CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027400010056-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 2008
• Sequence Number: 56
• Publication Date: February 26, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
14 7Z
State Dept. review completed
NSA review completed
National Intelligence
Bulletin
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
February 26, 1975
N2 638
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 26, 1975
CONTENTS
CAMBODIA: Military situation. (Page 1)
ETHIOPIA: Rebels appeal to US to stop providing aid to
Addis Ababa. (Page 2)
PORTUGAL: Major non-communist parties take exception to
parts of Armed Forces Movement's program. (Page 3)
GREECE: Government must now find way to remove disloyal
elements from army without stimulating further coup plot-
ting. (Page 5)
LIBYA-EGYPT: Libyan editorial critical of Sadat likely
to jeopardize rapprochement. (Page 8)
SINGAPORE: Plans for withdrawal of British forces.
(Page 9)
USSR: Prospects favorable for grain crop this year;
record winter harvest possible. (Page 11)
EAST GERMANY: Energy conservation. (Page 12)
ANNEX: Overwhelming Mandate Expected for Marcos in
Philippine Referendum. (Page 13)
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 26, 1975
CAMBODIA
The Khmer Communists have increased their attacks
against Phnom Penh's southwestern defenses, and a se-
rious threat to the army's main ammunition dump and
to Pochentong airport could develop.
Almost all government units in this sector have
been engaged in heavy combat for the past two days, and
a number of positions have been lost. The Cambodian
army high command has committed some reinforcements to
the front, but relief operations are being stymied by
stiff insurgent resistance--including some howitzer fire.
With the Communists continuing to press the capital's
northwestern defenses, and with renewed fighting occur-
ring along the Mekong northeast of Phnom Penh, the sit-
uation in the capital area could soon become critical.
In the north, government troops yesterday pulled
out of the town of Oudong, located on Route 5 some 20
miles northwest of Phnom Penh. The town was reduced to
ruin during heavy fighting last spring and summer, and
not many civilians still live there. Oudong had been
only lightly defended since mid-January, when a govern-
ment brigade stationed there was withdrawn to the Phnom
Penh area.
Preliminary reports are sketchy, but most of Ou-
dong's defenders apparently withdrew to the nearby base
at Lovek, taking four 105-mm. howitzers with them.
Lovek is now the only major government position near
the Tonle Sap River between Phnom Penh and the provin-
cial capital of Kompong Chhnang..
Elsewhere, the Khmer Communists are continuing to
Civil-
shell the navy base at Neak Luong, on the Mekong.
ian casualties there are beginning to mount. Communist
gunners yesterday also destroyed two navy craft trying
to resupply a beleaguered beachhead souutheofb~ Neak Luong.
The navy has been able to resupply a
nearby, however, and despite significant losses convo s
continue to reach Neak Luong from Phnom Penh.
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 26, 1975
ETHIOPIA
The Eritrean rebels are well aware of the Ethio-
pian government's request for additional military aid
and are likely to attempt action against US interests
if such aid is forthcoming.
The US naval communications facility in Asmara is
vulnerable to rebel attack. Earlier this month, the
rebels fired at the facility's fuel supplies in an at-
tempt to prevent the fuel from being used in the gener-
ators that are being connected to Asmara's electrical
system.
Osman Saleh Sabbe, leader of one of the main fac-
tions of the insurgent movement, has repeated an earlier
appeal to the US to stop providing Ethiopia with mili-
tary supplies.
Sabbe, now in Kuwait after a visit to Syria, said
yesterday that Damascus is ready to provide military
training to the Eritrean insurgents. Syria has long
provided arms to the insurgents and is the only major
Arab country that openly supports the rebel demand for
complete independence
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 26, 1975
Portugal's major non-Communist parties are opposing
parts of the Armed Forces Movement's program to formal-
ize its role in the government's decision-making process.
A special committee of the Movement known as the
"committee of eight" has begun separate consultations
with all political parties on the contents of the seven-
point program that the Movement?s assembly approved on
February 17. According to a Popular Democratic Party
leader, his party and the Socialists object to three
points: prior approval by the Movement of all presiden-
tial candidates; the arrogation of legislative powers
to the military-dominated Council of State; and the
Movement's selection of all. future defense and economics
ministers.
According to press reports, the Popular Democrats "
have already formulated counterproposals, and the Social-
ists are in the process of doing the same. The Portu-
guese Communist Party, hoping to expand its own influence
through increased military control over the government,
is expected to endorse the Armed Forces Movement's deci-
sion formalizing the role of the military in governing
the country.
