CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --HOUSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72-00450R000100090003-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 15, 2002
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 13, 1967
• Content Type: REGULATION

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12614 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE March 13, 1967
in. Congress assembled, That the Secretary of
Transportation acting in cooperation with
the Interstate Commerce Commission shall,
within one year after the date of enactment
of this Joint Resolution, prepare and submit
to the Committee on Commerce of the Senate
and the Committee on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce of the House of Representa-
tives a master ground transportation plan
for the United States.
SEC. 2. Until the 60th day after the sub-
mission of the master ground transportation
plan to the committees of the Senate and
House of Representatives as provided by the
first section of this Joint Resolution, the In-
terstate Commerce Commission may not ap-
prove any consolidation, unification, merger,
or acquisition of control of a railroad cor-
poration, nor may there he any discontinu-
ance or change, in whole or in part, of the
operation or service of any train or ferry
subject to part I of the Interstate Commerce
Act, unless such discontinuance or change
is approved by the appropriate State regula-
tory agency of each State affected by such
discontinuance or change. During the pe-
riod while the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion may not approve any consolidation, uni-
fication, merger, or acquisition of control of
a railroad corporation, the operation of any
provisions of antitrust laws applicable to
mergers or consolidations that are not opera-
tive while the Commission has such author-
ity shall be in full force and have full
effect.
(Mr. MOSS (at the request of Mr.
MONTGOMERY) was granted permission
to extend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous mat-
ter.) ,
[Mr. MOSS' remarks will appear here-
af~er,in the Appendix.]
A BILL TO IMPROVE THE DIREC-
TION AND SUPERVISION OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
(Mr. REUSS (at the request of Mr.
MONTGOMERY) was granted permission
to extend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous
matter.)
Mr. REUSS. Mr. Speaker, I have to-
day introduced H.R. 7107, a bill to pro-
vide for better direction and supervision
of the Central Intelligence Agency and
other U.S. intelligence activities.
The bill would place the political ac-
tion activities of the CIA under the
President's personal direction. It would
also establish a Joint Congressional
Committee on Intelligence to supervise
CIA activities. The membership of the
committee would be changed every 4
years in order to bring fresh insights to
bear on CIA operations.
I am distressed by recent revelations
of the extent of the Central Intelligence
Agency's secret involvement in American
civilian life. Americans have discovered
that the hand of the CIA has been laid
on student organizations, universities,
labor unions, and the press. How much
further the CIA has woven itself into the
fabric of American. life no one on the
outside knows. The Washington Post
recently reported that only about $15
million of CIA largesse has been traced
and that "unsubstantiated rumors"
place the actual amounts in the hun-
dreds of millions of dollars.
On February 16, I said in a speech
here on the floor that if the valuable
work of the National Student Associa-
tion, the Peace Corps, and other private
American groups is not to be destroyed
by suspected ties to the CIA, we must
initiate an immediate house cleaning.
If there is to be tidying up, it falls
upon Congress to do it. I sincerely hope
that we will get on with the task.
The first job is to be clear as to what
we are about.
The CIA is in a sense a front for it-
self. Its publicly announced function
is to gather intelligence; but, in addition,
it has the covert assignment of carrying
out political action in furtherance of
U.S. foreign policy.
Allen Dulles, whose excellent book
"The Craft of Intelligence," is the most
straight-forward statement on the CIA
which I have seen, puts it this way:
CIA is not an underground operation. All
one needs to do is to read the law-the
National Security Act of 1047-to get a gen-
eral idea of what it is set up to do. It has,
of course, a secret side, and the law permits
the National Security Council, which in ef-
fect means the President, to assign to the
CIA certain duties and functions in the in-
telligence field In addition to those specif-
ically enumerated in the law. These func-
tions are not disclosed.
The cloak of intelligence shields the
dagger of political action.
