NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027500010050-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2006
• Sequence Number: 50
• Publication Date: March 29, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence
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State Dept. review completed
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National Intelligence Bulletin
SOUTH VIETNAM
March 29, 1975
Da Nang, in effect, has fallen. General Truong,
the regional commander, has abandoned his headquarters
and is believed aboard a tugboat in the harbor.
The only South Vietnamese military remaining in
Da Nang are marine units, but they are trying to get to
the beach to be evacuated. It is doubtful that any of
these units can be rescued.
Early this morning, the North Vietnamese began a
heavy artillery and rocket, barrage against the airport.
Many refugees crowding the runways were probably killed.
The government was able to get some if its aircraft in
the air, but many were destroyed.
Given the imminent arrival of North Vietnamese in-
fantry units in the city, there is little chance that
further evacuation of civilians can continue either by
sea or air. All Americans have left the city, including
the US consul general, who is aboard a tugboat in the
harbor.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 29, 1975
CONTENTS
SOUTH VIETNAM: The situation in Da Nang is totally out
of control and the airlift has been suspended. (Page 1)
CAMBODIA,- The military situation. (Page 5)
CAMBODIA: Latest political developments. (Page 6)
SYRIA: Damascus appears to be closing ranks with Cairo
on future Middle East talks. (Page 9)
USSR: Moscow getting set for Middle East talks in
Geneva. (Page 10)
NATO: Further delay likely in decision on F--104 replace-
ment. (Page 11)
GREECE-TURKEY: Athens will not back down on airspace
violations by Turks. (Page 13)
PORTUGAL: Authorities now have necessary powers to keep
elections peaceful and troublemakers out of circulation.
(Page 14)
VENEZUELA: Caracas will host conference of Latin American
army chiefs of staff next week. (Page 16)
PHILIPPINES: Renewed negotiations in Jidda with Muslim
insurgents unlikely. (Page 17)
NORTH KOREA: Pyongyang?s interest in trade with West
being acknowledged more openly. (Page 18)
ZAMBIA-RHODESIA: Crackdown on feuding Zambian-based
Rhodesian insurgents. (:Page 20)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 21)
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National Intelligence Bulletin
SOUTH VIETNAM
March 29, 1975
Refugees and armed stragglers in Da Nang are to-
tally out of control. The airlift from the city's main
airfield has been suspended, although some people were
evacuated yesterday from the smaller field at nearby Mar-
ble Mountain.
I the communists
have begun to rocket the main airfield. The situation
in the port area is similarly chaotic, with ships refus-
ing to come to the docks. Transporting refugees by boat
to these ships has proved dangerous and slow. The senior
government commander in Da ].Nang has begun to use marines
from his defensive perimeter to reassert control over the
mob.
The communists further tightened the noose around
Da Nang yesterday by overrunning Hoi An City, 15 miles
to the south. At last report, government forces no
longer had control of the Hai Van Pass, just north of
Da Nang.
Communist forces are closing in on Qui Nhon City
from the north, and pressure is also increasing from the
west. The situation on the coastal plain south to Nha
Trang remains unclear. The Phu Yen Province chief stated
yesterday that he had been ordered to hold the capital
city of Tuy Hoa. As many as 60,000 persons from the
Kontum-Pleiku convoy have arrived in Tuy Hoa. Most of
the town's shops have closed, and at least half of the
population has fled south toward Nha Trang. There is a
report, however, that the communists have moved into the
southern districts of the province, and Tuy Hoa may be-
come another isolated government enclave.
The loss of the mountain province of, Lam Dong yes-
terday brings the communists closer to Da Lat. The road
from Da Lat to the coast remains open, however, and much
of the city's population has already fled along this
route.
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 29, 1975
It is not clear how the government intends to bring
its units from Military Region 1 to the Saigon area.
Even if logistic and transportation problems are solved,
it will be very difficult to reconstitute these units as
an effective fighting force. Military Region 1 commander
Truong has agreed to relinquish command of the 4,000
troops of the South Vietnamese 2nd Division who were
evacuated to an island off the northern coast. Senior
officials in Saigon are concerned, however, that if they
were moved too quickly into Military Region 3 without
adequate psychological preparation and without their de-
pendents, the discipline of the troops would disintegrate.
