armed forces, but also deplored actions that "prejudice the exercise
of authority." Following the ceremony, Socialist leader Soares was attacked by a
crowd of radical leftists and had to be rescued by armed naval police-
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President Costa Gomes returned to Lisbon yesterday from official visits to
Poland and the USSR. Moscow treated the four-day visit to the USSR as a major
international event, evidently anxious to cultivate ties with the new Lisbon
government despite recent setbacks for the Portuguese Communists.
Costa Gomes met for two hours with General Secretary Brezhnev on Friday
and with several other Soviet leaders, including President Podgorny and the ministers
of foreign affairs, foreign trade, and defense. The results of the visit were primarily
political, as reflected in the joint communique and in a separate declaration signed
on October 3 by Podgorny and Costa Gomes. The declaration attached "especial
importance" to the principles of national self-determination and noninterference,
direct or indirect, in the internal affairs of sovereign states. The two sides pledged to
hold regular consultations at various levels to develop bilateral relations on political,
economic, scientific, and cultural matters.
Before the arrival of the Portuguese delegation, the Soviet press emphasized
economic relations between the two countries. A reported agreement on long-term
economic cooperation may be the culmination of year-long negotiations for Soviet
economic assistance to Portugal, although it appears unlikely that Moscow pledged
substantial aid for any specific projects.
The communique pledges Portuguese support for progress toward force
reductions in Central Europe and for a number of pet Soviet disarmament initiatives,
including a world disarmament conference, a comprehensive nuclear weapons test
ban, and the prohibition of new categories of weapons of mass destruction. The
declaration, however, specifically notes that its provisions "in no way affect" earlier
international obligations, including presumably Portugal's NATO commitments.
Both documents stress the importance of the European security agreement, as
did the recent Portuguese-Polish accord. The Moscow declaration marks the first
instance since Helsinki in which the Soviets have pledged in an international
document to implement in full measure the provisions of that agreement.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 6, 1975
Independence movements remain active in both the Azores and the Madeiras,
but the replacement of the pro-Communist Goncalves regime in Lisbon has sapped
much of their momentum.
The Azores Liberation Front is circulating a new program that calls for
negotiations with Lisbon and a referendum on independence. Should negotiations
fail, however, the Front advocates a unilateral declaration of independence.
The new program represents the views of the largest faction of the Front which
is dominated by the center-left Popular Democrats. It includes provisions for land
reform, the dissolution of monopolies, free trade unions, and equality among all of
the islands of the archipelago.
The progressive features of the program may improve the image of the Front,
which has been closely identified with the Azorean upper classes. At the same time,
however, it could cost the Front the financial support of some of the large
landowners and wealthy Azorean emigres in the US who first organized the
movement.
Even the new program, however, may not be sufficient to attract many new
adherents to the independence movement. Having gained some concessions from
Lisbon, Azoreans now appear to be turning their attention to more traditional
partisan political activity. Public debate among political parties has increased and the
press has given broad coverage to a dispute between the three principal parties over
proposals for autonomy, including the suggested "regionalization" of banks and
insurance companies.
Independence sentiment in the Madeiras has been exaggerated by the mainland
press, because most islanders seem to prefer autonomy. At present, it appears that
Madeirans would move for independence only in the case of a resurgence of
Communist influence in Portugal or the denial of a satisfactory arrangement for
autonomy. Reportedly, there are as many as four independence groups in the
Madeiras, none of which is effectively organized. The most widely known group, the
Front for the Liberation of the Madeiran Archipelago, was formed early last summer
by conservative businessmen and landowners worried about the leftward trend of
mainland politics and the damaging impact of the sagging Portuguese economy on
the Madeiras.
The separatist movement in the Madeira Islands began much like the Azorean
Front, which was used as a model. In contrast to their Azorean counterparts,
however, the Madeiran separatists have been unable to stimulate much interest,
especially among the working class, which makes up about four fifths of the
population.
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The bombing incidents on the islands over the past few weeks provoked much
greater concern on the mainland than they did among Madeirans. Lisbon's concern
and the heavy coverage in the mainland press, however, has aided the constituent
assembly delegates from Madeira in their move for greater autonomy.
