DOWNGRADING OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93B01194R001000240122-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 122
• Publication Date: June 10, 1981
• Content Type: MF

11 -- RUMOVIUMITHIGEMM WE UNLY
Approved F elease 2005/08/16: CIA-RDP93B014 (R001000240122-0
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Management and Planning Group, IMS/DO
STAT FROM:
ict, C assi -i.cat_ion Review ])ivision, OIS/DA
SUBJECT: Downgrading of Classified Information
ItlFEMME: Memorandum from Chief, IMS/MPG,
dated 16 December 1980; same subject.
1. First of all, my apologies for not responding to your position paper.
(Reference) earlier.
2. After careful consideration of the position set forth in Reference,
we must advise that we find ourselves in some disagreement, to wit:
a. to say that all information concerning such a broad category of
:i.n.formation as encompasseeTy intelligence sources, methods, and activities must
be held at the SECRET level, as implied in Reference, is somewhat arbitrary and,
we believe, indefensible;
b. sonic of this information was (and is) originally classified CONFIDENTIAL,
or given only internal administrative protection; an
c. this approach tends to undercut the spirit of E0 12065 which states
that "the least restrictive (classification) designation shall be used" when
there is "reasonable doubt" as to which classification level should be assigned*
to a given item of information.
3. We are in agreement, of course, that classification and classification
level are based on the degree of damage that would result to our national secu-
rity from disclosure. We also agree that information concerning intelligence
activities, sources, and methods requires protection certainly for twenty to
thirty years and most likely for a much longer period. We also would be inclined
to agree with the statement that "the unauthorized disclosure of information
revealing intelligence sources and methods is generally expected to cause serious
damage to national security and therefore it is initially classified at least at
Orig - Addressee
1 CRD (MC) (;tai del ines) w/att.
/OPS w/at
Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194RO01000240122-0
Fff OULY
 a0MIN61WAPM-MrtRNAi. W ONLY
Approved Faelease 2005/08/16: CIA-RDP93B011R001000240122-0
the S.LiCI:ET level." This is a 'rather broad, basic position, however, which leaves
room for classification of some material at a lower level, if it is appropriate,
and it is on this point that our viewpoints essentially differ. The key word in
your statement is "generally," which is inoperative if we accept the conclusion
given in the final unqualified sentence of Reference that "intelligence sources
and methods information should remain classified indefinitely at least at the
SECRET level." To exclude absolutely the possibility of using a lower level of
classification for such material is, in our opinion, not justifiable.
4. Indeed a sizable quantity of the DO records that CRD receives for systematic
classification review contains documents classified CONFIDENTIAL on inallL. We
also find material bearing the obsolete RESTRICTED marking, and occaslonaily
documents which have no classification markings at all. Our systematic classifi-
cation review process is designed to correct the classification status of documents
where that is necessary and appropriate, but in these cases we would be hard
pressed to justify upgrading all such material to the SECRET level, which is
what we would be required to do, of course, were we to interpret and apply
position literally. It is of Yin-
particular interest to note that, even today, in-
formation is being originated in the DO, which in our minds would be considered
intelligence sources and methods information, which is being classified at the
CONFIDENTIAL level., Indeed, the biggest single complaint we had about the
DO Classification Guide put out under EO 12065 was that there was no allowance
made for information that did not warrant more than a CONFIDENTIAL, classification
level. It must be remembered as well that in systematic classification review
we consider each item or document on its own merits and judge the proper classi-
fication level accordingly. ktien classification is extended, we must mark on the
docuinent the date for declassification or the next review (Section 3-401, EO 12065).
S. It must be recognized, despite the entirely valid considerations set
forth in paragraphs 3 - 5 of Reference, that some "intelligence activities,
sources, or methods" information is in fact, less sensitive; e.g., certain oper-
ational support information. Other information becomes less sensitive with the
passage of time and/or intervening events. One has only to look at such instances
as the once highly clandestine Agency sponsorship of Radio Free Europe and
Radio Liberty, now acknowledged, or the Pentagon Papers, M[LCHAOS, and MKULTRA
information which is now in the public domain as a result of official disclosures
(not always endorsed by the Agency, to be sure, but revealed nevertheless).