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Subsection 102(d) of the National Se-
curity Act of 1947 lists as the intelligence
duties of the CIA:
J I) to advise the National Security Coun-
cil in matters concerning such Intelligence
activities of the Government departments
and agencies as relate to national security;
(2) to make recommendations to the Na-
tional Security Council for the coordination
of such intelligence activities of the depart-
ments and agencies of the Government as re-
late to the national security;
(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence
relating to the national security, and pro-
vide for the appropriate dissemination of
such intelligence within the Government us-
ing where appropriate existing agencies and
facilities;
(4) to perform for the benefit of existing
intelligence agencies, such additional services
of common concern as the National Security
Council determines can be more efficiently
accomplished centrally;
Intelligence is not defined in the
statute. A widely accepted definition
found in the Dictionary of U.S. Military
Terms for Joint Usage describes intel-
ligence as: "The product resulting from
the collection, evaluation, analysis, inte-
gration, and interpretation of all avail-
able information which concerns one or
more aspects of foreign nations or of
areas of operations, and which is imme-
diately or potentially significant to
planning.", -
Simply put, intelligence is information
culled from numerous sources. There is.
a common misconception that intelli-
gence work is wholly espionage-the
secret gathering of information by agents
or mechanical devices, such as the U-2.
In fact, about 80 percent of all peace-
time intelligence comes from open
sources-from reports of State Depart-
ment officials, military attaches, or tour-
ists, or from a careful reading of news-
papers, periodicals, and' other published
documents.
Most of us would agree, I am sure, with
the 1955 task force on intelligence activ-
ities of the Hoover Commission that-
The fate of the Nation well may rest on
accurate and complete intelligence data
which may serve as a trustworthy guide for
the top-level governmental decisions on pol-
icy and action in a troubled world.
In the present anarchic world of in-
dependent nation states, great powers
must continue to gather information by
straight forward and by devious means
about the military capabilities and inten-
tions of rival nations.
The 1962 Cuban missile crisis is an ob-
ject lesson. Only our highly developed
Intelligence system, including our aerial
surveillance of Cuba, gave us the oppor-
tunity to avert the installation of offen-
sive Russian missiles 90 miles off our
shores.
Intelligence activities, though distaste-
ful when espionage work is involved,
must be viewed as a necessary evil.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
The dark side of the CIA is its special
operations in political action. Para-
graph 102(d) (5) of the National Secu-
rity Act authorizes the CIA:
(5) to perform such other functions and
duties related to intelligence affecting the
national security as the National Security
Council may from time to time direct.
Many rumors as to what in the past
two decades have been CIA special op-
erations. CIA's most notable effort was,
of course, the abortive Bay of Pigs in-
vasion. Also on the public record are
two CIA-engineered palace coups-one
in 1953, in Iran against Mossadegh, and
the other in 1954, in Guatamala against
Abenz.
The recently revealed CIA subsidies
to all kinds of private groups are an-
other form of special operations. The
principal purpose of giving financial as-
sistance to the National Student Associa-
tion was to prevent the other side from
capturing world youth conferences, not
to gather intelligence.
Allen Dulles has been quite forthright
about CIA's political action activities.
He writes that it is the task of the CIA
to assist the internal security services
of countries which are the targets of
Communist takeovers wherever this can
best be done on a covert basis.
Mr. Dulles justifies covert special op-
erations as a necessary weapon against
Communist subversion. Perhaps this
too is a necessary evil. But, if it is some-
times justified to carry on covert special
operations, it must be done sparingly and
with the greatest selectivity and sensi-
tivity. For it is a weapon with vast im-
plications for deepening United States
involvement, as President Kennedy
rightly foresaw at the Bay of Pigs. It is
also a weapon which should be used only,
where the stakes are high. Secret
U.S. Government meddling in the affairs
of state of other nations or in the affairs
of domestic or foreign private organiza-
tions is so alien to our traditions that it'
can only be justified when the national
security is genuinely at stake.
A large part of the difficulty of justi-
fying the recently revealed CIA subsidies
to private organizations is the very real
doubt whether the efforts of these
groups, no matter how laudable, are
really vital to our national security.
