NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027700010040-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 31, 2006
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: May 23, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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NXIMP-MI
National Intelligence
Bulletin
Top Secret
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
1 -1
May 23, 1975
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National Intelligence Bulletin
May 23, 1975
CONTENTS
LAOS: Americans in Vientiane continue
to be harassed by communists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,
PORTUGAL: Socialist leader criticizes
Communist Party and Armed Forces Movement . . . . . . . . . . 3
LEBANON: Fighting continues
in Beirut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
ISRAEL: Aircraft producer promoting
its export sales program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
SYRIA: Reasoning behind decision to
extend UN mandate through November . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
FRANCE: Sauvagnargues under
increasingly heavy criticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
SOUTH VIETNAM: Communists may be
preparing to "punish" some segments
of population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
NORTH KOREA - IRAN: Pyongyang is
negotiating with Tehran for a loan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
USSR: No successor named for Shelepin . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
(continued)
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SOUTH AFRICA: Pretoria to defy
UN resolution on Namibia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ARGENTINA: Lopez Rega set back in
confrontation with military . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
FOR THE RECORD: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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May 23, 1975
The planned mass rally in Vientiane was under way as of mid-morning. Foreign
Minister Phoumi Vongvichit told a less-than-capacity crowd gathered at the stadium
that negotiations with the US embassy had resulted in agreement to close down
USAID offices in the provinces and that talks were being held to dissolve the AID
organization in Vientiane. Phoumi's speech was moderate in tone, and his audience
was restrained.
The number of demonstrators occupying the main AID and defense attache
compound has dwindled from about 300 to about 30.
The hard core in the compound, however, have reportedly threatened to kill
the US marine guards, who are barricaded inside the AID headquarters building. No
serious effort has yet been made to enter the building itself. Some friction has
developed between the demonstrators and Lao AID employees trying to draw their
pay.
The AID warehouse on the northern outskirts of Vientiane is occupied by a
small number of communist troops and student demonstrators. Communist soldiers
entered two other AID warehouses in the capital at gunpoint yesterday and, at last
report, continue to occupy one of them.
Communist members of the capital's joint military security force are
continuing to search vehicles entering and leaving the largest American residential
housing compound in the northern suburbs of Vientiane. The compound houses
some 143 families.
Demonstrations also erupted yesterday against AID flight facilities at Vientiane
airport. Traffic at one of the gates leading to the AID flight ramp was blocked by
barricades, but there was no reported interruption of air operations.
Broadcasts over the Lao national radio-now largely controlled by
communists-are taking an inflammatory anti-American tone. One broadcast
yesterday reported that the withdrawal of police protection for all Americans was
imminent, and another threatened the life of a senior US official.
Communist Deputy Prime Minister Phoumi Vongvichit yesterday told the US
charge that the disturbances in Vientiane would be "easily resolved" if Washington
would agree "in principle" to negotiate with the coalition government the
dissolution of AID in Laos and the revision of the 1951 economic assistance
agreement.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
May 23, 1975
The coalition government yesterday granted the US embassy permission to
evacuate the 13 Americans who had been under house arrest in Savannakhet since
May 14. They were flown to Udorn, Thailand. Now, the 900 or so Americans left in
Laos are all in Vientiane.
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National Intelligence Bulletin May 23, 1975
The ruling Revolutionary Council, apparently concerned about the
deteriorating political situation, early today called for national unity and said it
would never permit a dictatorship to be set up. The Council appealed to all political
parties to cooperate in view of the country's worsening economic situation.
The Council's pronouncement followed a day of tense political activities:
--Socialist leader Mario Soares in a press conference strongly criticized the
Communist Party and the Armed Forces Movement and said his party would
boycott government meetings until the Socialists' newspaper was returned and
until press freedom and union and municipal elections are allowed.
--Socialist rallies in several major cities turned out tens of thousands of
Socialists in support of Snares.
--A statement by the Communists accused the Socialists of threatening the
Portuguese system with their boycott and warned them that they would be
responsible for the outcome of their actions. The Communists also said that
the people would never allow a democratic regime to be put in jeopardy.
Whether the Council continues to be conciliatory remains to be seen. The
Armed Forces Movement yesterday may have taken the first step toward removing
President Costa Gomes, because of his sympathies for the Socialists. The military
retirement age was lowered to 60; Costa Gomes is 62.
