NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027900010029-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: July 18, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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USIB
UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE
BOARD
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
July 18, 1975
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 18, 1975
CONTENTS
TURKEY: Action against
US bases postponed
1
PORTUGAL: Rumors of move to
unseat Prime Minister continue
2
VIETNAM: UN strategy
3
LAOS: Communists now moving
against non-communist missions
4
YUGOSLAVIA: Concern over Soviet
intentions in post-Tito era
7
ARGENTINA: Latest setbacks
to Peron government 8
BRAZIL: Arrests of
subversives continue
OAU: Summit meeting
convenes today
9
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 18, 1975
TURKEY
The Turkish government evidently still hopes to avoid upsetting efforts
currently under way to lift the US arms embargo, despite the expiration yesterday
of its self-imposed deadline for rescinding the embargo.
Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil told Ambassador Macomber yesterday
that his government would defer steps to place the US defense installations on a
provisional status until new agreements are negotiated. Turkey was postponing
action despite the fact that developments with respect to lifting the embargo were
"not as strong as expected" during the 30-day grace period announced on June 17.
Caglayangil said any move to place the installations on a provisional status
would create "difficulties" for President Ford's efforts to lift the embargo. He added
that a final decision on the matter will be made once the US Congress has acted.
The foreign minister claimed, however, that it is necessary for Turkey to open
negotiations immediately to revise the status of joint defense installations. He made
it clear that such negotiations need not deal with substantive matters for some time,
suggesting they are being initiated in part with an eye to mollifing the government's
harsher critics. Caglayangil, pointing out to Ambassador Macomber that the previous
day's cabinet discussion on the subject was "difficult," expressed concern about the
domestic reaction to the government's temporizing action.
The first session between US and Turkish negotiators took place yesterday
afternoon, but it was largely ceremonial. The Turkish side noted that it will not call
for another meetina until the results of Presidentcord's effort with the Congress are
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 18, 1975
PORTUGAL
Rumors of an impending effort to unseat Prime Minister Goncalves continued
to circulate in Lisbon yesterday, but there is no evidence of a struggle in the
Revolutionary Council session on Wednesday that gave Goncalves the task of
forming a new cabinet.
According to council spokesman Lourenco, Goncalves will decide whether to
replace the entire cabinet or only those portfolios left vacant by the Socialist and
the Popular Democratic resignations. The new "nonpartisan" cabinet reportedly will
be composed of both military and civilian members, with the civilians appointed as
individuals and not as party representatives.
Most of the civilians, however, will probably be pro-communist. Socialist leader
Soares has said that no member of his party will serve in the new government as long
as the differences between the Socialists and the Armed Forces Movement remain
unresolved. The Popular Democrats will probably take the same line.
Moderate officers in the Revolutionary Council reportedly have planned to
block Goncalves' effort to form a new cabinet. Should he present to the council and
the President a cabinet list heavily weighted in favor of the Communists, the
moderates could have their opportunity to move.
Some newly
formed popular committees have scheduled a rally tonight in ()porto to compete
with one planned by the Socialists. The Communists have issued a statement
attacking .the Socialists' plan to appeal to the people, and have pledged to resist the
new "wave of reaction."
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 18, 1975
VIETNAM
Hanoi has issued a strong blast against Secretary Kissinger's criticism of
third-world countries in the UN, in a bid for support for its own application for UN
membership. The commentary, published in the official party journal Nhan Dan,
suggests that Hanoi will count heavily on nonaligned support to get into the General
Assembly this year. A similar strategy presumably will be pursued by the
Saigon-based communist administration. The Algerians reportedly will sponsor the
Provisional Revolutionary Government.
In the Nhan Dan commentary, Hanoi chronicles a long history of
"contemptible actions" by the US designed to control the UN. The commentary
maintains that it was the seating of third-world countries in the early 1960s that
undercut US control and that Afro - Asian - Latin American solidarity and
effectiveness in the UN improved when these nations began to follow the
Vietnamese model of struggling for "national independence and peace."
North Vietnam is probably confident of lining up the necessary votes among
third-world and Socialist countries to get into the General Assembly.
The Vietnamese may believe they can build enough pressure in that body to
discourage a veto by the US in the Security Council. Hanoi previously has registered
concern about the US attitude and made it a topic of discussion in almost every
recent contact with foreign governments on the subject of diplomatic
representation.