Continued disagreement could disrupt planning for
the elections to the constituent assembly, now set for
April 12. One of the points in the Movement's program
requires all political parties to reach an understanding
regarding certain minimum features of the constitution
before they will be allowed to participate in the cam-
paign, which is scheduled to begin on March 3.
There are no signs of how amenable the Movement will
be to changes in its program. In recent months it has
allowed considerable debate within its own membership,
but once it reaches a decision it has grown accustomed
to having that decision accepted as final. Moderate
parties run the risk of having their opposition equated
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 26, 1975
with reaction. Earlier this week, for example, Commu-
nist Party leader Cunhal criticized the Socialists and
Popular Democrats for attacking communism "instead of
the reaction."
Leftist extremists over the weekend stepped up their
pressure tactics on more moderate political elements.
They disrupted two rallies of the Popular Democrats, and
a bomb demolished the car of one of the party's leaders
in a Lisbon suburb. Prior to this time, the extreme
leftists have confined such efforts largely to intimi-
dating the Party of the Democratic Social Center, a
slightly right-of-center party.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
GREECE
February 26, 1975
The Greek government has arrested 37 army officers
in connection with .a,military-led conspiracy, but the
issues that caused the basic unrest remain unresolved
and could create additional disaffection within the
officer corps. The government's action seems to have
been a preemptive move.
Most of the detained officers are on active duty,
although some of them have been retired or cashiered.
All of them face charges of insurrection.
The ringleaders have long records as conspirators,
and a good number of them--including three of the six
generals involved--were among 36 officers suspended
last September because of their active support of the
former military regime and their close links to former
strongman Brigadier General Ioannidis. loannidis' close
associate, Major Athanassios Perdikis, who was suspended
in September but reinstated two months later, appears to
have been a key figure in the conspiracy.
The government continues to emphasize the limited
nature of the conspiracy. Prime Minister Karamanlis
has nonetheless pledged to carry through on the govern-
ment's measures to eradicate the "cancer" in the armed
forces. In a statement yesterday he hinted that these
measures--presumably more suspensions--may have spurred
the plotters to action.
The opposition and the press are already calling
for a more thorough purge of the army. Yesterday in
Thessaloniki, about 5,000 demonstrators from leftist
groups called for a complete overhaul of the army and
for the dismissal of Defense Minister Averoff. One of
the army's criticisms of the government has been that
it is too soft on demonstrators while allowing press
attacks against the army.
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 26, 1975
The government's dilemma, now sharpened, is how to
remove disloyal elements from the army without further
damaging morale and stimulating additional coup plotting.
The current arrests have badly damaged Ioannidis' power
base in rho arm b
ut Probably--pot destroyed it.
The government's problem is complicated by the fact
that after seven years of military rule, during which
almost all officers were loyal to the junta, it is diffi-
cult to carry out a purge of junta supporters without
drastically cutting into the officer corps. Minister of
Defense Averoff has told the US embassy that he has been
reassured by the failure of malcontents to rally support
among the Greek military, and that he is determined to
resist efforts by the opposition to force the overnment
to conduct a general purge.
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 26, 1975
The Qadhafi regime leveled an editorial blast at
Egypt late last week that is certain to jeopardize the
developing rapprochement between the two countries.
The editorial, in Libya's leading daily newspaper,
Al-Jihad, stopped short of referring to Egypt and Presi-
dent Sadat by name, but it was clearly an attack on Sadat,
his negotiating strategy, and his refusal to give per-
sonal attention to President Qadhafi. The. editorial
referred, in highly colored language, to broken promises
and heretical actions that had led to the betrayal of
friends and capitulation to enemies. The editorial
warned at several points that Tripoli would no longer
restrain its public comments. Libya, it declared, is
prepared to "escalate everything up to the end, whether
against an individual or a state."
The nature and timing of the outburst suggests that
Qadhafi authorized--and may well have written--the edi-
torial. Repeated complaints about insults and contemptu-
ous treatment of Libya are out of phase with recent suc-
cessful ministerial exchanges. This, along with the use
of the word "Israel"--normally strictly forbidden to the
Libyan press--point to Qadhafi as the author.
We are unaware of any one thing that could account
for the Libyan leader's fury. Sadat may have scotched
plans for the bilateral summit meeting that Qadhafi has
been trying to arrange for months. Qadhafi probably
fears the cooperation between Secretary Kissinger and
Sadat and believes the inattention that Libyan overtures
have received in both Cairo and Washington is part of a
larger design. He may suspect, for example, that $adat
has weighed in with Washington against the release to
Tripoli of eight C-130 aircraft being held in the US
pending a license review.
