FIRING LINE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020008-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 2001
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: April 30, 1972
• Content Type: TRANS

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4433 WISCONSIN AVE. N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20016. 244-3540
PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
( SEE PAGE 10 )
PROGRAM Firing Line STATION WETA TV
NET Network
DATE ` April 30, 1972 8:00 PM CITY . Washington, D.C.
FULL TEXT
WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY JR.: Mr. Andreas Papandreou --
did I get that wrong?
ANDREAS PAPANDREOU: No, it's okay.
BUCKLEY: Sorry. Was-an American citizen for a while.
He was automatically given citizenship when he served in our
armed forces during the Second World War. And in any case he
had attended Harvard University and gone on to do graduate work
in economics. In fact, he became a professor of economics and
headed the department at the University of California at Berkeley,
when suddenly he felt the callo.f Greek politics, ditched it
all, and went back to Athens in 1959. A few years later he
was a minister in his father's cabinet and the leading.Greek
noncommunist leftist.
But late one night in April, five years ago, a group
of colonels staged acoup and democratic government-, once again,
was terminated in Greece. Mr. Papandreou was kept in prison
for about eight months and then released.
He is once again a professor of economics, this time
at York University in Toronto. He has written'a book about
his experiences in Greek politics, Democracy at Gunpoint, and
.has another book coming out on what he calls "creative capitalism".
Meanwhile he continues to apply such pressures as
he can against the government of the colonels. He is particularly
active in the lobby that seeks to influence Congress and the
White House to put pressure on the colonels to democratize their
government. Which seeks also to deprive the Greeks of military
aid in the event that they do not do our bidding.
I should like to ask, Mr. Papandreou, do you believe
that the United States government should deny economic or military
aid to all nondemocratic powers?
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~PAPANDREOU: I do not believe that it is for me to
judge what should the American government do.
BUCKLEY: Are you -- you're not an American citizen
now, are you?
PAPANDREOU: No. I am speaking here as a Greek.
And when I plead a. cause in the United States, I plead this
cause because the government of the United States has decisive
influence on the fate of my country.
Of course, as a democrat, and as a man who identifies
himself with the cause of the people and of freedom, of open
society, I stand against militarism in all its forms. And I
consider indeed that most of the military programs, east and
west, east and west, have undermined our freedoms, have sapped
the strength of our societies, and sooner or later will bring
us to the brink of another massive confrontation.
On the question of Greece, the main reason that we
take such a strong stand on the.question of military aid is
simply the fact that the only source of strength of this junta,
as we call it,-junta, junta in Greece is not Its popular appeal
or its popular base but the armed forces. And the armed forces
themselves are very much integrated into NATO, into the structure
of command that .has its apex at-the Pentagon.
Now, the cutting off Of military aid would have a
.fantastic symbolic significance. It would mean that the one
source of support that permits them to.oppress people in a brutal
way, that one source of support is cut off. And it would be
a signal to the Greek officer corps that the Pentagon and NATO,
of which they feel very strongly to be a part, no longer approves
of what is happening in. Greece.
I remember, if I may off the cuff say, that Robert
Kennedy, on the very day he went to television to announce his
candidacy, asked me what would it -- what would do it in Greece?
What single action might do it, topple the colonels? And I
said to him, "Cutting off military aid". And he took that stand
publicly, not only privately. And there of course many Senators
and many Congressmen who have taken such a stance. Indeed Congress
as a whole has. Were it not for the fact that it has been overruled
by the President, this might have come about.
BUCKLEY: Now, you've covered a lot of ground. And
I'm very anxious to hear more on some of the points that you
have raised. But for instance, I have heard it said that the
kind of military aid that the colonels primarily desire is the
kind of aid that would be useful to Greece by no means in increasing
their powers of suppressing their own people but would be extremely
useful in the -- defending the Greek frontier against a possible
invasion from a superpower.
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s
As somebody said, "Look, it doesn't matter if you
have a World War II tank to keep the citizens of Athens in line,
but a World War II tank would not stop the kind of modern equipment
that the Soviet Union is in a position to advance." Now, how
do you handle that particular argument?
