NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027700010028-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: May 16, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027700010024~
Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
25X1
may 16,
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27700010028-4
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27700010028-4
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27700010028-4
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin
May 16, 1975
CONTENTS
25X1
25X1
LAOS: Major urban areas reported quiet. (Page 1)
CAMBODIA-INTERNATIONAL: World reactions to US action
in Cambodia. (Page 3
WESTERN EUROPE: Favorable initial reaction to Secretary
Kissinger's speech. (Page 7)
CANADA: Ottawa promises to consult allies on planned
troop cuts. (Page 9)
PORTUGAL: Moderates in Armed Forces Movement suffer
a setback. (Page 10)
AZORES: Separatist sentiment. (Page 12)
LEBANON: Prime Minister Sulh resigned last night.
(Page 13)
SPANISH SAHARA: Status of dispute. (Page 15)
M07/03/07 0 - T00975AO27700010028-4
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Question of presidential succession
may precipitate a new phase in the party power strug-
gle. (Page 19)
Approved For Release
 Approved For Releas4
FORTH
Vtf TNAM N
Predominantly communist-controlled territory
at time of February 1973 cease-fire
Hanoi '
Approved For Release
 Approved For Release 2
National Intelligence Bulletin
May 16, 1975
With the exception of Thakhek, most major urban
areas in the non-communist zone as well as the "neutral-
ized" twin capitals of Vientiane and Luang Prabang were
reported quiet yesterday.
In Thakhek, a town along the Mekong long controlled
by the rightists, an estimated 500 Pathet Lao - inspired
students, soldiers, policemen, and low-level civil serv-
ants assembled at the local USAID compound early yester-
day. No action was taken against either the compound or
its American employees. Instead, the protesters demanded
action on the area's serious economic problems as well as
the ouster of a number of local rightist officials.
According to one report, the atmosphere in Thakhek
resembled a country fair more than a demonstration of po-
litical solidarity. Nevertheless, the rhetoric of the
protesters was highly inflammatory, and more radical stu-
dent agitators were reported to be on their way to Thak-
hek from nearby Savannakhet.
The situation in Savannakhet, meanwhile, has stabi-
lized, at least temporarily, following several days of
anti-rightist and anti-American demonstrations. The coa-
lition government has formally apologized to the US for
the protesters' occupation of the USAID compound in Savan-
nakhet and for the detention of three of its American of-
ficials. The three hostages were released late yesterday
and allowed to return to their private residences in the
city. The coalition government has dispatched a joint
peace-keeping delegation to Savannakhet to negotiate the
protesters' grievances.
The coalition cabinet met under Prime Minister Sou-
vanna Phouma's chairmanship on May 14 amid considerable
speculation that replacements for a number of recently
ousted rightist ministers would be announced. Action
on the important cabinet shuffle, however, was, deferred
Approved For Release 2007/03/0i': CIA-RDP79T00975AO27700010028-4
 Approved For Release ?007/03/07 : CIA-RDP7pTOO975AO27700010028-4
May 16, 1975
to next week at the earliest. Pathet Lao General Kham-
mouane Boupha presumably will remain "acting" defense
minister and may assume the post permanently.
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27700010028-4
National Intelligence Bulletin
 Approved For Relea - 9T00975A027700010028-4
National Intelligence Bulletin May 16, 1975
CAMBODIA-INTERNATIONAL
Chinese Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien has labeled the
US action to recover the Mayaguez "an outright act of
piracy" that "should be condemned by world opinion."
Li spoke at a reception given by Vietnamese representa-
tives in Peking and took the occasion to claim that the
Mayaguez incident "showed that the US had not learned
from its defeats in Indochina." Li portrayed the inci-
dent as arising from the intrusion of a US ship into
Cambodian territorial waters. His comments constituted
the first authoritative statement from Peking and came
after the military action had been completed. Earlier,
Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-peng told reporters in Paris
that there was "nothing China could do" if the US used
force against the Cambodians, but these comments were
not replayed by Peking.