Meanwhile, the tone of current Vietnamese communist
propaganda shows that Hanoi now sees the clear possibil-
ity of a final unraveling of Saigon's position and is
moving to encourage the political collapse of the Thieu
government. Citing a fundamental change in the balance
of power in the South, a North Vietnamese party newspaper
editorial of March 21 underscored the communist position
that only the removal of Thieu could lead to negotiations
and a "speedy settlement of South Vietnam's affairs."
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 29, 1975
In an effort to encourage high-level defections
from the Thieu government, a Viet Cong statement broad-
cast to the South on March 26 promised that. all generals
and senior officials prepared to "implement. the Paris
Accords seriously" would be treated as members of a
"neutralist third force." The broadcast went on to de-
clare that all military personnel and dependents who
choose to remain in the rapidly expanding "revolutionary
zones" will be "welcomed," and that all officers who
defect with their units will be allowed to keep their
ranks and be given "important. jobs" by the "revolutionary
side."
Given the confusion and mounting defeatism in many
areas of the country, such appeals could become increas-
ingly effective.
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 29, 1975
The US airlift operation into Pochentong Airport
was suspended yesterday because of concentrated and ac-
curate 105-mm. howitzer fire against the offloading ramp.
The first rounds struck the ramp about 45 minutes
prior to the arrival of the first aircraft. Additional
rounds hit the ramp 20 minutes after the plane had landed.
One round reportedly damaged the primary taxiway that
leads to the ramp, rendering it unserviceable for DC-8
operations. Barring any interference from communist
fire, it will take an estimated six hours to repair the
taxiway.
The communists apparently are adjusting their fire
every 24 hours, and the patterns of impacts since March
26 give them the capability to deny the use of Pochentong
to sustained airlift operations. Operations cannot be
shifted to other parts of the field, because other ac-
commodations for the aircraft are not available. It now
appears that unless the government can push the commu-
nists out of artillery and rocket range of Pochentong,
the airlift may be suspended indefinitely.
Government attempts to retake Tuol Leap have been
unsuccessful. Continued command-and-control problems,
logistic difficulties, and the diversion of forces to
resecure Route 4 have greatly hindered government ef-
forts.
Army elements abandoned a battalion-sized position
about four miles northwest of Phnom Penh on Thursday.
The local commander stated that without reinforcements,
the withdrawal could cause abandonment of other posi-
tions. Government troops reportedly are exhausted, and
units are understrength from continuous?combat. Two
battalions recently withdrawn from the upper Mekong are
being sent to reinforce the area. Communist pressure is
continuing against 7th Division elements along Route 51.
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 29, 1975
Prince Sihanouk appears to have firmly closed the
door on future dealings with any element of the current
government in Phnom Penh.
The Prince on March 26 released a list of 21 "war
criminals" who would be put on trial following any com-
munist take-over. The list includes all ministers in
the newly reshuffled cabinet as well as President Lon
Nol's younger brother Lon Non and Saukham Koy, who is
constitutionally empowered to assume presidential func-
tions in Lon Nol's absence. The newly named "war crimi-
nals" join the list of seven active and retired govern-
ment leaders whom the communists have said they will ex-
ecute.
Sihanouk's latest announcement is in marked contrast
to his claim in December that he might be able to find a
place in his "government" for key Phnom Penh leaders such
as tong Boret and Sirik Matak.
For the past several weeks, Sihanouk has been hewing
close to the communists' line in his public statements.
This appears to reflect and substantiate Sihanouk's
claim that he and the communists have reached agreement
on his future role and that he will stay on as nominal
chief of state following a communist take-over. I
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 29, 1975
SYRIA
Now that the indirect negotiations between Egypt
and Israel have broken down, the Syrians will probably
move to try to close ranks with Egypt and chart a common
course. President Asad, who was in Libya yesterday, may
visit Cairo this weekend.
