DIARY NOTES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP73-00027R000100040001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 83
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 11, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 31, 1970
• Content Type: NOTES

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DIARY NOTES
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DD/S 31 March 1970
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
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*Garage At the Executive Committee
today I informed the meeting of the selection of the
Garage and the cost and other reasons therefor. The Director asked if
we were considering arrangements whereby the assigned chauffeurs might
park their cars at Agency headquarters property thereby avoiding the
time spent and difficulties of negotiating the traffic flow during the morning
hours from the garage to headquarters and the evening hours from head-
quarters back to the garage. I advised that this matter was under
consideration.
25X1A
25X1A In connection with the planning for the use of the
I asked that consideration and planning be given to this aspect
as expressed by the Director. Sometime before occupancy of the garage
I would like the Office of Logistics to submit a tentative plan as to how this
might be worked out. This may pose some servicing problems On the cars
in use but certainly this could be worked out. On the other hand, there
might be a fair savings in the overtime earned by chauffeurs as they would
not have to spend quite so much time "in transit" if they had to pick up and
deliver their cars at the new garage.
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7E
DIARY NOTES
DD/S 30 March 1970
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*1. Re lacement of Today, with Mr. Blake,
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I visited the prospective sites at the D. C.
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Transit Building on Grace Street, Georgetown, and th?1 25X1A
Building located on Prior to
the visit a briefing was given concerning all pertinent statistics and costs
relating to the several properties. Upon completion of the inspection
it was my decision that the Agency should acquire the. 25X1A
site in light of its cost per foot at $1.65, annual rental at $36,000,
renovation cost at about $150,000 and its inside square footage of 21,000
plus additional 13,840 square feet of outside useable property. Following
the inspection I so informed the ExDir of my decision and in turn informed
the Director of Logistics to proceed with GSA in the acquisition of this
property. In the discussion with GSA for the rental of the property,
presumably on a five-year lease, we should seek to incorporate a forfeiture
clause in the event we do not need this facility for the full five years, and a
sublease clause for commercial use also on the premise of not needing
the property for the full five years. The commercial sublease clause may
be a problem with GSA.
**2. Repairs to the Director's Chrysler: Today I inspected the
Director's Chrysler to assure that the suggested repairs set forth in
the 20 March 1970 memorandum from Chief, Logistics Services Division
were warranted and necessary. My findings were as follows:
a. The new engine is necessary, cost $940.
b. The rear bumper is damaged and should be
replaced, cost $167.
c. The windshield is cracked having been struck
by some object. The crack apparently is spreading and the
windshield needs to be replaced, cost $127.
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d. The metal wheel covers are badly pitted and
scarred and all should be replaced, cost $80.
e. The upholstery in the front and rear seats is
rather badly soiled through use. It does not appear that
these could be cleaned successfully after their long use
and they need to be replaced, cost $75.
f. Painting of the car. In a number of places the
paint is chipped and a number of places on the side doors
and on the front hood the metal surfaces which represent
ridges in the body frame or edges are worn down to the
metal. Some of this has resulted from chipping but mostly
from abrasion and rubbing where the paint has been
completely removed. Accordingly a repaint job is
necessary, cost $200.
g. Minor miscellaneous repairs, cost $50.
Total $1, 639.
is to ascertain if a new engine is available for
installation and arrangements should be made through Elizabeth with
the Director for the availability of the Chrysler for 10 days to effect
these repairs. During the 10 days the Director can use the Cadillac
which is in good operating shape or if this is not to his liking, one of
the new Fords or Chevys.
***3. Newsweek Article on Air America: On 27 March 1970 I
25X1A mentioned at the Executive Committee Meeting that Everett Clark of
Newsweek had contacted concerning Air America and in
the course of this meeting we learned that Harvey Wexler of Continental
Airlines had twice stated to Newsweek that Air America was owned by
the U. S. Government and run by CIA and that he had been officially
informed of this fact.
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S
DIARY NOTES
DD/S 25 March 1970
1. Headquarters Cafeteria Survey: I met with the Executive
Director to discuss my upcoming luncheon with Mr. John Dillon,
newly appointed President of GSI. I outlined my approach to Mr. Dillon
vis-a'-vis the Agency's desire to have several outside cafeteria vendors
review the Agency operation and seek proposals for the operation of the
cafeteria. This survey will be conducted before we adopt the two
principal recommendations of the GSA-Marcus N. Wright recent survey,
namely to install self-bussing and totalizing of servings rather than a
normal cashier payment type operation.
The Executive Director advised that he wanted Agency
representatives to directly participate with the GSA in the selection
of the outside vendors and advising the vendors as to certain basic
requirements in any proposal for the operation of the Agency cafeteria.
Additionally, Agency representatives would be present and facilitate
outside vendor survey. It was felt that this is necessary to get a
reasonable consideration of any outside proposal as GSA appears to be
quite satisfied with the GSI operation and they would tend therefore not
to pursue the outside vendor approach too vigorously. It could well be
that the outside vendors will show little interest and that GSI operation
may end up as the logical course of action, however, we must make the
effort and satisfy ourselves as to whether there is a better way to
operate our cafeteria in the best interests of all concerned.
2. Display of President's Picture: Today Mr. Blake handed to
me a memorandum dated 17 March 1970 from Mr. Weaver, GSA
Building Manager, concerning the lack of Agency response to the display
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of the President's picture in the main lobby of the Headquarters Building.
It appears that this direction from GSA for such action has been rocking
along since 31 December 1969 with an inadequate response from the
Agency to the GSA. According to the memorandum the matter has
reached Mr. Harold Pavel, Deputy Director PBS Region 3, who asked
that the Agency provide a memorandum explaining why the picture would
not be allowed in the lobby.
Obviously the Agency has been dilatory in responding and it
appears to me the matter is getting a bit out of hand and could have some
unfortunate and misunderstood repercussions. Accordingly I asked
Mr. Blake to contact Mr. Pavel immediately and explain that we have the
matter under consideration but we are having some difficulty from the
aesthetic standpoint in properly locating the place to display the
President's picture. Mr. Pavel was advised that appropriate action
will be taken as soon as possible. Meantime I talked to
Elof the Fine Arts Commission and advised of this situation and the
fact that we must take some immediate action and not let this drag on
any longer. The manner in which the program has been presented leaves
us little alternative except to display the President's picture in the lobby
even though we might think there are more appropriate places to display
this picture. I also called Building Manager, and advised
that we were taking action and that we would not write a letter to GSA
but would leave it to to handle it through his channels
advising that appropriate action had been taken. I further alerted the
Executive Director to this problem and the course of action that I was
taking to assure that we do have appropriate response to this GSA
requirement.
3. Repairs to the Director's Chrysler: I showed to the Executive
Director the proposed repairs to the Director's Chrysler as set forth
in the memorandum on 20 March 1970 from the Chief, Logistics Services
Division. These repairs will take 10 days if all are approved. The
Executive Director asked me to personally inspect the Director's car
to assure myself that the list of seven repair items are necessary. I
will do so within the next several days.
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DIARY NOTES
DD/S
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23 March 1970
25X1A
25X1A 2. Soviet Movie - "True Sons of the People": At the conference
at the movie, "True Sons of the People" was shown and it
was determined by the Director that he would like an English sound
25X1A
commentary to go with the film explaining some of the types of equip-
ment featured in the film. recommended of his 25X1A
Directorate as being the most knowledgeable of the equipment and
personalities in the film. Accordingly, I have arranged for 25X1A
25X1A OTR to collaborate in
devising an English language sound commentary to the film. I asked that
this be first worked out in script form and submitted to the DD/S, DD/S&T
and the DD/I for approval. (Action on this was issued on 25 March.)
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DIARY NOTES
DD/S 23 March 1970
1. Agency Garage: In reference to the proposed authorization
to take over the property on
as the Agency garage the consideration was raised by the Executive
Director of the possibility of constructing a garage on Agency
Headquarters property. As a result a meeting was held today with the
Executive Director, Larry Houston, John Clarke and the DD/S to
consider the legal and congressional proprieties of obtaining approval
from the Bureau of the Budget and the congressional committee but
without the necessity of having to get a congressional authorization and
appropriation. After some discussion of the problem it was agreed that
Mr. Houston would submit a paper to the Executive Director who in turn
will take this matter up with the Director for policy approval. Meantime,
I asked the Executive Director to approve the
memorandum so that we might proceed with the obtaining of this property
and renovating it for garage purposes. Construction on the Agency
property would take a minimum of two years and we must have a garage
by 30 June 1970.
2. Research and Development Funds: A meeting was set up
with the DD/P for 23 March to discuss projects of mutual interests to
the DD/P and the DD/S. Unfortunately the DWI' had to cancel for
other priorities but it was agreed that we would meet prior to the
Deputies' Meeting on the allocation of R&D projects.
25X1A
3. Finance Officers Overseas: Les Bush this date asked whether
or not I would agree for relatively senior Finance officers scheduling
TDY trips overseas for the purpose of reviewing the activities of
individual Finance officers assigned overseas. This would be a two-way
street of briefing the Finance officers on Finance matters, career program
activities, personnel policy aspects and reviewing any problems that the
Finance officer may have. This is particularly for those Finance officers
who are the only representatives at overseas stations. I thought this was
a good idea and so approved this action.
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4. Subject, who served as the Labor Advisor
to the FEPA negotiating team, asked to meet with me to discuss a
suggestion by to whether he would be interested in
serving as t.h
I made arrangements to meet with at Costin's Restaurant
at 12:20 p.m. Wednesday, 25 March 1970.
*5. Request to the Bureau of the Budget for Additional SPS
Positions: DD/S&T in support of its newly assigned programs is
requesting some additional SPS positions. In accordance with the
agreement reached with the Bureau of the Budget, increase in such
positions is negotiable for new projects. In a discussion with the
Executive Director the problem of who would negotiate with the Bureau
of the Budget was raised and it was agreed that John Clarke and the
Office of Personnel would pursue this with the Bureau of the Budget.
I asked out of this proposition as I would simply have to brief myself
to a considerable degree on a matter that is fully knowledgeable to
both John Clarke and SPS.
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DIARY NOTES
DD/S 19 March 1970
1. Flight Surgeon: Dr. Tietjen advised today that he is
deleting the Flight Surgeon from his Table of Organization. This
type of service has not worked out too well and it is felt that the
need for this program is not a continuing responsibility.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
25X1A
25X1A 2 Dr. Tietjen today advised that
plans to retire in December 1971. He wishes to discuss
this with me and has made some vague reference to what he terms
his "commitment". I do not know what this means but I will explore
this with him.
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Luriche_on for
Representative William E. Minshall (R., Ohio
Wednesday - 18 March 1970
)\\\\
---kg;5=Creours
Director's Dining Room
Lawrence K White
R Jack Smith
T. H Ka a ess
Carl Duckett
Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Executive Director - Comptroller
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Plans
Deputy Director for Science and
Technology
Deputy Director for Support
Legislative Counsel
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.S7CRET
MINSHALL, Representative William E. (R., Ohio)
Birthplace: East Cleveland, Ohio
Residence: Lakewood, Ohio
Marital Status: Married
Birthdate: 24 October 1911
Children: 3 sons
Education:
Attended University of Virginia; Cleveland Law School, LL. 3., 1940.
. Public Career:
Congresses: 84th - 91st (1955-70).
? Current Congressional Committees: Appropriations (CIA Subcommittee
? Other: Member, Ohio General Assembly, 1939-40; General Counsel,
Maritime Commission, 1953-54.
Military Service:
Enlisted in December 1940 as private in U.S. Army and served in
European theater, G-2 Section, Hdqtrs. III Corps and was honorably discharged
as lt. colonel in March 1946.
Civic Activities and Organization Affiliations:
American, Ohio and Cleveland Bar Associations; Rotary.
SECRET
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sEn
CIA Interests:
Member of Defense Subcommittee for several years, appointed to
CIA Subcommittee in 1970.
Has expressed concern that the intelligence community does not
provide advance warning of flare-ups as in the case of the 1968 Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia and the 1967 coup in Athens.
Once commented that the Director wasn't too popular in some circles
because he was the only one in Washington who told the truth and some
people didn',,t like that.
SECRET
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DIARY NOTES
DD/S 16 March 1970
1. Air America - Arnold Abrams Newspaper Inquiry: I
briefed the Executive Committee on the message from dated
13 March (IN 042797) concerning inquiry by Abrams about Air Asia-
Air America operations. Abrams represents the Seattle Times and
Far East Economic Review. The interview has been conducted and
at best we can wait for the results of the interview.
2. GSI - John Dillon: From briefing notes and a conversation
with the Executive Director I am to invite John Dillon, the new President
of GSI, over for lunch. At the same time I will brief him on our GSI
contract arrangement at It appears there is
some confusion with GSI over our attitude towards the continuing of
the GSI contract and whether or not we are ready to go for self-bussing.
I will have an opportunity at this time to explain all of this to Mr. Dillon.
I will endeavor to set up this luncheon either this week or next week.
3. On Saturday Elizabeth indicated that
she wanted 12 copies of the booklet "Presidents of the United States
on Intelligence". I asked Miriam if she would arrange for that number
25X1A of copies to be furnishe on Monday morning.
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
4. Weekend Meeting at11111111.111 For this coming weekend's
meeting al he Executive Director asked if the film "Why
Man Creates" by Kaiser could be shown to the group on Friday evening,
20 March. I calledand asked him to make the necessary
arrangements and let me know if there was any problem.
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25X1A 5. I advised the Executive Director that
25X1A the subject is the son of He was arrested early
Sunday morning and charged with assault with intent to commit murder
and concealment of a weapon. It appears that who has had a
number of problems of recent date, was in a bar at 23rd and K Streets
in Washington. He was fairly drunk and got in a fight at the bar.
After leaving the bar an undercover police detective who was not in
uniform approached him with a view to arresting him.
apparently thought the policeman was one of those with whom he had
just had the fight at the bar and he pulled a concealed .25 caliber
revolver and began shooting. He was disarmed, arrested and charged
25X1A as above. Howard Osborn was alerted and has endeavored to keep it
out of the press. Sunday was so notified. So far there
has been no publicity.
