NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028000010014-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: August 11, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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N ~~
National 1 ntel 1 igence
Bulletin
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
N?_ 669
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 11, 1975
PORTUGAL: Anti-regime
document gaining support 1
ITALY: Christian Democrats to discuss
political issues with the communists 3
THAI LAND: Student demonstrations
cause political tension 5
MALAYSIA-THAI LAND: Joint counter-
insurgency operation authorized 7
PANAMA: Nonaligned
membership planned 8
THAILAND-LAOS: Relations
deteriorating 9
FOR THE RECORD 9
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 11, 1975
The anti-regime document released last week by dissident members of the
Armed Forces Movement appears to be drawing widespread support from military
units throughout Portugal. The decision of the ruling three-man directorate to
suspend the nine original signers from the Revolutionary Council may incite more
soldiers dissatisfied with the way the country is being run by the radicals to accept
the document.
A communique on the suspensions, issued last night by the internal security
forces, says that those officers holding purely political posts were ordered to report
to their general staffs for reassignment. Those who held military positions, namely
the commanders of two of Portugal's three military regions, will retain their
commands. General Otelo de Carvalho, commander of the security forces, has
publicly denounced the dissidents' document, but is reportedly waiting to see how
much support the document gets before fully committing himself. The security
forces' communique is being interpreted as an indication of Carvalho's support for
the dissidents.
Army units, according to press reports, met yesterday to decide how to react to
the suspension of the nine.
The original signers requested that military personnel make their position
known by today. Final assessment of support may be delayed beyond today's
deadline, since circulation of the document has been slowed partly because
pro-Goncalves supporters have threatened to take legal action against those who
circulate the document. Press reports indicate that Information Minister Jesuino has
ordered that no mention of the document be made in the mass media.
The dissidents apparently hope that Goncalves will resign peacefully, but if he
refuses he will have to rely on repressive tactics.
The Socialists, meanwhile, are completely behind Antunes' efforts to diminish
Communist influence in Portugal.
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Nati?nal lntell~gence Bulletin
August 1 i , 1'975
They are also encouraging visits Pram Vtilest European socialist leaders,
oiling t~ attract their support and to demonstrate that the Socialist Party is
acceptable to V1lestern Europe. ?3anish Prime Minister Jorgensen arrives today as the
first of three visitors.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 11, 1975
The Christian Democratic Party last week ended its opposition to discussing
political issues with the Communists on the regional and local level.
-Under former party secretary Amintore Fanfani the Christian Democrats were
flatly against any increase in cooperation with the Communists at the local or
national level. Interim Christian Democratic leader Zaccagnini, however, won
unanimous support from the party's executive directorate for an "open comparison"
of ideas with the Communists on local legislative matters. The Christian Democrats,
nonetheless, maintained their ban on actual participation with the Communists in
local governments.
The new element in the Christian Democratic position is the party's apparent
willingness to bring its contacts with the Communists into the open. As a practical
matter, the two parties have consulted discreetly in many areas for years. The
Communists have tried to make the practice more visible as another way of
establishing their party's respectability.
The question of whether to apply the new standards at the national level will
inevitably arise this fall when the fate of the fragile Moro government comes under
review. The Socialists are making Christian Democratic acceptance of "indirect"
Communist participation a condition for renewed Socialist participation in the
center-left coalition.
Although the new Christian Democratic position paves the way for an
institutionalized dialogue with the Communists at the local level, it is more a
recognition of political reality than a new departure. Christian Democratic
organizations in 5 of the 20 regions-Lombardy, Marche, Lazio, Calabria, and
Basilicata-had already agreed to an overt conversation between the regional
center-left governments and the Communists. The same thing is happening in a
number of cities and provinces.
More characteristic of post-election developments, however, is the proliferation
of Communist-Socialist coalitions. The "red belt," where such coalitions have been
the rule, has now grown from three to five regions with the addition of Liguria and,
more recently, Piedmont. Leftist administrations control all of the cities north of
Rome with more than 300,000 people-Milan, Turin, Venice, Florence, Genoa, and
Bologna. Close to a third of the 94 provinces and provincial capitals have, or are
expected to get, leftist administrations.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 11, 9 975
The Communists are not entirely happy with this trend, because it runs counter
to party chief $erlinguer's goal of an eventual power-sharing arrangement with the
Christian Democrats, i.e., the "historic compromise." The Communists continue to
believe that they need a modus uivendi with the Christian Democrats in order to
avoid provoking adverse reaction in centrist and conservative circles.
Accordingly, the Communists claim, for example, they are "not a bit haPPY'~
about the situation in Milan. The Communist-Socialist majority there was made
possible by the defection of a small group of Christian Democrats and Social
l:lemocrats, a Socialist-engineered development that the Communists fear will sour
their relations with the Milanese Christian ?emocrats. The Communists are trying to
patch things up by offering the Christian Democrats continued access to municipal
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 11, 1975
Students are again causing political tension to rise in Bangkok.
On August 3, nine farmer and student activists were arrested on charges of
kidnaping and arson in north Thailand. Chiang Mai University has been closed, and
students, from the major universities in the country have boycotted classes in
protest. Several political parties, including the Democrat Party, publicly criticized
the government for the arrests. In addition, nine labor unions of state enterprise
workers pledged full support for the student cause, and the National Student Center
of Thailand has been organizing rallies to support the protest. A rally early Friday at
Thammasat University reportedly attracted thousands of student participants who
demanded the immediate release of the nine activists.