If the Portuguese government continues to be receptive to the demand of the
Azoreans and Madeirans for greater autonomy, the independence movements will
find it difficult to find new recruits. If Lisbon returns to its old policy of neglect,
however, or should the present government crumble in the face of leftist opposition,
the separatists could quickly become a serious threat.
The Dutch parliament will oppose the government's proposed defense budget
cuts later this month, according to a coalition defense expert.
A press story citing retired General van Eisen, chairman of the parliamentary
defense committee and a defense spokesman for the coalition's Catholic People's
Party, said that at least two of the five coalition partners, as well as several
opposition parties, will oppose the Labor Party's proposed cuts. Only if the Labor
Party decided to make the issue a question affecting government survival are some of
the parties likely to change their positions.
Opponents feel the government's program will affect the Dutch NATO
commitment. Van Eisen said that the Neptune anti-submarine aircraft squadron,
which -the Labor Party -has -proposed to take out of service, is vital. He assured US
embassy officials that his party and the Anti-Revolutionary Party-the second and
third largest parties in the coalition-would accept his judgments.
As an alternative, van Eisen has unveiled a proposal that involves reductions in
other service areas, such as training facilities, that would not affect NATO
commitments. The US defense attache recently reported that the Dutch base
commander at the Hilversum training center claimed that a feasibility study is being
made on closing it. The attache believes the move might be a trade-off to keep the
Neptune squadron in service.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 6, 1975
Economic recovery in the export-oriented countries of Hong Kong, South
Korea, and Taiwan is being threatened by increasing textile import barriers in many
industrial nations. The region's textile industry accounts for roughly 30 percent of
industrial output and brings in 25 to 30 percent of total export earnings.
Late last month, the UK imposed curbs on textile imports from Taiwan and
South Korea. No new import licenses will be granted for a number of major textile
articles, despite contracts already in hand for delivery during the remainder of the
year.
In August, the EC imposed restrictions on selected textile imports from Hong
Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea as a result of a breakdown in trade negotiations.
Hong Kong traders reportedly have some $40 million in textiles loaded on ships or
in transit to EC customers that must be returned for lack of import licenses.
Earlier this year, Canada placed restrictions on some Asian garment imports
and induced voluntary restrictions on other commodities. Japan reimposed an
embargo on South Korean raw silk imports, and forced South Korea informally to
agree to limit exports of silk clothing. East Asian textile exports to the US market
are already covered by restraint programs.
The trade barriers will set back the recent upswing in the region's textile
industry. After falling sharply in 1974 and early 1975, textile production and
exports in the three countries had turned up steeply by midyear on the strength of
increased sales to Western Europe and to a lesser extent the US. The improved
performance helped end the spate of bankruptcies that plagued the industry last
year.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 6, 1975
President Marcos' much publicized purge of his government has created
considerable uncertainty in military and civilian circles and has led to intense
political lobbying by some who fear dismissal. Marcos apparently wanted to take
dramatic public action that would reinvigorate his "new society" programs, but the
manner in which he has carried it out may ultimately cause more problems than he
anticipated.
In many cases, there was no prior planning for replacing officials who were
forced out. According to Ambassador Sullivan, this has resulted in great disorder in
the government and has left some departments without effective leadership. Various
power centers in the government are up in arms about what has been done, or what
they anticipate may now follow.
The state of nerves has now spread to the military. On September 24, Defense
Secretary Enrile requested all armed forces general officers to submit letters of
resignation, which, he said, would clear the way for a house-cleaning in the military
to parallel the civilian purge.
The general air of confusion and jitters is compounded because Enrile, a close
presidential confidant, is himself under something of a cloud because of a murder
scandal involving his son. Enrile has taken a leave of absence and will be out of the
country until the investigation of his son's complicity in the killing is completed.
This has raised doubts about Enrile's political position, particularly about his
standing with the President.
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Several motives may have been behind Marcos' original action. Although he is
under no strong domestic pressure to move against corruption, he is sensitive to
criticism both at home and abroad that the "new society" differs little from
previous regimes either in its actions or in its cast of characters. Marcos may also
have seen a chance to increase his own personal authority over the civilian and
military bureaucracies and to remind his close associates that their positions depend
on him personally.
