CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010034-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: April 19, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top.Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
DIA review(s) completed.
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
April 19, 1975
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 19, 1975
CONTENTS
CAMBODIA: Communists have evacuated large numbers of
civilians from Phnom Penh. (Page 1)
SOUTH VIETNAM: Communists tightening noose around Saigon.
(Page 3)
CHINA: Peking's statements on Cambodia emphasize
Sihanouk's role. (Page 5)
CHINA-KOREA: Peking setting moderate tone for North
Korean President Kim I1-song's current visit. (Page 6)
SYRIA: Asad unable to strengthen his hold on Baath Party
at sixth congress. (Page 9)
PORTUGAL: Coutinho reportedly will be named armed forces
chief. (Page 12)
INDIA: Criticism of US increases as election campaigns
near. (Page 15)
INDIA: Navy would like to purchase British Harriers.
(Page 16)
JAPAN-AUSTRALIA: Reduction of import restrictions under
negotiation. (Page 18)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 20)
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 19, 1975
Radio Phnom Penh has been off the air since late on
April 17, and the French representative in the capital
is.the only contact with the outside. He is apparently
staying inside the French embassy compound, and thus has
provided few details on the communist occupation. I
There is still no evidence that senior Khmer commu-
nist leaders have entered Phnom Penh to setup their new
regime. Their occupation plans called for the establish-
ment of a temporary "revolutionary council" to consoli-
date control in the city, and press reports indicate
that a "council" has indeed been formed.
Prince Sihanouk is still in Peking, where he has
received numerous congratulatory messages. The most in-
teresting of these was a telegram from Soviet leaders
Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Kosygin, who somewhat lamely
claimed that "the Soviet Union has always supported the
Cambodian'patriots." Moscow also promised support to
build an "independent and flourishing Cambodia." Siha-
nouk for his part is still being coy about his travel
plans.
The. Association of Southeast Asian Nations--Thailand,
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines--
yesterday announced joint recognition of Sihanouk's gov-
ernment. Laos and Portugal made similar announcements.
Japan followed suit today, even though Sihanouk had told
a Japanese newsman that any such move would be rebuffed
because of Tokyo's past support for the Lon Nol govern-
ment.
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PHNOM-~k` I
PENH
30
MILES
557732 4-75
CON
SON
SOUTH
VIETNAM
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National Intelligence Bulletin
SOUTH VIETNAM
April 19, 1975
The communists are tightening the noose around Sai-
In a matter of days they will have 17 full divisions
to commit against remaining government positions defend-
ing the capital and the delta, and will outnumber the
government forces by about two to one. The South Viet-
namese have only seven divisions left, and many of these
have recently been hard hit. Three other divisions are
in the process of rebuilding, but they cannot be expected
to be ready for combat in the next few critical days.
Moreover, communist artillery attacks are threatening
to make inoperative the government's airbases close to
the capital. Without air support, the South Vietnamese
will be greatly outgunned as well as outmanned.
On the eastern end of Saigon's defense line, at
Xuan Loc, South Vietnamese forces are still crumbling
in the face of sustained communist attacks. It appears
likely that the South Vietnamese 18th Division and an
airborne brigade will be lost. At least one of the
attacking communist divisions--the North Vietnamese 6th--
already has pulled away from Xuan Loc and is swinging to
the south, headed either for Vung Tau or around the gov-
ernment's southern flank and on toward Saigon.
A large gap in the defense perimeter at Bien Hoa was
filled yesterday when a brigade of marines was moved into
blocking positions north of the city. Despite airstrikes
against North Vietnamese artillery positions, the Bien
Hoa airbase has been hit again with large-caliber artil-
lery and rockets.
To the south and west of Saigon,. the communists are
bringing the fight closer to the capital. During the
past two days, a flurry of communist attacks in Long An
Province spread to the outskirts of the capital. A num-
ber of smaller positions were overrun, and many others
were hit hard with shellings and ground attacks.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 19, 1975
The communists are threatening to close down the
government's two large airbases at Bien Hoa and Tan Son
Nhut. The Bien Hoa airfield has already been hit by
122-mm. artillery, which has a range of 13 miles; the
communists also possess the heavier 130-mm. field gun,
which is accurate up to 17 miles.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
CHINA
.April 19, 1975
Continuing the themes that have typified Chinese
commentary on the insurgent offensive in Cambodia since
it began early this year, Peking's major statements yes-
terday on the "liberation" of Phnom Penh emphasize China's
solidarity with the rebels and the importance Peking at-
taches to Prince Sihanouk's past and future role in Cam-
bodia.
