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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72-00337R000200040003-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2000
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 19, 1969
• Content Type: MFR

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Conversation between Mr. Carl Marcy, Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff,
and Mr. John M. Maury -- 19 June 1969
Marcy: Thought we had better check to make sure things are on the
track--10:30 Monday, the Director and Secretary Laird.
Maury: That is what I understand. Do you have any guidelines as to
what should be covered? ,
Marcy: It would be best to take the 20 questions and amend them as
required--that is update them if they need updating. You know
this was Lairds idea. We wanted to talk with the Director
privately. We never told Laird that. When Senator Fulbright
went to Laird, Laird said he wanted an executive session with
the Director and was so insistent that Senator Fulbright felt
he should go along with it. We are interested in having those
20 questions, that is the answers to the 20 questions, updated
and anything else the Director might want to bring up. It will
be in Room s-116 in the Capitol and will be the full Committee.
-Another thing--for some weeks Life Magazine has had "Okie",
who was Johnson's photographer in the White House, on their
payroll, doing a series of behind-the-scenes photography--he
wants to take pictures while an executive session is going on.
We set up a session for him but he wants to be present when'
an important hearing is going on.
Maury: I'd have to check on that with the Director.
Marcy: Please do that--I can turn it off if you wish.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 19P 1969
ABly! tion urging the President to seek_ agreement
wtth the Soviet Union to bait testing of
sary confrontation between the C.I.A. and
the Pentagon.
The bureaucratic ordeal of achieving a con-
sensus position among various Government
agencies has stirred Congressional interest in
the reliability of top-level intelligence and
the means by which raw data are analyzed.
In policy controversies, particularly on
strategic arms questions, individual agencies'
tentative or preliminary assessments are por-
trayed as the latest authoritative intelligence
as they are passed around among participants
in the debate.
The purpose of the United States Intelli-
gence Board is to provide a high-level forum
for the entire intelligence community to meet
and try to achieve a nonpartisan consensus
for the President.
Mr. Helms acts as the spokesman for the
community and the C.I.A. in policy-making
counsels. Pentagon and State Department in-
telligence assessments can also be called to
the President's attention independently by
Mr. Laird, by the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler and by
Mr. Rogers.
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, there multiple-warhead missiles.
are obvious and disturbing similarities The signers included the Senate Demo-
between the Safeguard anti-ballistic- cratic leader, Mike Mansfield of Montana,
mliSsile system and its predecessor, the and the Democratic whip, Edward M. Ken-
Sentinel. nedy of Massachusetts. Senator Edward W.
The intelligence estimates on which Brooke, Republican of Massachusetts, was
the need for the Sentinel was justified the chief author of the resolution, which was
endorsed by a total of 27 Democrats and 11
were erroneous. The intelligence esti- Republicans.
mates used to justify the Safeguard, ac- SECURITY COUNCIL TO MEET
cording to an article in the New York Critics of the Administration are fearful
Times of June 18, are now disputed that Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird and
within the Government. Pentagon strategists have drowned out Sec-
The cost estimates for the Sentinel retary of State William P. Rogers and other
escalated at a frightening pace. So too potential restraining voices-including the
are the estimates on the Safeguard. Central Intelligence Agency-in pushing for
From the $6.6 billion figure of March, a stern negotiation position and for costly
which did pot include $1.2 billion for defense programs, by in the critics' view,
nuclear warheads, the estimate, accord- exaggerating Soviet nuclear capabilities.
ing to the New York Times of ,fine 18, Among Congressional opponents of the
Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system, there
has increased to $10.8 billion. The addi- is particular resentment at what they see
tional amount was acknowledged by Sec- as the Pentagon's highly selective, if not ac-
retary Laird on May 22, in testimony be- tually distorted, use of raw intelligence data
fore the House Appropriations Commit- to promote the pro-ABM position. The same
tee. He stated that the $7.8 billion esti- resentment has been voiced privately by in-
mate did not include the $500 million telligence officials themselves.
cost of extending the system to Alaska It is in this context that the high-level
consensus estimate of the entire intelligence
and Hawaii, nor did it include the $2.5 community assumes special significance.
billion cost of research, development, The United States Intelligence Board is a
and testing of the systems components. high-level coordinating group that meets
It must be noted that the new $10.8 bil- weekly to correlate all the data available
lion estimate is preproduction. And as across the Government. Sitting on the board
we are learning every day, preproduction under Mr. Helm's chairmanship are repre-
sentatives of the C.I.A.; the Pentagon's De-
fense Intelligence Agency; the intelligence
never less than ultimate cost. branches of the Army, Navy and Air Force;
I ask unanimous consent that an arti- the State Department, the Atomic Energy
cle and a editorial from yesterday's New Commission and the National Security
York Times be entered into the RECORD Agency.
at this time. These agencies agreed last week that the
I also ask unanimous consent that a Russians appear to be moving rapidly, more
compilation of editorials regarding the so than expected several years ago, to
deter-
nd d are their
probably striving nuclear forces for as a more dt s than
ABM controversy be entered into the rent t and strengthen
han
RECORD at this time. equality of missile strength with the United
There being no objection, the material States.
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, DESIRE AND INTENTION
as follows: But, in the board's judgment, this drive
[From the New York Times, June 18, 1969] falls short of an effort to achieve a "first-
U.S. INTELLIGENCE Douars SovIET HAS FIRST- strike capability"-the capability to destroy
?nh TTni+e,i C+u+- miecil- i? o A-+ n+,. -
Moscow DOES SEEK MORE THAN PARrrY--- to prevent this country from launching an
effective retaliatory blow.
MISSILES The "desire" ultimately to acquire such a
(By Peter Grose) capability may be present in some Soviet
WASHINGTON, June 17.-The United States policy-making circles, the board concluded,
intelligence community has reportedly con- but both the capability and the specific in-
cluded that the Soviet Union is not now tention to achieve it were ruled out for the
striving for the capability to launch a first- foreseeable future.
strike nuclear attack against this country This conclusion was reportedly stated in
but is probably seeking more than parity the formal "national intelligence estimate"
with the United States in missile strength. without any dissenting footnotes from any
. At meetings last week of the United States of the participating agencies.
Intelligence Board, which is presided over by Pentagon strategists have repeatedly cited
the Director of Central Intelligence * * * the threat of a Soviet first-strike capability
civilian and service Intelligence agencies are to justify the need for the Safeguard ABM
understood to have reached a consensus esti- System.
mate of Soviet strategic strength for the NOT A DIRECT CONTRADICTION
coming two or three years. The intelligence community's estimate
sent to the White house as. the official minimized this threat, though it is not in di-
judgment of the intelligence community, the rect contradiction with the official Pentagon
detailed and secret survey seems bound to view; Mr. Laird's statements raised the, pos-
bec me embroiled in._the currept controversy sibility of a Soviet first-strike capability by
over the opening of strategic arms talks with the mid-1970's, a time beyond the two or
the Russians and the proposed deployment three years covered in the intelligence com-
of an antiballistic-missile system. munity's estimate.
The White House announced today that Preliminary assessments prepared by the
the National Security Council would meet C.I.A. and made available to Congressional
tomorrow on ar7n policies. President Nixon committees were understood to have come
is expec to disclose at a televised news down far harder in rebutting Mr. Laird's
conference at 7 o'clock Thursday nighrt when arguments about Soviet capabilities.
rnnIni open Lion, proposes to According to reliable sources, Mr. Helms,
aon ere tkle
new r0 rmament talks, aware of the political controversy surround-
Meanwhile, in a related, development, 40 ing the estimates, softened some of the lan-
Senntors my 11 short of a majority- guage of the final survey-without altering
joined together as Co-sponsors of a resolu-, the basic conclusions-to avert an unneces-
[From the New York Times, June 18, 1969]
,THE COST OF ABM
Critics of antiballistic missile (ABM) de-
ployment have now been confirmed by De-
fense Secretary Laird in their predictions
that the so-called "thin" system would prove
far more expensive, if built, than initial
Pentagon figures indicated. Mr. Laird's latest
figures, declassified from Congressional tes-
timony, reveal that the antimissile system
will cost $10.8 billion, twice as much as orig-
inally claimed and almost as much as the
price tag originally put on one of the "thick"
ABM systems long under discussion.
The cost of the original 'rthin" Sentinel
ABM system proposed by the Johnson Ad-
ministration in September 1967 was said to
be $5.5 billion. The Nixon Administration's
modified ABM system, Safeguard, was priced
for Congress at $6.6 billion in March. It
shifted Sentinel sites from urban areas to
presumably less expensive nonurban loca-
tions. But it added omnidirectional radar
and close-in defense of Minuteman ICBM
silos, increasing the number of antimissile
missiles from 700 to a reported 900 or more.
In May, the Defense Department acknowl-
edged under Congressional and press ques-
tioning that it had been understating the
price of the proposed Safeguard system by
$1.2 billion 'by not including the Atomic
Energy Commission's estimated ,bill for de-
veloping, producing and testing ABM nuclear
warheads. The system's total cost then was
put at $7.8 billion.
But on May 22, in testimony before the
House Appropriations Committee that now
has been published, Secretary Laird acknowl-
edged that these figures included neither
the $500-million cost of extending the Safe-
guard system to Alaska and Hawaii nor the
$2.5 billion cost of research, development and
testing of the system's components.
The present $10.8 billion total is still a
preproduction estimate, of course. Most re-
cent experience in procurement of complex
new weapons systems is that actual produc-
tion and construction costs usually exceed
original estimates by substantial amounts,
apart from the normal effects of inflation. In
the end, it would not be surprising if the
cost of a "thin" Safeguard defense proved
to be substantially more than the heavy sys-
tem under discussion during the Johnson
Administration, which was priced by the
Pentagon as purchasable for $13 billion.
Within reason, of course,. cost should not
be, the determining factor in weapons deci-
sions that could affect the life or death of
the nation, But this is precisely what is
wrong with going ahead on Safeguard: it is
not a life-or-death matter, Its Utility and
workability are challenged by many experts.
Even advocates of the "thin" ABM system
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June. 19, 196P CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
involving defense, the search for relaxation
of East-West tension, and the search for ways
to control our environment.
B t first let us look briefly at the past.
Just twenty years ago, in May 1949, Wins-
ton Churchill spoke of the need for a North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). At
the time, Churchill was in the Opposition,
just as he was when he made his "Sinews of
Peace" speech in 1946 here in Fulton. He
proclaimed:
"It is our plain duty to persevere stead-
fastly, irrespective of party feelings or na-
tional diversities, for only in this way have
we good chances of securing that lasting
world peace ... on which our hearts are
set."
That Is still true today.
Some two years earlier, Congressman
Richard Nixon was assigned to the special
Herter Committee, the committee which laid
the foundation for enactment of the his-
torical Marshall Plan. Mr. Nixon has re-
garded his work on that Committee as the
most important work he did during his years
in Congress,
Twenty years later, President Nixon made
it a very early order of business, in his new
Administration, to visit Europe. His first stop
was in Brussels, where he spoke to the North
;Atlantic Council. There the President re-
stated, his willingness to enter an era of
negotiation with the Soviets and East Euro-
peans, and he pledged full, deep and genu-
ine consultation: a new spirit and process of
cooperation within the Alliance. Some of our
Allies in recent years have criticized the
United States for failing to consult as fully
as it might have. The President has made
it clear that there will be no'further grounds
for such criticisms.
The President's two addresses to the North
Atlantic Council-in Brussels in February
and in Washington in April-were the first
major policy addresses of his Presidency.
He reminded the Alliance in Washington:
"Two decades ago, the men who founded
NATO faced the truth of their times; as a
result, the Western world prospers in free-
dom, We must follow their example by once
again facing the truth-not` of earlier times,
but of our own .
"NATO is needed; and the American com-
mitment to NATO will remain in force and
remain strong. We in America continue to
consider Europe's security as our own."
As I see it, the people of this country
have three clear Interests in the Atlantic
Alliance.
(1) Twice in this century America has
been drawn into European wars. We are
entitled to maintain a basic interest in pre-
venting conflict in Western Europe, remote
as' that possibility is today. The great
Churchill himself spoke in 1952 of "... the
thousand-years' quarrel which has torn Eu-
rope to pieces .
(2)The pursuit of a stable peace, not only
with Moscow but-also with the nations of
Eastern Europe. Here the Atlantic Alliance
must maintain cohesion and unity in ap-
proaching the difficult and "potentially divi-
sive issues affecting East-West relations.
(3) Development of closer and more effec-
tivp relationships among the arts, the eco-
noinies, and the technologies whose interde-
pendence gives substance to our emerging
common civilization.
Pursuit of peace depends above all on
solid military security in the West, and our
prospect for success in any arms limitation
or force reduction negotiation depends
direltly on the adequacy of our joint security
arrahgelnents in the Atlantic Alliance.
Ties, we must preserve military strength
ai1.4 political solidarity to deter aggression;
and if it does occur, we must be ready to
join in the common defense.
To be realistic, we must recognize that the
Alliance today has problems on this score.
Allies used to be strengthened through im-
provements which have been recognized as
necessary, and which the Allies have agreed
to undertake.
Let me make one thing clear: so long as
the achievement of a European settlement
remains a major piece of the unfinished
business of our troubled world, the Atlantic
Alliance must remain strong. President Nixon
said recently:
"It is not enough to talk of flexible re-
sponse, if at the same time we reduce our
flexibility by cutting back on conventional
forces."
With respect to the political processes of
the Alliance, President Nixon said in Wash-
ington last month:
"It is not enough to talk of relaxing ten-
sion, unless we keep in mind that twenty
years of tension were not caused by superficial
misunderstanding. A change of mood is use-
ful if it reflects some change of mind about
political purpose......
He also said:
"It is not enough to talk of European
security in the abstract; we must know the
elements of insecurity and how to remove
them."
The President has proposed a fundamental
change for the Atlantic Alliance: a break-
through to a new and deeper form of political
consultation as a means of approaching these
issues. Thus, in connection with the forth-
coming strategic arms limitations talks with
the Soviet Union, the President has pledged
and asked for full, deep, and genuine and
continuing Alliance consultation-for such
talks will clearly involve not only our own
security but also that of our allies.
The other major Alliance task for the fu-
ture is the development of a framework to
define community interests in our ecology-
our total environment. As Admiral Rickover
said last Wednesday, the problem of making
wise future use of technology might be the
paramount issue facing the people of all in-
dustrial democracies.
At the 1969 Washington Ministerial Session
of the North Atlantic Council, the nations
agreed:
"The members of the Alliance are conscious
that they share common environmental
problems which, unless squarely faced, could
imperil the welfare and progress of their so-
cieties .
There is much conventional wisdom about
the problems of our environment and of our
urban societies. Most of, it tells us how diffi-
cult these problems are. A review of it shows
how few are the solutions which we can be
confident will really work, and how impor-
tant it is that we find some way of exchang-
ing views and ideas in an organized fashion
designed to benefit those involved in formu-
lating broad public policy on essentially in-
ternal problems. For instance, our own De-
fense Department, uninhibited by local regu-
lations or traditions, has made significant
advances In the design, construction and ad-
ministration of hospitals on a "systems"
basis. Studies might be made, similarly, of
training and use of paramedical personnel;
helicopter rescue service for accident vic-
tims; occupational and physical therapy; the
movement of goods and people; heliport con-
struction and operation; school construction;
language teaching; and other education prac-
tices. This would stress the positive spinoff
of defense efforts and could result in better
mechanisms for transfer of the findings.
Other broad categories - nd headings sug-
gest themselves for possible exploration with-
in the entire Atlantic Alliance.
Env-ironmental matters: urban planning,
air and water pollution, urban and inter-
urban transportation, conservation, leisure,
the harnessing of technology, and the role
of the private sector in all these fields.
Civil and social affairs: adapting Western
institutions to the technological age; investi-
S 6775
gating the po{??entlal role of the private sector
(for example, extension by European govern-
ments of tax advantages to contributors to
foundations and other organizations seeking
to improve the "quality of life.")
Educational -natters: stimulating non-
military research and technology on an At-
lantic basis; promoting equivalence of uni-
versity entrance requirements and degrees to
provide greater international academic mo-
bility; updating and coordinating curricula
to provide more meaningful conceptions of
the past, present and future for future citi-
zens of an interdependent world; plurina-
tional Peace Corps-Vista-type projects; and
modernization of educational theory and
practice.
A 20-year old international alliance is in
some ways like a middle-aged university pro-
fessor: both tend to resist major changes in
their life styles. There has been a certain
amount of resistance to involving NATO, as
such, in environmental problems. But sup-
port for this dimension for the Alliance is
growing.
By focusing the attention of the Alli-
ance on these problems we do not of course
mean to Imply that only the members of
the Alliance need to confront them. We
would expect that Alliance efforts would be
closely related to efforts in other interna-
tional bodies with different memberships.
But we are convinced that the Atlantic Alli-
ance, being composed of many of the most
advanced industrial countries, can play a
major role.
One of the most intriguing and effective
aspects of the new Alliance initiative will be
the bringing together of the most responsi-
ble and knowledgeable officials having broad
responsibilities cutting across such fields as
education, urban development, technology,
and pollution control. We hope that these
men and women can cut through bureau-
cratic undergrowth and bring about work-
able, pragmatic solutions to problems of our
technological age. Within our own govern-
ment, for example, the Departments of Labor,
and of Housing-as well as Mr. Pat Moyni-
han, Assistant to the President for Urban
Affairs-have all expressed interest in the
new Alliance Initiative.
