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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP66B00403R000200160024-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: August 20, 1964
• Content Type: OPEN

1964 CO GRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
ministration may be made to see after the
election.
I should, appreciate It if you would be good
enough to send me the CONGRESSIONAL REC-
oiw of yesterday's debate as well as your own
speeches on the Vietnam issue during the
last week.
May I recall by way of Personal introduc-
tion that I met, you when I was teaching at
Columbia,
`Yours gratefully and respectfully,
ERNEST DALE,
,Professor, the University of Virginia.
VALLEJO, CALIF.,
August 4, 1964.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senator from Oregon,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
SIR: In the April 6 issue of I. F. Stone's
Weekly a section is abridged from your March
25 speech in the Senate on South Vietnam.
The Weekly states in its abridgement: "We
are "there we, say at the invitation of the
South Vietnamese Goverxinent. But that
Government is our .own creature. We know
it and the world knows it. One might as
well try to claim that the Soviet Army is
in East Germany only at the invitation of
the East German Government."
It continues further on in the article:
"There are no Chinese soldiers fighting in
Vietnam; there are no Russian soldiers. The
only foreign troops are Americans. Every
time an American dies in Vietnam, the flag
should be lowered to half mast over the
Capitol, over the White House, over the Pen-
tagon because boys are dying in the execu-
tion of a unilateral policy that no longer has
a direct bearing on the defenses of the
United States."
If this is the correct sense of your Senate
speech, it is a severe indictment of U.S.
action in South Vietnam.
I. F. Stone, himself, speaking on KPFA
radio (a listerner-supported radio station in
Berkeley, Calif.) stated that news correspond-
ends from other countries covering South
Vietnam found that of all the arms recov-
ered from the Vietcong, a vast majority were
United States made and only a small propor-
tion were made in Communist China. If
this is so, it makes talk of taking the war
north irrelevant if not dangerous. The
above-noted observation indicates further, I
think, that the fighting is a revolution in-
ternal to South Vietnam; the U.S. arms were
stolen by the Vietcong from South Viet-
namese,
Statements such as the above, by respon-
sible citizens such as you and Mr. Stone,
have raised. grave doubts in my mind as to
the justice of U.S. actions in South Vietnam.
Doubtful, though I may be and respectful
of your opinions, sir, I find myself with a
scarcity of facts to substantiate criticism of
the administration's present course of action.
I would very much appreciate it If your
office would send me a statement of your
own on the South Vietnam action and of
what are the true U.S. interests in the area,
In addition, I would like a catalog of the hard
facts (along with independent sources) by
which you document your view and the
reasoning behind it.
If I find the. documentation adequate, I
will be glad to join you "out on (your) limb"
and, in my small capacity as a citizen, I will
help you in any way I can.
Very truly yours,
JOHN P. WEBBER.
CAMBRIDGE, MASS.,
Hon. WAYNE MORSE, August 8,1964.
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I should like first
of all to express my gratitude and admira-
tion for the courageous stand you have con-
sistently taken against the aggressive foreign
policies of this country. How it is that you
are virtually the sole person in the Senate
who has not made himself a stooge for the
Military Establishment and the business
community I do not know, but your lone
dissent has my full support.
I am a student at the Harvard Graduate
School in the field of Soviet studies. I am
planning to do an analytic and interpretative
study of U.S. policy in Vietnam, and I shall
endeavor to place this in the full historical
context of American policy in Asia. Since,
however, my, major objective is to elucidate
the real nature of what is going on in that
part of the world today and what is likely to
happen in the near future, I am very much
concerned with the serious difficulties which
one faces in obtaining reliable information.
The recent crisis was enormously frustrating
to and who refuses to accept the veracity of
official Government statements and explana-
tions.
Since the American Government has quite
consistently and deliberately lied to the
American people with regard to matters con-
cerning Indochina, and since you alone have
sought to counter this deception, it seemed
useful for me to find out if you could pro-
vide me with any information. Your mem-
bership on the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and your deep concern with de-
velopments in Indochina have no doubt made
you one of the best informed persons in
these matters.
I should like to know, therefore, if there is
any information which you could send me
and which it would be permissible for me to
quote, including any specific remarks which
you yourself might care to make. I am par-
ticularly Interested in the extent to which
the United States and our South Vietnamese
puppets have been carrying out air attacks,
dropping sabotage teams, supporting naval
attacks, etc., on North Vietnamese territory.
Also, do you have official information rele-
vant -to the myth of North Vietnamese and
Chinese aggression, infiltration, and supply-
ing of arms and men? I have followed most,
if not all, of your remarks which have found
their way into the newspapers, including
more sympathetic publications, such as I. F.
Stone's Weekly.
Thank you very much for whatever addi-
tional information with which you can pro-
vide me, and thank you again for you voice
of dissent against the increasingly dangerous
policies of the American Government.
Sincerely,
STEVEN J. ROSENTHAL.
Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR MORSE: You are certainly to
be congratulated on your splendid stand for
right as you have drawn so clearly the pic-
ture of the southeast Asian problem.
The people (meaning the man or woman
on the street) are not well informed with
regard to most of today's crisis situations.
Nor are we thoroughly informed as to your
position. But, it is the thought of some of
us that you have objected to the military
giveaway-the Interference on our part in a
war that we cannot win, etc.
Many of us feel that the whole of south-
east Asia should be neutralized and that the
U.N. should have a firm hand. We hope for
the reconvening of the Geneva Conference.
We feel that the policy started by Dulles and
carried on in support of the corrupt Diem
regime was totally bankrupt, and we feel
the same way about Khan. We deplore the
strategic hamlets, the abuse of the people,
and the no-win, wasteful situation, as we see
it.
You may not agree at all, but De Gaulle
has, to the way of many people's thinking,
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19877
offered some ideas worth considering 1t
there.
More than all else, today, we believe that
13' Thant is the wise one. We believe that
you and Senator GiuENING have taken a less
warlike position, and we feel that a third
world war is the destruction of civilization.
We deplore the quick money for arms and
feel that negotiation-use of the U.N., etc.-
are., the wise moves, Walter Lippmann al-
was stands tall.
On foreign aid, many of us would see tech-
nical help, an expansion of the Peace Corps.
In place of the military (except for gen-
uine internal security), we would see schools,
hospitals, roads, dams, help to the people.
That would be a "win" policy, whether done
at home or abroad.
Mr. MORSE, will you please send a dozen of
the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD sheets, showing
your position, that I may put them in the
hands of responsible people?
Thank you.
ANGINNETPE SHERMAN GORES,
RIALTO, CALIF.,
August 5, 1964.