PAPANDREOU: Well, I shall give you the answer that
Secretary of Defense McNamara gave to me when I put the question
to him in June of 1964. He made it very clear he did not expect
Greece to really be able to hold the line for more. than a few
days, and that -- made it also very clear, in case of such a
confrontation, that the main -- well, the main burden of the
confrontation would be -- in such kind of war, would be yours,
would be -- fall on the shoulders of the U.S.
It is for me inconceivable that the Greek armed forces,
150,000 strong, could do much more than delay for a few days
a well-designed attack in the context of a world war. I'm not
talking about police actions.
BUCKLEY: How well did you do against the Nazis?
PAPANDREOU: Beautifully.
BUCKLEY: Well, why couldn't you do well against the
Russians?
PAPANDREOU: Well, against the Nazis we held five
days
BUCKLEY: You call that beautifully?
PAPANDREOU: No. I was talking about the Fascists.
You see, Nazis and Fascists in my mind sometimes get a little
confused. The Fascists, Mussolini's forces, were not only held
at bay but practically thrown into the Ionian Sea. And Hitler
had to come down, in fact delay his whole schedule for attack
in the east in order to confront the literally practically unarmed
soldiers. Not very different from Vietnam, by'the way. When
there is soul in a struggle the arms may be quite incapable
of...
BUCKLEY: Are you suggesting there wouldn't be soul.
in the struggle against the Soviet Union?
PAPANDREOU: I am not suggesting that. I think there
would be soul in Greece in the struggle against any occupation
force, whether it wears red, blue, green, or. white colors.
And this is why we are fighting against -- today -- against
what we consider to be a military occupation of Greece, not
an internal dictatorship.
BUCKLEY: Yes.
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PAPANDREOU: A military occupation of Greece by NATO
and under the general guidance of the Pentagon.
BUCKLEY: Well, you -- you -- but you're not suggesting,
are you, that if we were to stop military aid, there wouldn't
be enough gun powder...
PAPANDREOU: No.
BUCKLEY: ...for the junta there to continue to stay
in charge, would you?
PAPANDREOU: No. Not at all. No, not at all. You're
quite right. Our argument -- by the way, you do know an important
fact that Greece is a very chosen instrumentality in the military
and for the Pentagon and that they are now the recipients of
30 Phantoms, highly prized possessions by any ally. But I don't
think they.lack bullets to kill.Greeks.
BUCKLEY: So -- so therefore...
PAPANDREOU: I think...
BUCKLEY:. ...we are talking about..,..
PAPANDREOU: No.
BUCKLEY: Excuse me?..
PAPANDREOU: No. You're quite right. I mean no,
I confirm what you say. The act is symbolic. That is to say,
it is not in fact those guns that are essential, the additional
guns that are essential to hold the situation in hand. It is
a deeper question. That is to say, were it the fact, were
it the case, that the administration, the government of the
United States to say we cut off military aid because this is
an oppressive regime, because these would be the grounds of
course; it's neo-fascist regime.
BUCKLEY: Should we cut off military aid to Yugoslavia?
PAPANDREOU: Well, let me finish my sentence.
BUCKLEY: Yes. =
PAPANDREOU: Now, let's consider Yugoslavia and'how
much aid it is getting.
For it to do that, your government, it would then
say to the Greek officer "The Western alliance does not approve
of fascist regimes" -- of the Portugals, of the-Spains, of the
Turkeys, of the Irans, and of the Greeces -- "and in this climate
you officers have. to choose between supporting this regime and
losing your membership in the alliance of the free world or
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really dumping this'regime and becoming and staying as members
of a truly free world military community".
BUCKLEY: Right. Okay, now let me get into that,
but first of all let me ask you this. When McNamara was talking
to you in 1964 did he tell you for how long West Germany would
be able to withstand, let's say, a blitzkreig mounted by 95
Soviet positions?
PAPANDREOU: No, sir. Naturally not. The only question
I was authorized to talk about was Greece.
BUCKLEY: Uh huh. Because I've heard that-estimated
at two or three days.
PAPANDREOU: Yes.