25X1A
6. Acting Chief, Soviet Bloc Division,
25X1A called to advise thai ias been ill for some time and
advised that he wants to recommen for promotion and asked
whether a memorandum from him was necessary. I advised that we
will have in the near future another supergrade promotion exercise
and that we fully understood that and it
was unnecessary that he write another memorandum to this effect.
I will use this opportunity to write a memorandum for the record which
will serve the same purpose.
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7. The Director called me through Colonel White
to advise that Saturday while over at the White House a
advised that her husband used to work for the Agency but is
now an inmate of the Western State Hospital in Virginia. She stated
that she has been unable to get anything out of the Agency and she can't
pay the bills for the hospital care and doesn't think the Agency had done
right by her. I had Mr. Wattles check the record and found that
eft the Agency on disability retirement,
presumably on psychiatric grounds. The handling of his case and all
benefits would be by the Civil Service Commission. He had only Aetna
Hospital Insurance for himself alone. It appears he physically mistreated
his wife just prior to the retirement. He had been an employee since
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and was a GS 12-8.
I arranged to have Mr. Wattles call at the White
House and in turn have someone go over and meet with her to find out
what the problem is and see what we can do to assist her in her
contacts with the Civil Service Commission. I advised the Executive
Director of this course of action.
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DIARY NOTES
DD/S 13 March 1970
25X1A
1. Congressman Passman Foreign Operations Subcommittee
of the Appropriations Committee - USAID Hearing: Les Bush advised
that James E. William's office, Chief, Budget Division, USAID advised
that they were to appear before Congressman Passman's committee
on Wednesday. AID had been informed in advance that the committee
would be interested in knowing how many man years and how much
money CIA had reimbursed to USAID from Fiscal Year 1969 to projected
Fiscal Year 1972 for Additionally,
they wanted to know the Agency's share in dollars of USAI
Subsequently, it was determined that this is a
regular appropriations hearing by AID and the committee was really
interested in determining whether AID appropriations were being used
to pay CIA costs. The answer of course is no as CIA reimburses AID
in full. The dollar costs in question have been worked out between the
Office of Finance and AID and there is no dispute on these figures. I
discussed this with Jack Maury and Mr. Maury was
endeavoring to arrange how we will handle this request. It is
believed that the best way would be for AID to advise the committee
that CIA reimburses AID in full for all costs and that no AID appropriations
are used on behalf of CIA. If the committee wishes details and amounts
the AID officials should state that they must take the matter under
advisement and confer with CIA fill endeavor to work out this
formula.
2 Air Conditioners: I advised the Executive
Committee that the Agency had acquired 200 surplus window-type air
25X1A
conditioners from the Navy which will be shipped to.nd
installed in the houses at
As surplus they will be at no cost
to the Agency except for delivery and repair costs. The Director
advised that this was a good step.
torrading and
declissIficatIon
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3. Personal Firearms: In my recent trip overseas there were
several instances where employees had a personal firearms collection.
They were mentioning some of the problems that were incurred in
including these weapons in their household effects in returning to the
States. I noted with some concern the elaborate series of steps of
registration and declaration and identification of the ownership of the
arms in arranging for their return to the U. S. In addition I understood
that to have possession of the weapons in a foreign area the individuals
apparently had to register these boti
In light of the great public concern expressed today over
possession of personal firearms, registration of such weapons and the
somewhat elaborate control about transporting weapons across state
lines and international lines the personal weapons should be transported
by our employees only when the employee knows in advance that the
weapons can be readily taken with him and that the opportunity to use
them for personal purposes is clearly evident at the post of assignment.
I have not made a study of this problem but am looking at it in a very
cursory fashion. I asks thateview our
regulations and procedures in this regard and perhaps consider whether
or not this poses a serious problem and whether or not there should be
some DD/P guidance to all personnel about transporting personal
weapons overseas.
4. WAEPA Board: John Noble of WAEPA called me at my home
on Wednesday 11 March to advise that the WAEPA Board is meeting next
week and they are anxious to have the official designation of the new
Agency representative. It seems that was our designated
representative of this Board but his position has been vacant since July
when retired. Today I checked with both Mi. Wattles and the
Executive Director and the latter designated as our
representative. Meantime the Executive Director called both Roger
ho are members of that Board nominating
I in turn called John Noble to advise that is our
representative and asked whether any additional papers were necessary.
Noble advised that he had all the necessary information and he would
make the formal presentation to the Board.
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5. Package Inspection: A bomb threat was made against the
Agency in a telephone call to the Security office today. The caller
stated that he had been asked to bring a bomb into the Agency to blow
up the building. Howard Osborn took a number of precautionary
measures in checking access to the Headquarters compound and the
questioning and inspection of any suspicious persons trying to enter.
Over the weekend, Saturday and Sunday, a tighter badge and package
control was exercised. Any employee bringing a package into the
Agency was asked to open it and inspect it in the presence of Security
Officers to be sure there was no unauthorized material. This
proceeded without problem except for of DD/I who raised
a considerable objection. The matter was eased after it was made
plain that he was the one to do the inspecting in the presence of a
Security Officer. Another DD/P employee objected but quickly relaxed
as soon as he understood that he was the one to do the inspecting of
his own package.
6. When I was in was quite
interested in his next assignment but I was not aware of that assignment.
Upon returning to headquarters the decision was reached that he would
be Chief of Support a_tand a message was sent to
Icivising him of this assignment.
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Wednesday
A. M.
11
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070 Wednesday, March 11, 1970
295
25X1A
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MINUTES OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING
A -DD/S 11 March 1970
trip.
back. He had a good, although very fast,
2. DD/I reported some unhappiness with the persistent
challenge which he perceives in White House Staff questions on
quality of research. The Director had not heard of this before and
ndicated that the challenge seemed to be the depth of
the research in contrast with that for example of the
3. Mr. Maury called attention to the award made to Senator
Jackson of the VFW Congressional Award.
4. Yesterday's Hearing apparently went well, the Di rector
giving credit to Mr. Duckett and Mr. Chamberlain. Mr. Maury
sited as evidence of the satisfactory nature of the Hearing that Senator
Murphy had asked for a picture of the Director.
25X1C 5. On th matter, Mr. Helms
noted a telephone call from Under Secretary Richardson in which he
had agreed with the Under Secretary's idea of suggesting to Senator
Fullbright that Mr. Helms appear before Mr. Fullbright's Committee
in lieu of AID's Dr. Hannah. Further on the the
Director noted that he had telephoned the managing editor of the
Washington Post and the Washington Bureau Chief of the Los Angeles
Times and had some other actions planned.
25X1A
6. Colonel White noted favorably the special CBS half-hour
program last night hosted by Charles Collingwood - DD/I said that they
have a tape of the program.
CLES
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tES ONLY
7. The Director asked Mr. Houston the status of the transfer
of to the Smithsonian. Mr. Houston indicated that a letter
to Dillon Ripley from the DCI is being prepared and that following
consultation with protocol people the physical transfer will be arranged.
The Director enjoined Mr. Houston to see this transaction through to
its final conclusion.
25X1A
8. DD/P reported that thhave initialed a
stand-down in liaison with military and civilian contacts.
9. Colonel White noted that a Mr. Sorrels (sp. ?), BOB, had
requested the CIBts for the month of February proposing to analyse what
raw intelligence went into the finished report. (Mr. Sorrels was identified
to the Director as the individual who sat behind at a NRO
related session and had evidenced anti and other anti-program
ideas.) The DD/I opposed giving the book to the BOB noting that this
people had recently completed detailed analysis on six months work. The
Director decided that Mr. Sorrels should be invited to come to the Agency
to meet with the DD/I representatives to sort out this matter.
10. DDCI reported on the Defense Posture Committee Meeting
which he attended yesterday for Mr. Helms. Apparently the bulk of the
time was devoted to the question of further public disclosure concerning
In the final analysis it was decided that the CIA matters and
involvement would remain classified. Also from this meeting came word
that SecDef is very bothered by the air costs in and is determined
to cut the sortie rate. He believes and apparently many other people do
also that the criteria are availability of planes, pilots and ordnances and
not operational requirements.
25X1A
11. responded to the Director's question concerning
the Washington Post article on the Kissinger team having returned from
Vietnam. said that there was not a team per se, that a
number of individuals who had been working on the Vietnamization question
had gone to South Vietnam to complete studies on a number of specific
provinces. Only two Agency officers were involved, both from OER,
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12. The Director asked Mr. Karamessines when he would be
ready to react to the comment by Re resentative Bow to the effect that
the Agency had too many people ii Mr. Karamessines said
that DC/WH, is ready and the Director (not completely
satisfied on said that Mr. Maury should arrange 25X1A
25X1A to call on Mr.
25X1A
13. The Director called attention to a memorandum signed by
Mr. Richardson as Chairman of the NSC Under Secretary's Committee
which calls on CIA and DOD to further reduce overseas Agency and
attache personnel. The Richardson memorandum attaches a paper
from Mr. Kissinger which identifies the reduction as the President's
desire. The Director was very unhappy with this event and intends to
counter it very strongly. His proposed initial action will be a session
with the PFIAB and a letter (not clear whether to Mr. Kissinger or
Mr. Richardson) challenging the basis on which the conclusion was
founded. DDCI speculated as to whether Ambassador Annenberg's recent
remark about stumbling over people irIMMould be the basis for the
Kissinger paper.
25X1A
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Sen. Jackson Praised by President
CPYRG HT
President Nixon last night
praised Sen. Harry M. Jackson
(D-Wash.) as a spokesman for
national security and "a man
who widerstands the threat
to peuce and freedom in the
worl as well as any man I
know."
'. Nixon delivered the ac-
colade at a dinner of the Vet-
erans of Foreign Wars, which
presented Jackson with its
Congressional A war d. The
Washington senator has been
a leader of senate forces favor-
ing the anti-ballistic missile
and was Mr. Nixon's first
choice for Secretary of De-
fesne. Jackson declined to be
considered for the post.
VFW Commander-in-Chief
Ray Gallagher pledged his or-
ganization to back Mr. Nixon
"100 per cent" in any effort to
increase defense spending, in-
cluding the ABM. ?-
CPYRGHT
Kissinger Team Ends Vietnam Survey
By Robert G. Kaiser
-Washington Post Foreign Service
,SAIGON, March 10 ? Ten
officials sent here by Dr.
Henry Kissinger to assess the
pacification program have
coinpleted their work and
headed back to Washington.
ten?five from the State
D,epartment, three from the
CIA and two from the Defdise
Department ? came to Viet-
n4in to investigate optimistic
-eports from the field with a
Viberately skeptical eye.
dAccorOing to informed
4-iirces here, Kissinger and,
Aber top officials in Washing-
ton hoped this kind of special
investigation would help them
evaluate the'steady stream of
optimism that has dominated
official reports from Vietnam
for months.
"They're inundated with
facts in Washington," one of-
ficial source said. "They don't
know what to make of them."
The 10 men who came to
Vietnam for visits of about
three weeks all had previous
experience here. All ' spent
most of their time in the coun-
tryside, each investigating the
situation in one or two prov-
inces. Several went to prov-
inces they had worked in' on
earlier tours in Vietnam.
Sources who talked to the
visitors said many of them
found grounds for skepticism
about the official optimism
here. Several, for example,
said the South Vietnamese
government seemed to have
little to do with pacification's
success in the last year, these
sources reported.
Some pacification officials
in Vietnam have also expressed
the view that the dramatic in-
crease of government control
in the countryside has ? been
achieved in spite of a medio-
cre performance by the gov-
ernment. Like several of Kis-
singer's investigators, these of-
ficials attribute many of the
gains to 1.1. S. firepower and
temporary Communist
weakness.
Informed sources also said
some of the Kissinger investi-
gators were impressed by ,the
degree of government control
in the country, even if they
questioned the reasons for it.
Most of the 10 investigators
shared their observations with
Gen. Creighton W. Abrams
and other top officials here be-
fore returning to Washington.
Abrams was said to have spi
as much as two hours wit'
some of them.
?
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THE WASHINGTON POST
11 March 1970
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DIARY NOTES
A-DD/S 11 March 1970
Deputies' Meeting: Mr. Karamessines was tied up with the
Director so Colonel White stalled momentarily.
a. CT Paper: He announced that he had approved
the rewrite of the CT paper on the assurance of Hugh
Cunningham that the only problems had been raised by the
CS and these had been resolved. When Mr. Karamessines
came in Colonel White repeated his statement including
the understanding that the CS was satisfied with the paper.
It drew no adverse comments from Mr. Karamessines.
b. Risk-of-Capture: I suggested as a filler item
25X1A the status of the 8-hour risk-of-capture course which had
been proposed b.31 as a preliminary to
consideration of our paper by the Deputies' Meeting. I
passed out, with Colonel White's blessing, copies of the
attached outline paper.
25X1A
c. Proper Attire: Colonel White also used the blank
time to comment on the dress of some of the people he sees
in the halls and the cafeteria. He suggested that perhaps
these individuals, primarily men, are shift workers in the
Signal Center, Cable Secretariat, or computer areas. He
asked that staff meeting channels be utilized to request
that at least when in the corridors individuals should dress
with appropriate measure of dignity and good sense.
25X1A d. Colonel White passed out copies of
the "final" draft c as Mr. Karamessines joined
the meeting. He asked that comments/concurrence be given
to the Director of Personnel not later than close of business
18 March. He noted his understanding that the DD/S, IG and
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GC had agreed to the paper as distributed. He had Mr.
Houston give a short background briefing for the manner
in which the regulation was constructed. In the course
of his discussion Mr. Houston mentioned the procedural
document which DD/S and DD/P (D/Personnel added DD/S&T)
have produced as being correctly structured and worked.
