CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027500010044-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 44
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
National Intelligence
Bulletin
Top Secret
t4
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
N2 657
Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
 Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
 Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
National Intelligence Bulletin
March 26, 1975
CONTENTS
SOUTH VIETNAM: Communists in northern half of country
threaten Da Nang, Qui Nhon, and Nha Trang. (Page 1)
CAMBODIA: The military situation. (Page 3)
SAUDI ARABIA: Crown Prince Khalid's accession to the
Saudi throne yesterday.went smoothly. (Page 4)
MIDDLE EAST: Breakdown in negotiations boosts Sadat's
standing in Arab world. (:Page 7)
PORTUGAL: Communists strengthen representation in new
government. (Page 9)
TURKEY-CYPRUS: Ankara claims Makarios plans terrorist
action. Page 12)
PANAMA: Torrijos gets desired support from meeting with
neighboring chiefs of state. (Page 13)
EGYPT-FRANCE: Mirages recently delivered to Egypt prob-
ably will--Se- used primarily in an attack role. (Page 14)
SOMALIA: Power struggle under way. (Page 15)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 17)
Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
 Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
 Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975A027500010044-8
I I
National Intelligence Bulletin
March 26, 1975
Communist forces in the northern half of the country
now seriously threaten not only Da Nang but important
coastal cities farther south, including Qui Nhon and
Nha Trang.
In a well-coordinated and rapid movement, the commu-
nists have placed at least one artillery and five infan-
try regiments in Khanh Hog Province, where they pose a
powerful threat to the city of Nha Trang. The North
Vietnamese 320th Division, which was in the highlands
last week, now has an advance unit in Phu Yen Province.
Other communist units from the highlands may also be
heading for Binh Dinh Province to reinforce the North
Vietnamese 3rd Division in a move against Qui Nhon.
The North Vietnamese have been reacting with un-
characteristic speed to the rapid pullback and collapse
of South Vietnamese forces in the northern half of the
country. Last week, communist commanders in the central
provinces moved rapidly to deploy at least two regiments
from Darlac to Phu Bon Province to head off the govern-
ment column trying to reach the coast from Kontum and
Pleiku provinces. The commanders are traditionally con-
servative and inflexible, and slow to take advantage of
unexpected battlefield developments. Restructuring of
the communist military command and control apparatus,
however, has been going on for a year or so, and may
have contributed to an improved ability to respond quickly.
The heaviest fighting continues northwest of Saigon,
where South Vietnamese forces are holding blocking posi-
tions along the roads linking Tay Ninh with the capital.
Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975A027500010044-8
 Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
Cambodia: Lower Mekong
v--
Oudong
Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
 Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975A027500010044-8
National Intelligence Bulletin
March 26, 1975
Insurgent forces have reoccupied Tuol Leap, causing
the Cambodian army defenders to fall back to new posi-
tions about a mile to the east. The communists had posi-
tioned 105-mm. howitzers near Tuol Leap when they held
the town early this month, and renewed shelling of Pochen-
tong airfield from this area can be expected.
Little progress has been made by the army in its
attempts to retake the three positions south of Tuol Leap
that were lost over the weekend. One has been reoccupied,
but operations against the remaining two, although meet-
ing light resistance, reportedly are being hindered by
mines.
Northeast of Tuol Leap, government forces backed
by armored personnel carriers briefly penetrated into
the "rocket belt" yesterday, before pulling back for the
night. Rocket attacks against the airfield and capital
continued yesterday, without disrupting airlift opera-
tions.
In the capital's northwest sector, insurgent pres-
sure continues along Route 51. The Cambodian army's 7th
Division remains hampered by logistical problems and a
shortage of personnel.
Along the Mekong River, Banam came under ground
attack Tuesday, but the defenders were able to hold.
Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975A027500010044-8
 Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
National Intelligence Bulletin
March 26, 1975
The accession of Crown Prince Khalid to the Saudi
Arabian throne yesterday smoothly followed arrangements
worked out by King Faysal several years ago. Shortly
after Faysal was murdered, five senior members of the
royal family--including Prince Fahd, who is expected to
emerge as the country ?s strongman--met to ratify the
succession agreement
Following his investiture, Khalid promptly named
Fahd crown prince.
Jidda and Riyadh are calm. The national guard--the
mission of which is to protect the royal family--is on
alert, but there have been no unusual troop movements.