It is by no means certain that the final result of the current shake-up will be
anything more than window dressing. Some of the civilians purged reportedly have
already been promised special posts in the palace to compensate for their lost
offices. Others may be given lucrative sinecures to ease the pain of their public
disgrace.
Marcos will have to move soon to reassure his followers, particularly in the
military, that their interests will not be threatened, or his "reform" could
boomerang. He depends on the military to remain in power, and the generals see no
reason why they should be publicly humiliated for corruption when many of the
President's relatives are equally tainted. if the present uproar creates serious doubts
in their minds about Marcos' continued willingness to repay their loyalty, this could
over time erode the President's power base. The apparent ineptness with which the
purge is being handled is already causing criticism of Marcos' leadership and, in
particular, has discredited the image of efficiency he hoped to create.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 6, 1975
The program announced this week by the new Nigerian military regime for
turning power back to civilians within four years has undoubtedly upset important
civilian groups-students, intellectuals, and former politicians-who want an early
end of military rule.
The regime's extension of the ban on political activities for at least three more
years will increase skepticism about the military's promise to hand back power. The
new program also provides no clues about the future shape of political institutions
or what role the military envisions for itself under a civilian government.
The program was announced by Brigadier Muhammed, who replaced General
Gowan as head of state in the coup last July, in a speech on Wednesday marking
Nigeria's 15th anniversary of independence. It contained a series of deadlines for
accomplishing major national tasks that Muhammed indicated must be completed
before the government could be turned over to elected civilian representatives.
Despite Muhammed's assertion that the military does not intend to stay in
office a day longer than necessary, there is little doubt that the regime intends to
control the pace and direction of its program. Muhammed and other key members
of the Supreme Military Council say publicly that Nigerian unity and stability are
the first priorities. If Nigeria's tribal and regional animosities get out of hand, the
regime probably would not hesitate to renege on its promise to restore civilian rule.
The new military leadership distrusts the country's old-line civilian politicians,
whose ethnic politics led to two military coups in 1966 and a civil war a year later.
The politicians are still around and it is unclear how the military leaders intend to
handle them as they move toward civilian rule. None of the civilians has political
support that transcends either an ethnic or sectional base, and none of the younger,
more nationalistic politicians has enough support yet to be a factor.
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AUSTRIA: Chancellor Bruno Kreisky's Socialist Party regained its absolute
majority in yesterday's election in Austria. With all votes counted except absentee
ballots, the Socialists have won almost 51 percent of the vote and 94 seats in the
183-member parliament; the Austrian People's Party has 78 seats and the Austrian
Freedom Party has 11. The Communists, with only 1.2 percent of the vote, have
again failed to win a seat.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 6, 1975
The Bulletin today publishes an interagency memorandum approved and issued
October 3, 1975, on the implications of the emergency declared by Prime Minister
Gandhi in India and of the recent coup in Bangladesh.
Key Points
The military-led coup in Bangladesh, unlike Gandhi's crackdown on her
domestic opponents, has had a considerable impact on South Asian regional and
international relationships.
--The new government in Dacca is seeking to strengthen Bangladesh's relations
with Pakistan and China.
--This introduces new uncertainties into Dacca's relationships with New Delhi
and Moscow, although the new leaders in Bangladesh, fearing possible Indian
intervention, have asserted to a doubtful India that they want to retain close
ties.
The situation in Bangladesh is fragile, and India, already concerned about the
turn of events in Dacca, may be laying the groundwork for the option of fomenting
dissidence and turmoil or a pro-Indian coup in Bangladesh.
Although there are numerous constraints on New Delhi, there is a significant
risk of Indian military intervention within the next year in Bangladesh. (The Bureau
of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State believes that there is a
significant risk of a coup, perhaps aided by India, within the next year, but that
direct Indian military intervention is much less likely. The chances for such
intervention would increase dramatically if a coup failed and if refugees continued
to stream into India.)
--A breakdown of domestic order in Bangladesh which caused a flood of
refugees into India would probably lead to a coup or Indian military
intervention.