BUCKLEY: But 'I -- don't we -- don't we agree that
notwithstanding our recognition of force majeure., of superior
Soviet-Power, it is also a symbol that JVATO.seeks in sending
tanks, whatever, to Greece or to Italy or to West Germany on
the basis of which to hold the NATO line. So that even a couple
of days might be significant.
PAPANDREOU: Yes. But really I don't -- I don't honestly
believe that is the issue. And..I don't believe it because the
Soviet Union and the United States in Europe proper have made
a accommodation which has been more or less confirmed now and
consolidated by the ostpolitik of Chancellor Brbndt. Actually
there is a freeze i?n Europe. Greece is becoming an American
outpost. There are 13 military establishments now. Piraeus,
the port facility, has been extended now to the Sixth Fleet.
The main reason for this is the Middle East and the
Eastern Mediterranean. There is oil in the Middle East.' There
is the Arab-Israeli conflict. And it is essential for the United
States military to have a staging base from which to operate.
And while this can be -- may be said to be very good short run,
hard headed, military technocratic thinking, one can really
ask the question about the long run, the kind of long run that
you are facing in the Vietnams of the world.
BUCKLEY: Well, now you speak as a Greek, and I...
PAPANDREOU: I have to.
BUCKLEY: Of course. And I can perfectly well understand
your desire in behalf of Greece to influence the policies of
the western world in such a way as uniquely to enhance the best
interests of Greece. However, two subquestions. I of course
need. to question yo'u as an American.
PAPANDREOU: Of course, of course.
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6
BUCKLEY: 'And there are an awful lot of Greeks who
do not share your particular enthusiasm...
PAPANDREOU: Surely.
BUCKLEY: .. for doing this and who are very much
puzzled in the light of your stated preferences for democratic
government that you should pool your resources with Bulakis,
a communist, and make common cause with him to try to restore
order-to a country that was very nearly done under by communist
subversion over a period of four bloody years after the Second
World War. Now, is this easy to understand on purely tactical
grounds?
PAPANDREOU: It's very easy to understand. First
of all, in terms of the facts, I think it's important to mention...
BUCKLEY: Yes..
PAPANDREOU: ...that the agreement is an agreement
of year 1968 summer. And that agreement relates not to two
political parties -- these distinctions are hard to understand
in a society which is not experiencing, of course, dictatorship,
suppression of parliamentary procedures and democratic freedoms.
This 'is not an agreement between two parties. It is an agreement
between two resistance organizations-which have nothing to do
with party politics. The agreement is tactical to the extent
that it is viable and valid today. This is not too -important
a question. It is an agreement as to the manner in which we
shall actively combat in Greece the occupation forces we see.
To us it doesn't differ much from the presence of the Nazis
in Greece. Memories are the same. Of course it's true we don't
have mass executions. But we have tortures on mass scale.
And we've had imprisonments and complete death of all kinds
of personal freedom and human dignity.
BUCKLEY: Mr. Sulzberger says there are 100 political
figures in prison. Is that an underexaggeration?
PAPANDREOU: Mr. Sulzberger is a specialist in this.
.Actually, taking not my figures, because my figures could be
biased and, you know, I'm -- I'm a partisan...
BUCKLEY: Yes.
PAPANDREOU: I have a cause. I believe in my country.
And I shall fight for it. But taking the numbers of Ronald
Steel, say, in The New York Review of Books, there were 30,000
Greeks that had been in jail at the end of the first year of
.the coup...
BUCKLEY: How many before the coup?
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.PAPANDREOU: Well, it depends what year you're looking
BUCKLEY: Well, the year before.
PAPANDREOU: The year before the coup I don't think
we had more than -- no political prisoners -- but there must
have been maybe 20, 30, I cannot be exact, people committed
for actually homicide, not political crimes, but homicide that
was connected to political meanings. And in fact our government,
the government of George Papandreou, put an end to the shameful
period, this garrison state that we had in Greece, which gave
a lot of economic growth but really at the same time combined
it with substantial police...
BUCKLEY: That was Karamanlis's (?) fault?
PAPANDREOU': Yes. Well, fault? Whose fault? History's
fault. The 'fact that there had been a. civil war in Greece was
not Karamanlis's fault. It was the.fault of many forces, the
Soviet Union, the British, the communist party, the Nazi collaborators.
