NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A028100010028-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
11
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
March 23, 2006
Sequence Number:
28
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 18, 1975
Content Type:
REPORT
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National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
September 18, 1975
Q
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 18, 1975
PORTUGAL: Deliberations
on cabinet makeup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
LEBANON: Clashes
continue in Beirut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
FRANCE: Another crack
in alliance of leftists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 18,1975
Portuguese Prime Minister - designate Azevedo yesterday met with party
leaders in an effort to resolve the differences between the Communists and
center-left Popular Democrats.
According to the US embassy in Lisbon, most portfolios have already been
distributed among the major parties-the Socialists, Popular Democrats, and the
Communists-and independents. The talks have bogged down, however, because of
differences between the Communists and the Popular Democrats over how many
portfolios each party will receive.
The Communists have been pushing for equal representation in the cabinet
with the Popular Democrats. The Popular Democrats, who polled twice as many
votes as the Communists in elections last April, insist that the division of portfolios
reflect electoral strength. The Socialists have tried to mediate the dispute but are
likely to support the Popular Democrats in an effort to override Communist
objections and get the talks started again.
The Communists apparently continue to believe that stalling and playing on the
military's fear of Communist armed strength will win them further concessions. At a
party rally on Tuesday, Cunhal seemed to threaten the use of force when he said the
party would fight to prevent the formation of a right-wing government-presumably
any cabinet that excludes the Communists.
The Communists have also suffered setbacks in the labor movement. Although
the leaders of the single labor confederation are pro-Communist and are elected for a
three-year term, Communist slates in individual unions have lost a series of elections
to the combined opposition of the Socialists and the extreme left wing.
Rumors of divisions within the Communist Party as a result of the recent
setbacks may help explain Cunhal's threatening tones and determination to force
concessions on the formation of a new government.
unhal's leadership is being challenged by Carlos Aboim
Ingles, a entra ommittee member, and others who are unhappy with the party's
strategy. A Socialist-oriented weekly has also reported that Cunhal is being
challenged by Ingles.
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Communist influence in the military's top policy-making body, the
Revolutionary Council, was further reduced Tuesday when supporters of the
Antunes anti-Communist faction were elected to the three air force positions on the
Council. The final makeup of the restructured Council will not be known until the
army elects its representatives later this week.
The army's six-man delegation will likely be dominated by members of the
Antunes group, but apparently the navy's three allotted representatives-who were
elected yesterday-are either Communists or extreme leftists. In addition to the 12
service representatives, the restructured Council will include the president, prime
minister, internal security chief, armed forces chief of staff, and the chiefs of staff of
the three services.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 18,1975
Armed clashes continued in Beirut yesterday, and government security forces
suffered heavy casualties while attempting to restore order. The fighting was
especially intense in the southeastern part of the city, where a Muslim suburb abuts
a Christian area controlled by the right-wing Phalanges Party. Beirut radio said today
that none of the city's streets is safe and that armed persons are manning barricades
in all sections of the city. The radio urged citizens not to leave their homes.
The Phalangists, who were deeply involved in the fighting last June, have
threatened to step in again if the government-from which they are excluded-does
not call the army into Beirut. So far, the sizable Phalangist militia has limited itself
to setting up roadblocks and occasional shelling.
Interior Minister Shamun has said he is willing to call in the army, but he has
been opposed by Prime Minister Karami and Palestine Liberation Organization
chairman Yasir Arafat. F_ I
The cabinet met yesterday to consider whether to use the army, but apparently
failed to reach a decision. According to Justice Minister Adil Usayran, the question
"will be decided at the next meeting."
Despite the reluctance of Lebanese Muslim and Palestinian leaders to turn to
the army, they have been consulting on contingency plans for just such a move. The
Beirut press speculates that agreement may be reached under which PLO forces will
work with the army, as they have done in northern Lebanon.
The cabinet yesterday did announce creation of a "Committee of National
Reconciliation" to arrange talks among the leaders of the country's political and
religious factions. The principal leaders of the committee are the same politicians
who have been meeting daily in the cabinet, so it is not likely that the new group
will come up with any dramatic initiatives to arrest the deterioration in the security
situation.
Fighting in Tripoli died down yesterday, as leftists gradually implemented the
provisions of the "truce" negotiated Tuesday night. The radical October 24
Movement has released most of the several dozen policemen it had seized, and
Christians and Muslims in the area are negotiating through intermediaries to define
the buffer zone that separates Tripoli and Zagharta.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 18, 1975
A move by the left Radicals to open a dialogue with the government will
further strain the alliance of the Radicals, Communists, and Socialists. This week the
left Radical president, Robert Fabre, sought an appointment with President Giscard
to discuss "the gravity of the situation" resulting from the government's policies.
The three members of the left alliance had previously refused Giscard's
continued invitations to participate in a dialogue between the government and the
opposition on the major problems facing the nation. Earlier this year the left Radical
leadership dissociated itself from a party vice president who publicly criticized the
Communists and said he might support some of the government's programs.
Fabre said he asked for the meeting to begin "the process of returning to
normal relations without in any way renouncing our own political objectives." The
move will add yet another strain to the credibility of the left alliance, already
damaged by the Communist-Socialist dispute over Portugal. The Communists and
Socialists will be forced to consider whether Fabre's move warrants expelling the left
Radicals from the alliance. More significantly, the Socialists may re-evaluate their
own attitude toward dialogue with the government. Socialist leader Francois
Mitterrand had told the National Assembly on September 10 that his party had "no
objection in principle to returning to a practice interrupted in 1958"-when De
Gaulle established the Fifth Republic-and that the Socialists would accept such
invitations when they "think it opportune."
The Communist leadership is adamantly opposed to the contacts and sees the
willingness of its two allies to talk with the government as further evidence of their
half-hearted commitment to the interests of the left and the workers. The
Communists have long suspected that Mitterrand is trying to exploit the alliance to
boost the Socialists to a dominant position on the left, from which he could forge an
alliance with Giscard's government that would effectively exclude the Communists
from power.
Giscard, for his part, has been wooing moderate leftists since he took office last
May and will probably seek to capitalize on his contacts with left Radical leaders to
move them toward cooperation with the government. The center and right wings of
the Radical Party already support Giscard. The President hopes not only to broaden
the base of his government by extending it leftward but also to reduce his
dependence on the Gaullists within the coalition by forming an alliance among his
own Independent Republicans, center parties, and moderate leftists. His coalition
now holds about 290 of the 490 Assembly seats. Although the 14 left Radical
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 18, 1975
deputies would not alter the power balance in the Assembly if they should bolt the
left alliance, their support could offset opposition by some conservative members of
the governing coalition to the liberal social and economic programs Giscard plans to
present to the Assembly later this year.
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