NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028000010004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 6, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National 1 Intel l ig~ence
Bullletin
DIA review(s) completed.
To Secret
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National Inte:lligen~e Bulletin
August 6, 1975
CONTENTS
PORTUGAL: Top military leaders meet
again to discuss executive power 1
ANGOLA: Fighting spreads.
south of Luanda 3
SOUTH AFRICA- RHODESIA: l~lithdrawal
of South African police 4
SOUTH VIETNAM: Food
shortages expected 6
PERU-CHILE: Tension mounts over
Bolivian access to the sea
EGYPT: Helicopter lift
capabilities improved 12
ISRAEL: New defense
group established 13
IRAN-ISRAEL: Tehran pressing
Tel Aviv to be more flexible 14
FOR THE RECORD 16
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 6, 1975
Violence continued yesterday in northern Portugal as the country's top
military leaders, including President Costa Gomes, Prime Minister Goncalves, and
security chief Carvalho, met again in Lisbon to discuss the division of executive
power.
Yesterday, Goncalves met briefly with some members of his former cabinet,
apparently to give the appearance that 'the country's affairs are being administered
by a caretaker government. Top civiliain party leaders such as Socialist Party head
Mario Soares and Communist Party IeadE~r Alvaro Cunhal were excluded.
In northern Portugal, hundreds of demonstrators sacked offices and apartments
of known Communist Party members iri Famalicao, where two demonstrators were
shot to death Monday. A crowd of some 3,000 burned Communist Party
headquarters in nearby Santo Terso.:Similar anti-Communist violence has been
reported in several other areas. A northeirn police spokesman said that the people are
mobilizing in many villages to "finish off' the Communists."
The visiting military governor of the Azores, General Magalhaes, who has strong
family ties in the north, has told US military attaches that there is a strung separatist
movement in northern Portugal. The movement, according to Magalhaes, may soon
begin inciting the people to "rise up" ag~iinst the central government.
A bomb exploded yesterday in Lisbon outside a government office. Operatives
of the rightist Portuguese Liberation Army operating out of Spain reportedly were
responsible for similar incidents several weeks ago.
Communist efforts to infiltrate and control key military units also suffered a
reversal yesterday. Last week, they appeared to have succeeded in ousting a
conservative commander, Colonel Neves, and his supporters from the Amadora
Commando Regiment, outside of Lisbon. After an official investigation, however,
Neves and his men were reinstated and court-martial proceedings were ordered for
the Communist instigators. The Amadora decision should not only reinforce flagging
military discipline, but also give badly needed encouragement to military personnel
who oppose Communist infiltration of their units.
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NCOr~, Clashes Between Popular Movement and National Front Troops
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 6, 1975
Fighting between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola and the
National Front for the Liberation of ,Angola has spread south of Luanda. The
fighting appears to be on a relatively modest scale, but could escalate at any time.
Traditional tribal ties in the area to a third independence movement, the National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola, may draw the National Union into the
conflict.
The National Union has the smalllest military force of Angola's liberation
groups. It has remained neutral in the fighting between its stronger rivals, although it
has been forced to defend itself against a number of smalp-scale attacks by the
Popular Movement over the past feNr months.
Meanwhile, the Portuguese military delegation that visited Luanda last weekend
has returned to Lisbon, leaving behind considerable speculation but no hard
evidence of what policy recommenciatioris it will make to Lisbon. Many Portuguese
military officials in Lisbon and Luanda sympathize with the Popular Movement and
are probably urging in private that thie territory be turned over to it. Such a decision,
however, would be tantamount to invitincl full-scale war throughout Angola.
The Popular Movement and the National Front appear to be awaiting new
political signals from Lisbon. For the time being, they seem content to strip out
their war of attrition and wait for Lisbon to make the next move.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 6, 1975
The South African government's public acknowledgement on August 1 that all
its police forces in Rhodesia are being withdrawn seems intended to underscore
Prime Minister Vorster's impatience with Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith's
refusal to begin settlement negotiations with the black Rhodesian nationalists.
South African police had participated actively in Rhodesian counterinsurgency
operations until last December, when a truce with black insurgents was arranged by
Prime Minister Vorster and four black African presidents. Rhodesian whites are
outnumbered by more than 20 to 1, and the shortage of white manpower limits
further expansion of the security forces.