The new shape of the Atlantic Alliance is
not yet here. The strategic arms limitation
talks have not begun, nor have negotiations
on European problems. The key processes,
however, are underway: the Alliance was
consulted on the President's decision to
change the Sentinel ABM system to the
more defensive and appropriate Safeguard
system, and there is widespread understand-
ing and universal appreciation within the
Alliance.
The intense concern over environmental
challenges has not had time to take con-
crete form within the Alliance, notwith-
standing extensive conversations and dis-
cussions at Brussels and in national capitals.
But, in fact, there will be a new Atlantic
Alliance. The future will bring "steadfast
perserverance"-to use Churchill's phrase
"steadfast perseverance" in the maintenance
of our overall defense strength. It will bring
a deepening of the process of political con-
sultation. And, the future will bring better
understanding and control of our technology
and our environment.
For of course our age is an age of very
great peril. The central questions we face in
the future are the questions of man's sur-
vival in the face of his weapons technology
and the effects of his industrial technology
on his environment. If we do survive, It will
be because we have learned how to consult
each other with regard to our political prob-
lems, rather than hurl weapons at each
other; and because we will have learned to
control our industrial technology-to make
our world fit for man.
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'June 19, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 6777
agree with the original proponent of Sen-
tinel, former Defense Secretary McNamara,
that it has only "marginal" value. The Pen-
tagon's obviously unreliable and vastly
escalating cost estimates-from $6.6 to $10.8
billion within about two months-make in-
creasingly pertinent the question whether
the possible marginal gain is worth the
money, especially at a time when urgent
civilian needs are going begging.
[From the St. Louis (Mo.) Post-Dispatch,
Apr. 15, 1969]
CONTRADICTIONS OF SAFEGUARD
The case for deploying the Safeguard anti-
missile system has developed so many con-
tradictions that the Nixon Administration
would be well advised to lay the project aside
for extensive re-examination.
Quite possibly the Administration could
browbeat Congress into reluctantly granting
the funds. But Mr. Nixon would be unwise
to exercise that power. To undertake such a
fateful escalation of the arms race without
a substantial consensus behind it would
alienate a large and important segment of
public opinion, especially in the intellectual
community. To invoke the sheer political
muscle of the Pentagon and its allies in
behalf of a highly questionable and costly
program would deepen the frustration many
Americans feel over their seeming inability
to, influence the course of events.
Secretary Laird says we must deploy the
ABM system in order to protect our land-
based missiles from a first-strike attack by
the Russians. At the same time, the Ad-
ministration cites the Russians' mild reac-
tion as evidence that our plans are not pro-
vocative. Here is one contradiction. If the
Soviets are not bothered by our ABM, it
must be for one of two reasons. Either they
are convinced from their own experience
that it will not work-a conclusion con-
curred in by many of our own scientists-
or they are not actually basing their nuclear
strategy upon the ability to destroy our
"deterrent." Either way, the case for Safe-
guard is fatally weakened.
Consider another contradiction. Secretary
Laird presents Safeguard as absolutely vital
to our national security in the years ahead.
But Secretary of State Rogers is willing to
bargain the ABM away, so he says, within
the next few months. The Administration
cannot have it both ways. If our defenses
would be stripped naked without ABM, then
no treaty to abandon it is justified. If ABM
can be put on the bargaining table at the
arms talks, then it can be laid on the shelf
before the arms talks begin.
Secretary Laird was quite right in rec-
ognizing that his whole case for ABM rested
on the premise that the Russians, in his
words, "are going for a first-strike capabil-
ity." As the debate has developed, however, it
has become progressively clearer that the
premise is not a fact but an assumption-
a questionable assumption which even the
Administration is now backing away from.
Scientific studies for Senators by Ralph
E. Lapp argue very strongly that even by
the most generous estimate the Soviets can-
not acquire the power to knock out all our
land-based missiles, which are only one part
of our nuclear arsenal. If the Soviets could
by a miracle acquire that power, we would
still have left for devastating retaliation all
our bombers, all our Polaris-Poseidon sub-
marines, all our vast array of nuclear weap-
ons based in Western Europe. To assume
that every one of these weapons in our
catalogue of overkill could be destroyed in
one fell swoop is to'wander in the realm of
fantasy.
The truth is that Mr. Laird does not know,
and neither does anybody else, that the
Russians "are going for a first-strike ca-
pability." The same weapons which he
chooses to regard as offensive in character
can with equal reason be regarded as de-
fensive, or "deterrent." Any huge nuclear
force can be a first-strike force if it is tar-
geted on the weapons of the other side. Our
own enormous arsenal, which we claim is
designed only for retaliation, may look like
a first-strike force to somebody else.
What it all boils down to is that both
superpowers possess far more nuclear weap-
ons than they need to destroy each other,
and neither, so long as sanity survives, can
afford to use them. In these circumstances,
no security will be gained by escalating the
arms race another notch. Deploying Safe-
guard will not deter the Soviets from build-
ing more ICBMs; it is fare likelier to have
the opposite effect. We need to negotiate an
end to the race instead of running it through
one more round of escalation.
[From the St. Louis (Mo.) Post-Dispatch,
May 8, 1969]
SAFEGUARD: COLLAPSE OF A CASE
The longer the ABM debate goes on, the
clearer it becomes that the central issue is
not one of strategic Imperatives, but of al-
location of resources.
The case against deploying the ABM has
now been restated by a distinguished scien-
tific panel in a report for Senator Edward
M. Kennedy. The case for has been restated
by two scientists and a former head of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff in a report to the Amer-
ican Security Council, an organ of the mili-
tary-industrial complex.
Both reports leave the argument pretty
much where it was. The fundamental ques-
tion remains whether, in the present state
of world affairs, the arms race, and our do-
mestic social crisis, it is wise or necessary to
commit the nation to an expenditure of
eight to 20 billion dollars for more nuclear
weapons.
The evidence seems to us overwhelmingly
on the negative side, and to be buttressed
by the constantly shifting grounds on which
the Nixon Administration defends its deci-
sion to deploy the Safeguard system.
Thus the Kennedy report cuts the ground
under Secretary Laird's crucial premise that
the ABM is essential because the Soviets are
"going for a first-strike capability." It does
this so effectively that John S. Foster Jr., the
Pentagon's research chief, is compelled to ac-
knowledge that the Soviets cannot really
hope to knock out all our offensive missiles
at one fell blow. Dr. Foster has had to think
up a new rationale. He says the ABM is nec-
essary to give a future President time to con-
sider how he should respond to a nuclear
attack; by "protecting" some of our land-
based missiles, he says, the ABM would ob-
viate the necessity of instant, automatic
"retaliation.
But while Dr. Foster is advancing this
feeblest of all rationales, the President's se-
curity adviser, Henry Kissinger, is spreading
the sophisticated word that Safeguard is not
directed against the Russians at all, but
against the Chinese, just as the Johnson Ad-
ministration originally said. Nobody, how-
ever, suggests that the Chinese are likely to
achieve a first-strike capability. And if they
are going for a second-strike capability,
which can be exercised only against cities,
then why is the Safeguard system being de-
ployed around missile bases instead of around
cities, as Mr. Johnson originally planned?
The Nixon Administration's confused and
contradictory explanations for Safeguard all
lead to one conclusion, that the decision to
deploy it did not in fact flow from authentic
considerations of strategic security. The de-
cision was a pragmatic and political one, de-
signed to satisfy the military-industrial pres-
sures for initiating a new weapons system
while inventing a new rationale for it that
would, so it was hoped, mollify the develop-
ing opposition to Sentinel. For Mr. Nixon,
the decision was a holding action, reflecting
his reluctance, in the first few days of his
Administration, to deny the Pentagon and
Its contractors what they had set their hearts
on.
But there has to be a better reason than
this for oommiting the nation to a vast in-
crease in Its nuclear overkill capacity at a
time of grave internal crisis. The strategic
case for Safeguard having collapsed, Congress
should say what Mr. Nixon could not bring
himself to say: Not
[From the St. Louis (Mo.) Post-Dispatch,
May 7, 1969)
OH, YES, THE WARHEADS
Opponents of the antiballistic missile have
been saying all along that, judging by past
performance, the Pentagon's estimate of costs
for the Safeguard system would very likely
turn out to be an understatement. That
judgment has been verified sooner than
might have been expected.
The Pentagon now acknowledges, in re=
spouse to press inquiries, that the cost figure
it has been using in testimony before con-
gressional committees-6.6 billion dollars-
was wrong by some 1.2 billions. It turns out
that Pentagon spokesmen conveniently ne-
glected to include the cost of the warheads.
That is something like pricing a Cadillac
without the engine.
This, we confidently predict, is only the
beginning. The Union of Concerned Scien-
tists which sponsored the research stoppage
at M.I.T. last month, estimates conservative-
ly that the $7 billion price tag on Safeguard
"will more than double before completion."
Which raises again a persistent question
about the military establishment's tech-
niques in selling arms expenditures to the
public: When does simple misrepresentation
become outright mendacity?
[From the New York Times, May 22, 1969]
ABM: THE CENTRAL ISSUE
The great debate over the Safeguard anti-
ballistic missile (ABM) system has ranged
far and wide, but the central issue facing the
Congress has been unwittingly clarified by
the Pentagon's research chief, Dr. John S.
Foster.
Dr. Foster asserts that Phase I of the proj-
ect-defense of two Minuteman sites against
possible Soviet attack-must be authorized
this year or it could be outstripped by the
Soviet buildup of big offensive SS-9 intercon-
tinental missiles. A one-year delay now in
starting Safeguard's Phase I would mean a
two-year delay later in completion of the
system from 1974 to 1976. The system, Dr.
Foster argues, will be needed by 1974 because
the Soviet Union is adding to its 200 or more
SS-9's at a rate of about 50 a year.
Dr. Foster is frank to admit that "we do
not know just how effectively" SS-9 warheads
could attack Minuteman silos since "we do
not know precisely their accuracy." Further,
"we do not know how many SS-9's the
Soviets will finally build," Dr. Foster adds,
and "perhaps the Soviets themselves haven't
decided."
But, the Pentagon's research chief argues,
Moscow by 1974 could deploy 420 SS-9's. So-
viet technological skill could by then equip
each missile with three independently-tar-
geted 5-niegaton warheads, a guidance sys-
tem accurate to one-quarter mile, a failure
rate of only 20 percent and a device to re-
place failures. In that event, the 1,260 SS-9
warheads would have a capability of destroy-'
ing 950 of America's 1,000 Minuteman silos.
These estimates represent a sharp up-
grading of Pentagon figures released only two
months ago and many scientists outside the
Government are skeptical about them. More-
over, they argue that the Soviet Union, to
achieve a first-strike capability and avoid
nuclear suicide, would also have to acquire
the means to destroy the American Polaris
and strategic bomber fleets at one blow.
But there is another and simpler reply to
the Administration's case. It is that the east-
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S 6778
ast and best way to head off a future Soviet
threat to the Minuteman force would be to
propose an immediate Soviet-American mor-
atorium on deployment and testing of de-
Pensive, and offensive strategic weapons.
;lY Moscow agreed, the Soviet SS-9 force
would be frozen at less than 250 single-war-
head missiles. Soviet development of MIRV
warheads (multiple independently targeted
re-entry vehicles) and further deployment of
antimissile missiles would be halted. Safe-
guard deployment, no longer urgent, could
be deferred. American development of MIRV
and the Poseidon and Minuteman III missiles
to carry It-planned to penetrate the heavy
ABM system It was thought Moscow was
building-would no longer be needed.
A moratorium-urged recently by Senators
Mansfield, Percy, Cooper and Brooke-would
freeze the present Soviet-American nuclear
balance, which provides mutual deterrence
and security to both sides. This summer's
projected strategic arms limitation talks
would then seek agreement on a more formal
system and, ultimately, arms reductions.
Could the Soviet Union be trusted not
to evade a moratorium? No such trust
would be needed.. Reconnaissance satellites
and other intelligence now enable both sides
unilaterally to detect any evasions large
enough to alter the nuclear balance.
Heading off the next round in the missile
race is essentially a matter of halting de-
ployment ' of ABM's and, even more im-
portant, MIRV's-which threaten to multiply
nuclear delivery vehicles on both sides many
times over. America's interest lies in talking
the Soviet Union out of building these sys-
tems. It is best done by offering to forgo
them for the United States, not by forcing
a race that is more than likely to become
irreversible than to strengthen the American
bargaining position in negotiating a stand-
down.
[From the St. Louis (Mo.) Review,
Apr. 4, 1969]
WHILE PRIORITIES WAIT-ABM ADDS TO
ARMS PROLIFERATION
(By Barbara Ward)
Clearly, of all the things the Americans
and the Russians could do together, or on
parallel lines, to keep the planet safe for its
human inhabitants, the most urgent and the
most immediate is to avoid another upward
twist in the arms spiral.
An ABM shield, beginning at $5 billion and
rising to who knows what cost, is only part
of the Issue,. the sharp tip of the iceberg
above the diplomatic waters. The iceberg it-
self is-the $120 billion a year spent by the
Powers on their armaments. It is right to
stop the further speeding up of the arms race
which a new set of automatic, nuclear coun-
ter-missiles would set in motion. But it is
even more urgent to begin going Into reverse,
to begin reducing the vast, unseemly burden
of destruction carried by both sides.
Under Article VI of the Anti-Proliferation
Treaty, both Great Powers bind themselves
to take significant steps to limit their own
arms. But the clause may simply be the rhet-
oric of a bargain between two giants who
are chiefly concerned with keeping other
peoples' weapons under control. Neither side
has said much about actual reductions-
by percentages of war budgets, by types of
weapon, by matching withdrawals. Until they
do, the hideous bulk of $120 billion worth cif
weapons will go on throwing a cold and ugly
shadow across the nations' collective life,
The horror, of -this vast hemorrhage of re-
-
trlilo) potential wealth when children go mously among scientists because of misrepre-
llungry. The tactV is, on _any calculation of sentations about Safeguard and his veto of
Atlantic natiornal irlcgme, over the next de- a director for the National Science Founda-
cade, the Western arms burden can be sold tion because he opposed Safeguard.
,to be quite tolerable in financial terms. Under Secretary of Defense David Packard
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 19, 1969 '
As this column has pointed out before,
Atlantic wealth is growing by at least $60 bil-
lion a year. A couple of years' increment could
cover the Atlantic arms budget completely.
Extend the calculation to 1980, and the extra
income each year-on top of the present an-
nual combined national income of rising
$20,000 billion-would be at least $600 billion
a year. Out of an addition on this scale, any
conceivable arms budget could be carried
without disrupting a single other desirable
use of income.
But it is precisely at this point that some
of the deeper evils of our arms race become
apparent. We do not extend to any other
vast social pursuit the largely unthinking
acceptance we give to the concept of de-
fense. We seem unaware-and our leaders
do not enlighten us-of the future resources
we shall have available and how many
blessed and useful things we could do with
them-rebuilding cities, for instance, or
educating the drop outs and the handi-
capped, unpolluting our stricken atmos-
phere, giving every elderly citizen an income
which permits a quiet old age and a digni-
fled death.
But with our mental block about virtually
every large public expenditure except de-
fense, we say: "How can we rebuild the
ghetto when we have such an arms budget?"
We do not say: "Next year, we shall have
$60 billions in new resources. How should
they be spent?"
At best we say: "With all this defense
spending, we can only afford to help the poor
at home. The poor abroad must look after
themselves." We do not say: "Twice over-
fkill is as good as four times over-
kill. Let us cut away $20 billion, add in next
year's resources, double foreign aid, treble
the new cities program, quadruple housing-
and still come out with a bonus for our-
selves."
In short, if we felt about any great human
undertaking-education, urban renewal,
health, anti-pollution-the instinctive ac-
ceptance we give to defense-spending, we
would scale down the arms, transfer the re-
sultant saving to life-giving projects and
throw in a proportion of the resources which
will be provided by future growth. We would
demand from our leaders some "budget" of
priorities for the Seventies, some sense of
how and where so much rising wealth ought
to be spent.
Until we make some such calculus, it is
not surprising that so many young people
around the world find our society grotesquely
ugly. This vast apparatus of wealth, used so
acceptingly for destruction, so grudgingly
for the great creative purposes of society,
finally seems to them unworthy and despica-
ble. The clutter of consumption, the high-
velocity advertising, the shining glass office
buildings and, alongside, the rat-infested
tenements-is all this, they ask, so worth
defending that billions on arms are almost
taken for granted? Give us instead a picture
of true wealth. Give us something we can
fully respect. But money and weapons, piled
up without compassion and justice, com-
mand neither our loyalty nor our love.
[From Long Island Newsday, May 1, 1969]
NIxow'S ALBATROSS
The ugly thing hanging around the neck
of the Nixon administration only looks like
an albatross. It is really a Safeguard anti-
ballistic missile.
The President has received generally high
marks for the openness and honesty with
which he has started his administration. But
this generalization cannot be applied to the
campaign being waged for the missile system.
Already, Nixon's reputation has suffered enor
claimed that Dr. W. K. H. Panofsky had re-
viewed and endorsed Safeguard. Dr. Panofsky,
a renowned radar expert, responded irately
that his "review" took place after he hap-
pened to run into Packard at an airport-
and that he opposed Safeguard.
The Pentagon told Senate inquirers that 21
members of the President's Science Advisory
Committee had reviewed Sentinel with the
Defense Department's research chief. It
turned out that the review took place March
17 and 18-the week after President Nixon
had announced his decision to proceed with
the missile system in modified form. Some
of the most influential members of this com-
mittee oppose Safeguard and resent being
used in a public relations ploy designed to
support it.
