SAUDIA ARABIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00364R000300120002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

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SAUDI ARABIA
Leader: King Faysal
Population: about 3.8 million
Attitude toward US: Before the Arab-Israeli War, Saudi
Arabia was closer to the US than any other Arab
country -- partly because of the amazingly success-
ful relationship between the Saudis and the American-
owned Arabian American Oil Co. (ARAMCO), partly
because Faysal is almost fanatically anti-Communist
and saw the US as a kindred spirit.
Attitude toward the USSR: Saudi Arabia has no diplomatic
relations with the Soviet Union, and Faysalis - STATINTL
STATINTL convinced that the Soviets are
wore ng to overthrow him and all remaining tradi- STATINTL
tional regimes in the Arabian Peninsula.
Attitude towards a peace settlement: Faysal is
convinced that Palestine must
be re-urne to the Arabs. Because he is the guardian
of the Muslim holy places in Mecca and Medina, he
feels a personal responsibility for Jerusalem as
well. He attitude could complicate a possible
peace settlement with Israel, even though Saudi
Arabia was not directly involved in the war.
Size of Armed Forces: army 28,000; navy 200; air force
5,150 (100 pilots); national guard 28,000.
Political factionalism and opposition groups: In Saudi
Arabia, the royal family is firmly in the saddle, but
there are certain groupings within the royal family
that could pose a problem in the event of Faysal's
death
STATI NTL STATINTL
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Otherwise, there
s little organized opposition in the countr
So far,
political opposition is more or less confined to
the workers in the oil installations in the Eastern
Province, who are exposed to more sophisticated
political ideas and subversive influences.
Position and influence vis-a-vis the other Arabs: Before
the war, Saudi Arabia had been the leader of the
"conservatives" among the Arab states -- Morocco,
Libya, Kuwait, and the shaykhdoms of the Persian
Gulf. Because of its financial and material support
of the Yemeni royalists, Saudi Arabia had become
embroiled with Egyptian troops in Yemen and had
come close to the brink of war. The war weakened
the socialist Arab states, however, and Egyptian
dependence on Saudi subsidies has given Saudi Arabia
a. voice in Egyptian policy.
Oil: Saudi Arabia produced 2,597,600 barrels per day in
1967, amounting to an estimated $879 million in
revenues paid to the government.
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UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (EGYPT)
President: Gamal Abd al-Nasir, born 1918, one of leaders
of the successful military coup against the monarchy
in 1952, emerged as the real leader of Egypt in
1954.
Population: 32,000,000 as of 1969, over 90% Muslim.
Attitude toward US and USSR: Egyptian relations with the
US have fluctuated dramatically over the years.
Egypt sees considerable value in maintaining moderately
good relations with the US now as a counter-balance
to the urge Soviet presence in Egypt, and in the
hope the US will be more amenable to the Arab
viewpoint in working out a settlement of the Arab-
Israeli impasse. Egypt views Soviet military,
diplomatic, and economic aid as necessary but at
the same time is wary of becoming totally dependent
upon Moscow at the expense of all ties with the
West.
Attitudes toward a peace settlement: Egypt desires a
peaceful settlement if possible but one that can be
pictured as honorable by the Arabs. Will not agree
to any arrangement that appears to be surrendering
to Israeli terms. Would like a solution that
appears imposed by the great powers or the United
Nations.
Size of Armed Forces: Egypt has some 160,000 men in all
branches of its military services. It has some 1,200
tanks and assault guns, and about 500 aircraft of all
types.
Political factionalism: The Nasir regime is confronted
with the most serious opposition it has yet had to
face. Following the war with Israel in 1967, unrest
in the military grew dramatically. Civilian unhappiness
is also at an all time high, highlighted by two out-
bursts of student rioting in 1968. The opposition
appears diffused, however, so Nasir will probably be
around for awhile yet.
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Position and influence in the Arab World: Nasir's pre-
eminence in the Middle East has waned since the
military debacle of June 1967 but he remains the
most prominent single Arab leader of modern times.
With the powerful propaganda facilities at his
N STATINTL
STATINTL disposal,
Nasir
continues to command considerable respect in the
Middle East.
Oil: Petroleum production in Egypt has risen dramatically
in the last few years and is one of the brightest
hopes for the future of the Egyptian economy. Egypt
now exports some crude oil and hopes to be producing
near 300,000 barrels per day by mid-1969.