Without the South African police, the Rhodesian security forces will be hard
pressed if the black nationalists carry out their threat to resume guerrilla warfare
uniess Smith agrees by October to a settlement conference. The black nationalists
insist that the conference take place outside Rhodesia, because several of their exiled
leaders might be arrested if they returned there.
Vorster apparently has now come to believe that leaving even a small police
contingent in Rhodesia has encouraged Smith to evade meaningful negotiations with
the black nationalists.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 6, 1975
Communist officials apparently are preparing the Vietnamese people for
possible food shortages later this year and next. Recent propaganda broadcasts have
stressed that "famine," caused by the old capitalist-oriented agricultural system,
"will continue to wreak a disastrous impact for a long time to come as it cannot be
overcome immediately."
Rice stocks are probably large enough to last until the next harvest this
autumn. Localized shortages are occurring in urban areas and in the traditional
rice-deficit provinces north of Saigon. These reflect distribution problems rather
than a shortage of rice.
Rice output this autumn, however, will be lower than fast year's record crop of
7 million tons. Many peasants fled their farms during the turmoil of the communist
take-over in April. The profit-oriented production and marketing system of the past
has been upset, and previous incentives for growing large surpluses may not have
been maintained. Moreover, farmers are confronted by reduced supplies of
fertilizers, fuel, machinery, and spare parts-all of which must be imported and most
of which were previously financed by foreign aid.
The communists will have to use traditional growing methods such as standard
rice varieties and draft animals, but they hope to compensate partially for
production shortfalls by expanding farm acreage and increasing rural labor. The end
of the war will permit the eventual cultivation of up to a million hectares of
farmland that was formerly insecure or in need of rudimentary clearing and
irrigation.
The dissolution of the South Vietnamese army and cutbacks in urban
employment opportunities have freed labor for farming. The communists have been
sponsoring population movement out of the cities with offers of free land, transport,
seeds, and tools. Since April, several hundred thousand people have reportedly been
resettled.
The communists have thus far avoided a rush to collectivize the agricultural
sector. They probably recognize that such a move would disrupt production even
more. Instead, communal farming has been introduced only in previously settled
communist areas, refugee resettlements, and on newly opened farmlands provided to
urban emigrants.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 6, 1975
These efforts are unlikely to offset expected production declines. Gains in rice
output over the last decade, which averaged about 5 percent annually, resulted
largely from new growing methods, such as planting high-yielding rice varieties, and
extensive use of chemicals and machinE~s. The change in agricultural practices under
the communists will undercut reviou~~ ains and a longer term growth more
difficult.
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i erritorial Losses in the War of the Pacific
~~
Iquique'
"Tarapaca? "
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National Intelligence Blulletin
August 6, 1975
Concern in Peru that Chile is prepared to give Bolivia some form of access to
the sea through Chilean territory ghat formerly belonged to Peru is likely to set off a
round of intense diplomatic maneuvering as officials from all three countries meet in
La Paz today to celebrate Bolivia's independence day.
The most accessible Bolivian outlf~t to the sea would have to pass through the
territory Peru lost to Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879-83). A protocol to a 1929
treaty between Peru and Chile prahibii:s Chile from ceding any of this territory to a
third party without Peru's consent. Although Santiago almost certainly does not
intend any outright cession, a move to give Bolivia greater control over territory in
this area would put Peruvian leaders on the spot.
An announcement from Lima that Peru is prepared to discuss Bolivia's access
problem would put Chile on the defensive, but it could establish a framework for
constructive tripartite negotiations. If, on the other hand, the Chileans make a point
of offering Bolivia more than Peru can accept, tension between the two countries
will mount even further.
We have seen no recent activity that indicates either side is preparing aggressive
action in the immediate future. Both Ctiile and Peru, however, are continuing efforts
to strengthen their military postures in the border area. and each remains suspicious
of the other's intentions.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 6, 1975
Egyptian heliborne operations conducted at multibattalion or perhaps brigade
level will probably play an important role in any future Arab-Israeli conflict.
By the end of 1975, the air force will have more than 125 helicopters,
including over 75 MI-8 Hips and 21 Westland Commandos. With these assets, Egypt
could land about 3,500 commandos in a single lift. The army has some 15,500
personnel who could conduct heliborne operations. Interceptor cover could be
provided by MIG-21 Fishbeds and possiblyMIG-23 Floggers.