The Foreign Ministry in Hanoi issued an official
statement in which it described the Mayaguez as a
"reconnaissance ship" and condemned its recovery as a
"serious act of war." The North Vietnamese also pledged
support for the Cambodian "right to defend its territory,
airspace, and territorial waters"--a statement which
may come back to haunt Hanoi given Phnom Penh's recent
moves to assert its rights to disputed offshore islands.
The new government in Saigon has not yet commented but
can be expected to parrot Hanoi's line.
The Soviet media have given the incident extensive
but essentially factual coverage. Cambodian charges and
US denials that the Mayaguez was engaged in espionage
activity have both been reported. Radio Moscow has noted
Thai protests as well as US Congressional and American
press criticism of the action, but thus far Moscow has
offered no editorial comment of its own.
The East Europeans have been somewhat out in front
of Moscow in their criticism of US actions.. The East
Germans have used the most pejorative language.
Public reaction in Britain and West Germany has
been generally favorable. French press commentary, how-
ever, has been mixed: the left condemned the action as
Approved For Release 9T00975A027700010028-4
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin
May 16, 1975
"shameful," while the right--still rankled by Cambodian
handling of the refugees in the French embassy in Phnom
Penh--has been basically favorable. Swedish newspapers
have been almost unanimous in their criticism of Washing-
ton's use of force, but Foreign Ministry Secretary General
Astrom claimed privately that he would say nothing that
would give the US offense. In Copenhagen, Foreign Minis-
ter Anderson was noncommittal in receiving the US embassy's
presentation of the Mayaguez incident.
A spokesman for the Japanese Foreign Ministry implied
approval for the action by telling newsmen that ships in
"open waters must not be subject to seizure," and said that
Tokyo viewed American action as "limited." Privately,
Japanese officials expressed their belief that greater
US patience would have won more respect. Official and
unofficial commentary from South Korea and Taiwan has
been predictably favorable as was the Australian press.
Despite the strong Thai reaction, a communiqu6 issued
on the completion of a meeting of foreign ministers from
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations--Thailand, the
Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore--made no
mention whatsoever of the Mayaguez incident.
Of the Arab nations, only Algeria has weighed in
heavily with invective against Washington. Cuban commen-
tary was relatively mild, while Paraguayan and Uruguayan
officials expressed satisfaction with the outcome of the
incident. The rest of Latin America has yet to make
itself heard.
Approved For Release 9T00975A027700010028-4
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27700010028-4
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27700010028-4
 Approved For Release
T00975A027700010028-4 '
National Intelligence Bulletin
May 16, 1975
West European states have voiced initial approval
of Secretary Kissinger's speech earlier this week on a
possible new meeting of oil producers and consumers.
Most European officials want more time to study the US
proposals before giving a formal response.
They are likely to welcome the US readiness to dis-
cuss with the developing states--on a case-by-case basis--
international commodity agreements, which the Europeans
have conceded are necessary in order to get the oil pro-
ducers to discuss energy issues. There also is general
agreement that existing international forums should be
used to resolve raw materials issues, but the Europeans
will be sensitive to the reactions of the developing
states before expressing outright support for this aspect
of the US proposal. The Europeans may also be less forth-
right in rejecting the developing states' demands for a
new world economic order.
The West Europeans remain interested in resuming
energy talks between producers and consumers, but since
the collapse of last month's talks in Paris they have
shifted their priority to developing a common policy on
raw materials:
--The Europeans and Japanese are generally grati-
fied that bitter recrimination was avoided among the
groups that met in Paris. They feel an overly hasty
resumption of energy talks--and a possible second
failure--would strain relations between producers
and consumers.
--They are apparently satisfied that the Interna-
tional Energy Agency provides a favorable framework
for energy discussions and want to strengthen this
channel before any future talks with oil producers.
--The relatively favorable market conditions that
currently exist for oil importers have reduced
pressure for immediate talks with oil suppliers.