An authoritative People's Daily editorial yesterday
declared that the Cambodian people were successful
against the government because they rallied around a
united front that included Sihanouk as well as the com-
munists. Expressing its interest in Sihanouk's future
role, the editorial also asserted that the united front,
formally chaired by Sihanouk, and the royal government
"represent the interests of the Cambodian people."
Moreover, Peking's congratulatory message from Chair-
man Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese leaders was addressed
to "head of state" Sihanouk, as well as to the prime
minister and deputy prime minister of the royal govern-
ment. These references indicate that Peking hopes the
Prince will play a significant role in Phnom Penh; they
may also mean that the Chinese hope to preempt any pos-
sible move to shunt Sihanouk aside, now that the war is
over.
The thrust of the Chinese statements is that Peking
should be considered the new regime's most consistent
ally--now and in the future. The editorial specifically
contrasted Chinese support with the duplicity of the
Soviets. The editorial carefully balanced criticism of
the US role in Cambodia with an attack on the Soviets
for supporting Lon Nol until the last minute. It said
Moscow had been exposed as "a political gambler who has
lost his all."
Neither the. editorial nor the congratulatory message
made any direct reference to Hanoi---an indication that
the Chinese may expect to find themselves in competition
with the North Vietnamese for influence in Phnom Penh.
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 19, 1975
Peking appears to be setting down a moderate tone
for North Korean President Kim Il-song's visit, which
began on Thursday.
A People's Daily editorial that appeared the day be-
fore Kim's arrival in Peking pledged support for the
"correct policy" of peaceful reunification of the two
Koreas. Treatment of the US role in Korea was perfunc-
tory; US involvement in the Korean war was not even men-
tioned, while the only reference to US troops in the
south was a pro forma statement that they "must be with-
drawn."
The editorial did not attempt to associate recent
events in Indochina and the Kim visit. In fact, the
references to "peaceful reunification," as well as the
relatively restrained criticism of Seoul, strongly sug-
gest that Peking is in no mood to support any thoughts
Kim may have about increasing tensions on the Korean
peninsula.
The importance that the Chinese attach to Kim's
visit is obvious from the massive welcome given him and
the fact that he met with Mao--the Chairman's first ap-
pearance in three months--only hours after he arrived in
Peking. The very fact that Kim traveled to China--his
first official visit in 14 years--in itself suggests
that issues of importance to both countries are under
discussion.
The pre-arrival editorial suggests concern by Peking
that North Korea, perhaps influenced by recent events in
Indochina, is seeking support for a more militant posture
toward Seoul. Although the editorial clearly comes down
on the side of moderation, it also goes to great lengths
to emphasize the importance of continuing Sino-Korean
friendship.
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 19, 1975
Kim's talk with Mao probably centered on military
matters because military aid negotiator 0 Chin-u was par-
ticipating. If Kim is in Peking to solicit support for
any sort of specific military moves, the Chinese will be
careful in responding because of concern that the North
Koreans will turn to the USSR if they are given the cold
shoulder by Peking. Although Moscow has shown no dis-
position to encourage possible Korean adventurism, the
Chinese have continually evinced great sensitivity about
Soviet relations with Pyongyang.
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 19, 1975
SYRIA
President Asad failed to strengthen significantly
his tenuous hold on the Syrian Baath Party at its sixth
congress, which ended earlier this week with the election
of new members to the regional command, the party's gov-
erning body.
Four of the seven new members of the ruling group--
like President Asad--are members of Syria's minority
Alawite sect. All seven of those dropped were from the
country's Sunni Muslim majority. To a limited extent,
this will strengthen the President's influence with the
party, but it will also risk aggravating Alawite-Sunni
tensions. In the past there have been charges that Asad's
government is not representative of all Syrians.
The most notable addition to the regional command
is Rifat Asad, brother of the President and commander of
the elite security force that guards the capital. Rifat's
election reportedly was the result of aggressive lobby-
ing on his part before and during the party congress.
