NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028000010025-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 23, 2006
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: August 21, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 21, 1975
CONTENTS
PORTUGAL: Speculation that
Goncalves is on his way out . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
THAILAND: Khukrit facing
first serious political test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
BANGLADESH: Friction
within army intensifies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
USSR-BANGLADESH: Soviet
views on the coup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
USSR-INDIA: India to receive three
Soviet guided-missile destroyers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
INDIA: Gandhi and the judiciary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
LIBYA-TURKEY: Military and
economic agreements signed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
THE NETHERLANDS: Cut in
NATO forces planned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
ITALY: Socialist Party strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
SPAIN: Talks could bring
policy changes soon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
ARGENTINA: Terrorist
violence anticipated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 21, 1975
President Costa Gomes yesterday touched off a wave of speculation that Prime
Minister Goncalves is on his way out with a statement that the duration of his
government "can be expressed in days."
Costa Gomes may have been referring back to his earlier statement that the
Goncalves government is transitional. In the unstable atmosphere of Lisbon,
however, his comments are being widely interpreted as giving substance to reports,
otherwise unconfirmed, that Goncalves' opponents in the military had threatened to
seize power by force if the pro-Communist Prime Minister was not removed within a
week.
The Lisbon press says the ultimatum was delivered by Melo Antunes, the leader
of the anti-Communist faction, who has apparently managed to formulate a
compromise program. He was accompanied by security chief Otelo de Carvalho, as
well as by the army and air force chiefs of staff and five other officers.
The move to oust Goncalves appears to have been strengthened by support
from army Chief of Staff Fabiao. In a press interview published in Paris yesterday,
Fabiao is quoted as saying that the government headed by Goncalves is ineffective
and has little chance of continuing to function. An unconfirmed report alleges that
Costa Gomes signaled his acceptance of the demand for Goncalves' ouster by
speaking of his preference for General Fabiao as a replacement. Fabiao has been
reluctant to enter the power struggle, and this reluctance may in fact improve his
chances of replacing Goncalves and restoring some unity to the armed forces.
Meanwhile, the failure of recent Communist efforts to recapture the political
initiative, such as the aborted rally in Porto last Monday and the ineffective general
strike in Lisbon Tuesday, may be prompting the party to put some distance between
itself and the Prime Minister. Goncalves' opponents reportedly do not rule out
Communist participation in a new government, as long as the party's influence is
kept in proportion to its support among the electorate.
After a wave of anti-Communist violence in the Azores, the military governor
in the islands has ordered several Communist leaders deported. A separatist
organization similar to the one active in the Azores has been established on Madeira,
where a series of anti-Communist incidents has also been reported recently.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 21, 1975
Fresh outbreaks of civil unrest in Bangkok have presented Prime Minister
Khukrit with his first serious political test since taking office five months ago.
In the most serious incident, policemen, protesting the government's release of
nine student and farmer activists arrested last week for kidnaping and arson, stormed
and ransacked Khukrit's house. Across town, a violent confrontation took place
between radical university students and vocational students determined to avenge
the wounding of a fellow student. In addition, striking security guards broke into
Labor Department offices, reportedly wounding one official and abducting three
others.
Khukrit has decided against declaring a state of emergency for the time being.
The police demonstrations may be of particular concern to Khukrit because
they reflect the bitterness of conservative groups over the government's reluctance
to rein in student dissidents. Some military and other senior security officers have
long maintained that civilian rule is not capable of providing Thailand with civil
order and political stability. The government's release of the nine activists following
the week-long student protest lends credence to this belief.
It seems unlikely that the unrest in Bangkok is being orchestrated by any one
group, but it is possible that some of the protesters are being manipulated by others
intent on bringing down the government. There are certain elements in Thailand
who would like to see the experiment in parliamentary democracy end. The radical
left has spoken of its desire to foment unrest in the hope of precipitating a military
coup. They believe that only a coup would force the educated middle class into
joining the communist insurgents. Some conservatives, on the other hand, are eager
to see a military or a more authoritarian parliamentary government in power and
would take advantage of any unrest to discredit the present government.