Approved For Release T00975AO27700010028-4
 Approved For Release X2007/03/07 : CIA-RDPy9T00975A027700010028-4
National Intelligence Bulletin
May 16, 1975
--Preparations will soon begin in earnest for an
extensive series of international meetings on issues
relating to economic development and raw materials.
The EC foreign ministers will meet in Dublin later
this month to consider raw materials issues, and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment will hold a ministerial meeting in Paris at
which raw materials policy will be a key topic.
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027700010028-4
 Approved For Releasd 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP719T00975A027700010028-4
National Intelligence Bulletin
May 16,1975
Ottawa has assured US embassy officials that Canada
intends to consult its allies if the defense review now
under way recommends changes that would affect Canada's
NATO commitments.
An official in the External Affairs Department dis-
missed recent press speculation that the Trudeau govern-
ment was in favor of pulling out Canada's 2,800-man
mechanized brigade from West Germany and modernizing its
air force fighter contingent there. He said that all
options were still very much open. Those include retain-
ing Canada's existing force structure in West Germany or
reducing it by withdrawing either the ground forces or
the air contingent. He added that while cost-effective-
ness and military efficiency were factors in the review,
the political implications were also very important.
The official noted that if consultations were re-
quired, they probably would not take place until a
recommendation had been forwarded to the cabinet for
approval. In any event, Canada's allies would not be
presented with a fait accompli. The cabinet would be
asked to endorse the proposal in principle, subject to
approval by the NATO allies following consultations.
The NATO allies apparently can still influence
Canada's decision. The US embassy believes that such
intervention now would strengthen the hand of those in
the government who have misgivings about the implications
of any reduction of manpower in the Canadian NATO force.
Approved For Release - T00975A027700010028-4
 Approved For Release 2q
National Intelligence Bulletin
May 16, 1975
Moderates in the Armed Forces Movement have suf-
fered a setback with the forced resignation yesterday of
General Mendes Dias, the air force chief of staff and
member of the Revolutionary Council.
Mendes Dias' resignation comes as no surprise since
his moderate views made him suspect, especially after
the abortive March 11 coup. Moderate officers in the
Movement had hoped that the popular strength demonstrated
by the Socialists and the Popular Democrats in the con-
stituent assembly election would give them increased lev-
erage in the Council. So far, however, they have had
little success in making their influence felt.
In a communique released by the Revolutionary Coun-
cil, Mendes Dias was criticized for "deficiencies" in
command during the coup attempt, but he was not accused
of complicity in the plot. The Council stated that his
loyalty to the Movement is not in question.
25X1
25X1
Press reports
speculate that the Council's rebuke was intentionally
mild to avoid antagonizing the air force, which is in-
clined to support the moderates.
The Portuguese media indicate that the commander of
the Lisbon air region, General Pinho Freire, also sub-
mitted his resignation out of loyalty, but the Council's
decision on this matter has not been announced.
The new chief of staff is Colonel Morais da Silva,
until recently a major who assumed command of an air base
in the aftermath of the abortive coup.. As chief of staff,
he is promoted to the rank of general.
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27700010028-4
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27700010028-4
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27700010028-4
 Approved For Release 21J07103107 : CIA-RDP79100975A027700010028-4
National Intelligence Bulletin
AZORES
May 16, 1975
Lisbon's plan to reorganize the Azores has sparked
dissidence by two separatist groups.
Under the Ministry of internal Administration's
reorganization, the present three districts would become
a single province. The lack of Azorean participation
in preparing the plan and the secrecy of the district
governors' deliberation on it have caused some disgruntle-
ment, as reflected in press comments. This disenchantment
has given at least a temporary boost to the separatists--
the Movement of an Independent Azorean Republic and the
Azorean Liberation Front. The latter group has been in
the forefront of groups charging that the Azores are
being treated as a colony and has urged an end to eco-
nomic and fiscal exploitation.