DEAR SENATOR: I always used to impress
with your views, because regardless of party
affiliations, all other needs of conformity, I
think you are one of those who says what lie
thinks.
It is Impossible to get full text of your
speech on Vietnam, which must include lot
of facts press and TV decline to tell or print.
If possible I like to have full text of your
speech on Vietnam you gave on August 5.
Because of my knowledge of history of
Vietnam since 15th century and United
States, French, and Vietnamese relations be-
fore Dienbienphu and since I see not much
moral base on U.S. arguments about inde-
pendence of South Vietnam.
U.S. position in South Vietnam as similar
to those Russian position in Hungry.
United States paid 82.7 billion to French
to kill Vietnamese when their only crime
was to fight to kick French out of their coun-
try, yet United States did not mind to gave
Ho Chi Minh and Pathet Lao when they were
fighting against Japanese.
After World War II over, despite of those
loose talk about Four Freedoms, Atlantic
Charter and all those freedom nonsense
French did not mind to grab those lands
back, with approval of United States of
course.
Before Bao Dal and after moral position
of United States was vulnerable at Vietnam,
especially unkept parts of Geneva agreement
on Vietnam, when United States stayed out,
after Mendes France said put up or shut up
to Dulles, when they were beaten at Dien
Bien Phu by Pathet Lao and Ho Chi Minh
and Wo Nguyen Giap.
It is nice to see that there are men like
you still existing, when heads are hot, it
takes guts to criticize oneself.
Sincerely,
HALIL S. GIIRELLI,
Turkish Student.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR MORSE: This is to confirm to-
day's telegram wishing you courage in the
continuing fight against our policy in Viet-
nam which inevitably leads to war.
Enclosed, too, are copies of wires I have
sent to my two Senators.
It would be helpful to me in talking with
friends and neighbors to have any available
copies of transcripts of the talks you have
been making on this question. Truthfully,
I had given but passing attention to the in-
conspicuous newspaper reports of your
speeches. But shocked as I was by the Presi-
dent's message on Tuesda F night, and the
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19878 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE August 20
.yitj went developments, I was overjoyed
wh n I saw and heard you on TV this morn-
ing. It bolstered my hope and my deter-
mination to see that you are there and still
fighting In the face of this veritable landslide
of was incitement.
Keep up the good fight. I am sure there
are many like myself who want to help in
any small way we can.
Sincerely,
only to the underprivileged of all races but
to the whole population, and especially to
the Negro people as well as the Puerto Rican
and Mexican-American minorities.
President Johnson, many of your fellow
citizens hope you will have the courage and
the bigness to recognize the error of your
policy on Vietnam (which Is a result of the
unfortunate policies you inherited from
previous administrations) and will withdraw
the joint resolution, pull out our Armed
Forces from that area and give the people of
Vietnam the liberty to solve their own prob-
lems in their own way.
Respectfully and sincerely,
CLARACOLfN.
---
BROOKLYN, N.Y.,
dugust 6. 1964,
President LYNDON B. JOHNSON,
White House,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR PRESIDENT JOHNSON: It is not my
custom to dash off letters to public officials
at the drop of a hat. But Since hearing your
message to us fellow Americans last Tuesday
night, I have not had a moment's peace of
mind. When you said that our planes at
that moment were In action, I shuddered
remembering the nightmare of the Korean
war behind us and aghast at the possibility of
nuclear war ahead of us. As every passing
hour brings new efforts through radio. TV,
and the papers to raise a war fever, I am
increasingly alarmed. I could not go to
work this morning before writing to you.
If we are indeed a country whose Govern-
ment-exercises power by consent of the gov-
erned, I must In good oonscience raise my
small voice to declare I do not consent to
your message of Tuesday night, nor your
speech at Syracuse, nor Ambassador Steven-
son's presentation at the U.N. Security Coun-
cil yesterday, nor the joint resolution being
debated In Congress today. And I have so
wired to my Senators.
Without any hesitation I am ready to
make every sacrifice for the genuine defense
of my country. But I am convinced that my
country is In no way threatened by North
Vietnam's PT boats In the Gulf of Tonkin.
At this moment, Incited by publicity, many
people may be horrified by an "unprovoked"
attack upon our destroyers. But these same
people, if furnished more Information and
given a chance to really judge, would prob-
ably join me In asking, "What are our de-
stroyers doing there in the first place?" Why
have we let our Government get into the
business of upholding one corrupt and shaky
regime after another, none of which have
enjoyed the confidence of its own people?
Wasn't the experience of France, and its in-
evitable debacle at Dien Bien Phu lesson
enough for us? Do we have to step Into
France's outworn colonialist oboes? And at
what cost to us taxpayers?
You seemed to take pride and comfort, Mr.
President, In the fact that Senator BARRY
GoLOwATER supports your conduct in the
Vietnam situation. I am frankly shocked.
It was bad enough to see a candidate of Sen-
ator GoLDWATER's extremist views nominated
by a major political party, but at least we
had the alternative of supporting a mature.
forward-looking, thoughful, reasoning leader
In the other party. Do you not realize there
is no statesmanship in capitulating to Sena-
tor GOLDWATER's brinkmanship?
Let me refer again to the astronomical
cost of our Vietnam policy. How can we
keep on spending billions in support of a
dubious "freedom" In Vietnam (which the
majority of people in Vietnam reject) at
the cost of building the foundation for real
freedom for the Negro 20 percent of our
citizens here at home? Just Imagine what
effective application could be given to both
the civil rights law and the antipoverty
program if the funds now used for a false
defense of freedom in Vietnam were allo-
cated to a real defense of freedom at home
in the form of job opportunit'es, job train-
ing, quality education in intergrated schools,
slum clearance and new low-rent housing.
This would be of tremendous benefit not
Senator JAOOa K.JAVrrs,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
For sake of peace please vote against reso-
lution giving President power to declare In-
stant war.
CLARA COL6N.
AUGUST 8, 1964.
Senator KENnrrH B. KEATING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
To preserve peace urge vote against resolu-
tion tantamount declaration of war.
CLARA COL6N.
CHICAGO. ILL.,
August 5,1964.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR MORSE: It takes guts to take
the stand you did on the NBC program this
evening. Your courage and integrity in
pointing out our violations of the Geneva
agreement are exemplary. We have read
an abridged version of your speech to the
Senate on June 29. Please send us a copy
of the entire speech. We heartily concur in
your statement. "Before any administra-
tion threatens to take the United States into
war It should exhaust the last possibility
to avoid It." We can hardly believe that
bombing bases In North Vietnam fits into
this possibility. Apparently we have learned
nothing from the disaster that befell the
French in Indochina, and by escalating the
war we may all of us "pay the uttermost
farthing."