Khukrit is likely to continue to seek resolution of these issues through
compromise because strong-arm efforts to deal with the situation could easily
backfire on him. A crackdown against the students would be likely to spark a new
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 21, 1975
wave of student protests, whereas a move directed against the police would further
alienate conservatives both in the government and the military. It is possible that the
various protesters will themselves back off and avoid forcing the government's hand.
The students, perhaps more than the other groups, have a vested interest in seem
Thailand's ex ri in democratic government succeed. 25X1
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 21, 1975
Frictions are intensifying within the Bengalee army as the various contenders
for power at middle and senior levels continue to maneuver for position.
Government operations have been immobilized, while the officers who dominate the
new government work out relations among themselves.
Despite their differences, the officers are trying to maintain an outward
appearance of unity; they fear Indian intervention if their dispute gets out of hand.
The senior officers contend that the middle-grade officers are still refusing to honor
the chain of command. The younger officers apparently thought agreement had
been reached early this week to establish a new policy-making group in which they
would share power with the senior officers.
Chief of the general staff Brigadier Khalid Musharraf-the army's number-three
man-may be emerging as the dominant force among the senior military men. He
reportedly is prepared to take drastic action against recalcitrant coup leaders,
including Major Farook-his nephew and confidant before the coup-and Major
Raschid-a nephew of President Mushtaque.
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August 21, 1975
The Soviets have been publicly noncommittal about the coup in Bangladesh,
but-like most observers-undoubtedly see it as a setback for Soviet and Indian
interests.
Moscow had its problems with former president Mujib, who regarded Soviet
economic aid as niggardly, but believed he was the only person who could keep
Bangladesh from disintegrating. The Soviets welcomed his assumption of more
authoritarian power, not only because it was in keeping with their own
predilections, but also because they hoped it would enable him to deal more
effectively with Bangladesh's many problems.
The coup seems to have taken Moscow by surprise. The day before, a Soviet
South Asian expert in Moscow said he thought Mujib had broad support and
therefore stood a good chance of ridding the Bengalee government of its
administrative chaos and corruption. Immediately after the coup, Soviet officials in
Dacca were trying hard to discover the origins of the action and the orientation of
the new regime.
The Soviets are uneasy about Pakistan's early recognition of the new
government, fearing a Pakistani-Bengalee rapprochement can take place only at the
expense of Dacca's ties to New Delhi and Moscow. The Soviets also are unhappy
about what they see as the pro-US sympathies of the coup leaders. Moscow's
greatest concern, however, is that the new government will move to improve
Bangladesh's relations with China.
Until the Soviets have a better idea of Dacca's intentions, they are unlikely to
do or say anything to antagonize the new leaders. Moscow will probably let India
take the lead in testing the sincerity of the new government's pledges that
Bangladesh will continue to follow Mujib's foreign policy. The Soviets may caution
India against an overreaction, even though India apparently needs no such advice.
The Soviets may well worry about the effect events in Bangladesh may have in
India. Moscow has supported Prime Minister Gandhi's power grab, but even prior to
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The Soviet Union will provide three Krivak-class guided-missile destroyers to
India, his destroyer is the most heavily armed
combatant of its size in the world and would be the most modern major combatant
ever exported to any country by the USSR.
The Krivaks are part of an aid agreement signed in February 1975. The first
destroyer will be delivered in 1978, and the other two are scheduled for delivery in
1979 and 1980.
Soviet Krivaks carry the SS-N-10 antiship cruise missile, the SA-N-4
surface-to-air missile, a dual-purpose gun system, and two antisubmarine weapons
systems.
Also reportedly included in this agreement are three minesweepers and three
Nanuchka-class guided-missile patrol boats. Soviet Nanuchkas are armed with the
SS-N-9 antiship cruise missile and the SA-N-4 missile system. Both the Krivak and
the Nanuchka are powered by gas turbines and have a speed in excess of 30 knots.