Efforts to play on the underlying Azorean resent-
ment of the mainland to organize an effective movement
for greater autonomy or independence, however, have all
had a marked lack of success. The group that came
nearest in being effective was the Movement for Azorean
Political Autonomy (NAPA), which was organized in the
wake of the April 1974 ouster of the Caetano regime.
MAPA succeeded in mobilizing a considerable body of
political opinion, but was forced out of existence by
leftist groups following the unsuccessful coup attempt
on the mainland on March 11.
Separatist movements will probably remain weak if
Lisbon can establish a system that ensures equal treat-
ment of the Azores with mainland provinces. Separatists
Approved For Release - 00975A027700010028-4
 Approved For Release 12007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027700010028-4
National Intelligence Bulletin May 16, 1975
would then be forced to depend on less cogent warnings
against the leftward trend in Portugal to gain adherents.
The government is expected to be able to control separa-
tist sentiment unless these movements receive external
assistance or Lisbon shows continued insensitivity to
Azorean ro
LEBANON
Prime Minister Rashid Sulh resigned last night. He
was finally forced out by leaders of the country's two
largest Christian political parties, which had withdrawn
their support for his cabinet to protest his handling of
last month's disturbances in Beirut.
Lebanese leftists and the fedayeen made a last-min-
ute effort to drum up public support for Sulh's govern-
ment. They opposed him on many issues, but they valued
the freedom provided by his,weak leadership and were
eager to deny the right-wing Phalanges Party the credit
for bringing down the government.
It could take President Franjiyah as long as several
weeks to come up with a new prime minister acceptable to
him and to the country's main political and religious
blocs. By custom, the prime minister must be a Sunni
Muslim; powerful leaders of that sizable community have
in recent years been reluctant to serve under Franjiyah,
who dislikes sharing power with anyone.
Because Franjiyah has been ill-served by three weak
prime ministers in the past two years, he may now make
the concessions necessary to recruit a more assertive and
politically powerful candidate. The next prime minister's
'
s
primary challenge will be to grapple with the country
deteriorating security situation.
Approved For Release 0975A027700010028-4
 Approved For Release
Approved For Release T00975AO27700010028-4
 Approved For Release12007/03/07 : CIA-RDP7VT00975AO27700010028-4
National Intelligence Bulletin
May 16, 1975
The arrival in Spanish Sahara this week of an in-
vestigating team of the UN Committee on Decolonization
has stirred action among the parties contesting the dis-
position of the territory. The team has already visited
Madrid and will go on to Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania.
Recent allegations in the Spanish press about secret
conversations between Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania for
settlement of the Sahara problem have led Spanish Foreign
Minister Cortina to announce that Madrid continues to sup-
port a self-determination referendum under UN auspices. A
Spanish Foreign Ministry official has told the US embassy
that the press stories came from certain Spanish offi-
cials who favor a negotiated settlement that would take
into account Moroccan King Hassan's determination to
annex the Sahara.
The arguments of these officials have been weakened
by Hassan's renewed claim to the Spanish enclaves of
Ceuta and Melilla in northern Morocco--territories that
Madrid says it has no intention of relinquishing.
Cortina's formula reportedly has the full backing
of Franco. Madrid appears to believe that a referendum
would result in a vote in favor of an independent state,
which the Spaniards could hope to control.
The Spaniards postponed their plans to hold a ref-
erendum during the first half of this year because last
fall the UN General Assembly adopted a Moroccan-initiated
resolution that sent the dispute to the International
Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. The court
will decide whether the Sahara was administered by any
government prior to Spanish occupation and, if so, what
legal ties existed then between the territory and Morocco
and Mauritania.
Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania have submitted
written briefs to the court, which began hearing the
case on May 12. Algeria has notified the court it
wishes to present its views as an interested party.
Approved For Release12007103107 . - TO0975AO27700010028-4
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin
May 16, 1975
A court opinion is expected next September in time
for the UN General Assembly session. Faced with competing
claims to the area, the court may rule that Spanish Sahara
was an unadministered territory. That would return the
problem to the General Assembly, which would probably
recommend implementation of existing resolutions that
call for a UN-supervised referendum.