Yoy know, who knows who's at fault? All of them jointly.
But there'd been a miserable civil war in Greece that
ended after the Truman Doctrine with substantial American participation,
not in the field, but financial participation, three to four
billion dollars.'on the whole, ended in 1949 and in the defeat
of the communist insurgents, the Aomalas (?) forces. And during
.the next decade,:14, 15 years, we had in Greece something of
a garrison state: Democracy, yes. The parliament always. functioned,
by the way, even when the communist forces were on top of us,
practically in Athens, the parliament functioned. This is a
very very substantial difference from today when there was no
communist danger in Greece of'any kind, the communist party
.being very small and very nonmilitant and very European in style.
We were the danger in Greece this time. And we represented
53 percent of the Greek people. And that is why a dictatorship
was necessary to suppress not us but the Greek people.
BUCKLEY: Well, now that gets us...
PAPANDREOU: Sorry about the speech.
BUCKLEY: That's all right, that's all right. That
gets a little bit complicated because I know that your father's
party came in with 53 percent of the vote. But it was also
dismissed from power a year later as the result of an argument
with the...
PAPANDREOU: A year and a half.
BUCKLEY: ..with the king. Year and a half, yes.
And then there were five caretaker governments. And then there
was a period during which you were denouncing your father's
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policies, and he was offering support of a particular caretaker
government. And a lot of rightwingers got all excited because
you were questioning the fidelity to NATO of Greece. And in
fact you are on record in your own book as admitting that perhaps
if it hadn't been that you decided to stop teaching economics
in California, Greek -- the Greeks would have a parliament right
now.
PAPANDREOU: Well, that's a bit arrogant. I'm not
sure if I put it that way. I'm not sure I'm that important.
But let me -- let me say this. You've said many things.
BUCKLEY: Yes.
PAPANDREOU: And some of them are valid, and some
of them not quite. Not intentionally. I never during the period
of my political life had
to be pulled out of NATO
Greece.
BUCKLEY: Uh huh.
PAPANDREOU: What I did say was that Greece bejonged
to the Greeks, that Greece was an ally but not a satellite,
We didn't want to be Washington's Bulgaria, or even Czechoslovakia.
BUCKLE'Y: And who did want that?
PAPANDREOU: Well, I'm afraid your generals did.
BUCKLEY: Well, I -- let's assume it a?minute, but
what Greek politician wanted that.
PAPANDREOU: Oh, most were afraid that without --
I'm not prepared to name names, but I would say that --well,
I shall give one example but I -- I hate -- I won't mention
the name, because I respect today everyone who's fighting this
regime -- but there has been a Prime Minister in the history
of Greece who when General Van Fleet stepped down in the airport
of Illinikon (?) turned his hand and showed the Greek troops,
and he said, "General, here are your troops."
I would never have shown the Greek troops to any general
of a foreign nation, allied or not, and say to him "here are
your troops". Thieu will do this.
BUCKLEY: Well, that's just a form of hospitality,
isn't it?
PAPANDREOU: But not -- well, not the kind that I
would buy.
BUCKLEt: After all, Eisenhower managed the movements
of a lot of Gr ek and French...
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PAPANDREOU: He did. By common consent.
BUCKLEY: ...and -- well, yes. Uh huh.
PAPANDREOU: And he did not think of a French officer
as being an American officer.
BUCKLEY: No. But he was simply given the -- Van
Fleet was given the job of heading up the counter-insurgency...
PAPANDREOU: Yes.
BUCKLEY: ...movement, and simply did rather well.
He also left. I'm -- I'm...
PAPANDREOU: Well, you understand...
BUCKLEY: I am aware that your...
PAPANDREOU: ...that my point is.a moral point.
BUCKLEY: Well...
PAPANDREOU: It's a moral point.
BUCKLEY: Once again-it's a symbolic point, isn`t
it?
PAPANDREOU: But life is -- what is life but a series
of symbols? Really, in the end, what are we about ---for bread
alone?
BUCKLEY: No,- I don't think so. I don't think so.