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July 18, 1975
LAOS
The Lao communists, having forced a drastic reduction in the size and role of
the US mission, are focusing on the activities of other diplomatic missions.
The Lao are moving rapidly to eliminate any non-communist foreign
diplomatic presence outside of Vientiane?perhaps to give the communists an
opportunity to install new administrations throughout the country without
observation. The Thai, who have been subjected to virulent propaganda barrages for
months, closed their three consulates last week because of uncertainty about the
safety of their personnel. The Lao have also asked the French to close their three
small military training missions in the provinces and have suggested that Japanese
and Australian voluntary agencies end all activities outside Vientiane. The
government has thrown up bureaucratic barriers to travel outside Vientiane by
foreigners.
Although other non-communist missions in Vientiane have been spared intense
harassment, pressure is building. All are finding it increasingly difficult to transact
even the most routine business with the government. In contrast, the Soviets claim
they are having no such problems. A pro-communist Vientiane newspaper recently
lumped the Australians with the Thai as obstructers of progress toward national
reconciliation. Leftist student spokesmen are saying that they are examining the size
of diplomatic missions so as to recommend limitations to the government. These
students in past months have been principal agents of the communists.
The French, British, Australians, and Japanese provide much-needed economic
assistance through small aid projects and the Foreign Exchange Operations Fund
(FEOF). The US, which provided the major share of funds for FEOF, recently made
its final contribution to it.
The communists would like to continue to receive this assistance beyond the
current calendar year, but they may insist that it be administered free of foreign
control. Used to years of austerity in the caves at Sam Neua, most communist
leaders probably see little reason to end the restrictions on the non-communist
diplomatic presence iust to ensure continued aid.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 18, 1975
YUGOSLAVIA
Despite Moscow's efforts to improve ties with Belgrade, high-level Yugoslav
authorities continue to view the USSR with distrust. At the same time, they are
seeking Western support in the event of attempts by Moscow to influence
developments in the post-Tito era.
suspicion of Soviet motives leads Belgrade officials to
operate on the premise that Moscow will continue to stir up dissident groups in
preparation for Tito's eventual demise. The Soviet activity is said to be taking place
both at home and abroad and could include the Croatian exile terrorists, the Ustashi.
The Soviet effort is intended to weaken Yugoslav internal security as a prelude to
further Soviet penetration.
Yugoslav authorities are also said to be aware that Tito's death could trigger
preplanned agitation by Soviet sympathizers, followed by "appeals" for Soviet
forces to "restore order." Unlike the situation in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the
Yugoslav army will defend the country's territorial
integrity?a principle Tito has succeeded in firmly establishing.
While Belgrade realizes its inability to resist a large-scale Soviet
invasion?especially over terrain suitable for armored vehicles?the experience of
Yugoslav partisans against the Germans during World War II has led officials to
believe a similar campaign would exact a heavy toll from invading forces.
the Yugoslav leadership does not expect substantial
assistance from other nations to be forthcoming, should an invasion take place. The
chances for success under these circumstances might be slim, but Yugoslav armed
forces would oppose invading troops with all available resources. Yugoslavia,
however, has not abandoned hope for outside aicll
President Tito, for his part, has in the past successfully courted the Soviets
without effectively yielding Yugoslav independence or turning a blind eye to Soviet
meddling. As the 1974 Cominformist affair illustrated, however, he is also aware
that Moscow will not wait until his death before attempting to interfere in
Yugoslavia's internal affairs.
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July 18, 1975
ARGENTINA
Strong opposition to President Peron's policies and advisers continues to
weaken her government. The most recent setbacks are the resignation of the
president of the Central Bank, which occurred on July 16, and a renewed drive by
labor leaders to terminate the political influence of former social welfare minister
Lopez Rega, whom they apparently believe is still her chief aide.
Mrs. Peron has been absent from her office for two days because of what press
aides describe as the flu. A press report indicates she is about to request a leave of
absence; indeed, rumors have been circulating for some time that Mrs. Peron would
depart temporarily or even resign.
The announcement of a new devaluation of the peso, the second in less than six
weeks, sparked the resignation of the government's second highest economic official,
Ricardo Cairoli, who stated publicly that he had not been consulted in the decision.