All this maneuvering and misrepresenta-
tion is a good example of how easily an argu-
ment for a bad cause is corrupted into a bad
argument. Safeguard is a bad idea, for many
reasons, and most independent scientists ap-
pear to oppose it. Nixon administration tac-
tics are widening and intensifying hostility
to the system-and to Nixon-within the sci-
entific community.
Meanwhile, politicians from both . parties
and opinion makers of assorted idealogical
hue are seconding and amplifying the dissent
of the scientists. The Nixon administration
has responded by getting tough. A White
House aide is quoted in the New York Times
as promising that "all the conventional and
proper, the unconventional and improper
means of persuasion will be used" to sell Safe-
guard to Congress.
Roger C. B. Morton, the new Republican
national chairman, has threatened to make
Safeguard a test of Republican orthodoxy
and opposition to it a mark of shame on
Democrats and Republicans alike.
Sen. Strom Thurmond, Nixon's Southern
outrider, has branded as "defeatist" objec-
tions to the missile by Dr. Herbert York, Pen-
tagon research chief in the Eisenhower ad-
ministration.
Gerald Ford, the House Republican leader,
has accused Safeguard's foes of really seeking
unilateral disarmament.
Like poison gas, the sinister Implication is
being spread that Safeguard's. foes are moved
by a deficiency of patriotism. Scientists who
show this lie up for what it is are being cyni-
cally used, and misrepresented. This is not,
we imagine, the way the President wanted the
Safeguard debate to go. But that is the way
it is going, as the President's men are pushed
toward extremism and cynical manipulation
by the faultiness of the case available for
their missile.
It is too late now for Nixon to cast off with-
out embarrassment the missile that looks
like an albatross. But Safeguard remains a
mistake-a dubious and expensive venture
that may or may not work if it Is ever needed,
and that will escalate the arms race in either
case. Continuation of Safeguard is bad for the
President, bad for the country and bad for
a world already grotesquely oversupplied with
nuclear weapons. Nixon should stop it, even
at the cost of some embarrassment, Con-
tinuing with it promises to be a great deal
more embarrassing in the months ahead, and
In the history books.
[From the Portsmouth (Ohio) Times,
Mar. 25, 1969 ]
NOW A SUPERMISSILE GAP
The American people have survived two
crisis "gaps." President Kennedy's missile
gap and President Nixon's security gap were
quietly filed away after their campaigns
ended, but now we have a new gap.
Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird has
alerted the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee about a supermissile gap.
Speaking in behalf of deployment of the
antballistic-missile (ABM) program sought
by President Nixon, Laird said the Russians
are continuing to build up its SS-9 force.
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The SS-9 (Supermissile) is described as a
missile with a 20 to 25-megaton warhead-
much 'larger than anything the United
States has at the ready.
Secretary Laird said the ABM protection
offered American missiles would have the
desired effect on the Soviet Union of letting
them know a "substantial number" of our
missiles would survive any attack "and then
destroy the attacker as a modern society."
David Packard, deputy secretary of de-
fense, added that the ABM would be "a
stabilizing influence in the long 'term' in
the strategic relationship between the
United States and the Soviet Union."
That's strictly a pipedream.And so long as
military thinking dominates a nation's for-
eign policy, money is going to be poured
into the bottomless defense well while that
country 'caves in from domestic malnutri-
tion,
The thin ABM around missile sites will ex-
pand into a thick shield, Then it will creep
around population centers, first as a thin
system and then a thick one.
All the while the missile arsenal is grow-
ing-just to keep pace-and $100 billion is
gone. And there still will be no security.
It is up to the politicians in both Amer-
ica and Russia to override militaristic think-
ing and reach a meaningful reproachment.
It isn't the supermissile gap we're worried
about, it's the diplomacy gap.
[From the Roanoke (Va.) Times,
Apr. 5, 1969]
GLORIOUS ... OR PURPOSELESS?
The Army's chief scientist says a multi-
'warhead ABM is one of the "glorious goals of
the future,"
So is an end to the arms race, General.
Now If Gen. Austin Betts would care to
try to convince us that only Washington, not
Moscow, dreams of building a multiple war-
head interceptor, possibly we could all better
understand just what it is that the ABM
race is going to accomplish. For if each side
simply cancels out the other, as inevitably
happens in a nuclear arms race, it is time
that we stopped the whole silly ABM busi-
ness.
Oh, we know Defense Sec. Melvin Laird
has suddenly discovered that the Soviets are
building a new offensive missile that some-
day might be available in such massive num-
bers that the U.S. could be destroyed in a
preemptive attack. But nobody has explained
how Laird can forecast the Soviets' missile-
construction timetables of a decade hence,
or why such an interpretation of Soviet
intentions was not made by civilian Pentagon
leaders in the Johnson Administration, or
why the Pentagon suddenly thinks bomber-
and submarine-carried ICBMs would not still
provide the needed second-strike deterrent.
Each day, it sometimes seems, brings a new
explanation for ABM deployment. When the
latest explanation is punctured, a revised
rationale is always at the ready. In judg-
ing Soviet and Red Chinese Intentions, the
Pentagon assumes the worse-as it's paid to
do. But in judging whether or not scientists
can ever build nuclear-tipped defensive mis-
siles that will, actually intercept incoming
missiles with pinpoint accuracy and with
only a 15-minute warning, the Pentagon as-
sumes.the best-as it did. With Vietnam, the
Bay of Pigs, the F-111, ad infinitum.
Few scientists. outside the Pentagon think
the ABM will work, even against a stray mis-
sile accidentally fired by the Soviets or the
dozen or so ICBMs that' Red China might lob
at us in the mid- or late-Seventies (when; we
are supposed to believe, they would willingly
invite instant annhilation of their own coun-
try in return for attacks by crude first-gen-
eration missiles that might or might not hit
the handful of cities at which they were
aimed).
If the Soviets think they can build a first-
strike missile system, the Nixon Administra-
tion's modified ABM program-limited to a
dozen offensive missile sites-will not cause
them to shift course. Even if Moscow con-
ceivably could someday develop a missile sys-
tem that had the potential for simultane-
ously destroying all 1,000-plus land-based
ICBMs and 646 Polaris- and bomber-carried
ICBMs-and not even a Dr. Strangelove has
yet figured a way to develop such a war ma-
chine-It is absurd to think that the U.S.
would sit idly by and not redesign, expand
and further diversify its own offensive missile
system to counteract the whole thing.
The U.S. has 1,700 ICBMs, the Soviets only
1,100, based on latest available estimates,
According to Deputy Defense Sec. David
Packard, the Russians possess some 200 of
their new super-missiles, the SS-9. Yet they
would need 15 times that number to gain
first-strike capability against our land-based
missiles alone. Such a build-up would require
huge Soviet expenditures, to say nothing of
the costs of trying to design anti-submarine
systems that also would be required if first-
strike power were ever to be achieved.
If the U.S. Is threatening to accelerate an
ABM race simply as a means of forcing a
Soviet halt to further offensive and defensive
missile development, a case conceivably can
be made for authorizing the start of planning
for Mr. Nixon's so-called "Safeguard" system.
On that point we are prepared to reserve
judgment.
The Pentagon, however, appears to think
that the Soviet Union presently is deluding
itself into believing that it someday can
destroy the U.S. without destroying itself
and the world in the process. If See. Laird
really believes that, a modified ABM system
will be no defense against such madness. We
will simply have to bankrupt ourselves, in-
stall unreliable ABMs around cities and mis-
sile bases, build more and more offensive
missiles, bombers and submarines . . . and
await the apocalypse.
[From the Milwaukee (Wis.) Journal, Apr.
14, 1969]
ESCALATING THE TERROR
Senators McGovern (D-S. D.) and Kennedy
(D-Mass.) have accused the Nixon admin-
istration of using "terror tactics" to sell the
Safeguard antiballistic missile system to con-
gress and the American people. McGovern
has complained that the country has "had
a whole series of rationalizations for Safe-
guard from the administration.... Now it
seems to me they are escalating the terror
rather than giving us any enlightenment."
Defense Secretary Laird has argued for
building the Safeguard system to protect
American missiles from the continued de-
ployment by the Soviet Union of its large
SS-9 intercontinental ballistic missile, capa-
ble of carrying a 25 megaton thermonuclear
warhead. Recently he said that the Rus-
sians were testing multiple warheads that
would make the missile even more potent.
The Soviet's ultimate aim, he claims, is a
first strike capability that could utterly de-
stroy America's retaliatory power and leave
it defenseless.
Scientist Ralph Lapp responds that even
using the most dismal Pentagon estimates of
Soviet capabilities it is unlikely that Russia
could gain a first strike capability with the
SS-9.
Such "fright" tactics are not unknown in
the cold war. On the advice of the late Sen.
Arthur Vandenberg (R-Mich.), President
Truman in 1947 deliberately acted to frighten
the American people about the danger of
Soviet expansionism to push through con-
gress the Truman doctrine of military and
economic aid to Greece and Turkey.
Use of like tactics has led in many cases
to reliance on militarism, defense and weap-
ons as the simple answers to complicated
problems of foreign policy, whether they be
the Lebanon landing, the Bay of Pigs in-
vasion, the Occupation of the Dominican Re-
public or the Vietnam war,
Kennedy has pointed out that congress
has been all too eager "to accept on faith
the recommendations of the Pentagon."
Even if Laird IS right about Russia's first
strike capability, there is no way, given pres-
ent technology, that a "thinly deployed"
Safeguard system or an extremely expensive,
"thickly deployed" ABM system could com-
pletely protect the United States from such
an onslaught.
Congress should not succumb to any cam-
paign of fear in considering the Safeguard
proposition. Let it rather, by its action, show
the new administration that it wants more
vigorous efforts toward peace and disarma-
ment, not more nuclear weapons unless they
are justified by reason and proved need. .
[From the Lewiston (Idaho) Tribune,
Max. 22, 1969]
SIMPLE WAYS To BOMB A NATION
The best and really the only fairly relia-
ble defense against nuclear attack is an
offense the ability to respond in kind. It is
the celebrated balance of terror under which
neither side can dispose of the enemy with-
out committing suicide.
But, other than the balance, based as
much on fear as hardware, there is really
no such thing as a perfect shield against
nuclear attack or any great chance of one
being developed.
It doesn't require technical knowledge to
know that. Common sense will suffice. For
example, as Dr. Ralph E. Lapp, a physicist
who appeared at a Washington State Uni-
versity political institute this week noted,
the ABM system currently proposed could
not cope with massive dirty bombs exploded
from rafts off the West Coast with the fall-
out drifting over the mainland. Nor could
the ABM cope with nuclear weapons ex-
ploded from ships in dozens of American
harbors. Or nuclear weapons erected piece
by piece in a building in the heart of an
inland city.
The proposed ABM system is a conven-
tional response to a conventional nuclear
attack (to use an extreme use of the word
conventional). But there are no guarantees
that anyone intent on doing this nation
harm will deliver weapons in a nice, neat
ballistic missile fashion susceptible to a
nice, neat ballistic missile response.
Even if, at a cost of billions, this nation
should be able to develop a workable ABM
system (which many scientists doubt), there
are numerous ways around it.
Play the game yourself. Assume that the
Soviet Union and the Red Chinese have anti-
ballistic missile systems, capable of stopping
all conventionally-launched missiles from
the United States. If it became your inten-
tion for this nation to strike first against
them, ? try to think of the many ways you
could penetrate their shield-relatively sim-
ple ways like smuggling the parts of a hy-
drogen bomb into their ports and major
cities, or hitting them with fallout from afar.
But what if you knew that your success
would be greeted with a counterattack on
this nation? That would give you pause.
That, and not hardware, is what would deter
you.
And, if that would not deter you, it is un-
likely that anything else would. You would
then proceed to work around the enemy's
futile sophisticated defense system.
An American ABM system might be able
one day to cope for a time with some of the
incoming missiles launched in the sophisti-
cated fashion. But a sophisticated. defense
cannot always cope with an unsophisticated
attack.
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It would be far simpler and far less expen-
sive to bolster what is already our best de-
tense-the fear of U3S. retaliation. Rather
than ipvolve this nation's .wealth, time and
talent in the enormously expensive effort to
develop something new, different and prob-
ably futile, America should concentrate on
the far less expensive and far more reliable
alternative-increasing the number of re-
taliato2y missiles in our arsenal.
The mold for the Minuteman has already
been made. The development cost is behind
us. Cranking out a few dozen more copies
would be far less costly-and a good deal
faster-than this naive scheme to bleed the
taxpayers of billions for a system that no
one can guarantee will work half as well as
simply installing more ICBMs and thereby
enhancing the enemy's fear of retaliation.
If there was ever any validity to that old
right wing saw about the Communists trying
to get America to spend herself to death, it
would be ironic if the $80-billion-per-year
Defense Department-rather than Medicare
and higher teacher salaries-turned out to
be the principal contributor to our economic
downfall.
It is beginning to appear that the ABM
system we need most is an Anti-Bankruptcy
Move against our own military leaders.
[From the Anderson (S.C.) Independent,
Apr. 4, 1969 ]
How WOULD LIMITED ABI DEFENSE FORESTALL
INSANE ACTION BT CHINESE?
We take as our text today the assertion by
President Nixon, to the National Association
of Broadcasters; that his decision to go ahead
and spend $6.5 billion on the Safeguard an-
tiballistic missile system was necessary be-
cause "we find within the last third of a
century that sometimes decisions by great
powers, as well as small, are not made by
rational men , , . Hitler was not a particularly
rational man in some of his military
decisions."
Now the existence of human irrationality,
in high places as well as in low, is hardly a
matter of debate.
But without making any invidious com-
parisons, we thinnk it well to inquire as to
whether the ABM decision is itself a rational
calculation which tailors means to the end
we all seek-tlle security of our nation.
Consider first the specter, which ABM
proponents keep raising, of the Red Chinese
menace.
True enough, "the heathen Chinese is pe-
culiar," but the fact remains that since
seizing power in the late 1940s the Chinese
Communists have, in their foreign relations,
shown a remarkable restraint,
This is not to say that they have not
committed aggression; they have, notably
in Korea in 1950 and, a few years later in
Tibet.
But the act of aggression, while much to
be condemned, of course, is not in itself
necessarily an "irrational" decision.
It can be, and in Korea and Tibet was, a
rationally calculated move, and it may also
be noted that notwithstanding Peking's
pyrotechnic propaganda about our own al-
leged "aggression" in Vietnam, it has re-
frained-rationally, we might suggest-
from inviting annihilation by sending its
troops into Vietnam.
Nevertheless, let us suppose the worst.
Asume that, sometime in 1973 or after,
the", leaders of tied China are so irrational
that they decide to unlease nuclear missiles
upon the United States.
How in the. name of rationality would our
having spent $6.5 billion, or upwards of eight
times that nil ,4 money, on an ABM defense,
possibly dissuade them?
aZUsape people do not understand the coun-
s4ls of ;sanity;,insane people are insane.
With our retaliatory capacity as of now,
as Mr. Nixon himself. points out, we could
wipe out half the population of China.
Under no conceivable circumstances can
Red China ever possess a "first-strike capabil-
ity" which could knock out the ability to
respond possessed by our nuclear submarines
alone.
If the inevitability of obliteration could
not affect an insane calculation, why should
the possibility of a very limited defense af-
fect it any more?
The Nixon decision bears the hallmarks
not of rationality but of rationalization.
The President says it was also necessary
"because we found that the Soviet Union had
developed new weapons with great accuracy."
His Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird,
is developing his own weapon-"the tech-
nique of fear," as Sen. J. William Fulbright
calls it-to peddle the Safeguard system.
Mr. Laird asserts that the Soviets "are go-
ing, for our missiles, and they are going for a
fist-strike capability. There is no question
about that."
But there are many questions about that.
The Soviet SS-9, from which Mr. Laird has
suddenly unveiled the secrecy, was regarded
by the Defense Department, and the Senate
Armed Services Committee so informed, as
a "second-strike" weapon. Which is it?
And how effective would the Safeguard sys-
tem be against it?
As Foreign Relations Committee Chairman
Fulbright obbserved, the Russians are not
"very bothelted" about the ABM, "because I
am sure, they know, as nearly every witness
outside the Pentagon knows, it is not much
good."
The one thing we concede that it would be
good for is the "military-industrial complex"
whose "unwarranted influence." President
Eisenhower warned against in his last mes-
sage to Congress.
"The potential for the disastrous rise of
misplaced power exists and will persist," the
general correctly foresaw. It certainly exists
and does persist in the Nixon administration.
[From the Michigan Catholic, Mar. 20,
1969]
DEFENSIVE MISSILES BALK DISARMAMENT
Given the growing opposition consensus
against it and the almost universal scientific
testimony to its futility, President Nixon's
decision concerning the Sentinel ABM system
may have been appropriate. It is appropriate,
at least, if one buys the theory that a little
bit of nothing is better than a whole lot of
nothing.
We have been told and the administration
seemingly agrees, that the Sentinel system
would be useless against a massive Russian
attack. It might prove effetcive against a
Chinese attack which is non-existent now
and would be real only if the Chinese were to
attack before they possessed a Russian capa-
bility. And this is not likely.
Now, instead of locating the missiles near
heavily populated areas which have reacted
to possible placement near them as if the
Sentinel were a hot potato, plans are to
locate in two remote areas of Montana and
North Dakota. Thus will some of our ICBMs
be protected.
We also have been told that our second
strike capabilities with ICBMs, even if we
were attacked first, are overwhelming enough
now to destroy any aggressor nation several
times over. We might assume then that if
Russia, or any other attacking nation, were
to destroy even many of our ICBM sites,
we still would be able to incinerate our
enemy, only we would not be able to kick
his ashes about very much.