But I.do -- I do think that it is probably instructive, isn't
it, to dwell for a moment on the rather distinctive difficulties
of Greece during this century.
PAPANDREOU: But...
BUCKLEY: You've had eight military coup-d'etats in
50 years.
PAPANDREOU: Yes.
BUCKLEY: You've had an average change of government
every year. You've had two civil wars. And under the circumstances,
a lot of people seem to me to be rather resigned about the Greek
experience, because what they're saying to themselves is, well,
Hell, Greece can't have democracy any more than Spain apparently
could, or Portugal. And I'm not saying this is true or it is
not true, but I'm saying that this reasonably occurs to people
who contemplate your history over 30 to 50 years.
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is a correction of something I said myself.
BUCKLEY: Yes, sir.
PAPANDREOU: And then the other one is a response
to your last very important question, or statement.
I like to be perfectly honest. And I would like to
say that while my positions at the time were the ones that I
have stated to you, following five years.of bitter experience,
when we have seen the West in the context of the NATO alliance
which was presumably established to defend self-determination,
integrity, and democratic institutions -- that's the preamble
of NATO -- when we.see that this very organization has become
the instrument of oppression in Greece, under the guidance of
your Pentagon...
BUCKLEY: But you haven't made that plain.
PAPANDREOU: Allow me -- allow me. to complete this,
because you wanted me to answer properly...
BUCKLEY: Yes, absolutely.
PAPANDREOU: And now I shall.
BUCKLEY: Yes, and dwell on the instrument of oppression.
PAPANDREOU: Why not?. It is. And I think of course
we should dwell. But I won't repeat it too often...-
BUCKLEY: Sure.
PAPANDREOU: ...because time is valuable. But not
only in Greece, in Portugal, in Spain, in Turkey, in Iran --
and I'm talking about my part of the world, I'm leaving Brazil
out of the way -- now, under those circumstances, when most
of southern Europe is practically neofascist, when Italy may
position in vember,
American rro --a : - d,-from-Ge-r. y_ sf~o ...0~cup Ita y.
BUCKLEY: Well, the socialists did come to power.
PAPANDREOU: And this I make a statement. No, but
Mr. Walters was no longer in Italy.
troops?
BUCKLEY: And you think he would have brought the
PAPANDREOU: As a matter of fact, I think ttiht was very
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he has repeated the statement now. It'd be very very important
for Con ress to fin"ut what GenPr~1 ~,1alters think``a1'"'~'" a1y
today, and w ether indeed in Ital.a new putsch is not underway.
BUCKLEY: Managed by the CIA?
PAPANDREOU: Managed? Well, you know I get a bit
lost, because for instance there is a man in Greece who played
a very important role, Mr. Norbert Anschutz (?). He was the
charge d'affaires. Actually I knew him very well.. And I thought
of him as a charge d'affaire. Now it turns out that he was
a colonel in the U.S. Army, that's Pentagon. It turns out he
is officially a top CIA agent. And now he turns out to be the
manager of the First National Bank in Beirut. So you ask me
is it the Pentagon, is it the First National Bank, is it the
CIA, I just don't know.
BUCKLEY: You -- do you question the wisdom of our
maintaining a Central Intelligence Agency?
PAPANDREOU: Not at all, sir.. I do not. But I don't
want it to manage my affairs.
? BUCKLEY: Yes. Well, no...
it.
PAPANDREOU: I want it to manage yours if you choose
BUCKLEY: Yes, yes.
PAPANDREOU: But not mine.
BUCKLEY: Well now, are you not -- or are you suggesting
that Colonel Papadopoulos is an instrument of the CIA?
PAPANDREOU: Oh, but you see I happen to know this
because it was my very bad luck that I became Minister of State
and I was in charge of Greek intelligence. And I discovered
to my very great. surprise two things. Well, one thing. Namely
that the Greek CIA, which -- that is, KYP, K-Y-P is the acronym --
was both fiscally and administratively an appendage of your
CIA. Not surprising, because it was built after the civil war
by the Office of Strategic Services, which preceded the CIA.
But the thing that -- in fact, you know, that's why we couldn't
stop them tapping our telephones. Which we tried, you know.
