DESIGN AND DETERRENCE: BEYOND THE STEREOTYPES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96B01172R000100040001-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1984
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

? Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP96B01172R000100040001-7
by Jonathan Walters
and
T'S NOT EXACTLY THE ODD COUPLE,
but it hasn't been a match made in
heaven, either. Architects worried about
the "bunker mentality" of security
professionals, while security profes-
sionals worried about architects' failure
to include security elements in the
ground-up design of buildings.
The conflict's result? Say architects,
buildings that take on more of the aura
of a prison than of a place to live or
work. Say security professionals, build-
ings that may be nice
to look at, but which
are so riddled with
security leaks neither
Deterrul
0,,nce,
Beyond
the
Stereotypes
tected after the fact-and that can be
complicated and expensive. "We're often
called in after a building has been com-
pleted." says William J. Kelly, presi-
dent of V.T. Technologies. Inc.. a wholly
owned subsidiary of Barnes Engineering
Company in Stamford. CT. which spe-
cializes in design. fabrication, and in-
stallation of security systems. "Satis-
fying security requirements after the fact
is extremely expensive-and may be nigh
on impossible."
Beyond their expense and difficulty.
retrofits are often controversial because
they may call for significant alterations
in design. This fact makes retrofits the
most common battleeround for architects
and security professionals.
Many older foreign missions abroad
offer prime examples of buildings that
have undergone insensitive retrofits. ac-
cording to Stuart L. Knoop. of Oudens
and Knoop. a Washington. DC. archi-
time, money, nor
prayer can plug them.
"[Design professionals] would like to
see use of materials that are as appro-
priate as possible." says Rod Mercer,
staff landscape architect with the Land-
scape Architecture Foundation in Wash-
ington, DC. "We'd like to get away from
prominent, prison-like features in meet-
ing security considerations."
Security professionals, on the other
hand. say they would like architects to
be more aware of the importance of de-
signing security into a project. For a
building to be made truly secure, security
considerations must be in the blueprint
from the beginning. Otherwise, you end
up with a site that may have to be pro-
tecture firm that spe-
cializes in designing
US missions. Secur-
ing existing build-
ings has "usually in-
volved the erection
of hard defense lines
insensitive to the ex-
isting architecture,"
says Knoop. "You
see some missions
where painted steel
and aluminum and
low-quality wood
paneling are used.
You often see
coarsely designed,
welded steel grates.
Some facilities are
protected by over-
turned flatbed trucks.
And there is often a
lot of poor lighting
and acoustics as a re-
sult of retrofits."
But having to come
in and retrofit sensi-
tively isn't exactly a
picnic for security
professionals, points
out William Kelly.
"Take a building with
lots of nooks and
crannies designed
into it. If the owner
later decides he wants
to use CCTV cam-
eras to monitor activ-
ity outside, you're
going to need a lot of
cameras." Besides
the expense, he con-
tinues, "a guard can
well and two
poorly. three is hopeless. if the building
had been designed so one camera had a
clear view, you wouldn't have these
problems."
With the battle lines so clearly drawn,
is rapprochement possible? Absolutely.
say architects and security professionals
alike. What it takes is a little coopera-
tion, a lot of communication, and a dash
of mutual respect.
Cooperation is on the Rise
"Many architects are defensive about
being asked to design bunkers." sans
Knoop. "They needn't be. The tech-
20 Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP96B01172R00010004 ,TY MANAGEMENT
 Approved For Release 2005/07/12: CIA-RDP96B01172R00010
\.J
was designed and built out of the same
type of marble as the building it stood
by. At another site, security specialists
agreed to a hard defense line pulled hack
from the entrance so harriers wouldn't
have to he erected in the grand lobby.
"They wanted a hard line that would huv
them time. We gave them a design that
did that." Knoop says.
Experienced architects and security
professionals agree that both groups are
becoming more understanding of the oth-
er's point of view. Both groups agree
that retrofits put a special strain on the
relationship. It' security is designed into
a project from the beginning. they point
out, you end up with far less conflict
between aesthetics and security-and you
get more security at greatly reduced ex-
pense.
But working together is still a rela-
tively new experience fir architects and
security professionals. Neither ;group is
exactly sure what the other wants. They
still speak slightly different languages.
and they still conk to a project with fairly
disparate points of view. But. members
of both groups believe. once each has
come to understand the goals of the other.
they can achieve a working relationship
that is most often harmonious.
niques and technology are now available
so that security doesn't have to mean a
bunker." Landscape architect Rod Mer-
cer agrees. "There are so many different
plantings now, ways to use earthworks
to soften the effect of fences, ways to
design circulation routes for maximum
security." Given today's materials and
design techniques, it's possible to design
security in without resorting to ''prom-
inent, prison-like features." he says.