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March 13, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
A CRITICAL DISTINCTION
To properly direct and supervise the
CIA, foreign intelligence activities must
be carefully distinguished from special
operations.
The two activities differ in kind. In-
telligence work produces neutral infor-
mation as an aid to the President in
reaching decisions involving the national
security. But in its political action ac-
tivities, the CIA is an arm of already
established policy.
The two activities differ in seriousness.
Intelligence activities, even espionage
activities, very seldom, if ever, have the
potential for more deeply involving the
United States. There is evidence that
even the U-2 incident, which was an in-
telligence activity, was seized upon by
Khrushchev as a pretext for torpedoing
the Paris Summit Conference, and not
the basic cause for its failure.
On the other hand, secret political
warfare which threatens other govern-
ments could become a casus belli; and
less ambitious activities, such as the Na-
tional Student Association affair, have
wider philosophical and ethical aspects
which must be carefully weighed.
The two activities differ in sensitivity.
Espionage is, both at home and abroad,
an accepted international activity; sub-
version is not. If the United States is
not to remake itself in the mirror image
of its adversaries, it must use the latter
instrument, if at all, with the greatest
discretion.
Mr. Dulles confirms that foreign in-
telligence, activities and special opera-
tions can be separated. Traditionally,
he says, intelligence services have kept
espionage and political and psychologi-
cal warfare in different compartments,
but-
. The CIA abandoned this kind of compart-
mentalization which so often leads to
neither the right hand nor the left knowing
what the other is doing.
WEAKNESSES IN PRESENT CIA DIRECTION AND
SUPERVISION
There are two major weaknesses in to-
day's administrative set-up for directing
and supervising the CIA:
. First. The special operations of the
CIA are not necessarily under the per-
sonal direction of the President.
Second. The people who supervise the
CIA are not changed often enough to
bring a fresh viewpoint to bear on CIA
activities. .
1. PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTION
Subsection 102 of the National Secur-
ity Act places all activities of the CIA
under the general direction of the Na-
tional Security Council. In addition,
the CIA can only undertake special
operations which the National Security
Council from time to time directs.
The National Security Council, whose
sole function is to advise the President,
as a body does not make decisions. It
therefore cannot itself direct the CIA.
So far as I can determine from published
sources (for this is not a part of the offi-
cial information on the CIA), the Na-
tional Security Council has delegated
the direction of the CIA to a high level
interdepartmental committee, some-
times known as the Special Group.
This committee is composed of a high-
ranking member of the White House
staff, the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
and the Deputy Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs. The committee
meets weekly.
Mr. Dulles says: -
All operations of intelligence character
which involve policy considerations are sub-
ject to [the committee's] approval.
Ultimately, the CIA is under the con-
trol of the President; and I assume that
the interdepartmental committee refers
questions which it believes to be of great
importance to the President.
It is clear that the CIA is subject today
to higher political authority; namely, the
directives of the interdepartmental com-
mittee, the policies of the National Secu-
rity Council, and, ultimately, the direc-
tion of the President.
For example, in the case of the Na-
tional Student Association subsidy, the
recently appointed Katzenbach commit-
tee has reported:
When the Central Intelligence Agency lent
financial support to the work of certain
American private organizations, it did not
act on its own initiative but in accordance
with national policies established by the Na-
tional Security Council in 1952 through 1954.
Throughout it acted with the approval of
senior interdepartmental review committees,
including the Secretaries of State and De-
fense or their representatives. These policies
have, therefore, been in effect under four
Presidents.
This direction is not good enough,
however, when questions concerning CIA
special operations are up for discussion.
These operations are so serious and so
sensitive that the President personally
should authorize each and every one in
writing, and should periodically review
each of them.
I have therefore included in my bill
a provision requiring a Presidential di-
rective to authorize each special opera-
tion, and an annual Presidential review
of the operation. This amendment will
underline the extreme seriousness of
special operations and the extraordinary
importance of their being limited in
number and nature, precisely directed,
and carefully supervised.