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A member of Prime Minister Gandhi's legal defense staff says her government is
formulating plans to reduce significantly the powers of the judiciary. The power of
judicial review reportedly will be further curtailed, and administrative courts on the
French model established to handle economic and administrative cases, which
constitute the bulk of the judiciary's business.
The revisions are expected sometime after the Supreme Court decides on the
validity of the recently enacted constitutional amendment that retroactively places a
prime minister's election to parliament outside the jurisdiction of the courts. On
August 25, five members of the Supreme Court, including the chief justice, will
begin hearings on the amendment. Gandhi maintains that the amendment does not
alter the basic structure of the constitution and therefore is valid. If the court
concurs, the case against Gandhi for election violations in 1971 will almost certainly
be voided immediately.
Although four of the five justices who will rule on the constitutionality of the
disputed amendment appear to favor Gandhi, the court is sensitive about its
independence and may prolong the hearings beyond the anticipated two weeks or
even rule against her. In the event of an adverse ruling, Gandhi may once again turn
to parliament, which is subservient to her, to secure her position. She might, for
example, convert it into a constituent assembly that would make major changes in
the governmental structure, including the establishment of a less powerful judiciary.
Gandhi insists that parliament should have supremacy over the courts, arguing that
legislators represent a majority of the people, while the judiciary speaks only for a
privileged minority.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 21, 1975
Libya and Turkey reportedly have negotiated a number of military and
economic agreements over the past several months.
Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil, who was in Tripoli on Sunday, signed
protocols for industrial, banking, and shipping projects agreed to in January. Under
the January accords, Libya agreed to finance a petrochemical plant in Turkey and to
participate in joint ventures in shipbuilding and vehicle assembly. Libya also offered
to provide 22 million barrels of petroleum annually in exchange for commodities.
The two countries reportedly have agreed to set up a joint Libyan-Turkish
bank. They also probably agreed on the use of Turkish contractors, engineering
companies, and the dispatch of workers to augment the 5,000 Turkish personnel
already employed at Libyan construction projects.
Libyan and Turkish air force representatives have discussed establishing an air
force academy in Tripoli and sending Turkish air force personnel to Libya. Earlier,
agreement had been reached on a pilot exchange program in which Turkish pilots
would train on Mirages and Libyan pilots on F-5s. This might facilitate any loan of
Libyan aircraft to Turkey in the future.
Ankara has been exploring the possibility of developing its own defense
industry for several years. The US arms embargo and the availability of Libyan
money doubtless added impetus to the exploration. I
For the Libyans, the Turks are a useful source of technical knowledge and
skilled manpower for Libya's ambitious military and economic development plans.
For the Turks, the Libyans are a useful source of needed oil; the Turks may also feel
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August 21, 1975
The Dutch government, under pressure to trim the budget, informed NATO
last week that it plans to make further reductions in naval forces in order to reduce
defense spending. The plan, if implemented, would significantly reduce, by January
1976, Alliance capabilities for sea surveillance and antisubmarine warfare.
The Hague has agreed to consult with its allies before making any final
decisions. US embassy officials in The Hague believe the Dutch government may
have advised NATO of the planned reduction in order to mobilize opinion within
the Alliance against such a step and strengthen the hand of key Labor ministers who
feel strongly about The Netherlands' obligations to the Alliance.
The Dutch notified NATO of their intention to retire 15 long-range Neptune
patrol aircraft used in sea surveillance and antisubmarine duty and postpone the
purchase of US-built Orion aircraft originally planned as replacements. In addition,
the Dutch flagship, a guided-missile cruiser, would be de-commissioned next month,
rather than in 1977 as planned.
The NATO military committee in Brussels is concerned that if the Dutch do
reduce their forces, the surveillance of Soviet submarine activity in the eastern
Atlantic will be seriously hampered. The committee previously recommended
speeding up the Dutch replacement program and even suggested increasing the
number of patrol aircraft.