At the same time, awareness of se-
curity considerations among architects in
Building Function Dictates
Design + Security
At the heart of harmony between ar-
chitects and security professionals is one
vital understanding: what the building in
question is being designed to do. Un-
derstanding a building's function is vital
to a good working relationship according
to architects and security consultants used
to working together. They share the task
of designing a building that meets the
client's needs.
Is the structure to be an office build-
ing. a government building. a corporate
headquarters, or what'!" says landscape
architect Mercer. "How will the site be
used by people?" Part and parcel of these
considerations, adds Knixop. is what level
of security the building's function dic-
tates. Is the client interested in prevent-
ing the theft of typewriters or in keeping
employees out of the hands of terrorists!
Mobil Oil's facility in Fairfax. VA. is
piunuul'm IorcIL'n ms}}?..~! s y ? g x .
A /h~~ic iFii~pt?~1~~~~~~ can work to- r.7
curity professionals sh iiDbovl@Id ti4C-Rftjf l'i? A9 07, r c ge er on a project, says Steve Wein- o
pect increasingly fewer glazed looks when with security specialists. 'a guard booth berg, Mobil's manager for facilities in
fwr_t+xrurro IOQI
they bring the subject of security up with
architects. "Until recently, I found most
architectural firms viewed security as an
after-the-fact consideration," says Kelly.
"But that's changing rapidly."
Adds Knoop. architects who view se-
curity professionals as merely an imped-
iment to good design have a few things
to learn. ''I've worked with quite a few
security professionals," he says. "They
know the difference between good and
had architecture."
Knoop cites work he's done at several
 Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP96B01172R000100040001-7
of people coming and going because the
design of parking. entrances, and lobbies
did not anticipate control requirements.
In addition, open service counters, such
as cashier. pharmacy. and payroll
counters-alarmed or not-that were not
initially designed to be secure. only in-
vite robbery attempts. Inappropriate
parking and pedestrian traffic patterns
invite extraneous persons and congestion
in critical or hazardous areas (loading
dock, mechanical areas, inventory, pro-
duction, or assembly). which can en-
courage accidents, vandalism, and theft.
Electronic door and window detectors
installed after the fact may be circum-
vented through plasterboard walls or
hanging ceilings.
If the facility's security needs are ad-
dressed during its original design, the
design can provide a high degree of pro-
tection and still be aesthetic and func-
tional.
Security becomes obtrusive when it is
imposed on the environment: designed
into the environment, it becomes a~pan
of the whole and far less offensive.
Components of Protection
The effective protection of any facility
is accomplished through three distinct
but related capabilities:
^ A loss prevention management pro-
gram should include identification of the
types of losses to be prevented. and where
and how each type of loss is most likely
to occur; assignment of the responsibility
to prevent loss at potential locations: ac-
ceptance of the concept that loss pre-
vention, rather than investigation and ap-
prehension, shall be the.primary objective
of the program; and identification of the
methods and activities to be used to pre-
vent each potential type of -loss at all
locations.
? An architectural plan should pro-
vide in its design, layout. and physical
construction effective access control: and
assistance to operational personnel in the
sponsc system. Loss prevention man-
agement uses the organization's normal
management structure to identify and
prevent potential kiss; it is not meant to
apprehend perpetrators after losses have
occurred. Since the responsibility liar the
prevention of loss rests within the normal
management structure, a facility should
be designed so each department can pro-
vide for its own protection. rather than
relying on a guard force. The security
department and guard force should serve
as a resource to line management.
The primary goals of protection design
are to protect a facility and each de-
partment from penetration by persons who
may deliberately or accidentally cause
harm, minimize the opportunity for
wrong-doing by persons properly ad-
mitted to the facility, and reduce acci-
dents. Protection design should also give
department managers an opportunity to
protect and control their own depart-
ments. reduce annual protection costs.
and enable each staff member to assist
in the loss prevention effort by providing
an environment that is easier to monitor
and in which suspicious behavior be-
comes more evident. The final goal of a
protection design plan is to provide an
atmosphere of safety and tranquility.
Design techniques
The protection design goals are
achieved through the following basic de-
sign techniques:
^ access control, which confines per-
sons to certain areas of a facility where
they have legitimate interests, or ex-
cludes others from a facility entire/v.