In view of Israel's highly effective air defense and ground combat forces,
aircraft and personnel losses in such operations could be heavy. Nevertheless,
potential benefits from limited tactical successes and the psychological effects on
both sides of such attacks might be sufficient to persuade Egyptian commanders to
accept high losses.
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National Intelligence Builletin
August 6, 1975
A joint General Staff -Defense Ministry planning group has been established to
provide strategic and political planning for both the Defense Ministry and the Israel
Defense Forces (IDF) General Staff. It ~~laces the General Staff's existing planning
branch under joint control.
The defense minister will now have pan efficient tool for national security policy
planning and will be less dependent on tt-ie chief of staff for important inputs. In the
past, the defense minister had to depend. on special advisers for long-range strategic
and political planning.
The decision to form the new group was approved by Chief of Staff General
Gur at a meeting between senior IDF officers and Ministry of Defense officials.
Gur's two immediate predecessors werE: opposed to forming such a body. They
probably believed such a move would induce the military's influence in forming
defense policy and increase the prospects for direct political influence in defense
force affairs.
The joint planning group is headed by Major General Tamir, who has directed
the planning branch since its inception following the October 1973 war. The
planning branch has been responsible for strategic plans and long-range defense
forces organization and structure, as well as for assessments of possible terms for a
second Sinai disengagement agreement.
Although the Defense Ministry ap~~ears to be the primary beneficiary of this
organizational change, all cabinet-level decision-makers should be better served. The
group is expected to receive Defense Ministry personnel and should be more ca able
of addressing the broader aspects of Israel's security problem.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 6, 1975
Tehran is pressing Tel Aviv to adopt a more flexible position on Arab-Israeli
questions.
the Iranian press gave
ront-page coverage to a lourna ist s interview wit t e hah. The Shah accused
Israel of delaying tactics that could lead to the replacement of Sadat by an extremist
regime, commented that Tel Aviv is committing a "grave blunder" in relying on
occupied Arab territories for its security, and referred to the occupation as an
"extremely unethical issue," which the US should not defend.
The Iranian foreign minister raised fears in Tel Aviv when he went along with
the Arab resolution at the Islamic conference in Jidda in July advocating Israel's
suspension from the UIV. Iranian diplomats have since begun to vacillate on whether
Tehran will go along with anti-Israeli motions in the UN or will abstain.
The Shah's real leverage over Israel is oil; Iran now supplies approximately 30
percent of Israel's daily domestic requirements. The implicit threat behind the
Shah's increasingly tough talk is that he will cut the flow. The Shah has said
repeatedly, however, that the sale of Iranian oil is not determined by politics; he
probably is not ready to abandon this policy.
The Shah's tactics are not likely to cause Tel Aviv to re-evaluate its position on
Middle East peace negotiations. They will, however, heighten Israel's apprehensions
concerning Iran's reliability as a major supplier of oil and will make Tel Aviv even
more determined to nail down a firm commitment from Washington guaranteeing its
nil requirements before it agrees to return the Abu Rudays oilfields to Egypt under
the terms of another Sinai agreement.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 6, 1975
ISRAEL: According to the US defense attache in Tel Aviv, the Gabriel II
surface-to-surface missile has apparently now been accepted for installation on
Saar-class missile boats. The units reportedly will receive the weapon within six
months. The Gabriel II's 22-nm range is almost twice that of its highly successful
predecessor, the Gabriel I, and should provide the already formidable Israeli missile
boats with significantly improved striking power. The navy will apparently place a
mixture of Gabriel Is and Its on Saar IVs, while the smaller Saar Its and Ills will
receive only the later version. Mixing of the two systems will allow the cheaper
Gabriel I to be used to attack targets at closer ranges. The navy expects to obtain the
US-built Har oon eventually and may mix all three systems on its larger missile
boats.
ARGENTINA: Despite announcements that President Maria Estela Peron was
to have begun a week's vacation, she made awell-publicized return to the
presidential office on August 4. Her reappearance at work seemed designed to
demonstrate that she still has a firm hold on the presidency, although she has, in
fact, virtually relinquished effective power. The business of government has fallen
increasingly to three members of the cabinet who may be working to keep Peron in
the public eye to divert attention from their handling of day-to-day problems. The
retention of Peron as figurehead also suggests that acceptable arrangements for a
successor remain elusive, even though a respected Peronist politician was recently
chosen for the con sessional osition that places him next in the line of succession.
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Top ~'ecret
Top Secret
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