Cordially,
Dr. and Mrs. ALFam STEIN.
EvANSVILLE COLLEGE.
Evansville, Ind.,
August 6, 1964.
Hon. WAYNE C. MORSE,
Senator from Oregon,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
MY DRAB SENATOR Moasz: Congratulations
upon your forthright affirmation of sound
moral truth In the midst of the belligerent
nationalistic spirit of the day.
The radio and television reports have given
only partial extracts of what YOU said, how-
ever, but by putting together what each of
the three networks quoted I suppose we have
a fair representation of what you really said.
If It is possible to have a copy of these
statements and of other statements that you
will make in the near future, I shall be very
grateful to be on your mailing list for such
materials. Some of the materials will be
directly useful in my teaching of a course in
ethics, and the rest will be interesting and
morale-boosting for me to have personally.
Thank you. With all good wishes, I am,
Sincerely yours.
HARRIS D. ERICKSON,
Professor of Philosophy.
PITTSBUEGH, PA.,
August 5, 1964.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR: Were your remarks regard-
ing the situation in south Asia extended into
the RECORD? If so I would appreciate a copy.
At least there some Senators who are
concerned about sending our boys to war.
Sincerely yours,
RICHARD J. WAGNER.
BURLINGTON, VT.,
August 5, 1964.
WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senator,
Washington, D.C.
DEAa SENATOR MORSE: Congratulations on
all your past speeches on the errors of our
foreign policy in southeast Asia. All our
citizens owe you a debt today for the cou-
rageous way in which you expressed the
"nagging doubts" which many of us feel over
President Johnson's decision to attack mili-
tary installations in North Vietnam when
our fleet was in no immediate danger. I
would like very much to have copies of any
of your speeches on this topic which may be
available. Keep up the good work.
Sincerely yours,
THOMAS J. SPINNER, Jr.
Los ANGELES, CALIF.,
August 5, 1964.
DEAR SENATOR Moasz: I fully agree with
your position on refusal to agree with the
resolution on engagement in North Vietnam.
The parents of all children should be grate-
ful that there Is at least one Senator who
can expose the onesided argument of Presi-
dent Johnson to engage In aggressive war.
Please send me your entire speeches on this
vital Issue before the Senate now. What can
the people do when all the news media are
controlled? Even the proceedings of the
U.N. weren't carried In its entirety here in
Los Angeles. What can be done to make
these channels open to the public?
Yours truly,
JOSEPH SIEGEL.
MISADVENTURE IN VIETNAM
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in
the RECORD an article entitled "Misad-
venture in Vietnam: The Mix of Fact
and Myth," written by John Gange, and
published in Nation magazine for August
24, 1964.
John Gange is director of the Insti-
tute of International Studies and Over-
seas Administration, of the University
of Oregon. He served for some years as
an officer in the State Department. I
am proud to ask unanimous consent that
this scholarly article by an outstanding
professor at the University of Oregon be
printed in the RECORD. His scholarship
has won for him a high reputation.
If one will read Mr. Gange's article,
entitled "Misadventure in Vietnam: The
Mix of Fact and Myth," he will find fur-
ther substantiation of the criticisms of
U.S. warmaking policies in Asia that the
junior Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUEN-
rNG] and the senior Senator from Oregon
have been presenting on the floor of the
Senate for the past 6 months. They will
find ample support for the position of
the Senator from Alaska and the Sena-
tor from Oregon in refusing to vote for
a joint resolution which, as we said at the
time, constitutes a predated declaration
of war, giving to the President, in clear
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CVNGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
4NZ of the Constitution, the right to
ake war In the absence of a declaration
of war.
I also ask, unanimous consent to have
printed in the RECORD a second article
published in the Nation magazine for
August 24, 1064, this one entitled "The
Only War We've Got." It was written
by Daniel F. Ford. Mr. Ford, a free-
lance journalist, has been in South Viet-
nam for the past 2 months on. a magazine
writer's grant from the Philip M. Stern
Family Fund. This is the last article in
a series he has written- for the Nation
from this most unfortunate war zone, in
the creation of which the United States,
since 1954, will have to assume a large
share of the responsibility and burden in
the pages of history.
There being no objection, the articles
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
MISADVENTURE IN VIETNAM-THE MIX OF
FAOT AND MYTH
(By John Gang'e)
The weathered headstones in the old Prot-
estant cemetery of Portuguese Macao tell of
the misadventures of many Americans in the
Gulf of Tonkin and the South China Sea.
In the early years of our Republic, the Ameri-
cans who died in this faraway area were
sailors, Yankee traders, missionaries, and
visionary diplomats-like Edmund Roberts,
who first sought treaties for the United
States In southeast Asia, journeying to Co-
chin China, Siam, and Muscat In 1832,. To-
day, the' headlines toll the death of many
Americans pursuing the poltical Interests of
the United.States in southeast Asia.
From small beginnings our interest in
southeast Asia swelled to include ,a colonial
empire highlighted by our half century in
the,Philippines. The United States blund-
ered into empire in 1898 by defeating the
weak Spanish imperialists in the Battle of
Manila Bay. Now we are fighting again in
the Gulf of Tonkin and in the. steaming
jungle of old Indochina. For many Ameri-
cans today our deep involvement In southeast
Asia's civil wars is as inexplicable as was our
plunge into empire in the Philippines. For
14 years we have propped the French effort
to keep Indochina, or have underwritten the
"democratic" regimes of such as Bao Dai,
Ngo Dinh Diem and the subsequent military
dictators. We have stumbled into "colonial"
responsibilities without corresponding au-
tohrity since' the defeat of France by the
Vietnamese In 1954.
The dilemma we faced in mid-1954 was
very different in some respects from the
dilemma President McKinley faced in 1898
when he was informed that all of the Philip-
pine Islands were ours., for the taking-and
holding. In 1954, there was nothing ready
for the taking in Indochina-unless we were
prepared to battle the well-armed, well-led
and tough Vietnamese and almost certainly
the colossus of Communist China. We never-
theless decided to try to hold South Vietnam
aaginnt a Communist takeover.
In doing so we underestimated Communist
power and the response of great numbers of
the Vietnamese to Ho Chi Minh's leadership,
plus the extent of Communist outside aid,
.