In addition, I have designated the
President as the person to give general
direction to the intelligence activities of
the CIA, since the National Security
Council is only an advisory body. This
change is a technical one which will
probably not alter present White House
supervisory arrangements.
2. PERIODIC CHANGES Or CIA CONGRESSIONAL
SUPERVISION
In the National Student Association
case, it is clear that the top Presidential
aides charged with national security
duties, appropriate cabinet officers or
their representatives, and the Congress-
men and Senators who serve on CIA
watchdog committees all knew of this
CIA activity and approved of it. It is
unclear whether members of the Presi-
dent's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board knew of it, but it is probably fair
to assume that they did. They should
have, if they, were doing their job
properly.
I can only conclude that the CIA
policymakers were mistaken because,
being insiders for so long, their perspec-
tive had become distorted. The keen
112615
edge of common sense had been dulled
by lengthy contact with the intelligence
and military communities.
The need for men of clear insight to
pass on intelligence matters can only
be supplied by periodic changes of CIA
supervisors.
My bill establishes a Joint Congres-
sional Committee on Intelligence. The
joint committee's job would be to ex-
amine continuously the foreign intelli-
gence activities and the special opera-
tions of the CIA. The joint committee
would be reconstituted with new mem-
bers every 4 years, at the beginning of
even-numbered Congresses. In this
way Congress can periodically take a
fresh look at the CIA.
No criticism is meant of the Members
of Congress who now devote themselves
to oversight of CIA matters and appro-
priations. Theirs has been a job under
difficult circumstances. But the present
system of Congressional oversight is too
piecemeal to produce the close supervi-
sion which is called for.
TIIE JUDGMENT Or HISTORY
Secrecy is essential in the tasks of the
CIA-whether intelligence gathering or
political actions. Yet this same secrecy
is the chief problem in assuring that
CIA actions are in keeping with Ameri-
can values.
But, as President Kennedy suggested
when speaking to CIA personnel on No-
vember 28, 1961, it is "in the long sweep
of history" that the efforts of the CIA
will be judged. By this judgment of
history the American public retains a
subtle control.
To assure that the full record is avail-
able to the historians, the bill provides
that no GIA records can be destroyed
without the approval of the Joint Con-
gressional Committee on Intelligence.
All Government agencies, including
the CIA, are now subject to the statutory
requirement that the Joint Congression-
al Committee on Disposition of Executive
Papers approve any record destruction.
With this immense task before it, under-
standably, the joint committee cannot
give much attention to any single request
for permission to destroy records. And
in the case of the CIA, even if the Joint
Congressional Committee on Disposition
of Executive Papers were to pursue a re-
quest to destroy records, it would have a
difficult time ascertaining the importance
of the records, since it is not privy to CIA
operations.
Thus, it is logical to transfer the func-
tion of passing on CIA requests to de-
stroy records to the Joint Committee on
Intelligence, which would have the time,
resources, and authority to make certain
that all important CIA records are pre-
served for future historians.
Mr. Speaker, I ask the House to give
serious consideration to this bill.
Its sum and substance is to strengthen
the control of the Nation's elected repre-
sentatives-both the President and Con-
gress-over the CIA. Its enactment
would not hamper the effectiveness of the
CIA. It would only help to insure that
this potent secret arm of our foreign
policy is directed by American values and
not by the values of our adversaries.