Radio Damascus, after a day's delay, echoed Egyptian
Foreign Minister Fahmi's call of last Sunday for a resump-
tion of the Geneva peace conference, insisting at the
same time on the participation of the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization. Otherwise, Damascus has said little
officially about the collapse of the disengagement talks.
The private. Syrian reaction reportedly has been one
of relief, tempered by concern over how the US will react.
Damascus had feared President Sadat would make conces-
sions to Israel that would have seriously eroded Syria's
own bargaining strength.
In a conversation with Ambassador Murphy on March
24, a journalist who had talked earlier that day with
Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam and another cabinet mem-
ber portrayed the Syrians' attitude toward Sadat as hav-
ing undergone a transformation in the past few days.
They now are said to regard the Egyptian President as
an "Arab patriot" for refusing to agree to a pledge of
nonbelligerency with Israel.
Khaddam told the journalist that Syria would follow
Egypt's lead on the question of renewing the mandates
of the UN peace-keeping forces. The mandate for the
force in the Sinai expires on April 24, while the one
for the force on the Golan Heights runs out in late May.
The journalist indicated that Syrian leaders are
deeply worried that the US will wash its hands of all
peace efforts, and added that they appear to be genuinely
concerned about the possibility of renewed hostilities.
He said he was convinced the Syrian military has a real-
istic appreciation of Israel's military might and does not
want a war. Syrian chief of staff Shihabi told the US
defense attache in Damascus essentially the same thing
on Wednesday.
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 29, 1975
The Soviet Union reportedly is planning to send a
30-man contingent of Middle East experts to Geneva in
early April in expectation of a resumption of the Middle
East peace conference. Soviet embassies in the Middle
East have been instructed to begin forwarding their re-
ports directly to Geneva on April 1.
Moscow, nevertheless, still seems to have some
doubts about when, and if, the talks will be resumed.
Y. D. Pyrlin, deputy chief of the Foreign Ministry's
Middle East Division, told a US official on March 26
that the Arab positions have not yet clarified and that
Moscow did not expect to know where things stand before
mid-April.
Palestinian representation at Geneva is one problem
facing the Soviets. Pyrlin again expressed Moscow's
long-standing exasperation over the disunity in PLO ranks.
He claimed that the Soviets, who now publicly recognize
Arafat's leadership, are not even able to confer with
the Palestinian leader unless members of his entourage
are present. Pyrlin gave no sign that Moscow has a clear
idea of how to get around the Palestinian representation
problem, but he did say that an effort is being made to
schedule a visit by Arafat to Moscow in April. This
would provide an opportunity to discuss the issue.
On Soviet-Egyptian relations, Pyrlin confirmed that
the economic talks have been suspended, but the Soviets
expect them to resume by late April or early May. The
main issues remaining are the Egyptian debt settlement
and the integration of Soviet-Egyptian joint projects
into Moscow's new Five-Year Plan. Pyrlin added that
Brezhnev would probably not go to the Middle East before
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 29, 1975
NATO
An inconclusive meeting of Dutch and Belgian de-
fense and foreign ministers on March 25 portends further
delay in the decision by the consortium of Belgium, the
Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway on a replacement for
their F-104 aircraft. There is increasing evidence that
Norway and Denmark have decided to purchase the US
F-16.
The Belgians appear to be delaying a choice in order
to ensure fullest consideration of new offers by the
French. Prime Minister Tindemans, nevertheless, may try
to eliminate further delay on the grounds that the con-
troversy is aggravating domestic tensions--the French-
speaking element favors the F-lE Mirage, while the
Flemish-speakers back the US plane.
Tindemans also claims that it would be "politically
impossible" within the NATO framework for Brussels to
make a unilateral decision on its F-104 replacement. He
insists that the Belgian selection would have to be the
same as at least one of the other members of the consort-
ium.