^ visibility and communication through
electronic monitors, which heightens
control over high-security areas. Simple
visibility of an area is insufficient. per-
sons monitoring the area, whether in per-
son or through electronic means, must
resistant glass, an emergency button or
money clip, and preferably. a camera
tied to the emergency button. Of course,
wall construction should be consistent
with the value of the contents, and these
walls should extend to the ceiling slab
above: hanging ceilings only provide
thieves an additional entrance. Cer-
tainly. electronic devices such as move-
ment and vibration detectors should be
considered in determining what con-
struction material to use.
Access control and the
zone concept
In a zone concept, the paramount re-
quirement is effective access control-
employees, visitors, vendors, and others
are assisted in efficiently reaching their
destinations but prevented from entering
areas where they have no purpose. Con-
trolling access to each department screens
out undesirable visitors, reduces conges-
tion, and permits employees to identify
and question unauthorized persons.
During our development of design
standards for US naval medical facilities,
we introduced the zone concept by seg-
prevention of loss. , is to place service counters, entrances to
^ An electronic protection system, storage areas, men's and women's room
which is designed in conjunction with doors, stairwell entrances, emergency
the architectural plan, should help achieve exits, alarms, and other vulnerable spots
these objectives. in heavily occupied locations so they are
given high visibility. Very few crimes
Design philosophy/loss are committed in areas containing a num-
prevention management her of potential witnesses.
As with any other design specialty, ^ physical reinforcement, which should
security design requires a design philos- help protect entrances that are vulner-
ophy, which has to be understood and able to break-ins. Valuable inventories,
accepted by management. For most low- tools, pharmaceuticals, and office equip- ^ personnel, purchasing, and other
security facilities, werecommen s s 1ment ~I 0 ~! that frequently
tern of loss prevention'r~RS~~ e e t ~ err a rmaccy,, and a tai i o `fher service win--11 leeow by prospecfttii a employees and
than a traditional police-oriented re- dows should be protected with bullet- vendors
be able to communicate with subjects in
the area and detain them when necessary.
A second use of the visibility technique
menting the facilities into conceptual ac-
cess control zones. While the specific
examples below refer to hospitals, the
concept is equally effective for all types
of facilities.
Unrestricted zones. Some areas of a
facility should be completely unre-
stricted to persons entering the area dur-
ing hours of intended use. While steps
to provide visibility/communication and
site hardening may also be required in
unrestricted zones, the personnel traffic
load within these areas may be too great
to permit effective access control.
The design of unrestricted zones should
encourage persons to conduct their busi-
ness and leave a facility without entering
controlled areas. Hospital functions and
departments that might be located in un-
restricted zones include the following:
^ outpatient clinic lobby
? emergency room triage, reception,
and waiting areas
^ main lobby, including any ameni-
ties open to all visitors, such as a gift
shop, snack bar, or post office
^ any meeting rooms or auditoriums
that may be used by the public, persons
assigned to the base, trainees, or others
outside the hospital community
^ dining room, if open to outpatients
or the public
 INTERNAL
THEFT
A PROBLEM?
The best way to reduce Internal theft is
to make sure high-risk job applicants
don't get hired.
How? With London House's Personnel
Selection Inventory, or Employee Atti-
tude Inventory.
.The PSI is the only validated paper-
and-pencil test that evaluates job
applicants in three critical areas:
? Dishonesty ? Violence ? Drug Abuse
As thousands of companies have
already discovered, the PSI not only
helps reduce internal theft, it also aids
in reducing absenteeism, tardiness, on-
the-job drug abuse, violence, and
employee turnover.
The EAI can help reduce internal theft
by pinpointing those who are-or are
likely to be-engaged in thefl. It can
also help reduce drug abuse, burn-
out, and job dissatisfaction.
Protect your company's
profits-use the PSI and EAI.
For complete details, without obligation.
Phone Toll-Free: 1-800-323-5923
In Illinois, call: 1-312-298-7311. Ext. 613
London House. Inc.