Conversely, of course, some information may now be more sensitive than when
initially classified (or sometimes not classified, through inadvertence or
otlherw_ise). Our systematic review procedures take both of these factors into
account.
6. Section 1-101 of F10 12065 states that "the least restrictive (classifi-
cation) designation" shall be used. when, as is sometimes unavoidably the case
in an uncertain world, there "i.s reasonable doubt" as to the classification
level to be assigned to a given item of information. CRD must pay due regard
Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194RO01000240122-0
A~MI~I~TI~A-1
 19MINISTRAM-1WRNAL USE ONLY
Approved Fcelease 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B011W001000240122-0
to this admonition which we believe is applicable to systematic classification
review as well as to original classification actions. We are well aware of the
possible consequences of revelations concerning intelligence activities, sources,
and methods and every effort is made to ensure that all information reviewed.
retains an adequate level of classification. Downgrading (and,. for the matter,
upgrading) determinations are made only when the classification designation
found on a document is deemed inappropriate at the time of review in terms of
the extent to which Unauthorized disclosure of the information could adversely
affect the national security.
7. We would welcome further discussion of this issue to obtain a mutually
satisfactory position.
Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194RO01000240122-0
.! Fat A 1 I
 ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
Approved F elease 2005/08/16: CIA-RDP93B01 R001000240122-0
16 December 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Classification Review Division,
DDA/OIS
FROM:
iie , Management and Planning Group, DO/IMS
SUBJECT: Downgrading Classified Information
1. This will confirm the results of discussions between
the undersigned and Chief, Operations Branch,
Classification Review Division, 'namely that information concerning
intelligence sources and methods and activities should remain
classified at least at the SECRET level and should not be downgraded
in the course of systematic review for declassification. It is
recognized that such information would continue to be protected were
it downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL but the basis for classification is
not protection but the degree of damage to national security that
would be caused by the unauthorized disclosure of the information.
2. The unauthorized disclosure of information revealing
intelligence sources and methods is generally expected to cause
serious damage to national security and therefore it is initially
classified at least at the SECRET level. As we see it, there are
three bases for such classification:
a. The need to protect the operation.
b. The need to protect the source.
c. The possible repercussions to foreign affairs and
to intelligence operations in general which are caused by
such revelations.
3. The need to protect an operation lasts much longer than
the operation does. If war plans are stolen and it becomes known
the recourse is to change those plans. If public opinion is changed
or political action is undertaken-because of clandestine activities.
the revelation of such activities goes a long way toward undoing the
results of the activity. Similarly, the identification of a
clandestine intelligence source has p6g ible repercussions for the
source his family and close assoc.iatesr\extend far beyond the period
of clandestine activity. In both cases it is difficult to set time
limits on the degree to which unauthorized disclosure would affect
national security.
ADMINISTRATIVE -
Approved For Release 2005/08/16: CI
 ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USr' ONLY
Approved F ,Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01 WR001000240122-0
4. The third basis for classification, repercussions to
foreign affairs or intelligence activities in general, can be equally
serious and extend far beyond the life of an operation or agent.
For example, revelations of specific cases of espionage in a
country can seriously affect foreign relations with that country.
It can not only incense the government and public but call into
question whether or not the United States is continuing such
activities in that country. Even if one can anticipate no such
reaction from a current government, governments change and what might
be tolerated today may be viewed as intolerable by a succeeding
government. Iran is a good example.
5. Finally, repercussions to intelligence operations are also
far-reaching and long lasting. As the result of disclosure of
intelligence activities foreign governments may institute tighter
security controls, set up counterintelligence activities and make
operations much more difficult. An inability to protect agent
identities could have serious effect upon the willingness of agents
to work for an intelligence organization. For these reasons we
believe intelligence sources and methods information should remain
classified indefinitely at least at the SECRET level.