.
p
ec
on
n
especially from the Chinese. When Secre- Vietnam would not have been acceptable to The second myth that we embraced was
tary Dulles went to-the Geneva Conference North Vietnam and Communist China, one that military action would be an acceptable
of April 1954, called to discuss Korea and answer is that we never tried this course of substitute for basic political and social ac-
dispose of the pieces, of the broken French action and hence we can't say what the re- tion. Again the lessons of the bitter and
empire in Indochina, reportedly he refused sponse might have been. Instead, we pressed frustrating American experience in Nicara-
to look at the chief Communist Chinese dele- for a southeast Asian military security pact, gua, Haiti, and Santo Domingo in the years
gate, Premier Chou En-lat. This news which Secretary Dulles had urged in 1954. between World Wars I and II were passed over
sparked one of Fletcher Knebel's best quips The Eisenhower administration had just or rejected, if ever remembered. Military
to the effect that the Republicans were an swallowed the bitter pill of negotiating with force-if sufficient in amount and ruthless
odd lot, for Senator Joseph R. McCarthy saw Communist China and North Korea an ar- enough in direction--can suppress rebellions,
Communists where they did not exist, and mistice In the Korean war. The Republican but rarely has it produced the reforms of
Secretary Dulles couldn't see them where campaign oratory of 1952 would have sounded. conditions which lead men to join the ranks
they did exist. And here is a large part of
our trouble: the refusal to look at facts
which we dislike and hope will go away.
It has taken the French, through the
voice of General de Gaulle, to tell us that no
settlement of any Asian problem is possible
that doesn't take Communist China fully
19879
hollow and mocking indeed If the Dullesian
trumpets of "liberation from communism"
had sounded another retreat on the "roll-
back" front. Some prominent Republicans
had wanted our fighting forces to join the
Indochinese fray in early 1954, beside France,
but the general in the commander in chief's
into account. The British recognized this _ chair had overruled that, as he had rejected
fact in 1950 but they have not been so blunt any renewal of fighting in Korea above the
in asserting its validity. Americans have
not dealt with a strong, unified China since
1842, when the British forced the opening
of several Chinese ports to Western trade
with various related privileges. In 1844, we
got our treaty with China, including trading
rights and extraterritorial courts for our citi-
zens in China. This period of wars with the
West marked the end of a strong China for
a hundred years. It is time we now adjusted
ourselves to the fact of a new China. Is this
hard to accept? Indeed it is, and for a long
time we will no doubt fight this gross fact
of our times. Eventually, it will have to be
accepted and it must henceforth be included
in the ingredients that shape our Asian
policy.
In 1954, we chose not to join in the final
declaration of the Geneva Conference on
Indochina of July 21, 1954. (The United
States made a unilateral statement, however,
accepting the armistice agreements.) All
the other nations (United Kingdom, France,
U.S.S.R., People's Republic of China, Laos,
Cambodia, and the People's Republic of Vet-
nam [North Vietnam]) at this Conference,
except the State of Vietnam (South Viet-
nam), accepted the agreements drawn there.
South Vietnam, with our backing, refused to
carry out the provisions of the 1954 Geneva
Agreement for elections in North and South
Vietnam to form one government and instead
set its course against the intent of this agree-
ment. South Vietnam refused to permit the
elections, began its military buildup, and
prepared for the inevitable war of Vietnamese
against Vietnamese, with both sides drawing
on outside aid to maintain the fight. From
here on it is the old familiar story of who
first violated the accords or the Intent of the
accords, etc., etc. The fact that we first
refused to accept them puts both the United
States and South Vietnam in a dubious role,
in the objective light of history-a role our
Government has been diligent to gloss over.
We refused to permit "free elections" in Viet-
nam because we were sure we would lose
them.
When we found the 1954 Geneva Agree-
ments unacceptable to us, although accep-
table to the other signatory nations, we had
two broad alternatives open to us. One al-
ternative was to reject the final conclusions
of the Conference, disregarding thereby the
majority decision, and continue our own bi-
lateral policy with South Vietnam. This we
chose to do.
The second alternative was to seek a higher
forum than the Geneva Conference nations.
Resort to the United Nations through various
possible approaches would have involved all
who were concerned with peace and free-
dom, which we alleged were threatened in
Indochina. The U.N. supervised an election
and a plebiscite on the restoration of the
monarchy in wartorn Greece in 1946. The
conditions were hardly worse in all Vietnam
in 1954, or even 1956, when a general election
was to be held in July of that year. To those
who say that a 'U
N
-su
ervised el
ti
I
leaders knew from innumerable charges of
their own what a powerful weapon the Dem-
ocrats would have in our domestic politics if
the Republican administration now lost Indo-
china. Ironically enough, as with mainland
China allegedly lost by the Democrats, the
United States never had Indochina and
couldn't have held it if we had tried. There-
fore, another war In Asia was not a feasible
political course for a U.S. administration,
even one led by a five-star general.
Yet we did decide to try to hold at least
part of Indochina; namely, the new State
of Vietnam below the 17th parallel. And so
the newest phase of Western adventure in
Indochina began with that decision. We
have been trying for 10 years to prove it a
sound one.
In retrospect the foundations for our 1954
decision appear to be part fact and part
myth-a fairly common mix in foreign as
well as domestic policy decisions. The facts
were that (1) southeast Asia was a recog-
nized target of Communist subversion and
possible takeover; (2) many of the native
occupants of the Indochinese peninsula
wanted no part of a future regime that might
be dominated by Communist-oriented lead-
ers. For religious, economic, and political
reasons many feared the kind of society they
would have if Ho Chi Minh and others of his
strong Communist belief became the new
rulers of this war-weary part of Asia. The
foreign businessmen, rubber planters, and
mine operators also, of course, feared the
consequences of a Communist regime.
Moreover, the United States had become so
conspicuously identified with the French in
their struggle against Ho Chi Minh, albeit
in the name of defense against international
communism, that no further action by us
now would mean that we, as well as the
French, had gone down to defeat in another
sector of the containment periphery of mili-
tant anticommunism.
So much for three quite substantial facts:
a strong Communist drive for southeast Asia;
internal Indochinese anti-Communist opin-
ion; and the posture, or "face," of the United
States if no further efforts were made to
"save" Indochina.
