NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027800010038-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 3, 2005
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: June 23, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence Bulletin
June 23, 1975
CONTENTS
PORTUGAL: Military leaders
issue broad policy statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
TURKEY: Ecevit blames
government for armed attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
FRANCE: Leftist leaders
fail to reach agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
YUGOSLAVIA: Additional
import restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
ANGOLA: Latest agreement may be
little more than an uncertain truce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
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National Intelligence Bulletin June 23, 1975
PORTUGAL
The broad policy statement issued by Portugal's military rulers over the
weekend preserves the existing multiparty political system, but it also encourages
the establishment of direct links between the Armed Forces Movement and the
people. If such links are established, they could pose a threat to the existence of
Portugal's political parties.
The long-awaited reassessment of Portugal's revolutionary course-released
after eight days of debate within the Movement's Revolutionary Council-concluded
that the country must go through several phases before it reaches its final objective
of a classless society. The document states that during the current phase-called the
transition period-political parties would continue to play a valuable role.
While this does not give political moderates anything they did not already have,
it does set aside-at least temporarily-the demands by radical elements within the
Movement to abolish all parties. Some of these elements, associated with the internal
security organization, favor the establishment of councils of workers, soldiers and
sailors, while other pro-Communist factions want to set up committees for the
defense of the revolution.
The Revolutionary Council's communique declared its support for the
establishment of links with all grassroots organizations whose objectives correspond
to the Movement's program. It characterized these organizations as the "embryo of
an experimental system of direct democracy." The statement implies that once these
organizations are working properly, political parties will be unnecessary.
The statement emphasizes, however, that armed civilian organizations will not
be tolerated and repudiates the establishment of socialism by violent or dictatorial
methods.
A large part of the communique is devoted to Portugal's "grave" economic
condition. It admits that if the present trend continues the country's foreign
exchange reserves will be "practically exhausted" by the end of the year. The
communique calls upon the governing coalition to put aside its differences and
develop an economic strategy by the end of July that will reverse the decline in
production and the rise in unemployment. In a thinly veiled warning, the Council
refers to those discussions as an "in-depth test of the coalition's viability."
The statement also prohibits delegates to the constituent assembly from
debating matters not associated with the drafting of the constitution. This ruling is
likely to be violated by Portuguese politicians and could provoke another
confrontation between military and civilian leaders.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
June 23, 1975
In the policy statement, the Council also announced that it will exert greater
control of the nation's media and take over at least one newspaper to ensure
accurate coverage of the Movement's policies.
Specific issues such as the Republica affair, the election of trade union officials,
and agrarian reform were not addressed in the communique, but the Revolutionary
Council is expected to resume debate on these matters next week.
Meanwhile, the Movement's blueprint for the future has done nothing to dispel
church-state tensions. A statement by Portugal's Catholic bishops yesterday branded
the siege of Catholic demonstrators at the Cardinal's palace last week in Lisbon as an
"attack against fundamental liberties." The church is also angry at the Movement
because it will not expel lefitist workers who occupied a Catholic radio station last
month. How this and the Republica issue are resolved may say more about whether
Portugal is to have a multiparty system or a dictatorship of the proletariat than the
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National Intelligence Bulletin
June 23, 1975
TURKEY
Turkish opposition party leader Ecevit yesterday blamed the coalition
government of Suleyman Demirel for an armed attack against him and his followers
at a political rally on Saturday. The incident could further polarize the left and
right.
It is riot clear whether there was an attempt to assassinate Ecevit. Shots were
fired, according to press reports, and several of Ecevit's supporters were injured. The
assailants appeared to be members of Demirel's far right coalition partners, the
National Salvation Party and the National Action Party.
Demirel, who was assaulted in April by a left-wing supporter of Ecevit, denied
Ecevit's charge. Both political leaders have found it difficult to control their more
radical followers, who have clashed on several occasions in recent months at
universities and elsewhere.
The recent clashes do not compare with the violence and anarchy that finally
forced the military to intervene in politics in 1971. but their continuation and
escalation could again arouse the military's concern.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
June 23, 1975
Leaders of the French Left Alliance-Socialists, Communists and Left
Radicals-found little common ground at their summit meeting on June 19.
The first formal meeting of the three leaders in over a year lasted a scant three
hours and produced a terse communique expressing ritual affirmation of the
electoral goals of the Left. That, and opposition to President Giscard's policies, were
the only points on which the parties could agree. On all other issues-Portugal, civil
liberties, strategy for the next municipal elections, the world economic crisis, and
the EC-Socialists and Left Radicals locked horns with the Communists.