His charge, if true, would highlight the lack of policy coordination at a time when
Argentina is threatened with having to default on foreign debt obligations because of
a lack of adequate federal reserves.
The government has not been able to formulate proposals for dealing with the
worsening economic situation that are politically acceptable to labor. Minister of
Economy Rodrigo, a protege of Lopez Rega, is continuing to push most of the
economic austerity program he outlined on June 30, but he is largely discredited and
may soon be forced to resign. Strikes and work stoppages are occurring daily in
various cities as worker dissatisfaction grows, out of concern that even the recent
massive wage hikes soon will be eaten up by soaring inflation.
Labor leaders, formerly Mrs. Peron's strongest political supporters, have
become her most persistent adversaries. They have requested another urgent meeting
with her, ' undoubtedly to make new demands for the dismissal of Rodrigo. In
addition, they have decided to press for a complete restructuring of the Peronist
political hierarchy in order to eliminate the influence of Lopez Rega from the
movement. They have informed Lopez Rega's son-in-law, Raul Lastiri, who heads
the Chamber of Deputies, that they intend to choose new party officials soon.
Although there is no evidence of active military plotting against the
government, restiveness about the lack of effective national leadership is increasing.
Furthermore, by clinging to the hated Lopez Rega and retaining four cabinet
ministers who are believed to be his allies, the President has alienated labor and
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 18, 1975
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BRAZIL
Security forces-which are increasingly
apprehensive over opposition activities in congress and in le press, have recently
accelerated arrests of communists and leftists.
About 100 were taken into custody recently in the states of Sao Paulo, Rio de
Janeiro, and Bahia, and the Federal District of Brasilia. Despite President Geisel's
strict orders against torture and illegal detention, some of those arrested in Sao
Paulo reportedly were initially mistreated, held without the required notification
being given within 48 hours of arrest, and not charged.
There are increasing indications of growing discontent by hard-line military
officers and frustration over presidential moves toward political liberalization, which
they consider a threat to the nation's internal security. Despite the strong
admonitions by the President and the minister of justice, such intentional abuses
undoubtedly will continue.
The officers' objective is to convince the President and other key military
officers of the communist threat and to highlight the dangers of antigovernment
criticism. They hope to exert pressure on the President to preserve and increase the
use of extraconstitutional security regulations.
Thus, despite the President's desire to continue his program of relaxing political
controls, pressures antagonistic to the program?including the need to preserve
military unity?make further significant liberalization unlikely.
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July 18, 1975
OAU
Foreign ministers of the Organization of African Unity meet today in Kampala,
Uganda, in the preliminary phase of this year's OAU summit meeting. The heads of
state and government are to convene from July 28 to August 3.
The summit will probably focus on the stalled Rhodesian settlement talks,
proposals for closer Afro-Arab economic cooperation, and Africa's position on
world economic reforms to be presented at the special session of the UN General
Assembly in September.
The Palestine Liberation Organization has been invited to address the summit
and will probably solicit support for a resolution calling for Israel's expulsion from
the UN. Such a resolution was adopted at the Islamic foreign ministers' conference
earlier this week. The Algerians would be willing enough to sponsor the resolution
for the PLO. The Africans, however, may not be ready to commit themselves on the
issue; they resent past Algerian pressure tactics and the Arabs' refusal so far to
provide African countries with concessionary oil prices or significant development
aid.
Problems such as the fighting in Angola, the Eritrean rebellion in Ethiopia, and
Soviet military facilities in Somalia will probably not receive much, if any, formal
attention. The OAU is reluctant to tackle issues that it regards as internal matters.
The OAU chairmanship for the coming year is expected to pass to Uganda's
President Amin, since the position customarily is given to the summit host. The
meeting could be more sparsely attended than usual because many chiefs of state do
not want to be openly associated with Amin. Botswana President Khama has already
publicly declared that his government will not participate. Other African leaders are
trying to make the best of the situation. Nigeria's General Gowon, for one, has
appealed for a successful summit in the interest of African unity.
The summit was postponed from mid-June to allow for participation by the
leaders of Mozambique, the Cape Verde Republic, and the Democratic Republic of
Sao Tome and Principe?all of which gained their independence from Portugal
during the past month. Representatives of the Comoro Islands, which have declared
independence from France will also be on hand seeking OAU recognition.
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