On the side of the myths that entered into
our policy calculations, directly or indirectly,
there was first the one, still often expressed,
that it was possible to "draw a line" beyond
which there would not be tolerated any ex-
pansion of Communist control. This ap-
pealing myth evokes images of a resolute
U.S. cavalry stand at the pass, or "ils ne
passerant" at Verdun in World War I, or a
more sophisticated but still quite naive "con-
tainment of communism" concept. Think-
ing of communism as an Ideology ought to
make people chary of expounding on "draw-
ing a line" to stop the spread of ideas. In-
terestingly, history provides no example of
appealing ideas having been impeded eft'ec-
tively in their spread and adoption because
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19880 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENA L E August 20 _
of rebellion. We ventured to combine some Chinese peninsula. Secretary of State Rusk headquarters says: "You will meet t$e_brav-
economic and technical aid with military and Secretary of Defense McNamara repeat- eat and best soldiers In the U.S. Afmy fight
support, but the rationale for military mesa- edly say that no thought is being given to here. This is the only war we have got, and
urea has prevailed Increasingly as our efforts this alternative to our present massive mi11- I would rotate the whole Army through
in Indochina have persisted. The creation tary aid-cum-cheers-for-Khanh as our ap- here If I could. As it is, I am told the volun-
of SEATO in 1954 epitomizes this futile faith proach to the problem. The McNamara teers are backed up for 4 months."
in military power to solve the problems of shuttle to Saigon carries threadbare calls for Which is one reason why we are fighting a
disorder in politically Inchoate states desper- "greater resolve" and warnings of "an un- war and losing a revolution in South Viet-
ately In need of social reform. forseeable end to the effort." and then the man. The backbone of any army is its NCO'c
The third myth that we followed was the familiar and unconvincing reports of "graft- and company-grade officers, and it is no acci-
"domino" theory of the Inevitable loss of all fying progress" and "encouraging develop- dent that most of the American advisers at-
of Asia and a vital threat to our own con- meats" on the westbound run back to tached to the Vietnamese Army are sergeants,
tlnenbal security if any additional part of Washington. In the meantime, the Vietcong first lieutenants, and captains in their 20's.
Asia came under Communist control. This strike villages and cities at will in South A man must see combat before he is truly a
theory was the delight of Senator William Vietnam and simultaneously detail spare soldier. Our World War II veterans are mid-
Knowland, who trumpeted It in the Senate forces to push their campaign in I,sos. Re- die-age desk soldiers now, and even our Ko-
and across the land as if It had the infalli- cruits and military equipment are picked up rean veterans are in their 30's and passing
bility of Newton's law of gravity. Even Pres- In abundance from the South Vietnamese beyond the stage where they might be lead-
Ident Kennedy repeated the arguments of the civilian and military forces. ing platoons and companies in a future war.
"domino" theory and few voices were raised -Why are we involved in southeast Asia?' Thus there is a very human desire on the
to question its logic of inevitable, Irresistible -Where do we go for the next 10 years?" part of the U.S. Army to exploit the chaos in
and sequential massive defeat once the first These are the questions that beg and receive southeast Asia to train a new generation of
(additional) little domino fell against the no clear answers, other than "Carry on. What combat-experienced soldiers.
bastions of our friends. was valid in 1954 is still valid in 1964" al- Not all American servicemen in south Viet-
The domino theory overlooks the poses- though the Asian world has changed greatly nam share this attitude. Many, probably
bility of strong reaction by other nations at since then. At some point-and soon per- a majority, did not want to come here, and
different points when they are confronted haps-we must face up to: (1) our dubious now that they are here they would like
by new circumstances clearly threatening legal position In South Vietnam. with our nothing better than to go home. But the
their security. The theory assumes that all shooting and destroying of military forces professional soldiers are positively gleeful
powerful forces are on only one side, always under the thin deceit of being "advisers"; at this chance to advance their professional
moving outward, and it neglects the poses- (2) the soundness of our continuing passivity status.
busty of disruptive internal forces and coup- toward a strong role for the U.N. in southeast Professionalism is not the only reason we
terforces moving against the presumed mss- Asian strife, while at the same time we have are overemphasizing the military's role in
give seismic wave set in motion by any little pressed for U.N. action in the internecine southeast Asia. There is also the fact that
change of political status. It is a negative, fighting of the Congo, Cyprus and the Middle soldiers are bound to view affairs from a
fearful, and mechanistic view of politics and East; (3) a new look at neutralization of military standpoint, even if the results are
man, but for those very reasons it finds "border" areas between East and West in discouraging. as they have been so far. The
countless advocates. Asia and the established examples. both eat- appointment of Gen. Maxwell Taylor as our
So we took some facts and added some Isfactory and unsatisfactory. of neutralize- Ambassador to South Vietnam can hardly be
myths and came up with a decision-many tion in Europe and elsewhere: (4) a hard expected to reverse this tendency.
times reaffirmed-to deny all southeast Asia review of all our interests In Asia eventually But even more crucial is our refusal to
to communism, with military aid, and we in conference with Communist China; and name the fighting here for what it Is: a
created SEATO to do the job for us. Ten (5) abandoning the shibboleth of containing revolution. For a people born out of a revolu-
years later this queasy foundation of fact communism along artificial latitudes or tion, we are strangely reluctant to recognize
and myth finds us mired very deeply and longitudes. The truth is that the ideo'ogical the symptomoln other lands. We insist that
sinking in more and more. After expending appeal of Marxist doctrine and the reforms this Is war-guerrilla war, limited war,
many billions of dollars and sacrificing hun- that communism often has espoused effec- counterinsurgency war, some kind of war-
dreds of lives In combat or related services, tively appeal to many people around the despite all evidence to the contrary. I have
after twistings and turnings of CIA under- world; and the spread of these ideas will not spent 2 months In South Vietnam. I have
cover operations, with resulting changes of be stopped by military flat. Nor will It help been shot at. rained on, and chewed by in-
leaders in some of the states, there is still no at all to continue the repeated plaintive sects, but never have I had the feeling that
end In sight. lament of Secretary Rusk that there would I was witnessing a war, Most correspond-
What could we have done that we didn't be peace In Indo-China if only the North ents who go out into the field have a similar
do? If it had been possible for the Repub- Vietnamese and the Chinese would leave experience. Full-scale battles are such a
licans to have done otherwise-or for the their neighbors alone. If all countries would rarity here that when one does take place.