I couldn't do that. But the thing that surprised me -- not
surprised me, but the thing that I found out then, which had
no significance to me then, any kind of significance -- it does
now -- s that Papadopoulos was the official liason between
Ih.e L. -S_-. __C T A a n d. _.t_h.e.._, Iir_e.e k- K Y P .
in Greece now is that is is the
~"
European
first known CIA agent___tQ become a_~rime h'rinister of a
,cau.ntvr_y __.__Y.o u. know, this
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BUCKLEY: Well, I think it -- it seems to be going
a little bit far to say that someone who's in charge of-intelligence
in a country which, God knows, needed an intelligence after
the kind of civil war you went through, ended up simply being
an agent of -- of the CIA. Mr. Papadopoulos...
PAPANDREOU: Well, he happened to be. He happened
BUCKLEY: Mr. Papadopoulos was primarily...
PAPANDREOU: ...surely.
BUCKLEY: ...confused -- primarily condemned, in my
experience with him, as being very provincial, being very...
PAPANDREOU: This I don't mind being provincial myself.
BUCKLEY: ...being very narrow minded, being exclusively
concerned for his own country, and being a very'unreliable ally
in the sense that he would play with the Soviet Union even if
necessary...
BUCKLEY: ...to establish.,.
PAPANDREOU: No, he never would. That is -a little
caramel that is distributed by the Pentagon to get funds for
him. But the thing that also he was, and this is something
.that has been revealed in Congress, I did not know it for a
?fact myself, is that he was an agent of the SS during the Nazi
occupation in Greece. And I think it is a rather important
thing.
Nine members of the Greek junta were in the SS. And
this is not my information. It is information produced in Washing-
ton for Washington's use.
BUCKLEY: I think probably, since I'm not in a position
PAPANDREOU: To deny this or confirm it.
BUCKLEY: I think I probably owe it to viewers here
to say that your reliability has been questioned by some reviewers
of your book who are not agents of the CIA. For instance in
the New York Times. I don't intend anything personal by this.
But they say that you are a very passionate man, and, as the
New York Times man said, "oblivious of the fact that opposition
accounts could be similarly plausible and persuasive". Or as
another reviewer for Book World said, your book merely confirms
that what in fact the Greek politics demonstrated, namely a
strong disinclination to admit that there are other viewpoints,
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other interests...
PAPANDREOU: Yes.
BUCKLEY: ...other truth than your own.
PAPANDREOU: Well, you see of,course I am not going
judge myself. It is an impossibility.
BUCKLEY: Yes. It's awfully easy to say about Papadopoulos...
PAPANDREOU: No, no. You see...
BUCKLEY: ...that he was an ex-Nazi.
PAPANDREOU: No, no. You see -- no, no, but you see
I didn't make a judgment.
BUCKLEY: Uh huh.
PAPANDREOU: No, no. -I made a statement of fact.
Something that you can confirm or disconfirm. And I stand to
be corrected. -I'm.saying that your own Congress has evidence
and your State Department. And it is official and hard information
that he was in the SS during the Nazi occupation. And I say
this as a statement of fact, not a belief.
BUCKLEY: Uh huh.
PAPANDREOU: Now if this is wrong, then I'm not wrong
but those who have printed it in black and white, you know.
BUCKLEY: And you -- did you -- have long have you
known this, have you had this information?
PAPANDREOU: About a month and a half'to two months.
BUCKLEY: Yes.
PAPANDREOU: I did not know it before.
BUCKLEY: Now, what about -- what about the charge
that's been leveled about you, since we're exchanging charges,
do you...
PAPANDREOU: No, I'm not stating charges. I'm stating
BUCKLEY: You're stating something that you have heard.
PAPANDREOU: Yes.
BUCKLEY: Presumably...
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PAPANDREOU: Well, no. Something that-you can find
out, too. Not hearsay. This is documentary evidence, available
in the Capitol Hill.'
PAPANDREOU: I mean, you know, this is not hearsay.
? BUCKLEY: Yes, well this is, of course, the way facts
are always presented. It -- it's been said...
PAPANDREOU: Well, I'm sorry. I wasn't told that
I should bring documents here.