Meanwhile, the man most frequently mentioned as a potential successor to
Costa Gomes, Admiral Rosa Coutinho, has been tapped to accompany Prime
Minister Goncalves and Foreign Minister Antunes to the NATO summit. Ambassador
Carlucci learned of Coutinho's inclusion in the Portuguese delegation from
Goncalves during a discussion of issues that might come up at the summit.
Goncalves reaffirmed Portugal's intention to remain in NATO. He protested
that his government's philosophy did not equate with neutralism, but simply
reflected a desire to develop close relations with its former colonies. Goncalves said
Portugal's foreign policy was not designed to upset existing arrangements, although
his government favored a relaxation of tensions between NATO and the Warsaw
Pact. The Prime Minister seemed concerned about efforts to promote closer ties
between Spain and NATO, but noted that Portugal has a pact with Spain and
therefore was in no position to criticize.
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May 23, 1975
On a matter more critical to the Portuguese, Goncalves asked Ambassador
Carlucci if the US could intercede with President Mobutu of Zaire. He said Mobutu
had broken his promise not to involve himself in Angola and was sending men and
equipment to one of the liberation groups contending for power.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
May 23, 1975
The fighting in Beirut yesterday spread to other areas of the city but remained
sporadic and apparently limited to light arms, rocket, and mortar fire. Casualties
rose to an estimated total of 17 and 40 wounded.
Major fedayeen groups, the Palestinians' conventional military forces, and the
Lebanese army have raised their alert status, but have not yet become involved in
the clashes. Sources of the US embassy report, however, that radical elements
backed by Iraq and Libya are working to intensify the fighting in the hope of
provoking an all-out confrontation between government and fedayeen forces. Such
an encounter, these elements believe, could result in the destruction of Lebanon's
fragile governing system and, they hope, the accession to power of a radical regime
that would offer unqualified backing to the Palestinians.
Government and Palestine Liberation Organization leaders are attempting to
negotiate an end to the fighting. A cease-fire arranged by political and religious
leaders outside the government was scheduled to go into effect early yesterday, but
was violated almost immediately by both sides. According to press reports from
Beirut, the caretaker prime minister, Rashid Sulh, has told officials that he is
powerless to do anything to stop the fighting.
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National Intelligence Bulletin May 23, 1975
The Israel Aircraft Industry, Ltd. is promoting its export sales program. Its
latest success is a $5.5-million military contract with Bolivia concluded late last
month.
The agreement calls for the Bolivian air force to receive six Arava 201 STOL
light military transport aircraft in July and includes provisions for training, spare
parts, and ancillary equipment. Financing will be over five years at 8-percent
interest. The Israeli company has fared well with its sales of the Arava 201 in Latin
America since early 1973. Other orders include six to Ecuador, five to Mexico, two
to El Salvador, and one to Nicaragua.
The company also sells the 1123/4 Westwind business jet, various air defense
equipment, the Gabriel surface-to-surface missile system, and overhauled Boeing and
other commercial jets. About three quarters of its $270 million in sales last year
were with the Israeli Ministry of Defense. Because most of these deals are concluded
at fixed prices, the company is anxious to secure more lucrative foreign sales. Its
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May 23, 1975
best markets so far have been in the Western Hemisphere, but prospects for sharply
increased sales in Southeast Asia appear promising, especially in Singapore, South
Korea, and Taiwan.
.Early this year, the company launched.an extensive advertising campaign in
various military publications and in mid-April began an export drive for its Kfir
multipurpose combat aircraft. The Kfir is an amalgam of French, US, and Israeli
technology, employing the Mirage 5 airframe and General Electric's J79 engine, both
modified to incorporate Israeli design features. The company produces the
$4-million Kfir at a rate of about two a month.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
May 23, 1975
Syrian President Asad's decision to extend the UN observer force's mandate
until November 30, rather than for only two months as had been widely expected,
appears to be, in part, a deliberate move by Asad to maintain some distance between
his diplomacy and that of Egyptian President Sadat. Cairo's agreement last month
for renewal of the mandate for a similar UN force in the Sinai was limited to a
three-month period. Asad's decision may also have been influenced by his current
problems with Iraq.