Democrats to have altered that policy after leave their neighbors alone, It would be a very like the Do Xa operation in June, the
they took over in 1961-one would like to different world, but it is not realistic to ex- trophies are flown to Saigon for exhibition,
think that they would surely have done so. pect this change in our times. To expand and mass decorations are awarded in the
The losses of American lives, the outpour- the war would assure only another Korea or public squares.
lug of many billions of taxpayers' dollars and worse, with ail the possibilities of a nuclear I tried the notion of revolution upon sev-
the strains on our friendship with many war. eral American advisers. The most common
other nations which have not seen the issues Will the new year or the postelection pe-
as we have seen them, would not normally nod see usreexamine our decade of active retort was: "If this isn't a-war, why are they
be called assets to any political party seek- defense in southeast Asia's Indochinese shooting at me?" I pointed out that men
Ing voter support. And so the American Peninsula? Perhaps not: It has become a were being shot for civil rights activities in
people have been told over and over that habit to argue as we have for so long. Ap- the States. Was that war? "But they're not
there were-and still are-no other alterna- parently only a Senator WATNE Mocsm can using automatic weapons," was the reply,
tivea but to stand on the 17th parallel (or change his mind as fully as the circum- Ignoring the fact that most of the Viet-
well south of it) and fight the devils (alleged- stances require and still retain his follow- cong's automatic weapons have been cap-
ly all from the north) In the ancient battle- fng. Politics does not stop at the water's tured from government forces.
grounds of Indochina. What we have done edge, but rather it governs all we do. Only A more sophisticated argument goes like
Is Intervene in a third civil war In Asia; a statesman above politics can change our this: Revolutions are Indigenous to the
China and Korea being the other two very course now. Events in Indochina may not country, while the fighting In South Viet-
costly interventions. wait for our politicians to clear the Novem- nam is directed from Hanoi. This "masked
Until recently, too, we have lacked critical her election hurdle before they can lead aggression" theory Is official Army doctrine.
voices which, while not acting as "the devil's our discontented people to a new and more Quite apart from the fact that most revolu-
advocate," would at least ask If we are sure realistic settlement in southeast Asia. and tions-including our own-were assisted by
that what we are attempting Is the only extricate us from a misadventure born of foreign powers, It overlooks the evidence
possible alternative acceptable to our people. good motives based on some faulty calcula- which suggests that even hard-core Vietcong
Like McKinley and the Philippines, the vast tions and expectations. are recruited locally. They may have been
majority of the American people in 1954 had sent to North Vietnam for training, but
only the vaguest notion of where Laos. Cam- Txz ONLY WAR Ws HAVE GOT most of them were born south of the 17th
bodia, and Vietnam were--and they cared (By Daniel F. Ford) parallel. And our trust in military force
less. Do they even now believe these areas so SAraoN, VrzrxAM: YOU hear the phrase Is helping guarantee that this situation will
vital to their welfare that every extensive and everywhere. A young special forces captain, continue. As long as the countryside is
longterm Involvement is all that we can fresh from Okinawa declares, "All I want considered enemy territory, the Vietnamese-
consider? from Vietnam to the CIS" (the combat in- American campaign will generate as many
due time, probably later than would fantrymen's badge, a long rifle on a blue Vietcong guerrillas as it kills. That is one
hav ve been an optimum time for us, we will field with a silver wreath behind It). reason why our estimate of hardmen -core Viet-
be bility of the neutralization of all of the I do- have gotsnAndt an earnest major corps mained almost _ constantgsinoe0 961. has re-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 19881
Ina wry ecru u. 4++c ,.~a..y,..w_...._.,
an elderly representative of the V.S. Opera- teachers' salaries with an equal amount from
ns Mission (USOM is the local alias of the American funds, and he could only shrug.
ti
o
Agency for International Development) said ' The highlands are an especially fertile area
to me: for such programs because they are militarily
"We have some of the finest soldiers in the quiet. The Mekong Delta may have dete-
w5rld assigned to South Vietnam. But what riorated too far for education, agriculture
"does a military man know about the people? and medicine to win the countryside back
Will they' talk to a soldier, knowing what from the Vietcong, and there a military
they do of soldiers? No. But I am a fat old solution may be the only feasible one. But
man; they talk to me. They ask me why the the highlands are a different matter. The
United States talks about democracy while it Vietcong operates only in small units, usually
is supporting a military dictatorship. They consisting of irregulars, and even the U.S.
ask me why we talk about freedom when we military regards two vehicles as a sufficient
herding them into strategic hamlets, like
criminals. I have no answer.
"What would he do for a Western victory
in South Vietnam?
"We should cut our military advisers to the
1962 level, 5,000 or 6,000 men, and put the
difference into volunteers who know the peo-
ple, who want to help the people. Like the
IVS workers (International Voluntary Serv-
ice, similar to the Peace Corps and predating
it). The people trust them. I have never
heard of an IVS worker being harmed, or even
threatened. Soldiers must travel in con-
voys here, but the IVS can go anywhere."
Quality goes down as numbers go up, but
there is no doubt that several thousand young
volunteers-teachers, nurses and technicians
--could do far more than the same number
of soldiers to bring Western ideals to South
Vietnam. And they could do it far more
cheaply. The Peace Corps has functioned
admirably around the world without benefit
of officers' clubs, post exchanges and all the
other accessories that go with a U.S. Army
compound.
It would be unfair to suggest that our mil-
itary effort in South Vietnam is entirely
.confined to hunting the elusive Vietcong.
The army is trying hard to adjust to the de-
mands of revolution, by whatever name.
"Civil action" is almost a cant phrase in
military circles these days-there is even a
new S-5 section In the Army staff organiz-
ation, devoted to psychological warfare and
civic . action. Army engineers are digging
wells and building bridges all over South
Vietnam, and Special Forces is constructing
a model farm near Pleiku where montagnard
peasants can learn to use fertilizer and irri-
gation pipes. There are dedicated, inventive
soldiers in every outfit, but any ex-GI knows
how much of this dedication and inventive-
ness is destined to be smothered by the rou-
tine of army life. Whatever the U.S. military
is doing now to help the Vietnamese, the
same number of volunteer civilians could do
far more.
Opportunities are particularly abundant
in the central highlands where the mon-
tagnard population is only beginning to
emerge from the dark ages. A few miles
from Pleiku, the military headquarters for
fully one-fourth of South Vietnam, I visited
montagnard settlements which had never
seen a doctor or a schoolteacher.
"Talk about people that don't have a
chance," one American captain said in
amazement. "What will these kids do with
their lives? Why, I'll bet if you asked every
one of the 400 people in this village who the
premier of their country was, they wouldn't
be able to tell you."
That was overstating the extent of educa-
tion among the montagnards. Most of them
do not know that they have a country, let
alone a premier.
I asked the USOM representative in Pleiku
why we did not spend more of our money
for schools, instead of for armored personnel
carriers. "A schoolteacher here earns 600
piasters a month-about $6," he said. "A
i in the streets can earn 30 pi-
l
highlands have the lowest priority in every-
thing-even in the assignment of IVS and
USOM vrorkers. Yet if the military believed
its own doctrine-that the revolution here is
a war staged and supplied from North Viet-
nam-surely the opposite should be the case.