1550 N. Northwest Hwy.
Park Ridge. IL 60068
Controlled zones. While controlled
areas require a valid purpose for admis-
sion, they are basically open to staff,
inpatients. visitors to inpatients, and
vendors. Once admitted to a controlled
area, persons may travel from one de-
partment within the controlled area to
another without severe restriction. Con-
trolled areas should include the follow-
ing functional areas:
^ inpatient treatment areas, including
inpatient entrances to clinics shared with
outpatients
^ administrative offices
? patient care areas
? dining room, if limited to inpa-
tients, their visitors, and staff
^ security office
? emergency command post/com-
munications center
Restricted zones. Entrance to re-
stricted areas is essentially limited to staff
assigned to departments within that par-
ticular area. Departments within re-
stricted zones frequently require addi-
tional access control. Functions and
departments located in restricted zones
should include the following:
? pharmacy preparation, where dis-
tinct from dispensing
as sterile supply, central stores, and
bulk stores
^ receiving and loading docks
? laundry
^ food preparation, including receipt
and storage
? mechanical areas and telephone,
electrical, and other control rooms or
closets
Some functions located in unrestricted
or controlled areas may require a greater
level of protection than most other func-
tions in that area. For example, cashier's
offices, pharmacies serving outpatients
or emergency, radiology, silver recla-
mation rooms, and administrative offices
containing confidential information must
all have restricted access even though
operational requirements may necessi-
tate their placement in unrestricted or
controlled areas. Certain other depart-
ments, such as intensive care, surgery,
and laboratory, require a level of control
midway between controlled and re-
pharmacy
dispensary
alarmed doors cashier
from controlled area
all elevators
and stairs within
controlled or
restricted areas
windows protected (bullet-resistant
glasa, camera, emergency button)
and In plain view of public
OF COURSE. we to concerned about Internal then and other
types of cmimerproductivity. Pique send Inlormation on the:
0 Personnel Selection Inventory-for applicants
0 Employee Attitude Inventory-for employees
I Name
Title
Firm
Address
City State Zio -
Phone
Mall to: London House. Inc.
11550 N. Northwest Hwy. ? Park Ridge. IL 60068
L . . . . . . _ _ . .
Exhibit 1-Main Entrance and Lobby
clinic
reception
clinic
reception
Approved For Release 2005/07/12: CIA-RDP96B01172R000100040 NtfL TY MMANACE".1ENT
snack bar
post office
beauty salon
- auditorium, purchasing j men's room
t _
 pAproa or Release : CIA-RDP96B01172R000100040001-7
stricted. While the outpatient clinic lobby
is unrestricted, entry to individual clinics
would be controlled by the receptionist
of each clinic.
The number of entrances between zones
should be limited to the minimum con-
sistent with efficient operations, for pur-
poses of both visibility and access con-
trol. Fewer crossover points between
zones of differing access control levels
will require fewer control points. Keep-
ing these crossover points to a minimum
will reduce security operations, costly
personnel, and delays for staff, patients,
and visitors. Therefore, a facility should
be designed with the fewest possible dis-
tinct protection zones, and each zone
should contain the most possible de-
partments requiring that level of protec-
tion.
Fortunately, this basic zone concept
is being used in current efficiency de-
signs. Progressive architects and design-
ers have recognized the need to separate
hospital facility areas that handle inpa-
tients from outpatients and ER patients;
staff from inpatient and outpatient traffic;
and patients and visitors from support
staff.
The protection zone concept goes be-
yond basic zoning to require a designer
to consider security requirements when
designing service modules or zones, keep
the number of access points between zones
to a minimum, install access controls at
zone crossover points, and locate all pub-
lic or semipublic functions outside con-
trolled or restricted zones.
Once the zones have been identified,
the designer must develop or modify
parking, entrances, and personnel traffic
patterns to control access efficiently.
Doorways connecting less secure with
Eibit 2-Loading Dock and Inventory Department
F1_ M n fl
enclosed or
Interior dock
V
msnper'$
? Intercom
(glass
=1
walls)
proach it. Of course, such distancing will
also estrange the neighborhood residents
psychologically from the facility, which
may or may not be desirable.
Exhibit 1 depicts a potential layout
for the lobby of a hospital or other major
facility. Entrance to the lobby is unre-
stricted and permits efficient use of pub-
lic services. Prospective employees may
visit personnel, and public groups may
manager controls
dock doors
electronically and
sensor loops
close doews
as trucks depart
Carl Of
other
delivery system
use the auditorium without gaining ac-
cess to the rest of the facility. Of course,
the auditorium may be secured when not
in use, and the pharmacy and cashier's
windows feature additional security
measures, such as high visibility, phys-
ical reinforcement, and electronic se-
curity equipment, to discourage robbery
attempts.
Exhibit 2 depicts a loading dock and
more secure zones should be designed to
make the most efficient use of physical
design, electronic equipment, and staff.
Elevators and stairwells must not provide
unobserved access to controlled or re-
stricted areas. Therefore, elevators and
stairs must be located so they will service
areas of equal access priority or open
onto a control point. Stairs in unre-
stricted zones should be locked and el-
evator stops on restricted floors should
be controlled through the use of keys or
card readers.
Finally, exterior features, such as
landscaping and exterior design, can be
used to create a physical or psychological
barrier around the facility. The more a
facility is set apart from its neighborhood
in terms of distance d5s)jf~ltrReIe
such as hedges, walls, fences, or terrain,
the less likely people will casually ap-
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