There is no information to suggest that the assassin
had any accomplices.
A
brother was killed about ten years ago by Saudi police
during a religious protest against the introduction of
television to Saudi Arabia.
Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
 Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8 25X1
National Intelligence Bulletin March 26, 1975
It is not clear whether Fahd has been named prime
minister. Some press reports have referred to him as
"first deputy prime minister," the position Khalid held
until he became King. Faysal had been his own prime min-
ister and Khalid may have followed that pattern.
Faysal had character, style, and accomplishments
that any successor will find it hard to match. Faysal
had an aura that gained respect, both at home and abroad.
Both Khalid and Fahd are likely to be more accessible,
but their views will be given less weight.
The New Crown Prince
Prince Fahd has clearly been the number-two man in
the Saudi hierarchy for several years; officially he has
been serving as interior minister and second prime min-
ister.
In past years, he has taken new initiatives and be-
gun to exercise more influence in government, especially
in foreign policy matters. Fahd, in his early fifties,
has probably been the most important spokesman in the
Saudi establishment for close ties with the US. He is
not uncritical about some aspects of US-Saudi relations,
especially what he regards as the slow pace of US arms.
deliveries.
Prince Fahd is regarded as more a proponent of do-
mestic political reform and of an enlarged, social welfare
program than most Saudi leaders. He has on occasion
espoused in family circles the eventual appointment of a
consultative assembly in order to broaden political par-
ticipation and satisfy some of the quietly voiced polit-
ical demands of the growing middle class.
Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
 Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
National Intelligence Bulletin
March 26, 1975
Fahd has recently become more confident and asser-
tive in foreign affairs. Although concerned about left-
ist activity in Saudi Arabia and the radicalism of some
Arab states, Fahd has been a proponent in Saudi circles
of a less aggressive stance toward the leftist regime in
South Yemen--hoping to use the financial carrot to mod-
ify Aden's policies. He was scheduled to visit Iraq in
early April--a move which may have been intended as part
of an Arab effort to moderate Baghdad's domestic policy
and lessen the dependence on the Soviet Union. Fahd has
played virtually no role in Arab-Israeli affairs
He would probably be more re-
ceptive to cooperating with the Shah of Iran in regional
security matters than was King Faysal.
25X6
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
 Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
National Intelligence Bulletin 'March 26, 1975
MIDDLE EAST
Egyptian President Sadat's stock has gone up apprec-
iably in much of the Arab world following the breakdown
in disengagement negotiations. Egyptian spokesmen are
capitalizing on Sadat's new popularity, as long as it
lasts, to solidify Egypt's position with the Arab states.
The effect could be a hardening of Egypt's stance on
dealings with Israel.
Arab press commentators have hailed Sadat's stead-
fastness in refusing to commit Egypt to a nonbelliger-
enc led e with Israel
Egyptian press and radio commentators have reflected
this confidence, portraying the breakdown in the talks
not as a failure but as a victory for the justice of
the Arab cause and as proof of Israeli iniquity. The
commentators have called unanimously for a return to
the Geneva conference, emphasizing less that Geneva will
provide a forum for negotiations than that it will be an-
other arena for political "confrontation" with Israel.
All editorialists have raised the threat of force as an
alternative the Arabs are ready and able to use if the
Israelis "procrastinate" further.
No Egyptian has outdone Foreign Minister Fahmi in
emphasizing the firmness of Egypt's commitment to the
Arab cause, its leadership of that cause, and its harsh
denunciation of the Israeli position. During his emo-
tional speech to the Arab League foreign ministers'
meeting on Monday, Fahmi dwelled at length on the need
for Arab solidarity in the aftermath of the breakdown in
Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
 Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
National Intelligence Bulletin
March 26, 1975
negotiations. He concluded his speech with a call on
the Arabs to join forces and to isolate Israel from "the
international community and at the United Nations and
international organizations, like South Africa and
Rhodesia."
Much of the Egyptian rhetoric can be attributed to
an effort to use the current adulation being accorded
Sadat to reassert his waning position of leadership among
the Arabs. Egypt's effort to cover its negotiating fail-
ure with expressions of a new solidarity with the Arabs,
however, risks locking it into an immovable position
against Israel. The Arabs are likely soon to expect
that assertions of leadership be given substance by the
adoption of inflexible positions.
Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
 Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
National Intelligence Bulletin March 26, 1975
The Portuguese Communists have strengthened their
representation in the new government announced in Lisbon
yesterday, although the two major non-communist parties
are still represented in the cabinet.