Approved For Kereaie ~~(~&68/16 I ~I~iAbA39191000240122-0
 Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001000240122-0
I1i?1 OFLR1D1J ~t 1OR; Chief, Classification Review Division
Chief, Operations Branch
SUBJ kaCT: Comments on I Memorandum Concerning
Downgrading Classified Information dated 16 Dec 80
1. Les makes a good poit that classification is based on the degree
of damage to national security that would be caused by unauthorized dis--
closure and not on how it is to be protected.
2. in paragraph 2 he talks of the unauthorized disclosure of classifa-
idd information which reveals intelligence sources and methods is cg Hera.. Jy
eMected to cause serious damage to the national security. That, I believe,
is a good point and a reasonably supportable one.
3. His argument that protection must last a long time is, I think,,
valid when it refers to the protection of intel ligence sources, methods,
and activities as well as to prsAnwA O.S. foreign relations. Thus I
believe that we can agree with his conclusion that such information should
remain classified for long periods even indefinitely.
1.~. Where he comes a cropper., in nr opinion, is that in his conclusion
Les implies that all information of this nature should remain classified at
the SECRET level when his argument, iiaich I believe is more accurate, is
that such information "is l enerall ex cats d to cause serious damage."
1 believe that his position would be acceptable if his conclusion agreed
with his argument, i.e. that information concerning intelligence activities,
,ourcesland methods and U.S. foreign relations ?,enerall r is to be retained
at the SECRET level but that there may be exceptions.
Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001000240122-0
 Approved Fo lease 2005/08/16: CIA-RDP93BO11SAR001000240122-0 DRAFT
r 7ORA.NDUM FOR : Chief, Management and Planning Group., DO/1MS
STAT FROM
Chief., Classification Review Division, OIS/DDA
SUBJECT : Downgrading of Classified Information
REFERENCE : C/ir15/MPG memorandum dated 16 December 1980, same subject
1. Reference takes the position that the unauthorized disclosure of information revealing
intelligence sources and methods is "generally expected" to cause serious damage to
national. security and therefore such information is initially classified at least at the
SECRET level; and further, that information concerning intelligence sources and methods
should not be downgraded below that level in the course of systematic review for declas-
sification. We do not entirely agree.
2. Aside from the clear difference in meaning between "revealing" anelconcerningt', it
should be noted that Executive Order 12065 provides a resum kn of national security
damage only in Section 1-303: "Unauthorized disclosure of foreign government information
or the identity of a confidential foreign source is presumed to cause at least identifi-
able damage to the national. security." This provision clearly dictates a minimum clas-
sification level of CONFIDENTIAL for such information (but form other); it cannot in
our view be stretched to imply a presumption of "serious" damage (warranting SECRET clas-
sification) for the above or any of the other categories of classifiable information
covered by the Order, including that which "concerns intelligence activities., sources
or methods" Per Section 1-301(c). Indeed, information in this category as well as the
others listed in Section 1-301 may clearly be classified at 1evel from RONFIDENTIA.L
to TOP SECRET.
3. It may be worth noting that a good deal of the information CRD receives for syystematie
review was initially classified, if at all.., no higher than CONFIDENTIAL. Unmarked infor-
ration. (as well as that bearing the obsolete RESTf?.ICTED classification) is sometimes
Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194RO01000240122-0
 Approved Fo lease 2OOva/(f8/16 : CIA-RDP93BO11 WO01000240122-0
urraded to CONFIDENTIAL or even higher upon review., if its content or other considera-
tions so warrant. It has long been apparent, also, that some of the material reviewed
was initially mieclassified (too high, too low, or not at all) even under the looser
standards prevailing in former times. The review prooome i a dokeigned, smon ` other things,
to correct such misclassifications in accordance with E0O0 12065as requirements. Even
aside from the implied violation of the letter and spirit of the present Order, moreover,
CRD cannot In good conscience retain higher levels of classification than those approp-
priate to the degree of national security damage "reasonably to be expected" from unauth-
orized disclosure at the time of review or subsequently (i.e., until the next scheduled
systematic review date), regardless of the c '.oumstances under which it was initially
classified -- 20 or more years ago, in most cases.