A copy of H.R. 7107 follows:
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE March 1 3, 1967-
H.R. 7107
A bill to amend the National Security Act of
1947 and the Records Disposal Act of July
7, 1943, to provide for the improved direc-
tion and supervision by the President and
by the Congress of the foreign intelligence
activities and special operations of the
United States
Be it enacted by the Senate and Rouse
of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled,
IMPROVEMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTION
SECTION 1. (a) Subsection (d) of section
102 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401) is amended to read as follows:
"(d) For the purpose of coordinating the
intelligence activities of the several Govern-
ment departments and agencies in the In-
terest of national security, it shall be the
duty of the Agency, under the direction of
the President-
"(1) to advise the President in matters
concerning such intelligence activities of the
Government departments and agencies as re-
late to national security;
"(2) to make recommendations to the
President for the coordination of such Intel-
ligence activities of the departments and
agencies of the Government as relate to the
national security;
"(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence
relating to the national security, and provide
for the appropriate dissemination of such
intelligence within the Government using
where appropriate existing agencies and fa-
cilities: Provided, That the Agency shall have
no police, subpena, law-enforcement powers,
or internal-security functions: Provided
further, That the departments and other
agencies of the GoVernment shall continue
to collect, evaluate, correlate, and dissemi-
nate departmental intelligence: And pro-
vided further, That the Director of Central
Intelligence shall be responsible for protect-
ing intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure;
"(4) to perform for the benefit of the ex-
isting intelligence agencies, such additional
intelligence activities as the President de-
termines can be more efficiently accomplished
centrally and directs in writing;
"(5) to perform such special operations
affecting the national security and to expend
such funds thereon as the President may
from time to time direct in writing."
(h) Section 102 is further amended by
redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as sub-
sections (f) and (g), respectively, and by
inserting after subsection (d) the following
subsection:
"(e) (1) Within sixty days of the enact-
ment of this amendment, the Director of
Central Intelligence, and the heads of other
executive departments and agencies having
responsibilities for special operations shall
report in writing to the President on each
special operation in which the department or
agency is then engaged. Each report shall
include a comprehensive description of the
special operation, its history, its objectives,
the number of persons engaged in the opera-
tion, the total annual expenditures planned
for the operation, and the total expenditures
made to date. The President shall review
each report and shall issue a written direc-
tive stating whether the special operation
shall be continued or terminated, and, if
continued, at what level of effort and expend-
iture it shall be contined.
"(2) Thereafter, at least once a year from
the date of the Presidential directive estab-
lishing the operation (or, in the case of an
operation under way on the date of enact-
ment, annually from the date of the Presi-
dental directive issued in accordance with
paragraph (1) hereof), the head of the de-
partment or agency engaged in the special
operation shall report in writing to the
President on the current status of the oper-
ation. This annual report shall include a
comprehensive description of the special op-
eration, its history, its objectives, the num-
ber of persons engaged in the operation, the
total annual expenditures planned for the
operation, and the total expenditures made
to date."
IMPROVEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL SUPERVISION
BY ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE
SEC. 2. Section 102 is amended by inserting
after subsection (g) the following new
subsection:
"(h) (1) There is hereby established a
Joint Committee on Intelligence to be com-
posed of seven Members of the Senate to be
appointed by the President of the Senate, and
seven Members of the House of Represen-
tatives to be appointed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives. In each instance
not more than four Members shall be mem-
bers of the same political party.
"(2) The entire joint committe shall he
reappointed on January 3, 1972, and every
four years thereafter. No Member shall serve
more than four successive years as a member
of the joint committee, except that a Member
originally appointed to fill a vacancy may
serve the incompleted term and four years
thereafter.
"(3) The joint committee shall make con-
tinuing studies of the foreign intelligence
activities and special operations of the
United States, and problems relating there-
to, including problems of the gathering of
Intelligence affecting the national security
and of its coordination and utilization by
the various departments, agencies, and in-
strumentalities of the Government, and the
advisability and problems of carrying out
special operations. The Central Intelligence
Agency and other departments and agencies
engaged in foreign intelligence activities and
special operations shall keep the joint com-
mittee fully and currently informed with
respect to their activities. All bills, resolu-
tions, and other matters in the Senate or
the House of Representatives relating primar-
ily to the Central Intelligence Agency and to
activities of other departments and agencies
engaged in foreign intelligence activities shall
be referred to the joint committee (including
lists and schedules of records lacking preser-
vation value submitted to Congress by the
Administrator of General Services pursuant
to Section 4 of the Act of July 7, 1943 (44
U.S.C. 369) ). The members of the joint
committee who are Members of the Senate
shall from time to time report to the Senate,
and the members of the joint committee who
are Members of the House of Representatives
shall from time to time report to the House,
their recommendations, by bill or otherwise,
with respect to matters within the jurisdic-
tion of their respective Houses which are (1)
referred to the joint committee or (2) other-
wise within the jurisdiction of the joint
committee.