--Indian intervention would be strongly condemned by China and Pakistan, and
both might well engage in sabre-rattling near India's borders.
--Although the odds are against it, in such a situation India and Pakistan could
become embroiled in hostilities, leading to a serious international crisis.
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Two Political Changes
Two important political changes have occurred in South Asia during the
summer of 1975. The first, a crackdown launched in June by Indian Prime Minister
Gandhi against her domestic opponents, has substantially altered the character of
India's political system. The second event, a military-led coup in August in which
President Mujibur Rahman of Bangladesh was killed, has brought about a change of
leadership in Dacca.
The purpose of this memorandum is to explore the impact over the next year
of these developments on relationships among the South Asian states and between
them and the major external powers. The future of Bangladesh is particularly
obscure, not only because of the nearly insuperable problems facing the present-or
any future-government in Dacca, but also because of the almost proprietary interest
which India exhibits toward its smaller neighbor. Thus, any projection for
Bangladesh is complicated by the necessity of correctly predicting decisions,
probably not yet made, in New Delhi as well as in Dacca.
The recent developments in India have not caused significant changes in
relations among the countries of South Asia or between those countries and the
major powers. There has been little resistance to Gandhi's actions, and the internal
situation within India is likely to remain relatively stable over the next year. As a
result, Gandhi's crackdown probably will not generate pressures to change India's
regional or international relations.
Gandhi's dependence on pro-Soviet political elements in India has lessened. The
sharp increase in her personal power and the curtailment of opportunities for
political opposition have virtually eliminated her need for support from the
Moscow-oriented Communist Party, her occasional ally. Gandhi, however, is unlikely
to abandon her friendly ties with the USSR; she remains interested in a continuation
of the consistent diplomatic and material support the Soviets have given her
government, particularly since August 1971 when the two countries signed a treaty
of friendship and cooperation.
Recent developments in India also have not had any significant impact on
India's relations with China and Pakistan. Sino-Indian relations have been poor since
their war in 1962.. Gandhi will remain mildly interested in improving ties with China,
partly in hopes of reducing Peking's support for Pakistan, but she is unlikely to
make much effort to reach an accommodation. She will continue to give India's
Soviet ties much higher priority.
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Despite initial Pakistani fears of Indian adventurism, India's domestic problems
over the next year are not likely to cause Gandhi to resort to a military attack
against Pakistan to divert Indian public attention. But both India and Pakistan will
retain their traditional deep distrust of one another. Developments in Bangladesh, as
discussed below, have deepened their mistrust. Moreover, Pakistan will remain
particularly sensitive to India's-and the USSR's-diplomatic and material support
for Afghanistan, Pakistan's other adversary.
In her relationship with Washington, Gandhi has warmed slightly since the
crackdown. Despite sporadic flurries of anti-US invective in India, Gandhi seems at
the moment to favor an expansion of US aid and trade. Her long-standing wariness
and distrust toward the US, however, will continue to impede harmonious relations.
She will probably continue the policy she has pursued since the 1971 war, accepting
some slow improvement in Indo-American bilateral relations while holding the US at
arm's length.
Bangladesh
While the influence of Indian domestic developments has not significantly
affected regional and international relationships in South Asia, the emergence of a
new regime in Bangladesh has already led to a considerable change in those
relationships. The change of government in Dacca has introduced new uncertainties
in Bangladesh's relations with India and the Soviet Union, while ties with Pakistan
and China, virtually non-existent before the coup, are being expanded. Both
Islamabad and Peking have reacted positively to the coup, and both countries are
likely to establish diplomatic relations with Bangladesh in the near future. Pakistan,
in particular, is anxious to improve relations, aware that this would represent a
modest shift in its favor in the South Asian political balance and could introduce an
element of uncertainty for India on its eastern flank. (in fact, Pakistan and
Bangladesh agreed to establish diplomatic relations in a meeting between their
foreign ministers over the weekend.)