4. It must be recognized, despite the entirely valid considerations set forth in para-
graphs 3-5 of Reference, that some "intelligence activities, sources, or methods" infer-
oration does in fact become less sensitive and proteatable with the passage of time and/or
intervening events. One has only to look at such instances as the now long-acknowledged
but once highly clandestine former Agency sponsorship of Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty, or the Pentagon Papers, MHCHAOS and. MKULTRA information which is new in the
public domain as a result of official disclosures (net always endorsed by the Agency,
to be sure, but revealed nevertheless). Conversely, of course, some information may
now be more sensitive than when initially classified (or sometimes not classified,
through inadvertence or otherwise). Our systematic review procedures take both these
factors into account.
~ ~ t 3nfaermatiaen which reveals specif
to ~?`~ci:v~:tiss9 doti'u.?c'caa3 or ma~~ib s a
. the ,. rrgY?ees..__of, .tgs I;ii vnau sc ~o
Iva +
1 ~ evel ~s...?. ecpt UNC S lFIi Sag tic" i i yon an and r xo csott' -
Approved For Release 2005/08/16 CIA-RDP93BO1194RO01000240122-0
 Approved Fo elease 2005108/16: CIA-RDP93BO11 1001000240122-0
5d Paragraph I of Reference correctly notes that information must be classified at
a level corresponding to the degree of national security damage anticipated from its
unauthorized disclosure. At the same time, as also discussed in Reference (paragraphs
2 through 5), all classification levels ultimately depend upon an underlying "hood to
protect" the information.
6, Section 1-101 of 00d, 12065 states in no uncertain terms that "the least restrictive
(classification) designatiax'shall be used when, as is sometimes unavoidably the case
in an uncertain world, there "is reasonable doubt" as to which alassifieatlon level
should be assigned to a given item of information. CRD regards this provision as b,
with due regard for the factors pertinent to each case, not only on initial classifica-
tion determinations but also on those made upon systematic. review. We are well aware of
the possible consequences of revelations concerning intelligence activities, sources, and
methods. Every effort is made to unsure that all information reviewed retains an adequate
`Level of classification Downgrading (and, for that matter, upgrading) determinations are
made oniz when the classification designation initially assigned is deemed inappropriate
in terms of they extent to which unauthorized disclosure of the information under review
could adversely affect the national security -- defined as "the national, defense and
foreign relations of the United States" in Section 1-604 of the Order,
/a/
C/CRD
Approved For Release 2005/08/16: CIA-RDP93B01194RO01000240122-0
 Approved Forr{telease 2005/08/16: CIA-RDP93B011R001000240122-0
difficIIIt to vc'rit,lre six I::('rin;npfuIt or ;iolpfuI. conilient on Les' memo {nasruch as
W1. (. S 1 1t: e tiiLi t l a3 T, ` Lottelics on l'~._ _._._. __ in hi SI ,_ FL)cr that r'e have. net al ready encoelntored
n`' cc; s f onC 1 1v I:.e CF ; i n~ .-Filer': decisions on, in 1 % CrI nr T-itli so'i,,e of the s li f. estP.C.
? t, j ct,.l re s' no r , f,.vareci t per' too casil-` or1 ot. _en that not tor, lon` at;o most
r . !. cs Curi c;lsly ''-,.rj1` i.' diT1'..- EiSr r~iC1 FrE?ll (1eclassi fy'ing-Oi: Clocu",cnts,lint' 1 (iT';:
1 v,. ,c T ) . rson,.el t - n i V o l C ; : , l aIarrn and Loc. flow we n ha s the
ei pol.o.1t)::i CaII:L11-1:i-.iV(, (Ir.C1El.i:',E'}.