With characteristic caution, Syrian officials appear to have adopted a posture of
studied inaction for the moment. Foreign Minister Khaddam would only tell
Ambassador Murphy that he hoped President Ford's meeting with Sadat would be
successful and would "realize progress within the framework of Syrian discussions
with Sadat." He cast the Syrian-Egyptian talks in terms of Syria's standard position
calling for Israeli withdrawals from all Arab fronts and for the implementation of
UN resolutions providing for the rights of Palestinians.
The extension of the mandate should reduce tensions caused by recent Syrian
and Jordanian military movements near Israel's northern frontier. It will also free
Asad's hand for his current quarrel with Iraq.
Asad has become increasingly preoccupied with the problem of Iraq, despite
the absence of convincing evidence that he faces a military threat from that
direction. He almost certainly sees the problem more in political terms, having good
reason to believe that with the end of the Kurdish rebellion, Baghdad would quickly
turn its attention once again to subverting its rival Baathist regime in Damascus.
Asad deliberately revived the Euphrates water dispute, by cutting back the normal
flow to Iraq, in order to warn Baghdad against meddling in Syria's internal affairs.
Asad has probably also found the dispute useful to divert attention from the
stalemate on the Golan front and to ease domestic pressures for a more belligerent
policy toward Israel. The Iraqi threat can be used, moreover, to justify his decision
to agree to extend the UN mandate, an action which in turn makes it possible for
him to nose a more credible military threat on his eastern frontier
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National Intelligence Bulletin May 23, 1975
French Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues is coming under increasingly heavy
criticism from the Paris press, leading to renewed speculation that he may be on his
way out.
Since last fall, Sauvagnargues has been singled out as a likely candidate for
replacement. Over the past several weeks, the Paris press-with which Sauvagnargues
has had consistently bad relations-has moved from allegations that the foreign
minister is unhappy and frustrated with his job to a frontal assault clearly aimed at
hastening his departure.
The respected left-of-center Le Monde and the Gaullist-oriented newsweekly Le
Point have led the charge, accusing Sauvagnargues-and by implication President
Giscard-of ineptitude and lack of direction in foreign policy. The cover story in the
current issue of Le Point, "The Gaffes of French Diplomacy, blames the foreign
minister for three recent major setbacks in French diplomacy: the collapse of the
Paris energy preparatory conference; lack of progress in constructing a united
Europe; and failure of the French initiative in Indochina.
Last week, Giscard and Prime Minister Chirac both moved to defend
Sauvagnargues and counter speculation about his imminent departure from the
government. Earlier this week, the President assured his cabinet that there would be
no reshuffle "at the moment." The show of unity by the government seems pro
forma, however, and has not affected the general feeling that Sauvagnargues will step
down, perhaps before the year is out.
The precise timing of Sauvagnargues' departure is difficult to predict. He is
unlikely to be replaced very soon after representing France at the NATO summit
this month or before the end of the current French National Assembly session at the
end of June. For maximum political impact, Giscard would probably wait until
sometime after the summer doldrums and before the opening of the next National
Assembly in October.
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May 23, 1975
The communists may be preparing to "punish" some segments of the
population and apparently are cracking down on troublemakers in Saigon.
There has been no indication as yet of reprisals taken against former officials.
The tone of recent official statements, the mentioning of reprisals by "popular
movements," and the careful classification of government officials and politically
active individuals indicate, however, that, at a minimum, the former officials will be
carefully watched for "antirevolutionary activity."
The series of communiques issued by the Military Management Committee,
which give detailed instructions on who should register with the new government,
indicate that the new rulers would like a detailed listing of the Saigon population,
with information on past activities and associations. The latest directive was aimed
at members of all political parties "siding with the US imperialist aggressors." The
communique explicitly stated that even those party members who have already
registered as members of the "puppet military, administration, police, or
intelligence" must register again in this category.
Meanwhile, bands of youths-called "cowboys"-are creating a serious crime
problem in Saigon, according to news reports. Although the "cowboys" have long
been a part of Saigon life, their ranks reportedly have been swollen by still-armed
South Vietnamese soldiers and criminals recently released from jail by the
"liberators." One gang reportedly has attacked a police contingent, indicating the
boldness with which the gangs operate.