The decision to go ahead limitedly and
remotely may calm the real selfish fears of
city dwellers who worry that a mistake in
their own backyard would lead to their own
private little doomsday. But this new
Maginot line does not solve the problem of
waste and misplacement.
So the initial investment is a mere $6 or $7
billion. That, however, would feed a lot of
people, build a lot of homes, clear a lot of
slums.
And it does not much matter that the
ABM Sentinel system is called "Safeguard".
A wasteful missile system by any other name
is equally harmful.
It is not that our country should not be
defended. It is that we've about gone beyond
the point of defense. Only the balance of
terror-that a mistake or miscalculation by
one man on either side could wipe this
beautiful planet out of the heavens-protects
us.
In the light of this we opt for supervised
disarmament, already suggested by the Soviet
Union. Even our polluted air would go down
better if no one has a nuclear button he can
push.
It is still possible for Congress to waylay
this expenditure before it gets into the
ground. The administration has ignored con-
gressional advice, now is the time for Con-
gress to withhold its consent.
Our congressmen can prove that even the
middle of the road can sometimes be
dangerous.
[From the San Antonio (Tex.) Express, Mar.
24, 1969]
WEAKNESSES BEGIN To SHOW UP IN ARGU-
MENT FOR ANTI-MISSILES
Phase Two of President Nixon's decision to
deploy a "thin" anti-missile system has be-
gun. It is the sharp criticism being aimed at
the decision by the Senate Foreign Relations
Committe, whose members include the
Senate's ranking "doves."
On this issue, nearly half the Senate has
stated its opposition to the Nixon decision.
The committee is giving the Administration
abundant opportunity to say why the deci-
sion was made as it was. Best point scored so
far is that an intent to deploy is a trading
point in talks with Russia, Russia is reputed
to have deployed some anti-missiles and De-
fense Secretary Laird professes to believe the
Russians are working on "something" that
might jeopardize the American Polaris fleet.
It is difficult to argue with Laird that any
error we make should be on the side of
safety, but it is not difficult to argue that
the ABM has few backers who say it will do
what it is supposed to do. Fewer still think
the cost estimates will remain as low as they
are-which is horrendously high.
The thing that weakens the pentagon ar-
gument is that both Laird and Deputy Sec-
retary David Packard admitted Friday that
U.S. experts don't know enough to protect
cities-so the missiles will be deployed
around offensive missiles in place now. Un-
til Nixon made his decision, the argument
was all for emplacement around cities and,
in fact, that was the point of initial heated
opposition.
We don't think the Russians think any
more of anti-missiles than some of the
American opponents. A better case needs
to be made.
[From the Waynesboro (Va.) News-Virginian,
Apr. 1, 1969]
No SUCH THING As LIMITED ABM
Planning strategy for World War III is
called "thinking about the unthinkable."
It is not just that a thermonuclear holo-
caust is too horrible to contemplate. It is
that there are simply too many variables, pos-
sibilities and unknown quantities for anyone
to know what would really happen should
someone actually initiate a "missile ex-
change."
Underlying President Nixon's proposal for
a limited antiballistic missile system to pro-
tect the nation's missile sites is one basic as-
sumption-that an enemy, to have any hope
of "winning," would have to give first prior-
ity to wiping out or crippling his opponent's
retaliatory strength.
Thus it follows logically that an ABM sys-
tem that guarantees-or makes an enemy be-
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here it guarantees-that some of our re-
terliatory strength would survive a first
strike would be- Em effective means of stay-
ing his hand and preserving peace.
The logic fails to hold up upon closer ex-
san'inatlon., however-
lit conflicts with another basic assul}ption,
which is that,an enemy would have to shoot
his entire nuclear wad in the beginning.
While he might save a few missiles to mop
up a few cities or other countries afterwards,
if he hasn't obliterated his opponent, includ-
Ing his opponent's population centers as well
as missile sites, in the first round, then he
has failed.
The only feasible course for an aggressor
would be to inflict as much punishment as
he could in a first strike and hope that the
seeond-strike punishment he would have to
take would be at an "acceptable" level-say
20 or 30 million dead.
Thus Russia's missiles, should they ever
Dome, would come not by twos or threes but
in battalions. It is impossible to imagine
that a president, faced with a radar horizon
sparkling with the blips of hundreds of on-
coming missiles due to explode all over the
country in 15 minutes, would order that only
our ABMs be fired. It is impossible to imagine
this even if there were an ADM ring around
every city.
Not unless there existed a 100 per cent
perfect defense against a missile attack
could a president hold back immediate, total
retaliation-and, a 100 per cent perfect de-
fense is something that not even the staunch-
est advocates of the ABM claim is possible.
Because of this fact, the ABM has been put
forward as a short-term defense against the
Chinese, who at present have only a hand-
ful of Intercontinental missiles.
But crazy as the Red Chinese seem to be, it
is also impossible to imagine them wasting
their few missiles against our missile sites and
sparing our cities, while inviting devastating
retaliation upon themselves.
Thus, it is argued, there can be no such
thing as a limited ABM system. Either the
nation foregoes the ABM entirely, or it must
embark on a full-scale megabillion-dollar
program to include the cities-and even this
could be easily nullified by an enemy simply
by doubling or tripling his missile-launching
capability.
It is said that President Nixon is really us-
ing the ABM to get the Russians to sit down
for some serious talks about disarmament.
But it seems a terribly expensive and round-
about way to appeal to Russian logic.
Surely they have as many people think-
ing about the unthinkable as we do.
From the Marquette (Mich.) Mining
Journal, Apr. 1, 1969]
THE ABM Issus
A matter which looms even bigger than the
Vietnam war-in its potential for influence
upon the future safety of the United States
is the ABM issue.
The letters stand for Anti-Ballistic Missile
and refer to the plan for a defense system
against enemy ballistic missiles which our
government embarked upon in the Johnson
administration. With a,system of radars and
anti-missile missiles, the project would try
to shoot down enemy missiles before they
could reach targets in this country.
President Nixon reviewed the ABM project
and compromised on it. The Defense Depart-
ment's start on construction of ABM in-
stallations In Eastern cities was drawing lots
of .public flak. Mr. Nixon's compromise sug-
gests that the anti-missile missile batteries
be set up at major missile installations in
Montana and North Dakota to "protect our
deterrent." That is, to protect our missiles
from attack The intention would still-be to
lessen the damage and deaths from a nuclear
attack on the United States, but the political
pressure building up against the ABM proj-
ect might be lessened by not proceeding with
deployment of ABMs in big cities.
Defense Secretary Melvin Laird has urged
approval of the compromise plan in testi-
mony before a Senate committee. The cur-
rent effort is an end run around political
opposition and widespread concern that this
first "thin" ABM plan is really the first step
in military strategy to construct an extremely
costly "heavy" ABM system to attempt to
defend most of the big population centers
of the country.
Our reaction to the threat of nuclear mis-
sile attack up until recently has been re-
liance upon "massive retaliation" with our
own intercontinental ballistic missiles to
deter any aggressor. (The only nation capa-
ble of a massive nuclear missile attack upon
us at present is Soviet Russia, but our de-
fense leaders are increasingly concerned that
Red China, with its nuclear capability, will
develop the ability to attack with missiles
with nuclear warheads. Our fears are stimu-
lated by China's refusal to enter any nuclear
control agreement.)
The ABM project is being opposed for a
number of reasons:
1. An inherent distrust by politicians of
the military, which traditionally wants to
solve its problems of defending the nation
by mustering a defense capability superior
to any enemy's, and then using it, if neces-
sary, to settle issues (by war) that won't
Field to diplomacy.
- 2. The impossibility of knowing for sure
Whether an ABM will work until it is actu-
ally used, when it would be too late to do
anything about its failure.
3. That it may be one more step in esca-
lating the arms race with Russia. We get
nuclear bombs, they get nuclear bombs. They
build an ABM system; we build an ABM sys-
tem.
4. The conviction that we are building to-
ward a military holocaust that will destroy
much of the human race with our stockpil-
ing of nuclear weapons.
5. But especially and most importantly be-
cause our problems of living with Russia and
Red China can only be solved by political
solutions, not by nuclear weapons.
Americans who remember so well when
Nikita Khrushchev sneaked atomic missiles
into Cuba with the thought of confronting
us with their deployment 90 miles from our
shores, will be wary of believing that good
will will keep Russia from starting a nuclear
war.
But even if we both were to build an ABM
defense system to match our deterrent forces
of intercontinental missiles, the problem of
preventing war still would remain. We can-
not forever march step for step in an arms
race and expect the deterrent and the de-
terrent defense to protect us by technology.
.For that we must have leaders in the ma-
jor nations who will accept restraints. We
ourselves have not been without sin in this
matter. We had nuclear weapons in Turkey,
as close to Russia Ss Cuba is to us. We-must
somehow wage peace as extensively as we
now commit ourselves to military hardware
in the fragile hope that will avoid war in a
troubled peace of military standoff.
[From the Lancaster (Pa.) Intelligencer
Journal, Apr. 8, 1969]
NOT CONVINCING
It is of course, entirely possible that Secre-
tary of Defense Laird is correct when he says
the Soviet Union is testing a triple warhead
nose cone for the big SS9 rocket he con-
siders a threat to U.S. missiles.
However the news is hardly surprising. This
nation's 1,000 land-based Minuteman mis-
siles now have only one warhead, but the
U.S. plans to equip some of them with three
warheads. Additionally, the U.S. testing of
what it calls the multiple independently re-
entry vehicles (MIRV) has been under way
since last year.
So it would be a logical step for Moscow
to attempt to keep pace with the U.S. nu-
clear capability by putting triple warheads
on the 500 SS9's it reportedly has deployed
around Moscow.
However, Secretary Laird's announcement
must be considered in context, His record
for credibility has suffered of late. Last week,
for instance, the Pentagon quietly went about
correcting some testimony he and his deputy,
David Packard, had given before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. He said this
nation's missiles could be disarmed or aborted
after a launch. They can't.
Another inconsistency-Secretary Laird in
his testimony to the Senate Committee sup-
porting a proposed anti-ballistic system, said
"With their large tonnage warheads, they
(the Russians) are going for a first strike
capability-there is no geustion about that."
Yesterday, he said: "I've always made it
clear that I do not believe the Soviet Union
would be foolish enough ... to go forward
with a first strike."
It is probable that what Secretary Laird
is attempting is tb sway enough wavering
Congressmen to support the Safeguard ABM
system President Nixon has proposed. This
is the system the president has modified
from a $5.8 billion Democratic Sentinel into
a $7.2 billion Safeguard whose mission it is
to protect some of this nation's Minutemen
in their silos in the northern United States.
The whole rationale of this proposed ABM
system is illogical. If Russia is intending, as
Sen. Russell intimated the other day, to
build up its nuclear missile strength to such
superiority that "they will not have to fire
a missile but simply say 'this is it' ", then the
ABM is a totally inadequate response.
If the Administration truly believes the
Soviets want to be able to start a war with-
out fear of reprisals, then there should be
an immediate beginning on a 'thick' ABM
system, offensive forces should be beefed up,
and fallout shelters built for the country's
inhabitants.
Until much more persuasive evidence is
presented than has been presented so far,
there is considerable doubt that either the
Congress or the people of the U.S. will do
otherwise than view the ABM's Safeguard of
Sentinel, other than an expensive boondoggle.
[From the Ann Arbor (Mich.) News, Mar.
20, 1969]
U.S. MILITARY TAKEOVER NOT IMMINENT,
BUT . . .
President Eisenhower, in his leave taking of
the presidency, warned his countrymen of the
growing influence of the military-industrial
complex. He also warned about the tendency
of installed power to magnify itself.
The man who succeeded him, President
Kennedy, is quoted as saying that there was
scarcely a serious problem confronting the
U.S. abroad in which the Pentagon did not
advise him to use military force. Cuba is a
notable example.
Against this backdrop of surging militarism
in U.S. government the entire anti-ballistic
missile (ABM) Issue stands as a kind of
exclamation point. Belatedly, the country
and the Congress are coming to their senses
about the staggering costs of the ABM system,
and the type of thinking to which President
Kennedy alluded.
Norman Cousins, writing in the Saturday
Review, stated the problem in this way: "Is
military power becoming an end in itself and
a law unto itself? It is no answer to declare
that the men at the head of (the defense
establishment) are balanced, intelligent,
sober, responsible. This is not the issue.
"The issue is whether a context of power
is now being created beyond the ability of
even the best men to change.
"At the Philadelphia Constitutional Con-
vention of 1787-89 . it was decided to
create good government through good laws-
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and good structure. This meant preventing
runaway power situations.
"Today, the system of checks and balances
has become seriously impaired through both
the massive spending power of the military
and its ability to take actions and to create
situations in the field that force the hand
of the President."
Throughout the burgeoning Sentinel con-
troversy, the Secretary of State has been a
silent party. What are Americans to conclude
as concerns who 1s calling the tune on the
ABM? It is not the Congress, the body from
which massive military appropriations must
come.
Is it then the Executive, the man who pro-
poses? Well, hardly, because we are led to
,believe that because the Soviet Union had
taken initial steps to build their own ABM
our own President's hand was forced and he
had no other choice but to give the green
light to the Sentinel backers.
Thus by process of elimination only the
Pentagon is left. Its new occupant, Defense
Secretary Laird, has been one of Sentinel's
most vocal supporters.
The, American system of checks and bal-
ances traditionally is thought of as three
branches acting as brakes on each other.
The institutions of the military have been
part of this scheme of government only inso-
far as they have served civilian authority and
true power was kept in the hands of qualified
decision-makers. But if the executive and
the judiciary and the legislative act as checks
upon each other, who checks the power of
the military?
This is the question Americans must ask
of their government and the Nixon adminis-
tration must resolve before matters of na-
tional security are beyond recall.
[From the San Francisco Chronicle,' June 3,
19671
SAFEGUARD AND THE SECRET CHART
Senator Stuart Symington, one of 49 ABM
doubters in the Senate, says the Department
of Defense is not making public what it
admits in secret sessions about the Safe-
guard missile system.
If a secret Pentagon chart were released,
the controversy over whether to deploy the
ABM at a cost of $6 billion would in his view
be resolved. He implies that the military
would be sent back to their drawing boards
for more research on the weapon.
It is frustrating to be told that the answer
to a serious question in public controversy
cannot be given to the public. All that the
ordinary citizen can judge from Symington's
statement is that secret information has evi-
dently fortified his doubts. Since he is one
of Congress' best informed men on defense
matters, as a former Secretary of the Air
Force and a former electronics industrialist,
these doubts carry weight.
So what the secret chart shows is any-
one's guess. Our guess, based on the inter-
esting and presumably authoritative letter
of Dr. Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky of Stanford
which we published last Friday, is that the
chart shows the Safeguard system to be ill-
designed ant- Inadequate to do the job it is
totlttd tp do-i.e., protect the U.S. Minute-
naalimissile sites..
The number of ABM interceptors is so
small that only a tiny fraction of an in-
coming force which might be a threat to
Minuteman can be intercepted, Dr. Panofsky
wrote. He charged that the Defense Depart-
ment "has, frightened us by a projected threat
(from, the Soviet SS-9 missile), but has
hidden the extent by which the proposed
Safeguard system could possibly decrease
that threat,"
In the view of this distinguished radiation
physicist, who is the director of the Stanford
Linear Accelerator Center, Safeguard "may
or may not work." It is a "bad compromise";
its radar is much more vulnerable than the
missile sites it Is expected to defend, and it
costs a great deal more than the value of
the few Minutemen which, on optimum per-
formance, it could save.
Conceivably, Dr. Panofsky does not know
all that needs to be known in order to
evaluate Safeguard. Senator Symington may
not know, either. Certainly the public
doesn't. But these two men are in a growing
company of those who know enough about
ABM Safeguard to have informed doubts,
and it seems to us that the Senate has no
more pressing obligation than ruthlessly to
pursue these.
[From the Tupelo (Miss:) Journal,
Apr. 7, 19691
IT'S DEFENSE THAT NIXON NEEDS To RUN
President Nixon reportedly has about de-
cided to be his own Secretary of State, leaning
heavily on the Defense Department and the
National Security Council for advice and
using the man he appointed to the State
post, Bill Rogers, largely for administrative
matters within the department.
This is not a particularly new approach.
A number of modern Presidents have, in ef-
fect, doubled as Secretary of State in policy
making matters.
But it is new, and possibly quite dangerous,
for President Nixon to lean so heavily on the
Defense Department as his guide to a peace-
ful world.
For the Defense Department under Secre-
tary Melvin Laird is creating the No. 1
"credibility gap" in the new administration.
And if his free-wheeling statements made
without noticeable ability to back up their
truthfulness continue, America may find it-
self in need of a costly overhaul of its de-
fenses without the public support to foot
the bill.
For once it ceases to believe what the De-
fense Department is saying, the public may
fail to support even the most pressing mili-
tary needs. Then not just the Nixon admin-
istration but the whole country could be in
serious danger.
Laird was caught in his first apparently
false statement on the ABM issue when he
told a congressional committee that at least
one scientist outside his department had
supported the anti-imssile defense network
during a lengthy discussion with Laird.
That scientist, however, a few days later
denied that he had ever discussed the issue
in any detail with Laird, it being only rather
casually mentioned when they met in an
airport,
Then Laird undertook to discredit one of
the most effective witnesses against the ABM,
Herbert York, who was director of Pentagon
research and engineering during the Eisen-
hower administration.