In addition to serious budget difficulties stemming from inflation and
unemployment, Prime Minister den Uyl's government has been facing growing
antimilitarism as well. Furthermore, the current atmosphere of detente has raised
questions regarding Dutch participation in NATO.
Both den Uyl and Defense Minister Vredeling have displayed skill and
flexibility in managing the Dutch defense effort over the past two years. Like other
small NATO members, the Dutch have sought ways to stretch their budget to cover
increasing defense costs. A ten-year defense budget plan extending through 1983
and approved by NATO reflects the government's desire to maintain its
commitment. Although the plan is less than two years old, the government had
earlier indicated that it was considering other measures to reduce government
spending, in addition to the latest move affecting naval forces. Some government
opponents also object to the extended time riod covered by the plan, which will
commit future governments to these policies.
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Italian government and party leaders are still grappling with the consequences
of the Communist Party's unprecedented gains in the regional and local elections in
June. The main controversy centers on the continuing trend toward closer relations
between the Communists and the Socialist Party, which is pledged to support the
Moro government in parliament.
Since the elections, the Socialists have shown a clear preference for alliance
with the Communists in the new regional and local governments. The Socialists, who
gained moderately in the elections, now share power with the Communists in most
major Italian cities, 5 of the 20 regions, and nearly a third of the 94 provinces.
Socialist leader De Martino has rebutted criticism from the other parties that
participate in or support the Moro government--the Christian Democrats, Social
Democrats, and Republicans--by maintaining that he is against a Socialist-Communist
coalition at the national level. Such an alliance would not control a majority in the
present parliament, but that could change after the next national election, which
must be held no later than 1977.
De Martino drew additional fire from the other parties last week by signing a
joint communique with Communist chief Berlinguer on the situation in Portugal.
The communique called for a political agreement in Portugal between the
"democratic" parties-including the Communists-and the Armed Forces Movement.
The fact that De Martino associated himself in a joint statement with
Berlinguer drew more criticism than the document itself. Although the Communists
and Socialists have consulted discreetly on policy matters in recent years, they have
not issued joint communiques since the dissolution of their common "front" in
1957.
Berlinguer, for his part, scored a major gain by signing a joint document on a
foreign policy issue with a party that has participated in more Italian governments
for more than a decade. That will help him deflect the renewed criticism he has
come under as a result of his party's recent signing of a joint communique on
Portugal with the Soviets that seemed to give stronger support to the Portuguese
Communists than Berlinguer has in the past. On many occasions, he has publicly
stated his disapproval of Portuguese Communist strategy.
De Martino, on the other hand, will be able to point to the
less-than-revolutionary language in the document he signed with Berlinguer to
support his argument that Italy's Communists are developing into a legitimate
national party. The Socialists have used this line to help justify growing
collaboration with the Communists.
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The Socialists, meanwhile, have spelled out what they regard as a suitable
successor to the Moro government, which is almost certain to be replaced before the
end of the year. Although still opposed to giving the Communists any cabinet
positions, the Socialists desire an arrangement that would allow the Communists to
participate indirectly.
Last week, the Socialists pointed to the regional administrations in Lombardy
and Campania as models for the next national government. Although the
Communists are excluded from the center-left governments formed by the Christian
Democrats and Socialists in those areas, the two parties have agreed to negotiate
formally with the Communists on the regional legislative program.
I I
The meetings General Franco is holding this week with his designated
successor, Prince Juan Carlos, have sparked speculation that an important political
announcement is pending, perhaps as early as today.
Franco has given no indication that he is ready to turn over his powers to the
Prince, though rumors of such a move crop up periodically. There is a wide range of
other possible topics for the talks between the two, including:
--Possible cabinet changes; rightists reportedly have been pressing for the
replacement of Prime Minister Arias, who was damaged politically by Franco's
recent appointment of Jose Solis Ruiz as minister secretary general of the
National Movement.