~.t: 1_' `F 1%oi.nf in tii'.ie,'lion the. i,encyls cl.r-ssificcti.on
C ;,-:0 . i C7. nl' ? ',t,re r,!L,1.=3tc fvsxx :'Ile -i-re rational rtnlrire on C e ri` r{- isSL 1#$:u+1;t+ti?r=?7.`iK"t4tifili_;.tid3?'s~:':~2:'.itA3`..il( %`; s creare"' in l0,(.1,1,!~S 1S flr'lil:inp hard to
I1 C'. t'i, t (70C!;-C .. ' to `.nr! CP.Etrl +t15 tti r, A 'o IT(?avs old arc held at the
1rgveI kmq~ Inilc'C. ini4o ooriod tc'nc'_ in perpetuity l1(Cool-eati it as been
('C_ l rt-.sc' 1L tin CC7 i}llC (,0 O 's IdliCll cite. CC ;plete i)'.O C' t3 on potential,
i1: Sy ir(ii['.v rC:rt lly 1ct' c; a,oat c scets,nre given a confidential.
0135 si.f1Cat10n.
11 !'s re'lucti(-,n in the classificcLi()n Si-;:ndi_ne, of such clear cut source and mokw6x
t'i?OC tcr'1:l i_,~ ??n l-;O" il,li` by t r r rvelr of r;odern computer Ris~ st'.orape and
ri'C:. rC C,'-i,loiv), t"t far cry h-ece. & r frC,ra i.1'-e ancient f_'nC.IE'.:11iC C1t.SSlficiat1on
ct 1 '_.., t)i' ?t) 11'.r? a' yc:.,s r;r,(, c;hen 0rr..ctic.;ll.y e. er.ythint'',even the 'nst innocuous
l r i-: Li c,- 1_ ''rocs ,r:;-s rn,,, nc i v t.'.xa secret ,ramnt ore out of habit rather than
r1C'r 'T'Cr re r',Sented l~ot.entia' ,~rave Clr^'.cape to t112
t t, 11 C; ' V(, F P Cif i!F1.17 7 'i t'1 th 1-ere if Les had provided a hc',E~ Ithy list of momnaikum
ii:i) C S r F V i (:'t ()t: 1'i.' L(?r.L, 7 S 1 ^,! be dee-s Co C(1 titute serious or f',rtl'(%e damage to
-n, -.j ;;C (L1T1' e C,TI_ r l'Ietiy. firm rrosp Of what constitutes daTrage to tl e national
-'a in .r-in, c,ases c'P here ''c'Y ier s l een overly stringent in our !1Sr'f-'rS
io- Re
,,o tnt1,.l. Cia 1 -o n i n,-.t,-Pecs i:lv,)lv1n'',sour. cs end m*Am
otli(>d and possible e!i1 nt
s ?1nd loo. ble problems
con;ect:'on ''itt` c+ 4-T, affairs.LV to'--( t1 I:oo=evC'.r,ove'1 in the most scnsit.i\;c of
strlirive.,fin, ncP,lo istics)
? `1 ri'y
l
'
; 1'
a 1i i 1 t 1ld
).n r'-.c. C ,t.,i1:';CTtIS(VC`.S cou not possibly be construed as 1,{Y$3'I3 ?
r l (' iriris' mot: i bl i, 1
to t`t
: ' secar' ty of
I-l'e rJSCx (r:; p~clc;t~e Of
1 s fc,r r,t rffrriI; out ,'t't`i r'iisC[ 11an~'Ci:1S ex; eni:,eS devoid of
co,1't' nett coricoival ly be re!- rdi.ng as dar;laE_?it-:g 11`11esr: the reader
m-mmomm c, c : r Tx,
. Lln(c rst r c,int of L lie o,:eratinn:?l context e.l . tl.ir. entire: backdrop).