In the subsequent discussion it was noted that it would
probably be wise to reissue procedures following 1 July
since those now approved in the Directorates are keyed
specifically to the special situation and time table of the
period from I March to 1 July 1970. Colonel White noted
that he reviewed the 1 March reports from the Deputies
and believed that the maximum of 125 surplus is indicated
and that he would expect that the actual number would be
considerably less. Mr. Duckett has received an affirmative
ExDir response to his question as to whether Directorates
could be over-strenghed temporarily through the hiring of
needed new professionals at the same time that the surplus
declarations had not been finally settled. Colonel White
as a final point asked whether the protection of sources
and methods emphasized in the first sentence of
is appropriate and was assured by Mr. Houston that he feels
it is needed.
e. Married Couples Paper: Colonel White asked
for comments. I gave two mechanical suggestions (a) that
the papers be addressed to the Deputies and Heads of
Independent Offices rather than just to the Director of
Personnel, and (b) that the first sentence of paragraph 2c
be amended to include "consultation with the Deputy
Director (s) concerned" after "the Director of Personnel".
Colonel White accepted these but asked if there were any
problems with the basic substance of the paper. DD/I
suggested that the Directorate is not the right level of
prohibition and in subsequent discussions it was agreed to
change this to Office or CS Division. DD/P questioned the
problem behind the paper. Colonel White indicated the
Director had been bothered and had been desirous of having
some change made. Mr. Duckett suggested that the paper
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should deal with all family requirements not just married
couples - this point came out somewhat mute since
Mr. Stewart pressed for a separate paper, as this was
negative in character, on employment of both husband and
wife, and Mr. Duckett pressed for a paper which would
include the married couple policy and policy on other
family employment such as parent and child which would
be treated in an encouraging tone. D/Personnel is to redraft
(including the last sentence of paragraph 2c) for presentation
to ExDir by 17 March which will allow time for Colonel White
to talk to the Director. Colonel White has also in mind that
25X1A the Director might wish to put this into the miscellaneous
category fo]
f. ExComAir and Review of Air Support Activities:
Colonel White asked for comments on the two papers he had
passed out. I suggested a preference for a more formal group
effort rather than limiting the D/PPB. Mr. Houston said that
he felt the work would go faster if it is not given to the task
group. He had conceded my point, however, that some
25X1A technical expertise was needed and wondered if
might be made available to John Clark to do this
job. (I agreed to check this point.) Mr. Karamessines did
join me to the extent of agreeing the study paper should be put
through the Deputies concerned. Colonel White agreed to
accept editorial changes of this nature in the draft memorandum.
On thei
otice, Mr. Karamessines hoped
that paragraph four would not force him to void consideration of
sensitive operational requirements of the CS and he was
reassured on this point. I made the two points that
put in his note but neither was really accepted. Colonel White
seemed to misunderstand the idea of designating alternates and
went more to the support of primary membership - on this point
I told him that I felt it was necessary to defer to Mr. Bannerman
Mr. Houston has no problem with alternates providing it is not
delegated too far down and providing that the membership is
25X1A
fr: min
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sufficiently divided to assure the advantages of continuity.
On the proposed change in paragraph three Colonel White
seemed to prefer the wording as drafted. Mr. Houston
conceded that there was no definition to go with the word
"major" in the first sentence of paragraph three. This
discussion was concluded by ExDir in inviting editorial
suggestions on the paper as well as DD/S determination
on his primary representative.
g. Weekend: Colonel White at the
end of the meeting mentioned a weekend and 25X1A
informed those present that it would involve only DCI,
DDCI, ExDir, the four deputies and John Clark,
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Tuesday
A. M.
10
March
P.M
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-
MEMORANDA e-
i
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069 Tuesday, March 10, 1970
296
25X1A
25X1A
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Executive Committee Meeting Notes - 10 March 1970
1. The Director opened the meeting by reflecting to Mr. Karamessines
the telephone call he had just completed with
Mr. Helms noted the Ambassador was full of praise for the
Agency's team. The Director noted this as significant since Mr.
was not always as favorably impressed with Agency representation.
25X1A
2. DD/I advised the Defense officials had requested weekend process -
25X1A ing of the Lake in order to prepare SecDef for a Congressional appearance
next week. Mr. Duckett noted that thismission appears to be a very 25X1A
good one technically. The bucket is due to be picked up today or tomorrow.
25X1A
rted, in connection with PFIAB pressure on the Agency,
that is setting up a seminar which will look at computer 25X1A
assisted analysis of substantive information concerning Apparently
Government and contractor officials will be involved.
25X1A 4. I noted the requirement for one of the specially cleared Agency
communicators to accompanny in
order to handle any traffic in the special White House privacy system.
5. The Director reacted very firmly that he would not be the first
witness before the House Foreign Affairs Committee tpt
6. Mr. Bross was back after a bout with the flu.
25X1A
7. Mr. Duckett noted that today he is hosting for lune
25X1A and the departing and incoming ACDA military deputy.
25X1C
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25X1C
9. DDCI is attending a White House meeting (I believe on some kind
of a Defense review committee) this afternoon since Mr. Helms appears
before the joint Atomic Energy Committee.
10. The Director instructed Mr. Maury to invite Representative Bill
Minshall (Ohio) to come out for a briefing at his earliest convenience --
breakfast or dinner or duty hours. Representative Minshall has replaced
Representative Lipscomb on the House (Mahon) Agency Committee and was
at yesterday's hearing.
11. Mr. Maury regaled the group with a tale of his observation of
an education in the workings of the clerical/secretarial staff in the office
of Congressman Mendel Rivers. 25X1A
ifJoh fey
2
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Monday
A. M.
March
P.M.
8:45
1:00
9:00
1:15
9:15
1:30
9:30
1:45
9:45
VI
2:00
10:00-
)
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C
e)
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MEMORANDA
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068 Monday, March 9, 1970
297
25X1C
SECRET
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io WILT
A-DD/S
MINUTES OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING
9 March 1970
1. DD/I announced the schedule of NSC related sessions this
week. There supposedly will be no NSC Meeting but a Review Group
meets Tuesday, the Defense Committee meets Tuesday or Wednesday
and the Verification Committee meets Wednesday.
2. DD/I also reported that the (subject
unidentified) was producing excellent material to which the Director
responded that he wished the DD/I to press hard since he had recently
agreed to steadying liaison coverage.
25X1A 3. DD/I noted a report from Mr. Godfrey from (AD/OCI
told me that Mr. Godfrey is now in and should be back in a day or
two.)
4. Mr. Maury noted that Senator Stennis was quite happy with
25X1A Mr. Maury also noted a long list of
questions from Senator Case concerning the subject of the Gore Subcommittee
Hearing. The Director reacted somewhat soberly to the content of several
example questions and indicated that the position in response must be very
carefully thought out.
25X1A
5. The Director also commented on the fact that would
continue to be picked at as a subject and that this being a fact of life no
one should become unduly excited about one or another individual thrusts.
25X1A
6. reported that Mr. Bross was still ill.
7. Mr. Karamessines said that there would be no 303 Committee
Meeting this week and that he understood it was slipped until 20 March.
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8. The Director noted that he was seeing Representative Mahon
this afternoon - the Chairman having invited him in order to be able to
counter some of the challenges raised by congressmen such as Richard
25X1A McCarthy to the privileged five members of the Agency's committee.
The Director decided to take rith
him.
9. The Director noted that he had accepted an invitation to a
luncheon meeting of the American Foreign Service Association on 26 (?)
March. He solicited ideas for items which he might covFr. ((I wonder
if we might not consider suggesting Agency interest in or reaction to the
various points raised in Macomber's speech and or topics being
considered by the various task groups which the Macomber speech
identified, since AFSA. and a number of its leading lights have pressed
so hard for foreign service reform.))
10. The Director and Mr. Karamessines and General Cushman
engaged in a somewhat private chat abou and his
failure to act upon an earlier Agency warning. DD/P noted that he was
now holding and zeroing in on the right man.
11. No one mentioned during the meeting, although there had been
various comments before the Director arrived, the Today Show appearance
5X1A of a lawyer by the name of Beckett who asserted that
as claiming as his boy, his son.
Isn't that just unfortunate.
25X1A
Jo fey
9.14. -Li 1,1)5,..0,
tsk.S.\k Setwwio.
0- karTteN.
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DIARY NOTES
25X1A
?
A-DD/S 9 March 1970
25X1A DD/I Car Radio: In several subsequent conversations with
we sorted out that Mr. Jack
Smith's current car has installed two radio systems: (a) regular
motor pool connection and (b) one terminal in a private DD/I net
25X1A rented under a DD/I contract with Motorola. This second net
which was originally installed in regime consists of
five vehicles, the desk of the DD/I secretary and the Watch Office.
It is this second net with which Mr. Smith is unhappy and which he
desires to have replaced with something which works and with
something which will permit him to talk to the Operations Center
to whom he can give instructions for other action.
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
Today Mr. Smith, in all good humor, gave me a clipping,
indicating the type of thing he has in mind. I told him that we had
learned more about this setup since he spoke to me on Friday and
particularly that the Motorola system was one which his office
contracted for. He acknowledged this but repeated that it didn't work,
he wants it taken out and replaced with something which will provide
him simple but effective communication with the Watch. Meanwhile,
Logistics conferred by phone and in person
discussing the same problem withvith a
resultant agreement that would test ride Mr. Smith's car
and its radio systems and produce comments which will hopefully
lead to a determination of what we wish to have as a replacement system.
D/L is prepared to make available a customized Motorola system which
is due in shortly which could put Mr. Smith's car in the security net
from which calls could be phone-patched to the Watch or the DD/I
offices. Action will be held until hands the ball back to
Support. reported Mr. Smith as being currently happy with
the action which is taking place.
JWC:11c
rilf17 1
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IL K
Friday
--et' -61iC/2 j
March
P.M.
8:45
25X1A
9:00
1:15
9:15
1:30
9:30
1:45
9:45
25X1A
2:00
10:00
2:15
10:15
10:30
2:30
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11:15
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MEMORANDA
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065 Friday, March 6, 1970
300
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6 7
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_
JULY
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1234
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1
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4 5
1
2 3
1 2 3
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6 7
1
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4 5
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8 7
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MEMORANDA
4:00
4:15
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4:45
5:00
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066 Sat., Max. 7, 1970 299 067 Sun., Max. 8, 1970 298
Approved For Release 2000,105/05 : CIA-RDPahR001000404g1-6
MINUTES OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING
A-DD/S 6 March 1970
* 1. DD/I reported on his trip to the West Coast. He noted
that economic pressures are evident and serious all over the
West Coast. He also noted that young PhD's in various sciences
are having difficulty finding jobs upon completion of their studies -
25X1A this he got from representatives of industry and the President of
He also noted the surprise at the dramatic
growth of Phoenix as an electronic center stimulated principally by
Motorola.
25X1A
25X1A
2. reported that 0/S had given an 0. K.
forIMMMEMMMMMfor an historian's meeting
subject to his being given an appropriate defensive briefing.
3. Mr. Helms stated that the President would issue a
statement on Laos at noon today, this to be followed by a backgrounder
session with Mr. Kissinger with representatives of the news media.
Note was made of the accuracy of the Murray Marder piece in today's
Post (attached). Note was also made of the Joe Alsop article in today's
Post (attached). The Director mentioned the two-hour Verification
Panel Meeting yesterday and noted that there would be further meetings
on March 11 and 13 and that the NSC on March 18 would deal with SALT.
25X1A General Cushman bordered on the Secretary's Committee Meeting which
he attended for the Director which dealt with MMleadirg to the
unresolved question as to where funds would come from to mee==
desires.
25X1A
4. noted an upcoming issue of Ttue Magazine
in which an article will appear making extensive claims and allegations
about actions against Haiti.
John
*Extract to D/P
25X1A
, y
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i
25X1A
Approved For Release 2000/05/05 : CIA-RDP73-00027R000100040001-6
THE WASHINGTON POST -6 March 1970
Approved For Release 2000/05/05 : CIA-RDP73-00027R000100040001-6
'Relea e teop
RGHT
tatement
Due on Laos
CPYG-171TBy Murrey Marder ,
f k VII ? I-
The White House is expect-
ed to issue a statement, prob-
ably ,today, on American in-
volvement in the semi-secret
war in Laos in an attempt to
quell. domestic alarm about
escalating warfare in South-
east Asia.
There is open concern in-
side the administration that
suspicions about clandestine
warfare in Laos can shatter
the relative American calm
about U.S. strategy in adjoin-
ing South Vietnam. General-
ized denials that there is any
current administration inten-
tion to send American ground
troops into Laos have failed
,to head off congressional ap-
prehensions.
! White House ?Press Secre-
itary Ronald L. Ziegler said
'yesterday that "we have been
considering this matter and
there is a very good possibili-
ty that we will have some ad-
ditional information to give
you this weekend."
President Nixon left Wash-
ington last night by jet for
a three-day weekend at Key
Biscayne, Fla. Ile was ac-
companied by his principal
aides, including Henry A.
Kissinger, his national securi-
ty adviser.
What is expected is a
I White House statement on
;Laos with a press briefing for
newsmen.
I The Nixon administration
is expected to tell only part
of the facts about the full
U.S. role in the Laotian war
because the conflict directly
involves the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, whose detailed
!activities in such a situation
'never are officially disclosed.
See WAR, Al2, Col. 1
WAR ;
President Nixon, as 'presi-
dents Johnson and Kennedy
before him, is operating on
the principle that any one,
sided diselosure,40..,cpyfft
tiVitiek in Laos Wq41.4c: pt.4?tlie
United' States at 11.triajer
loinatic disadvantage .and also
damage the prospeets for halt-
ing the Laotian cenflict. . ?
The internal argument:has
been that North Vietnam
never admitted that it failed
to comply with the 1962 Gen-
eva agreement to pull its
troops out of Laos, but instead
greatly increased them. U.S.
military support, training, and
air power was then requested
clandestinely by Laotian Pre-
mier Souvanna Phouma:' to
preserve his neutral regime.