His elevation was, if anything, opposed by the President,
who nonetheless is now open to charges of nepotism. It
cannot be taken as evidence that Rifat has ut aside his
often basic differences with his brother
Rifat's election at least confirms that the military
plays a dominant role in party affairs, and that the Pres-
ident has only a limited ability to force his views on
the party.
Prime Minister Ayyubi lost his place on the regional
command. Always ineffectual, he has recently been at
odds with the President and may be dropped in the near
future. Reports in the Arab press suggest that the Pres-
ident plans to form a new cabinet soon. Also dropped
from the regional command was Naji Jamil, one of the re-
gime's inner circle who has been serving as air force
commander, deputy defense minister, and director of the
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National Intelligence Bulletin
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national security apparatus. Jamil may lose his secu-
rity responsibilities as a result of his failure to be
re-elected and the limited effectiveness of government
efforts to control the proceedings at the conference and
the outcome of the election.
Resolutions passed by the congress on general Middle
East issues broke no new ground. They called for total
support for the Palestinians--including implementation of
President Asad's recent proposal for joint Syrian-Pales-
tinian political and military commands--and better cooper-
ation among the Arab states.
The President stuck mostly to domestic themes in his
address to the assembly. He pointed out that the outgoing
congress was the first to serve a full four-year term, and
he stressed that his government, in power since 1970, has
provided Syria with its first extended period of political
stability.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 19, 1975
Admiral Antonio Alva Rosa Coutinho reportedly will
soon be named chief of staff of the armed forces. He
will replace General Francisco da Costa Gomes, who will
retain the presidency.
Coutinho was an original member of the now-disbanded
Junta of National Salvation, and until last January he
was the high commissioner in Angola. He has recently
been appointed executive director of
the ruling Council of Revolution--a
position he would be :Likely to re-
tain, if given the new post.
The admiral is believed to have
the allegiance of the largest faction
within the Council, but Prime Minis-
ter Goncalves may still wield the most
power because of his government posi-
tion and support from the Communist
Party and its allies. Coutinho's
group, composed of left-leaning na-
tionalists, is opposed to heavy reli-
ance by the Armed Forces Movement on the Communist Party
and its allies. It supports a continuation of Portugal's
ties with Western Europe and NATO as well as an expansion
of relations with the third-world countries rather than
Eastern Europe.
As armed forces chief, Coutinho would assume command
of the 2d Division of the General Staff, which is re-
sponsible for most internal security and counterintelli-
gence activities, and the Continental Operations Com-
mand elements charged with external intelligence. Con-
trol of the armed forces and the security structure would
provide the admiral with greater influence in an apparent
power struggle developing with Prime Minister Goncalves.
It would also make him a leading contender to replace
Goncalves, should the occasion arise.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 19, 1975
Coutinho's expected appointment as chief of staff
coincides with the planned reorganization of Portugal's
internal security structure, which may provide him with
an even more powerful base. A new organization, with
Coutinho in charge, will bring together various intelli-
gence activities. They include those charged with dis-
solving the internal security services of the Salazar-
Caetano regime, investigating the treatment of political
prisoners, and examining the ouster of President Spinola
last fall as well as the more recent rightist coup fail-
ure. The new body will also investigate problems relat-
ing to the economy.
Although Coutinho has been characterized as a left-
leaning socialist and has shown disdain for most politi-
cal parties, he is widely respected by Movement officers
and politicians of all persuasions. Leaders of the cen-
ter-rightist Social Democratic Center Party have described
him as pragmatic, nationalistic, anticommunist, and "in-
terested in constructing a national brand of socialism
adapted to national realities." Furthermore, the admiral
recently announced his belief that Portugal's membership
in NATO is imperative because of the country's location.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 19, 1975
Criticism of the US by Prime Minister Gandhi and
other Indian officials, aimed primarily at domestic In-
dian audiences, is beginning to increase as election
campaigns approach.
Early this week, Mrs. Gandhi publicly referred at
least twice to foreign "threats," including a new threat
from the sea, which she said justify the continuation of
a state of emergency in force since the 1971 war with
Pakistan. Mrs. Gandhi has used her emergency powers
primarily to detain suspected terrorists and smugglers.
Her insistence on retaining the emergency powers has
been frequently attacked by opponents, including her
leading critic, Jayaprakash Narayan.