In response to the crime problem, according to Liberation Daily, the people
themselves have "stood up to pursue" the disruptive elements. Additionally,
newsmen report that the newly established police force has become more aggressive
against the thieves and looters, in some cases shooting them on the spot or holding
public executions to dissuade other would-be "cowboys."
One of the causes of the recent upsurge in crime undoubtedly is the confused
economic situation in Saigon. Numerous refugees came into the city in the final days
of the republic, joining the already large refugee community. Furthermore, the rice
distribution system has broken down, and Chinese merchants reportedly are
hoarding grain until the monetary situation stabilizes. The banks remain closed and
the shortage of currency is becoming severe. There has been no indication that the
ruling Military Management Committee plans to reopen the banks anytime soon.
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May 23, 1975
The Committee has promised to provide suitable jobs for all workers, but
unemployment in Saigon is a serious problem-it was already high before the
government's surrender-and the new refugees and former soldiers have added
immeasurably to the problem. The communists will probably soon begin to move
refugees to their native villages, as they did in Da Nang, in order to relieve some of
the pressure from Saigon's administrative apparatus. So far, however, there has been
NORTH KOREA - IRAN
North Korea may soon receive a $200-million, hard-currency loan from Iran
which would enable Pyongyang to clear up a major portion of its defaults on loans
and letters of credits held by Japanese and West European banks. In March, the two
countries signed a memorandum of understanding on the loan and on a 5-year,
$700-million trade agreement.
North Korea's payment problems-the result of an estimated $550-million
trade deficit with the West in 1974-have now reached serious proportions, and its
credit rating has been damaged. France and West Germany have cut off government
guarantees for further credits, and deliveries of goods already under contract have
been held up.
Tehran has maintained cordial, though not close, relations with North Korea.
The Shah's sister ended a visit to Pyongyang on May 19. 'Trade between the two
countries has been negligible.
Although the loan would provide immediate relief for North Korea's current
debt problems, it is no solution for Pyongyang's lagging export earnings. Western
banks and firms, once burned, may be more cautious in extending credit. As a result,
Pyongyang could find it harder to pursue its ambitious goals for raoid
industrialization through the acquisition of Western technology
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National Intelligence Bulletin
May 23, 1975
The failure of the Soviet trade unions plenum yesterday to name a successor to
Aleksandr Shelepin, whom it released as trade unions head, suggests that in this, as
in other recent personnel shifts, the Politburo is undecided or perhaps unable to
agree on whom to choose. The filling of this vacancy, (like that of former party
secretary Petr Demichev, involves patronage, and will thus play a role in the political
maneuvering and shifts of alignment that will gather momentum prior to next
February's party congress.
Most previous heads of the Soviet trade unions have had considerable party
experience and have usually held either candidate or full membership on the
Politburo. The job has only rarely served as a stepping-stone to higher office,
however, and has not been a significant power base in itself. Announcement of a
new trade unions chief may be delayed until arrangements for further shifts in the
leadership have been completed.
There are unconfirmed but plausible reports in Moscow that Shelepin will be
named a deputy chairman of the State Committee for Vocational and Technical
Education. Since Stalin's death, high-ranking party officials whose careers have
collapsed have been allowed to retire, sent into diplomatic exile, or appointed to
minor government jobs.
At 56, Shelepin is too young to retire. Diplomatic exile seems out of the
question, in view of the hostile reception he received during his brief visit to the UK
this spring. His former colleagues, who apparently regarded him as an overly volatile
combination of ability and ambition, would consider the deputy chairmanship of a
relatively unimportant state committee -as an appropriately safe place to put him.
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May 23, 1975
South African Prime Minister Vorster's speech in Namibia (South-West Africa)
on Tuesday made it clear that Pretoria will not comply with the UN Security
Council's resolution adopted last December that sets a deadline of May 30 for
Pretoria to accept UN guidelines for preparing the territory for independence. The
resolution demands that Pretoria recognize the territorial integrity and unity of
Namibia, begin an actual transfer of power to the inhabitants, and allow a UN
agency to participate in the process.