This has put both sides, f0
some years, in actual violation
of the Geneva neutrality ac-
cords. But whoever admitted
it officially would put himself
on the spot. President Nixon
publicly tried to hold that line
as recently as his Jan. 30
press conference. Since then,
however, a rolling North Viet-
namese-led offensive in Laos,
reportedly with 15,000 new
troops added to the 40,000 to
50,000 Hanoi soldiers there,
has escalated U.S. alarm
about "another Vietnam," put-
ting pressure on the White
House to speak out.
President Nixon in the re-
cent? past has acknowledged
that U.S. air power has been
engaged in "interdicting" the
flow of North Vietnamese in-
filtrators across Laos into
South Vietnam. The United
States has said very little offi-
cially, however, about its role
in the other war in Laos, for
control of Laos itself.
Now, U.S. strategists them-
selves are wondering whether
the Communists plan either to
intensify the level of warfare
in Laos to checkmate U.S.
strategy in Vietnam, or to try
to gain enough control in Laos
to force the United States to
halt the bombing of the so-
called Ho Chi Minh infiltra-
tion trails. The latter has been
a longtime Hanoi objective.
On Tuesday in a private
meeting with the ,Senate For71 Odering a rePortle thknri
eign Relations Conithittee,,. can people that will 11' Welp-
Secretary of State William P: nil' on this count too. '
Rogers sought to ease senato- Mansfield said he' is en-
rial fears that :the United couraged to, hope that more
States ?is contemplating send- facts about U.S. activities in
ing: ground troops.into.Laos if Laos will be released. Other-
the situation worsens. wise, he said, "The people
Administration and congrffSt w11:14fivPrle,,,Inore? and more
sibrial sources yesterday ,betli ;??4iVtgeicitis .04 the situation
be deniedra gavepubl the
o
d erehipomttertsitQhat will become more difficult.',
a Mansfield said, `'We are up to
binding assuranee;.:. trot :the our neck in Laos and over
Nixon administration' never our head in Vietriam." '
will do so. Sen. George McGovern'
such absolute guarantee, ad- ' ed his charges
It is impossible to give any. (D-S.D.) renew
ministration sources said. yesterday' that in Laos, "we-
What Rogers did tell the corn- are flirting dangerously with
a new Vietnam.
mittee, sources in both- "The administration is viii-
branches of government said, iating the Geneva settlement
was that the administration of 1962 by interfering mili-
tias no current plans to send tailly' in ' Laos," McGovern
any ground combat troops into told the National Newspaper
Laos and would consult with Association in the Senate
Congress in advance if such auditorium. McGovern said,
an emergency should arise. "I firmly believe we are at
Rogers also notified Sen.
war in Laos on a dangerous
Stuart Symington (D-Mo),
scale," and '"the Nixon ad-
chairman of a Foreign ytela- ministration is guilty of deli-
tions subcommittee that has
investigated U.S. involvement
tions about that war.
in Laos, that the "serious situ-
ation w
presently existing in .Svean. Harry F. Byrd (D-
.) told the Senate, "Un-
Laos" makes it impractical for "v
der no foreseeable circum-
Ambassador G. McMurtie stances must we become in-
Godley to return to Washing-
ton to testify. When feasible, volved in another ground war
in Asia." Byrd said a state-
said Rogers, that will be ar- ment this week by Premier
ranged. Souvanna Phouma suggests
berate deceit" in its explana-
The Symington subcommit-
tee has clashed with the ad-
ministration for months over
security censorship and re-
,
lease of the record of its
closed hearings on Laos.
Senate Majority Leader
Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) told
newsmen yesterday that he be-
lieves President Nixon is con-
"that he may 1) e becorning
desperate and is seeking wid-
er and more comprehensive
support from the United
States."
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THF WASHINGTON POST - 6 March 1970
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Approved For Release 2000/05/05 : CIA-RDP73-00027R000100040001-6
CPYRGHT
Joseph Alsop
revailing Double Standard
n Laos Should Be Abandoned
?"r Where is Gov, Averell
^" Harriman, one wonders?
And why has he not been
,? speaking up about the cur-
rently dangerous problem in
' - Laos?
? With great patience and
astuteness, and under in-
struction from President
: Kennedy, Gov. Harriman ne-
gotiated the Geneva Accord
on Laos in 1962. At Gov.
'- Harriman's' urging, the lead-
ing neutralist and Laotian
"; patriot Prince Souvanna
Phouma, was therefore in
? stalled in the prime minis-
'.^tership, which he still hold.
The key features of the
3,^'). Harriman-negotiated accord
2 ' further seemed to guarantee
3: 'a free ritn, to Prince Sou-
"' ^vanna in his own country.
-) -Both the United States and'
-"North Vietnam undertook tu
' withdraw all their troops
'from'Laos.
Hanoi further promised,
most solemnly, to cease
? using Laos as a transit route
':"for men bound for the war
-'in South Vietnam. To make
'the outlook still more hope-
?ful, the Soviet Union guar-
anteed that the North Viet-
;namese would keep these
piomises
^"? AS SOON AS the accord
was signed, the United
States immediately with-
'4 drew every last one of the
".'-considerable number of
;'.United States soldiers and
- 'officers who had been serv-
',0ing in Laos in advisory and
:upporting roles. Hanoi,
'"meanwhile, had a far larger
'number of troops in Laos ?
,'?no less tan 6,000 at that
1`..rtime, land therefore quite
l'aenough to cause a decisive
.".tilt in the military balance
in such a tiny country. But
''of these 6,000 North Viet-
namese troops, exactly. 40
were withdrawn!
Hanoi's flagrant disregaAl
? for the accord that Gov.
Harriman negotiated did not
' '-end there, either. The prom-
ise 'to cease using the so-
- ^ called Ho Chi Minh Trail to
-; South Vietnam was also bro-
or ken before the ink on the
treaty was dry. In this cen-
tury's ugly history of such
episodes, there has been no
cruder, more open, more
shameless instance of treaty
violation. ,
, Before long, the Soviet
guarantees, given to, goy.
, jtarriman and embodied in
the treaty in apparent good
faith, had also proved to be
-, utterly worthless. In these
circumstances, the neutral
Approved For Release '2
turn except to the Milted
States.
Prince Souvanna therefore
asked for U.S. aid, though
not for a return of any
Americans in uniform.
Granting Prince Souvanna's
request was urgently ad-
vised by Gov. Harriman's
personal choice for the U.S.
Embassy in Laos, the able
William Sullivan, now in
charge of the Vietnamese
problem in the State Depart-
ment.
Ambassador Sullivan's re-
quest Was warmly approved
by President Kennedy; and
U.S. aid therefore began to
be provided in the form of
supplies, additional money
and civilian volunteers tapa-
ble, of helping Laos in var-
ious ways. And as the North
Vietnamese violations of,
Gov, Harriman's treaty &en-
tinuously grew more mas-
sive,- more outrageous and
more dangerous to Laos,
U.S. aid had to be increased.
THIS IS the long and
short of the U.S. role in
Laos, which is now being
"expoSed? by certain sen-
ators and certain report-
ers. You could have no ,bet-
ter illustration of the curious
double standard invariably
employed by people like
Sen. J. W. Fulbright.
One wonders why he and
his 'friends are not rather
more busy exposing the
North Vietnamese violations ,
of the Harriman-negotiated
treaty. These violations,
after all, are the sole cause
of the U.S. role in Laos. But
of these violations, nothing -
has been said by the
expose-experts.
Aside from these ironies,
moreover, this is now an
acutely dangerous situation.
In the recurrent offensives
in each year's dry season in
Laos, Hanoi has never be-
fore employed more than
elements of two North Viet-
namese regiments.
This year, in sharp con-
traSt, major elements of two
North Vietnamese divisions,
the 312th and the 316th, are
being used in Laos, without
counting the tens of thou-
sands of North Vietnamese
troops along the Ho Chi
Minh Trail in eastern Laos.
The North Vietnamese are
also using tanks and heavy
artillery for the first time.
These are the reasons they
are now two months ahead
of the schedules of the past,
in reaching the most ad-
vanced positions they have
ever occupied.
The, betting is at least
111)ill
th. siffp a--
dOkibtaicht7#001MA
rior power to go forward.
The aim, obviously, is to
reap a cheap victory in
Laos, to compensate for the
setbacks being caused by
the Vietnamization program
in South Vietnam.
But North Vietnamese oc-
cupation of most or all of
Laos will be too gross and
damaging an act to be
treated cheaply. Thailand
cannot tolerate North Viet-
namese control of the other
bank of the Mekong. Presi-
dent Nixon will also have to
think about withdrawing
sonic or all of President
Johnson's enormous, quite
unrequited conCessions to
'Hanoi. So the prevailing
double standard had better
be abandoned with some
haste.
1970. Los Angeles Times
Approved For Release 200045/05 : CIA- 00010004004,196
RDU3Ga6
25X1A
DIARY NOTES
A-DD/S 6 March 1970
Miscellaneous: Late today Colonel White telephoned on
several points:
* a. The Director has decided to keep the
25X1A Chrysler but wishes to have a new engine installed.
I passed this by phone to who will
advise when and how long it will take to acquire an
engine and to make the installation.
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
b. C/13, the NPIC employee, the
Director wishes that no dismissal action is concluded
without having been seen by a psychiatrist.
This was passed orally to Mr. Wattles, Mr. Osborn
and Dr. Tietjen.
c. Colonel White wished to confirm the name
of the forme employee who had dropped out
of sight. I gave him this name and subsequently the
text of a note from which responded to an
earlier inquiry from Colonel White as to the type of
individual young s.
JWC:11c
*Extract to D/L
:V1
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SKRET MR-fading and
declassification
Approved For Release 2000/06/05 : CIA-RD ir0001000400040
DIARY NOTES
A -DD/S 6 March 1970
Car Radio: Mr. Jack Smith asked me before the Morning
Meeting to look into the matter of a radio for his car. He said he
definitely does not want the radio which is in his current car since
it has never worked. He understands that the Director has a
radio-telephone setup including a telephone handset and this he
believes is what he should have in his automobile. I told him I
had no background as to his requirements or as to our plans but
would check and let him know. I passed the problem to
after the meeting and he will check and advise.
PAC:11c
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4.
tC.I
iiMP
.17R000106040001-6
sad
declassification
25X1A
25X1A
Approved For Release 2
out.nywuo :
t,i1A-pwr i 4-uutkii
rwym tuwyouuul
-t) MAY JUNE
814TWTF9
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Thursday
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mai
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2ni
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
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A-DD/S
MINUTES OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING
5 March 1970
1. A/DD/I noted that Mr. fii's father died this morning.
2. A/DD/I noted that the Under Secretary's Committee is
scheduled to meet at 1600 to discuss special trade relations with
Spain. The Verification Panel is scheduled at 1430.
3. A/DD/I reported a potential problem with DD/R&E and
his planned use of compartmented photography in congressional
hearings. The Director asked Mr. Duckett to call Mr. to
attempt to disiStade this action.
4. reported that he had selected a number of
charts used at the Director's appearance before the Gore Committee
which can be given to the Committee hopefully satisfying their request
for more charts.
5. advised that Mr. Jack Smith would be back
tonight.
7. Mr. Duckett reported that thlaunch was successful
and the first day operation was very productive.
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ClinilP 1
4006340001-6
derr3;:rading and ;
declassification
25X1A
SiCRET
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L11
8. DDCI noted a satisfactory conversation that he and Mr. Bross
had with newsman Orr Kelly.
9. DDCI also noted that he would be leaving Friday afternoon
and would be away until Saturday on a trip tcM====M
10. The Director noted the speech by Werner Von Braun at a
recent luncheon he attended in which Von Braun talked about the
future essentiality of satellite photography for peaceful purposes.
25X1A 11. The Director singled outM=M for extremely high
compliments for having selected and placed in his hands as he entered
the White House yesterday two pages from the Congressional Record
which prevented "uncomfortable confrontation" with Secretary Rogers,
Under Secretary Richardson, Assistant Secretary Green, etc. This
item identified Ambassador Winthrop Brown as the source of Senator
Symington's information quoted in the newspapers giving imperative
judgment on the significance of Laos and Vietnam. The newspaper
item might have been and apparently was interpreted as indicating
that the Director was the source of the information.
25X1A
Jolley
EYES ONLY
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nal027R000100040001-6
E,.41
25X1A
0-1
CD
T. U.S. Shifting Its Intelligence Strategy
Ey ORR KELLY Clmiuu Ji b. ,,n... Lard strongly aupportcd
Star Staff Writers deputy director of the Central creation of the Defense Intern-
al
N) The American intelligence Intelligence Agency last April gence Agency, following the
?community is in the midst of after commanding Marine failure of the Bay of Pigs inva-
gts most sweeping realignment
ince the one that followed the
ay of Pigs fiasco in 1961.
-a One chief aim is to save
("money by increasing efficien-
cy. But another major purpose
is to to prepare for a markedly
?thanged world situation that
ximight emerge from the stra-
Otegic arms limitation talks.