Whatever prompted it, the editorial seems sure to
touch off a new round of public and private bickering
between Libya and Egypt. The implied threat to Sadat
is an ominous reminder that the quarrel could escalate
quickly.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
SINGAPORE
February 26, 1975
Defense officials from the UK and Singapore have
drawn up firm plans for the withdrawal of British serv-
icemen from Singapore.
The plans--subject to final approval by both gov-
ernments--provide for a phased reduction of the 2,000
British forces beginning in July. By March 31, 1976,
all but a few air defense advisers will have departed.
Control of the naval base, which the government plans
to convert to commercial use, will be transferred to
Singapore by early next year.
A major issue concerning the British departure is
future access to naval base facilities by US and Allied
warships. Singapore has indicated that two berths will
be designated for use by the Allies and made available
on a preferred basis at "reasonable rental" and with
"proper" notice. Fuel storage facilities will also be
available. Singaporean officials have rejected a pro-
posal for New Zealand to manage several berths at the
base, but further discussion on the subject is expected.
Once Singapore assumes control of the naval facil-
ities, the previously designated restricted area will
probably be opened to commercial vessels, including So-
viet merchant ships and naval auxiliaries. Neverthe-
less, Singapore is not expected to alter its practice
of refusing access to Soviet naval combatants.
Following the British withdrawal, a 1,200-man New
Zealand defense force--including air, naval, and ground
elements--will become the largest foreign military pres-
ence in Singapore, Australia is to complete its pull-
out of a residual group of about 150 servicemen by June.
A detachment of fighter aircraft from the two Austra-
lian fighter squadrons based in Malaysia will probably
continue periodic deployments to Singapore, however,
and some Australian air defense technicians will remain.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 26, 1975
Prospects look good for a bumper grain crop this
year. Winter grains will continue to be vulnerable at
least through March, but winterkill apparently will be
less than normal, and a record winter grain harvest--
which normally accounts for one third the total crop--
could result. If average weather conditions prevail
through the rest of the growing and harvesting season,
the total grain crop should exceed domestic and export
requirements for 1975--estimated at around 210 million
tons.
Even so, corn for the ambitious livestock program
and some high-quality milling wheat may be purchased
if prices are attractive. The president of a large US
grain exporting company, who meets regularly with the
Soviets, believes that--barring serious crop failures--
the USSR will establish a pattern of buying 4-6 million
tons of corn annually and 1-3 million tons. of wheat
periodically.
Moscow originally contracted for almost 7 million
tons of wheat and corn for delivery this fiscal year.
A small part of this order was canceled or resold,
largely because of price changes and the fact that this
amount was no longer needed. The imports were used both
to meet domestic needs and to avoid drawing down Soviet
reserve stocks, since the 1974 grain harvest was below
Soviet expectations. Recently released Soviet statistics
confirm the disappointing harvest--the 83.8-million-ton
wheat crop was the smallest since 1969. The corn har-
despite a
r
,
vest was 10 percent below the previous yea
12-percent increase in acreage.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 26, 1975
EAST GERMANY
The East Germans have recently issued a resolution
to cut fuel consumption by 27 percent. This is in addi-
tion to conservation measures taken in 1974 which re-
duced consumption by 10 to 15 percent in many sectors.
The resolution was prompted by the increased price
of Soviet oil deliveries for 1975. According to a pro-
tocol signed on January 31, East Germany will import
from-the USSR 15 million tons of oil in 1975 at a price
more than double the 1974 price per barrel.
Domestic brown coal provides 80 percent of East
Germany's electrical energy, and the country is develop-
ing nuclear power as an alternative energy source. For
the most part, the Soviet Union supplies almost all the
fuel the East Germans import.
The East Germans are trying to convert a considera-
ble portion of their energy requirements from coal and
synthetic gas to natural gas. They must import about
30 percent of this natural gas--all of it from the USSR.
To assure a supply of natural gas, East Germany will
send up to 5,000 workers, including specialists, to
help construct a second pipeline in the USSR.
State organs have initiated gasoline-saving measures
and distributed extensive guidelines for fuel conserva
tion.l
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 26, 1975
Overwhelming Mandate Expected for Marcos in Referendum
President Marcos is campaigning for the referendum
to be held tomorrow on the question of martial law as
if it were an old-time presidential election. He is
seeking to drum up for himself and his government popu-
lar enthusiasm that will undercut foreign and domestic
criticism and serve as a popular mandate for future
decisions,
In his recent speeches, Marcos has used a. rationale
for martial law different from that cited when it was
proclaimed in September 1972. Then, he alleged that
communist conspirators planned the imminent overthrow
of the government. Now he says martial law authority
is needed to deal with the consequences of the interna-
tional economic recession and the major Muslim insurrec-
tion in the southern Philippines.