The new 21-man cabinet is comprised of 13 civilians
and 8 military officers. Four parties are represented:
the Communist, Socialist, and Popular Democratic parties
and the Portuguese Democratic Movement, a Communist-dom-
inated organization that enters the government for the
first time. An independent who is sympathetic to the
Democratic Movement was named economic coordination min-
ister, giving the Communists greater influence in eco-
nomic decisions.
The leaders of the four political parties were named
ministers without portfolio. Socialist leader Snares
was replaced as foreign minister by Major .Melo Antunes,
a Marxist who has generally been associated with the
moderate wing of the Armed Forces Movement. Antunes
will probably give Portuguese foreign policy a stronger
Third World flavor, but he is not likely to press for
major changes in Portugal's ties to the West.
Despite the demotion of Soares, the moderates came
through the shuffle with some pluses. Justice Minister
Zenha, a Socialist who was rumored to be on the way out,
stays on, and the Popular Democrats are still represented,
despite a concerted effort by the Communists to have
them ousted.
A major loss for the moderates was the removal from
the cabinet of Vitor Alves, a moderate member of the
Armed Forces Movement
Although civilians constitute a majority in the
cabinet, military officers hold most key positions, in-
cluding that of prime minister and foreign minister, as
well as the labor, defense, internal administration,
public services, and social communications portfolios.
Prime Minister Goncalves said recently that the military
will stay in the government for another three to five
years.
Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
 Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975A027500010044-8
National Intelligence Bulletin
March 26, 1975
In a discussion with Ambassador Carlucci yesterday,
President Costa Gomes suggested that events had taken
Portugal further to the left than he had expected. Costa
Gomes emphasized, however, that Portugal does not plan
to reduce its commitment to NATO and that once the Af-
rican situation is settled, more Portuguese troops will
be placed at the disposition of the Alliance. He com-
plained about Lisbon's exclusion from access to NATO's
nuclear information.
The President blamed the recent violence in Portugal
on Communists and non-communists alike, and assured Am-
bassador Carlucci that the government is determined to
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975A027500010044-8
 Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
 Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
National Intelligence Bulletin
March 26, 1975
A Turkish Foreign Ministry official claims that
Ankara has evidence President Makarios is financing and
arming a new terrorist organization which plans action
against Turks on Cyprus and elsewhere. The official
told the US embassy that Turkey will respond "very force-
fully" if Greek Cypriots resort to this kind of activity.
The Turks may be referring to the activities of
Vassos Lyssarides, a pro-Makarios politician, whose left-
ist party has its own paramilitary force and is gaining
favor among Greek Cypriot refugees.
The possibility of officially sanctioned Greek
Cypriot terrorist activity at some future time cannot
be excluded, but Makarios will first want to exhaust all
diplomatic options before adopting such a desperate and
dangerous course. As Greek Cypriot frustrations grow,
however, radical splinter groups and individual Greek
Cypriots may take actions on their own that could pro-
voke a strong Turkish response.
The Foreign Ministry official also expressed his
personal opinion that the initiation of any Greek Cypriot
terrorist. activity would make it difficult for Ankara
to participate in negotiations over Cyprus.
Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
 Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8 25X1
National Intelligence Bulletin March 26, 1975
General Torrijos got the support he wanted from his
three-day conference with the presidents of Colombia,
Costa Rica, and Venezuela. At the conclusion of the
meeting on Monday, the chief executives signed a "Dec-
laration of Panama," pledging support for Panama's as-
pirations in the canal treaty negotiations and calling
on other Latin American governments to make the same
commitment.
Colombia promised to give up its claim to special
canal privileges, once Panama signs a new treaty with
the US. In return, Torrijos offered to exempt citizens
and products of both Colombia and Costa Rica from any
taxes and duties not levied on Panamanians and to per-
mit navy ships and war materiel of the two countries to
pass through the canal without paying tolls.
The four leaders almost certainly discussed such
other topics as the impact of the US Trade Act and the
proposal of Mexico and Venezuela for a Latin American
Economic System. These were not, however, reflected in
the final declaration, probably because Torrijos wanted
to avoid diverting attention from the canal issue.
Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
 Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
National Intelligence Bulletin March 26, 1975
................ .....