Vorster flatly rejected the UN's claim that it should supervise preparations for
independence. He is apparently gambling that his own version of self-determination
for the territory will permit South Africa to maintain its economic stakes in
Namibia, despite international pressures for a South African withdrawal.
The South African leader said Pretoria was sponsoring a conference of
representatives of the territory's 12 ethnic groups who will be free to decide its
future form of government. He promised to arrange for the "true leaders" of the
non-white groups to meet with officials of the UN or the Organization of African
Unity. Vorster reasserted, however, that the "true leaders" are the members of
homeland governments-mostly old-line tribal chiefs who have gone along with
South African tutelage. He denounced as unrepresentative the South-West African
People's Organization-the only nationalist group recognized by the UN or the OAU.
Vorster may hope that a tough stance against UN "meddling" in Namibia will
overcome doubts of South African whites about continued white control of those
parts of Namibia with substantial mineral industries. The 90,000 whites in Namibia,
who make up only 12 percent of the population, have hoped that Pretoria would
eventually annex at least the areas of white settlement.
In, his speech, Vorster disclaimed any intentions of retaining Namibian territory
or imposing a political blueprint on the inhabitants. Nevertheless, he suggested that
the self-determination process may well result in a loose federation of ethnic
homelands that might become independent of Pretoria but remain subject to South
African economic exploitation.
Such a federation would be contrary to the UN goal of a unitary state
controlled by a non-white majority. Vorster apparently hopes, however, that the
smaller tribal groups will support a loose federation in order to avoid domination by
the Ovambos, who account for almost half of the population. Should the Ovambos
pull out of a federation, the whites would then be the largest of the remaining ethnic
groups.
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Vorster's offer to facilitate contacts between the "true leaders" in Namibia and
envoys from the UN or the OAU seems intended to show that the People's
Organization-a predominantly Ovambo group-is not genuinely representative.
Some leaders from other tribes have protested exclusive international support for
the People's Organization.
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National Intelligence Bulletin May 23, 1975
Social Welfare Minister Jose Lopez Rega appears to have suffered a setback in
his confrontation with the army.
The confrontation occurred when the newly appointed army commander, Maj.
Gen. Alberto Numa Laplane, a supposed protege of Lopez Rega, refused an order
from the minister of defense earlier this week to retire two highly respected
brigadier generals who are anathema to the social welfare minister. Laplane
threatened to submit his resignation to the President over the issue. The crisis was
averted by a compromise allowing the two generals to remain on active duty, but
not in the position Laplane originally desired.
Laplane has clearly demonstrated that his basic loyalties rest with the military
and not with the Peronist political movement-a position which has increased his
standing with the officer corps, which feared he would be a tool of Lopez Rega.
Recent power plays by Lopez Rega have substantially altered the political
outlook in Argentina. The military, which had adopted an uncharacteristically
apolitical stance after relinquishing power in 1973, now appears willing to consider
reassuming its self-appointed role as political arbiter. Army leaders have come to this
point only because of the inability of civilian political and labor leaders to contain
Lopez Rega, whose blatantly political firing of Lt. Gen. Leandro Anaya as army
commander last week and the appointment of Lapla'ne caused deep resentment
within the army. Although Laplane certainly got his position through his ties with
the social welfare minister, his actions indicate that Lopez Rega may have made a
serious miscalculation in his appointment.
One important question is how adroitly Lopez Rega adjusts to the fact that his
protege is not a puppet. In his various confrontations in the past, the presidential
adviser has shown an ability not only to survive but also to increase his political
strength. In the changed political climate of the present, however, the army appears
more willing to see Mrs. Peron go, if this is the price that must be paid to rid the
country of Lopez Rega.
The government's backing down in its confrontation with the army has
lessened the likelihood of a coup for now. Any further interference in army internal
affairs, however, will refuel coup plotting.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
May 23, 1975
USSR: Two Soviet guided-missile destroyers that visited Boston earlier this
month are now in Havana, the second Soviet naval visit to Cuba this year. During the
past two years, the Soviets have conducted two visits a year to Cuba, usually in the
fall and winter. The destroyers' visit to New England in commemoration of World
War II has apparently provided them with an opportunity for an extra port call. If
the ships follow the practice of earlier visits, they will probably remain in the
Caribbean for about 40 days and may conduct training exercises with Cuban patrol
boats.
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