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SYRIA
Leaders: Syria is governed by a military junta theoretically
loyal to the principles of the Arab Socialist Resurrection
Party -- the Baath. The Baathists took power in 1963
after a long succession of tumultous military and
civilian governments, but underwent a major reshuffle
in 1966 when a radical wing of the party took power
from a slightly less radical clique. The Baath
has hung on to power by virtues of its support within
the military, and the regime has been extremely
successful in repressing and purging opposition
groups of various stripes. Most Nasirists, conser-
vatives, and rival Arab nationalists have lost almost
all of their influence, and the present group is
narrowly-based Baathist group dominated by members
of a minority Muslim religious sect.
Population: Approximately 5,800,000. Of these, 90%
are Arab. 70% of the population are members of the
Sunni sect, and only 16% members of various minority
Muslim sects.
Attitude towards the US and the USSR: The Syrians are
bitterly antagonistic towards the US. Even before the
June 1967war American officials were almost univer-
sally distrusted by Syrian officialdom and, since
that time, we have had no diplomatic relations with
the country.
The Syrians have become heavily dependent on Moscow
for both military and economic aid. While the Soviets
have had some difficulty in keeping the rabid Syrians
in line from time to time, relations are extremely
close between the two countries. The Syrians; appear,
however, to be unwilling to let the Soviets infiltrate
too deeply into Syrian affairs.
Size of Armed Forces: Syria has an army of 55,000 men,
a navy of 1,000, and an air force of 2,100. In addition,
the government sponsors a national guard of approxi-
mately 5,000 men.
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Political factionalism and/or opposition groups: There
are no significant opposition groups in Syria.
The major opposition extant today comes from
exiled Syrian politicians -- mostly the so-called
"old Baathist" -- working out of Beirut and Baghdad.
The major threat to the regime lies in its own
basic instability and in the constant infighting among
its members. Any successor regime in the near future
would be likely to be some realignment of the present
players.
Position and influence vis-a-vis the other Arabs: The
Syrians have relatively little influence other than
harrassment over their fellow Arabs. Nasir is
still calling the shots pretty well in the Middle
East.
Attitude towards a peace settlement: Syria has consistently
been adamant in its opposition to a peace settlement.
If, however, Jordan and Egypt could work something
out with the Israelis, they would probably give the
agreement a tacit acceptance. The Soviet Union
would certainly urge them to do so.
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Leader: King Husayn is indisputably the ruler of the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. With the support of
his bedouin followers, he fully dominates the
government, despite occasional grumblings from
Palestinian elements in the country.
Population: Approximately 1,300,000 (post-June 1967);
almost one-half of these are refugees.
Attitude toward US and USSR: Jordan has long been friendly
to the US. The government has tried to continue
a policy of procuring arms only from the West -- the
most recent action along this line is a deal by which
the US will supply F-4's to the Jordanian air force.
Moscow has offered to discuss military assistance,
but the government has turned down such offers.
Economic aid is predominantly from the West, although
small Soviet deals have been concluded in the past.
The last Jordanian economic delegation spent a
chilly time, and Soviet proposals have apparently
been rejected to expand the program.
Attitude towards a peace settlement: Jordan is the most
anxious of any party involved to obtain a peace
settlement. Jordan lost more important territory,
and has been more affected politically since the war
than Egypt. Husayn, however, is politically unable
to seek a separate peace, and feels that he must
settle in the context of a total peace arrangement.
A separate peace without Cairo's public blessing
would probably be the end of the Hashemite dynasty.
Size of armed forces: Army, 50,000; navy, 150; air force,
2$500 (38 pilots)
Political factionalism and/or opposition groups: The
major opposition in the country is from the Palestinian
population. Radical Arab nationalism has found a
foothol among the Palestinians, who, should Husayn
be deposed or assassinated, would play a leading role
in a future government. The public's sympathy for
terrorist activity is high, and the terrorists
sufficiently strong that the government seems in-
capable fully of squashing their activities. Organized
political activity is still minimal, however, and the
Baathist, Nasirists and Communists in the country do
not at present constitute a formidable political
opposition force.
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Position and influence vis-a-vis the other Arabs: Jordan
is somewhat of a political maverick in the Arab world,
in that Husayn has kept his ties with the West and
eschewed the general rush to Moscow. In the area,
however, Husayn is compelled to make the proper
Arab noises and pay lip-service to Cairo. At the
same time, he takes no pains to conceal his contempt
for the Syrians. Jordan is one of the beneficiaries
of the Khartoum conference, and has been receiving
substantial financial assistance since the war from
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya.