-IGYPT-FRANCE
?airo's acquisition of a new version of the French
Mirage 5 fighter-bomber is part of a recent program to
improve the ground attack capability of the Egyptian air
force. Nine new Mirage 5s have been delivered to Egypt;
it least two of them are trainer versions.
The Egyptian air force flew and maintained about
40 Mirage 5s on loan from Libya for about a year, begin-
ining in late spring of 1973. The Egyptians, therefore,
should be able to integrate the new version of the air-
craft into their force. A total of 38 Mirages are be-
lieved to have been purchased by Saudi Arabia for deliv-
scrv to Egypt.
About three fourths of the Egyptian fighters have
primary air defense mission, while the remainder are
equipped for ground attack. The SU-20 Fitter C and
IG-23 Flogger fighter-bombers from the Soviet Union,
and the Mirage 5s, will probably be used in attack roles.
)ver the long term, Egypt will likely replace the older
`;oviet fighters in its inventor with later model Soviet
ind French aircraft.
Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
 Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
National Intelligence Bulletin
March 26, 1975
A power struggle is apparently going on within the
Somali hierarchy. The kidnaping of the French ambassador
in Mogadiscio on Sunday could be related to these de-
velopments.
According to the US embassy in Mogadiscio, reports
are circulating in the capital that President Siad has
confined his longtime rival', Defense Minister Samantar,
to a military hospital and has arrested 20 of the more
radical members of the office of the presidency for
plotting to oust him. Samantar and the others were said
to be responsible for the distribution in recent weeks
of tracts demanding that Siad step down because of irreg-
ularities in the distribution of aid to Somali drought
victims.
Diplomatic sources in Mogadiscio claim that the
kidnaping of French Ambassador Guery was engineered by
Siad's opponents to embarrass him by creating the impres-
sion he has little control. over domestic security.
Guery, who is being held hostage in a. Mogadiscio villa,
was seized by men who made a concerted effort to attract
attention. The abductors claimed membership in a group
seeking independence for the neighboring French Terri-
tory of the Afars and Issas. The Italian embassy, act-
ing as the intermediary in the effort to secure Guery"s
release, reports the abductors are demanding the release
of two colleagues held in French jails and the payment
of a $100,000 ransom. Paris has agreed to the demands.
Siad could be faced with a dilemma in deciding what
further actions to take against Samantar and the other
alleged plotters. Although Samantar has no strong tri-
bal base, he is said to have substantial support in the
Somali military.
Samantar and the other plotters have strong links
to the Soviet embassy, but it is not clear what role if
any the Soviets played in the activity to oust Siad.
The US embassy speculates that the plotters acted on
their own initiative and were relying on Soviet support
if they succeeded, or protection if they failed.
Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
 Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
National Intelligence Bulletin
Although the Soviets were probably in contact with
the plotters, Moscow would have had little reason to
cause trouble for Siad. In the last few years, the
Somali President has granted the Soviets military facil-
ities at the port of Berbera.
In any event, the Samantar affair is likely to be a
setback to Soviet interests in Somalia. Siad probably
will not take any strong action against the Soviets that
could end their military assistance, but the affair will
reinforce widespread S mali suspicions of Soviet inten-
tions in the country.
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
 Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
National Intelligence Bulletin
March 26, 1975
Ethiopia: According to the US embassy, it was
probably a belief among members of the ruling military
council that Ethiopian exiles loyal to former crown
prince Asfa Wossen were ready to form a government in
exile in London which triggered the announcement last
week formally abolishing the 3,000-year-old monarchy.
The council, which had been moving gradually toward end-
ing the monarchy since deposing Haile Selassie last
September, probably will next declare Ethiopia a repub-
lic. The council had designated Asfa Wossen as king
after deposing Haile Selassie, but the former crown
prince refused to return from Europe, where he has been
undergoing trea ment for the effects of a stroke suffered
in early 1973.
and recovery even with these measures will be slow.
Another fall in real gross national product this year
Japan: Tokyo has moved once again to ease its
monetary and fiscal policies, the second shift in two
months. The policy package! announced yesterday is simi-
lar to moves in February. Both involve easier lending
policies, additional government loans to industry, the
inclusion of more jobless workers in the unemployment
insurance system, and an acceleration of government
investment expenditures. The measures, however, are
important more for their psychological impact than for
their substance. Japan's economic decline is continuing,
is a distinct possibility.
Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
 Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8
Top Secret
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27500010044-8