NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027700010052-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 52
• Publication Date: May 31, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
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May 31, 1975
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 Approved For Relea
National Intelligence Bulletin
May 31, 1975
CONTENTS
LAOS: A situation report
and an outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
LEBANON: Fighting resumed
briefly yesterday . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
SPANISH SAHARA: Rabat upset
by Madrid's tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
AUSTRALIA: Resignation of defense
minister expected shortly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
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National Intelligence Bulletin
May 31, 1975
LAOS
Vientiane remains calm, at least on the surface.
American officials are going about their normal duties at the AID and defense
attache compound, but-in contravention of the terms of an agreement concluded
with Pathet Lao ministers and leftist student demonstrators earlier this week-some
members of the capital's joint police force remain on patrol inside the compound
grounds. Most of these police are Pathet Lao.
The evacuation of American dependents and other nonessential personnel is
continuing. As of May 30, some 153 official and 109 nonofficial Americans were
still, in Vientiane. The US mission will be down to about 50 personnel by the end of
next week.
The Pathet Lao, meanwhile, are continuing to increase their troop strength in
Vientiane. According to officials of the US defense attache office, there may now be
more than 5,000 Lao communist troops in the capital, and their strength appears to
be increasing daily. There also are reports that a Pathet Lao battalion, along with a
dozen light tanks, is on the capital's northern outskirts, and that still another
battalion is near the southeastern suburbs.
The situation calmed following the recent agreement to terminate AID
operations by the end of June and successful negotiations to provide severance pay
to former guards. The threat to the Americans still in Vientiane is not expected to
rise in the next week or so. Thereafter, however, the prospects for civil unrest in the
capital will grow, with a consequent increase in the threat to the safety of Americans
and other foreigners.
If there is a drastic reduction or a total cutoff of US assistance to Laos after
June, anti-US sentiments might then build and cause a serious threat to the safety of
the remaining US mission personnel in Vientiane. Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma
and non-US diplomats in Laos have already warned the Pathet Lao that the recent
harassment of Americans could result in an abrupt cessation of all US aid. Should
this happen, Souvanna noted, no other source of assistance could be substituted in
time to preserve the government as it has existed.
Loss of US assistance will exacerbate the already severe economic pressures in
Laos. Prices, unemployment, and inflation have already risen sharply, food and
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National Intelligence Bulletin May 31, 1975
other goods are becoming scarce, imports have dropped, and there is a shortage of
foreign exchange. About two thirds of the contributions to the multinational
foreign Exchange Operations Fund projected for 1975 are funded by AID.
Some Pathet Lao leaders understand the degree to which Laos is dependent on
US foreign assistance, and they want it to continue-without detailed accountability
to the US. Other communist leaders are apparently prepared to risk the complete
termination of US and other Western aid in order to achieve internal political goals.
The Pathet Lao, however, may decide to institute more strict population
control if civil disturbances continue. I
The North Vietnamese have committed themselves to providing the Pathet Lao
with whatever military hardware may be needed to assure effective communist
control over the country. The North Vietnamese will maintain their own military
forces and political as well as economic personnel in Laos in sufficient numbers to
ensure that Hanoi will be the predominant foreign influence there.
If the Pathet Lao prove incapable of controlling civil unrest, the North
Vietnamese can be expected to move units in to lend a hand. I
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Lao-Thai relations are bound to deteriorate if. North Vietnamese forces become
more active in areas close to the border and if people continue to flee from Laos
into Thailand. Both countries may try to seal the border. This could lead to
additional food shortages in Laos, increased border tensions, and greater Lao
reliance on the North Vietnamese.
Fighting, apparently initiated by extreme leftists attempting to spark new
violence, resumed briefly in Beirut yesterday, despite the increased effectiveness of
joint Lebanese-Palestinian patrols in separating Phalangist and fedayeen forces.
Prime Minister - designate Karami completed his formal consultations with
political and religious leaders on Thursday, but has not yet announced a cabinet. F_
Socialist leader. Kamal Jumblatt has raised an additional problem by insisting
that no representatives of the Phalanges Party be included in the new cabinet. He
probably will back down, however, if his own Progressive Socialist Party is offered
strong representation.
These differences could delay formation of a government for as much as several
days, but so far do not seem likely to prompt Karami to abandon his efforts. After
five years outside the government, Karami appears eager to succeed, and his critics
lack a more attractive alternative candidate.
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May 31, 1975
Spain's announced determination to speed up the decolonization of Spanish
Sahara has upset Morocco, which is worried Madrid may relinquish control of the
territory-possibly by granting it independence-before a political settlement
acceptable to Rabat is achieved.
Rabat, in a communique issued on May 26, expressed surprise at Madrid's
announcement last week suggesting that Spain might unilaterally transfer
sovereignty in the Sahara if the other parties-Morocco, Mauritania, and
Algeria-delay too long in coming to an agreement. The Spaniards also sent a letter
to the UN calling for negotiations among "all parties" and warning that if no action
is taken, Madrid would set a date for unilateral withdrawal. The Moroccan
communique concluded with a veiled warning that Rabat would use force if
necessary to uphold its claim to Spanish Sahara.
In conversations with US officials, Moroccans have said they suspect Spain is
colluding with Algeria, which supports a pro-independence party in Spanish Sahara.
Although Rabat has consistently opposed the inclusion of Algeria in any settlement
negotiations, the Moroccans may now acquiesce if only to prevent an early Spanish
withdrawal.
Algeria, which insists on being included in any negotiations, can be expected to
support the principle of self-determination for Saharans. Algiers may eventually be
willing to settle for less in order to avoid a confrontation with Morocco.
Madrid's statement last week does not necessarily portend its early departure
from Spanish Sahara. Spain has given no indication of how long it will remain there
or to whom power would be transferred if it withdrew unilaterally. The statement
probably was meant to goad Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria to settle their
differences and enter into serious negotiations.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
May 31, 1975
Canberra's moderate Defense Minister Lance Barnard is expected to announce
shortly that he is resigning to take an ambassadorial post. No reason has been given
for Barnard's decision, but he has no doubt been dissatisfied since he was eased out
of the deputy prime ministership a year ago.
Barnard's move will complicate the Labor government's already difficult
position in Parliament. His seat would be contested in an early by-election under
circumstances unfavorable to Labor. His constituency is traditionally a Labor
district, but the opposition Liberals have available a vigorous candidate who would
be a formidable threat.
Loss of Barnard's parliamentary seat would dangerously reduce Labor's already
narrow majority in the House of - Representatives. This, on top of the
opposition-controlled Senate's blockage of 25 pieces of legislation, might force
Labor to consider calling a national election. With public opinion polls showing that
Labor now trails the Liberal-Country-opposition by 13 percentage points, the Labor
government will face a difficult choice between an election under unpromising
prospects or continued frustration of its legislative program.
The front-runner for Barnard's defense job appears to be William Morrison,
now science minister. A left-winger who has questioned Australia's alliance with the
US, Morrison has opposed the presence of US scientific and defense installations in
Australia. Prime Minister Whitlam has strongly defended the facilities as important
to Australian security, however, and could be expected to assure their tenure should
he give Morrison the defense portfolio.
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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