When asked by newsmen what sea threat she had in
mind, Mrs. Gandhi said it was "obvious." US officials
in New Delhi believe there is little doubt she was re-
ferring to US sea power, including plans for expanding
US naval facilities on Diego Garcia Island in the Indian
Ocean.
Over the past two months Mrs. Gandhi and other In-
dian officials have been critical of the US policy change
in February that permitted the resumption of arms sales
to Pakistan. The rhetoric had been relatively restrained
but has become sharper during the past week. Some cab-
inet members have stated that US arms are sure to make
Pakistan a source of intrigue and aggression. The pres-
ident of.Mrs. Gandhi's Congress Party and the chief min-
isters of two states have gone even further, suggesting
that US policies are creating tension throughout Asia.
New Delhi has long opposed the presence of outside
powers--particularly the US--in the Indian Ocean, as
well as other US policies such as involvement in Indo-
china and military cooperation with Pakistan. In addi-
tion, Mrs. Gandhi has in the past shown a readiness to
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blame foreign countries, especially the US, for India's
problems. Such rhetoric may well increase as elections
draw nearer in Gujarat state, where they are scheduled
for June, and on the national level, where they are ex-
pected by early next year.
INDIA
The navy has expressed renewed interest in purchas-
ing Harrier vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL)
strike and reconnaissance aircraft, produced in the UK,
to replace obsolescent Sea Hawk fighters assigned to In-
dia's aircraft carrier.
t is likely that the navy
initially will buy seven of the aircraft, but details of
the agreement have not been worked out. Additional air-
craft and trainers may be purchased to equip a land-based
squadron so that replacements could rotate to the air-
craft carrier. Acquisition of the Harrier would provide
the navy with an improved strike capability to complement
the carrier's antisubmarine warfare mission.
The British Naval Arms Committee stated in September
that up to 25 Harriers might be sold to India. It is
believed that delivery of the aircraft may be completed
in two years if contracts are concluded in the near
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National Intelligence Bulletin
JAPAN-AUSTRALIA
April 19, 1975
Reduction of certain import barriers is among the
topics being negotiated by Japan and Australia; the sub-
ject is likely to be contentious. Unless these restric-
tions--imposed during the past year--are eased, they
may cut significantly into the two countries' $6-billion
yearly trade.
Japan--now Australia's leading trading partner--will
be the hardest hit by new Australian tariffs and quotas.
About one quarter of Japan's exports to Australia are
affected by the new restrictions, with textiles, steel
products, and cars leading the list. Australia, for
example, initiated quotas on car imports after imports
from Japan doubled in 1974 to $1 billion. Additional
trade restrictions now under consideration in Canberra
could increase to 35 percent the share of Japanese goods
covered by tariffs or quotas.
Canberra finds objectionable the restrictions Tokyo
imposed early last year on imports of beef. These re-
strictions all but eliminated a $250-million annual
market for Australian meat.
Tokyo, with US support, is pushing for an investi-
gation of the Australian trade curbs by the council of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Australian
officials, for their part, have threatened to embargo
coking coal shipped to Japan unless the beef import re-
strictions are lifted.
No agreements to reduce restrictions are likely to
emerge from these meetings. Even a general economic re-
lations treaty that was to be signed at the ministerial-
level meetings next month is in trouble. The two coun-
t
i
r
es have not been able to agree on a definition of
most-favored-nation status and Australian controls on
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(continued)
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Cyprus: Rival demonstrations by opposing women's
groups in Cyprus tomorrow have the potential for vio-
lence. A group of foreign and Greek Cypriot women plans
to hold a demonstration on the cease-fire line south of
Famagusta to protest Turkish noncompliance with the UN
resolution calling for safe return of refugees to their
homes.
Turkish Cypriot women have responded by schedul-
ing a counterdemonstration
for
the same time. They plan
to protest past injustices
at
the :hands of the Greek Cyp-
riots.
The prospect that
some
of the women sympathetic
to the
Greek Cypriot cause
may
try to break through the
Turkish
lines has prompted
UN
officials to attempt to
arrange a meeting between
repr
esentatives of the two op-
posing groups between the
Gree
k and Turkish lines. It
is hoped the demonstrators will return peacefully to
their respective sectors after the meeting.
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