,13 If the talks, scheduled to re- Froehlke meet whenever there Froehlke his special assistant
aurae April 16 in Vienna, are is something to do?sometimes for intelligence.
successful, much of the intern- once a week, sometimes not Froehlke also took over as a
agence now gathered the hard for two or three weeks?in the member of the National Intel-
way at great expense may be- CIA offices in Langley, Va. ligence Resources Board in
-.icome readily available, ac- The most visible change so place of the head of - the De- futt Air Force Base, Neb., to
Wcording to high-ranking gov- far in the nation's intelligence fense Intelligence Agency and become head of the National
,oernment officials. At the same operations is the emergence of set up a new deputy assistant Security Agency, replacing Lt.
otime, the nation's safety then Froehlke as one of the most secretaryship for intelligence Gen. Marshall S. Carter,for-
omay depend even more heav- influential members of the in- in his office. mer deputy director of CIA.
oily on the accuracy of intern- telligence community. That office was filled in No- In the last two years, the
2gence activities designed to A little more than a year vember with the appointment defense intelligence operation,
, ctmake sure- the agreement is ago, he was an insurance com- of Vice Adm. H. G. Bowen Jr., which controls about 85 per-
',o9kept. pany executive in Boston with a Naval Academy graduate cent of the nation's intelli-
Masterminding the effort to no more knowledge of intern- whose staff of 12 intelligence gence resources, has come un-
&get ready lortthe!:epanges is a gence than a casual reader of professionals may soon be-ex- der sharp criticism in Con-
three-manatio" Intern- James Bond thrillers. De- panded to 14. gess, much of it from the
gence Resomea, ard. The fense Secretary Melvin R. "I'm not an-expert on intelli- House Defense Appropriations
board was set4-up, in 1968 by Laird, a boyhood friend, gence and I am not, technically subcommittee, of which Laird
Richard Helms, in his role as brought him to Washington as oriented at all," , Froehlke formerly was a member. Two
director of Central his deputy for administration. says. "I'm strictly4manager. - years ago, a group of staff
gence, but it is *ps,t' nbw,,'get"."4 Last April, Laird asked Adm. Bowen's' background is investigators put together a
ting into high gear. -,. Froehlke to take a look at ae- both technical and that of a scathing report on operations
Chairman of the board fense intelligence activities user of intelligenee:".--.' ' ? , of the DIA.
e.arine Lt. Gen. Robert K.-c' and suggest what should be At the same time that con-4. In his posture:Statent
units in Vietnam.
The other two members are
Ray Cline, a former CIA man
who now heads the State De-
partment's Bureau of Intelli-
gence and Research, and Rob-
ert F. Froehlke, assistant sec-
retary of defense for adminis-
tration.
Cushm a n, Cline and
sion in 1961, but had since be-
come concerned that the
mammoth DIA was not work-
ing as well as it should.
Froehlke's major recom-
mendation was that an assist-
ant secretary of defense be
put in charge of management
of the whole intelligence oper-
a tion ?a n d Laird made
trol ovcr dofonco intolligoalasai--C'avg-ass is year, Lair?i
has been centralized, the two he found "intelligence activi-
ties diffused, with manage-
ment overlapping or non-
existent" and listed five criti-
cal problems:
Intelligence ;was being eval-
uated poorly, various activi-
ties overlapped, there was no
long-range plan, significant
gaps in intelligence gathering
went unnoticed and the "intel-
ligence community failed to
maintain frank and unrestrict-
ed internal channels of com-
munication."
DIA is not primarily a
collector of intelligence, al-
though it is. responsible for
more than a thousand military
attaches who openly gather in-
formation in foreign countries.
DIA's primary job is to pull
together information gathered
by other agencies, such as mil-
itary intelligence offices arid
the NSA, and interpret it to
the defense- secretary and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The NSA, which has a. large
_ headquarters building at Ft.
? Meade, Md., was formed in
1952 "for the performance of
highly specialized technical
functions in support of the in-
telligence activities of the
United States." Muck of its
degalscodwep. making and
work
biggest Pentagon intelligence
units acquired new chiefs as
the result of retirements.
Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett,
a 54-year-old West Pointer
with a brilliant Army career,
became head ? of the Defense
Intelligence Agency last sum-
mer, replacing Air Force Lt.
Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, who
had headed the agency since it
was created in 1961.
And Vice Adm. Noel Gayler,
54, a Naval Academy gradu-
ate, left his post as deputy
director of the Joint Strategic
Target Planning Staff, at Of-
_LHOIAdO
ti)t.*undag ?ilat
WASHINGTON, D. C., MARCH 8, 1970
However valid the criticism
? and it is impossible for an
outsider to judge ? Froehlke
is confident that impressive
steps are being taken to im-
prove the .situation.
"Part of it is simple, human
things," he said. "Every Fri-
day morning at 7:30, Mel
(Laird), Dave (Deputy De-
fense Secretary Dave Pack-
ard) and I and the heads of
the inteligence agencies have
breakfast and discuss our
problems. Once a month, the
heads of the service intelli-
gence agencies come to break-
fast.
"In the past, months might
go without these people talking
to each other."
Froehlke has been quite
open discussing intelligence
operations. He recently sat in
his Pentagon office and talked
with a reporter on the record
for about an hour. ,
"We managers- have to Liu'
legitimate ways of saying we
are doing a good job," he said.
"We would still lose any vote
of confidence in Congress. We
have to improve our product
?and then sell it." _
There still are great, bar-
riers to public knowledge of
the workings of the intelli-
gence community ? some of
'them mystifying.
Last year, for example, DIA
told Congress it needed $75
million or, if military pay is
included $112 million to fi-
nance its operations in the
1970 fiscal year. This would
support a staff of about 3,500
civilians and 2,776 military
men.
No comparable figures were
available for the NSA, nor for
the service intelligence and
cryptological operations. The
DIA figure did, however, give
some indication of the scope of
defense intelligence.
This year, the same kind of
information about DIA ?
budget and number of em-
ployes ? is classified.
The 1971 Defense Depart-
ment budget requests a total
of $5.2 billion for intelligence
and communications ? a drop
of about $500 'million from the
1969 figure.
Even though intelligence
cannot be separated meaning-
fully from communications, it
is clear from conversations
with informed officials that
-the figure for intelligence is
very large --- and that it is
being cut rather sharply.
"The services have taken a
signficant cut in intelligence
resources," Froehkle said."
"They have made some cuts
where it hurts, although they
have tried to cut where it
hurts the least."
Much of the effort of the
NlRB headed by Cushman is
now focused on trying to make
a list ? actually a computer
data base ? of the nation's
intelligence resources so intel-
ligent judgments can be
made about what is available
and how important it is.
Even before the change in
administrations, however; the
CIA had been moving, in coop-
eration with State and De-
fense, toward that goal. Work
had started on Setting up what
was 'then called a "Target Ori-
ented Display" on computers
at CIA.
The name has now been
changed to the Consolidated
Intelligence Resource Infor-
mation System (CIRIS), which
Laird described to Congress as
"the necessary, visible start-
ing point from which to evalu-
ate intelligence resources and
what they are doing."'
9-1?000170001.000tILZ000-?/dati-VI3 90/90/000Z aseeieu JOd 130A0iddV
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A-DD/S 5 March 1970
Following the Morning Meeting I took up several points with
Colonel White:
a. CIARDS Actuarial Study - I assured him that
we were pressing as hard as we could but were dependent
on the time table of the Government Actuary,
I noted Mr. Bush's hope that we will finally see this
finished next week.
b. On the letter to Admiral Harlfinger I noted
again the reservations we and Mr. Bush have about
inviting future business from the Navy. Colonel White
said that he felt that our draft letter was too hard-nosed
and had therefore modified it in redrafting. He did agree
however to the suggestion that we take out the invitation
for future projects. We will retype the letter accordingly.
25X1A
25X1A
c. CT Program Paper - Colonel White asked where
the CT Program Paper is. I explained that we had it ready
to come to him two days ago when we learned that DD/P
had raised a fundamental question concerning the internal
assignment arrangement. I explained that we held it until
after Mr. Cunningham had conferred with Mr. Karames sines
to find out that Mr. Karamessines had (again) been
misinformed by some of his staff people. I took the
opportunity to ask Colonel White if he wished us to circulate
the paper to the Deputies in preparation for a future Deputies'
Meeting discussion. He responded that he at the moment
planned to issue the paper feeling that it had been discussed
over too long a period already but would hold the decision
until he had had an opportunity to read the rewrite.
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,
25X1A
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
d. The unsuccessful status of the search for
employee. (Colonel White is
interested in learning sometime what type of
individual she is.)
vrt-
JWC:11c
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MAR
-1970-
APR
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JUNE
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1970
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1970
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Wednesday
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March
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MEMORANDA
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063 Wednesday, March 4, 1970
302
Approved For Release 2400/0
EC,I; ,e1
PEITS020litityl 00?40001-6
MINUTES OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING
A-DD/S 4 March 1970
25X1A 1. General Cushman was in the chair, the Director apparently
being at the NSC Meeting on The meeting was very short.
25X1A
2. Mr. Proctor invited attention to the article in the Wall
Street Journal on Laos. He indicated that the only new element was
the assertion that the Thais had, at our request, artillery in Laos.
3. Mr. reported that no Agency officer has the PSYOP
clearance at present. It is possible that the five-man OCI team on duty
at NMCC will again be cleared. This report is in response to an
instruction from the Director.
4. Mr. Maury confirmed that the Director's appearance before
the Joint Atomic Energy Committee is now scheduled for 2 p.m. , March
10.
5. Mr. Maury mentioned dinner discussions with Senator
Murphy at which apparently DCI, DDCI, ExDir and DDS&T will be
present in addition to the Senator's staffer Dick Spears.
6. Mr. Duckett reported that it is hoped that a successful
25X1A will be launched. He noted that this will have a new film load
but that the capacity has been seriously reduced due to problems with
a particular type of film. Mr. Proctor explained the reduced capacity
by identifying that higher altitude results in lower resolution and the
smaller film obviously produces fewer frames. Mr. Duckett further
stated that the program is so close to completion that it is not worth
attempting to correct the basic problem since an effort in that direction
25X1A would probably take about as long as the remaining shots prior to
culmination.
25X1A
Joh. . _offey
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Tir:et-lidden War: Nnalysts Doubt
The'Conflict in Laos Will Broaden
Continued From, Page One
bullets (and probably some opium) for these
'troops, while massive U.S..air strikes, some-
times by B-52s, blast the jungle in hopes of dis-
rupting North Vietnamese supply lines. Little
of this is ever acknowledged publicly.
That's not all. American helicopters move
Gen. Vang Pao between battles and press con-
ferences, Thailand-based U.S. jets blast Ha-
noi's trbops as. they try to overrun his moun-
tain outposts (he has lost nearly 200 in the-past
couple of years) and American-imported Thais,
Nationalist Chinese and Filipinos perform as-
sorted technical and military tasks in Laos.
Guessing at the Cost
There are no official statistics worth the
name apout how much manpower and money
'the, U.S. participation costs: Some guesses
Claim that roughly 200 U.S. airmen have been
lost_in Laos in recent years, and that the war
effort costs Washington some $250 million an-
nually; the official aid figure is currently $48
xnillton
HoWeVer, the apparent objectives of all par-
ties concerned still seem to be limited, despite
the current furor about ? alleged "escalation.:'
Consider the Communist side.
Officially, the Red troops are Pathet Lao, or
Laotian Communists nominally headed by
Prince Souphanouvong, a half-brother of Pre-
mier Souvaxma. Phouma. Actually, most of the
Combat forces are North Vietnamese, and
Hanoi ,exercises tight control over all Pathet
Lao actions. Of the 14,000 troops who recently
captured the Plaine des Jarres (named for an-
cient burial urns found there), some 70% are
said tO be North Vietnamese; Hanoi's men
comprise the fighting units while the Pathet
'Lao natives serve largely as coolies.
, Hanoi was obviously upset by Gen. yang
Pao's unexpected seizure of the plain last fall;
huge Red arms caches were uncovered, includ-
ing aging Russian tanks and trucks. Thus, sim-
ple revenge was one motive for the recent
counterattack. But rather sophisticated politi-
cal reasons seem more important to most ana-
lysts here.'
The plain is traditionally the stronghold of
"neutralist" forces who form one part of the
official tripartite government established in
1962. Rightists and Communists are the other
factions. However, the neutral forces have split
into "our" neutralists and "their" neutralists,
with )the Plaine des Jarres campaign having
put "their" neutralists firmly in charge.
Thus, if and when another peace conference
is held for Laos, the new government could be
composed of American-backed Premier Sou-
vannas men, Hanoi-dominated Communists
,and Hanoi controlled '`neutral" representa-
tives. This would insure' that a future govern-
ment would be subservient to North Vietnam,
'and would make much easier a possible total
take-over by the Reds some day. ,
Creating a Dilemma
, Other, motives also seem to guide the Com-
munists. The Americans must "first of all, stop
using the U.S. Air Force to bomb Laotian terri-
torY," demanded an official North Vietnamese
foreign ministry statement last week. But
many in Washington believe Hanoi isn't weep-
ing for its Laotian allies; it really wants a
bombing halt along the Ho Chi Minh trail,
which funnels men and material into South
Vietnam., , _ ,
This theory holds that the Flame "de S 3,arrea
campaign, plus other Red pressures, is an ef-
fort to blackjack Premier Souvanna into call-
A-
Mg off American planes. A publics appeal by
hilt:for an end of the bombing raids would cre-
ate a dilemma for the Nixon Administration.
It cbuld agree, making Red resupply in South
Vietnam infinitely easier, or it could reject the
appeal and bomb a friendly nation whpse gov-
erfunent wants a halt.
Propaganda considerations are also impor-
tant to the Communists. Hanoi 'has renewed
war fear in the U.S. by demonstrating that its
forces can go anywhere in Laos they desire de-
spite American-backed efforts to thwart them.
One goal is probably. to pressure Mr. Nixon
into making new concessions in search of Viet-
nam peace.
However, all these stop short of any Com-
munist attempt to take over Laos. North Viet:
na,rn still pays lip service to the Geneva ac-,
cords that established the tripartite govern-
ment and declared it neutral. Presumably, Ha-
noi's leaders feel this oft-violated agreement
may still prove useful some day when peace
treaties are 'written for both Laos and South
Vietnam.
Unpredictable Americans
In addition, an element of fear probably re-
tards the North Vietnamese advance in Laos;
they. just don't know what the unpredictable
.AmerieanS will do next. Analysts here doubt
that Hanoi expected U.S. bombing raids follow-
ing the Gulf of Tonkin incident of 1964 or Amer-
ican troop deployments in the south a year
later. A big pushj.n Laos could trigger yet an-
other "irrational!' American response,' in their
view, even including bombing pf Hanoi itself.
Also, the Communists may be worried about
continuation of aid from -Russia. The, Soviet
Union recognizes the Souvanna government
and, with the Americans, occasionally exerts
pressure to settle internal political disputes.