York said that the speed of action required
to activiate the ABM missiles against at-
tacking nuclear weapons was such that the
President could not be brought into the de-
cision making process at all. One low level
man in uniform would have to make the de-
cision whether the nuclear ABM - missiles
were to be fired if they were to have any
chance of shooting down the enemy missiles,
he testified before Congress.
Secretary Laird then came up with the ar-
gument that York could be expected to op-
pose the ABM because he also had not
thought the Polaris submarine missile would
work.
York pointed out shortly in a telegram
to Republican Congressman J. Sherman
Cooper of Kentucky that he had at all times
recommended to the Department of Defense
that the Polaris submarine missile be devel-
oped and deployed.
The record indicated that York, not Laird,
was telling the truth. And the credibility gap
of the Nixon administration on military mat-
ters widened further.
Then it was disclosed that Laird had
deliberately or otherwise misled the Ameri-
can public on the question of whether
launching our anti-missiles would in effect
be opening a nuclear war against America's
own towns and cities.
The fact is that both the Spring and Spar-
tan nuclear missiles which we would fire
against attacking enemy missiles are armed
before they are fired-meaning they are set
to go off whenever they hit something. And
they do not have any self-destruct system by
which the ground crew could blow them
up if they missed their target in the air.
Thus what is proposed is that American
nuclear missiles be fired into the air ready to
explode wherever they come down anywhere
from 25 to 400 miles from the point of firing.
And in view of the number of missiles
planned eventually for America's anti-mis-
sile defense network, we could end up hitting
American people with more American nuclear
missiles than the enemy could fire at us.
Adding to the significance of the growing
credibility gap In the Defense Department
are reports that the new administration al-
ready plans to spend $100 billion on new
weapons alone.
Aides to President Nixon have stated that
he plans to boost military spending by 1971
to $75 billion in addition to whatever Viet-
nam may be costing at that time.
Not even at the peak year of World War II
did military expenditures in this country run
so high.
And if President Nixon expects to sell Con-
gress and the public on such expenditures, it
is essential that he insist upon honesty
and openness in Defense Department rela-
tions with the American people at all times.
Thus far we are not getting such an ap-
proach.
Rather, Defense Secretary Laird is operat-
ing more like a free-wheeling congressman
who could depend on the other 534 members
of the House and Senate to correct any mis-
statements or errors he might make.
This level of integrity is not adequate for a
department which plans to boost annual
military outlays to something like $85 to $90
billion a year for many years to come.
Thus if President Nixon has the time to
take over any of his cabinet operations, the
Defense Department seems to need his at-
tention most.
[From the Salina (Kans.) Journal, May 3,
19691
A DASH OF SALT FOR ABM HISTRIONICS?
The nation is divided on the anti-ballistic
missile issue.
So are military men. So are scientists.
And so are politicians.
For example, Kansas Senator James Pear-
son doubts the value of the program while
Kansas Senator Bob Dole supports it. Both,
incidentally, have excellent records of mili-
tary service.
For as it is difficult to fathom, Presi-
dent Nixon has taken a tough line in behalf
of the proposal. He is giving it an arm-twist-
ing hard sell. Shades of Lyndon Johnson!
As part of that sell, Secretary of Defense
Melvin Laird is going about the country
evoking the Red Menace. We are being told,
in effect, that the Russians can wipe us
out if we do not go ahead with ABM Installa-
tions. And if not the Russians, then the
Chinese.
This may work. The Communists have
been bogeymen for two generations. The
Pentagon has secret information to which
ordinary Americans are not privy. If the
issue in truth is one of national security,
the commander-in-chief should be sup-
ported.
Then again we have been fooled in such
matters. History now reports that Presi-
dent Roosevelt helped bring about Pearl
Harbor. The Tonkin Gulf incident which
brought us full steam into the Vietnam
war has been shown since to have been
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"June 19, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
over-blown. The wars that were to stem
the Red Tide in Chine? Burma, Korea and
Vietnam have not. done so,
We recall that past Presidents have traded
on miaaite gaps that disappeared when they
won office. We remember the vast sums
wasted on like pits and ICBM alios-even
here in. Salina, We know about the costly air-
craft that wouldn't fly and the missiles that
didn't fire.
Wolf has been cried too often, But then
again, is the need for a Safeguard system
genuine this time?
Thiiortunately, we can't wait for history's
verdict. Hindsight is ahead of us. The issue
is now, for the Congressmen pressing.
However, in the light of sincere, patri-
otic and informed division of opinion about
Nixon's ABMs, he should not be surprised
if the histrionics of his helpers are taken
with a dash of salt.
[From the Honolulu (Hawaii) Advertiser,
Mar, 15, 1969]
WaoNG ABM DECISION
President Nixon's decision to go ahead with
a modified antiballistic missile system is a
disappointment. He has found and taken a
compromise middle course that will please
few and accomplish little at a high cost.
The system may be another Maginot Line,
as one senator suggested. More important is
-whether it will lead to greater long-range
security dangers than it aims to prevent.
With his polished press conference style,
the President did make his decision look as
good as possible:
There was the new name, "Safeguard" The
system will be away from major cities (pre-
.sumably including Honolulu), protecting our
offensive missiles instead of people. It is sup-
posed to be security against Chinese missiles
while no threat the Russians should take se-
riously. It won't lead to a costly "thick" sys-
tern, he said.
Some may feel grateful the President didn't
decide for the $40 billion thick system to go
around our major cities. But he seems to have
gone as far as he thinks is politically possible
at this time,
Many of the questions about the ABM
remain:
Highly reputable scientists, nationally and
here, feel it is a relatively simple matter for
even the Chinese to develop decoys and other
aids to penetrate such a system.
President Nixon made the point it would
at least serve as protection against any acci-
dental firing of a Russian missile, presuming
such a Soviet missile was aimed at our mis-
sile sites and not a city.
The odds on such an accident are probably
as great as for one of our "Safeguard" nuclear
missiles accidentally blowing up on the
ground.
Furthermore, it seems obvious the first
thing the Russians will do is give high pri-
ority to making missiles which, whether fired
on purpose or by accident, would be designed
to penetrate our ABM system,
So the next step -would be a new system for
us, followed by more sophisticated missiles
for them, then another system for us, etc.
This is perhaps the saddest part about the
President's decision, for even if labeled de-
fensive it follows the old arms race path that
at best can lead only to costly nuclear stale-
mate and at worst to total destruction.
Ineviably such defense system develop-
ments as these while starting out small ($6
billion, yet) have a way of expanding in size
and cost.
We may or may not end up with a thick
system-
We are virtually certain in the name of
dubious, even dangerous, security to end up
with a thinner checkbook to finance needier
programs.
One does not envy President Nixon this
kind of decision. Still it is what we elect
presidents for, and it is a pity he did not try
a more imaginative course.
As the ABM seem aimed at being more a
political than a practical safeguard for the
Johnson Administration? so it appears to be
a compromise for Nixon.
The tattle now moves to Congress where
the President seems likely to face his first
major struggle. The honeymoon is clearly
over.
[From the Louisville (Ky.) Courier-Journal,
Apr. 19, 1969 ]
'FIdaEs ARE STARTING TO SHOW IN THE
ARGUMENT FOR THE ABM
In their references to new and frighten-
ingly powerful Soviet missiles, which they
claim make the ABM Safeguard system vital
to our survival, President Nixon and Secre-
tary of Defense Laird are toying with some-
thing equally dangerous from a political
viewpoint-revival of the credibility gap. Mr.
Nixon simply cannot afford to have the pub-
lic suspect that he is being less than com-
pletely candid about our defense spending.
Yet the suspicion-and the evidence-is
growing that the public is being hoodwinked
about both the ABM and the Soviet SS-9.
In appealing for billions of dollars to begin
development of the ABM system, both Presi-
dent Nixon and Secretary Laird declared that
the anti-ballistic missile system had become
necessary to counter Soviet development of
a super-powerful, 25-megaton warhead mis-
sile, the SS-9. The ABM, they admitted,
would not protect our cities against nuclear
attack, and was not designed to. But it would
prevent the SS-9 from destroying our Min-
uteman missiles in their concrete silos and
thus robbing us of our ability to respond to
an attack with a devastating counterattack.
Aro make his appeal to Congress more dra-
matic, Mr. Laird revealed information about
the SS-9 that had previously been classified
as secret by the Pentagon, including the
claim that it carried a 25-megaton warhead
that could demolish Minuteman silos with-
in a wide area. President Nixon repeated this
reference to the SS-9 warhead, and added
that the ABM was also needed to protect us
against weapons the Chinese might develop
by 1973 or 1974.
INCONSISTENCES AND HOKUM
But inconsistencies and signs of hokum
are beginning to crep into this argument. As
Los Angeles Times columnists Tom Braden
and Frank Mankiewicz have pointed out, Mr.
Laird's declassification of data on the SS-9
may have been dramatic but it was also un-
necessary and misleading. There was no rea-
son why the Pentagon should have classified
the data in the first place, since it had al-
ready been published in 1968 in Jane's All
the World's Aircraft, which is commercially
published and circulated.
And the facts about the SS-9, as revealed
by Jane's, and by our own VIA, are quite dif-
ferent from the scare statistics quoted by the
President and Mr. Laird. It is by no means
a super-weapon. In fact, as Braden and
Mankiewicz point out, it is no more horrible
and considerably less efficient than many
weapons in our own arsenal. Indeed, it is
quite comparable to the Titan I missile that
we are now dismantling as obsolete.
Nor is there any proof, or even evidence,
that the SS-9 carries the 25-megaton war-
head mentioned by the President and Mr.
Laird. Assistant Defense Secretary David
Packard admitted to questioning Senators
that "it might be 20 megatons," and the CIA
report says flatly that it carries only a 5-
megaton warhead. If this is so, the SS-9
poses no real threat to Minuteman sites, for
whose protection the ABM is being urged.
Furthermore, the SS-9 was designed not
for use against such hard targets but against
cities, which the ABM is not intended to
protect. Repeatedly, in their initial appeals
for ABM, the President and Mr., Laird em-
phasized not our cities, and would not be
deployed to protect cities. Yet in his Friday
press conference President Nixon said it was
needed to protect our cities against the pos-
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sibility of a Chinese missile attack sometime
within the next decade,
These are not the only holes in the ABM
argument. Mr. Laird told the Senate that
Russia is the only country to fire an ABM at
an incoming missile. Yet former Defense
Secretary Clark Clifford quoted Pentagon
officials when he declared in his defense of
the ABM that "as long as seven years ago we
demonstrated we could destroy incoming
missiles." In its plea for the ABM the De-
fense Department said it had consulted Dr.
Wolfgang Panofsky, the noted Stanford
physicist. Dr. Panofsky says flatly he was not
consulted. ?
Someone, in brief, is not telling the truth.
Someone is not levelling with the American
people. The last time that happened it
created a thing called the credibility gap,
and the man trapped in it never quite man-
aged to scramble out. It could happen again
with the ABM.
[From the Boston Globe, Feb. 6, 1969]
WELCOME SIGNS OF ABM FREEZE
The unbelievable is happening. After
nearly two decades of rubber-stamping De-
fense Department requests, the U.S. Senate
is learning how to say "No." Hawk and Dove,
Republican and Democrat, have served
notice that they want more facts and figures
on the controversial ABM Sentinel system-
or else!
Many of the objectors are the same sen-
ators who only weakly opposed more por-
tions of the overall $1.2 billion ABM appro-
priation last year. But this year there is a
difference. The folks back home in Chicago,
Seattle and the north-of-Boston suburbs,
where land procurement for the ABM sites
is underway, are now acutely aware of this
so-called "thin line" missile set-up.
The new Senate Majority Whip, Edward
M. Kennedy, best summed up the view of his
constituents and his colleagues alike when
he called the present plans to deploy the
ABM system in densely populated areas "a
serious mistake," if not "a complete waste."
His request that President Nixon freeze the
program while Congress resolves questions of
site and effectiveness Is reasonable and log-
ical. The fact that the new Armed Services
chairman, Mississippi Sen. John Stennis,
readily agreed to hear scientific testimony
on the effectiveness of the ABM is further
justification for the immediate freeze Ken-
nedy and other Senate critics ask.
Republican Sen. Everett M. Dirksen's
statement that "it is time to take a cooler
and more deliberate look at this proposal"
provides bipartisan assurance of a searching
review.
Perhaps the first question any Senate in-
quiry should demand a definitive answer to
is the estimated cost of the "thin line." Dur-
ing Tuesday's debate Sen. Edward W. Brooke
said the Pentagon told him the Sentinel sys-
tem would cost $5.8 billion. Not so, said Sen.
Stuart Symington, a former Air Force Secre-
tary. His Pentagon sources, perhaps more
reliable than Brooke's, put current estimates
at $9.4 billion. And that, more than any-
thing else, is why Sen. Charles Percy was
speaking for more than his Illinois constitu-
ents when he warned: "We are on the brink
of a decision whose magnitude in cost could
be comparable to the Vietnam war. We
should know what we are doing before we
get into it."
Whatever the ultimate fate of the ABM
system, the Senate's new-found critical voice
an defense expenditures happily foreshadows
the day when less money is spent on exces-
sive armaments and more on the correction
on social ills.
[From the Western News, Apr. 3, 1969]
HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?
President Nixon's decision to modify his
predecessor's plans for an anti-:ballistics mis-
sile defense system and to proceed with con-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 19, 1969
struotion of only two remote installations
more convinced of theneed for theCOatl ABM ASSESSMENT IN THE OPEN
shield than Y House Minortiy Leader Ford stepped than are, most Americans, The Columbia Broadcasting System per- of a meeting with President Nixon on Tueout
s-
Officials of the Defense Department- ' formed a commendable public service Tues- day and said that opponents of the antibal-
under both Jdhnsoi. and Nixon-are press- day night with a special hour-long television listic program are seeking a weak and dis-
1ng for the ADM system because they believe program devoted to full exposure of the anti- armed America.
It Is their obligation to keep American the ballistic missile problem (ABM) in all its This kind of demagogic bombast contrib-
a most powerful nation in the World. Neither ramifications. utes much less than nothing toward a ra-
Republican nor a Democratic Secretary of CBS examined every aspect and presented tional resolution of the ABM problem. By
Defense wants to go down in history as the forceful speakers on both sides, those who slyly raising the patriotism issue it warrants
man who let his nation's guard down so that believe the expensive-though modified- the charge promptly raised of "McCarthyism."
it fell prey to a nuclear Pearl Harbor. Safeguard system is necessary for the na- Ford's implicit suggestion that the ABM
Many men in Congress feel, however, that tion's protection and those who believe the decision should be left completely with
even without an ABM system, American has United States Is building up "overkill" ap- the President and his military advisers
sufficient power to retaliate after an attack paratus at great expense and sacrifice. ignores the fact that the issue thrusts far be-
and devastate the homeland of the attacker. CBS arrived at no conclusion. yond the sphere of mere weaponry.
Even now, the United States Is said to have But the whole issue was presented in neu- Many thoughtful, informed, patriotic
"over-kill" potential, power to inflict greater tral perspective for the public to assess. Americans believe a choice is at hand between
damage than any enemy could possibly re- A basic premise is that the United States two major policy routes, one leading to a
cover from, government must protect the nation against frantic, indefinitely protracted arms race, the
Because no reasonable commander-in-chief attack from all directions. It has that awe- other toward a disarmament agreement that
would order an attack in the expectation of some responsibility. may be within the world's for the last
such calamitous response, grasp
it is improbable argument there.
that our present defense system will ever be The argument is in the amount of money The American people deserve to hear this
unleashed in anger. Likewise the ABM would that should be diverted for this purpose and debate conducted in a reasonable manner.
probably become only an unused monument the extent of this designated defensive mis- _
to national preparedness, sile system. [From the Miami (Fla.) News, Mar. 10, 1969]
The first two ABM sites at Great Falls and Part of the debate Is In semantics. Presi- NIXON'S DECISION: ABM Is No ANSWER TO
at Grand Forks, N.D., are expected to cost dent Nixon asks for a "sufficiency" of weap-
seven or eight billion dollars, a staggering ons, not necessarily a superiority. But if the MISSILE THREAT
cost but only a fraction of the total bill for layman is confused, so are the experts. On Sen. Stuart Symington, who is one of the
the nationwide system, the CBS presentation, well-qualified scien- more military-minded members of the Sen-
This Is a mighty large bill to hand to the tists disagreed on the amount of defensive ate, said at a subcommittee hearing on an
American people for a weapons system that air hardware needed. Senators disagreed. antiballistic missile system that we have
will provide little more deterrent than the How much is "sufficient?" spent $23.3 million on missile systems that
existing arms. Scientists and military experts have gone were later abandoned.
If America already has the ammunition to to great lengths to explain how, in the case "We've been missile happy in this country
wipe out an enemy population and the means of surprise attack, our retaliatory power still for years," Symington said, and the senator
to deliver that punch, added strength would would be great enough to knock out 70% should know, having once been secretary of
seem to be an unnecessary cost. of Russian cities and strategic warfare cen- the Air Force. His point was that the ABM
ters, This could happen, it is alleged, even system is likely to be obsolete before it is
[From the Deer Park (N.Y.) Suffolk Sun, though the United States suffered severe deployed.