New Delhi is clearly unhappy about the new government in Bangladesh, and
concerned by President Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmed's reputed coolness toward
India. Prime Minister Gandhi had established something of a patron-client
relationship with the late President Mujibur Rahman on the basis of India's
predominant role in securing the independence of Bangladesh in 1971. The
Mushtaque government is aware of Indian concerns and has attempted to placate its
giant neighbor by providing specific assurance that the New Delhi-Dacca treaty of
friendship signed in 1972 is still a cornerstone of Bangladesh's foreign relations.
Furthermore, within the new regime, military officers and civilian officials alike have
been disposed thus far to resolve their differences peacefully, largely because they
fear that turmoil in Bangladesh would cause India to intervene.
There are a number of constraints on Indian military intervention in
Bangladesh. The Indian leaders are aware that such a move would leave them saddled
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with coping with Bangladesh's many problems, thereby placing a heavy burden on
India's already weak economic base. Moreover, the Indians would be faced with a
situation where anti-Indian sentiment in Bangladesh would probably be high. New
Delhi would also be concerned about the impact of intervention on India's
international standing. In particular, the Indian leaders would fear that intervention
would cause serious economic difficulties by jeopardizing India's prospects for oil
supplies from Iran as well as prospects for aid from the US, the Consortium, and the
World Bank.
Nevertheless, there is a significant risk of Indian intervention The situation
within Bangladesh is extremely fragile, with the new government facing most of the
same political, economic, and social problems that plagued the last. These problems
could lead to turmoil and a breakdown of domestic order, resulting in extensive
anti-Hindu bloodletting and a mass exodus of refugees out of Bangladesh into India.
Such developments, possibly fostered by the Indians, would probably lead to a
coup or to Indian military intervention. (The Bureau of Intelligence and Research
believes that there is a significant risk of a coup, perhaps aided by India, within the
next year, but that direct Indian military intervention is much less likely. The
chances for such intervention would increase dramatically if a coup failed and if
refugees continued to stream into India.)
Another development that could trigger Indian intervention would be a further
shift by the Mushtaque or any other successor regime toward Pakistan and China.
In the event that India intervened militarily, its overwhelming military
superiority would result in a quick victory and the establishment of a regime
subservient to India. Such actions by New Delhi, however, would increase
anti-Indian sentiment in Bangladesh and over time an anti-government, anti-Indian
resistance movement would be likely to develop. Neither Islamabad nor Peking
would be in a position seriously to contest Indian dominance in Bangladesh, but
both would condemn India and give propaganda and perhaps modest material
support to a resistance movement.
In addition, Pakistan and China probably would engage in some sabre-rattling
of their own. China might make some troop shifts or even initiate small clashes near
the Indian border in order to make New Delhi nervous. The Chinese probably would
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not, however, launch a major military attack on India, given their apprehension that
the Soviets might intervene on India's side, China's lack of any significant stake in
Bangladesh, and the difficulties of logistically supporting such an operation. The
only precedent for a Chinese invasion of India-the Sino-Indian war in
1962-occurred under very different circumstances. Significant Chinese territorial
interests were then at stake and the Chinese enjoyed overwhelming local military
superiority. I ndo-Soviet ties, moreover, had not developed to their present level.
The case of Pakistan is somewhat different. Given the Indian armed forces'
vastly superior size and strength, we think Pakistan would be very careful to avoid
actions which might encourage a military attack by India. But Pakistan might try to
throw New Delhi off balance by engaging in clandestine agitation in Indian-held
Kashmir, and this could trigger an Indian military response.
Thus although the odds are against it, there is a possibility that India and
Pakistan could become embroiled in hostilities of their own following an Indian
invasion of Bangladesh. The risk of Chinese military intervention would be
somewhat greater in such an India-Pakistan confrontation than in an
India-Bangladesh crisis, but general caution and concern over possible Soviet
reactions would probably deter China from going beyond increasing its material
support to Pakistan.
An Indo-Pakistani war would, however, also open the door to involvement,
direct or indirect, of other nations. The Soviets, for example, would be pressured by
India for assistance, and Afghanistan might seek to profit from Pakistan's
difficulties. At the same time, the Shah of Iran, already inclined to the view that
India's ultimate goal in the subcontinent is to dismember Pakistan would be
tempted to aid Islamabad militarily. F7 I
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