For Moscow,. this is a rather comfortable sta-
tus quo that diminishes Communist Chinese in-
fluence. The Russians probably wouldn't cut
off their considerable arms aid if Hanoi upset
the balance in Laos, but the North Vietnamese
may not be entirely sure, say analysts here.
If this leaves North Vietnamese objectives
somewhat limited, the same is even more true
for the Americans.
The U.S. hope is that Laos can somehow re-
turn' to obscurity, serving mainly as a rugged
buffer between Communist North Vietnam and
China on one side and the U.S. ally of Thailand
on the other. The country is largely a product
of whimsical French colonial mapmakers; it
has few clainis to. nationhood such as ethnic or
linguistic .unity, or a viable economy. Smug-
gled gold and opium are the main exports; the
Laotian finance minister some time ago told a
visitor things had improved because his col-
leagues were only stealing enough state funds
to eat and not enough ,to get rich (if that doubt-
ful claim was ever true? there has been a
re-
lapse since then, according to all reports).
Military Credibility
Thus, the U.S. will \.continue to bankr-Al
Prince Souvanna and his government, and
Gen. Vang Pao's tribal army will continue to
get American air support and arms, by all ac-
counts. The justification is that this prevents a
rout by Hanoi and. gives the Laotian regime
some military credibility.
But it's claimed that senior officials here
ask hard questions whenever worried hawks
demand "action" against the Reds in Laos.
WAkt'wUj406,Q$P10 rwlitrill 1....ec0
44.
us? thefra",e'5444)..rdse /tog
, paLb's up 6r alian'doris 1:562Vell that, intelt. h4.7
aXtVt',-4 14
t
One example of a tactic abandoned: Thai
artillery units financed by the Americans
fought last year as Laotian troops, in clear vio-
lation of the Geneva accords. However, they
have been removed. If Thai troops had been
captured by the Communists, a major political
uproar could have ensued. Hanoi's allies would
surely display such prisoners and give maxi-
mum publicity to such an obvious infraction of
the Geneva agreements?giving the U.S. a
major hea dachc.
However, some Thais still fly Royal Laotian
Air Force planes, it is claimed, and others per-
form technical tasks. For this and other rea-
sons, covert U.S. involvement is likely to con-
tinue. And if the Communists do make some
unexpected push in Laos, a reflex reaction by
the Nixon Administration could at least tempo-
rarily enlarge the American role there.
But such a move by the Administration isn't
considered likely, partly,because Congress has
grown so aroused about Laos. Says GOP Sen.
Charles Mathias of Maryland: "I was a mem-
ber of Congress as we slid into Vietnam, and I
didn't ask the questions then that I should
have, and I can tell you that I am going to ask
them now."
Such hard questioning will make it difficult
for the White House to escalate in Laos even if
it wants to. The Senate yesterday afternoon de-
voted considerable time to dire warnings about
the consequences of U.S. actions in Laos. In a
National Press Club speech tomorrow, Demo-
cratic Sen. Edmund Muskie of Maine is ex-
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and Laos.
CPYRGHT
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Approved FThealdielieleN5:WPCRDP731027R000100040001-6
Analysts Doubt Conflict
In Laos Will Escalate
Into Another Vietnam
They Say Neither Side Plans
Expansion; Debate Is Seen
Aimed at Pressuring Nixon
But U.S. Involvement Is Wide
By ROBERT KEATLEY
Staff Reporter Of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
WASHINGTON?"Once again, we seem to
be heading down the same tragic road of esca-
lation. Once again, the American Govern-
ment seems to be trying to hide from the
American people the extent of our involvement
there."
The 'speaker is Sen. Frank Moss, not nor-
mally outspoken on foreign affairs, and the
subject Is Laos?more a geographic whim than
a nation?whose fragile neutrality has been
marred by gunfire ever since the 1962 Geneva
conference supposedly established peace. The
Utah Democrat, like many of his Capitol Hill
colleagues these days, fears the Nixon Admin-
istration may sneak this country into another
frustrating Asian war (much as critics charge
the Johnson Administration did in Vietnam)
while pretending that nothing much is really
happening.
Quite a bit, in fact, is happening in Laos.
But chances of Laos becoming "another Viet-
nam"?with U.S. ground troops slogging after
an elusive enemy?seem extremely remote to
most analysts here, despite considerable and ,
continuing U.S. involvement there.
No Big Battles
Officials who worry about Laos flatly reject
predictions that big battles involving Ameri-
cans are coming in that odd mountainous King-
dom of the Million Elephants and the. Royal
White Parasol (its official title). Talks with in-
formed sources lead to these conclusions:
?The Communists, who have just recap-
tured the Plaine des Jarres (usually labeled
"strategic") and restored battle lines roughly
to 1962 positions, have about halted their south-
westward offensive, though some small-scale
attacks continue nearby. Instead of moving on,
most units are resting, regrouping and trying '
to mend their overextended supply lines, which
are being 'blasted by U.S. and Laotion planes.
?More important, according to U.S. ana-
lysts, Communist troops don't seem interested
in puohing much further. For political and mill-
tail? reasons, Hanoi apparently has no plans to
use its 60,000 or so soldiers in Laos to over-
throw the official government or to grab addi-
tional chunks of real estate, even, though the
,ill-led ,troops of Laos' opium-trading, tennis-
? playing generals probably couldn't stop them if
they tried.
?Secret American support, essential to
those mountain tribesmen (the "clandestine
army" of Gen. yang Pao) who do fight the
Communists effectively, will probably continue
but not increase. Some Pentagon aides, in fact,
'would like to trim U.S. bombing raids in Laos
if only for budgetary reasons. Despite occa-
sional pressures to "do something more" about
the Reds in Laos, the White House (with much
help from Defense Secretary Melvin Laird)
seems determined to keep American foot sol-
diers out of that country.
?And some distraught Senators and Con-
gressmen, though sincerely concerned about
the possibility of an escalating Laotian war
may have other motives for speaking out. By
complaining about Laos, critics of the Vietnam
war can revive public concern about Asian con-
flicts, perhaps hoping to speed troop withdraw-
als from Vietnam or at least to deter the Nixon
team from suddenly seeking some illusory
"victory" over Saigon's foes.
All this indicates that big-time war in Laos
isn't likely. The Communists aren't seeking it,
the Americans want to avoid it and many crit-
ics here don't really expect it. The current up-
roar, for most parties concerned, is largely a
complex political and propaganda exercise di-
rected toward the iVetnam war and an even-
tual settlement there.
This doesn't mean there is no bloody fight-
ing in Laos; many bedraggled Laotian troops,
who would rather be back home at village fairs
pursuing food and girls, are being killed daily
without any clear idea what the shooting is all
about. And yesterday the U.S. Embassy in
Laos confirmed that the first American known
to have died during the Plaines des Jarres
campaign was J. C. Maerkl, a civilian heli-
copter pilot from Fort Worth, Texas, was
killed by a snilper while flying a supply mis-
sion there.
Moreover, the Nixon Administration, like
the Johnson, Kennedy and Eisenhower regimes
before it, has been deliberately misleading
about the extent of U.S. involvement in Laos,
It's known that the Central Intelligence Agency
finances a "secret war" of sorts there. Ex-
Green Berets in mufti train' and sometimes
command anti-Communist Laotian force's.
ArneriCan planes move everything from rice to
Please Turn to Page 15, ColUmn 1
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25X1A
DIARY NOTES
A-DD/S 4 March 1970
* 1. GSI Annual Meeting: Col. White telephoned to say that
he attended the annual meeting of GSI last evening and that he had
given a hard time to one and all. He mentioned particularly Mr. Dillon,
the new President, and Mrs. Toomey. He asked that Mr. Bannerman
be sure to see him before seeing any of the GSI officials. Mr. Bannerman
should expect that he will be called for an appointment very soon after
his return.
Col. White also suggested that we have the Office of Security
run a name check on Mr. John H. Dillon, the new GSI President, who
will have to be briefed in some detail including
contracts. Mr. Dillon is a retired Navy Department civilian employee.
He was the top Navy Department civilian administrator for a number of
years. He was forced out in some political hassle a number of years
ago. He became a successful management consultant and has a very
high reputation as an administrator and manager.
understands that Mr. Dillon agreed to take the job for 6 months only
and GSI has a continuing problem of finding a long term chief executive.
1.1so heard at the meeting that Marriott and Knott Hotels
have turned down the chance to contract with GSA to replace GSI.)
The name check request was subsequently passed to Mr. Osborn.
25X1A
2. PPB Hearing with BOB: PPB, telephoned to
advise that there will be a hearing conducted in the PPB tank by Mr. Jim
Taylor, BOB, Friday, 6 March at 1300. The hearing is on an Agency
request for a $9 million reserve release for
"wondered" if we would like to have representatives at the hearing since
it is so largely in the Support area. I told him that I was not at all sure
since I was not aware that Support had participated in the development of
the release request package. I also indicated that I was opposed to loading
a hearing room particularly when a single BOB representative was involved.
Finally I said that I would propose to telephone and be
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25X1A
25X1A
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gREO
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responsive to his desire with respect to participation. I subsequently
talked to Mr. Blake who confirmed that 0/L had not contributed to this
package and whose instincts are to avoid participation so that we are
not placed in the position of having to pick up the justification responsibility.
25X1A I discussed the subject with who plans to try and handle this
hearing on a very low key using the Branch Chief, as the
FE representative. He does not wish any Support participation - I
25X1A indicated that we prefer not to load p the e in with ad itional A en y
25X1A 25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
concurrence to our moving on the regulatory change on returns short
of tour without the necessity of meeting with him in the company of
D/Pers. I assured him that we and 0/P were in agreement with the
wording change which had resulted from his conversation with Charlie
He asked that we put the proposed wording in the form of
a recommendation on paper for his approval since it represents a
change in what he had earlier approved in writing, is to
draft the memorandum and will get D/Pers concurrence prior to our
sending it to Col. White.
During the same telephone conversation I brought Col. White
up to date on the case, the lost Air Force pouch and
the accident involving the new Ford which had been selected for DD/S.
25X1A
25X1A
4. Training Selection Board: Mr. Cunningham advised of a
discussion he had had with Colonel White concerning the Training
Selection Board and full-time academic training. The case 25X1A
keyed the discussion because Colonel White reacted negatively and
pushed Mr. Cunningham to justify the Board position. Mr. Cunningham
informed Colonel White that the Board did not attempt to second guess
the Deputies on external training requests and went on to indicate that
he believed such training requests should no longer be sent to the Board.
He believes that the Board should spend its only available time on matters
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,$)LtAl
cFrp2FT
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such as better review of the comparative merits of candidates for
competitive assignments such as to the senior schools. Mr. Cunningham
is preparing a paper to present his view.
Mr. Cunningham pointed out that he had described to Colonel
White the inconsistencies of approach and treatment which are demonstrated
25X1A by the case and the DD/S&T recommendation so technically
25X1A complicated that not even representing DD/S&T on the Board,
could understand it tht g se wound up with a negative
reaction whereas the incomprehensibly technical case sailed through.
JWC:11c
*Extract to D/L
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11 12 13
14 15
16 17
15 16 17
18 19
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16 17
18 19
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19 20
21 22
20 21 22
23 24 25 26
18 19 20
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25 26
26 27 28
29 30
31
23 24 25
26 27
28 29
27 28 29
30
25 26 27
28 29
30 31
29 30
27 28 29
30 31
30 31
LAST
MONTH
1970
MARCH
1970
1970
FEBRUARY
1970
SMTWT
F
S
SMTWTF
S
1 2 3 4 5
8 9 10 11 12
15 16 17 18 19
22 23 24 25 26
6
13
20
27
7
14
21
28
1
8
15
22
29
2
9
16
23
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3
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17
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31
4
11
18
25
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19
26
6
13
20
27
7
14
21
28
A.M.
Tuesday
?
NEXT
MONTH
1970
APRIL
1970
SMT
W
T
F
S
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
March
P.M.
8:45
1:00
9:00
1:15
9:15
1:30
9:30
1:45
9:45
2:00
10:00
5X1A
2:15
10:15
2:30
10:30
2:45
10:45
3:00
11:00
3:15
11:15
3:30
11:30
3:45
11:45
4:00
12:00
4:15
12:15
4:30
12:30
4:45
1245
500
MEMORANDA
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062 Tuesday, March 3, 1970
303
25X1A
[Tya-aige
=+
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MINUTES OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING
A-DD/S 3 March 19
1. This meeting was also short with considerable attention
to yesterday's hearing. The Director paid particularly high compliments
to Mr. Duckett and Mr. Bruce Clarke for their part in the hearing.
2. The Joint Atomic Energy Hearing for WAesday has been
cancelled. The Director suggested to that it be rescheduled
for 10 March.
3. A/DOCI called attention to Harry Kamm's article in today's
New York Times.
4. DDCI noted an outstanding request from
for a meeting to talk about NIRB. After some discussion it was agreed
that General Cushman and Mr. Bross would work out a script for a
meeting.
5. Before the meeting began
had reported that Mr. Duckett's session with the MAG last night was
both good and lively.
25X1A
John
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AOTIANZOBAL
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TELLS OF U.S. LIMIT
ON BOMBING RAIDS
Commander Declares Line
Follows Road Being Built
by China in Northwest
Ry TIVIVRV KAMM
Special to The New York Times
LUANG PRABANG, Laos,
March 2?Maj Gen. Tiao Saya-
vong, commander of the North-
ernmost military region of Laos,
said today that his constant re-
quests for American bombing in
northwestern Laos were turned
down because of the existence
of a line beyond which the
United States did not bomb in
Laos.
The line, according to the
general, follows a road being
constructed by Communist
China from the northwestern
border of Laos in the direction
of the Laotian-Thai border.
United States bombing, accord-
ing ?to the general and his
deputy for operations, Col.
Bounchanh Savathphayphane,
halts at a strip three miles from
the eastern edge of the road.
tor. Details on obituary page.