The people will vote on two relatively narrow prop-
ositions: whether they approve of martial law and want
it continued, and whether they approve proposed adminis-
trative changes that would impose presidential appointive
authority over local government. The vote will be care-
fully managed to assure an overwhelming mandate for Mar-
cos, but most Filipinos will probably vote yes without
compulsion--either because they see martial law as a
definite improvement over the previous system or be-
cause they believe there is no alternative.
Since the last referendum on martial law, in July
1973, Marcos has loosened some of the more authoritarian
aspects of his regime, Government censorship of the
media has been relaxed, but most journalists are aware
of the unwritten restrictions and are demonstrating
that self-censorship is as stifling as the government
variety, Many political prisoners have been released,
including several well-known political opponents of
Marcos. Snap arrests and harassment of potential crit-
ics still occur, however, and Marcos' best known polit-
ical rival, Senator Benign. Aquino, remains in prison,
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 26, 1975
Marcos over the past 18 months has dealt relatively ef-
ficiently with immediate economic problems, such as the
1973 oil embargo, and has made some progress toward re-
solving long-range issues, such as land reform,
On the other hand, neither military nor political
action has been effective in settling the Muslim insur-
rection, which has become more widespread and intense.
Members of the Marcos clan have used martial law to fur-
ther enrich themselves financially and to deport them-
selves in the style of latter-day Asian royalty. Dummy
corporations fronting for Marcos' interests have bought
up enterprises formerly owned by his rivals,
Moreover, the excesses of Marcos' wife Imelda have
tarnished the regime's image at home and abroad. Last
year she squandered millions to host the Miss Universe
pageant in Manila, And finally, military and police
corruption and brutality evidently are increasing as
the armed forces grow in size and influence,
Clerical Opposition
Outspoken critics of Marcos prior to martial law
have had little success capitalizing on the deficiencies
of the current regime and have been remarkably quiescent.
The only important exception is the Catholic Church,
which has gradually emerged as the focus for public op-
position to martial law. Several liberal priests have
been speaking out against Marcos since 1972, but during
the past year they have been joined by increasing num-
bers of moderates and, on one occasion, by conservatives.
Public pressure from Philippine bishops provided the
impetus for last year's much-publicized release of polit-
ical prisoners, as well as for public promises by Marcos
to relax some authoritarian aspects of his government.
Church liberals are publicly attacking the present
referendum as a "mockery of democracy," They held a
well-attended outdoor penitential service in Manila on
February 21 to protest the injustice of martial law.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 26, 1975
While maintaining the church's right to speak out
on moral issues, most church leaders still oppose such
overt political action and want to avoid direct confron-
tation with the government. Marcos, acutely aware of
the church's potential to arouse popular opposition, is
trying to exploit ideological divisions within the Coun-
cil of Bishops and to create suspicions between foreign
and native clerics.
In addition to their politics-as-theater aspects,
Marcos' periodic referenda are designed to create a new
political structure by enhancing the status of the vil-
lage-level citizens' assemblies created under martial
law. They not only give Filipinos a sense of participa-
tion in government, but allow Marcos to argue that his
regime is based on direct consultation with the people,
bypassing former, often corrupt, intermediaries such
as governors and congressmen. The village assembly meet-
ings also give Marcos a carefully controlled forum for
identifying potential sources of popular discontent.
In his "campaign" speeches, Marcos is stressing the
need for a popular mandate that will allow him to make
important decisions in the future. The only specific
issue he has raised in this context is the Muslim rebel-
lion in the south, but there probably are others. He
could, for example, choose to regard a "popular mandate"
as a license to deal with the question of political
trials for such figures as Aquino.
Marcos has spoken about expanding the armed forces
because of the increased fighting with Muslims in the
south. A major military buildup would entail added
burdens on the economy as well as personal sacrifices
by many, Filipinos. Settling the problem through nego-
tiations would also involve hard decisions for Manila,
including a willingness to compromise on Muslim demands
for autonomy. Unraveling the diplomatic complications
surrounding the Muslim revolt would require Marcos to
give up the Philippine claim to the Malaysian state of
Sabah.
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February 26, 1975
President Marcos does not really need any sort of
"mandate" to take action on these or other issues, for
he has virtually unchallenged authority. But he doubt-
lessly believes that an overwhelming vote of confidence
will be a useful trump card that he can play if he en-
counters domestic or foreign criticism for some decision.
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