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Leaders: The Sudan is governed by an extremely unstable
coalition of civilian politicians. The civilian
political parties have tried to lead the country
since 1964, when civil protest led to the army's
stepping from power after 5 years of military rule.
'he present government -- which might fall apart
or be subjected to a realignment of political groups
-- is dominated by a fairly leftist and Arab-
nationalist minded party known as the Democratic
Unionist Party.
Population: 15,000,000. 39% are Arabs, and most of the
remainder represent negroid strains of one kind
or another. 73% of the population are Muslim, and
many of the negroid southerners are Christian.
Attitude toward US and USSR: While the Sudanese people
are basically friendly to the US, the majors y of the
government -- particularly the foreign minister --
are not. Relations with the US were broken after
the June 1967 war, and the limited US aid projects
then in process cut off. The government had been
traditionally pro-Western, but in the past two years
has turned closer to Cairo's Arab nationalism and
last year concluded an arms agreement with Moscow.
Attitude towards a peace settlement: The Sudan will
follow Egypt's line as regards a peace settlement.
Premier Mahjoub fancies himself as an international
peacemaker, but will have little chance of exercising
his influence in a situation in which the Sudan plays
no direct role.
Size of Armed Forces: Army, approximately 26,000; navy,
200; air force 500 (40 pilots).
Political factionalism and/or opposition groups: Sudanese
politics are characterized by a constant shifting
of factions, largely based on personal rather than
ideological principles. The major oppostion group
at present is the Sadiq al-Mahdi branch of the Umma
Party -- the other branch of the party remains part
of the government. The DUP itself, which dominates
the government, is a disparate organization which
could break apart at any time.
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Position and influence vis-a-vis the other Arabs: The
Sudan, a member of the Arab League, plays little
role in the Arab world. The Sudan has always been
especially susceptible to Egyptian influence, but
has little influence of its own to bring to bear
on its fellow Arabs. With no oil, no political
influence, and a remote position geographically,
the Sudan is definitely on the fringe of the Arab
world.
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IRAQ
President and Prime Minister Hasan al-Bakr; Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of Defense Hardan Tikriti;
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior Salah
Ammash.
Population: 8,791,000
Attitude towards US: Although a socialist Arab state,
whose armed forces are equipped by the Soviet Union,
Iraq had grown increasingly friendly toward the
US before the Arab-Israeli war. At that time
diplomatic relations were severed and the government
has remained hostile ever since. Iraqi propaganda
is proabably more virulently anti-American than that
of any other Arab state; the CIA is currently being
accused of working with Israel to establish espionage
networks throughout the country. Seven Americans --
six of them women -- were recently arrested and held
without formal charges, although all have now been
released. Iraq's anti-American posture is a reaction
to US support of Israel, but its intensity also
reflects the instability of the Iraqi regime.
Attitude towards Soviet Union: Soviet stock in Iraq
has never been higher. Despite the fact that the
USSR is the source of Iraqi arms, relations were
chill before the Arab-Israeli war, primarily because
of Soviet support for rebelling Iraqi Kurds. Now,
however, the Soviet Union has become the chief friend
of the Arabs, and relations are close.
Attitude towards a peace settlement: Iraq's position
towards Israel is probably more intransigent than
that of any other Arab state. Iraq was not directly
involved in the fighting in June 1967, but has
denounced the UN resolution. Some 22,000 Iraqi
teoops are now stationed in neighboring Jordan and
would be involved in any renewal of large-scale
fighting. No Iraqi leader has suggested the slightest
willingness to compromise with Israel on any point.
Size of Armed Forces: army 80,000; navy 400; air force
3,550 (260 pilots); mobile police force 4,800.
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Political factionalism and opposition groups: Those now
in power in Iraq belong to the "moderate" wing of
the Iraqi Baath Party. Bakr, Tikriti, Ammash
and a number of others are rivals for power, however,
and are engaged in complicated maneuvers against
one another which will sooner or later result in
some kind of coup attempt. Meanwhile, various other
groups would like to take power -- the left wing of
the Baath Party; a group of junior army officers;
the Communists; pro-Nasirists; and a number of in-
dividuals out for themselves. Several of these
elements are likely to combine in a coup attempt --
perhaps with one or more of those presently in
power.