The final Belgian position may be influenced by the
degree of Dutch Defense Minister Vredeling's political
clout. Vredeling seems to have retreated somewhat from
previous support for the French Mirage F-lE and now may
lean toward the F-16. One faction within his Socialist
Party, however, is against any replacement for the F-104,
while another favors reducing the role of the Dutch air
force and buying a cheaper, less versatile aircraft. If,
after convincing his party--the dominant partner in the
coalition government--that an advanced aircraft is re-
quired, Vredeling continues his swing toward the F-16,the
Belgians might decide to abandon their support for the
Mirage F-1E. Otherwise, a consensus or a single choice
by the consortium may be virtually impossible. 25X1
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The Greeks are responding more aggressively to Turk-
ish overflights of the Aegean islands because they be-
lieve Ankara is testing their resolve on the Aegean sov-
ereignty issue. Greek Defense Minister Averoff yesterday
told US Ambassador Kubisch this was the reason the Greek
government had authorized commanders to open fire on the
Turkish planes and Greek fighters to intercept the Turk-
ish aircraft.
Averoff said that--in addition to the overflights
last week--there had been at least four flights over
Greek airspace on Thursday. Two were over Chios, one
over Lesbos, and one over Samos. In accordance with in-
structions, Greek personnel on the islands fired at the
Turkish aircraft with 40-mm. automatic weapons. The US
ambassador described the firing as "symbolic" and be-
lieves the Greeks wanted not to hit the aircraft but
simply to raise the level of response as a. further warn-
ing to the Turks. The Turkish planes were well out of
the range of the Greek weapons, and an interceptor air-
craft from Limnos arrived after the Turkish aircraft had
left.
The reinforcement of some of the islands in recent
weeks contravenes the terms of international treaties.
The Turks may be attempting to acquire photographic evi-
dence to support the aide-memoire they circulated last
week charging Athens with violating such treaties.
Last spring, Ankara did test Greek sovereignty in
the Aegean by sending a hydrographic vessel with a naval
escort into the disputed area. The absence of a strong
government in Ankara and of firm lines of authority at
this time increases the possibility that decisions on
further overflights could be made on a military rather
than a cabinet level.
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 29, 1975
11OR!VUGAL
Portugal's newly formed Revolutionary Council has
taken several steps in the past few days to prevent the
disruption of the electoral process.
Yesterday, the council approved legislation allowing
Lhe armed forces to detain violators of electoral laws
[or up to 30 days before turning them over to civilian
authorities. Offenders are subject to penalties of up
to eight years' imprisonment and fines of up to $4,000.
The council has also outlawed the extremist Reorgan-
i.zinq Movement of the Proletariat Party. According to
press reports, the party had refused to drop the hammer
tna.. sickle from its party symbol, angering the Communists,
who have vehemently protested the use of variations on
their emblem by left-wing splinter groups. The Communists
demand that each party have a different symbol so as not
to confuse illiterate voters.
The Reorganizing Movement was one of the three
parties barred from the constituent assembly elections.
The party is expected to move underground and try to
disrupt the campaign.
'These measures, plus previous legislation, give the
authorities the power necessary to keep elections peace-
'ul, and troublemakers out of circulation. Extremist
demonstrations had been banned in the past, but no action
had been taken against the demonstrators who ignored the
1) an..
During the past week, President Costa Gomes' com-
inents to several NATO ambassadors revealed how sensitive
thy:- Armed Forces Movement is to any intimation of foreign
intervention. Costa Gomes bitterly complained to most
of the ambassadors about the niggardliness of Western
zid and the unfairness of foreign press criticism of the
=ew government.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 29, 1975
Communist Party leader Cunhal, meanwhile, has al-
ready attacked the non-communist participants in the
new provisional government. Cunhal accused the Popular
Democrats of "benefitting from all the advantages of
participating in the government without carrying out the
obligations which arise from this participation."
The Popular Democrats, according to Cunhal, are
holding the government back from the "progressive course"
it should be following. The Popular Democrats and the
Communists have repeatedly accused each other of using
violence to break up the other's political meetings.
The Communists were unsuccessful in their campaign to
have the Popular Democrats excluded from the new govern-
ment.
Communist criticism of the Socialist Party has been
less intense. The Communists still officially claim that
they want to cooperate with the Socialists.