BUCKLEY: No, that's all right. That's perfectly
all right. We've -- we've had a lot of facts of this kind alleged.
Ten years ago Life magazine published a charge that Stalin had
been a member of the Okrona (?), and for all I know it was true.
I don't think it greatly influenced Stalin towards pro-Czarism
after 1917. And I certainly haven't seen any...
PAPANDREOU: Well, he was...
BUCKLEY: ...indications about...
PAPANDREOU: ...he was ready to become a priest, by
the way, which..'.
PAPANDREOU: ..must have meant at some point that
he was part of the establishment in that country or trying to
become a member of the establishment. So maybe it was...
BUCKLEY: Well, that -- that was really before the
nationalization of religion in Russia.
BUCKLEY: But I haven't seen Papadopoulos urging a
western dominated Nazi regime in Greece.
PAPANDREOU: Well, what is h,is regime? What is his
regime? In fact he does urge exactly that. In fact if you
do read all the editorials of his controlled press, they point
an accusing finger at the Norwegians and the Danes and the Swedes.
And they say Americans, look, these are not your friends because
they are playing around in a coffee shop called democracy.
What you need is law and order and responsibility and honest,
loyal membership in NATO for the defense of the-free world --
with concentration camps and torture chambers and prisons, things
like that.
AOINUS or. Rkise AqJ111t01I: 6XIF8Pi4VA4'I RA31 00t b8h-9
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or it's unfortunate (blank in broadcast) Papadopoulos seems
to be a resurrection of something that probably Greeks have
gotten awfully used to during this century. When Papadopoulos
came out against Miniska oit recalled Pangalos (?) doing the
same thing in 1924. When he called for national regeneration,
it recalled Metaxis (?) doing that in the 30s.
I don't think unfortunately there's anything very
new about Papadopoulos from anybody who views the situation
a little bit more detachedly than you. By which I mean you
were thrown out, and obviously this is bruising experience.
Lots of people have been thrown out of Greece by the victor
the eight military coups of the last 50 years.
Meanwhile you...
PAPANDREOU: What's the moral of that story?
BUCK-LEY: ...want us to...
PAPANDREOU: What's the moral of that story?
BUCKLEY: The moral of that story is that you want
us to. reorient western policy in NATO'in behalf of your feelings
about Greece. And I'm trying to say to you that I can share,
I hope quite sincerely, your disappointment about the antidemocratic
nature of that regime without, however, feeling that they ought
to impose on...
PAPANDREOU: Oh, heavens...
BUCKLEY: ...an alliance that has kept as much freedom
as manages to survive in western Europe..
PAPANDREOU: Heaven forbid, no. The last thing I
want is for you and the alliance to impose anything on Greece.
BUCKLEY: Uh huh.
PAPANDREOU: The most I want, the thing we all wish
now in Greece, is that we be left alone to run our own home.
We have lots of business in Greece...
BUCKLEY: Yes, but you have...
PAPANDREOU: We have -- allow me to finish, you see,
unless you...
BUCKLEY: Sure. No, go ahead, go ahead, go ahead.
PAPANDREOU: Okay. We have much social reform to
carry out in Greece. We want to bring democracy to every village,
We want to build a Greece that really belongs to the Greeks
and to the Greek youth. And I want to be left out of the Cold
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War strategic games that are ruining not only us.but the world
and you...
BUCKLEY: But you can't be.
PAPANDREOU: ...as-well.
BUCKLEY: You can't be left out. You'd be gobbled
PAPANDREOU: Well, look. What do you think we are
BUCKLEY: Well...
PAPANDREOU: We are gobbled up by the Pentagon right
(Both men talk at once)
BUCKLEY: I think, if I may say s'o, that's your superstition.
PAPA.NDREOU: If -- superstition?
BUCKLEY: Absolute superstition.
PAPAND-REOU: Let me give you some facts, sir.
BUCKLEY: Okay.
PAPANDREOU: W. W. Rostow, February 1967, subcommittee
of the Security Council of the United States, reviewed the Greek
situation. Conclusion: the Center Union and Papandreous will
win in May '67.
BUCKLEY: Oh, I -- everybody agrees...
PAPANDREOU: That being...