As expected, issues related to the Republica affair in Portugal-freedom of the
press and Communist tolerance of a pluralist political system-caused the most
heated exchanges, including a blistering attack by Communist leader Marchais on the
Socialists for their support of the Portuguese Socialists. Marchais went further than
ever before in voicing Communist fears that the Socialists are trying to woo the
anti-Communist majority.
The two parties also disagreed sharply over electoral strategy for the 1977
municipal elections. The Communists and the Socialist Party's left wing-which
constitutes about 25 percent of the party's strength-are calling for a single list of
Left Alliance candidates in the first round of the elections. The current agreement is
that the Left will support the leading Alliance candidate in the second round if the
election is not won outright in the first round.
The Socialists believe that the Communist strategy is aimed at undermining
their power base-small-town elected officials-so Mitterrand turned down the idea.
The Communists fear that without obligatory alliances in the first round, the
Socialists will enter into electoral agreements with parties of the governing majority.
The liaison committee of the Left Alliance was mandated to create a working
group to study:
--the effects on society of the international "crisis of capitalism" and the
French economic slump;
--the problem of Europe and its collective security;
--the defense and extension of liberties.
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June 23, 1975
The summit meeting served only to preserve the facade of a united Left. The
appearance of unity will probably suffice for the time being; the nearest elections
are two years away.
The fundamental cleavages between the Socialists and Communists on issues
raised by the Republica affair were even more divisive than was apparent prior to the
meeting. If the Portuguese Socialists are forced out of the government because of
the Communists, the French Left Alliance will be in serious danaer of falling apart
Yugoslavia has imposed yet another round of import restrictions in an effort to
reduce its mounting trade deficit. The restrictions supplement measures introduced
last April aimed primarily at reducing raw material imports.
The new measures, which will be in effect until the end of the year, apply to a
broad spectrum of consumer goods, including many electrical appliances such as
television sets and refrigerators as well as certain food items. The restrictions also
cover some heavy equipment imports, including agricultural machinery. The
government hopes that the measures will reduce expenditures for nonessential items
leaving adequate foreign exchange for higher priority goods.
Yugoslavia's trade balance has been severely affected by the recession in the
West. In the first five months of the year, Belgrade's trade deficit reached $1.6
billion, a 23-percent increase over the same period last year. At the same time,
earnings from foreign workers' remittances and tourism have leveled off. As a result,
Yugoslav officials have been predicting a current account deficit-the balance of
trade in goods and services-of about $900 million in 1975. There are some
indications that creditors' willingness to cover the deficit is waning, and Yugoslavia
may be forced to reduce drastically its foreign exchange reserves unless it can find
financing elsewhere.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
June 23, 1975
The agreement reached over the weekend by Angola's three top nationalist
leaders to ease tensions in the troubled territory amounts to little more than an
uncertain truce. Holden Roberto, Agostinho Neto, and Jonas Savimbi met almost
continuously last week in Kenya following recent heavy fighting that threatened
Angola with civil war even before it achieves independence on November 11.
The measures agreed upon by the three leaders to end the fighting merely
restate past agreements that have failed. The key to effective implementation will
depend on whether Neto's Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola and
Roberto's National Front for the Liberation of Angola will refrain from further
military operations against each other.
Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, the
smallest of the three nationalist groups, has largely kept out of the fighting.
The recent fighting left the Popular Movement with certain advantages over the
National Front, which could spark the National Front to retaliate. The Popular
Movement has gained the upper hand in several areas north of Luanda, severely
limiting the National Front's access to the capital.
The summit communique also commits the three leaders to vague provisions
designed to make the transitional government more effective. The transitional
government that was set up by the nationalists and the Portuguese last January has
been unworkable, and it appears unlikely that the government can be strengthened
to the point where it can maintain order between now and November.
The transitional government is based on an unworkable system of checks and
balances under which the nationalist representatives, as government officials, work
at odds with each other. The Portuguese officials are not effective because they are
caught in the middle.
Neto, Savimbi, and Roberto will apparently try to hold the national elections
that are scheduled for next October. The elections are supposed to choose a
constituent assembly that will select a head of government to assume office after
independence.
Prospects for holding elections, however, remain uncertain. Further violence
may occur as the National Front and the National Movement vie for support in the
countryside, particularly in areas which are not controlled by either group.
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June 23, 1975
In effect, the summit agreement merely postpones an eventual confrontation
between Roberto and Neto. The nationalist leaders seem to have already recognized
this by agreeing to meet again in November to adopt another form by which to
transfer power if the October elections fail to take place.
ETHIOPIA: Rebels staged a one-hour attack last Saturday on selected military
targets in Asmara, the provincial capital of Eritrea. This incident may mark the
beginning of increased activities by the insurgents who have been lying low for more
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