Mar, 20, 19691 damage, possibly 50% destruction, in a sud- It may be obsolete even on the drawing
NUCLEAR WEAPONRY: NEVER-NEVER LAND den onslaught from the skies. board. Dr. Hans Bethe, Nobel prize winning
The situation calls for penetrating in- physicist, is one of a number of scientists
The Pentagon has wheeled out Its biggest sight, not for a callous disregard for oppos- who told the committee that the defensive
oral guns to frighten the American people ing opinion such as demonstrated this week missile system could be foiled in any number
Into believing that without the Sentinel ABM by House Republican Leader Gerald Ford of of ways.
system the nation will be helpless In the face Michigan who accused anti-ABM forces of Beyond its practical limitations, the ABM
of an all-out nuclear attack. advocating unilateral disarmament suggest- is questionable for other reasons. For one
If Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's on- Ing lack of patriotism. thing, it would be a highly negative answer
again off-again pronouncements about troop Two avenues can be explored: to the Soviet Union, which has indicated it
withdrawals from Vietnam are an example of One is the possibility of suspending de- would prefer arms control discussions to the
the military establishment's current reason- velopment of the $7 billion Safeguard ABM expense of installing a missile defense of its
Ing, we place no stock in his pitch for the if Russia would halt deployment of its de- own. (The Russians have already deployed
Sentinel. What he and the brass pass over fensive arms system and cease testing its about 75 anti-missile missiles around Mos-
lightly in this case is that the nation will be multiple warhead missiles. In that interim, cow, but they are of dubious value against
just as helpless in an all-out attack with the negotiations on arms limitations of all kinds a U.S. attack.)
system installed. Therefore, why spend bil- could proceed. This involves a trust in the These are matters which President Nixon
lions of dollars to hold up a false front? Soviet Union, which many people are un- is weighing as he prepares to state his ad-
How much solace can scores of millions of willing to grant. But it ties in with the next ministration's position on the ABM this
potential victims get from an educated guess Item. week. The Johnson Administration had al-
that the ABM network might save enough This Is the further development of the ready decided to go ahead with a $7 billion
Minutemen sites to mount a nuclear coun- aerial spy system, via satellite photography so-called "thin" ABM system, but Mr. Nixon
terattack? Few of us would be left to restore and sophisticated radar, to keep tabs on has Interrupted its installation pending fur-
our own rubble, much less crow over enemy Russia-and now Red China, too. This might they study,
losses, be a protection against duplicity while any Dr. Jerome D. Weisner of the MIT calls the
The thinking that has created this never- formal moratorium on weapon production thin system "a bad joke." Ostensibly de-
never land of nuclear confrontation is aptly was in force.
expressed by Edmund Stillman in the cur- signed counter a threat from Red China,
If such a moratorium seems "far out" it it is really the base for a wider s system which
rent issue of Horizon. Experience, he argues, should be remembered that Russia and the would cost upwards of $50 billion. Sen.
is the club with which an elder generation United States did reach agreement on lim- George S. McGovern, one of many ABM
beats the young-but if no one can truly say ited nuclear testing. critics in the Senate, says a "thick" system
what happened, and why, in history, the ex- The two superpowers have stocked up would be a "national blunder."
perience of the outgoing elders is less rele- enough weapons to destroy each other- One big drawback to the ABM, as former
vant than they may care to think, and the world-several times over. The mad Vice President Humphrey
"What may assert itself as the wisdom arms race, in order to end sensibly, has to it encourages militry adopolitical l is that
born of sad experience," he writes, "may only involve good will as well as caution and of both nations to believe thatsomeone can
be the elders seeking to redeem the shame preparedness. The potential destructive win a nuclear war. The only real answer to
or folly of their own youth in wholly distinct power, as filmed by CBS, is appalling. The the doomsday threat of the missiles is an
or inappropriate circumstances-to the cost goal must be to keep the United States international agreement on arms control.
of the young." strong enough to be respected as a world President Nixon has indicated he is inter-
These are good words to remember, particu- leader and at the same time share its talents ested in entering negotiations to that end
laxly for the people of Hiroshima and Naga- and resources In peaceful pursuits of science, with the Russians. The Russians have indi-
eaki, and Americans who cannot forget, education, welfare and global progress. cated they are ready, A decision to proceed
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
"quite positive" that neither the present nor
the next generation of Soviet submarines
would be able to track submerged Polaris
subs, He said the Navy is unaware of any
new Soviet anti-submarine devices and that
satellites will never be able to detect sub-
merged subs.
Argument No. 4: The Safeguard system
will be able to knock down a missile
launched "by accident," and it will also be
able to cope with the threat from Commu-
nist China for years to come.
Answer: Only two offensive sites will be
protected from an accidental launch. The
greatest danger from any such accident is
not to our offensive capacity, since this will
not be appreciably impaired by a single er-
rant missile. The danger instead is to a
given population center, which the Safe-
guard system will not protect.
Communist China is probably a genera-
tion or so behind the Russians in missile
capability. Since there is no conceivable way
the Soviets can threaten our retaliatory
forces over the next several decades, it de-
fies logic to insist that the Chinese will be
able to do so.
It is crucial to remember that we are pres-
ently talking about a skeleton project. Loose
talk about protecting our population cen-
ters or all offensive sights is talk that en-
visions appropriations of at least $30 billion.
And by the time that electronic Maginot
Line was complete, there would undoubtedly
be talk of new billions to build new systems
to meet new challenges.
We return to where we began. The pro-
posed Safeguard system is a freak, even when
placed in the company of several previous
Pentagon monsters. The idea was conceived
in error, has been perpetuated through self-
deception, and is being peddled by thinly
veiled appeals to terror and ignorance. It
protects nothing and deters no one.
It closes no defense gap, missile or other-
wise. The only gap it does affect is the cred-
ibility gap, and that it widens substantially.
We're against it.
with the ABM would be a crippling setback
to the new President's professed quest for
peace,
ABM WOULD SHIELD NOTHING, DETEa NOBODY
lIad. any department of our government,
except the-Pentagon, come before Congress
asking for an initial expenditure of $7-$9
billion for any program supported by so
little in the way of hard evidence, logic,
or common sense as has the proposed ABM
system, that department would have un-
doubtedly been laughed off Capitol Hill.
But the Defense Department is so used to
having its way with Congress that normally
no revelations of, waste and inefficiency, no
evidence of misjudgement, no showing of
egregious error is able to withstand its
crunch. In a very real sense, the Pentagon
has come to regard itself as what the New
York Times recently called "a kind of military
W.P.A. which requires ever-expanding appro-
priations, regardless of the world situation."
The proposed "Safeguard" antiballistic
missile system may happily prove an excep-
tion to the general rule of Congressional
spinelessness with respect to these appropria-
tions. At last count, a slender majority of
those U.S. senators who have committed
themselves one way or the other oppose fund-
ing the program. Both of Alaska's senators are
officially uncommitted. We hope they will
vote "nay."
Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, who has
carried the ball for the Nixon administration
on ABM proposes to spend about $9 billion
to protect two our our 11 offensive missile
sines, the logic being that an enemy will know
that our retaliatory capabilities are invulner-
able for the foreseeable future, and will
thereby refrain from attacking us. He has
marshalled a series of unconvincing and, in
certain respects, self-contradictory argu
..ments to support his position
Argument No. 1: The Soviet Union has
upset the nuclear balance of power by deploy-
ing its awn ABM system around Moscow, and
proceeding with the development of large
numbers of offensive missiles which will be
difficult to detect..
Answer: The ..thin ABM system around
Moscow is already regarded as obsolete by all
U.S. experts. There are no known Soviet
plans to extend this system to other areas
or to ring its own offensive sites with ABMs.
The offensive missiles now being developed
by the Soviet Union are no threat, to our
bombers, some of which are always airborne,
or our Polaris-equipped submarine fleet,
which together with our missile sites, main-
tain our needed retaliatory capabilities.
Argument No. 2: Scientific, opinion is "di-
vided" on this matter, so why take chances?
Answer: Except for those scientists in the
full-time employ of the Defense Department,
.scientific opinion in this country is hardly
divided at all. It is. virtually unanimously
against the Laird, position. In his testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, Laird was' asked. whether he had
found any reputable scientists in the coun-
try to support his position. He mentioned
two by name. It turned out he had chatted
with one at.an airport for a few minutes and
had not contacted the other at all, Both
opposed the Safeguard system.
Argument No. 3: There is "serious ,ques-
tion" whether the Polaris system will be ef-
fective in the years to come. There are some
things "the Soviets might do" indicated that
satellites will never ,be able to detect sub-
merged subs.
Answer: This is simply another bogeyman
of fear spawned by Laird and his Deputy
i efense Secretary David Packard in their
recent Senate testimony.
Rear Adm. Levering Smith is director of
the Navy's strategic systems projects. In a
recent interview with the New Bedford
(Mass.) Standard Times, he said he was
[From the St. Petersburg Times, Mar. 15,
1969]
ABM: THE PRESIDENT MAKES A TRAGIC
DECISION
The worst fears of many Americans have
been realized. President Richard Nixon has
decided to deploy a $7-billion anti-missile
defense system.
This decision will erode American security
by:
Escalating the arms competition with the
Soviet Union, which now may build more
and better attack missiles or expand its small
anti-missile defense around Moscow.
Diminishing the prospects for meaning-
ful negotiations with the Soviet Union-a
nation that Nixon acknowledges has been
traditionally defense-oriented, not attack-
minded.
Committing crucial American economic re-
sources to new military hardware when the
crisis of unmet domestic needs threatens
internal security.
Compromising presidential control over nu-
clear decision..making by permitting a tech-
nically uncertain ABM system to work auto-
matically in a sudden crisis.
Prejudicing the movement toward inter-
national arms control which began with the
nuclear test ban treaty and continued with
the nuclear non-proliferation pact approved
this week.
But most important of all, Nixon's decision
jams the rudder of American defense policy
and turns it in a different direction.
. Taken to its ultimate extension, an exam-
ination of defense theories in the nuclear age
reveals this truth:.Tlle only credible defense
is the ability to absorb a surprise nuclear
attack and then mount a counter-attack that
destroys the enemy utterly.
S 6785
We possess that capability now. It has
been our defense against Soviet attack dur-
ing the entire nuclear missile era.
The last two secretaries of defense con-
sidered deployment of ABM to protect missile
and bomber bases. Both rejected the idea
firmly. Other, simpler, surer options are open,
involving improvement of second-strike capa-
bility.
If that capability has been a credible de-
fense against the sophisticated Soviet nu-
clear threat, why wouldn't it be fully credible
against the primitive nuclear force that Red
China can assemble in the next 10 years?
The answer is that it would be.
And yet Nixon claimed his ABM system
would be aimed at the Red Chinese threat in
the next decade.
Sen. Richard Russell, D-Ga., put it suc-
cinctly: "The Chinese are not completely
crazy. They are not going to attack us with
four or five missiles when they know we have
the capability of virtually destroying their
entire country."
Nixon promises periodic "re-examination"
of his system. But "re-examination" is noth-
ing more than an escalator clause that pro-
vides an easy way to expand this thin sys-
tem into a bigger, more expensive deploy-
ment. The Nixon system is only a beginning.
It was the first major decision of the Nix-
on Administration, and it was a tragic one.
Only the good sense of congressional op-
ponents can salvage reason in this historic
debate.
NIXON SEEKS PROGRAM WHICH COULD TRIGGER
HUGE U.S.-U.S.S.R. ARMS RACE
Gratification over Senate passage of the
nuclear nonproliferation treaty by 83 to 15
is diluted by President Richard M. Nixon's
approval of a start on an antiballistic missile
defense system aimed both at Russia and
Red China. The treaty was in the bag and its
approval was delayed only because Nixon
chose not to take a position on it during the
presidential campaign.
This treaty is important, of course, since
the nations which now possess the bomb are
more knowledgeable in the danger they pose
and are less likely to employ them in a
demonic moment.
Far more significant, however, is Nixon's
skillfully contrived proposal for the ABM.
Aware of the mounting resentment in the
United States Senate against the Sentinel
system and the whole massive military
budget, Nixon made much of the fact he is
seeking appropriations for only about half
of the estimated $6 billion cost of the thin
line system.
What is important here is that if Nixon's
conception of the system as one aimed at
defense against Russia as well as Red China
is accepted, the door is opened for a major
arms race between the two super powers.
With every new missile development in
Russia the administration can return to Con-
gress to get money to expand the system
until it might amount to $100 billion and
still offer no guarantee of adequate defense.
Many senators are properly incensed by
what they deem to be the duping to which
they have been exposed by the Pentagon.
They still are not satisfied with the explana-
tion offered for the Gulf of Tonkin and other
incidents.
Certainly they know the Sentinel system
was introduced in a sneaky way as solely
aimed at Red .China. Shortly the truth
emerged and Nixon has now given it official
sgnctipn. It relates to both Russia and Peking.
Already some $3 billion has been spent on
research for the antiballistic defense line.
The additional $3 billion or $4 billion Nixon
says he will seek would accomplish little
toward missile defense, so it has to be a foot
In the door.
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The American public and many senators
and representatives are sick of riding the
Pentagon merry-go-round.
Who is so gullible as 'to suppose Russia
will accommodate the United $tates by main-
taining the kinds of weaponry which can
be shot down from a well-publicized Maginot
line? The proposed ABM system at best could
result only in a struggle to keep even, with
the result that after spending billions the
United States and Moscow would wind up at
the same level of standoff.
Nixon's proposal for the ABU offsets the
good news of the Senate passing of the non-
proliferation treaty.
[From the Miami Herald, Mar. 23, 1969]
POLARIS MISSILE FORCE MUST NOT BE SLIGHTED
Lost in the mumbo jumbo of Defense Sec-
retary Laird's testimony on the proposed anti-
ballistic missile (ABM) system before the
Senate was a statement which throws a
shadow over the nation's major nuclear de,?
terrent-the Polaris submarine force.
No weapon would seem more potent than
these swift undersea craft capable of cruising
great distances at considerable depths and
in secret. They are known to mount 656 mis-
siles. When these nuclear-propelled vessels
are fully equipped with the superior Poseidon
missile, they will be able to reach anVtarget
in strength from a distance of 3,500 nautical
miles.
Former Secretary of Defense Robert Mc-
Namara favored deployment of the Poseidon
submarine missile as an answer to a Soviet
antimissile system. This would be far less
qtly and probably far more effective than
the proposed $25 billion Nike-X antimissile
system, abandoned in favor of the cheaper
"thin" Sentinel covreage.
The Sentinel, It ought to be pointed out
again, defends only land-based missile sites.
In other words, the defense is of a deterrent,
and not targets such as "'cities and factories.
Years ago, after Hiroshima, it was pointed
out to the satisfaction of many Americans,
that there is no complete defense against
nuclear attack. The Pentagon still talks in
terms of 40 million dead in the first enemy
strike. But the nearest things to a defense
is an effective submarine ballistic system.
Lost, as we were saying, in Sec. Laird's
testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee was the gloomy report that be-
cause of "new things that have taken place"
the Polaris fleet probably would not remain
"very free from attack" after 1972. An aide
explained that the Soviet Union would have
parity in the number of submarine-based
missiles by 1974.
The only real defense against nuclear de-
struction is' a political understanding that'-
nuclear weapons will not be used. The next
best answer, to repeat ourselves, is the estab-
lished Polaris-Poseidon system. If this system
is in jeopardy, the Senate will want to find
out why, and how it can be strengthened.
The problem is not the Pentagon's ABM
boondoggle, but a very real and potent de-
fensive force, already in being. Is it being
slighted?
[From the Lewiston (Idaho) Tribune, Apr. 4,
1969]
A CYCLE OF MADNESS THAT MUST HAVE AN
END
Listening to Defense Secretary Melvin
Laird describe to his Senate audience the
*;1T,tues of -bigger, better ABMs, we got the
feeling that it was a performance needing
a, psychedelic backdrop of swirling colors
,and lights revolving patterns and words that
recede a lid It into other words
'GStlt ate ,3 gs t needed sound acid
lit flashes, far it was a per-
t?ea es U
.
eecS not to convince but to bedazzle.
tie, s , ,, jp ey pained from a pofnt-
by-poin argument over ?tr. Laird's partic-
ulars, for what he offers is not fact but a
premise, the premise that the evil men of
the world are arrayed against us, and that
we must move now to defend ourselves
against anything they may do at any time
in the future. It is to this thesis that we
must now address ourselves, not to any or-
derly discussion of whether or not ABMs
will work or whether or not we need them.
It is an argument based_ not on logical dis-
cussion but emotional appeal, and it de-
serves the emotional response of outraged
protest.
Mr. Laird admits, as did President Nixon
before him, that there. is no evidence that
either? Russia or China desires or is plan-
ning an attack on us. But because it is
possible that they may, we must prepare
against it. He admits that the ABM, no
matter how ruinously expensive, will not
protect us against a missile attack; but we
must build it because we don't know any-
thing better to do. And by implication we
must build also every new weapon that is
devised, not because it is needed, not be-
cause It will work, but because if we don't
someone may take it as a sign of weakness
and attack, or an attack will succeed that
otherwise might have failed....
We are being offered a world in which
-words lose their meaning. Only months ago
we were being told that the ABM was abso-
lutely vital for the protection of our cities;
the same men now say that ABMs can't pro-
tect the cities and aren't needed for that
purpose anyhow. Months ago these men were
telling us that the missile sites for which
we were spending billions were invulnerable
to attack; now we are told we must have
ABMs to protect these same sites from attack
by other missiles. Only days ago Mr. Nixon
assured us that only a few ABMs were needed
because recent Russian history showed a na-
tion primarily concerned with defense; now
Mr. Laird warns that we cannot neglect any
aspect of defense lest the Russians spring
for our throat.