i r unricrt-U l r . ,ie t t ' - , t " T L e t nri"a rc;plt of his mai'lo,the writer of Cit'7r
got in Sor et}..irtg
.,
C ,.. il
C __.r,'.-.etr; 1,"cii viti.C.LC'-S or w ....kens -f h's later cosiients.iie states t't't the
n i ; not 1i
rocectfc-n but rather thee degree of damage,, ,s if protection
l " e l,,ut ;r,lly o'-c'tusive.Front this l i e leaps t :ti-c conclusion that all
enrc yc)' Yc,!s = r; t':' ds fi InC.teria' s :' ust be classified secret to assure r:=rotrction,
that c14?ir:cz,tinn in any de,-rce is desilned. to ?-ssure a form
rot, i`)I1.11'rr i,osiLion 'i,ot.!.ld ti:, t lLj-j
? ?it?h -e l encrally agree. that all sources and
I rric r iril Warr; nts protect or,.!-li(.re arc shades a,nd (1eFrea.s of damage that recuireip
`r?r ^;: c t' ens -f otr-ct;on.: c: 'c clci::cnts of security domaAe are sore grievous than
e ';no-' ,'n;1,-in s!och inst%'nces (atokiic related data is an example) special
'lci?.E 'e(=_r1 cre>ea ed to a 1
ssur_. e tint such data is protected 1?"ithdiut any time 1iits.
- u,
I r t:o a r'i` tFo r.e. is zacxro 1 cr,iirse no comparison that con be drawn between the dam 1.{ e
inherent "n tic rc.ve1at on of atocric reItted data ,n(i that connected with sources and
b'uds ; , i , ter c i s , " L -e .s -t-t)r',:Jr from : tudying the memo in c uestion that an effort is being
n ,i11. (,u;`'rf,TSecret cl.ssafic_~ton :rmhrella over mater
.:ic':e Lo "_ct.r nci ials that do often
i1t1ini sl. -in c~ipmIfi c;ered them clearly l fr rind it is c e. es."c c:a _maG,ing ; nr..; ~rl.,.en i. ~ STAT
PLh'ent that we is a rot oven tLi'~en L'ie trouble to recognize this diminution in damage
STAB
otenl:i i . 1 LV C ) \ : a f' ;per e le ssifi caation peirn'i tted i nd recom-ended by law (will the 'udge
(I-rst,'n-1.1-1 _er` li;;.1se n CPP_ .-C'.11 .:i!'. that :i
:r.:i;:t stiII rin L.!: the `.Beret level becauee it> revel(r{- ion would
i,;r' ? T
tr i n,. I ..'1 ( 1: c .^-.1C C?:1"t1l venom f L - g.rav 1a 1L? -"g +TAT
P. C
~".' l' rC`'1. Y+'due f1 ill si7? ina)tlrtaUCC. 'rte. In(ln rote realistic bvk
STAT
Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194RO01000240122-0
 }, RAJ}t 11]~U i FOR: Chief., Classification Review Div lion
STAT M(11:
Chief, Operations Branch
OOA61`1~- ".
7
STAT SUBJECT: Comments on Flemorandum Concerning
Downgrading Classified Information. dated 16 Dec 80
1. Ices rrukes a good pokt that classification is based on the degree
o damage to national security that would be caused by unauthorized dis-
closure and not on how it is to be protected.
2. In paragraph 2 he talus of the unauthorized disclosure of classif-
idd information urhich reveals intelligence sources and methods is Lcanera
ex acted to cause serious damage to the national security. That, I believe,
is a good point and a reasonably supportable one.
-. His argument that protection must last a long tine is, I third-,,
valid when it refers to the protection of intelligence sources, method
and activities as well as to U.S. foreign relations. Thus 1".
believe that we can agree with his conclusion that such information 51iould
remain classified for long periods even indefinitely.
~.r where he comes a cropper, in my opinion, is that in his conclusion
Les implies that all information of phis nature should remain classified at
the SECRET level when his argument, thiich I believe is more accurate,
that such information is generally ex acted to cause. serious dsamage.tt
D. believe that his position would be acceptable if his conclusion agreed
with his argument, i.e. that information concerning intelligence activities,,
sources)and methods and U.S. foreign relations generally is to be retained
at the SECI0,T level but that there may be exceptions.
Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194RO01000240122-0
 Apr O #&MLge / 19~'tlA-RDP936 4 00 00240122-0
TO: (Name, office symbol, room number,
~.. _IJ?r Aw~w/?V ~Qhlt k.
DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals,
clearances, and similar actions
FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)
5041-102
S, C. S. (it,(, 97tt-0_261-647 3354
OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
Prescribed byy GSA
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206
Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194RO01000240122-0