Position and Influence vis-a-vis the other Arabs: Iraq
has little influence among the other Arab states,
most of whom are embarrassed by Iraq's uncompromising
and unrealistic attitude towards Israel. Iraq is
in a position to exert influence on Jordan, however,
through its troops on Jordanian soil -- probably
enough to overthrow King Husayn if Iraq so desired.
Iraqi propaganda could hinder more moderate Arab
leaders trying to compromise with Israel.
Oil: Iraq is the fourth-largest producer in the Middle
East. Production in 1967 amounted to 1,222,000
barrels per day, and yielded the government an
estimated $352 million in revenues.
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Leader: Amir Sabah al-Salim Al Sabah
Population: 546,000
Attitude toward US: Kuwait is historically closer to
the UK than to the US, but relations with the US
have been generally good. There were anti-American
demonstrations during the Arab-Israeli war, but
relations were never severed. Kuwait is disappointed
in US support for Israel, but is less emotional
on the subject than is Saudi Arabia.
Attitude toward USSR: Relations with the USSR are not
close; the regime is fully aware that Communism
would threaten its own existence. At the same
time, Kuwait appreciates Soviet support for the
Arab cause.
Attitude towards a peace settlement: Kuwait was not
directly involved in the Arab-Israeli war. Because
of an extremely large Palestinian element in its
population, Kuwait actively supports the fedayeen
both officially and through private donations.
However, Kuwait would probably go along with a
settlement if all of the other Arab states did so
as well.
Size of Armed Forces: army 8,000; air force 50 (8 pilots);
police force 1,500.
Political factionalism: the royal family is split into
two major blocs, and power must be balanced between
them. So far, however, they have managed to hang
together.
Opposition groups: The most important opposition group
in Kuwait is the Kuwait Arab Nationalist Movement,
which is linked with the area-wide Arab Nationalist
Movement.
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Position and influence vis-a-vis other Arabs: Kuwait is
a very small state with a very great deal of money,
and thus serves as a tempting target. Only prompt
British assistance prevented its absorption by
neighboring Iraq when the British gave Kuwait its
independence in 1962. Since then, Kuwait has success-
fully followed a policy of buying independence by
supplying funds to other Arab countries. Like Saudi
Arabia and Libya, Kuwait possesses economic leverage
over Egypt and Jordan through periodic subsidies.
Oil: Kuwait produced 2,295,000 barrels per day in 1967;
revenues to the government amounted to an estimated
$616 million.
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ISRAEL
1. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol as head of the
ruling Labor Party is the effective head of government.
Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan because of his immense
popularity and position is undoubtedly the second
most important Israeli leader. Israel's current population
is about 2.7 million. Israel currently occupied Arab
territory of some 25,000 square miles it took during the
June 1967 war -- 3 times the size of Israel;there are
some 1.1 million Arabs in the occupied territories.
2. Israel looks to the U.S. as its prime protector
and supporter, a source of funds and armament. Israel's
previous close association with France has soured with
De Gaulle's change of Middle East policies. The Soviet
Union broke relations with Israel as a result of the
June war, and Israel looks on Moscow as the primary
supporter of the Arab States and thus the prime trouble
maker in the Middle East. Israel would like nevertheless
to re-establish diplomatic with the Russians, and to
obtain Soviet permission for the emigration to Israel of
the 2-3 million Jews still held in the USSR.
3. Israel insists that it has been looking for a
peace settlement with the Arabs for the 20 years of
its existence. It thought after the June war that
peace was on the horizon. Soviet re-armament of the
Arabs they believe blocked Israel from obtaining it
on Irael's terms. Today, Israel professes to doubt
that the Arabs want or can make a viable peace, and
while willing to talk peace, Israel believes it may have
to accept something less than a viable peace. In the
meantime, Israel plans to sit on the occupied territories,
develop them, until a peace satisfactory to Israel can
be achieved. Israel, as the victor, of course would
like to dictate the peace settlement, and is opposed
to the Soviet and French proposals for four-power
talks since these, they feel, will lead eventually to
an imposed solution, unsatisfactory to Israel.
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4. Israel's military strength vis-a-vis the Arabs
is qualitative, not quantitative; its forces are
superior to the Arabs in skill, knowledge and techniques.
Israel has an army of about 65,000, a navy of about
3,000, and an air force of 11,000 with about 600 pilots,
It has some 262 jet aircraft, one destroyer, 2 active
submarines, and 15 patrol craft. It also has Hawk
missile units. Israel's military budget is about one-
third of the tt al budget.