There has been an upsurge of
concern in the United States
over reports of stepped-up
ibombing in Laos by American
planes, including B-52's. Despite
American air 'support, Laotian
government troops have been
driven off the strategic Plaine
des James by North Vietnamese
and Pathet Lao forces.
U.S. Aides Won't Comment
Customarily, United States
Ind Laotian officials reply to
luestions on American bombing
Vith a formula to the effect
ithat the United States conducts
,armed aerial reconnaissance
with the right to return fire if
fired upon.
United States officials de-
clined to comment on the gen-
eral's implicit avowal of Ameri-
can bombing.
General Savavong, a half
brother of King Savang Vat-
thana, made his remarks in an
interview at his headquarters,
across the road from Luang
Prabang airport, a single strip
that serves commercial airlin-
ers, Royal Laotian Air Force
converted single-engine trainer
planes carrying bombs and
rockets under the wings;
unarmed American planes on
undisclosed missions; Laotian
Army helicopters and gunships,
and cargo planes bringing
American air supplies.
The Chinese road from Bo-
tene on the Laotian border has
reached a point 40 miles north-
west of Luang Prabang, south of
the town of Muong Houn, and is
continuing in the direction of
Thailand. It follows the course
of the Beng River.
Road to DietthitRphth
Another Chinese-built road
connects Muong Sai with Dien-
bienphu, just across the border
in North Vietnam.
The Chinese are constructing
the roads under a tentative
plan discussed in the early six-
ties with the Government of
Premier Phoumi Nosavan. Lao-
tian sources contend that while
there may be some justification
for the projects in northern-
;most Phongsaly Province and
the stretch to Dienbienphu, no
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CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 2,,90/10 iy5M4Pips,09,143/My5M321:61m,
'Laotian. Oeneral Tells of U.S. Limit onBombing Raids
?41a.
CPYRGHT
Continued Front Page' I, Col. .5
plan fOr a road-toward Thailand
was ever discussed.
Colonel Bounchand said the
Chinese were using 2,000
sol-
diers along the road toward
Thailand. He said there was an
infantry battalion near the
starting point, two engineer bat-
talions carrying out the work
with the help of Laotian coolies
and one antiaircraft battalion
deployed along the road. In-
formed sources said the Chinese
antiaircraft batteries had never
gone into action, presumably
because of the limits on Amer-
ican bombing.
American sources put
the number of Chinese troops
throughout northern Laos at
6,000. They are reported to
be under steady surveillance by
Laotian intelligence agents.
Asian diplomatic sources
Washington have put the num-
ber of Chinese troops ?in the
area at 20,000.
There was no tension around
General Sayavong's second
military region headquarters
although about midnight Sat-
urday a small Pathet Lao unit
got within about a mile of the
northern end of the airstrip
and lobbed 20 mortar rounds
in the direction of the airstrip.
All the shells fell in nearby
fields doing no damage .
The attack made no imprint
on the mood of Luang Prabang,
which is sleepy even beyond
normal Laotian tranquillity.
The sense of security is rooted
in a belief that the Communists
would never attack the royal
capital. The optimism is not
considered naive. The Pathet
Lao and North Vietnamese
have never challenged the
King's authority, and well-in-
formed Laotians believe that as
long as they seek to maintain
an appearance of legitimacy
PLAINE
DES
JARRES
The New York Times March 3, 1970
A corner of Laos bordered by a road the Chinese have been
building from"Botene (1) to Moung Houn (2) and beyond
toward the Thai border is said to be out of bounds for
American bombers. This restriction apparently does not
apply to the Plaine des Jarres and other areas held by the
North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao (diagonally shaded).
this town of 30,000 will con-
tinue to be spared.
Some people are aware that
the Communist capture of
Muong Soul last week puts
them only 30 miles from the
road that links Luang Prabang
with the administrative capital
and principal city of Vientiane.
But they have been through
't all before and refuse to
worry. Children bathe, women
wash clothes and men fish in
the Mekong, which is too low
for the riceboats from Vientiane
at this season. Monks, a large
share of the population, prome-
nade under their yellow para-
sols from pagoda to pagoda.
The number and beauty of the
temples is the pride and fame
of Luang Prabang.
Bounkhom Pradichit, prefect,
or mayor, of the city, said
there was plenty to eat and
that Communist ambushes
along the road from Vientiane
had not curtailed food. But he
said there was a sharp reduc-
tion of general goods traffic
to Luang Prabang. The prin-
cipal casualty, he said, was the
cement for the tennis court at
the Cerele Priv& a private
sports club ?to which he be-
longs. A pity, he said, because
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he had succeeded in sidestep-
ing,the Ministry of Sports and
Youth md Persuading the Fi-
nance Ministry to underwrite
the cost of building the court.
But the United States had
come to his aid, the prefect
said. He said the Agency for
International Development had
rescued the. Cercle Prive by
lending it five tons of cement.
Senator Fulbright, Arkansas
Democrat, ,announced that he
intended to invite Mr. Rogers
and Mr. Laird to testify on Laos.
Although no date has yet been
set, committee sources indicated
the hearings may come in the
next few days.
The Administration was
understood to acknowledge the
danger that the North Viet-
namese thrust across the Plaine
des larres last.- month may 'be
followed ? by. further ..'attaek'S
aimed at both military and
political targets.
25X1C
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25X1A
DIARY NOTES
A-DD/S 3 March 1970
1. Risk-of-Capture: Mr. Stewart telephoned reference the
Risk-of-Capture training paper which we had sent out to the officers
who attend the Deputies' Meetings. He proposed, having already
received Colonel White's endorsement that instead of having the subject
discussed at a Deputies' Meeting as proposed in our paper, we have a
test running of the course itself with participation by a representative
of each of the Deputies' Meeting principals. has
discussed this with OMS/PSS and OTR and we propose to go ahead with
a proper Risk-of-Capture one-day course with a full student
complement which will have room for the representatives of the
Deputies' Meeting principals. It was estimated that preparation for
this course running would require approximately three weeks' time.
We will shortly be informed of the date selected and can then inform
ExDir, the Deputies, the IG and GC of this change in direction.
2. Luncheon Meeting with State Department Representatives:
As arranged, Mr. Bush and I met and lunched with Mr. Frank Meyer,
Mr. Joseph F. Epnelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Budget and
Finance, Mr. E,rnest Warlow, Director, Foreign Buildings Operations
and Mr. William Meek, Funds Management Director. The prime
purpose was to discuss and reach agreement on the handling of the
An
acceptable understanding was reached which is to be translated into a
Memorandum for the Record (to be drafted by Mr. Bush) which will be
agreed with Mr. Meyer and placed in the record of both organizations.
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3t.UK L, 1
1)fil3
7.R0004?190040001-6
dr:angstlIng aa
declassification
25X1A
25X1A
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Approved For Release 2000/05/05 : CIA-RDP73-00027R000100040001-6
Approved For Release,2000/05/05 : CIA-
25X1A I informed Col. White orally of the initial
25X1A information concernin NPIC cartographer,
25X1A whose difficulties had been reported to us yesterday afternoon by
and today by Mr. Osborn. I confirmed to Mr. Proctor
that Col. White had been informed.
A-DD/S
DIARY NOTES
7R00011111640001-6
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
3 March 1970
JWC:11c
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n
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040001-6
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lore
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j
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? AY JUNE
4 58
11 12
18 19
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22 23 24
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11 12
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8 7
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20 21
27 28
1 2 3
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22 SO SI
4 5
11 12
18 19
25 28
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JULY
AUGAUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
5 8
12 13
10 20
26 27
1 2
7 8 9
14 15 16
2122 23
28 29 30
3 4
10 11
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24 25
31
2 3 4
0 10 11
18 17 18
23 24 25
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5 6
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13 14 15
20 2122
27 28 29
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1
6 7 8
13 14 15
20 2122
27 28 29
2 3
0 10
18 17
23 24
30 31
4 5
11 12
18 19
25 28
LAST
MONTE
1970
MARCH
1970
NEXT
MONTH
1970
FEBRUARY
1970
3970
APRIL
1970
SMTWTF
SMTWTF
1 2 3 4 5 6
8 9 10 11 12 13
15 16 17 18 19 20
22 23 24 25 26 27
29 30 31
7
14
21
28
MTWTPS
1
8
15
22
2 3
9.10
16 17
23 24
4
11
18
25
5
12
19
26
6
13
20
27
7
14
21
28
5
12
19
26
67
13 14
20 21
27 28
1 2
8 9
15 16
22 23
29 SO
3
10
17
24
4
11
18
25
Monday
A. M.
NEP
March
P.M.
8:45
1:00
9:00
1:15
9:15
1:30
9:30
1:45
9:45
25X1 A
2:00
10:00
2:15
10:15
2:30
10:30
2:45
10:45
3:00
11:00
3:15
11:15
3:30
11:30
3:45
11:45
4:00
12:00
4:15
12:15
4:30
12:30
4:45
12:45
5:00
MEMORANDA /
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061 Monday, March 2, 1970
304
25X1A
25X1A
4(41
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Release.2,000/0R1 PEYES3
10%1100001-6
MINUTES OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING
A-DD/S 2 March 1970
1. This was a very short meeting since the Director and
several others had to leave early for the Gore Committee Hearing.
The meeting was devoted almost completely to items relating to or
relatable to the hearings, e. g., checking the accuracy of various
news reports for future articles that had appeared over the weekend
or in Monday's papers.
2. Mr. Karamessines reported that was on
leave ii for a few days.
3. General Cushman reported the good visit tc
and mentioned to Mr. Karamessines that had done well
by him.
Approved For Release 2000/Q5/
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JohP:ffey
triRDP73-00027R0041E0tgoftt
0rn
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0,4!y
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The Washington Merry.' )-Round THE WASHINGTON PC Monday, March 2,1970 B 9
,,,trirtroveel-Fer-Refeese-Wf06#06-!-CIA-RDP73-00027R000100M001-6
rwsinen See Long Chen Base Click
By Jack' Anderson
The inside story can now
be told of what has been gding
on at the secret Long Chen
base, which three unauthor-
ized newsmen visited in Laos
last week.
The newsmen slipped away
from a conducted tour and
hitchhiked to the forbidden
base, carefully skirting gov-
ernment roadblocks. For two
hours, they watched Ameri-
can-made planes taking off at
the rate of one a minute. They
also reported seeing armed
Americans in civilian clothes
on the base.
The Long Chen base has
been used to support the gov-
ernment guerrillas Whom the
United States has trained and
supplied. The bulk of them
are Meo tribesmen, who have
been deadly effective at har-
assing the North Vietnamese
invaders.
In a previous report, this
column told how President
Johnson, after halting the
bombing of AftrittAidtkpir,
merely transferred the bomb-
ing campaign across the bor-
der and unleashed the same
bombers against North Viet-
namese targets in Laos.
?The bombing was so devas-
tating that U.S. advisers de-
cided their guerrillas might be
able to throw the North Viet-
namese off the strategic Plain
of Jars. A government force of
10,000 guerrillas, commanded
by Maj. Gen. Vang Pao, swept
over the plain last year.
The whole operation was
planned and supported by the
United States. American
fighter bombers and gunships
chewed up the retreating
North Vietnamese. American
helicopters and transport
planes hauled in the govern-
ment guerrillas.
Once the guerrillas had cap-
tured the Plain of Jars air-
field, which was given the
American code name of 'lima
Lima," an airlift was estab-
lished between Long Chen and
the captured field.
The U.S. advisers never
thought their rugged, little
guerrillas could hold the plain
against the superior North Vi-
WSW 2000/05105e:rCIAe
operation was intended as a
massive, hit-and-run attack.
Its success was spectacular.
The guerrillas struck the
North Vietnamese a bloody
blow and captured huge quan-
tities of supplies.
Civil Rights at 0E0
For the first year of the Re-
publican takeover, a career
bureaucrat named Walter Rob-
bins served as acting director
of the antipoverty program's
Civil Rights Division. He was
finally forced out last month
by blacks who felt a Negro
should be in charge of civil
rights.
Not the least bitter over
being ousted by the blacks he
had been defending, Robbins
turned the other cheek. He
left his successor, an able
Negro named Frank Kent, a
thoughtful memo declaring;
"Segregation exists on a
wide scale within our pro-
grams in spite of the agency's
herculean efforts to eliminate
it. Patterns of segregation im-
posed on the poor by the pow-
er structure are so well in-
grained that the Office of Eco-
nomic Opportunity funded
programs cannot help but re-
13P7t3FO00EIROO 0100040
extent."
Robbins pointed out that
federal assistance is going pri-
marily not to poor blacks but
to affluent whites.
"The real beneficiaries or
federal domestic assistance;",
he declared fiercely, "are tl*
middle class, particularly the
residents of the affluent sull-
urbs that ring (zur decaying
inner cities.
"Low-income Americans
provide a disproportionately
high share of tax revenue
when measured against their
incomes. Yet they receive the
short end of the stick every
possible Way when it comes to
the distribution and expendi-
ture of tax dollars at the local
level.
"This discrimination against
low-income, inner-city and
rural residents is compounded
by the racial discrimination
which ghettoizes groups of
people on the basis of their
race.
"Why should a city or
county be permitted to use'
open space and recreation
money granted by the federal
government in a way which
benefits the middle class to
t_eirtual exclusion of t h
i1-housed, ill-fed, unemployed
residents? . . ."
I
0 1970, Bell-McClure Syndicate, Inc.
Approved For Release 2000/05/05 : CIA-RDP73-00027R000100040001-6
he
he
o rc he d EtAirth'
it
is-
he Reported in Laos
en
to-
U.S.Aided Plan
By Jack Foisie
Si-
rS7
in
ad
re
of
1-,e
VIENTIANE ? The Royal
Lao gOvernment, with- the as-
sistance of Americans, appar-
ently conducted a scorched-
earth policy last fall in antici-
pation of the Communist drive
to recapture the Plain of Jars
in northern Laos.
The aim was to leave the
I
a
-v
ti
b
3(
m
PS
at
Communist enemy -fiOthing
upon which he could IiiTe-410
4...,
'
ti-
people, no shelter, and no
MI
Or
!k
it-
stocks of food or buffalo.