BUCKLEY: Sure. Everybody knows that.
PAPANDREOU: ...against the interest of the United
States, proceeds Mr. Rostow, therefore necessary to move toward
a dictatorial solution in Greece. Source, because you like
sources: Marquis Childs' syndicated column, plus oral confirmation
by Marquis Childs to me in person, Spring 1968. Available in
print.
BUCKLEY: To say that Marquis Childs said it doesn't
mean that it's true. But...
PAPANDREOU: All right.
BUCKLEY: ...but let's -- let's oblige it...
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PAPANDREOU: All right. Next...
BUCKLEY: Go ahead.
PAPANDREOU: ...who made the coup in Greece? Five
men. I can reel off their names. It don't make much sense;
Greek names are difficult to pronounce if you're not a Greek.
But the five men -- I'll reel them off -- Papadopoulos, Makarezos
(?), Patakos (?), Hadzipatro (?), Foralis (?). This is the
group.
Of the five, the four members of the Greek intelligence
agency. Therefore of the five, the four members necessarily
and inevitably of the CIA. The coup was a CIA coup. And it
was a Pentagon supported one.
We hope b next fall an arm o er who has
"
say --
escaped _.junta_ to__-whi c..h_ e e one -- we hope, I
will _ be secure enough abroad to beableto give testimony to
personal participation in Greek uniform . of CIA ..personnel , as-
-in. Cambodia and as in Laos.
By the.way, it might be of interest to you that the
overthrow -- the officers who overthrew Sihanouk in Cambodia
were trained in Greece by Papadopoulos. Just as you may be
interested to know that the Italian neofascists, the MSE in
Italy,.is getting today,its guidance by the junta. And there
is now documentary evidence of this in Italy.
The famous general who tried the coup a little while
back -- not general but prince, in fact, Borgese (?), Borgese
is now in Corfu, working very closely with the Greek junta and
preparing the next few moves in Italy.
So we're talking about a pattern here...
-B,UCKLEY:__ Mr. Papandreou, I wish -- I wish that the
CIA were one half as powerful as you depict it as -bein.a.. ;W-e
would have m-_ fuc i less difficulty throughout the--'wor-1`d-.
back as 1958 because it
oulos was inves tiated as far
e was involved it
Greece _e ore CIA
coup.aNttl~a~so know that there are coups in
.,was invenzea.
PAPANDREOU: Yes.
BUCKLEY: It's the obvious, it's the ordinary thing
in Greece ...
PAPANDREOU: The ordinary?
BUCKLEY: ...not the extraordinary thing.
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PAPANDREOU: Oh, no.
BUCKLEY: They've been going on in Latin America for
150 years before we -- before we discovered the existence of
Latin America.
PAPANDREOU: Allow me to disagree with you. We can
disagree, can't we?
BUCKLEY: Sure.
PAPANDREOU: Are you -- are you suggesting that the
.present Bra7i1ian dictatorship for instance is independent
offtthepi1ic. el pursued by C I A - ? _
BUCKLEY: Of course I...
PAPANDREOU: Are you suggesting that...
BUCKLEY: It's highly...
PAPANDREOU: ...the IT&T, for instance...
BUCKLEY: It's highly...
PAPANDREOU: ...would not have been involved with
the CIA in the overthrow of All.ende?' Yes or no?
BUCKLEY: Mr. Papandreou, if you think this is a dilemma,
you have something...
PAPANDREOU: No. I want your'answer.
BUCKLEY: It's -- it's -- it's obviously true that
there are identities of interest throughout the world. Here
you're about to participate in a great big rally in New :York
in which...
PAPANDREOU: Yes.
BUCKLEY: ...you urge action in behalf of policies
that you desire. Now, there's no reason in the world why other
people don't -- and in fact they do -- urge action in behalf
of policies...
PAPANDREOU: Oh, this I understand.
BUCKLEY: ...that they desire.
PAPANDREOU: This I understand.
--BUCKL.EY ___..But-- toe hobg-o b1 ?4 isn-af _- ot-e-rnat4.oila1
Qol iti cs on grounds of the_._p._l i_san_ard__tha~_._._tthe CIA runs ever thi n