5. Israel is presently governed by a "national
unity" cabinet formed for the June war. The core of Isrel's
government is the Labor Party which has through alignment
of other lesser parties now has (for the first time in
20 years) an absolute majority (63) in the 120-member
Knesset. The groups in "opposition" include the small
Communist parties, some right-wing parties, and the
religious parties. None of these could form a government.
Political factionalism centers within the Labor Party,
the most notable, being the faction led by Moshe Dayan
and Simon Peres, and the faction led by Deputy Prime
Minister Allon. Both Dayan and Allon are ambitious to
succeed Eshkol, but both a currently within the Labor
Party since it alone is the route to power.
6. Not applicable to Israel.
7. Israel is normally dependent on outside sources
for oil, but currently is believed to be supplying its
domestic oil requirements from the captured Egyptian oil
fields in Sinai and offshore.
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LIBYA
Head of State: King Idris I
Head of Government: Prime Minister Wanis al-Qa.ddafi
The King and majority of the ruling establishment
are very pro-US. Libya depends on US and the UK for
defense against external aggression although the US had
made no formal commitment to defend the country. A
further factor binding the two countries together is the
nearly one billion dollars in revenue that Libya annually
receives from American economic interests in the country.
While the USSR and Libya have diplomatic relations,
the Libyan attitude toward the Soviet Union can best
be described as cool and correct. The Soviets have
no economic interests in the country and it is very
doubtful that the King would allow them to acquire any.
While the Libyan government is very anxious to see
a peace settlement reached as soon as possible, it must
be careful not to espouse any terms of the settlement
that are not acceptable to the Arab states directly
involved in the dispute, Egypt, Jordan and Syria. The
emotional force of the Palestine issue among the general
population is such that any other course of action by
the Libyan government would result in public disorder.
The armed forces, which number ' 24000, are
adequate to maintain public order and internal stability.
However, should there by an external aggression outside
aid would be needed. Libya presently has a defense treaty
with the UK providing this aid. We would cooperate with
the British in this.
There are no opposition groups of any importance in
the country. Leftist elements attempted to form a
political organization, which is illegal under Libyan law,
after the June 1967 war but government security forces
put an end to this within a very short time.
Ordinarily Libya has very little influence with
other Arab states. However, since the June 1967 war it
has provided Egypt and Jordan with $75 million in financial
support. This has helped to moderate Egypt's attempts
to subvert other Arab states.
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Libya is the third largest oil producing nation
in the Middle East. Its revenues from oil totaled over
$1 billion for 1968 and is expected to grow by 42 per
cent during the next decade. US oil companies loom
very large in the Libyan oil complex.
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LEBANON
Head of State: President Charles Hilu
Head of Government: Prime Minister Rashid Karami
Population: approximately I million
The government and about one half of the populationis
pro-US and look upon it as the guarantor of the country's
continued independence. The radical elements, mostly
Muslims as opposed to the pro-American Christians,
identify very closely with Syria and Egypt and are
anti-American because they feel the US government follows
a pro-Israel policy in the Middle East. The Soviet Union
on the other hand is popular among the Muslim masses
because of its military support and political support
in the UN of the radical Arab states. The government main-
tains a correct, but cool, attitude towards the Soviet
government.
The government is very anxious to see a peace
settlement reached as soon as possible because it feels
that is considerable danger to the nation's continued
existence as an independent state in he absence of a
settlement. It is caught in a tug of war between the
radical Arab state of Syria and Egypt on the one hand and
Israel on the other. The two Arab states are pressuring
Lebanon to take a more active role in the struggle against
Israel and Israel is warning Lebanon if it does so,
Israel will retaliate.
The Lebanese Army is about the size of an American
Army division, the navy and air force are very small with
not more than a few hundred men each. The armed forces
are able to maintain internal security but they would not
be able to defend the country against any of its neighbors.
The Communist Party is one of the largest in the
Middle East and a subversive threat to the country. The
major threat to Lebanon however comes from various left
wing Arab nationalist parties that want to see Lebanon
incorporated into a larger Arab state.
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Lebanon has very little influence vis-a-vis
the other Arab states. With a population that ih
about one half Christian, it has always occupied a
special position in the area. It has usually played
the role of a bridge between the Christian West and
the Muslim East.
Lebanon has no oil deposits within its territory.
What income it gains from oil comes from transit chargers
levied on American and British companies that have pipe-
lines running to terminals in Lebanese territory.
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