The highlands are the logical infiltration
route from Laos and Cambodia. If the
montagnards were won over to the Vietnam-
ese Government, the Vietcong supply line
would be cut and (if the military view is
correct) their war in the delta would be
choked off. Whether the "masked aggres-
sion" theory is right or wrong, we are mak-
ing a tragic mistake in the highlands.
More likely, the fighting in the delta would
continue even if the highlands were pacified.
But that is a military assessment, and our
error in South Vietnam has been to think
in military terms. A peaceful, prosperous
central highlands would demonstrate to the
rest of the nation that the Government has
more to offer than the Vietcong. Victory for
the West in this revolution waits upon that
demonstration. If we make it, we shall
win; if we do not, we deserve to lose.
I shall never forget the afternoon I
watched three young men through binocu-
lars, convinced that they were hard core
Vietcong soldiers. They were strong fea-
tured and alert, dressed in black; they were
cooking dinner behind a boulder about 500
yards from the spot where our strike force
patrol was taking a 10-minute break. A
squad had been sent out to encircle them.
But the young men heard the snap and rus-
tle of moving soldiers. They stood up,
ready to flee. The American Special Forces
sergeant in charge of the patrol decided to
fire while he still had a target. He fired
twice, aiming into a cleft in the boulder, and
his buddy did the same. Then we sprinted
up the hill. The three young men had fled,
unharmed, leaving behind not weapons but
a much-thumbed copybook of the kind used
in rural schools.
The sergeant was troubled by the idea of
shooting at schoolboys.
"Well, I'm glad we missed," he said, Then
he brightened. "But if those guys weren't
Vietcong an hour ago, they sure as hell are
by now."
Things were right in his world again.
He did not seem at all concerned by the like-
lihood that, instead of lessening the Viet-
cong threat, our patrol had added to it.
PROBLEMS IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed at
this point in the RECORD an article en-
titled "Johnson's Problems in the Medi-
terranean," written by James Reston,
and published in the New York Times of
August 19, 1964.
There being no objection, the article
a sweep g
coo
asters a day. We can't recruit enough was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
teachers to staff the schools we are building." as follows:
JOHNSON'S PROBLEMS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
(By James Reston)
WASHINGTON, August 18.-The rising op-
position in the Congress to U.S. foreign mili-
tary aid is vividly illustrated by the current
Greek-Turkish crisis over Cyprus.
For the Congress Is now confronted by the
fact that the Greeks and Turks are with-
drawing U.S. military equipment from the
North Atlantic alliance and threatening to
use these American supplies on one another.
This has put the Johnson administration
in a delicate and untenable position. The
President does not want to pass judgment on
who Is to blame for the fighting on Cyprus,
but at the same time, he cannot explain to
the Congress why American arms intended
to maintain the peace are being diverted for
possible military action on Cyprus.
From 1948 to. 1963, the United States sup-
plied military aid to Greece totaling $1,656
million. The total for Turkey in this same
period was $2,404 million. In the fiscal year
1963, the Greek allocation was $85,800,000 and
the Turkish $160,800,000.
THE LEGAL RESTRICTIONS
That these impressive sums should be
voted for arms to bring some kind of decent
order into the eastern Mediterranean and
then be used in part in the bitter communal
struggle in Cyprus is the sort of thing that
makes the Congress balk every time the for-
eign aid bill comes to debate.
President Johnson has been trying quietly
to bring an end to the fighting. He sent
this week a curt note to President Makarios
ignoring the latter's plea for more aid and
advising him bluntly to cooperate with the
United Nations and avoid any action that
might make the bitter struggle between the
Greek and Turkish Cypriots any worse than
it now is.
Meanwhile, disturbed by the Turkish use
of American planes and arms to attack the
Greek Cypriots, he has been in personal
communication with the Turkish Govern-
ment to halt all military activities. The
answer of both the Ankara and Athens
governments was to withdraw arms from
the NATO command.
This sort of thing cannot, however, go on
without placing the foreign aid program of
the United States in jeopardy. In fact, con-
tinued defiance of Washington's requests
for a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus dis-
pute, and constant vilification of the United
States for its efforts to produce a peaceful
settlement there can easily force the Presi-
dent to cut off aid from both Greece and
Turkey.
The bilateral agreement between the
United States and Turkey on the furnishing
of aid is quite specific on this point. The
aid is made available by Washington to help
secure the freedom and independence of
Turkey and the allies. The U.S. retains the
right to withdraw its equipment if its arms
axe used in such a way as not to further
the interests of the United States.
Furthermore, section 506(d) of the For-
eign Assistance Act of 1961 states that "Any
country which hereafter uses defense arti-
cles or defense services furnished such coun-
try under this act * * * in substantial
violation of the provisions of this chapter
* * * shall be immediately ineligible for
further assistance."
Also, the so-called Gruening amendment, to
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section
620(1), insists that "No assistance shall be
provided under this or any other act * * *
to any country which the President deter-
mines is engaging in or preparing for aggres-
sive military efforts directed against (1) the
United States, (2) any country receiving as-
sistance under this or any other act (Cyprus
is receiving assistance under the act)."
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE August 20
THS TURKISH ARGUMENT I particularly call attention to the The procurement of the longer range IRBM"8,
There is little doubt here that American analysis of the military strength of Com- of the type which were first publicly known
arms have been used In theCyprus crisis in monist China. This report indicates that to be operational when launching pads for
violation of these amendments, but the ad- while China maintains an armed force of them were bunt in Cuba In 1962, is probably
ministration has been hesitating to invoke 2 4763 000, it has 130 million men of mill- continuing.
the law for fear of creating an even more tary age. It also estimates that China's Defense expenditure iture has increased slightly.
serious crisis within the NATO alliance. This Is probably due to the demands of re-
The Turkish argument apparently is that military power has declined over the last search and development, and to some extent
they not only have the right to withdraw 5 years, and that its concentration of of the modernization of the armed forces.
their military units and American arms from forces has moved away from the Taiwan It is notable- that the USSR. Is continuing
NATO but that they are using these arms Straits to China's northern and southern the procurement of medium-range supersonic
legitimately in protection of their treaty borders. bombers which are clearly expected to con-
rights in Cyprus. I also point out that the Institute es- tinue in service for the foreseeable future.
evIf, it s all can likely sustained, rprovoke new timates the size of the Soviet Army at no Though the Soviet Union has a force of fleet
to P more t2,300,000 and possibly only ballistic missiles, it is doubtful whether So.
and sterner amendments to the Foreign As- 2 more than
million. It also describes a 25 viet claims to have developed a true equi-
sistance Act to make sure that U.S. arms percent valent to the American Polaris submarines
cannot be used legitimately in any such ad- downward revision of Soviet tactical air can yet be taken literally.
ventures in the future. strength, and a doubling of the number But although the main lines of Soviet pol-
In fact, It is only the preoccupation of the of nuclear-powered submarines com- icy are unchanged, there have been a number
Congress with the presidential election and pared to last year. of developments which indicate changes of
other matters in the closing days before the I ask unanimous consent to have the emphasis, and to some extent of force levels.