--Base negotiations with the US; in the round of talks that began this week, the
Spanish raised the possibility of a US withdrawal from all facilities in Spain
except the naval base at Rota if Spain's desire for a NATO connection cannot
be met.
--Counterterrorist measures; tough new regulations are planned that are likely
to draw a hostile reaction from Spain's European neighbors.
--Recent military arrests; some of those arrested reportedly were classmates of
the Prince at the military academy.
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Security forces are bracing for possible major violence by leftist extremists on
Friday, the third anniversary of the killing by the government of 17 captured
terrorists said to be attempting to escape. The left often cites this incident in
support of claims of government repression and to justify its own violent tactics.
An additional justification this year for major violence was last week's
particularly brutal murder of the family of one of those shot in the escape attempt
three years ago. A heretofore unknown group, presumably rightist in orientation and
possibly connected to the well-publicized Anti-Communist Alliance, claimed credit
for the murders. In the course of the theft this week of a military munitions truck,
terrorists killed an army captain. A note found at the scene claimed that the two
principal leftist guerrilla groups had acted jointly and planned to retaliate for the
murder of the family.
In recent weeks, the number of killings and bombings by the left has been on
the rise. Among the victims has been the mayor of the capital city of Buenos Aires
Province. Yesterday, leftist extremists launched gun and bomb attacks against
government buildings and an army barracks in the industrial city of Cordoba,
reportedly killing 5 policemen and wounding 26 civilians.
Although leftist violence has plagued the country since 1969, officials have not
seen it as a threat to the survival of governments. Indeed, full-scale antisubversive
efforts-as opposed to retaliation in kind-have been slow to materialize and have
made only modest headway.
Since the departure of Lopez Rega, widely thought to be backing the
Anti-Communist Alliance, the administration has been at pains to change its rightist
image. It has, for example, eased restraints on the previously heavily censored press
and fired numerous officials connected with Lopez Rega. Last week's murders will
hurt that effort, but of itself the event constitutes only an irritant to the left, whose
goal all along has been to spark -a popular uprising that would bring down the
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August 21, 1975
CAMBODIA: At farewell banquet ceremonies in Pyongyang yesterday, North
Korean President Kim II-song announced that Prince Sihanouk will accompany
visiting Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Khieu Samphan back to Phnom Penh. No
date was given for their departure, but they are expected to leave Pyongyang within
the next few days and return to Phnom Penh via Peking.
an agreement had
indeed been reached between Sihanouk and the Khmer communists permitting the
Prince's return to Cambodia in September. No indication was given, however, as to
the duration of his stay in Phnom Penh or to the political role he may play.
I I
MEXICO: Most of the destruction of Mexican opium poppy fields in the
record-breaking antinarcotics campaign conducted in the first few months of this
year may have occurred after the opium pods had been harvested. A detailed study
by the US Drug Enforcement Administration indicates that as much as 60 percent of
the fields in the main growing area of the northwest had been harvested at least once
before the Mexican eradication teams reached them. This finding casts considerable
doubt on the validity of previous statistics on poppy field destruction and may help
explain why large quantities of Mexican heroin continue to flow into the US.
Harvesting before destruction may have been the result of collusion between the
authorities and the opium growers, simply a matter of poor timing b those who
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JAPAN: Leftist radicals plan a demonstration in Tokyo on August 28 to
counter Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's visit beginning that day. Some 3,000
radicals intend to show opposition to US bases in the country and to embarrass the
two governments. A US air force transport squadron scheduled to arrive in the
Tokyo area from Okinawa may overlap the visit, attracting additional adverse leftist
reaction. The Japanese police have successfully controlled previous incidents with
stringent security measures and overwhelming numbers. Isolated acts of violence by
small groups of terrorists, however, remain a real possibility. On August 14, three
time bombs were exploded virtually simultaneousI at police boxes in different
sections of Tokyo. A leftist group claimed credit.
DIA
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