As the Communist forces
in
a-
began their advance towards
4
Lc)
the Plain of Jars three weeks
.
;o
1-
ago, U.S. aircraft evacuated
some 13,000 refugees to the.
111,
n
n
Vientiane area from villages
":
e-
f-
on the plateau.
Many of these people went
t/
B
,
a-
voluntarily, happy to be out of
,'
I-
the way of allied bombing
"
strikes, and away from the ar-
mies of both sides, which peri-
!
odically move across the plain.
1
-
But it was also learned to-
day that another, forcible
s
evacuation had been conduct-
1
ed by the allies in September
1
and October to remove all of
the merchant class in the
towns and villages of the Plain
c,
,
c
_
it
of Jars.
c
n
They were removed because
ts
of the fear that they had been,
and would again be, the prin-
3
cipal supporters of the Pathet
1
'
Lao. It was assumed that
4
11
many did not want to submit
11"
to Communist control, but felt
i
e"
it was the best way to save at
I
13"
least part of their wealth?by
'
e-
staying in place and putting
1
up with the heavy taxes that
(
to
Pathet Lao extracted from
them.
t
See LAOS, A6, Col. 2
1
,
CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 2000/05/05: CIA-RDP73-00027R000100040001-6
Approved tar Release 2000/05/05 : CIA-RDP73-00WR000100040001-6
trtr, want-Lulu-tun 1-1J&1
A6 Monday, March 2,1970
? ? ?
4 aos 'Scorched'Plain of Jars
, ?
Atr Losses
lit Laos
Dtsclosed
SUMMARY, From Al
The overall U.S. plane losses
may now be closer to 400 than
300.)
. The U.S. Command's annual
summary also notes without
further comment that the
number of Americans missing
In action at the end of the
year was 118 greater than 12
months previously.
Since almost all the U.S.
missing are airmen and almost
all of these are missing in
Laos, the annual report indi-
cates about 100 missing in the
past year?by far the largest
figure of any year since the
war in Vietnam began spilling
over into Laos.
The U.S. embassy in Vian-
tiane has furnished the Corn-
munist Pathet Lao representa-
tive in Vientiane with the
names of 184 American air-
men missing in action in Laos.
Some of these names date
back to 1964.
So far the Communist Pa-
thet Lao have given no infor-
mation concerning any of the
downed fliers, although Pathet
Lao prisoner Of war camPApp
known to exist.
Information Ban
? ^ -
?
LAOS, From Al
There was sufficient aocu-
mentation of forcible taxation
of these merchants and artis-
ans to make evacuation advisa-
hie under the policy of remov-
ing helpers away from the Pa-
thet Lao.
Rough Handling Alleged
-
However, what is emerging
now is evidence of the rough
handling of some of these per_
sons by the troops of Gen.
yang Pao, the Royal Army
commander in the area
The forced evacuation
included the removal of 680
Chinese, 60 Vietnamese who
were long-time residents of
Laos, 60 Thais also living for
some time in the area, 85 Cam-
bodians and seven Indians.
They had to walk to air-
strips as far as 20 miles from
their villages and were al-
lowed to take with them only
what they could carry.
Although no Americans are
known to have been on the
ground at the time these vil-
lages were evacuated, Amen-
cans helped plan the program
and U.S. pilots and planes
flew them out of the plain.
Allowing for some harsh
feeling on the part of the eva
cuees, and the possibility that
some may have Communist
loyalties, a careful interroga-
tion of a number of refugees
leaves the impression that the
September-October evacua-
tions were roughly handled.
oald kwriReleatsw'2000t0?;
and there are many similar re-
ports:
He lived in the village of
Khang Khay on the northern
of the plain. He does not
wish give his name or na _
tionality.g
Last Sept. 13, troops of yang
Pao's army came in and or-
dered all the villagers to pre-
pare to leave in an hour.
Then' this man claims, the 'Vietnamese
troops began burning houses,
helping themselves to people's
possessions, and molesting
women. ,
He says the soldiers shot all
the livestock,
"The soldiers were brusque
and rude, and made no distinc-
tion between Lao, Chinese or
other national groups," he
sal
The refugees were required
to walk about 20 miles to an
-
waited
airstrip, where they for
planes.
' - .
At the airstrip, the Lao rem
gees were ordered to stay be-
hind and he does not know
what happened to them. But it
is no secret that Vang Pao's
army badly needs fighting
men of almost any age, and it
i d
is the practice to induct Lao or
mountain tribesmen who are
refugees into uniform. Their
t
allowed o say
families are a d t
with them.
Flown to Vientiane
The other nationals were
flown to Vientiane. The pilots
were American.
In Vientiane, their experi-
0 ii s: OlffDP7I3-0001F1I
were mostly accommodated by
the Chinese community. Indi-
ans were likewise cared for by
Indian residents. For the oth-
ers, it was up to their respec-
tive embassies. ,
I saw ten Vietnamese fami-
lies?about 40 persons?living
together in the moderately
Y
comfortable two-room house
that had been rented for them
for six months by the South
embassy,
They were rather well off?
but will be forced out when
the rental period ends. The
embassy says it will continue
to provide them with rice, but
can do nothing more.
Some church groups and the
U.S. aid mission have given
help.
Lao officials have given
. .
them identity cards.
Their main complaint is the
inability to find work. Another
complaint is that the govern-
ment has not offered to buy?
their Pathet Lao-issued cur-
?
rency, whichis almostworth-
.
less in Vientiane.
?0
,. uvanna Requests
Geneva-Type Meeting
Reuters
VIENTIANE, March 1?
Prime Minister Souvanna
Phouma sent letters today to
the British and Soviet embas-
sies officially requesting Ge-
neva-style consultations on the
situation in Laos, embassy
sources said.
Britain and the Soviet
Union were co-chairman of the
1962 Geneva Conference,
)111000411001t60 guarantee
the neutrality of Laos.
Souvanna announced four
days ago that he intended to
write to the co-chairmen call-
ing for consultations.
The only military action re-
ported in Laos today was a
bombardment of 15 88-mm.
mortar shells near the air-
field of the royal capital of
Luang Prabang 142 miles
north'
of the administrative
capital of Vientiane. No dam-
age or casualties were re-
ported and the mortar shells
exploded in an open ricefield.
Sen. Mathias Wary
Of Laos Involvement
WASHINGTON, March 1,
(UPI) ? Sen. Charles McC.
Mathias (R-Md.) said today he
fears the United States m
be inching into a commitme
i? ? ?
Laos similar to that in V'
nam. ,
.
"I think we're reaching t
point now that we might v-?
close to the commitment th. 'l,?
we inched into in Vietna
where if something goe ,
wrong we find ourselves corn
nutted far beyond the inten-
tion of the Congress or be-
yond the intention of the
American people," Mathias
said,
Asked about the apparent
buildup of military activity in
Laos, including reports of an
increasing American military
presence there, Mathias said,
"I think you have to view it
very seriously."
Mathias was interviewed on
the CBS television program
"Face the Nation."
'
?
CPYRGHT
Approied For ReleagagOt
AN,1NDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER
it Al
1 II
I I
1.0"
b
1 -6
? RI
MONDAY, MARCH 2, 1970 PAGE A18
Laos: The Same Old Shell Game
Even the best dispatches from Laos read like
some combination of Terry and the Pirates, Graham
dreene and Art Buchwald. Our Man of the Hour is
General yang Pao who is rated by American offi-
eials just behind Alexander the Great, in large part
because by Asian military standards he is honest,
which is to say that when we pay him the money
for his men, the men get paid. But his men are
mostly teenaged kids recruited from the tough
Meo hill tribes and 'built into an irregular army,
financed, trained, supported, and largely directed
by the Americans (which is another way of saying
the CIA). This supposedly secret operation is a
secret to nobody in Laos. It was conceived* as a
substitute for the regular armed forces of the
Laotian Government which is supposed to be neu-
tral, and whose army doesn't fight much, and as a
counterweight to Communist forces, both imported
and homegrown. Van Pao's army does fight, but
lately it has been doing badly in what pass for
battles in the Laotian war but are really rather
eccentric skirmishes for places like the Plain -of
Jars or Lima Lima or Muong Suoi. These are called
strongholds or key towns or vital road junctions
until they change hands, which they do more or less
regularly, at which time they turn out to be more
like tennis trophies, temporarily held, until the
next tournament.
All this is played out against the backdrop of a
psychedelic political power struggle between frac-
fared Centrists and splintered Neutralists, Rightists
and crypto Communists, which might tell you a
great deal about the significance of the military
byplay if you could somehow wrap your mind
around it, and having done that, take it seriously.
6?4--1
- That's the thing about Laos?it is hard to take
it seriously until suddenly something or somebody
threatens to upset the delicate equilibrium and the
whole thing ceases to be a giant put-on and be-
comes, or is made to become, a critical element in
the Vietnam equation or a test of strength and
Will between us and the Russians, or perhaps us
and Hanoi. This is what is happening now, as it
happened in 1961 and in 1964 and again last year,
and it happens, of course, because we are in Viet-
nam and because Laos is next door. Wedged in be-
tween Red China, Burma, Thailand, and stretching
alongside the two Vietnams, it is strategic, as an
infiltration from North Vietnam to the South, and
as an opening Southward for the Communist Chi-
nese. It is also a domino, if you accept that image,
ready to fall if Vietnam isn't held upright?al-
though as of now you could argue that it might
fall even if South Vietnam is held up, which could
reverse the theory, and make South Vietnam the
next to go. In any case, we care about Laos for the
same reason we care about Vietnam, and that is at
least understandable.
What is neither understandable nor defensible,
in our view, is the way we give expression to our
care?furtively, in clandestine support of a proxy
army, and without the slightest concern for Con-
gressional prerogatives or for the possible conse-
quences of systematically deceiving the American
public about an expanding American military inter-
vention which could all too easily fail.
You might have thought that, having seen the
results of the great Vietnam shell game as con-
ducted by the last Administration, the present one
might have learned something about the effect this
can have on public understanding and support. But
no, President Nixon has decreed that he doesn't
think "the public interest would be served by any
further discussion" of Laos and that apparently is
that. The President will go to Congress if there is
any change contemplated in our military involve-
ment in Laos, Secretary Laird has promised, and
this would be somewhat reassuring were it not for
the fact that our military involvement has changed,
significantly, and the President hasn't gone to
Congress about it, at least publicly.
It is all too,,fLa.miliflrAlinclp6li280nwitonplel)irsk
ar4Apitarany fhvimeadieva accMs whicl set
up a neutral Laotian government, the Administra-
tion argues privately, and since these accords called
for the removal of all outside military forces we
cannot discuss what we are now doing in Laos
without acknowledging publicly and officially that
we are violating the accords. The theory is that
this would then make it incumbent on the Russians
to do something in response, as a matter of pride
or prestige or simple geopolitics?and never mind
that the Communists broke the Geneva agreement
from the day that it was signed. Even assuming
that there is something to this theory, at best it
would only justify a policy of silence; it can not
justify the sort of calculated dissembling engaged
in by Secretary Laird when he Was asked the other
day on Meet the Press whether American B-52's
were used to provide close-in support of Laotian
troops in the Plain of Jars. "This is quite far from
the Ho Chi Minh trail which the President said we
were bombing to interdict supplies into South Viet-
nam," the questioner continued, "Does this mean
we have decided to take .a role in the Laotian war?"
This is the nub of it, of course?whether we are
bombing in Southern Laos as part of the Vietnam
interdiction effort, or intervening increasingly in
the quite separate Laotian civil war in the North,
and Mr. Laird's answer deserves to be set down
in full:
First, I would like to say it is not possible to use
B-52's for close-in support. Any close-in support
would have to be provided by tactical air and of
course the Royal Laotian forces have tactical air
of their own. The President has said that we are
using United States air power as far as the inter-
diction of supplies and material coming into Viet-
nam are concerned. The mission of air power, as
far as Laos is concerned, on the Ho Chi Minh trail,
has been handled by the President of the United
States and we have used it in connection with the
war in Vietnam. We have of course flown recon-
naisance missions over Laos on a continuing basis.
These reconnaissance missions have been accom-
plished by armed escort. The President has made
it clear the mission of our air power as far as the
war in Vietnam, and that is all that I care to say on
it at this time.
While it would be too much to characterize this
as a pack of lies, it is it least a pack of evasions,
irrelevancies, semantics and half-truths. B-52's have
regularly been used in Vietnam for what could
reasonably be called "close-in" support?as wit-
ness their vaunted effectiveness at Khe Sanh. More
important, there is compelling evidence that they
were used in the recent unsuccessful defense of the
Plain of Jars, and this marked a significant step-up
in our combat role in Laos. Leaving all that aside,
it is nonsense to talk about reconnaisance flights
with armed escorts when everybody in Laos who
cares knows that we are flying about as many pure-
and-simple bombing missions in support of our
proxy army in the North as we are flying interdic-
tion missions in the South.
044
The simple fact is that we are deeply involved in
the Northern war, such as it is, no matter what arm
of the government pays for it, or provides the mili-
tary advisers?or what if any uniform they wear.
And while it is easy to laugh about that war, be-
cause it never seems to get anywhere, it is just as
easy to make the Case that our f ?ices dangerously
disturbed a five-year equilibrium by reoccupying
the Plain of Jars last fall, and thus inviting its re-
capture in the last few weeks.
Perhaps it will stop at that. Or perhaps Hanoi
has hit upon Laos as a new way of squeezing us in
Vietnam, by raising new anxieties and fresh outcries
in this country over our whole inter-locking Asian
policy. In any case, with at least two months of dry
season ahead, none of the experts in this town are
prepared to say categorically that the Communist
forces will not now press on in Northern Laos
towards the Mekong or the administrative capital
of Luang Prabang, or to predict what kind of crisis
this would provoke, militarily out there, or politi-
cally here at home. And that in itself is argument
DP/140327140011114430116001t6an the same old
shell game.
CPYRGHT