We are being offered a world In which
spending for death leaves nothing to spend
for life, in which our cities rot and our
waters reek and our people groan from the
burden of taxes, while we build more stately
mansions underground from which to kill
other men, frightened and frightening as
ourselves. This is the cycle of madness and
somewhere, somehow, it must have an end.-
The Louisville Courier-Journal & Times.
From the San Francisco Chronicle, Apr. 27,
1969]
THE TIME Is Now
Senator John Sherman Cooper (Rep.-Ky.)
has enlivened the Safeguard debate with a
suggestion that President Nixon defer his
proposed limited deployment of the anti-
ballistic missile system pending discussions
with the Soviet Union toward a disarmament
agreement.
The suggestion had scarcely been uttered
before its wisdom was reinforced by a curious
coincidence in which the Nixon Adminis-
tration, in Washington, and the Soviet Un-
ion, in the 17-nation disarmament talks at
Geneva, put forward remarkably similar views
on how such an agreement should be ap-
proached.
Washington spoke Of a series of separate
accords on limiting various weapons sys-
tems-one for submarine-fired missiles, an-
other for land-based intercontinental ballis-
tic missiles, another for anti-ballistic missile
systems, and so on. The Soviets' chief dele-
gate at Geneva said that Moscow has aban-
doned its early one-package plan and now
favors a phasing-out approach-first a pro-
hibition on the use of nuclear weapons, then
a limitation of delivery systems, then a pro-
hibition against bomber flights outside of
national borders, and so.
That program, he informed the delegates,
was specifically designed "to limit and ex-
clude completely the possibility of a nuclear
attack by one country against another" and
"to promote an international atmosphere fa-
vorable to further disarmament negotia-
tions."
U.S. officials are reported to have sniffed at
the proposal as "nothing new" and to have
pointed out the absence of any reference
whatever to U.S. demands for on-site inspec-
tion to guarantee compliance. But the sim-
ilarity of the Moscow and Washington posi-
tions is unmistakable-and the inspection
issue may have become moot through devel-
opment of reconnaissance by satellites. Sen-
ator Aiken of Vermont may have exaggerated
somewhat in asserting that the system can
"detect a postage stamp from 50 miles up,"
but its effectiveness was revealed by Presi-
dent Nixon himself when in his March 14
press conference he gave specific informa-
tion that Moscow is ringed about with 67
ABMs.
Thus there is ample support for the op-
timistic appraisal that the time was never so
propitious for disarmament talks, or so fa-
vorable toward the arguments of Senator
Cooper, and other opponents of Safeguard,
that postponement of any deployment would
not only save billions but would head off a
ruinous escalation of the arms race.
Supporters of Safeguard have apparently
reached a similar conclusion. They have
suddenly intensified a scare campaign in
which the Defense Department speaks
ominously of the Soviet Union's "first-strike
capability" and Senator Strom Thurmond
speaks fearfully of a "missile gap" in which
he says the Soviets have more ICBMs than
we have and-revealing that the gap is more
anticipatory than real-"are catching up in
all other areas of nuclear warfare."
[From the Riverside (Calif.) Enterprise,
Mar.27, 1969]
SUDDENLY, 8 FEET TALL
Defense Secretary Melvin Laird came out
with some frightening testimony before a
Senate Foreign Relation subcommittee, testi-
mony that raises more questions than it
answers.
In justifying the President's anti-ballistic
missile decision, Secretary Laird said that the
Soviets have embarked upon a policy which
could give them the power to destroy Amer-
ica's retaliatory strength.
The Secretary said that the Soviets are de-
ploying nuclear blockbusters and building
a more sophisticated submarine fleet. He -
concluded that their ambition is to achieve
a first-strike capability, "no doubt about
that."
When did this happen? If the Secretary's
comments are correct, then there has been
some amazing intelligence gathered in just
the last eight weeks or a grave threat to the
national security was allowed to occur.
Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright
responded, "Suddenly the Russians are be-
coming eight feet tall and they are about to
overwhelm us." That is not an entirely un-
reasonable observation, given what prompted
it.
For, when did the Soviets decide on getting
into position to knock out America's nuclear
arm in one fell sweep? Is this, in fact, a new
policy? Or it it something that has always
been an ultimate goal, to be worked toward
if not realized? Is the U.S. after a similar
first-strike capability?
Secretary Laird has to understand that
this is quite a bit to throw at people, that
there are those who might take him literally
and get the impression that the Russians are
bent on doing In the United States next
week.
Also, the Secretary's view is hard to ad-
just to the fact that he speaks for an Admin-
istration which claims to .,be basing its re-
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 lations,wjtll the Soviets on negotiations, not
confrontations.
r4ither someone is dra}natizing the Soviet
ambitions t? -this atior b ,ln, dire straits,
-,Anti, to think, only months ago the reason
offered for, an ABM thin-line was that it was
insurance against the Chinese doing some-
thing crazy. Now, its because the Russians
are supposed to be intent upon changing the
entire balance of power, maybe just by sud-
denly wiping out this country.
If the ABM line thickens at the rate the
justifications for it have proliferated, then
within a few years there's going to be a mis-
sile site in every other backyard.
[From the Sacramento (Calif.) Bee,
Apr. 16, 19d69]
ANOTHER VIEWPOINT: THE VERSATILE ABUT
One of the }narvels -of-the ABM is the facil-
ity with which proponents of the system
switch their rationalizations for it. When he
appeared before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, Secretary of Defense Laird
preached the gospel of ABM as an indispensi-
ble defense against Soviet nuclear power.
When he appeared before the Foreign Rela-
tions disarmament subcommittee, he painted
it as a "building block" toward disarmament.
We must deploy the system, he seemed to be
saying, in order to be in a position to agree
not to deploy it.
The same flexibility, "if that is what it
should be called, has been exhibited by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. For years the JCS has
been insisting that the national security de-
manded missile defense for at least 25 major
cities. The "thin" system adopted by the
Johnson administration was regarded by the
joint chiefs as only a stepping stone toward
a? thick. system covering the population
centers.
Yet when the Nixon administration de-
cided that the population cannot be pro-
tented and thatthe.ABM should be deployed
around Minuteman missile sites instead, the
joint chiefs abandoned their position and
embraced the new rationalization.
How much value is to be attached to a
solemn determination of "security" needs by
the military mandarins when it can be so
readily alerted to fit the politico] needs of a
new administration?
What made the Johnson version of the
Sentinel system untenable, and caused work
on it to be suspended, was not a military but
a political fact-namely, the exploding oppo-
sition of suburbanites who did. not want
ABMs in their back yards. This was a blow
to the Pentagon, whose public opinion engi-
neers had expected the location of ABMs.
near some cities to produce irresistible de-
mands for their location around all cities,,
When the people displayed more common
sense than they had been credited with, a
new rationalization had to be hastily put
together. The specter of a mad Chinese
launching a missile attack on the cities had
to be laid,aslde, and the old,,. reliable specter
of a Russian assault on Aing4ean civilization
revived for one ?nose run around the track.
When so many conflicting reasons can be
advanced for an escalation of the nuclear
arms race, that is cause enough to be skepti-
cal of all of them.
[From the Riverside (,Calif,) Enterprise, Mar.
24, 1968]
DOWN, NOT UP
The Senate Armed Services, Committee has
made itself a televised forum,for witnesses
who support President Nixon's plea to deploy
a modified system of anti-ballistic missiles.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Is giving a televised forum to witnesses who
oppose it. When the Senate decides whether
or not to appropriate funds for the first two
planned ABM sites, it will have to resolve
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
ish bias on Vietnam and most other issue., Is
charged with the relatively narrow task of
preserving America's military security. For-
eign Relations has to deal with all the
broader aspects of national security; arma-
ments and strategic dispositions are a part,
but only a part of the larger picture.
Buttressing the case for the ABMs, Defense
Department witnesses painted for Armed
Service committeemen an alarming picture
of the Soviet missile buildup. Witnesses
even were permitted-encouraged might be
a better word-to reach back into the security
stockroom and bring out material hitherto
stamped secret. This, after all, is the Penta-
gon's big push.
Perhaps the Soviet buildup Is as alarming
as was depicted. But that is not the same as
establishing that the best way to keep the
country, and world, from destroying itself,
is to embark on an intensified American
Somewhere, if armament races never stop,
somebody is bound to throw a match and the
stockpile will blow up. Who's safe, what
country has a chance of "winning" once nu-
clear warheads are flying?
If the Soviets are getting near to a position
of dangerous superiority, or even omnious
first-strike capability, the obvious first U.S.
effort should be to explore fully the prospects
of negotiating the arms race down rather
than jockeying it up.
. And particularly at this time when the
Soviets sound more interested in arms talks
than they have for many years, and when
they are pressed from behind by a belligerent
Red China.
[From the St. Petersburg, (Fla.) Times,
Apr. 7, 19691
FTIXON'S ABM: COLD WAR OF ANOTHER
KIND
The Senate Foreign Relations Disarmament
Subcommittee has stripped the fiction from
President Nixon's anti-ballistic missile pro-
posal. The Sentinel-turned-Safeguard stands
naked of any validity and shivering in the
cold blasts of truth leveled at it by the sub-
committee.
The two most chilling indications that
Nixon's ABM is a high-yield boondoggle came
from Administration spokesmen themselves.
Secretary of State William Rogers told the
subcommittee the Administration would
"have no problem," in fact would "be de-
lighted," to put the American ABM pro-
posal on ice if the Soviet Union would
dismantle its small ABM system around
Moscow.
If that is so-and there is every reason
to hope it is-then Secretary of Defense
Melvin Laird was misleading the American
people when he said this system is necessary
to protect against the Soviet "offensive"
threat that might develop in the mid-1970s.
If the American ABM can be traded for
its Soviet counterpart, then it has nothing
to do with an alleged Soviet Intent to build
an offense so strong it could overwhelm the
American ability to counterattack. It has
nothing to do with new intelligence alleged
to indicate such an intent. It has nothing
to do with changes in the Soviet SS-9 missile.
As for its other potential uses:
Deputy Secretary of Defense David Pack-
ard himself dismissed the Chinese threat as
"not much further along than it was three
years ago."
Protection against an accidental launch
would be limited immediately to two Minute-
man sites in the upper Midwest, and the
urban centers of North Dakota and Mon-
tana, according to Administration presenta-
tions.
But there is an even more disturbing indi-
cation that the Administration Is misleading
the American people. Pressed to produce the
this clash between two of Its own committees, list of non-Pentagon scientists he promised-
Armed Services, with its generally hawk- a list supposed to offer names of Independent
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experts who served as advisers on ABM-
Packard produced only one name: Dr. Wolf-
gang K. H. Panofsky, a Stanford physicist.
Panofsky was called before the subcom-
mittee, where he immediately set the record
straight. His service as adviser was limited
to a chance meeting with Packard in the San
Francisco airport. He said, "I would like to
state that I did not participate in any ad-
visory capacity to any branch of the govern-
ment In reviewing the decision to deploy
the current modified Sentinel or Safeguard
system."
Every credible indication is that ABM is
unncessary, fabulously expensive, diplo-
matically disruptive, strategically provoca-
tive and technically uncertain.
But what makes the blood run cold is
that the Administration apparently is willing
to mislead the American people to justify
the ABM.
[From the Hackensack (N.J.) Record,
Mar. 31, 19691
REASONS FOR ANGER
The sheer horror of the national debate
over the antiballistic missile-here we so-
berly discuss the instantaneous slaughter of
scores of millions of human beings as if it
were a problem in mathematics-is mitigated
by the intensity of the opposition.
It is critically important that the tradition
of giving the Pentagon its own way be chal-
lenged-challenged vehemently. The United
States has already gone altogether too far
in the direction of militarism. The New
Yorker magazine quotes George Wald of Har-
vard, the Nobel laureate in biology, on the
subject:
"How many of you realize that just before
World War II the entire American Army, in-
cluding the Air Corps numbered 139,000
men?.,. Now we have 3 1/y million men under
arms: about 600,000 in Vietnam, about 300,-
090 more in support areas elsewhere in the
Pacific, about 250,000 in Germany. And there
are a lot more at home. Some months ago
we were told that 30,000 National Guardsmen
and 200,000 Reservists-so half a million
men-had been trained for riot duties in
the, cities."
And last Monday in the Senate Sen. Ste-
phen M. Young, D-Ohio, termed the United
States the world's largest military-industrial
complex. He continued:
"Ten per cent of the American labor force
is involved in either military or defense-re-
lated employment. Approximately 22,000 of
our largest manufacturing corporations are
prime military contractors, while more than
100,000 firms contribute to some type of
output td defense production.
"The United States is the world's largest
exporter of munitions. Our annual expendi-
dures for defense purposes, so called; far ex-
ceed the total amount spent for welfare, edu-
cation and poverty programs."
And as Sen. Young said, the pressure now
is building for vastly increasing military
spending in the United States, the instant
project being the $6-billion ABM system that
no one can believe will remain within that
estimate.
It is time for serious, thoroughgqing de-
bate, not only concerning "the ABM proposal
but concerning the direction the country is
to take. There is no question that the United
States and the Soviet Union have right now
the capacity to destroy each other and much
of the rest of the world. And there should be
no question that this country, with its en-
lightened traditions, should be leading the
world into -paths far from militarism.
The militarism we now have came out of
World War II and a' long series of crises that
built one on another until we got to where
we are. It is not necessary any one's especial
fault. It need not commit the nation to a
course of lavishing Its brains and its re-
sources on machinery of death and destruc-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 19, 1969
tion. Let the debate in the Senate-and in
the country at large-be thorough, candid,
and if necessary angry. We are under no
compulsion to drift to disaster.
[From the Jamestown (N.Y.) Post-Journal,
Mao'. 27, 1969)
POWER OF THE MILITARY
There have been several shocking exposes
recently in the nation's press pointing up
the validity of the warning issued by former
President Dwight Eisenhower some years ago
when he cautioned Americans to beware of
the industrial-military complex in this
country.
The Washington Post has turned up "clas-
sified" documents detailing the massive prop-
aganda campaign carried on by the Defense
Department last year which it used in per-
suading Congress to appropriate initial funds
for the conroversial Sentinel Antiballistic
Missile System.
Mere is how the Defense Department op-
erates as disclosed by the Washington Post:
The Pentagon organizes favorably disposed
scientists. to manufacture, magazine articles
supporting the Sentinel system; senators and
congressmen are given classified briefings by
high officials"; industrial firms and civilian
contractors riding on the Sentinel gravy train
are mobilized to generate public opinion in
favor of sane;' leading citizens in "impacted"
communities are communicated with; trans-
portable display exhibits, pre-taped voice
conuukentaries, "information packets," visual
aids and mockups are employed to spread the
Word that if only the nation will go on spend-
ing billions for ABM's, maybe casualties in a
nuclear exchange can be cut from 100 million
to 40 million. The campaign worked last year
and it is expected it will have its impact
again this year despite mounting opposition
to the ABM system in Congress.
When Washington Post uncovered the De-
fense Department's "public information" ap-
paratus the Pentagon responded by saying
that it was "standard procedure" and
couldn't understand why anyone would get
excited. Using the taxpayers' money to com-
mit the taxpayers to vast new military ex-
penditures has become so routine that the
Defense Department doesn`t care If the pub-
lic knows about it or not.
One of the latest pieces of evidence point-
ing up the power of the military-industrial
complex came in the revelation that the De-
partment of the Army involved itself in an
apparent conspiracy with defense contractors
to propagandize in behalf of- the Sentinel
system.
Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor's
hand was caught In this operation, in which
the Army planned to conspire with defense
contractors to "plant" articles favorable to
the Sentinel in the nation's press.
We pan be sure that once the ABM system
has been deployed the Pentagon's propa-
ganda machine will be busy again this time
pushing for the development of an expensive
.decoy missile system and the packaging,of
greater destructive megatonnage in the mis-
sile warheads. That is the next step! It will
be argued that an aggressor can afford to sat-
urate a target with ten or more decoys to one
armed- fiiissile, activating the ABM defense
and causing it to expend most of Its explosive
payloads on unarmed attackers.
And "the decoy system is not the end of
the line either.. Next we shall hear how the
SG vle# TJntqu is going underground with all
of its major industrial and defense facilities,
its utilities and its key government bureau.
Of cotwsebthe TJ.S.will have to match this ef-
fort .mod. ,qne?pip _ agine, the billion and
billlons Of cl ]dam, yet to be expended for this
ever cSCaTa in arms race and military
strategy.
Thgge,w o argue in favor of President Nix-
en's proposed modified ABM system saying
Shat because it Is of a defensive nature there
is no threat to stimulating the arms race
simply are Ignorant of the facts of life as they
are viewed and plotted by the military-indus-
trial complex. They apparently are not aware
that the decoy system comes next, followed
by higher explosive payloads and eventually a
movement of major faculties underground.
But this is the way it is and the American
people seem to be at the mercy of those pow-
erful forces which propagandize the nation
into submission at the taxpayer's expense.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President. It is
extremely difficult for many Americans
and this Senator to understand those
who have traditionally opposed the de-
fense of our Nation-those, who today
amidst a cloud of technical misinfor-
mation tell us it is wrong to provide for
our national security in the 1970's. They
have given the national debate on the
Safeguard ABM as requested by Presi-
dent Nixon a very curious twist. Sud-
denly, it is wrong, they say, to devise and
to maintain a force which will help pre-
vent nuclear war; and to do so in a way
.Which would not tend to quicken the
much talked about arms race, but would
merely defend and protect our military
capability and make an attack less likely.
Much has been said as well about that
"dreadful military-industrial complex"
and its alleged outlandish profiteering.