Democratic atic Nominating yne mom th at entire publication "The Military Balance, In the Staff, of Marshal 1963, the ovief was the replaced the Cp~ controversy p 1963 64 printed in the CONCRESSYONAI P y
lug another anti-foreign-aid storm on Capt- by Marshal Blryuzov who had previously held
tot Hill. RECORD. the key posts of chief of Soviet air defense
Meanwhile, pro-Greek elements In this There being no objection, the material from 1955-62 and commander of the strategic
country, which are vocal and influential In was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, rocket forces from 1962-89. The Increasing
some of the big electoral States, are begin- as follows: influence of officers with a scientific back-
ning to demand that military aid to Turkey Tux MILITARY BALANCE. 1963-64 ground which this Indicated is likely to con-
be cut off and withdrawn. Thus the con- roEEwoRD unue. Marshal Mallnovsky, the Defense
troversy affects not only the President's re- Minister, may be the last of the generation
lations with the Congress and the allies, but This is the fifth of the institute's annual of military commanders whose authority
with the voters as well, and he will no doubt estimates of the nature and size of military arises from the part they played in the Sec-
be forced to act unless he begins to get some forcesof the principal powers involved in the and World War. It should, however, be
kind of settlement of the dispute before long. cold war. It covers the Communist bloc and noted that the book "Military Strategy,"
those countries with which the United States edited by Marshal Sokolovsky, has been crit-
has mutual defense treaties. This year in- icized in the Soviet Union over the past year,
DOCUMENTATION OF MILITARY formation has also been Included on a num- not only for ignoring the importance of
POWER ber of Important nonaiined countries, scientific developments in determining mili-
The institute assumes full responsibility tary strategy, but also for paying no atten-
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, one of for the facts and judgments which the pam- tion to the political and ideological factors
the most useful documents published phlet contains. It owes a considerable debt in maintaining morale and military eflicienc.
anywhere in the world is the annual sum- to a number of its own members and con- The debate between traditional mili y
taru leads
sultants who have cooperated compiling technocrats will dou
me Institute military Strategic published in and checking the material. However not all cers and ontnue ynutheyears ahead. From he less-
London. u of
sought in the United countries have been equally cooperative in viet viewpoint the most noticeable feature
If one producing information and some figures have of the Sokolovaky book was perhaps the fact
States the information that is contained been estimated, that for the first time it presented an accu-
in this document, much of it would be This pamphlet examines the military bel- rate picture to the Russian public of the
marked "Secret," This bears out the ante as It existed at the endof October 1968, strategic strength of the United States. The
point which the senior Senator from ndn it the will, an present indications, change book has been criticized for ignoring the
Oregon has made for many years, during ensuing year. No longer-range possible circumstances in which nuclear
namely, that the American people are projections of force levels or weapons beyond weapons could not be used if war broke out:
being yivtn a t the snow job" b oGov- 1964 have been included. the significance of this criticism may be re-
y The material in this pamphlet should not vealed when the revised edition of the book
ernment. Citizens are being denied ac- be regarded as a comprehensive guide to the appears later this year.
cess to the public business in regard to nature of the balance of strategic power: it The test ban treaty is unlikely to inhibit
the military power of the United States. does not reflect the facts of geography, vul- Soviet development and advance in the one
It Is business which they are entitled to nerabillty, efficiency, etc? on both sides. It field where Soviet prowess Is apparently in-
know. may, however, be found useful In the context ferior to that of the United States-very low
This British document contains much of discussions on disarmament and the gen- yield nuclear weapons. Official doctrine has,
military information that one cannot get ein balance of power, however, laid little stress on these in the
from the Pentagon. Note on the figures past. The treaty may inhibit the antiballis-
This article shows how ab- Manpower figures given are those of regu- tic missile program, but it would appear that
perfectly lar forces, although an indication of the size the Soviet Union has resigned itself to a
surd our so-called top secret policy is of paramilitary forces, militia or reserve period without any effective defense against
in the United States. It serves for the forces, has been given in the sections deal- missiles, and believes that the same will be
most part only to deny to the American lug with Individual countries. Naval true of the United States. This resignation
people the facts which they should have strengths are those of active fleets and ships seems to be a part of the general Soviet ap-
if they are properly to judge and to ap- In Commission only, except where otherwise proach to the present strategic confronta-
praise the unsound policies of the United stated. All vessels of less than 100 tons tion: It appears that the Soviet authorities
States in the field of military aid and in standard displacement have been excluded. are debating future policy in terms of their
the building up of a war machine in this Fighting ships below 400 tons have been own resources and of the current strategic
country far beyond the kind of war ma- classed as light coastal units. Figures for controversies within NATO before they de-
defense budgets are exclusive of American cede whether any large reorientation of their
chine we need to protect the security of military aid. Fighter and strike squadrons own policy Is necessary.
the free world. of allied air forces have 25 aircraft and wings Meanwhile the Sno-Soviet dispute pro-
In my judgment, as I have said this have 75 aircraft, except where otherwise vides a complicating factor. Apart from 17
annual summary of the world's military stated. Soviet divisions in the Far East, troops al-
power published by the Institute of Stra- PART I. THE COMMUNIST eowxRS ready In central Asia, and a few detach-
teglc Studies in London, is one of the The Soviet Upton, ments beyond Lake Baikal, the Soviet Union
population: 225 million has no military formations, other than bor-
most useful documents published any- The main lines of Soviet defense policy in der guards, along its border with China.
where in the world. 1963 have changed little from those of the There Is unlikely to be any shift of forces
As I did last year, I am going to have preceding 2 years. The slow buildup of the from Europe or European Russia, but there
It Printed In the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, strategic deterrent force of ICBM's is con- might be military pressure for a reactiva-
it that it will be more readily available tinning. Soviet policy still lays stress on tion of the cadre divisions in the Soviet Un-
high-yield warheads for the small number ion, and a reorganization of naval and air
to Americans who are interested in the of missiles available. It would appear that defense. It Is doubtful whether this pol-
facts of the world's military power, the deployment of MRBM's is now complete. Icy will be put Into effect. In European Rus-
Approved For Release 2006/08/10: CIA-RDP66B00403R000200160024-5