The Socialists, on the other hand, have not hesi-
tated to publicize their unhappiness about the makeup
of the new cabinet. They have objected strongly to the
addition of ministers from the Communist-influenced
Portuguese Democratic Movement, and they issued a state-
ment yesterday criticizing the composition of the cabi-
net. The Socialists explained that they had agreed to
remain in the government only because their absence
would "imperil the consolidation of democracy." I
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March 29, 1975
A meeting of army commanders from several Latin
countries, scheduled to begin in Caracas early next week,
gives another indication of Venezuelan President Perez'
aspirations for regional leadership. This is the first
time such a high-level military gathering has been
scheduled without the US having been invited.
Army leaders from Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Panama, and Peru are expected to be present.
Antiguerrilla operations, arms limitation, difficulties
in arms procurements, and US policy on foreign military
sales are likely topics of discussion.
Adverse reaction could come from the Latin countries
not invited--principally Brazil, Mexico, Paraguay, and
Uruguay. Having their own goals of leadership roles in
the area, Bra l and Mexico may be particularly upset by
the meeting.
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The Philippine government appears to be backing off
from a second round of talks with the Moro National Lib-
eration Front next month in Jidda, Saudi Arabia.
Manila has been publicizing a letter from the Front
that says it will not participate unless the Filipinos
accept in advance its demand for Muslim autonomy. Pres-
ident Marcos cannot accept a negotiated settlement in-
volving autonomy, which he sees as tantamount to relin-
quishing the Muslim-populated areas, but he recognizes
the difficulty of forcing a military solution to the
Muslim insurrection.
To avoid the appearance of doing nothing, President
Marcos is calling for wider ranging discussions in April
at home with representatives of all Muslim dissident
groups. He apparently expects that Muslim diehards will
reject the offer, although some Front members who have
surrendered may provide a token presence.
The Philippine government agreed to the initial
round of talks in Jidda in January, primarily to appear
responsive to Islamic pressure on behalf of Filipino
Muslims. Manila found its negotiating position weakened
by the venue and by the coaching given the rebels by
their Islamic brethren. Manila was also disturbed by
the international stature accorded the Front, which the
Filipinos argue is only one of several disparate Muslim
rebel groups, albeit the best organized.
Marcos feels encouraged by the fact that Indonesia,
which has been in the forefront of regional attempts at
mediation, resented the Arab interference. He may cal-
culate that his gesture regarding holding new talks in
the Philippines will at Least deflect any charges of
Philippine footdragging when the Islamic conference con-
venes in Cairo in May.
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 29, 1975
Pyongyang's interest in trading with the West is
being acknowledged more openly in its domestic propaganda.
A speech by Kim Il-song broadcast over Pyongyang radio
earlier this month is the first occasion in which North
Korea has admitted to its own people the need to purchase
materials and machinery outside the socialist market. Al-
though trade with the West has been growing for several
years, Kim's previous references to it have always been
confined to interviews with foreign media that were not
publicized by Pyongyang.
North Korean trade with the non-communist countries
jumped from $120 million in 1970 to about $800 million
last year and now accounts for roughly half of the coun-
try's total trade. Most of the increase has been in
imports from the West. Since 1970, Pyongyang has signed
contracts with firms in Japan and Western Europe for
nearly $600 million worth of industrial plants and re-
lated equipment.
Credit financing for industrial imports and grain
purchases has permitted North Korea to run large trade
deficits with the non-communist world--$170 million in
1973 and about $400 million last year. Exports to the
West consist largely of nonferrous metals, steel products,
and silk.
The recession in the West resulted in reduced demand
and falling prices for North Korean goods, particularly
nonferrous metals. Although the failure of exports to
keep pace with rapidly rising imports has led to serious
payment problems, Pyongyang appears to be pushing ahead
with its program of trade expansion with the West. The
North Koreans are inquiring about new plants, seeking
additional loans, and even attempting to purchase long-
range transport aircraft.
In his recent speech, made to a meeting of indus-
trial activists, Kim noted that trade confined to the
socialist countries is no longer sufficient for the
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North's developing economy. The decision to publicize
the address, which called on export industries to improve
their work, may have been prompted by the serious diffi-
culties Pyongyang has encountered in financing its trade
deficit, as well as its desire to overcome a reputation
for inferior merchandise. Kim did not acknowledge the
foreign exchange problems, concentrating instead on the
need for high-quality exports in order to earn the "con-
fidence of the international market."