It is time to set the record straight on
that score, too. Over the past 8 years,
nearly every major defense and tech-
nologically oriented manufacturer in
California has faced a reduction in sales,
profits, and most important, in employ-
ment. Several have suffered the agonies
of layoffs in the thousands. And there
are few industries whose profits are con-
trolled by law and Executive order like
those of which I speak. It should be well
noted that a 3-percent net profit is re-
garded as outstanding by executives in
this field.
Mr. President, our late beloved Gen-
eral Eisenhower has been quoted by many
from his farewell speech as he left the
Presidency.
It is again high time to set the record
straight-to quote from the meat and in-
tent of his remarks. President Eisen-
bower's main thrust was toward our
national security, with the assurance
that at that time we had the national
strength of character to bear the burdens
of a prolonged and complex struggle,
against any who might wish to destroy
In context, President Eisenhower said,
and I quote:
A vital element in keeping the peace is our
Military Establishment. Our arms must be
mighty, ready for instant action, so that no
potential aggressor may be tempted to risk
his own destruction.
He continued:
We face a hostile ideology-global in scope,
atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose,
and insidious in method. Unhappily, the
danger it poses promises to be of indefinite
duration. To meet it successfully, there is
called for, not so much the emotional and
transitory sacrifices of crisis, but rather those
which willenapl.e its to carry forward steadily,
surely, and without complaint the burdens
of a prolonged and complex struggle-with
liberty the stake.
In other words, then as now, we can-
not progress in the fight to achieve a bet-
ter life for all Americans unless we are
free to operate within a framework of
security and safety which can be pro-
vided only by our great military and
technical strength-not to make war,
but to guarantee peace.
It is most difficult to understand how
those who oppose the Safeguard ABM
ever got so far afield from the words of
Eisenhower-how they would have us
gamble on our security.
Mr. President, the issue is simple:
Faced with a rapidly growing Soviet nu-
clear force, which has now surpassed
ours in number of land-based ICBM's in
being and under construction; and the
very real potential of a Chinese Com-
munist nuclear armed ICBM, what are
the most prudent actions to take?
An immediate answer might be-dis-
arm. But even the most ardent advocate
of disarmament surely would not seri-
ously propose unilateral disarmament in
the face of the present example of Soviet
actions in Czechoslovakia and their con-
sistently expanding nuclear armament.
Should we hold arms limitation talks in
missiles, bombers, and submarines, then?
Most certainly. But, we must deal real-
istically with this most important situa-
tion. I fully hope discussions between the
United States and the Soviet Union on
arms limitation will proceed and possibly
be completed before the first Safeguard
site becomes operational. And, it seems
clear the Safeguard not only will not
interfere with such talks but, in the face
of the potential Chinese Communist
threat which must be considered by both
the Soviet Union and the United States,
the existence of a light defense may well
make it easier for us to agree with the
Russians on an arms limitation proposal.
But arms limitation talks are, after all,
only talks. It takes two sides to agree;
meaningful agreement may be very diffi-
cult to attain and may take years. We
are, as yet, uncertain concerning Soviet
strategic motives, and there is sufficient
evidence to prove the U.S.S.R. has, in
fact, quickened her arms production.
What then is prudent while we proceed
with arms limitation discussions?
What are our goals? They are: First,
to prevent nuclear war by insuring that
any possible adversary recognizes the
certainty of our deterrent capability;
second, to do all that we can to slow the
arms race, while at the same time mak-
? ing certain of our defense. In consider-
ing these goals, let me place the issue
in its proper context. The Soviet nuclear
force buildup is a reality-now. The So-
viet ICBM force is there-now. It is at
least equal to our ICBM force-now.
That Soviet force is-rapidly expanding-
now. The Soviet Polaris-like submarine
is being produced in great numbers-
now. The Soviet Union has an ABM de-
fense of a wide area surrounding Mos-
cow-now. The proposed Safeguard sys-
tem, if approved, would not be opera-
tional for another 41/2 years.
Consider our first goal: To prevent
nuclear war by insuring that any possi-
ble adversary recognizes the certainty of
our deterrent capability, and therefore
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une 19, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
the utter futility of initiating nuclear
war.
The possibility of the continued
growth of Soviet nuclear forces to a point
where a response on our part was re-
quired has been recognized for several
years. The most recent review of that
situation has convinced the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secre-
tary of Defense, and the President tilat
a response to preserve our deterrent
strength must be initiated now. This re-
view considered the Soviet threat that
exists now, the time involved in our mak-
ing an adequate response, and uncer-
tainties In Soviet intentions. The re-
sponse proposed is Safeguard. Phase 1
of the Safeguard deployment is a light
defense of part of our Minuteman land-
based ICBM force. In the annual reviews
of the program promised by the Presi-
dent, subsequent actions of the Soviet
Union and the status of the arms limita-
tion talks will be carefully considered in
determining which, if any, of the options
available in phase 2 of the deploy-
ment it is appropriate to undertake. In
my opinion, this light defense of our
Minuteman ICBM's is a prudent step
toward maintaining the adequacy of our
deterrent. With annual reviews it will
remain responsive to changes, up or
down, in the Soviet offensive forces.
Safeguard clearly tells the Soviet
Union that faced with the growing
threat to the survival, of our deterrent
force, had we elected to increase the
number of our deterrent weapons, our
action could have been misconstrued as
a threat to their nation, Safeguard, how-
ever, does not threaten the Soviet Union.
And-the Soviet? leaders know that. I
repeat-the Soviet leaders know that.
While meeting our second goal-it will
not incite a Soviet reaction and thus add
to the arms race nor will it in any way
hinder the initiation of arms limitation
talks. The Safeguard program has as one
of its possible future alternatives a thin
defense against attacks anywhere in the
country. This is not part of the first
phase of Safeguard and would be under-
taken only if future developments prove
it to be necessary. We do not know how
4o defend our cities against massive at-
tacks such as the Soviet, Union could
launch, except by letting them know that
we have the capability of retaliating with
unacceptable destruction. We could pro-
tect them against light attacks which
would be the best, Communist China
might do for some years. It is nocneces-
sary nor Is it being proposed to make
the decision now to deploy such a
nationwide defense. That will be decided
only when necessary.
Then, it is necessary to set the record
straight on another important factor-
cost. The American people have been
confused and alarmed by the figures
quoted by some of those who oppose the
ABM. They would have us believe the
President intends to open the money
hydrant to pour some $30 billion,
or even a hundred billion dollars into
a program before the first phase of
research and development is 'started.
That, Mr. President, simply is not the
truth. I submit there Is, a question of
propriety in such rhetoric and when our
citizens are already overtaxed, it is In-
deed cruel to raise the specter of an im-
possible financial burden in order to
deny the President the Safeguard he
needs. The President has asked for only
$392 million to proceed with the initial
steps toward deployment of Safeguard.
This is less than the usual request for
major programs and is a small price to
pay for a step toward the continued se-
curity of our people.
Mr. President, if I may borrow from
the vernacular of our youth, it is time
to tell it like it is. Safeguard is simply
a minimum prudent step to protect our
deterrent capability in the face of a large
and growing Soviet offensive nuclear
strike capability. It is a step which will
not quicken the arms race; it is a step
which does not hinder arms limitation
talks; it is a step which goes only so far
as is required by the growth in the Soviet
force; it is a step which is subject to
annual review by the President and the
Congress; and it is a step which must be
taken now if we are to have any defense
5 years from now. It is a step which, I
believe, the security of this Nation de-
mands that we take.
CONCLUSION OF MORNING
BUSINESS
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, is
there further morning business?
The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there fur-
ther morning business? If not, morning
business is closed.
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL APPRO-
PRIATIONS ACT, 1969
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the unfinished
business be laid before the Senate.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will
be stated by title.
The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A
bill (H.R. 11400) making supplemental
appropriations for the fiscal year ending
June 30,-1969, and for other purposes.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there ob-
jection to the present consideration of
the bill?
There being no objection, the Senate
resumed the consideration of the bill.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, what
is the pending question?
The VICE PRESIDENT. The pending
question is on agreeing to the amend-
ment offered by the Senator from New
York (Mr. JAVITS).
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will
call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I ask unani-
mous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-
jection, it is so ordered.
AMERICAN CASUALTIES IN
VIETNAM
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, the Defense
Department reports that for the week
ending June 14, 335 American soldiers
S 6789
were killed in Vietnam and 1,695 were
wounded.
This brings the total number of such
casualties to more than 42,000. which
have suffered in Vietnam since the in-
auguration of President Nixon.
Mr. President, this war must end. It
must end because it is immoral and be-
cause it is wrong.
It must end too, because it threatens
to destroy us.
I hope that the chairman of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations will consider
convening the committee in public ses-
sion in order to examine the question:
What is the road to peace, and what
policy, what action, would constitute a
step toward peace, an appropriate policy
for peace?
This, it seems to me, is the fundamental
policy decision before our country today.
We have been diverted from this prin-
cipal issue by the attention focused upon
the proposal to withdraw some 25,000
American soldiers from South Vietnam.
The key policy issue is whether the
United States shall seek, and whether
we will use our pervasive presence in
South Vietnam to persuade a peaceful
settlement through concilliation of the
forces and factions in South Vietnam, or
whether we shall persist in supporting
and maintaining in power the reprisive
Thieu-Ky regime.
Now that President Nixon has "ruled
out" a military victory, the political proc-
ess seems an appropriate, if not the
only, procedure for peace. What proce-
dure or policy would be most appropri-
ate?
This deserves and requires our atten-
tion.
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL APPRO-
PRIATIONS ACT, 1969
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill (H.R. 11400) making supple-
mental appropriations for the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1969, and for other pur-
poses.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I suggest
the absence of a quorum.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will
call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be dispensed with.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-
jection, it is so ordered.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that I may yield to
the Senator from Virginia (Mr. SPONG)
for the purpose of considering his
amendment, and that consideration of
my amendment shall follow immediately
upon the disposition of the amendment
of the Senator from Virginia.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-
jection, it is so ordered.
AMENDMENT NO. 47
Mr. SPONG. Mr. President, I call up
my amendment No. 47 and ask that it
be stated.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The amend-
ment will be stated.
The assistant legislative clerk read
as follows:
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE June 19, 1969.
On page 17, line 11, strike out "$19,920,000"
and insert in lieu thereof "$20,280,000".
On page 18, line 6, after "grants," insert
the following: "$360,000 which shall remain
available until expended and shall be con
sidered as interest earned on the sum au-
thorized to be appropriated by section 108(b)
of the District of ColumbiaPublic Education
Act, as amended (D.C. Code, sec. 31-1608)
and shall not be considered as an amount
appropriated under such section,".
Mr. SPONG. Mr. President, first, let
me thank the distinguished Senator from
New York for yielding to me at this time.
On, yesterday, I filed a complete state-
ment on this amendment along with cer-
tain correspondence pertinent to it.
Additionally I would only say to the
Senate that this amendment appropri-
ates, in lieu of land-grant-endowment
appropriation for the District of Colum-
bia, a sum equivalent to the income on
such an endowment, This will enable the
extension work in nutrition education,
homemaking, consumer and adult edu-
cation in the District of Columbia to be
tripled in the next year. The fate of the
endowment fund, which has passed the
House, will be determined in conference.
Regardless of what the conference de-
cides, this type of-extension education is
badly needed at this time in the District.
I have discussed this with the Senator
from West Virginia (Mr. BYRD) and oth-
ers on the committee, and I would be
pleased at this time to hear from the
Senator from West Virginia with regard
to it.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, the distinguished Senator from
Virginia has discussed this matter with
me and I have discussed it with the
ranking minority member on the sub-
committee. I think the Senator from
Virginia (Mr. SPoNC) has made a fine
presentation which has reflected a great
deal of research and work on his part.
I commend him for it. The ranking mi-
nority member and IJ have agreed to
accept this amendment and go to con-
ference with it.
Mr. SPONG. I thank the able Senator
from West Virginia.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The question
is on agreeing to the amendment of the
Senator from Virginia.
The amendment to -the committee
amendment was agreed to.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The question
now 'recurs on the amendment of the
Senator from New York (Mr.' JevrTS)
(No. 40).
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I think
that I shall go ahead, as some of the
points with respect to this amendment
are incorporated in a letter which every
Member of the Sgr.te has received, and
deal with the basic problem.
Mr, President, the problem really in-
volved 'here is the very deeply rooted
one pf reallocation of priorities in our
-
I seek to reallocate an amount
country.
of $55 million, which is no great sum of
money, considering the problems and
the extent of our bucetary expendi-
ture, Noitlsl it is a significant ex-
ample of what people like myself, deeply
coilceriied with our big cities, as well as
our smaller cities, and with what is
hap- them. have been bringing up
Here we are, coming into the sum-
mer, with more than 1,500,000 young
boys, and girls, below the poverty line,
14 to 21 years of age, out of school; the
question is, What is going to happen to
them this summer? This question is com-
plicated, of course, by unforeseen events
which could take place. But we already
know we have faced a condition of con-
cern and disruption not only in colleges
and universities, but in high schools as
well, and hence we probably do not face
a tranquil national situation.
In addition, we are very cognizant of
the fact that in the field of housing,
health, and education, we have tremen-
dous divisiveness and many dislocations
in the country. I need only mention the
terrible struggle, so bitter and deep, over
school decentralization in my own city
of New York; the fact that, for lack of
money, whole school systems have been
shut down in other parts of the country,
indicates the incendiary material that' is
upon us. In addition, the measures which
we have taken in the poverty program,
the manpower training program, and'so
many other programs, have given some
opportunity, but by no means enough
opportunity, to make' a dent in the
mounting of poverty in the country.
Hence, all of the combustible materials
are there, and the outlook seems bleak.
The question is, What kind of summer
are we going to have? I do not know, but
I do know that I am certainly against
asking for trouble or paying somebody
off not to create it. I feel that when we
have ongoing programs which have
proved their worth, which are modest in
cost, and which are a constructive contri-
bution to the way in which citizens in
the poverty classification can be helped,
we certainly ought to do everything we
can to enhance these programs to pro-
vide for the constructive utilization of
the time of our Nation's youth. No one
knows better than I-who have had a
lifetime of experience with all of these
programs-that you simply cannot force
money into these operations the way you
would force food into the throat of a
Strasbourg goose. But there must be
some capacity to use them effectively.
Hence, both the Department of Labor,
which, by the delegation of the Anti-
poverty Office, handles this particular
matter, and the committees, and others,
have done their utmost to ascertain what
is really needed as compared with what is
available.. The real issue between my
committee and myself and those who are
supporting me-and I will read the list of
the cosponsors of this amendment-is:
Shall we provide what the Department
says can be used effectively, or shall we
provide what the mayors of the country,
who are right on the firing line, feel can
be used effectively?
We must bear in mind that, no matter
what we provide in the Senate-and I,
have served on the Appropriations Com-
mittee, just as has the Senator from West
Virginia (Mr. BYRD) and the Senator
from New Hampshire (Mr. COTTON), who
are both in the Chamber-this matter
will go to conference and some com-
promise will be hammered out. Or shall
it be some figure in between?
$ere are the bare bones of the factual
situation : Last year there were, roughly
speaking, 336,000 of these summer job
slots. The reason why there were 336,000,
and not something like 300,000, was that
after an unbelievable struggle in the con-
ference, with the tremendous aid of the
Senator from West Virginia (Mr. BYRD),
the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr.
COTTON), and other members, it so hap-
pens that we got $13 million more than
the House originally allowed. So we had
336,000 slots.
The target population is 1,500,000
youths between 14 and 21 in the poverty
category. The Department of Labor says
that if you add 24,000 more slots to the
336,000 slots already provided-making a
total of 360,000 slots-then that's making
a total of all they think they can effec-
tively use. That would require that the
added appropriation which is contained
in the committee amendment be $10 mil-
lion, instead of the $7,500,000 provided.
I will say this to the members of the
committee: The department has been
moving on this matter. At one time, its
figure was $5.5 million additional. When
the Appropriations Committee considered
it, the amount was $7.5 million. The last
figure which we received, which was just
the other day, June 17, moved the figure
up to $10 million.
I think it is a very significant approach
to the question of a reallocation of prior-
ities that the Department has been mov-
ing up its own figure as it has obtained
more information.
The U.S. Conference of Mayors, which
represents the mayors of 610 cities, hap-
pens to have been meeting in Pittsburgh
this week. The conference feels that the
cities need 136,500 slots. In fact, it
adopted a resolution, which I agreed to
report to the Senate, which was phoned
in to me just yesterday, asking for $100
million, not for the $55 million which I
have asked for, which is the appropriate
translation of the 136,500 slots, at $411
Into $55 million. They have asked for
$100 million, based upon what they con-
sider to be their best information.
The $55 million for 136,500 would stand
in the place of the $71/2 million for 16,000
to 17,000 slots which the committee bill
would add, and in place of the $10
million for 24,000 slots which even the
Department of Labor recommends. This
number, 36,000 slots, is based on the ac-
tual survey of capability of use of the U.S.
Conference of Mayors. It calls for 72,382
slots in the 50 largest cities in the coun-
try; and I put into the RECORD of last
Monday a chart which analyzes that
figure, and shows the additions required
in each major city, so that Senators may
identify and check our figures.
The 72,000 slots for the 50 major cities
would cost roughly $30 million. I am
giving these various cost figures, because
I think each of them is meaningful.
In the smaller cities of the country, the
mayors estimate that some 67,000 slots
are required. Now, because the data has
been slow in coming in, we have only
been able to get samplings from the vari-
ous States. However, we do have a
sampling of a smaller city from practi-
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