Relations between Morocco and Algeria have recently
become strained again over the Sahara issue. Algiers,
which is determined to block Moroccan annexation of the
territory, supports the proposed referendum, on the assump-
tion that it would result in independence for the area.
Such a solution would at once deny Morocco any form of
control and open the territory to Algerian influence.
The two countries clashed over self-determination
for the Sahara at the Arab League foreign ministers'
meeting in Cairo last month. The day after the meeting
ended, Hassan warned that Morocco would use force, if
necessary, to prevent "self-determination in the Sahara."
Hassan, however, still prefers a settlement through bi-
lateral negotiations.
The extensive coverage in the Moroccan press last
week of recent attacks against Spanish forces in the
Sahara suggests that Rabat is preparing its people for
the use of Moroccan irregulars in small-scale guerrilla
operations.
Morocco will be circumspect in using paramilitary
pressure tactics inasmuch as it does not want a military
confrontation with the Spanish in the Sahara. The
latest incidents may be designed to demonstrate to the
UN observer team that there are pro-Moroccan Saharan
dissidents as well as those who favor independence.
Rabat may also wish to create a sense of urgency in
Madrid in the hope of inducing the Spaniards to resume
bilateral talks.
-16-
Approved For Release 20070307 ? ClA_Rno7aT00975A027700010028-4
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27700010028-4
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27700010028-4
 Approved For Releasd 2007/03/07 - CIA-RnPZ9T00975AO27700010028-4
National Intelligence Bulletin
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
May 16, 1975
The power struggle between moderates and hard-liners
in the top party leadership may soon enter a new phase.
The question of presidential succession, which re-
portedly is to be settled at the end of the month,. has
long had an unsettling effect on the delicate political
balance within the leadership. It has now become even more
contentious as the leadership also wrestles with such
nettlesome issues as how to handle former party chief
Alexander Dubcek and other dissidents, as well as what to
do with the thousands of party members who were expelled
after the. Soviet-led invasion in August 1968.
In many respects, the regime is paying the price
of avoiding the succession issue for so long. Ludvik
Svoboda, the 79-year-old President, has been seriously
ill and unable to perform his official duties for more
than a year. In 1973, he reportedly agreed to serve
another term in office so that the leadership would have
time to resolve the succession question in an orderly
way.
Premier Strougal now has told the Austrian foreign
minister that a presidential successor will be chosen
by June 1. Party chief Husak will probably assume the
presidency and also retain the party's top office.
Czechoslovakia has a precedent for one individual holding
the country's top party and state offices concurrently.
Husak, however, may keep the "two top hats" only until
the party congress next spring. The possibility that
he will relinquish his party position is already leading
those who see themselves in line for Husak's party mantle
to jockey for position.
Meanwhile, the US embassy reports that Husak has
come under attack both from hard-liners, who evidently
cannot stomach his moderate approach toward some of
Dubcek's less prominent sympathizers, and from emigres
and their activist supporters still in the country, who
oppose him as the symbol of Dubcek's defeat.
-19-
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin May 16, 1975
Given the pressures that he faces, Husak may decide
to end the pause in the anti-Dubcek campaign that pre-
vailed during the ceremonial holidays of early May.
Husak may now feel free to undercut his hard-line critics
by taking measures to rein in the dissidents.
Husak will have to move with some circumspection,
however, if he is to avoid interfering with Moscow's
plans for the European security talks and a conference
of European Communist parties. He must give serious
thought to the effect that his threatened "administrative
measures," such as arrests, trials, and imprisonment,
could have in international forums. If Husak lays too
heavy a hand on the dissidents, he could create a vul-
nerability that the exiles and their internal supporters
would immediately try to exploit. Husak still appears
to be on top of the situation, but his ability to meet
these challenges will be carefully noted in Moscow and
the outcome could directly influence his future.
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27700010028-4
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27700010028-4
 Top Sealtoved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27700010028-4
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27700010028-4