A major element in Kim's philosophy of nation-build-
ing, as expressed in North Korean media, has been an in-
sistence on substantial--but not total--economic self-
sufficiency. In his speech. to the industrial activists,
Kim was careful to note that he was aware of the "in-
trinsic defects" of a capitalist economy and would not
allow Pyongyang to become dependent on the capitalist
market for-raw materials.
This point was reiterated in a North Korean news
agency report of March :L7, which asserted that North
Korea meets more than 70 percent of its demand for in-
dustrial raw materials domestically and relies on the
socialist countries for the rest, thereby safely in-
sulating the country from the "worldwide crisis of the
capitalist economy."
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National Intelligence Bulletin
jAMs3IA-RHODESIA
March 29, 1975
'Zambian authorities are cracking down on all Rhode-
=_icn insurgent groups that have continued to maintain
t. ?.Eir own bases in Zambia since their leaders agreed to
merge in the umbrella African National Council last Decem-
ber. President Kaunda is using the need to apprehend the
t_s.assins of Herbert Chitepo, a Rhodesian insurgent leader
::.i'_~?ed in Lusaka last week, as an opportunity to neutral-
ize insurgent elements that have been resisting a genuine
,_+r_fication of the Rhodesian nationalists.
The Zambian move weighs most heavily on the former
=,:ivibabwe African National Union, the most militant of
+_s.1e insurgent groups and the one that has carried out
jipost all of the guerrilla activities in Rhodesia. F_
J.'he Zambians acted the day after the funeral of
'htepo, who died in a bomb explosion on March 18. Con-
vTinced that Chitepo was the victim of tribal-based feud-
=_s:q within his own group, they reportedly decided on
'.arch 22 to arrest all members of the group who might
=iave been involved in the assassination. Kaunda also
lecided to close down all the offices and guerrilla
bases in Zambia belonging to two smaller insurgent groups
that had signed the merger agreement.
Kaunda and the other African leaders who helped
arrange the truce between the Rhodesian insurgents and
"Y' Minister Smith last December have tried unsuccess-
.::ui ly to make the rival insurgent groups pool their re-
-sources under a unified command that would be responsive
.i) rue leaders of the African National Council who are
based in Rhodesia. Moreover, the detention of the Na-
3_%._-anal Union officials may also help ease the pressure
rc-,m. hardliners within the group who have been pressing
l:a's.nda and the other African mediators to renew the in-
urgency.
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Middle East: The commander of the Palestine Libera-
tion Army has resigned after a dispute with PLO leader
Yasir Arafat. Major General 25X1
Mahmud Azzam, a former deputy commander of the Syrian
air force, was appointed to replace him. Syrian Presi-
dent Asad, despite his close relations with outgoing
commander Budayri, apparently agreed to Arafat's re-
quest to replace him. A former Syrian military officer
and a trusted Baath Party member, Azzam could bring
greater Syrian influence and control over the Palestine
Liberation Army. The appointment might help solve one
of Arafat's immediate problems, but over the longer run
it could weaken his ability to control or isolate the
Palestine Liberation Army. I 25X1
Angola: After a week of sporadic fighting in which
some 50 persons reportedly were killed, Angola's two
major rival liberation groups agreed yesterday to a
cease-fire. The National Front for the Liberation of
Angola and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola signed the agreement following mediation by the
Portuguese foreign minister and the minister for overseas
territories. The National Union for the Total Indepen-
dence of Angola, the third liberation group participating
in the transitional government, also pledged to respect
the cease-fire. Under the terms of the agreement, the
liberation groups will limit. to 500 the number of troops
they will maintain in the capital. Each group will also
be allowed to contribute 100 men to a mixed police force.
The agreement, however, will probably provide only a
temporary halt to the violence in the troubled territory.
Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027500010050-1
 I opA3 f Or Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027500010050-1
25X1
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010050-1