The Khukrit government seems to have the situation wel- in hand. It still
intends to prosecute those arrested and has issued a lengthy statement clarifying the
legalities involved and affirming its determination to see the matter through the
courts. The government has also promised a full investigation of the recent wave of
murders of activist farmers, another of the students' demands. The government's
low-key approach-no riot police have been called out-has kept a potentially
volatile situation from getting out of control. The current tense atmosphere is being
aggravated, however, by a growing polarization between the public and Thai security
officials on the one hand and students on the other. While it is clear that the
government is not trying to confront the students, a provocateur from the political
right or left could spark an ugly incident.
Significantly, university officials have taken steps to assist the government. On
the 10th, officials of six Bangkok universities discussed ways to end the student
protests. Reports indicate that the protesting students are getting little public
backing, and student- leaders have announced that they are willing to negotiate with
Khukrit.
The student movement has been sharply fictionalized since its involvement in
the ouster of the Thanom government in 1973. If a cause could be found to pull the
various factions together, however, the students could represent a formidable force
in domestic politics. Moreover, with the support of farm and labor unions-not
usually prone to cohesive action-the movement could offer a significant threat to
Khukrit's coalition. Khukrit, for his part, is basking in his recent successes. He
apparently is prepared to take steps toward meeting some requests of both groups
but will hold the line against unreasonable demands in an effort to establish his
ima a as a stron domestic leader able to maintain law and order.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 11, 1975
The Malaysian and Royal Thai armies have agreed to conduct a combined
counterinsurgency operation-the first in recent years-against sanctuaries used by
Maoist rebels in the east-central part of the border. The strength of the insurgents in
this long-time rebel-controlled area is not thought to be significant.
The Thais will provide one infantry battalion with artillery and border patrol
police support, while Malaysia will contribute three infantry battalions and
supporting units.
In recent weeks, Kuala Lumpur has been pressing Bangkok to commit more
forces to counterinsurgency operations against Malay Maoists. Malaysian leaders
believe that the guerrilla problem could be reduced significantly with greater Thai
cooperation. The Thais have, h ccu ied with insur ent
problems in northern Thailand.
Thailand's Prime Minister Khukrit recently promised greater cooperation and may
have insisted that the Thai military participate in the combined operation as a sign
of good faith. Prospects for military success are limited because of the local Thai
commander's opposition and because the intended locale contains no major rebel
elements. Success will also hinge upon whether participating units merely coordinate
acti"vities on their .respective sides of the border or operate under a single command.
The combined counterinsurgency operation may, nevertheless, be an important
breakthrough, especially, if procedures for inter-army cooperation and cross-border
operations are improved.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 1 i, i975
Panama will formally join the nonaligned nations group at its meeting in Lima
beginning on August 25 to demonstrate independence from the US, enhance its
image among third-world nations, and revitalize its leftist revolutionary credentials.
Chief of Government Genera! Torrijos made the public announcement on
August 7 amid indications that he also plans to establish diplomatic relations with
Moscow before the -end of September, and with Peking in the near future. In the
past, General Torrijos has been careful not to join the nonaligned group, authorizing
only an observer status, in order to avoid the commitments and issue-oriented
responsibilities such membership entails. He has also feared such moves would
antagonize the US and jeopardize treaty negotiations.
The faltering course of negotiations since March, however, coupled with
residual doubts concerning Washington's determination to conclude a new treaty
mast likely caused the General to change his tactics. The expected action in Lima
and movement toward ties with the USSR and China also derive from the General's
need to maintain his nationalist, revolutionary credentials and again assert
independence from the US in the face of opposition criticism at home. The General
probably hopes these moves will convince the US of the desirability of movin
forward with treaty negotiations.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 11, 1975
Relations between Vientiane and Bangkok are deteriorating further. In
apparent retaliation for the lack of Lao action in freeing two Thai assistant military
attaches detained since early last week, Thailand has ordered its ambassador home
for "consultations."
A Foreign Ministry official in Bangkok informed the press on August 10 that
Ambassador Sawet must seek a meeting with the Laotian foreign minister to inform
him officially of the recall order. The meeting is scheduled for today, and if the men
are not released, Sawet plans to return to Bangkok later in the day.
Sawet's planned meeting today with the Laotian foreign minister, however,
seems to indicate a desire to give the Laotians some maneuvering room and perhaps
avoid the actual ambassadorial recall. Bangkok does not want to see the dispute
escalate further and almost certainl wants to avoid a chain of events leadin to a
formal break in diplomatic relations.
USSR: The Soviet press has begun carrying pessimistic reports on the
prospects for the Soviet grain harvest. In stories apparently intended to prepare their
readers for worse news to come, both Izvestia and Pravda have reported that the
summer drought and poor preparation for the harvest are taking their toll on crop
yields. The stories cite instances where corn, originally intended for grain, has had to
be harvested for silage and green fodder. The reports also note some loss of grain
from shattering in areas hardest hit by the drought. Although the stories also blame
poor preparation of machinery and equipment for the worsening prospects, such
charges are common in both good years and bad.
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Top Secret
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