"(4) Vacancies in the membership of the
joint committee shall not affect the power
of the remaining members to execute the
functions of the joint committee, and shall
be filled in the same manner as in the case
of the original selection. ' The joint commit-
tee shall select a chairman and vice chairman
from among its members.
"(5) The joint committee, or any duly
authorized subcommittee thereof, is author-
ized to hold such hearings, to sit and act
at such places and times, to require, by sub-
pena or otherwise, the attendance of such
witnesses and production of such books,
papers, and documents, to administer such
Oaths, to take such testimony, to procure
such printing and binding, and to make such
expenditures as it deems advisable.
"(6) The joint committee is empowered to
appoint such experts, consultants, tech-
nicians, and clerical and stenographic assist-
ants as it deems necessary and advisable.
The committee is authorized to utilize the
services, information, facilities, and person-
nel of the departments and establishments
of the Government on a reimbursable basis
with the prior consent of the heads of the
departments or agencies concerned.
"(7) The expenses of"the joint committee,
which shall not exceed $250,000 per year,
shall be paid from the contingent fund of the
House of Representatives upon vouchers
signed by the chairman."
DEFINITIONS
SEC. 3. Section 102 is further amended by
inserting after the new subsection (h) the
following new subsection:
"(i) As used in this section:
"(1) 'Intelligence' means knowledge which
is the product resulting from the collection,
evaluation, analysis, integration, and in-
terpretation of all available information
which concerns one or more aspects of for-
eign nations or of areas, of operations and
which is immediately or potentially sig-
nificant to policymaking or planning.
"(2) 'Intelligence activities' means those
activities undertaken for the sole purpose of
producing intelligence, and does not mean
covert operations which, in whole or in part,
are undertaken to carry out the foreign
policy of the United States.
"(3) 'Special operations' means those
covert operations undertaken by the Central
Intelligence Agency or other departments or
agencies which, In whole or in part, are un-
dertaken to carry out the foreign policy of
the United States."
PRESERVATION OF INTELLIGENCE RECORDS
SEC. 4. (a) Section 5 of the Act of July 7,
1943 (44 U.S.C. 370) is amended by adding
an additional sentence at the end thereof
as follows:
"Except that all lists or schedules of the
records of the Central Intelligence Agency,
or of the activities of any other departments
or agencies engaged in foreign intelligence
activities and special operations, shall be re-
ferred to the Joint Committee on Intelli-
gence, and the joint committee shall examine
such lists or schedules and submit to the
Senate and House of Representatives, respec-
tively, a report of such examination and its
recommendations."
. (b) Section 6 of the Act of July 7, 1943 (44
U.S.C. 371) is amended by inserting, after
the words "joint committee" and before the
word "reports", the phrase, "to which the
lists or schedules were referred".
(c) Section 7 of the Act of July 7, 1943
(44 U.S.C. 372) is amended by inserting, after
the words "joint committee" and before the
word "fails", the phrase, "to which the lists
or schedules were referred".
VOCATIONAL AND TECHNICAL
SCHOOLS IN FLORIDA
(Mr. PEPPER (at the request of Mr.
MONTGOMERY) was granted permission
to extend his remarks at this point in
the RECORD and to include extraneous
matter.)
Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, I am
proud to say that my State of Florida has
had an excellent record in moving for-
ward strongly in the development of the
building of some 29 area vocational and
technical schools and in an overall ex-
pansion of its vocational program in the
State.
Florida has been one of the fastest
growing States in the country and has
expanded greatly its vocational schools
and has presently five more schools in
the planning stages. It is, therefore,
apparent that we must appropriate the
full authorized figure for fiscal 1968 as
authorized under Public Law ' 88-210.
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